

MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Edited by
ITAMAR RABINOVICH
HAIM SHAKED

Westview Press

MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Volume XI: 1987

MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY
Published for
The Moshe Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies
The Shiloah Institute
Tel Aviv University

Other volumes in this series:

Volume I, 1976-77
Volume II, 1977-78
Volume III, 1978-79
Volume IV, 1979-80
Volume V, 1980-81
Volume VI, 1981-82
Volume VII, 1982-83
Volume VIII, 1983-84
Volume IX, 1984-85
Volume X, 1986

MIDDLE EAST CONTEMPORARY SURVEY

Volume XI
1987

ITAMAR RABINOVICH, HAIM SHAKED
Editors

AMI AYALON
Associate Editor

Barbara Newson, Executive Editor

**The Moshe Dayan Center
for Middle Eastern and African Studies
The Shiloah Institute
Tel Aviv University**

Westview Press
BOULDER, SAN FRANCISCO, & LONDON

Middle East Contemporary Survey

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

Copyright © 1989 by Tel Aviv University

Published in 1989 in the United States of America by Westview Press, Inc., 5500 Central Avenue, Boulder, Colorado 80301, and in the United Kingdom by Westview Press, Inc., 13 Brunswick Centre, London WC1N 1AF, England

Typeset in Israel, Graph-Chen Ltd., Jerusalem

Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 78-648245

ISBN: 0-8133-0925-5

ISSN: 0163-5476

Printed and bound in the United States of America



The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

About the Book and Editors

Established in 1977, the *Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS)*, a unique annual record of political developments in the Middle East, is acknowledged as the standard reference work on events and trends in the region. Designed to be a continuing, up-to-date reference for scholars, researchers and analysts, policymakers, students and journalists, it examines in considerable detail the rapidly changing Middle Eastern scene in all its complexity.

In each volume, the material is arranged in two parts. The first contains a series of essays on broad regional issues and on the overall relations of the region with other parts of the world. The second consists of country-by-country surveys of all the Arab states, as well as Turkey, Israel, and Iran. The accent in the second part is on elucidating the inner dynamics of each country's polity and society.

In a work of this kind, the events of the past year inevitably dictate the major themes of each volume. The topics discussed in Volume XI, which covers the year 1987, include:

- The collapse of the Israeli-Jordanian "London agreement";
- The outbreak of the Palestinian uprising;
- The complications of *glasnost* for the Middle East;
- The continuation of the Gulf War;
- The lingering stalemate in Lebanon.

While surveying and analyzing these and other developments, this volume also explains why they did not amount and lead to substantive change in the patterns of Middle Eastern politics.

Maps, tables and a detailed index accompany the text.

Itamar Rabinovich is Professor of Middle Eastern and African History and Head of the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University. **Haim Shaked** is Professor of Middle Eastern and African History and Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. They are coeditors of *The Middle East and the United States: Perceptions and Policies*. **Ami Ayalon** is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History and Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center at Tel Aviv University.

This One



3136-PZK-TZB4

Uncopyrighted material

Preface

The Middle East Contemporary Survey (MECS) is an annual record and analysis of political, economic, military, and international developments in the Middle East. The present volume is the eleventh in a series which provides scholars, diplomats, students, and informed laymen with a continuing, up-to-date reference work recording the rapidly changing events in an exceptionally complex part of the world. Every attempt has again been made to use the widest range of source material and maintain the highest possible academic standards.

Most of the essays in this volume have been researched and written by the members of the Shiloah Institute of the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University. Other contributions have been made by academics and experts from abroad.

The material in this volume is arranged in two parts. The first comprises a series of essays which study developments relating to internal and external issues, both regionally and internationally. Subjects explored in detail include Arab-Israeli and inter-Arab relations, as well as the international dimensions of the contending forces in the region. The second part comprises a country-by-country survey of each of the Middle Eastern entities, excluding the three North African states of Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco.

The period surveyed in this volume, unless otherwise indicated, is from January to December 1987. In order to avoid excessive repetition while at the same time achieving a comprehensive survey of the affairs of each country individually, extensive cross-references have been used.

In this volume, as in the previous one, the sections on economic affairs and the armed forces which, in previous volumes, were appended to each country survey, have been discontinued. This is due to the appearance, in recent years, of other surveys which are fully devoted to these two themes, and therefore provide much more data on them.

I.R. & H.S.

Acknowledgments

As editors we are grateful to a large number of contributors who have made this volume possible. First and foremost we recognize the work of the staff of the Moshe Dayan Center and its Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies at Tel Aviv University, whose individual contributions are acknowledged separately.

In the process of preparing this volume we were given much help by Alec Israel. Barbara Newson's role as executive editor has been indispensable. The exacting work of indexing has been carried out by Ronald Watson. A novel aspect of the editorial work on this volume was Ami Ayalon's important contribution made in his capacity as Associate Editor, and the fruits of his work are readily discernible in the following pages.

At the Dayan Center, Edna Liftman and Amira Margalith, assistants to the Head of the Center, were responsible for the complicated coordination of the production of the volume, and fulfilled a variety of other executive tasks with accuracy, skill, and unflagging care. Others at the Center who must be singled out for special thanks are Lydia Gareh, Margaret Mahlab and Ilana Grinberg, and the Moshe Dayan Documentation System team. Ruth Beit-Or prepared the maps for publication, and David Levinson proofread large parts of the volume.

Finally, we would like to express our sincere thanks to Frederick A. Praeger, Barbara Ellington, and the staff of Westview Press for their help in the production and distribution of this volume of *MECS*. The first seven volumes of *MECS* were published by Holmes & Meier. The contribution made by Max Holmes and by Colin Legum to the launching of this project and to setting its standards remains invaluable and much appreciated.

I.R. & H.S.

Table of Contents

About the Book and Editors	v
Preface	vii
Acknowledgments	viii
List of Maps	xiv
Transliteration	xv
List of Initials and Acronyms	xvi
List of Sources	xx
Notes on Contributors	xxxv

PART ONE: CURRENT ISSUES

THE MIDDLE EAST IN PERSPECTIVE

The Middle East in 1987: A Year of Kaleidoscopic Change, <i>Haim Shaked</i>	5
Note	21

THE MIDDLE EAST AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The United States' Middle East Policy in 1987, <i>Barry Rubin</i>	25
The Iran Arms Deal and its Aftermath	25
Deepening Engagement in the Persian Gulf: Reflagging	29
Arab-Israeli Peace Process	35
Conclusion	41
Notes	42
The Soviet Union and the Middle East in 1987, <i>Robert O. Freedman</i>	44
Notes	66

ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

The Middle East Peace Process, <i>Mordechai Gazit</i>	75
Jordan	75
The Palestinians and the PLO	79
Egypt	82
Syria	84
Israel	85
The United States	92
The Soviet Union	95
Appendix I: The Ten Principles Agreed between Israel and the United States, January 1987	97
Appendix II: The London Document of Understanding between Jordan and Israel, April 1987	97
Notes	98
Armed Operations, <i>Uzi Rabi and Joshua Teitelbaum</i>	103
Israel and the West Bank and Gaza	103
Lebanon	106
The International Arena	108
Chronology of Events	109
Notes	114

INTRAREGIONAL AND MUSLIM AFFAIRS

Inter-Arab Relations, <i>Bruce Maddy-Weitzman</i>	117
The Islamic Conference Organization's Summit in Kuwait	118
The Road to Amman	121
The Amman Summit	128
Egypt and the Arab World	134
Maghrib Affairs	139
Conclusion	142

Appendix: Final Statement and Resolutions of the Extraordinary Arab Summit Conference held in Amman, 8-11 November 1987	143
Notes.....	147
Islam's Enduring Feud, Martin Kramer.....	153
Islamic Summit Conference in Kuwait.....	153
The March of Sunni Islam.....	158
Libya's Islamic Call.....	161
Iran's Muslim Message.....	162
The Pilgrimage of 1987: Death in Mecca.....	172
Dueling Conferences after Mecca.....	174
Notes.....	176
The Iraqi-Iranian War, Gideon Gera.....	180
Military Developments.....	180
The Tanker War.....	184
Security Council Resolution 598.....	190
The Superpowers and the Conflict.....	191
Balance and Outlook.....	192
Appendix I: The Cease-fire Resolution.....	193
Appendix II: Security Council Resolution 598 — Comparison of Iraqi and Iranian Positions on Main Paragraphs.....	194
Notes.....	195
PALESTINIAN ISSUES	
The Palestine Liberation Organization, Joshua Teitelbaum.....	201
The Eighteenth Session of the Palestine National Council.....	201
Developments in the Aftermath of the Palestine National Council.....	213
The Peace Process, Meetings with Israelis, and the Armed Struggle.....	217
The PLO and the Arab World.....	223
The PLO and the Superpowers.....	229
The Palestinian Presence in Lebanon.....	230
The PLO and the Uprising in the Territories.....	231
Appendix I: Resolutions of the Political Committee of the Eighteenth Palestine National Council.....	233
Appendix II: Organizational Structure of the PLO.....	237
Notes.....	238
The West Bank and the Gaza Strip, Elie Rekhess.....	244
The Israeli Government and the Local Population.....	244
Jordan's Involvement in West Bank-Gaza Affairs.....	253
Views and Attitudes.....	257
The December 1987 Uprising.....	263
Notes.....	269
MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC ISSUES	
Middle East Oil Developments, Benjamin Shwadran.....	275
Introduction.....	275
Price and Production.....	276
Non-Opec Producers.....	277
25-27 June 1987 Vienna Conference.....	279
From Conference to Conference.....	280
9-14 December 1987 Vienna Conference.....	283
Opec Price Impact on the United States.....	285
Assessment.....	286
Saudi Arabia.....	287
Hasty Panic Predictions.....	288
Miscellany.....	290
Table 1: Opec Production as Reported by Member Countries.....	292
Table 2: Opec Production as Reported by Some Secondary Sources.....	292
Table 3: Netback Values for Selected Crudes, January 1987.....	293
Table 4: Netback Values for Selected Crudes, December 1987.....	294
Notes.....	294

Arab Labor Mobility in the Middle East in a Period of Economic Recession	
1982-87, <i>Gil Feiler</i>	298
Introduction.....	298
Impact of the Recession on Migration: General View	301
Impact of the Recession on Migration: Specific View	304
The Reasons for the Gradual Remigration.....	310
Conclusions and Prospective Development	310
Table 1: Total Economically Active Population.....	312
Table 2: Remittances.....	312
Table 3: Government Oil Revenues of Opec Member Countries	312
Table 4: GCC: Current Account Estimates, 1986-87.....	313
Notes.....	313

PART TWO: COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY SURVEY

Middle East Countries: Basic Data; Currencies	321
The Arab Republic of Egypt, <i>Ami Ayalon</i>.....	323
Domestic Affairs.....	323
More "Dosages" of Democracy: Parliamentary Elections and Presidential Reelection.....	323
Economic Pressures and Sociopolitical Tensions.....	332
Foreign Affairs.....	337
Egypt and the Superpowers.....	337
Egypt and the Arab World	340
Egypt and Israel	347
Table 1: 'Atif Sidqi's Cabinet, 13 October 1987	352
Notes.....	353
The Gulf States, <i>Dore Gold</i>.....	358
Regional Developments	358
The Gulf Cooperation Council Institutions	359
Appendix I: Final Statement of the Eighth Gulf Cooperation Council Summit Held in Riyadh	361
Notes.....	363
Bahrain, <i>Uzi Rabi</i>.....	364
Domestic Affairs.....	364
Subversive Activities.....	364
The Armed Forces.....	365
Economic Development.....	365
Foreign Affairs.....	366
Regional Politics	366
International Politics	367
Notes.....	367
Kuwait, <i>Dore Gold</i>.....	369
Domestic Affairs.....	369
Subversive Activities.....	369
Foreign Affairs.....	372
Toward Increasing Confrontation with Iran: The Reflagging of Kuwaiti Tankers by the United States	372
Regional Politics	374
Global Politics.....	375
Notes.....	376
Oman, <i>Uzi Rabi</i>.....	378
Domestic Affairs.....	378
Subversive Activities.....	378
Cabinet Changes.....	378
The Armed Forces.....	378
Economic Development.....	378
Foreign Affairs.....	379
Regional Politics	379

Oman and Inter-Arab Relations.....	380
International Politics.....	381
Notes.....	382
Qatar, Uzi Rabi.....	383
Domestic Affairs.....	383
Economic Development.....	383
Foreign Affairs.....	383
Regional Politics.....	383
Inter-Arab Relations.....	384
International Politics.....	385
Notes.....	385
The United Arab Emirates, Uzi Rabi.....	386
Domestic Affairs.....	386
The Attempted Coup in Sharja.....	386
Economic Development.....	387
Foreign Affairs.....	387
Regional Politics.....	387
Inter-Arab Relations.....	388
International Politics.....	389
Notes.....	390
Iran, David Menashri.....	391
The Struggle for Power.....	392
Khomeyni's Succession.....	393
The Authority of the Leadership.....	395
Rafsanjani's Power Further Strengthened.....	398
The Impact of the War and Revolution: Economy and Opposition.....	401
Economic Difficulties.....	401
The Iraqi-Iranian War.....	404
The Opposition.....	406
Foreign Relations.....	409
Relations with the West and the East.....	410
The Muslim World.....	415
Notes.....	419
Iraq, Ofra Bengio.....	423
The "Modernization of the State".....	425
The War Effort.....	434
The Opposition.....	437
The Foreign Arena.....	444
Table 1: Ministerial and Other Changes.....	454
Table 2: The Military High Command.....	455
Notes.....	456
Israel, Yael Yishai.....	460
Political Affairs.....	460
Foreign Affairs: Doublespeak.....	476
Social Affairs: An Accumulation of Tensions.....	477
The Economy: Growth and Prosperity.....	481
Conclusion.....	484
Table 1: Economic Indicators 1986-87.....	485
Notes.....	485
Jordan, Asher Susser.....	489
Domestic Political Affairs.....	489
Jordan, the Palestinians, and the Middle East Peace Process.....	496
Jordan and the Arab World.....	506
Jordan and the Great Powers.....	507
Notes.....	510
Lebanon, Yosef Olmert.....	514
Functioning of the State Institutions.....	515

Chaos, Terrorism, and Violence in Lebanon	518
Large-scale Military Confrontations in Lebanon.....	521
The Economic Disaster and its Ramifications.....	525
The Situation within the Political Coalitions and the Main Communities.....	527
The Death of Camille Chamoun	536
Notes.....	536
Libya, Yehudit Ronen	543
Internal Affairs.....	546
Cancellation of Tripoli's Status as Capital; the Transfer of Central Institutions from the City	546
The Annual Conference of the General People's Congress; the Reshuffle of the General People's Committee	547
Reported Unrest.....	549
The Resumption of Liquidation Campaigns against the Expatriate Opposition.....	552
Foreign Affairs.....	552
Dramatic Debacle in Chad.....	552
North Africa (Maghrib).....	557
Changing Attitude toward the Conflicting Sides in the Gulf War.....	559
The Superpowers.....	563
Table 1: Composition of the General People's Committee.....	565
Notes.....	565
The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, Joseph Kostiner	570
Internal Affairs.....	571
Consolidation of the New Regime	571
Attempting Economic Development.....	573
Foreign Affairs.....	574
Regional Relations	574
Relations with the Soviet Union.....	577
Notes.....	577
The Saudi Arabian Kingdom, Jacob Goldberg	579
Domestic Affairs.....	580
Ambiguities of Saudi Oil Policy	580
Economic Challenges.....	583
Defense and Military Priorities.....	587
The Mecca Riots — The Saudi Assessment.....	589
Royal Family Politics	591
A Growing Drug Problem	594
Foreign Affairs.....	595
Saudi Position in the Arab Arena.....	595
Saudi Arabia and Iran.....	601
The Global Arena.....	605
Notes.....	611
The Republic of Sudan, Haim Shaked and Yehudit Ronen	615
Internal Affairs.....	616
The Coalition Government — Successive Crises and Continued Failure to Cope with the Country's Key Problems	616
Table 1: The Cabinet	619
Mounting Economic and Political Turmoil; "State of Emergency" Declared.....	620
Aggravation of the Armed Conflict in the South	622
Foreign Affairs.....	625
Notes.....	631
The Arab Republic of Syria, Yosef Olmert	635
Domestic Affairs.....	636
Challenges to Internal Stability	636
Formation of a New Government.....	638
The Economic Crisis — the Regime's Response	638
Regional Affairs.....	641
The Conflict with Israel.....	641

Syrian Policy in Lebanon	643
Syria and Inter-Arab Affairs	645
Syria and Jordan	647
Syria and the PLO	648
Syria-Libya-Algeria	649
Syria and Egypt	649
Syria and Turkey	650
International Affairs	650
The Drive for a Better Image	650
Syria and Western Europe	651
Relations with the United States	652
Syria and the Soviet Union	653
Notes	654
Turkey, William Hale	659
Domestic Politics	659
Parliament and the Parties	659
Islam and Politics	660
The Kurdish Problem and Civil-Military Relations	662
Constitutional Changes	663
Constitutional Upsets, and the Election Campaign	665
Election Results and Analysis	667
Economic Trends	669
Foreign Relations	671
Table 1: Results of the 1987 General Elections	675
Notes	676
The Yemeni Arab Republic, Joseph Kostiner	678
Internal Affairs	679
Sociopolitical Calm	679
Economic Development	680
Foreign Affairs	681
Seeking Regional Stability	681
Notes	685
Index	687

List of Maps

Location of Major <i>Fida'i</i> Operations and Other Incidents in South Lebanon, 1987...	104
Battle Lines in the Gulf	182
Area of the Iranian Offensive in Basra, January-March 1987	424
Libya-Chad	544

Transliteration

The Arabic language has been transliterated as follows:

b	for	ب	q	for	ق
d	for	ض ، د	r	for	ر
dh	for	ذ	s	for	ص ، س
f	for	ف	sh	for	ش
gh	for	غ	t	for	ط ، ت
h	for	ه ، ح	th	for	ث
j	for	ج	w (or u)	for	و
k	for	ك	y (or i)	for	ي
kh	for	خ	z	for	ظ ، ز
l	for	ل	'	for	ا ، ء
m	for	م	'	for	ع
n	for	ن			

In addition, the following should be noted:

Long vowels are not marked for distinction from short ones. Thus ناظر = *nazir*, but also نظير = *nazir*.

The *hamza* is used only in the middle of a word.

The *shadda* is rendered by doubling the consonant containing it.

The *ta marbuta* is not shown, except in construct phrases. Thus *madina*, *madinat Nasr*.

The definite article is always shown as "al-", regardless of the kind of letter following it.

Exceptions to the above are names of Lebanese and North African personalities who have adopted a French spelling for their names.

In transcribing Persian, frequent allowance is made for pronunciation; thus Khomeyni (not Khumayni). Names appearing in both Arabic and Persian texts are transcribed according to the language of the relevant text, thus *Hizballah* (Arabic) or *Hizbollah* (Persian).

List of Initials and Acronyms

Adm.	Admiral
Aipac	America-Israel Public Affairs Committee
ALF	Arab Liberation Front
Aramco	Arabian-American Oil Company
AWACS	airborne warning and control system (radar)
b.	born
BBC	British Broadcasting Corporation
BD	Bahraini dinar(s)
b/d	barrels per day
BMW	<i>Bayerische Motoren Werke</i> (Bavarian Motor Works)
bn.	billion
BP	British Petroleum
Brig. Gen.	Brigadier General
CAPMS	Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics
CC	Central Council
CD	Chamber of Deputies (Lebanon)
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency (US)
Col.	Colonel
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CRM	Citizens' Rights Movement (Israel)
cu.	cubic
DECA	Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (Turkey and US)
DFLP	Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine
DLP	Democratic Left Party (Turkey)
DUP	Democratic Unionist Party (Sudan)
EC	Executive Committee
ed.	edition
EEC	European Economic Community
EIU	<i>The Economist</i> Intelligence Unit
ETA	<i>Euzkadi ta Azka Asuna</i> (Basque Separatist Organization)
Exxon	Standard Oil (formerly ESSO)
f.o.b.	free on board
Fr.	Father
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GCC	Gulf Cooperation Council
GDP	gross domestic product
Gen.	General
GNP	gross national product
GPC	General People's Congress (Libya, YAR)
GPCom	General People's Committee (Libya)
GPO	Government Press Office (Israel)
GSS	General Secret Services (Israel)
GUNT	<i>Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition</i> (Chad)
hy.	heavy
IAF	Israeli Air Force
IAI	Israel Aircraft Industries
IBA	Israeli Broadcasting Authority

ICO	Islamic Conference Organization
ICP	Iraqi Communist Party
ID	identity
IDF	Israel Defense Forces
IFLB	Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies (London)
ILO	International Labor Office (UN)
ILP	Islamic Liberation Party (Jordan)
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INLA	Iranian National Liberation Army
IR	Iranian rial(s)
IRA	Irish Republican Army
IRGC	Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (Iran)
IRP	Islamic Republican Party (Iran)
ISF	Islamic Solidarity Fund
JD	Jordanian dinar(s)
KD	Kuwaiti dinar(s)
KDP	Kurdish Democratic Party
km.	kilometer
KPC	Kuwait Petroleum Company
LCP	Lebanese Communist Party
LD	Libyan dinar(s)
LDC	least developed country
LF	Lebanese Forces
LNM	Lebanese National Movement
LNRF	Lebanese National Resistance Front
lt.	light
Lt. Gen.	Lieutenant General
m.	million(s), meter(s)
Maj. Gen.	Major General
ME	Middle East(ern)
MIDEAST-	
FOR	US Middle East Force
MK	Member of Knesset (Israel)
MP	Motherland Party (Turkey)
MTI	French acronym for the Islamic Tendency Movement
MWL	Muslim World League
NAPC	North Aegean Petroleum Company
Nato	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDF	National Democratic Front (YAR)
NDP	National Democratic Party (Egypt)
NEP	Nationalist Endeavor Party (Turkey)
NIF	National Islamic Front (Sudan)
NIS	new Israeli shekel(s)
NLP	National Liberal Party (Lebanon)
NPUG	National Progressive Unionist Grouping (Egypt)
NRP	National Religious Party (Israel)
NSC	National Security Council (US)
NSP	National Salvation Party (Turkey)
OAU	Organization of African Unity
OC	Officer Commanding

OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
Opec	Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OR	Omani riyal(s)
OTA	Office of Technology Assessment (US)
p.a.	per annum
PCP	Palestine Communist Party
PDRY	People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen)
PFLP	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PFLP-GC	Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine — General Command
PKK	<i>Parti-ye Karkaran-i Kurdistan</i> (Kurdish Workers' Party)
PLF	Palestine Liberation Front
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
PNC	Palestine National Council
PNSF	Palestinian National Salvation Front
Polisario	Front for the Liberation of Al-Saqiyya al-Hamra and Rio de Oro
£L	Lebanese pound(s)
£S	Syrian pound(s)
£Sd	Sudanese pound(s)
PoW	prisoner of war
PPP	People's Progressive Party (Sudan)
PPSF	Palestine Popular Struggle Front
PSP	Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon)
PUK	Patriotic Union of Kurdistan
QR	Qatari riyal(s)
RC	Regional Command (Iraq)
RCC	Revolutionary Command Council (Iraq)
res.	reserve
ret'd.	retired
Revd.	Reverend
RG	Revolutionary Guards (Iran)
SADR	Saharan Arab Democratic Republic
SAIRI	Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
SAMA	Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency
SAVAK	State Intelligence and Security Organization (Iran)
SDPP	Social Democratic Populist Party (Turkey)
SFP	Sudan Federal Party
SISC	Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council
SLA	South Lebanese Army
SLP	Socialist Labor Party (Egypt)
SPLA	Sudanese People's Liberation Army
SR	Saudi riyal(s)
SSNP	Syrian Social Nationalist Party
SSPA	Southern Sudanese Political Association
SYD	South Yemeni dinar(s)
Texaco	The Texas Company
TL	Turkish lira(s)
TNT	trinitrotoluene
TPP	True Path Party (Turkey)
TWA	Trans-World Airlines
UAE	United Arab Emirates
UAEDh	UAE dirham(s)

UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
Unicef	United Nations (International) Children's (Emergency) Fund
Unifil	United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
Unita	<i>União nacional para a independência total de Angola</i>
UP	<i>Umma</i> Party (Sudan)
US	United States
USS	United States' ship
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VAT	value added tax
VEVAK	<i>Veزارate Ettela'at va Amniate Kishvar</i> (Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security)
vs.	versus
WICS	World Islamic Call Society
WP	Welfare Party (Turkey)
WTI	West Texas Intermediate
YAR	Yemeni Arab Republic (North Yemen)
YSP	Yemeni Socialist Party (South Yemen)

List of Sources

Newspapers, Periodicals, Irregular and Single Publications

<i>Name</i> (Place, Frequency of Publication)	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Notes</i>
<i>Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica</i> (Copenhagen, 12 per year)		In English
<i>Adelphi Papers</i> (London, 10 per year)		Published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies
<i>Afaq 'Alamiyya</i> (Amman, twice per month)		
<i>Al-Afkar</i> (Beirut, weekly)		
<i>Africa Confidential</i> (London, fortnightly)	AC	
<i>African Business</i> (London, monthly)		
<i>Africa Report</i> (New York, monthly)		
<i>Africa Research Bulletin</i> (Exeter, England, monthly)	ARB	
<i>Africasia</i> (Paris, fortnightly)		English-language edition of <i>Afrique-Asie</i>
<i>Al-Ahali</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Organ of the National Progressive Unionist Grouping
<i>Al-'Ahd</i> (Doha, weekly)		
<i>Al-'Ahd</i> (Beirut, weekly)		Organ of the Lebanese Shi'i Hizballah
<i>Al-Ahram</i> (Cairo, daily)		
<i>Al-Ahram International</i> (London, daily)		
<i>Al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Published by <i>al-Ahram</i> ; deals mainly with economic issues
<i>Al-Ahrar</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Organ of the Liberal Socialist Party
<i>Al-Akhbar</i> (Cairo, daily)		
<i>Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami</i> (Mecca, weekly)		Published by the Muslim World League
<i>Akhbar al-Khalij</i> (Manama, daily)		
<i>Akhbar al-Ussu'</i> (Amman, weekly)		
<i>Akhbar al-Yawm</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Weekly edition of <i>al-Akhbar</i>
<i>Akhir Sa'a</i> (Cairo, weekly)		
<i>Al-'Alam</i> (London, weekly)		

<i>Al-'Alam</i> (Rabat, daily)		Organ of the <i>Istiqlal</i> Party
<i>'Al-Hamishmar</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)		Organ of the United Workers' Party (Mapam)
<i>Alif Ba</i> (Baghdad, weekly)		
<i>Al-Alim</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>Alwan</i> (Khartoum, daily)		
<i>Al-'Amal</i> (Beirut, daily)		Organ of the Lebanese Phalanges
<i>American-Arab Affairs</i> (Washington, quarterly)		Pro-establishment but critical of specific government policies and of US attitudes toward the Middle East Rightist
<i>Al-Anba</i> (Kuwait, daily)		
<i>Al-Anwar</i> (Beirut, daily)		
<i>Arab-Asian Affairs</i> (New York, monthly)		
<i>Arab Gulf Journal</i> (London, twice annually)		
<i>Arab News</i> (London, daily)		Published by Saudi Research and Marketing Company
<i>Arab Oil and Gas</i> (Paris and Beirut, fortnightly)	AOG	Published by the Arab Petroleum Research Center
<i>Arab Press Service</i> (Nicosia, weekly)	APS	
<i>Arab Times</i> (Kuwait, daily)		
<i>Arabia, The Islamic World Review</i> (London, weekly)		Published by the Islamic Press Agency
<i>Asian and African Studies</i> (Haifa, Israel, three times a year)	AAS	
<i>Al-Ayyam</i> (Khartoum, daily)		
<i>Al-Badil al-Islami</i> (Beirut, fortnightly)		Iraqi Shi'i <i>al-Da'wa</i> newspaper; began publication in 1987
<i>Baltimore Sun</i> (Baltimore, daily)		
<i>Barron's</i> (Ann Arbor, Mich. weekly)		
<i>Al-Ba'th</i> (Damascus, daily)		Organ of the Syrian Ba'th Party
<i>Al-Bayadir al-Siyasi</i> (East Jerusalem, fortnightly)		Sympathetic to al-Fath
<i>Al-Bayan</i> (Casablanca, daily)		
<i>Al-Bayan</i> (Dubai, daily)		
<i>Al-Bilad</i> (Jidda, daily)		
<i>Boston Globe</i> (Boston, daily)		
<i>Briefing</i> (Ankara, weekly)		

<i>British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin</i> (St. Anthony's College, Oxford, two per year)		
<i>Bulletin of Atomic Scientists</i> (Chicago, monthly)		
<i>Christian Science Monitor</i> (Boston, daily)	CSM	
<i>Conflict</i> (New York, quarterly)		Reports on "all warfare short of war"
<i>Country Profile</i> (London, annually)		Published by Economist Publications Ltd.
<i>Country Reports</i> (London, quarterly)	CR	Published by Economist Publications Ltd. Formerly <i>Quarterly Economic Review</i> (until No. 2, 1986)
<i>Cumhuriyet</i> (Istanbul, daily)		
<i>Current Digest of the Soviet Press</i> (Chicago, weekly)	CDSP	Translation from the Soviet Press. Published by the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, University of Illinois at Chicago Circle, Chicago
<i>Current History</i> (Philadelphia, monthly)		
<i>Daily Telegraph</i> (London, daily)	DT	
<i>Danas</i> (Zagreb, weekly)		News magazine
<i>Davar</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)		Organ of the Israeli Trade Union Federation (Histadrut)
<i>Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya</i> (Tripoli, Libya, bi-monthly)		
<i>Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly</i> (Washington, D.C., weekly)		
<i>Democratic Palestine</i> (Cyprus, monthly)		English-language organ of the PFLP
<i>Department of State Bulletin</i> (Washington, D.C., weekly)	DSB	
<i>Al-Difa' al-'Arabi</i> (Beirut, monthly)		Deals mainly with military affairs
<i>Al-Dustur</i> (Amman, daily)		
<i>Al-Dustur</i> (London, weekly)		Pro-Iraqi. Originally a Beirut weekly reflecting the Iraqi Ba'th views. Closed down by the Syrians (December 1976). Published in Paris until July 1977 and then in London
<i>The Economist</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>Egyptian Gazette</i> (Cairo, daily)		
<i>L'Espresso</i> (Rome, weekly)		
<i>Ettela'at</i> (Tehran, daily)		
<i>Euromoney</i> (London, annually)		

<i>Al-Fajr</i> (East Jerusalem, daily)		Sympathetic to the PLO
<i>Al-Fajr</i> (East Jerusalem, weekly)		English- and Hebrew-language weekly editions of <i>al-Fajr</i>
<i>Al-Fajr al-Jadid</i> (Tripoli, daily)		
<i>Filastin al-Thawra</i> (Nicosia, weekly)		Organ of the PLO. Ceased publication during the war in Lebanon. Resumed publication in Nicosia in October 1982
<i>The Financial Times</i> (London, daily)	FT	
<i>Foreign Economic Trends and Their Implications for the United States</i> (Springfield, V.A., irregular)	FET	Published by the US Technical Information Service
<i>Flight International</i> (Sutton, Surrey, weekly)		Published by Business Press International Ltd.
<i>Foreign Affairs</i> (New York, quarterly)		
<i>Foreign Policy</i> (Washington, quarterly)		
<i>Foreign Report</i> (London, weekly)	FR	Published by Economist Publications Ltd.
<i>The Forward</i> (New York, weekly)		
<i>Fourteenth October</i> (Aden, daily)		Organ of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP)
<i>Al-Fursan</i> (Paris, weekly)		
<i>The Guardian</i> (London, daily)		
<i>Guardian Weekly</i> (Manchester, weekly)		
<i>The Guiding Star</i> (Khartoum, monthly)		
<i>Al-Guraba</i> (London, monthly)		
<i>The Gulf States</i> (West Sussex, bi-weekly)		
<i>Ha'aretz</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)		
<i>Al-Hadaf</i> (Cairo, weekly)		
<i>Al-Hadaf</i> (Damascus, weekly)		Organ of the PFLP. Transferred from Beirut after the war in Lebanon. Began publication in March 1984
<i>Hadashot</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)		
<i>Al-Haqiqa</i> (Beirut, daily)		
<i>Hatzofeh</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)		Organ of the National Religious Party (Mafdal)
<i>Al-Hawadith</i> (London, weekly)		A Beirut weekly, reflecting pro-Phalangist tendencies. Published in London since November 1978

<i>Hürriyet</i> (Istanbul, daily)		
<i>Al-Hurriyya</i> (Nicosia, weekly)		Organ of the DFLP. Ceased publication during the war in Lebanon. Resumed publication in Nicosia in February 1983
<i>Al-Idha'a wa'l-Tilifizyun</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Radio, television, and cultural weekly
<i>IEA Oil Market Report</i> (Paris, monthly)	IEA	
<i>IFS Yearbook</i> (Washington, annually)		Published by the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
<i>IJA Research Reports</i> (London, 20 per year)		Published by the Institute of Jewish Affairs
<i>Ila al-Amam</i> (Damascus, weekly)		
<i>The Independent</i> (London, daily)		
<i>Insight</i> (Washington, bi-monthly)		
<i>International Crude Oil and Product Prices</i> (Nicosia, Cyprus, twice annually)		Published by Middle East Petroleum and Economic Publications
<i>Internationales Asienforum</i> (Cologne, West Germany, quarterly)		Published by the Europäisches Institut für Politische, Wirtschaftliche und Sociale Fragen
<i>International Financial Statistics</i> (Washington, monthly)	IFS	Published by IMF
<i>International Herald Tribune</i> (Paris and Zurich, daily)	IHT	
<i>International Journal of Middle East Studies</i> (Cambridge, quarterly)	IJMES	Published by Cambridge University Press
<i>International Migration</i> (Geneva, Switzerland, quarterly)		Published by the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration
<i>International Migration Review</i> (New York, quarterly)		Published by the Center for Migration Studies, Staten Island
<i>Al-Inqadh</i> (bi-monthly)		Organ of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, opposing the regime. Started publication in early 1983. Place of publication not indicated
<i>Al-Iqtisad</i> (Damascus, monthly)		
<i>Iran Press Digest</i> (Tehran, weekly)	IPD	English-language summary of Iranian Press
<i>Al-'Iraq</i> (Baghdad, daily)		
<i>Iraq al-Ghad</i> (London, bi-weekly)		
<i>Israel and Palestine</i> (Paris, monthly)	I&P	
<i>Israel Statistical Abstract</i> (Jerusalem, annually)		Published by the Central Bureau of Statistics
<i>Al-Frisam</i> (Cairo, monthly)		

<i>Al-Ittihad</i> (Abu Dhabi, daily)		
<i>Al-Ittihad al-Ushu'i</i> (Abu Dhabi, weekly)		
<i>Izvestiia</i> (Moscow, daily)		Organ of the Government of the USSR
<i>Al-Jamahiriyya</i> (Valletta, daily)		Pro-Libyan
<i>Jane's Defence Weekly</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>Al-Jazira</i> (Riyadh, daily)		
<i>The Jerusalem Post</i> (Jerusalem, daily)	JP	
<i>The Jerusalem Star</i> (Amman, daily)		
<i>Jeune Afrique</i> (Paris, weekly)	JA	Reflects views of Tunisian expatriates
<i>Jordan Times</i> (Amman, daily)	JT	
<i>Journal of Palestine Studies</i> (Washington, quarterly)		Published by the Institute of Palestine Studies and Kuwait University
<i>Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies</i> (Villanova, Pa., quarterly)		
<i>Al-Jumhuriyya</i> (Baghdad, daily)		
<i>Al-Jumhuriyya</i> (Cairo, daily)		
<i>Al-Jumhuriyya</i> (Tripoli, weekly)		
<i>Jumhuriyye Islami</i> (Tehran, daily)	JJ	Organ of the Islamic Republican Party
<i>Kayhan</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>Kayhan</i> (Tehran, daily)		
<i>Kayhan al-'Arabi</i> (Tehran, daily)		
<i>Kayhan Hava'i</i> (Tehran, weekly)	KH	
<i>Keesing's Contemporary Archives</i> (Harlow, Essex, monthly)		
<i>Khaleej Times</i> (Dubai, daily)		
<i>Al-Khalij</i> (Abu Dhabi, daily)		
<i>Al-Kifah al-'Arabi</i> (Beirut, weekly)		
<i>Koteret Rashit</i> (Jerusalem, weekly)		
<i>Kull al-'Arab</i> (Paris, weekly)		
<i>Libération</i> (Paris, daily)		
<i>Literaturnaya Gazeta</i> (Moscow, weekly)		Organ of the Union of Writers of the USSR

<i>Al-Liwa'</i> (Beirut, daily)		
<i>Al-Liwa al-Islami</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Islamic publication of the ruling National Democratic Party
<i>Los Angeles Times</i> (Los Angeles, daily)	<i>LAT</i>	
<i>Ma'ariv</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)		
<i>Al-Madina</i> (Jidda, daily)		
<i>Maghreb-Machrek, Monde Arabe</i> (Paris, quarterly)		
<i>Al-Majalis</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>Al-Majalla</i> (London, weekly)		Published by Saudi Research and Marketing (UK) Ltd.
<i>Majallat al-Azhar</i> (Cairo, monthly)		
<i>Al-Masa</i> (Cairo, weekly)		
<i>Al-Masar</i> (London, weekly)		Opposing the Iraqi regime
<i>Al-Masira</i> (Beirut, weekly)		
<i>Le Matin</i> (Paris, daily)		
<i>Al-Mawqif al-'Arabi</i> (Nicosia, weekly)		
<i>Al-Mawqif al-'Arabi</i> (Cairo, monthly)		
<i>May</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Organ of the National Democratic Party
<i>Maydan</i> (Khartoum, daily)		
<i>Memo</i> (Cyprus, bi-weekly)		
<i>MEN Economic Weekly</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Published by the Middle East News Agency
<i>The Middle East</i> (London, monthly)	<i>ME</i>	
<i>Middle East Economic Digest</i> (London, weekly)	<i>MEED</i>	
<i>Middle East Economic Survey</i> (Nicosia, weekly)	<i>MEES</i>	Published by the Middle East Research and Publishing Center, Beirut
<i>Middle Eastern Studies</i> (London, quarterly)	<i>MES</i>	
<i>Middle East Insight</i> (Washington, bi-monthly)		
<i>Middle East International</i> (London, monthly)	<i>MEI</i>	
<i>Middle East Journal</i> (Washington, quarterly)	<i>MEJ</i>	Published by the Middle East Institute
<i>Middle East Newsletter</i> (London, fortnightly)		
<i>Middle East Review</i> (New Brunswick, N.J., quarterly)		

<i>Middle East Times</i> (Nicosia, weekly)		
<i>Mideast Markets</i> (London, fortnightly)	<i>MM</i>	Published by <i>FT Business Information Ltd.</i>
<i>Milliyet</i> (Istanbul, daily)		
<i>Monday Morning</i> (Beirut, weekly)		Right of center
<i>Le Monde</i> (Paris, daily)		
<i>Al-Musawwar</i> (Cairo, weekly)		
<i>Al-Mustaqbal</i> (Paris, weekly)		Pro-Saudi
<i>Al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi</i> (Beirut, quarterly)		
<i>Al-Nadwa</i> (Jidda, daily)		
<i>Al-Nahar</i> (Beirut, daily)		Rightist
<i>Al-Nahar al-'Arabi wal-Duwali</i> (Paris and Zurich, weekly)	<i>NAD</i>	Weekly international edition of <i>al-Nahar</i>
<i>Al-Nahar Arab Report and Memo</i> (Beirut and Zurich, weekly)		English-language political and economic report of <i>al-Nahar</i>
<i>Namehe Mardom</i> (Stockholm, weekly)		Organ of the Tudeh Party
<i>Al-Nashra</i> (Athens, bi-weekly)		
<i>Al-Nashra</i> (Nicosia, weekly)		Deals with opposition movements in various Arab countries
<i>Al-Nashra al-Istratijiyya</i> (London, fortnightly)		
<i>National Journal</i> (Washington, D. C., weekly)		
<i>Near East Report</i> (Washington, weekly)		
<i>Neue Kronen-Zeitung</i> (Vienna, daily)		
<i>Neuer Zürcher Zeitung</i> (Zurich, daily)		
<i>New Outlook</i> (Tel Aviv, monthly)		Published in English by the Jewish-Arab Institute
<i>Newsday</i> (New York, daily)		
<i>Newspot</i> (Ankara, weekly)		Turkish digest, published by Directorate-General of Press and Information
<i>New Statesman</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>Newsweek</i> (New York, weekly)		
<i>New Times</i> (Moscow, weekly)		English-language edition of <i>Novoe Vremia</i>
<i>New Yorker</i> (New York, weekly)		
<i>The New York Review of Books</i> (New York, fortnightly)		

<i>The New York Times</i> (New York, daily)	NYT	
<i>Al-Nidaa'</i> (Beirut, daily)		
<i>Nidal al-Sha'b</i> (Beirut, weekly)		
<i>Nouveau Magazine</i> (Beirut, weekly)		
<i>Al-Nur</i> (Cairo, weekly)		
<i>The Observer</i> (London, weekly)		
<i>October</i> (Cairo, weekly)		
<i>L'Opinion</i> (Rabat, daily)		
<i>Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs</i> (Philadelphia, quarterly)		Published by Foreign Policy Research Institute
<i>Orient</i> (Hamburg, quarterly)		
<i>L'Orient le Jour</i> (Beirut, daily)		
<i>El Pais</i> (Madrid, daily)		
<i>Petroleum Economist</i> (London, monthly)	PE	
<i>Petroleum Intelligence Weekly</i> (New York, weekly)	PIW	
<i>Le Point</i> (Paris, weekly)		
<i>Policy Papers</i> (Washington, irregular)		Occasional papers published by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy
<i>Politique Internationale</i> (Paris, quarterly)		
<i>Population and Development Review</i> (New York, quarterly)		Published by the Population Council, Center for Policy Studies
<i>Pravda</i> (Moscow, daily)		Organ of the Central Committee of the CPSU
<i>Profil</i> (Vienna, weekly)		
<i>Al-Qabas</i> (Kuwait, daily)		Kuwaiti nationalist; sympathetic to the Palestinian cause
<i>Al-Qabas International</i> (London, daily)		
<i>Al-Qadisiyya</i> (Baghdad, daily)		
<i>Al-Quds</i> (East Jerusalem, daily)		Known for favorable views toward Jordan
<i>Le Quotidien de Paris</i> (Paris, daily)		
<i>Al-Quwait al-Musallaha</i> (Khartoum, weekly)		
<i>Al-Ra'id al-'Arabi</i> (Amman, twice per week)		

<i>Al-Ra'y</i> (Amman, daily)	
<i>Al-Raya</i> (Doha, daily)	Organ of the National Islamic Front
<i>Al-Raya</i> (Khartoum, daily)	Kuwaiti nationalist; conservative
<i>Al-Ra'y al-'Amm</i> (Kuwait, daily)	
<i>La Repubblica</i> (Rome, daily)	
<i>Resmi Gazete</i> (Ankara, irregular)	Official gazette
<i>Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales</i> (Villanova, Pa., quarterly)	
<i>La Revue du Liban et de l'Orient Arabe</i> (Beirut, weekly)	
<i>Al-Riyad</i> (Riyadh, daily)	
<i>Ruz al-Yusuf</i> (Cairo, weekly)	
<i>Al-Sabah</i> (Tunis, daily)	
<i>Sabah al-Khayr</i> (Beirut, weekly)	
<i>Al-Safir</i> (Beirut, daily)	Reflects Libyan views
<i>Al-Sahafa</i> (Khartoum, daily)	
<i>Al-Sakhra</i> (Kuwait, weekly)	Organ of al-Fath
<i>Saudi Economic Survey</i> (Jidda, weekly)	
<i>Saudi Gazette</i> (Jidda, daily)	
<i>Sawt al-'Arab</i> (Cairo, daily)	
<i>Sawt al-Bilad</i> (Cyprus, weekly)	
<i>Sawt al-Sha'b</i> (Amman, daily)	Started publication in early 1983
<i>Sawt al-Umma</i> (Tehran, fortnightly)	The Arabic publication of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance
<i>Al-Sayyad</i> (Beirut, weekly)	
<i>Al-Sha'b</i> (Algiers, daily)	
<i>Al-Sha'b</i> (Cairo, weekly)	Organ of the Socialist Labor Party
<i>Al-Sha'b</i> (East Jerusalem, daily)	Sympathetic to the PLO
<i>Al-Sharq</i> (Beirut, daily)	Pro-Syrian
<i>Al-Sharq al-Awsat</i> (London, Jidda, and Riyadh, daily)	

Al-Sharq al-Jadid
 (London, monthly)
Al-Shira'
 (Beirut, weekly)
Shu'un Filastiniyya
 (Nicosia, monthly)
Sid Svenska Dagbladet
 (Stockholm, daily)
Al-Siyasa
 (Khartoum, daily)
Al-Siyasa
 (Kuwait, daily)
Le Soir
 (Brussels, daily)
South: the Third World Magazine
 (London, monthly)
Der Spiegel
 (Hamburg, weekly)
Al-Sudani
 (Khartoum, daily)
Sudan Times
 (Khartoum, daily)
Sunday Telegraph
 (London, weekly)
Sunday Times
 (London, weekly)
Al-Surush li'l-'Alam al-'Arabi
 (Tehran)

Survival
 (London, bi-monthly)
Al-Tadamun
 (London, monthly)
Al-Tadamun al-Islami
 (Mecca, monthly)
Al-Tali'a
 (East Jerusalem, weekly)
Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya
 (Paris, weekly)
Al-Tali'a al-Islamiyya
 (Paris, monthly)
Al-Tayyar al-Jadid
 (London, weekly)
Al-Tawhid
 (Tehran, bi-monthly)
Tercüman
 (Istanbul, daily)
Tehran Times
 (Tehran, weekly)
Al-Thaqafa al-Jadida
 (Iraq, monthly)
Al-Thawra
 (Baghdad, daily)
Al-Thawra
 (Damascus, daily)

Published by the PLO
Research Center

Reflects the views of the *Umma* Party

Moderate; pro-Government

ST

Arabic-language version of the
Surush magazine; frequency
 of publication unknown
 Published by the International
 Institute for Strategic Studies

Pro-Iraqi

Radical Islamic

Conservative

TT

Clandestine magazine published by the
 Iraqi Communist Party
 Organ of the Iraqi Ba'th Party

<i>Al-Thawra</i> (San'a, daily)		Semi-official
<i>Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya</i> (London and Washington, monthly)		Organ of the Islamic Revolutionary Movement in the Arabian Peninsula
<i>Al-Thawri</i> (Aden, weekly)		Organ of the central committee of the YSP
<i>Time</i> (New York, weekly)		
<i>The Times</i> (London, daily)		
<i>The Times of Oman</i> (Muscat, daily)		
<i>Tishrin</i> (Damascus, daily)		
<i>'Ukaz</i> (Jidda, daily)		
<i>'Uman</i> (Muscat, twice a week)		Published by the Ministry of Information
<i>Al-Usbu'</i> (Khartoum, daily)		
<i>Al-Urdun al-Jadid</i> (Nicosia, quarterly)		
<i>Al-Usbu' al-'Arabi</i> (Beirut, weekly)		
<i>USIS News Report</i> (Tel Aviv, irregular)		Published by USIS, US Embassy, Tel Aviv
<i>USIS Report</i> (Tel Aviv, irregular)		Published by USIS, US Embassy, Tel Aviv
<i>US News and World Report</i> (Washington, D.C., weekly)		
<i>De Volkskrant</i> (Amsterdam, daily)		
<i>Al-Wafd</i> (Cairo, weekly)		Organ of the New Wafd Party
<i>Al-Wahda al-Islamiyya</i> (Beirut, monthly)		Islamic, pro-Iranian
<i>The Wall Street Journal</i> (New York, daily)	WSJ	
<i>Al-Waqi'at al-'Iraqiyya</i> (Baghdad, weekly)		Official gazette of the Republic of Iraq
<i>The Washington Post</i> (Washington, daily)	WP	
<i>The Washington Quarterly</i> (Washington, quarterly)		
<i>The Washington Times</i> (Washington, daily)		
<i>Al-Watan</i> (Kuwait, daily)		Critical of Kuwait's Government; pro-Syrian
<i>Al-Watan al-'Arabi</i> (Paris, weekly)		Pro-Iraqi
<i>Weekly Petroleum Argus</i> (London, weekly)	WPA	
<i>World Marxist Review</i> (London, monthly)		
<i>Al-Yamama</i> (Riyadh, weekly)		

<i>Al-Yaqza</i> (Kuwait, weekly)	Reflects pan-Arab tendencies
<i>Al-Yawm</i> (Amman, daily)	
<i>Al-Yawm al-Sabi'</i> (Paris, weekly)	Affiliated to the PLO; started publication in 1984
<i>Yedi'ot Aharonot</i> (Tel Aviv, daily)	
<i>Al-Zahf al-Akhdar</i> (Tripoli, weekly)	Ideological weekly of the Revolutionary Committees; appears in both Arabic and English editions
<i>Zo Haderech</i> (Tel Aviv, weekly)	

News Agencies

<i>Full Name</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>
Aden News Agency (Aden)	ANA
Agence France Presse (Paris)	AFP
Algérie Presse Service (Algiers)	APS
Anatolia (Ankara)	
Associated Press (New York)	AP
Deutsche Presse Agentur (Bonn)	DPA
Emirates News Agency (Abu Dhabi)	ENA
Gulf News Agency (Manama)	GNA
Iraqi News Agency (Baghdad)	INA
Islamic Revolution News Agency (Tehran)	IRNA
Jamahiriyya Arab News Agency (Tripoli)	JANA
Jordanian News Agency (PETRA; Amman)	JNA
Kuwaiti News Agency (Kuwait)	KUNA
Maghreb Arabe Presse (Rabat)	MAP
Middle East News Agency (Cairo)	MENA
Novinska Agencija Tanjug (Belgrade)	Tanjug
Pan-African News Agency (Dakar)	PANA
Qatari News Agency (Doha)	QNA
Reuters (London)	
Saudi Press Agency (Riyadh)	SPA
Sudanese News Agency (Khartoum)	SUNA
Syrian Arab News Agency (Damascus)	SANA
Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskovo Soiuz (Moscow)	Tass
Wikalat al-Anba al-Filastiniyya (Palestinian News Agency; Damascus)	WAFA

Radio and Television Stations, and Monitoring Services

(Radio stations known by the location of their principal transmitter are not listed — their names being self-explanatory)

<i>Name</i>	<i>Abbreviation</i>	<i>Notes</i>
American Broadcasting Company	ABC	Headquarters in New York City
British Broadcasting Corporation	BBC	
British Broadcasting Corporation, Summary of World Broadcasting: The ME and Africa	SWB	Monitoring reports published in English translation

Daily Report: Middle East and Africa DR

Daily Report: Soviet Union DR:SU
Europe One Radio

Israel Defense Forces Radio R.IDF
Joint Publication Research Services: JPRS

Near East and North Africa
Soviet Union
Sub-Saharan Africa
West Europe

Middle East Television METV
National Broadcasting Company NBC TV
Television

R. Bardai, Voice of the
Chadian GUNT

R. Ihdin of Free and Unified
Lebanon

R. L'Orient

R. of the Toilers of Iran

R. Peace and Progress

R. SPLA

Second Channel

United States Information Agency USIA
United States Information Service USIS
Voice of the Arabs VoA
Voice of Free Lebanon

Voice of the Homeland
Voice of Hope VoH

Voice of Islam
Voice of Israel Vol
Voice of Lebanon VoL

Voice of the Masses R. Baghdad,
VoM

Voice of the Mountain

Voice of National Resistance
Voice of Palestine (Algiers) VoP
(Algiers)

Monitoring reports published in
English translation by the US Foreign
Broadcasting Information Service

France

English-language translation from
foreign press. Occasionally includes
monitoring reports as well

Cyprus
New York

A clandestine radio station
apparently based in northern
Chad and operated by the Libyans
Operated by Faranjiyya's faction

Based near Paris
Radio station of the Komaleh Kurdish
movement, broadcasting from
Kurdistan or from Iraq near the
Iranian border

Official USSR station transmitting
from Moscow to the ME

Voice of the Sudanese Revolutionary
Armed Struggle

Semi-public TV station operating on a
temporary, experimental basis in the
Tel Aviv area. Intended to provide an
alternative to the nationalized
TV system
Washington

Military station of the Lebanese
Phalanges

Muslim leftist radio in West Beirut
Maj. Sa'd Haddad's militia station
broadcasting from Marj 'Ayyun in
South Lebanon

The *Hizballah* radio station
Israeli national radio
Radio station operated by the
Lebanese Phalanges

A series of special programs in
Arabic, Kurdish, and Farsi, broadcast
over R. Baghdad for a few hours each
day

Radio station of the Progressive
Socialist Party, operating from the
Shuf mountains

Radio station connected with *al-Amal*
PLO daily program over R. Algiers

Voice of Palestine (Baghdad)	VoP (Baghdad)	PLO main radio station, transferred from Beirut after the war in Lebanon. Began transmitting in November 1982
Voice of Palestine (San'a)	VoP (San'a)	PLO daily program over R. San'a
Voice of Peace		Operated by Abie Nathan outside Israel's territorial waters. Carrying a clear pacifist message
Voice of the People		Communist Party radio station
Wireless File	WF	Published by the USIA Library, Washington
Worldnet		USIS global television satellite network

Note: Radio and news agency material not otherwise attributed is available in Hebrew translation at the Moshe Dayan Center archives.

Notes on Contributors

AMI AYALON, PhD (Princeton University, 1980). Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Senior Lecturer, Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University. Author of *Language and Change in the Arab Middle East* (1987) and numerous articles on modern Middle Eastern political and cultural history. Editor of *Regime and Opposition in Egypt under Sadat* (1983, in Hebrew).

OFRA BENGIO, MA (Tel Aviv University, 1986). Junior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: history and politics of Iraq. Contributed chapters to the *Middle East Record*, and articles. Author of *The Kurdish Revolt in Iraq* (1989 in Hebrew).

GIL FEILER, MA (Haifa University, 1986). Instructor in the Department of Middle Eastern History in Haifa and Tel Aviv Universities. Completing PhD thesis on "The Economic Relations between Egypt and the Arab Oil States, 1967–83" at Tel Aviv University. Has published articles on labor mobilization in the Middle East.

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN, PhD (Columbia University), is the Dean of the Peggy Meyerhoff Pearlstone School of Graduate Studies and Professor of Political Science at the Baltimore Hebrew College. Author of *Economic Warfare in the Communist Bloc: A Study of Soviet Economic Pressure against Yugoslavia, Albania and Communist China* (1970) and *Soviet Policy toward the Middle East since 1970* (1975, 1978, 1982). Editor of *World Politics and the Arab-Israeli Conflict* (1979), *Israel in the Begin Era* (1982), *The Middle East since Camp David* (1984), and *Soviet Jewry in the Decisive Decade 1971–80* (1984).

MORDECHAI GAZIT, MA (Hebrew University). Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center and the Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, Hebrew University. Formerly Director-General, Office of the Prime Minister of Israel (1973–75); Director-General, Israel Ministry for Foreign Affairs (1972–73); Ambassador to France (1975–79); Minister, Embassy of Israel, Washington, D.C. (1960–65); Fellow, Center for International Affairs, Harvard University (1980–81).

GIDEON GERA, PhD (Tel Aviv University, 1978). Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: current politics of the Arab world; the Iraqi-Iranian War. Author of *Libya under Qadhafi* (1983, in Hebrew).

DORE GOLD, PhD (Columbia University, 1984). Senior Research Associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University. Fields of specialization: Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states, US strategic interests in the Gulf region and the Middle East.

JACOB GOLDBERG, PhD (Harvard University, 1978). Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Chairman of the Editorial Board of the Moshe Dayan

Center Occasional Papers Series. Fields of specialization: the modern and contemporary history of the Arab world with particular reference to Saudi Arabia. Publications: *The Foreign Policy of Saudi Arabia: The Formative Years, 1902-1918*; coeditor of *The Soviet-American Competition in the Middle East*.

WILLIAM HALE, MA (Oxon.), PhD (Australian National University). Senior Lecturer in Politics, University of Durham, England. Author of *The Economic and Political Development of Modern Turkey* (1981, 1983). Coauthor of *Aspects of Modern Turkey* (1976) and *Four Centuries of Turco-British Relations* (1984). Published numerous articles on Turkish politics and economic development.

JOSEPH KOSTINER, PhD (London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 1982). Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center; Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Fields of specialization: history and current affairs of the Arabian Peninsula states. Published several papers on this subject. Author of *The Struggle for South Yemen* (1984).

MARTIN KRAMER, PhD (Princeton University, 1982). Associate Director and Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: Islamic and pan-Islamic activism. Author of *Islam Assembled: The Advent of the Muslim Congresses* (1986), and published articles on the modern history of the Middle East; editor of: *Protest and Revolution in Shi'i Islam* (1985, in Hebrew); *Shi'ism, Resistance and Revolution* (1987).

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN, PhD (Tel Aviv University, 1988). Junior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: contemporary Middle East history, inter-Arab relations, and the Arab-Israeli conflict. Published papers on Arab politics, and the Iraqi-Iranian conflict. Title of thesis: "The Crystallization of an Arab State System: Inter-Arab Politics, 1945-1954."

DAVID MENASHRI, PhD (Tel Aviv University, 1982). Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center and Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University. Field of specialization: the history and politics of Iran. Author of: *Iran: The Islamic Revolution and Beyond* (1989), and *Iran in Revolution* (1988, in Hebrew). Published papers on Iranian politics and contributed chapters to *Middle East Record*.

YOSEF OLMERT, PhD (London School of Economics and Political Science, University of London, 1984). Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Lecturer in the Department of Middle Eastern and African History at Tel Aviv University. Fields of specialization: political and ideological history of Syria and Lebanon. Published papers on various aspects of political development in Syria and Lebanon.

UZI RABI, BA (Tel Aviv University, 1986). Researcher at the Moshe Dayan Center and Instructor in the Department for Middle Eastern and African History and in the

Preparatory Program, Tel Aviv University. Fields of specialization: Persian Gulf states and Palestinian armed operations.

ELIE REKHESS, PhD (Tel Aviv University, 1987). Senior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: the Israeli Arabs and the Arabs on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Published papers and studies on the Arab intelligentsia in Israel and on the West Bank; political trends and socioeconomic changes within the Arab population in Israel, the West Bank and Gaza, and on the Communist movement in Israel and the Arab world.

YEHUDIT RONEN, BA (Tel Aviv University, 1977). Junior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: Sudan and Libya. She has contributed to previous volumes of *MECS* as well as to a number of edited volumes on the Middle East.

BARRY RUBIN, PhD (Georgetown University, 1978). A Fellow at the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies. Fields of specialization: modern Middle East politics, US foreign policy. His latest books include *Secrets of State: The State Department in US Foreign Policy* and (as coeditor) *The Israel-Arab Reader*. His other works include *Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran* and *The Arab States and the Palestine Conflict*.

HAIM SHAKED, PhD (School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1969). Professor, Department of Middle Eastern and African History, Tel Aviv University. Head of the Shiloah (now Moshe Dayan) Center (1973–80); Dean of the Faculty of Humanities, Tel Aviv University (1975–80). Fields of specialization: modern and contemporary history of the Middle East. Author of *The Life of the Sudanese Mahdi*, and coeditor of *From June to October: The Middle East between 1967–73* and *The Middle East and the United States: Perceptions and Policies*. Editor in Chief of *Mideast File*. Chairman, Editorial Board of the Moshe Dayan Center Monograph Series.

BENJAMIN SHWADRAN, MA, PhD (Clark University, 1945). Taught Middle Eastern Studies in the New York School for Social Research; Professor of Middle Eastern Studies and Director of the Middle East Institute, Dropsie University, Philadelphia; taught in Hofstra University, New York. Professor of Modern Middle East History at Tel Aviv University since 1973. Formerly editor of *Middle Eastern Affairs* and of the Council for Middle Eastern Affairs Press. Among his publications are *Middle East Oil and the Great Powers* (three editions); *Jordan, a State of Tension*; *The Power Struggle in Iraq*; *General Index Middle Eastern Affairs*; *Nefi Hamizrah Hatikhon: Berakha Veiyum*; *Middle East Oil: Issues and Problems*.

ASHER SUSSER, PhD (Tel Aviv University, 1986). Senior Research Associate at the Moshe Dayan Center. Fields of specialization: history and politics of Jordan and the Palestinians. Author of *Between Jordan and Palestine: A Political Biography of Wasfi al-Tall* (in Hebrew), papers on Jordanian history and politics, and contributed chapters to the *Middle East Record*.

JOSHUA TEITELBAUM, MA (Tel Aviv University, 1988). Junior Research Fellow at the Moshe Dayan Center and Instructor in the Overseas Students Program, Tel Aviv University. Fields of specialization: Palestinian history and politics, modern Islamic movements, and the history of the Arabian Peninsula. Researching PhD dissertation on "The Hashimite Kingdom of the Hijaz, 1916–1925."

Yael YISHAI, PhD (Hebrew University, 1976). Professor of Political Science, University of Haifa. Author of *Israel: The Peaceful Belligerent 1967–1979* (with A. Sella); *Land or Peace: Whither Israel* (1987); and *Interest Groups in Israeli Politics* (1981). Has published numerous articles on Israeli domestic politics.

PART ONE: CURRENT ISSUES

THE MIDDLE EAST IN PERSPECTIVE

The Middle East in 1987:

A Year of Kaleidoscopic Change

HAIM SHAKED

Unlike 1986, defined by Itamar Rabinovich in the previous volume of *MECS* as "another year when much happened but little was altered in the general scheme of things in the Middle East," the year 1987 was witness to a rearrangement of the regional kaleidoscope.¹ No new pieces could be discerned in the Middle Eastern "tube," but by the end of the year the aggregate regional picture was significantly different from what it had been at the end of 1986. "Constants," or elements of continuity, which had been shaped well before 1987, continued to provide the warp and woof of the ME texture, but its overall pattern was undergoing gradual change — with some major implications for the whole region.

The main elements of constancy were formidable. The region continued attracting the worldwide attention of policymakers as well as the general public. The region's sensitive geopolitical position relative to other parts of the world, and its centrality as a major oil supplier (and an even greater oil depository), helped maintain its high place on the international agenda. Its volatility and numerous domestic, local and regional hot spots of open warfare, violence and conflict, accentuated the inherent risks for the international community and enhanced its high profile in the world arena.

As before, the ME continued to be plagued by a number of major problems: national identity crises; competing ideological and spiritual policies, and the challenge of religious militancy; ethnic tensions; economic hardship and frustrations aggravated by conspicuous consumption and uneven distribution of wealth; festering conflicts and warfare; regional fragmentation; and international intrigue.

The year under review saw no significant breakthrough in any of the following issues, each of major importance in its own right: the establishment of clear-cut and stable demarcation lines of the superpowers' influence in the region; the resolution of major — local or regional — violent conflicts (the Iraqi-Iranian War; the Arab-Israeli conflict; the internecine violence in Lebanon; the civil war in Sudan); the development of an economic master plan to alleviate local or regional hardship and reduce frustrations; and the formulation of a positive, constructive, and comprehensive vision for the ME or, at least, most of its member nations.

By the end of 1987, the aggregate picture of the ME was problematic and gloomy. During the greater part of the year there had been much motion, or even commotion, but very little movement towards the resolution, or even the major improvement, of the main ailments of the region. For the most part, 1987 seemed to be devoid of the kind of landmark events that had highlighted ME chronology in previous years.

Much like 1986, 1985, 1984, and 1983 — 1987 lacked occurrences that could be immediately discerned as being of exceptional magnitude or as exerting regional impact. Dramas such as the Iranian Revolution (1978–79); the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty (1979); the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian War (1980); and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon (1982), which punctuated the turn of the 1970s and early 1980s, did not recur in mid-decade.

By the same token, 1987 was even devoid of smaller-scale, albeit significant events which would highlight the spring and summer of 1988: the surprise Iranian move towards the acceptance of a cease-fire in the Gulf War; the stubborn Palestinian *intifada*; and King Husayn's disengagement from the West Bank gambit, with the ensuing expectations that the Palestinians might announce independence of some sort. Other developments of 1988 which were indirectly connected with the ME, such as the ever warming and engaging US-Soviet dialogue, buttressed by the full-scale Soviet military withdrawal from Afghanistan, the progress made in negotiations on Angola, and the fourth summit between President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev, which was held in Moscow in December 1987. The actual beginnings of some of these developments in 1988 could be traced to 1987, or even earlier, but they were accelerated during the year under review.

The focus of regional dynamics remained in the Gulf region and its immediate environment in 1987, which itself was the continuation of the pattern established in 1986: the overwhelming salience of the Iraqi-Iranian War and the relative marginality of the Arab-Israeli conflict, the other major regional dispute. In terms of superpower commitment and involvement, the configuration of regional foreign policies, and inherent dangers to immediate and more distant political environment, the Gulf War significantly outweighed all other open and latent ME hostilities and conflicts. As Gideon Gera points out in his essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War, there were two important developments in 1987, one static and the other dynamic. The static aspect was the "strategic stalemate" between the warring parties. The dynamic dimension was the "internationalization" of the conflict, as Kuwait and the US were drawn directly into the war while Saudi Arabia, other Gulf states, and the People's Republic of China — a major supplier of weaponry to Iran — became indirectly involved.

Locked into the eighth year of their war, Iran and Iraq fought each other fiercely in the "battle of the cities" (January-February) and in the "tanker war," which was stepped up in 1987. While the land and sea battles were interrelated in the eyes of Iraq, Iran considered them unrelated. The land battle culminated with a major Iranian attack on Basra in January-February — the most important military thrust since the Iranian occupation of the Faw peninsula in February 1986.

In mid-1987, the Iranians also opened a major front in the north, reigniting violent Kurdish opposition on a scale unequaled since the height of the Kurdish war in 1974. The Iraqis responded with a ruthless combination of executions and poison-gas attacks, destroying entire villages in attempting to "de-Kurdize" Kurdistan. The sea battle, which was launched by Iran in 1984 in retaliation against Iraqi attacks on Iranian oil installations, brought about in 1987 an unparalleled American military involvement through the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers (January-April), and the provision of a naval escort (as of July). In May an Iraqi plane accidentally attacked a US frigate, the *Stark*, causing the death of 37 servicemen. To Iran's dismay, the US, which hitherto had tilted towards Iraq in the Gulf conflict, refrained from "punishing"

the Iraqis and instead adopted a more aggressive anti-Iranian stance. By mid-1987 the main focus of the Iraqi-Iranian War seemed to have shifted from land to sea, and before long Kuwaiti oil installations became the target of Iranian missile attacks (September-October). The war thus expanded, in 1987, not only in scope but also in substance: a formidable American armada, backed up by diplomatic and naval support systems on the part of several European countries, became the symbol of this shift.

In July 1987, however, a turning point occurred with the UN Security Council's unanimous adoption of Resolution 598, which called for an immediate cease-fire; the military withdrawal of Iranian and Iraqi forces to their respective territories; an exchange of prisoners; direct peace talks; and the setting up of an impartial body to determine who had been responsible for starting the war. (Iran claimed that the war had begun with Iraq's aggression on 22 September 1980, while Iraq argued that the conflict had commenced with Iranian border provocations on 4 September 1980.) Iraq immediately accepted the resolution. Iran did not, demanding that Iraq first be identified as the aggressor.

By the end of 1987, there was still no indication that the cessation of hostilities was imminent. However, Resolution 598, perhaps like Resolution 242 (1967) and 338 (1973), was to assume a more lasting importance than a host of other Security Council resolutions that attempted to replace war by negotiations and, eventually, by peace. Following the passage of 598, Iraq stepped up its military pressure on Iran, and hoping to coerce Tehran into acceptance of a cease-fire, tried to exploit its supremacy in the air by extensive activation of its Air Force against Iranian cities, as well as oil targets on land and sea. Iran, for its part, resorted to intensive use of *Scud-B* missiles, mainly in January-February and October-November, hitting Iraqi civilian targets.

By year's end Iran seemed to have maintained the relative military superiority it had established in 1986. But, as Gera states, "the concluding wisdom of 1986, that Iran had not won but could not lose the war, and that Iraq had not lost but could not win it" — had been reaffirmed in spite of the escalation. If 1987 was "a year of decision" for Iran and "a year of steadfastness for Iraq," events in 1988 introduced significant change, engendered a reduction in Iran's rigidity which was caused, *inter alia*, by a number of major military setbacks, and brought about a cease-fire in the summer.

Whereas the volatile situation in the Gulf riveted international attention to ME developments for most of 1987, toward the very end of the year riots in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank injected a new dynamic into the Arab-Israeli conflict. World attention, alerted by persistent media interest in the violence and the forceful way it was handled by Israel, rapidly shifted from the eastern edge of the region to its western parts. A much-heralded, major Iranian thrust towards Basra, which never materialized, and Israel's inability to quell the violence in the territories under its control since 1967, strengthened this shift in attention.

The *intifada* — as the persistent popular Palestinian uprising in the territories came to be known in Arabic — accentuated the dangers inherent in the stalemated Israeli-Arab peace process.

Prompted by a number of factors — the perceived low priority the November Arab summit in Amman ascribed to the Palestinian question (as compared with the high priority accorded the Iraqi-Iranian War and Iran's threat to Arab countries); the minor role of the Palestine issue on the Reagan-Gorbachev agenda at their third

(Washington) summit; and the euphoric Palestinian reaction to the successful hang-glider attack by a Palestinian on a military camp in the north of Israel, where six soldiers were killed and several wounded — the *intifada* forced a flurry of evaluations and reevaluations, as well as hectic diplomatic activities well into the middle of 1988. These concentrated on the question that had become a bone of contention in Israeli-Arab relations: the holding of an international peace conference. As Mordechai Gazit points out, “the peace process in 1987 was hardly more fertile than in the preceding years.” The US continued making available its “good offices to the parties, but most of the time the level and intensity of its exertions showed no expectation of quick results. US diplomats, as had become their habit, claimed that their quiet diplomatic work was laying the foundations for future progress. They were, so they explained, engaged in a patient and incremental diplomacy.”

The four parties directly involved — Israel, Jordan, the Palestinians and the PLO, and the US — developed stances that made it clear that a breakthrough was highly improbable. In Israel, the rotation from a Labor-controlled premiership to one dominated by the Likud, which was effected in October 1986 — according to the terms of the 1984 agreement to set up a National Unity Government — put Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir in a strong enough position to outmaneuver Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. Shamir felt that an international conference, as defined by Jordan and cautiously promoted by the US, was tantamount to a trap. On the other hand, the Peres-Husayn agreement, worked out in April in London, did not develop enough leverage to introduce the necessary momentum.

While Israel's prime ministerial position came to dominate Israeli action (notwithstanding all attempts to neutralize it by Peres and his entourage), Jordan did not really come forward with a move bold enough to dislodge the situation from its downward spiral. Jordan did increase its involvement in, and contribution to, the West Bank, but did not “cross the Jordan” all the way to assuming full responsibility for the resolution of the Palestine problem. The PLO, which in 1986 had broken away from a joint PLO-Jordanian frame of action, was concerned that the Husayn-Peres format and procedure for an international conference “would make it impossible for their friends, notably the Soviet Union, to lend them effective support.” They were therefore equally uncooperative, and the 18th Palestine National Council (PNC), held in Algiers in April, “passed resolutions which ran counter to what Israel, the US and even Jordan could accept.”

One of the resolutions was the formal abrogation of the February 1985 Amman agreement between 'Arafat and Husayn (which the king had annulled in February 1986). Another resolution reiterated the demand for Palestinian self-determination and rejected alternative proposals — the Reagan plan, the Camp David autonomy plan, etc. A third resolution insisted on the PLO's right to represent the Palestinians in all negotiations on an equal footing with all other parties. Under the circumstances, the US was, naturally, unwilling or unable to launch a major initiative, and, until December, there seemed to be no special urgency to introduce significant momentum into the peace process. Therefore, the US maintained a low diplomatic profile on this matter throughout 1987.

Outside the Israeli-Jordanian-Palestinian-American quadrilateral, Arab-Israeli relations were imbued more by tension than by relaxation. Egypt, formally at peace with Israel, meticulously kept to the letter of its 1979 peace treaty — as far as

substance was concerned — but maintained a cold, at times unpleasant, dialogue with Israel, in which indications of estrangement were far more frequent than signs of cordiality, particularly after the rotation of power in Israel. Egypt denied that its “cold peace” with Israel was linked to its persistent diplomatic efforts — rewarded at the Amman summit — to rejoin the Arab fold. Symbolically, when the 10th anniversary of Anwar al-Sadat’s trip to Jerusalem was celebrated in November 1987, Israel played up the event, whereas Egypt played it down.

As long as Iraq was tied down in open warfare with Iran, the only remaining major Arab country directly relevant to the Arab-Israeli conflict was Syria. This “confrontation state,” strongly attached to its self-image as the center and upholder of Arabism, continued — despite serious economic, financial, and political difficulties — to adhere to its notion of achieving “strategic parity” as the necessary base from which to confront Israel. Expanding the concept of strategic parity to include the cultural as well as the military dimension, and clarifying that Syria should not be expected to be the sole bearer of Arab responsibilities in this regard, “Asad committed himself, again, not to concede ‘a single inch’ of the Golan Heights, even if it meant ‘fighting a hundred wars.’” He also rejected “all solutions that did not recognize Palestinian national rights.” By the same token, it was due to Syria’s condition for its participation in the Amman summit conference that the Arab-Israeli conflict was added to the agenda of the summit, originally scheduled to confine its deliberations to the Gulf War.

If in 1987 Egypt commemorated 10 years of Sadat’s peace visit to Jerusalem, Syria celebrated the 800th anniversary of the battle of Hittin, in which Saladin routed the Crusaders near the Sea of Galilee. While the Syrian proclivity to make ominous statements did not subside in 1987, prevailing evaluations during the year predicted lower chances of a military confrontation between Israel and Syria.

Other manifestations of violence, however, continued to punctuate the diplomatic efforts to revive the peace process. While terrorist operations against non-Jewish, Jewish, and Israeli targets internationally were, during 1987, “few and far between,” there were Israeli-Palestinian-Arab-related armed operations on three fronts: in Lebanon, in Israel proper, and in the territories. The decline in ME-sponsored international terrorism in 1987 could perhaps be attributed to the severe Western reaction to Syria’s and Libya’s support of terrorist acts in 1986.

On the other hand, the “war of the camps” in Lebanon launched in 1985, continued unabated. Primarily pitting the Syrian-backed Shi’i Amal militia against pro-‘Arafat factions of the PLO which were trying to regain control of Palestinian refugee camps, mainly in South Lebanon, this war wrought added devastation without major benefits for either side. Lebanon was also used more frequently and boldly in 1987 as a base for attacks against the South Lebanese Army and against Israel, culminating with the aforementioned hang-glider attack on 25 November.

In Israel proper and the territories, a significant intensification of armed operations manifested itself around the time of the PNC meeting in Algiers in April and the Arab summit in Amman in November. It was in stark contrast to the ineffectiveness of these operations, that the demonstrations, stone throwing, tire burning and so on by youths, and strikes by merchants — the hallmarks of the Palestinian *intifada* — had such a tremendous impact on the Israeli-Palestinian equation.

On another level, military analysts in various ME capitals, particularly those

apprehensive about the eruption of major wars in the future, could not ignore the implications of the intensification, in 1987, of the use of surface-to-surface Russian-made *Scud*-B, and Chinese-made *Silkworm* missiles in the Iran-Iraq war of the cities, as well as the heavy damage inflicted on commercial civilian targets in the ongoing tanker war. Iraq's seemingly uninhibited use of poison gas against Iran and Kurdish villages, denounced but not curtailed by the free world, added trepidation to thoughts about the "future battleground" and what it might look like.

No annual overview of the ME can be complete without reference to six additional dimensions: (a) superpower competition; (b) the impact of Islamic militancy; (c) inter-Arab relations; (d) economic conditions; (e) domestic stability and instability; and (f) the overall map of violent conflicts.

As was the case in 1986, during the year under review the US retained its lead in the superpower competition for exerting influence in the region. This supremacy was, however, relative to the other superpower's position rather than an absolute, solid posture. For about two thirds of 1987, American presidential policy towards the ME labored under the shadow of the "Irangate" scandal, which had erupted in October 1986 and quickly snowballed into one of the most serious crises with which the Reagan Administration had to contend. Yet, despite America's preoccupation with the investigations, and the widely televised congressional hearings of the Iran-Contra affair, the embarrassment caused by the revelations and the serious damage done to the credibility of the US as a consistent superpower on important policy matters such as counterterrorism and arms embargoes against its foes, the US expanded and increased its military commitment in the Persian Gulf in 1987.

"America's regional objectives," as Barry Rubin points out, continued to be defined by four principles: (a) limiting Soviet influence while maximizing its own; (b) encouraging regional stability against the danger of war or radical revolutions; (c) supporting and strengthening allies; and (d) seeking the continued supply of oil at reasonable prices. "While, as always, there were numerous points of danger and tension in the Middle East in 1987, the overall picture in terms of these four concerns was reasonably positive." For the most part in 1987, American strategic action in the ME concentrated primarily on Iran-Iraq-related issues, and focused on the Persian Gulf subregion.

Irangate demonstrated that the US ascribed great strategic value to Iran in the long run. It was clear, however, that in the short run the US continued its tilt towards Iraq. Thus, while in the mid-1970s the US was Iran's main ally in the subregion and Iraq spearheaded opposition to the American presence in the Gulf, by the mid-1980s this situation was completely reversed, and Iraqi and American interests converged against Iran due to its revolution, its vehemence against the US, and its war with Iraq. Paradoxically, and to Iran's chagrin, within three months of the attack on the US *Stark* the US signed a commercial, economic and technical agreement with Iraq.

In the Gulf itself, the US's reflagging and escorting of 11 of Kuwait's oil tankers lent credence to its resolve to maintain the Persian Gulf as an American-protected body of water, rather than a Russian or American-Russian one. The Gulf Cooperation Council and Saudi Arabia responded in kind; and while some American allies opted to maintain low-key support of the US, during the second half of 1987 Saudi Arabia raised the level of its publicly admitted collaboration with the US over military fueling and landing facilities.

Increasing US involvement in the Gulf was further accentuated when the US military set up a special command (the Joint Task Force — Middle East). Thus, despite the collapse of a complex stratagem designed by a senior official of the US National Security Council to rebuild US-Iran relations, to release American hostages (held by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon), and to serve as a feather in the cap of the Reagan Administration — and the resultant controversial public scandal that undermined the president at the pinnacle of his power — American activity in the Gulf was not seriously curtailed.

By the same token, while the US was unable to breathe new life into the Arab-Israeli peace process, America's position in the western part of the ME had not been eroded by the end of 1987. American relations with Turkey, somewhat strained over questions of military and economic support, remained positive. Similarly, despite tension over the repayment of Egypt's military debt of \$4.5bn., and the fact that President Husni Mubarak postponed until 1988 a trip to Washington that had been scheduled for February 1987, the special relationship between the two countries remained strong. US-Egyptian military cooperation was not affected, and in August another "Bright Star" joint military exercise was conducted in Egypt's Western Desert. The US also resumed diplomatic relations with Syria, in September.

The Soviet Union tried to capitalize on the perceived US weakness in the Gulf area due to the Iran-Contra scandal, and to make gains in the western part of the region as a result of the stalemated peace process. In the Persian Gulf, the USSR made some headway. Several Arab countries, appalled by revelations of American double-dealing, indicated their interest in improving relations with the Soviet Union. The Kuwaitis asked the Soviets to lease them three oil tankers and provide a military escort; the United Arab Emirates opened an embassy in Moscow in April; and Oman, which had begun a policy of *rapprochement* with the Soviet Union in late 1985, followed it through to an exchange of ambassadors between Muscat and Moscow in December 1987. At the same time, however, the USSR showed hesitation about its continuing support of Iraq, despite the five-year extension in April of the Iraqi-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation they had originally signed in 1972. In 1987, this turned out to be of academic value because of the warming up of Iraqi-American relations and the decisive American action in reflagging the Kuwaiti tankers, not to mention the mid-1987 Soviet tilt towards Iran. But this last did not yield significant results. On the one hand, it caused a cooling down of Soviet-Saudi relations, which had warmed up since the early 1980s. On the other hand, in Robert Freedman's words: "The pro-Iranian tilt...did not appear to gain the Soviet Union any substantive influence in Iran while it proved increasingly counterproductive to Moscow's efforts to improve its position in the Arab world."

Even with Syria the Soviet Union did not enjoy quite the same cordiality that had previously marked their relations, as became evident during President Hafiz al-Asad's visit to Moscow in April. Relations with Libya, too, left a lot to be desired. On the other hand, the USSR, eager to exploit the US's inability to generate momentum in the peace process, signaled that it might improve its relations — albeit very cautiously — with Israel. Relations with Egypt, too, were so improved that Mubarak was forced to deny that Egypt was considering a reversal of its American orientation to the pre-1972/73 Russian orientation. An indicator of the friendlier Russian-Egyptian atmosphere was the Russian agreement to reschedule Egypt's military debt.

The USSR also scored an important success with the PLO during the PNC meeting in Algiers. The PLO's abrogation of the February 1985 Husayn-'Arafat agreement removed, or at least postponed, the danger of the US mediating a deal between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. The partial reunification of the PLO under 'Arafat, which the Soviets helped structure, also acted in their favor.

As 1987 began, the USSR was faced with a number of acute problems in the ME. The Islamic conference which met in Kuwait in January called for a total, unconditional Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Ethnic rioting in Kazakhstan, in Soviet Central Asia, in mid-December 1986, served as a reminder of the potency of Islam in the non-Russian Central Asian republics and the vulnerability of the Soviet system there. Continued instability in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDY), still reeling from the 1986 bloody upheavals, threatened to undermine Soviet influence in that country.

Another Arab country, Libya, a close ally and client of the Soviet Union, was still shocked by Russia's reaction in the face of the US bombing of Tripoli in 1986. In 1987 Libya suffered a series of defeats in Chad (which was supported in its anti-Libyan stance by France and the US).

The sharp drop in oil prices, given the Soviet dependence on sales of oil and natural gas for 50% of their hard currency, constituted yet another problem. By the end of the year, some of these problems had become less acute than they had been 12 months previously. The bottom line, however, did not provide cause for much joy in Moscow. While its arch rival, the US, was able to extricate itself, albeit not completely, from the corner into which the Iran-Contra scandal had forced it, the Soviet Union had not been able to take full advantage of the situation in the Gulf area. Also, as far as the Arab-Israeli conflict was concerned, by the end of the year it was still only the US that was in a position to broker peace, while the USSR was on full speaking terms only with some, but by no means all, of the relevant parties.

Summarizing the Islamic dimension of developments in the region, Martin Kramer points out that "the events of 1987 demonstrated the tenacious hold of sectarian hatred upon the imagination of contemporary Islam." Battle lines were still drawn along ancient or medieval divisions, marked by combinations of religious, ethnic, socioeconomic, communal and political factors fomenting distrust, competition, conflict and violence. "The most virulent form of their distrust affects the mutual perceptions of Sunnis and Shi'is," Kramer goes on to say, but "on both sides of the divide, none dare speak the name of this bigotry...and the mere enumeration of these differences is often denounced as part of an imperialist plot to foment division. This reflects the influence of ecumenism upon the intellectual climate of contemporary Islam, a climate now inhospitable to overt sectarian polemics."

But beneath the thin intellectual surface, the great traditional religious — or religious-ethnic — rifts continued to take their toll. Shi'i and Sunni, Jew and Muslim, Christian and Muslim were pitched against each other — each pair with its own focus of tension. Some of these burst forth in various forms during the year. The Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), obligated by its charter to convene an Islamic summit every three years, met in Kuwait in January for a grand conference. Iran's absence highlighted yet again the impact of the Iraqi-Iranian War on regional configurations. The conference turned into "the most inconsequential Islamic summit held to date," and became through its preoccupation with Egypt's "return to the fold"

among other things, "not so much an Islamic summit as an Arab summit attended by 'observers' from non-Arab Islamic states."

The Kuwait convention of the ICO did not serve the original purpose "of lining up non-Arab Muslim support for an Arab consensus on Palestine." Rather, it "functioned as an alternative forum for the thrashing out of Arab differences." Eighteen years after the first Islamic summit in Rabat, the ICO could boast few political accomplishments. Thus, institutionalized Islam had turned into a shell for rather routine matters. States such as Iran and Libya, which claimed to hold the key to the true, eternal message of Islam (each according to its own interpretation), and were dedicated to spreading that truth beyond their own boundaries, were unable, by year's end, to claim to have altered the course of Islam.

Nevertheless, popular Islam, of the radical and militant inclination, continued to show growing vitality in undermining or at least threatening the established state systems directly or indirectly, openly or surreptitiously. In Jordan, Sudan, Syria, Iraq, and even Saudi Arabia, as well as in Libya and Iran — the ruling elites faced various forms of challenge. Egypt experienced Muslim-Coptic clashes, great restiveness among university students, and even "a mighty wave of terrorist acts by Muslim radicals." Their magnitude and intensity were sufficient to alarm the regime.

Lebanon and Israel — the two non-Islamic political entities in the ME — were not free of religious challenges. In Lebanon, the changing balance between various denominations of Christians and Muslims continued to alter the very structure of the political system beyond recognition. In Israel, a growing salience of Jewish religious-messianic militancy was discernible, while Islamic sentiments among Arabs under Israeli control continued to cause a degree of unrest.

Even in Turkey, where for decades the government had consistently tried to impose a secular system on an Islamic society, there was some shock at the beginning of 1987, when university female students demanded permission to wear traditional headscarves in class. All things considered, it was the Iranian (Shi'i)-Saudi (Sunni) explosion during the July pilgrimage in Mecca, causing hundreds of deaths, which perhaps signified the most prominent "Islamic event" of the year. The incident itself, and the accusations and counteraccusations it generated, provided testimony of the disruptive potential of politicized religion — a terminological dichotomy which, in itself, is so alien to ME society in general and to Islam in particular. Religious fervor and its political translation into militancy and radicalism thus served, in 1987, either as a potentially disruptive manifestation or as a source of encouragement to existing cleavages and conflicts.

The state of inter-Arab relations in 1987 mirrored yet another dimension of the region's fragmentation, but the divisiveness that was the hallmark of 1986 seemed to give way to a growing Arab solidarity during the year under review. As Bruce Maddy-Weitzman characterized it, while "there were no fundamental shifts in orientation by any of the Arab states," it was evident that "inter-Arab alignments seemed less etched in stone than previously" and, "in many respects, 1987 was a year of an exceptional amount of dialogue among Arab rivals, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels."

As had been the case in previous years, the intensification and expansion of the Gulf War and the growing Iranian menace — as perceived by most Arab states, particularly in the Arabian Peninsula — was the predominant inter-Arab issue. However, in a

departure from the prevailing pattern, 1987 saw significant inter-Arab action. Two important, comprehensive events highlighted this change: the above-mentioned ICO summit in Kuwait in January; and the first all-Arab summit since September 1982, which convened in Jordan in November. While the deliberations at both summits, and particularly in Amman, reflected the preoccupation of the Arab world with the Gulf War and its challenges, an important change occurred with regard to Egypt, and therefore indirectly also with regard to the Arab-Israeli peace process. Mubarak's presence at the Kuwait summit and the warm welcome accorded him there accentuated the gravitation of the Arab world — accelerated by the Iranian threat — toward normalization with Egypt.

While Egypt had been readmitted into the Islamic fold in 1984, it was at the Amman summit that a complementary process of readmission into the Arab fold was all but sealed. In its wake, Arab countries (except Syria, Libya, Algeria and the PDRY) which had not resumed diplomatic relations with Egypt, did so. (Jordan had renewed relations with Egypt in 1984; Sudan, in 1981.) A decade-long Egyptian effort, since Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, thus came to fruition. Syria's participation in the November summit and Jordan's major role in convening it were also significant milestones in the evolution of inter-Arab relations in the second half of the 1980s. This could develop into an important factor in the dynamics of the Israeli-Arab-Palestinian conflict, as this conflict inches its way into the region's center stage as a result of the impact of the *intifada*, and the decline — in mid-1988 — in the imminence and intensity of the Iranian threat.

On a subregional level, too, wars and conflicts determined the pattern of alignments and counteralignments. But, as was the case at the all-Arab level, these were marked by dialogue and attempts at *rapprochement* rather than rifts. In the Persian Gulf, the Iranian thrust against Basra at the beginning of 1987, the intensification of the tanker war, and Iran's treatment of Kuwait as an enemy at war and therefore a military target, forced "a deep reconsideration of some of the most basic principles that had guided the Gulf Arab countries' collective foreign and defense policies since 1981." Their security doctrine of "self-reliance" gave way to openness towards military involvement by the US as well as non-Gulf Arab states. This was the main theme of the eighth Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit held on the very last day of 1987. At the same time, however, the GCC also intensified attempts to improve — or at least ease — relations with Iran, in part through the good offices of Syria, Iran's chief ally in the Arab world.

On the other side of the Arab world, in the Maghrib, events in 1987 generally fell into the pattern of dialogue generated by Algeria, Libya and Morocco. Under the personal auspices of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, an Algerian-Moroccan summit was held in May on the Algerian-Moroccan border, in an attempt to resolve the violent conflict over the Western Sahara, where the Algerian-backed Polisario continued its military struggle with Morocco. Libyan-Moroccan relations, chilled by the breakup in 1986 of their short-lived union, remained at a low. In contrast, Libyan-Algerian relations, which had improved as a result of a *rapprochement* begun in 1986, following the 1985 crisis which had marred their relationship, continued to improve in 1987 to the point where Mu'ammār Qadhafi — in his constant search for unity with other Arab countries — announced, prematurely as it turned out, that a framework for Libyan-Algerian unity would be consummated in November.

On the bilateral level, the most significant change was Syria's effort to break out of the inter-Arab isolation forced on it by an ever solidifying all-Arab coalition because of its close association with Iran. Syria's move in this direction was not crowned with success. Its participation in the Kuwait ICO summit and in the Arab summit in Amman emphasized its role as a "spoiler," albeit a relatively tame one. A failed attempt at reconciliation with Iraq (a summit meeting between Presidents Asad and Saddam Husayn took place in Jordan in April but did not produce a breakthrough) was another case in point. So were the strains on the Syrian-Libyan-Iranian alignment, made more severe by Syrian-Iranian disagreements over Lebanon. The thaw in their relations, which brought about a resumption of Iraqi-Libyan diplomatic relations in October, did not help either. Syria's initiative in the Gulf, launched late in December, which was aimed at the introduction of dialogue into the tense Iran-GCC relations, did not fail altogether, but could not provide enough momentum to ease Syria's growing isolation. Its troubles in Lebanon and its ailing economy were added burdens that further limited its ability to maneuver within the Arab world.

By year's end, the "winners" in inter-Arab relations were the anti-Iranian coalition headed by Iraq and Jordan, and the relatively moderate pro-Arab-Israeli peace process coalition led by Egypt and Jordan. Jordan thus emerged as a pivotal point in inter-Arab affairs — a remarkable change from King Husayn's position 30 years before.

Trends affecting the regional economy in the early 1980s continued to be felt in the ME during 1987. With very few exceptions, ME countries had to contend with serious economic problems. These contributed to the buildup of anti-government sentiment and tension and, in several cases, erupted in open turmoil or even violence (for instance in Sudan).

The catastrophic collapse of the oil price structure in mid-1986, when the price per barrel of crude oil fell to less than \$10 (in July), was not truly remedied in 1987, even as oil prices bounced back. Opec's attempts to stabilize the price at a higher level were only partially successful. This was due to several reasons: non-Opec producers' competition and unwillingness to cooperate with Opec's cartel policy, as well as the undisciplined behavior of Opec's own members. The latter, torn between conflicting interests, could hardly agree on production and price levels, and when they did — at the 81st Opec conference in Vienna at the end of 1986, for instance — they unscrupulously cheated on each other. The vicissitudes of the Iraqi-Iranian War and the violent turbulence in the Gulf, with the concomitant threat to the flow of Gulf oil to Western countries, had a global impact and added to the uncertainty surrounding the oil industry. Oil prices consequently fluctuated throughout the year, more as a result of psychological and political-military anxieties than as a reflection of supply and demand or real economic considerations.

The deliberations of the 82nd Opec conference in Vienna, in December 1987, attested to the great rift within the once powerful organization, with Saudi Arabia and Iran emerging as the main antagonists. Eventually, Opec agreed only to a six-month "roll over" proposal providing for a continuation of the reference price of \$18 a barrel which Saudi Arabia fought for, and rejecting Iran's demand for an increase to \$20. Saudi Arabia, which previously had become the "swing producer," stubbornly and unequivocally refused to play this role throughout the year. By year's end, oil prices dropped to their lowest levels in 10 months, and the price of West Texas Intermediate hit \$15.58 on 18 December (from \$18.31 a week earlier).

Under the circumstances, several Opec members adopted the market price for oil. Thus, the Opec crisis, which was triggered when demand for ME oil began to fall at the end of 1981, hitting the bottom in mid-1986, was not resolved in 1987. The specific interests of individual oil producers carried the day and dictated each producer's real actions, as distinct from declarative commitments. It was clear that 1987 did not bring about an acceptable — or impossible — formula or technique which could discipline Opec members' production and prices. Underlying the superficial stabilization of prices accomplished with great difficulty by Opec were real centrifugal forces threatening to further undermine the oil income on which several key ME regimes had come to rely. This had significant consequences for oil producers as well as regional impact on other beneficiaries from the oil bonanza of the 1970s.

All oil-producing countries continued to feel the brunt of these dramatic changes, which brought about recession and a need to profoundly reexamine public spending policies, tighten belts, and reevaluate priorities. Saudi Arabia was a remarkable case in point, as Jacob Goldberg put it: "With the overall revenues of Saudi Arabia ever declining, budgetary expenditures continued to fall by staggering proportions: from close to \$90 bn. in 1984–85, to \$45.3 bn. in 1987, to a projected \$37.65 bn. in 1988. The deficit the Saudis incurred in 1987 was \$14 bn., i.e., over 30% of the total budget, and the projected deficit for 1988 was over \$10 bn. The Saudis seemed to have second thoughts about their traditional policy of drawing on their financial reserves to fund the deficits....The cumulative deficit of over \$65 bn. since 1984 had depleted the kingdom's financial reserves from \$150 bn. down to no more than \$50 bn. in liquid assets."

If such was the case with Opec members that were not involved in open warfare, the situation was much worse in the case of countries whose resources were drained by war. Iran and Iraq continued to hemorrhage. In both, the tremendous war burden aggravated economic problems to an extent that adversely affected their war effort. In both, the economic situation was intertwined with major political power struggles. But while Iraq gained some relief through the support provided by other oil-rich sister states, and through the inauguration in July of a new oil pipeline through Turkey, Iran could rely only on its own rather limited resources. Hence Iraq's insistence on hitting Iran's vulnerable economic point — the flow of its oil to markets abroad.

Another oil-rich Arab country that came under economic stress in 1987 was Libya, whose continued military involvement in Chad added pressure to an already stretched economic system. This resulted in the near collapse of Libya's entire retail system. Syria, seriously drained by an ongoing military commitment in Lebanon, and Sudan, deeply hurt by the rekindling of the rebellion in the south, were two other countries whose economies were overstretched to the point of constituting a threat to the stability of their regimes. In both cases, economic duress reached crisis levels and became the most pressing item on the national agenda, necessitating, in the case of Syria, a 50% devaluation. Lebanon's protracted self-destruction, inevitably played havoc with the economy, bringing the country to unprecedented economic deprivation, and rendering its currency "cheaper than wallpaper."

Other countries in the region, which did not have the excuse of immediate war or insurgency, did not fare much better. The PDY — devastated by the civil war of 1986 — was only slowly stabilizing its economy. By the end of 1987 it "had yet to overcome the economic crisis that had plagued the state for two decades" since

independence. Egypt — the largest Arab country — was no exception. Without the burden of a war effort, but with a domestic population explosion instead, the Egyptian economy was in dire straits, with pressing immediate economic problems overshadowed by an even gloomier long-term trend, as the accretion of problems outpaced the solutions the government could provide. What made matters worse was the fact that the government's efforts to lighten the economic burden resulted, in Ami Ayalon's words, in "the bill for economic recovery...being submitted to the country for immediate payment, [while] recovery itself remained a matter for the distant and unforeseeable future."

All efforts to improve public services and develop the economy through a second five-year plan (1987–92) were dwarfed by the staggering results of the census published in 1987. It showed an increase of 11.5m. people in 10 years, to 50.45m. (including 2.25m. Egyptians working or living abroad). The population was increasing at a rate of 2.8% annually (*up* from 2.31% a decade earlier); and 34.1% of the populace were in the 0–12-year group (compared with 31.7% in 1976). All other things being equal, the number of Egyptians would reach 70m. by the year 2000, with no commensurate growth of gross national product in sight.

The only two exceptions in this bleak overview were Turkey and Israel. From a state of economic collapse at the end of 1970, which was one of the factors leading to the takeover of the military in the early 1980s, Turkey's civilian government made impressive economic strides, achieving domestic growth and strengthening its balance of payments through an impressive rise in foreign trade. In April 1987, Turkey formally applied for admission into the European Economic Community.

In Israel, the economic recovery that began in the second half of 1986 continued through 1987. The impressive reduction in the inflation rate without significant layoffs was accomplished by the National Unity Government when Labor's Peres was prime minister and the Likud's Yitzhak Moda'i was finance minister. This provided a positive shock to the economy and led to significant recovery. However, a considerable slowdown in the pace of growth during the last two quarters of 1987 reminded Israelis "that the economy's healthy appearance might not necessarily indicate a healthy body." The impact of the *intifada* would be felt only later, well into 1988. Thus, even the two exceptions of Turkey and Israel represented very fragile economic cases.

Throughout the year, there was no positive economic breakthrough anywhere in the ME system. Governmental acts and remedies — such as belt-tightening, economic diversification, restructuring foreign debt, reexamining priorities, and reallocating resources — could hardly cope with the immediate, pressing problems. They amounted to the superficial relief of symptoms rather than a radical treatment of the real ailments of the region.

Except for one abortive *coup d'état* in Sharja in June, there were no major domestic upheavals in the region throughout the year. Several regimes could have passed a superficial test of stability with flying colors. Closer scrutiny, however, revealed that most governments operated under great strain, resulting from domestic or external stress, or worse — a combination of both.

Turkey and Israel, two out of three functioning Western-type democracies in the ME, continued to enjoy solid political stability. In Turkey, the restrictive political system inherited from the military regime of 1980–83 was gradually, but consistently, becoming more liberal and solidified. In November 1986, martial law was lifted in all

but five of 67 provinces. In September 1987, a referendum "returned full political rights to the former party leaders, who had been kept out of parliament since the *coup d'état* of 12 September 1980." This did cause a regression — as some feared — to the chaotic political conditions of the late 1970s. Early general elections were held in November, in which all parties competed except the ultra-left ones. The result: the ruling Motherland Party stayed in power with an increased majority. Turkey seemed to be assured of reasonable political stability, a necessary condition for continued progress and improvement.

In Israel, the unique system of a rotating National Unity Government, invented in 1984 out of electoral necessity, held against all odds. In October 1986, the Labor Party prime minister and the Likud vice premier exchanged roles. On the surface, all seemed well in 1987; in reality, however, the deep cleavage between the two-headed substructures within the government either paralyzed or sterilized policy-making on most major issues and on all cardinal ones. As Yael Yishai put it: "Fundamental matters of state were pushed to the brink, and then placed on hold without reaching any decision...Beneath the surface...there were undercurrents that threatened to undermine the comfortable status quo. Israel was skating smoothly, but on thin ice, and at the end of the year the ice cracked, forcing the state to take stock and to reconsider its policy of brinkmanship."

The *intifada* was about to present the Israeli body politic with a formidable, ongoing challenge. This challenge would further accentuate the deep-seated political and ideological diversity of Israel — and the fact that, since 1984, Israel had been ruled in effect by two subgovernments. Throughout 1987, Israel's parliamentary elections, scheduled for November 1988, were already shaping many top-level considerations and decisions.

The third functioning democracy in the region, Sudan, fared much worse than Turkey and Israel. Its coalition government, which came to power in 1985, following the overthrow of Ja'far Numayri's military dictatorship, was almost totally incapacitated by a combination of devastating economic difficulties and the escalating rebellion in the south. Somehow, the government plodded through the year under review. Its very survival was, of course, a testament to independent Sudan's almost unique political characteristic vacillation between military dictatorship and parliamentary democracy. However, unlike Turkey (the other case of a pendulum-like swing from military to civilian government), by year's end Sudan's economic future seemed bleak, and its political stability appeared to be threatened by major cracks.

Lebanon — the fourth parliamentary democracy in the ME — belonged to this shortlist only technically. There was a further deterioration of the Lebanese political system during the year, aggravated by the death of the veteran Maronite leader, Camille Chamoun, and the assassination of the Sunni prime minister, Rashid Karami. For all intents and purposes, the central government lost more and more power during the year "and partition along communal lines" became an "almost irreversible fact of life." Syria's military intervention in West Beirut in February and Israel's continuous military involvement in South Lebanon demonstrated yet again that Lebanon had ceased to be a fully independent country. A democracy in form, it was gearing up for the election of a president, due in August-September 1988. It was clear, however, that the presidential elections would underline political weaknesses and communal strife.

Two ME countries which could not boast membership in the small club of Western-style democracies, but which in past years had made significant steps toward the controlled liberalization and democratization of their political systems, were Kuwait and Egypt. Kuwait suspended its parliament in 1986, and in 1987 experienced an upsurge of mostly Shi'i opposition and terrorism, which threatened its political stability. Most of Kuwait's problems were triggered or fueled from the outside, by Iranian pressure related to the Gulf War.

Egypt — a totally different case in terms of size and regional importance — provided another example of pressures generated, paradoxically, through political liberalization. In 1987, the People's Assembly (elected in 1984) was dissolved, following a complicated revision of the electoral law in December 1986. New elections were held in April. In October, Mubarak — the only presidential candidate — was reelected for a second six-year term, with 88.4% of the eligible voters participating and 95.08% of the actual voters supporting him. In Ayalon's evaluation, "the 1987 elections represented an important step on the road to greater democracy. Yet the Egyptian leadership, having committed itself to following such a course, was inclined to proceed as slowly and gradually as possible....It was...in the nature of the process, however, that increasing pressures on the government by its rivals would make it increasingly difficult for the former to curb the latter. The more the opposition consolidated its political position, the more able it would be to maneuver the regime into having to choose between expanding freedom and abandoning democracy: and the choice would be harder each time."

Broad dissatisfaction — generated by a convergence of numerous, relatively independent grievances among leftist and rightist groups, the secular and the militant religious, Muslims and Copts, restless young students and the establishment, the haves and the have-nots — culminated in mid-1987 with a wave of attempted political assassinations by elements as divergent as radical Muslims and Nasserites. In Ayalon's summation: "As the year drew to a close, the domestic front seemed to be returning to relative quiet — relative, that is, to the mid-year turbulence. But few deluded themselves that the quiet was more than temporary....There was little doubt that, so long as the basic circumstances [incremental economic crisis, frustration of the opposition, the ideological challenge of the ultraleft and radical Islamic militancy, and lack of hope] that encouraged these phenomena remained unchanged, further periods of internal friction and perhaps terror lay ahead for Egypt."

Libya, Syria, Iraq, and Iran — four major ME actors with regimes based on the absolute control of a single leader and his close retinue — were all faced with power struggles.

In Libya, Qadhdhafi started the year by annulling Tripoli's status as the capital of the *Jamahiriyya*, in an abortive attempt to decentralize the government. On the other hand, the return from exile at the beginning of the year of 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, Qadhdhafi's right-hand man for many years, signified Qadhdhafi's continued ability to hold the reins of power.

In Syria, there was a continuation of the power struggle that began when Asad fell ill in November 1983. Asad's underlings squabbled while jockeying for position. However, opposition to Asad was less intense than in 1986.

In Iraq, Saddam Husayn launched a major shake-up or "administrative revolution" — which lasted throughout the year — in an attempt to weaken the Ba'th Party and

the prevailing concepts and structure of an etatist-socialist economy. Husayn also curtailed the influence of the bureaucracy, the trade unions and the security apparatus. He promoted the military as his main power base and encouraged an "open door" policy (*infitah*) aimed at strengthening the private sector and capitalist enterprises. The Gulf War — which was particularly difficult for Iraq throughout the first half of 1987 — served, in Ofra Bengio's words, as "both cause and excuse" for these far-reaching reforms. Husayn "had never lacked in boldness and ingenuity." Often in the past, when the situation was critical, he went onto the offensive. Faced with great domestic difficulties and tremendous external pressure in the protracted war against Iran, Husayn pursued a bold and hazardous course of action throughout 1987.

Iraq's archenemy, Iran, experienced an intense power struggle among the clerics, the disciples of the octogenarian Ayatollah Khomeini. In David Menashri's words, "compared with their first years in power, the clerics were undoubtedly more firmly entrenched in 1987. As in the last few years it was clearly not the opposition that posed the main challenge for the revolutionary regime, but elements in the situation that they had created themselves" — including the socioeconomic problems and discontent that they generated, and the lack of a decisive breakthrough in the Gulf War. "Growing disillusionment and disaffection within the ranks of the dispossessed...added a new challenge, more serious than anything the regime had faced before. Such challenges, already discernible in the previous two to three years, were further aggravated in 1987... they clearly posed a critical threat. Until 1986, these challenges led the leadership towards greater pragmatism; in 1987 their intensification led to greater radicalism." Ironically, as the struggle between the ultraradicals and more pragmatic groups intensified, the latter found themselves in no position to implement the relatively moderate positions they had advocated. Rather, they found themselves toeing a radical line, especially in their foreign relations.

The two major traditional monarchies of the region — Jordan and Saudi Arabia — experienced the smallest visible domestic challenges to their stability in 1987. But even there pressures and dissatisfaction were mounting, due to a combination of socioeconomic problems and the lack of safety valves to let off steam.

The only removal of a head of state took place in Tunisia in November, when the 84-year-old Habib Bourguiba was deposed. The act signified a generational change; Bourguiba was the last leader in the region who belonged to the generation that had led the struggle for independence from colonialism.

The overall impression of relative political stability — at the governmental level — across the region was a prominent element in the general ME situation in the year under review. The depth and solidity of this stability could not be fathomed. It was clear, however, that as far as local and subregional conflicts were concerned, the region was as volatile as ever. Violence was not confined to the Iraqi-Iranian War on land and its extension in the Persian Gulf. A bird's-eye view revealed quite a few points of continuous or intermittent violence which were not as dramatic as the all-out war between Iran and Iraq, but not necessarily of smaller consequence domestically and/or locally.

Aside from political assassinations or domestic terrorism (in Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Kuwait, Israel, and the major incident in Mecca in July), various ME countries were embroiled in serious trouble. Communal, ethnic and religious conflicts, expressed in open hostilities, seriously threatened the very future of Lebanon. They also challenged

Sudan, where the war in the south escalated and expanded. In Iraq, the Iranian-backed Kurdish *intifada* in March-April, and the formation of the United Kurdish Front in July, served as a reminder of fierce Kurdish demands for independence. Polisario forces continued their battle — now in its 13th year — against Morocco over the Western Sahara. In Israel, the Palestinian *intifada* was about to aggravate an open sore.

Libya and Syria were involved in taxing military intervention in neighboring countries. Libya suffered a series of dramatic defeats in Chad, where it had been involved militarily since the end of 1980, and was forced to evacuate its forces, early in the spring, from all but the Aouzou Strip (claimed by Qadhdhafi and occupied in 1973). A successful Chadian offensive in the summer forced Libya to negotiate a cease-fire in the fall. In contrast, Syria became more actively involved in Lebanon. From the summer of 1985 through the beginning of 1987, Syria's main efforts in Lebanon were concentrated on pacification and consolidation. After 18 months of relative passivity, Syria decided to move in force into West Beirut, which was one step short of full-scale military involvement. As a result, Syria reasserted its role as the dominant outside power in most of Lebanon *vis-à-vis* Iran, Israel and the PLO. The other side of this coin included Syria's inability completely to swallow up or subdue Lebanon, the limitations this factor imposed on Syria, and the risks it generated.

The only category of volatile conflict which saw some relaxation in 1987 was that of border disputes. Israel and Egypt continued their complex but peaceful negotiations over the Taba dispute. Border wars and subversion between Oman and the PDRY came to a practical standstill, with one accidental incident in October. And Qatar and Bahrain, through Saudi mediation, reached reconciliation in their dispute over the Bahraini-controlled Fasht al-Dibal island, and in December agreed to submit their dispute to the International Court of Justice for arbitration. The long-lasting border dispute between the Yemeni Arab Republic and the PDRY was dormant in 1987. The only exception to this otherwise relaxed state of affairs was the old Turkish-Greek dispute which, in March, saw another "up" in tension. However, it did not deteriorate to the point of violence.

At the end of 1987, the ME scene was thus different in detail, but not in essence, from what it had been at the end of the previous year. However, the incremental dynamics of trends and events that took shape or occurred in 1987 were about to introduce significant changes into the scene in 1988. Missing in 1987, as in previous years, was a visionary breakthrough that might open prospects for a more tranquil ME. Not only was this not accomplished, but it hardly occupied a place on the regional agenda.

NOTE

1. This integrative essay is based on the chapters that follow in this volume of *MECS*. In many instances, therefore, paraphrases of contributors' writings have been incorporated. Whenever a passage appears in inverted commas without attribution to an author, it has been taken from the chapter on the relevant country. Longer or more meaningful quotations are explicitly attributed.

THE MIDDLE EAST AND WORLD AFFAIRS

The United States' Middle East Policy in 1987

BARRY RUBIN

US Middle East policy during 1986–87 was concerned mainly with the Persian Gulf, where new problems were added to old ones to preoccupy the Reagan Administration. A central issue involved the Administration's 1985–86 secret arms sales to Iran. Ostensibly intended to rebuild US–Iran relations, their principal objective seemed to be to obtain the release of Americans who were held hostage by pro-Iranian terrorists in Lebanon. When these activities were revealed, in November 1986, the result was a major national controversy that seriously damaged the government.

The second important development was the significant escalation of US intervention in the Gulf, when the Administration allowed Kuwait to register 11 tankers under American flags. The US Navy escorted these ships in an attempt to protect them from Iranian attacks. There was an apparently accidental Iraqi attack on a US naval vessel, and there were several small-scale clashes between US and Iranian forces, but no major confrontation.

On the Arab–Israeli peace process, Washington took relatively little action after King Husayn's abandonment of his 1985–86 initiative (see *MECS* 1986, essay on the ME peace process). Nonetheless, the attempt to convene an international conference on the issue continued with important implications for future US policy.

THE IRAN ARMS DEAL AND ITS AFTERMATH

The Administration followed a consistent position on the Gulf War from the time it took office in 1981: neutrality modified by a tilt toward Iraq. This posture avoided entanglement in the fighting, kept open the possibility of a future *rapprochement* with Iran, and reduced the chance that Iran would be pushed into an alliance of convenience with Moscow. Some US allies — including France, Egypt, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia — aided Iraq, while others — notably Israel, Pakistan, and Turkey — kept channels to Iran open through overt or covert trade and diplomacy.

The pro-Iraqi tilt helped prevent that country's defeat. Washington gave Baghdad trade credit and intelligence. Large amounts of modern weapons and a great deal of military training were provided throughout the 1970s and 1980s to improve the Gulf Arab states' defensive capabilities. No attempt was made to prevent US allies from selling arms to Iraq, while Washington made it clear to all its allies — in a campaign called "Operation Staunch" — that it did not want them selling arms to Iran.

As President Ronald Reagan began his second term in January 1985, the question of Iran preoccupied his top advisers. They had an exaggerated fear of a Soviet takeover and more rational concerns that Iran might defeat Iraq and spread Islamic revolt. The White House found particularly frustrating its inability to free American hostages held in Lebanon by Iran-backed terrorists. But the prospect of

rapprochement with Iran or a serious retaliation against it seemed most unlikely. At this unpromising moment in the spring of 1985, Iranian emissaries appeared claiming to represent moderates who wanted to overthrow rivals they accused of being pro-Soviet. Thus began a complex series of talks and arms deals that would shake the Administration and American public opinion when revealed in November 1985.¹

Some Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and National Security Council (NSC) officials had developed, in the first half of 1985, an excessive concern that Iran might turn toward the USSR. When Iranians approached Israel claiming to represent moderate factions that sought to press their government toward a stance friendlier to the West, the Israelis pursued these contacts and passed them on to the US. Reagan was informed of these initiatives and sent NSC consultant Michael Ledeen to meet Manouchir Ghorbanifar, an Iranian merchant and intermediary.

Ghorbanifar and other Iranians with whom Ledeen met, mid-level officials linked to *Majlis* Speaker 'Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, wanted to buy arms and indicated that American hostages would be released in exchange. The US had placed an arms embargo against Iran in 1979 and had urged other countries not to sell that country arms in order to weaken Tehran's war effort. Nevertheless, the US Government gave permission to Israel to send 504 *TOW* anti-tank missiles. These were flown to Iran in August-September 1985. On 14 September, the date of the last shipment, Rev. Benjamin Weir, an American hostage in Lebanon, was released.

Hoping to obtain the release of all the hostages, the US Government now approved a shipment of 120 *Hawk* anti-aircraft missiles to Iran in exchange for the release of all the hostages. The first 18 missiles were sent from Israel in November 1985, but, because they were not the latest model, the Iranians returned them. Meanwhile, however, matters were further complicated as Lt. Col. Oliver North, of the NSC staff, used excess money from Iranian payments to obtain and ship arms for the US-backed Nicaraguan guerrillas, the *Contras*.

The Administration was now split over whether to try again, with Secretary of State George Shultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger opposing any further sales, and National Security Adviser Adm. John Poindexter and CIA Director William Casey supporting them. Reagan signed a "Finding" authorizing the sale of more arms to Iran and the NSC took over the administration of the program.

In February 1986, the US sold an additional 1,000 *TOW* missiles to Iran. North also supplied some intelligence designed to convince Tehran of a Soviet threat. Additional funds were generated and used for the *Contras* and other covert operations around the world. But, again, Iran did not live up to the US expectation that it would help to free all the remaining hostages.

A third round of attempted exchanges with Iran began in May 1986. *Hawk* missile parts would be offered to Iran, but only on condition that all American hostages in Lebanon were released. Robert McFarlane, the former national security adviser, traveled to Tehran with the first shipment of *Hawks*. There he met with government officials, albeit at a much lower level than he had expected. Unable to reach any agreement, he considered the mission a failure. However, on 26 July 1986 a second American hostage, Fr. Lawrence Jenco, was released. Although McFarlane had warned the Iranians that no further arms would be sent, the Administration again relented and sent more *Hawk* parts after Jenco was freed.

In September 1986, the NSC began negotiating with a new group, the "Second

Channel," apparently members of another Iranian faction linked to Prime Minister Mir-Husayn Musavi. The American negotiators promised to press the Kuwaiti Government to release 17 Shi'ite terrorists, members of the Iranian-backed *al-Da'wa* group, held for a major series of attacks in December 1983. North and retd. Gen. Richard Secord, the man handling the logistics for the Iran and Contreras arms supplies, also told the Iranians that the US would help them remove Iraqi President Saddam Husayn and defend their country against Soviet aggression. (These commitments had not been approved by the president.)² In addition, 500 more *TOW*s were supplied in late October. A third hostage, David Jacobsen, was released on 2 November 1986.

The President's Special Review Board (known as the Tower Commission) that was set up to investigate the affair, published its report in November 1986. According to the report, the motives for all these activities and maneuvers were:

First the US Government anxiously sought the release of seven US citizens abducted in Beirut...held hostage by members of Hizballah, a fundamentalist Shi'ite terrorist group with links to the regime of the Ayatollah Khomeyni.

Second, the US Government had a latent and unresolved interest in establishing ties to Iran. Few in the US Government doubted Iran's strategic importance or the risk of Soviet meddling in the succession crisis that might follow the death of Khomeyni. For this reason, some in the US Government were convinced that efforts should be made to open potential channels to Iran.

Arms transfers ultimately appeared to offer a means to achieve both the release of the hostages and a strategic opening to Iran.

In its critique of the operation, the commission found it to have been "directly at odds" with other important policies, including the Administration's stance over terrorism and the Iraqi-Iranian War. The concern over hostages became the dominating factor, pushing aside and even contradicting any effort to rebuild the strategic relationship between the US and Iran. The arms sales created:

an incentive for further hostage-taking [and] could only remove inhibitions on other nations from selling arms to Iran. This threatened to upset the military balance between Iran and Iraq, with consequent jeopardy to the Gulf states and the interests of the West in that region [and] rewarded a regime that clearly supported terrorism and hostage-taking. They increased the risk that the US would be perceived, especially in the Arab world, as a creature of Israel. They suggested to other US allies and friends in the region that the US had shifted its policy in favor of Iran. They raised questions as to whether US policy statements could be relied upon.

And, in the end, the offer had not even brought the release of the hostages.³

A congressional investigation subsequently made similar points and concluded:

* The US armed Iran, including its most radical elements, but attained neither a new relationship with that hostile regime nor a reduction in the number of American hostages.

* The arms sale[s] did not lead to a moderation of Iranian policies....And Iran to this day sponsors actions directed against the US in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere.

* The US opened itself to blackmail by adversaries who might reveal the secret arms sales and who, according to North, threatened to kill the hostages if the sales stopped.

* The US undermined its credibility with friends and allies, including moderate Arab states, by its public stance of opposing arms sales to Iran while undertaking such arms sales in secret.⁴

The Administration maintained it was acting to gain influence in Iran and to help moderate factions in the country rather than merely to free hostages. Earlier, on 13 November 1986, Reagan explained in a national address that he had sought "to renew a relationship with the nation of Iran, to bring an honorable end to the bloody six-year war between Iran and Iraq, to eliminate state-sponsored terrorism and subversion, and to effect the safe return of all the hostages....The US has not swapped boatloads or planeloads of American weapons for the return of American hostages." Instead, he stated, only one planeload of arms had been sent to establish his negotiators' credentials.⁵ Indeed, this argument echoed an NSC memo written by North in December 1985: "Achieving a more moderate Iranian Government depends on [winning] credibility as one who can 'deliver' on what the Iranians need."

There was overwhelming public disapproval and the affair was widely criticized on a number of grounds. The Administration's behavior blatantly contradicted its own stated policies of not negotiating with terrorists and of discouraging other countries from selling arms to Iran. Thus, US credibility on these issues was severely damaged. Terrorists, it was argued, would now be encouraged to take more hostages; allies would be discouraged from taking a tough line against terrorism and could not be asked to refuse to provide Iran with weapons.

On strategic grounds, the policy was criticized for seriously misestimating the Soviet threat to Iran and the state of the Iraqi-Iranian War; moreover, it even misread the US's own interests. It could also damage American relations with Iraq and the Gulf Arabs. On procedural grounds, it was said to have been amateurishly implemented, having failed to produce results. White House lines of authority and decision-making methods were found to be inadequate.

Constitutional objections were raised over the fact that Congress had been systematically excluded. The president, it was pointed out, had even ordered Casey (in January 1986) not to follow procedures for allowing the intelligence committees to pass judgment on the covert operations. The fact that money had been diverted for the Contras, contrary to congressional decisions to withhold aid from them, also seemed an act of bad faith. On legal grounds, questions were raised about the use of US funds and weapons, the enrichment of private individuals, the destruction of official documents, and the authority assumed by individual officials in their actions.

Poindexter and North were relieved of their duties on 25 November 1986, following the disclosure of the diversion of funds to the Contras. The president's chief of staff, Donald Regan, resigned a few weeks later.

In addition to the hearings conducted by the Tower Commission and a House-Senate committee, there was an investigation by an independent prosecutor. The congressional committee's hearings were televised and widely discussed during the summer of 1987.

Even within the executive branch there was dissent. Shultz had opposed the Iran

arms sales policy, though not strenuously, in internal discussions. The open criticism by Under Secretary of State John Whitehead in congressional testimony was virtually unprecedented. "We in the State Department found it difficult to cope with the National Security Council's operational activities. I don't like to have to differ with my president, but I believe there is...evidence of continuing Iranian involvement with terrorists."⁶

The president himself generally rejected the more substantive criticisms. "What is driving me up the wall," he complained, "is that this wasn't a failure until the press...began to play it up. I told them that publicity could destroy this, that it could get people killed. They then went right on."⁷

The number of American hostages held in Lebanon actually increased during the course of the secret US-Iran contacts, despite the release of three people in exchange for arms. This fact reinforced the assertion that concessions to terrorists only encouraged them to carry out more attacks. The following were still held in early 1988 (the date of their abduction is given in parentheses): Terry Anderson, chief Middle East correspondent of the Associated Press, and Thomas Sutherland, an administrator at the American University of Beirut (1985); Frank Reed, head of the Lebanese International School, and Joseph Cicippio, deputy controller of the American University of Beirut (September 1986); Edward Tracey, an itinerant poet (October 1986); and Professors Allen Steen, Jesse Turner, and Robert Polhill (January 1987). The kidnappers of the last three threatened to kill them if Muhammad 'Ali Hamada, who had been detained in West Germany on suspicion of hijacking the TWA airliner to Beirut in 1985 and murdering an American passenger (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 87-99), was extradited to the US.

Many observers felt that the arms-for-hostages deal with Iran made it harder for the US to urge other countries to take a tough line against terrorism. US public opinion, however, changed in the opposite direction. Earlier, sympathy for Americans held in Lebanon produced sentiments favoring active government efforts to obtain their release. But polls indicated that the Iran affair had hardened popular opinion against making concessions to terrorists. It was also generally assessed that the president had not fully understood the issues at stake. The Iran arms deal was broadly regarded as the Administration's greatest single mistake and its most costly error.

DEEPENING ENGAGEMENT IN THE PERSIAN GULF: REFLAGGING

The US policy to keep away from direct involvement in the Gulf was based on the desire to avoid entanglement in the war and the fact that the local Arab states rejected — and might be damaged by — an increased US presence. The US had four basic objectives in the region: (1) blocking Soviet control or influence; (2) deterring Iran from attacking its Arab neighbors or fomenting Islamic fundamentalist revolutions; (3) ensuring the export of oil at levels required by the US and its allies; and (4) preserving US credibility as a power capable of protecting Gulf security and friendly regimes.

By 1987, however, the Administration had come to believe that new developments warranted a change in this basic strategy. High US officials felt that its objectives were critically endangered by Kuwait's request that Moscow lease it three ships. Earlier, Washington had been unenthusiastic about the idea of putting Kuwaiti tankers under

the US flag; but this position was reversed literally overnight in the face of a possible Soviet initiative.

The sequence of events was as follows: on 1 November 1986, Kuwait notified the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) that it was seeking international protection for its tankers. The Kuwaitis inquired about the technical requirements for reregistering tankers as US-flag ships on 10 December. The first query about the possibility of reflagging came on 13 January 1987. At about the same time, the US learned that Kuwait was discussing a similar arrangement with the Soviets.

On 23 January, Reagan restated his commitment to maintain the free flow of oil from the Gulf, as the White House informed Congress that it was requesting the sale of a squadron of F-16 fighter planes to Bahrain, and of Bradley fighting vehicles to Saudi Arabia. Six days later the State Department told Kuwait that it could reregister the ships as US vessels, and on 6 February, added that the US would protect them. Kuwait applied for reflagging on 2 March and was offered protection five days later. Kuwait agreed on 10 March and the Administration informed Congress of the offer on 12 March. On 2 April, Kuwait formally accepted the offer. The point of these three rounds of exchanges was first to work out the agreement between the White House and Kuwait before members of Congress or the US public were informed.

The Administration then stated its case boldly. If the US did not act, said National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, our allies "will be faced with either giving in to Iranian intimidation or accepting Soviet offers of protection, and not just for shipping." Shultz spoke in apocalyptic terms: "The worst thing that can happen to the US is to be sort of pushed out of the Persian Gulf.... One of the worst things in the world that could happen would be to find the Soviet Union astride the supplies of oil to the free world." Reagan summed it up: "In a word, if we don't do the job, the Soviets will."⁸

Attention was also drawn to the Gulf by a dramatic event on the night of 17 May. An Iraqi *Mirage* fighter plane fired an *Exocet* missile at the US frigate *Stark* about 110 km. northeast of Bahrain, resulting in the deaths of 37 crew members (for details see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). The Iraqi Government said the attack was a mistake and the US Government accepted the apology, although US Navy investigators were not allowed to interview the pilot.

The reflagging issue produced a controversy which took on both procedural and political aspects. On the procedural level, there was criticism that the Administration did not present Congress with CIA assessments warning that the American naval presence might lead to armed conflict, and chose to present instead the far more optimistic assessment of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

In addition, there were questions about whether congressional approval for reflagging was needed and whether the War Powers Act applied. Many senators and representatives clearly felt uncomfortable with the new Gulf policy. In the colorful words of Representative Toby Roth (Republican-Wisconsin): "At best the Persian Gulf is a snakepit and we're going to be bit again." Senator Dale Bumpers (Democrat-Arkansas) said: "There's not one member of this body that doesn't know we're courting disaster in the Persian Gulf... that a lot of sons aren't going to come back from the Persian Gulf." Even the relatively hawkish Senator Sam Nunn (Democrat-Georgia) said the plan "poses substantial risks" of violent confrontation with Iran. Nunn concluded that the US had "vital strategic interests" in the Gulf, but they were "not being substantially challenged at this time."⁹

The Administration denied the jurisdiction of the War Powers Act which required that the president report to Congress within 48 hours of US troops being in danger of hostilities. Unless Congress approved the military operations within 60–90 days, he had to remove the troops. Many Democrats wanted to apply the law to the situation in the Gulf, but a Republican filibuster blocked action for several weeks. The Senate finally refused to invoke the act by a 50–41 vote.

But Congress also had tremendous respect for the president's role as commander in chief, and a great fear of appearing indifferent to a Soviet advance into such a critical region. Representative Lee Hamilton (Democrat-Indiana), chairman of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, said: "I think the Congress would approve the president's policy in the Gulf if it was called upon to vote. Part of the reason is that there's no clear alternative."¹⁰ Once conveying began, its members largely accepted the argument that the US could not revoke such a public commitment.

The general public took a similar attitude. Asked if they supported a US military presence in the Gulf to protect the free flow of oil, 75% of those polled said yes, and only 24% said no. They were less sure of the US's ability to defend itself in the Gulf — 46% had "a great deal of confidence," 42% "some confidence," and 12% little or none. Asked if the US should take all steps including the use of force, to ensure an adequate supply of oil, those queried agreed by a relatively narrow 57–39 margin. They approved of "US ships escorting those reflagged oil tankers even if the US ships risk being attacked," but only by 53–44%.¹¹

On the substantive plane, many wondered whether the reflagging and conveying were really necessary or beneficial. Even Secretary of the Navy James Webb questioned, in a tough memorandum, whether it was wise to send a force without clear military objectives. Former secretary of state Henry Kissinger wrote:

The odd aspect of the crisis is that nothing significantly new has happened. The rate of attacks continues about at the level of last year, when no Western country — including the US — bothered to protest, and the US was clandestinely shipping arms to Iran. The best evidence that there is no new threat is that ship insurance rates for the Gulf have not changed appreciably in 1987.

Yet despite this lack of urgency, "America thus risks being drawn into an expanded military role that cannot be decisive."¹²

A Senate Foreign Relations Committee staff report in October concluded: "Overall, American policy toward the warring nations has comprised first a tilt toward Iraq, then arms sales to Iran, and now an even stronger involvement on Iraq's side. This incoherent policy has been confusing to the nations of the region and debilitating to American credibility."

The Soviet threat was also arguably overstated by the Administration. Kuwait's strategy, it seemed, was to play off the superpowers against each other, avoiding dependence on either one while trying to align both of them against Iran. As the Kuwaitis had hoped, their small gesture set off alarm bells in Washington. Soviet involvement, ran the Administration's argument, meant that the US must rush in to prove itself the real defender of Gulf security. Even the Kuwaitis seemed bemused. "The US's problem," commented Sulayman Majid al-Shahin, undersecretary at the

Kuwaiti Foreign Ministry, "is that the mentality of Hollywood tends to influence it sometimes. As for Soviet tankers, these have been quietly sailing in the Gulf for some time. So what has changed?"¹³

The second main US objective was to bring the war to an end and thus reduce the possibility of it spreading or Iran intimidating the Gulf monarchies. On 7 May, Washington announced its willingness to support sanctions against any country that refused to cooperate to end the war. On 20 July, the UN Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 598 calling for a total cease-fire, a withdrawal of troops to the international boundary, and a political settlement to the war. It seemed likely that another resolution, No. 559, would soon be passed to impose sanctions — including an arms embargo — on Iran for refusing to comply.

The Iranians, however, outmaneuvered US diplomacy by pronouncing themselves ready to accept a cease-fire if the UN first found Iraq responsible for starting the war. Yet given the continued domination of Ayatollah Khomeyni's hard line, this might only be a first step. Once negotiations began, Iran would use Iraq's war guilt as justification for its demands to overthrow the Saddam Husayn regime. Tehran also courted Moscow, persuading the Soviets not to back a UN resolution involving sanctions. Although the Administration repeatedly stated its belief that the Soviets would support the resolution, few hopes remained after General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev's December visit to Washington.

The third US objective was the continued free flow of oil from the Gulf, which provided about 66% of Japan's imported oil and 40% of the petroleum imported by Western Europe. Despite the numerous attacks, mainly by Iraqi planes and most often against Iranian-flag boats, and despite the dozens of seamen killed, ships suffered relatively minor damage and a surplus of tankers made shipping companies eager to undertake the Gulf run. Oil prices generally fell and there was still so much petroleum available that Opec was hard-pressed to hold down production.

By and large, reflagging Kuwaiti tankers did not greatly contribute to protecting this commerce, as US warships ignored Iranian and Iraqi attacks on non-US-flag ships. The Administration was far more successful, however, in gaining the support of West European allies. Britain, France, Italy, and other countries followed the US lead in sending naval forces to escort tankers.

In addition, the Administration stressed another objective: the need to preserve US credibility. Washington's basic assumption was that the Gulf Arab states would cooperate fully with the US as soon as they were persuaded that it was serious and consistent in protecting them. But the policy of Arab states was a largely independent variable based not on a yearning for US guardianship but on the rulers' domestic and regional political requirements. They wanted the option of enjoying American help in ending the war without the risk of direct involvement in the war or providing too much assistance to the US.

Defending the credibility argument, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy argued in testimony presented to Congress on 19 May 1987 that, "in the light of the Iran-Contra revelations, we had found that the leaders of the Gulf states were questioning the coherence and seriousness of US policy in the Gulf along with our reliability and staying power. We wanted to be sure the countries with which we have friendly relations — Iraq and GCC states — as well as the Soviet Union and Iran, understood the firmness of our commitments."¹⁴

Murphy also assessed positively the actual operations in the Gulf:

To date, Iran, has been careful to avoid confrontations with US-flag vessels when US navy vessels have been in the vicinity. US Military Sealift Command and other commercial US-flag vessels have transited the Gulf each month under US navy escort without incident. We believe that our naval presence will continue to have this deterrent effect. Iran lacks the sophisticated aircraft and weaponry used by Iraq in the mistaken attack on the USS *Stark*. Moreover, we will make sure in advance that Iran knows which ships have been reflagged and are under US protection.¹⁵

This situation essentially continued during the rest of the year. The Iranians went around the Americans instead of attacking them, but this use of guerrilla tactics also created problems for the US and the Gulf states. Thus, Iran mined Kuwait's harbors and the open Gulf waters, and used HY-2 *Silkworm* missiles to strike at Kuwait, while its Revolutionary Guards used hundreds of small speedboats for stepped-up attacks on tankers flying the flags of countries not participating in the convoys. (See essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War.)

The GCC states also continued to evince great doubt about US credibility in the face of both the superpower conflict and the threat from Iran. For example, *al-Wahda* (United Arab Emirates) said the war must be ended "to ensure that the Gulf is not converted into a US and Soviet arsenal under the pretext of protecting their military presence and strategic interests." Kuwait's ambassador to Washington complained that "Iran is now settling its score with America at the expense of Kuwait." The GCC states were reluctant to offer the US even minimal military facilities even in cases where the US Defense Department said assistance was forthcoming. Kuwait, for example, would not allow minesweeping helicopters to take off from its territory. Nonetheless, the Administration drew comfort from the fact that the Amman summit supported the measure Kuwait was taking in its defense, an implicit endorsement of the US presence.¹⁶

The revision of the traditional GCC position opposing the presence of any US warships in the Gulf was, indeed, a dramatic change brought about by the war and the fear of Iran. AWACS surveillance planes based in Saudi Arabia and P-3 reconnaissance aircraft taking off from Kuwait provided vital intelligence for the convoys. But the need to base US *Sea Stallion* mine-hunting helicopters on ships made it harder to clear the obstacles, particularly in the upper Gulf. In private conversations, American officials and officers indicated their dissatisfaction with the level of GCC assistance.

The Administration's policy on the military aspect of the reflagging policy was articulated by Weinberger, who promised that the US protection of ships was "not part of an open-ended unilateral American commitment to defend all non-belligerent shipping in the Persian Gulf." Rather, "we're there to ensure that there will be the free passage of vitally important cargoes in international waters." As part of "the normal course of patrolling," US military forces would "make sure of no additional minelaying, no additional concentrations that might be attempting to interfere with the free passage of navigation." It was most important to ensure "that Iran did not succeed in being dominant in the Persian Gulf by intimidating and bullying the Gulf states, and that the Soviet Union did not become, in a sense, the protector of these vital supply routes."¹⁷

The 835-km. run from the mouth of the Gulf to Kuwait's oil terminal took two days. The Strait of Hormuz provided a channel that was only 35 km. across at its widest, bringing ships in sight of Larak Island with its Iranian refinery. Through this chokepoint flowed 7–8m. barrels of oil a day. The first convoy entered the Gulf on 22 July. The US navy force in the Gulf included 11 warships and 17 supply, patrol, and minesweeping craft, involving about 4,000 personnel. An additional 16 ships, including an aircraft carrier and a battleship, comprising about 12,000 personnel, remained outside the Strait. The cost of the operation was estimated at \$15m.–\$20m. per month.

The failure to bring in minesweepers — intelligence had earlier warned about the danger of Iranian-planted mines — turned out to be an embarrassing military oversight. The reflagged tanker *Bridgeton* was damaged by a mine on 24 July. Minesweeping ships and helicopters were then dispatched. The convoys continued, each consisting of two to four reflagged ships and two or three warships. In the speech cited above, Weinberger stated that each time ships passed through safely it was a victory.

In his mid-September speech to the UN, Reagan called on Iran to accept a cease-fire “clearly and unequivocally.” But events soon escalated. On 21 September, night-flying US helicopters sighted the *Iran Ajr*, an amphibious landing ship, dropping mines in the Gulf, 80 km. northeast of Bahrain in international waters. American forces attacked the ship, set it on fire, and took it into custody. Some 26 crew members were captured, three were dead, and two were missing. The mines found on the ship were displayed before the international media and the *Iran Ajr* was later scuttled by the US and the crewmen returned to Iran. In his UN speech the next day, Iran's President Muhammad ‘Ali Khameneh’i charged that the attack had created a “grave and immediate danger.” Khameneh’i also “objected to but did not reject” UN Resolution 598, but added that “a principal problem remains punishment of the aggressor before a cease-fire can come into effect.” The US delegation walked out as he spoke. At the 25 September meeting of the Security Council, the Soviet Union blocked an Anglo-American effort to introduce a mandatory arms embargo against Iran.¹⁸

A second military incident occurred on 8 October when US helicopters sank three Iranian gunboats after they allegedly fired at a helicopter 24 km. southwest of Iran's Farsi Island. At least two Iranians were killed. After this, the Iranians were more careful and avoided impinging on the US rules of engagement, even when they attacked foreign-flag tankers very close to US convoys. US ships were permitted to fire if they determined that an approaching ship or plane had “hostile intent.”¹⁹

“We do not wish to get into a conflict with the US and we say so explicitly,” explained Rafsanjani. American policymakers concluded that this was indeed Iranian policy. Yet they also had to take into account the continuing fiery rhetoric emerging from Tehran, such as the Iranian statement that alluded to terrorist attacks on the US Marines and Embassy in Beirut: “We are ready to repeat the events of Lebanon which resulted in their flight.”²⁰

One point of controversy within the US was whether armed assistance should be extended to tankers owned by American companies but flying the flags of other nations whose regulations for operating ships were less strict and less expensive. One such tanker, flying a Liberian flag, was struck by an Iranian *Silkworm* missile in Kuwait's harbor on 15 October. The Administration repeatedly refused to extend such protection.

It was a different matter, however, on 17 October when the reflagged tanker *Sea Isle City* was hit off Kuwait by another Iranian *Silkworm* missile. The American captain was wounded. According to the orders governing the convoys, US protection did not apply within Kuwait's waters. Nevertheless, the attack required some response. US forces warned Iranian personnel to leave one of their oil platforms in the Gulf that was being used as a communications station, and then destroyed it.

The US thus showed its ability to escort the 11 ships and to muster support from European allies. But the wider issues remained unresolved. A GCC leader commented: "The whole issue is out of focus when one talks about accompanying or escorting ships. The issue is the war and how to end it." A Saudi official complained that the US was merely "administering pinpricks." He continued: "Hitting small boats doesn't matter. What matters is that the American military presence, in order to be justified by us, must [ensure] our total security by [ensuring that] Iran [is reduced] to total paralysis." Certainly, the US had entered into a long commitment whose direction and results were still unclear.²¹

ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

The idea of resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict was understandably attractive for American policymakers. A success in negotiating peace would bring great honor on the mediator and greatly simplify the problems of the US in the ME.

But the very factors that invited US involvement also made it a complex, frustrating endeavor. In addition to the long, bitter and entangled conflict itself, there were three additional difficulties for US mediation. First, there were conflicting objectives, not only between the Arab states and Israel but also among the Arab states themselves. Syria, for example, seemed determined to sabotage any negotiations that would give control of the West Bank to Jordan and entrench a Jordan-PLO alignment. King Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat would compete to dominate any future Jordan-West Bank federation, and so on. The US had to consider whether steps to improve relations or make concessions to one side — Syria or the PLO — might weaken and antagonize American allies who were that side's enemies. Washington was also reluctant to make concessions that might strengthen Soviet allies like Syria or the PLO or encourage a direct Soviet role in the peace process.

Second, there were also problematic points in the bargaining position and goals within each state. Jordan wanted the West Bank back, but without having to pay the price of recognizing Israel. Israel wanted peace, but not at the price of a PLO state that might pose a greater threat than the current situation; and leading parties also sought to retain sizable areas of occupied land. 'Arafat would like to have his own West Bank state but would neither recognize Israel nor designate stand-ins to negotiate because he feared Jordanian domination, Syrian revenge, and a split in his own ranks.

All these difficulties were interlocked. During the year under review, as in previous years, it was difficult to envision a diplomatic solution without Syrian participation, but almost impossible to see any framework or outcome that would please Damascus and still be acceptable to Israel, Jordan and the PLO. Husayn could not step forward to negotiate without 'Arafat and, apparently, could not persuade the PLO leader to make enough concessions to be acceptable to the US or Israel as an interlocutor. Consequently, the US Government tended to focus on other, more pressing — or

promising — areas of the world, except when developments in the region itself forced action or gave hope that activism might succeed.

During the Reagan Administration's years in office, its ME policy went through five distinct phases.

From January 1981 to August 1982 (when it formulated a response to Israel's intervention in Lebanon), the Administration downplayed the relative importance of the Arab-Israeli conflict to concentrate on Persian Gulf security issues emerging from Iran's revolution and the USSR's occupation of Afghanistan. Events culminating in the Lebanese crisis made a change in focus seem both necessary and opportune.

From September 1982 to May 1983, the Administration pursued an activist policy aimed at settling the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Reagan plan proposed the establishment of a Jordanian-West Bank federation as a framework for Palestinian self-determination and suggested that, in exchange for Israel yielding territory, the Arabs would recognize Israel and agree to some border modifications to enhance its security. (See *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 30–33.) The US efforts to end the Lebanese civil war and the Arab-Israeli conflict failed. Syria refused to withdraw from Lebanon; the Lebanese political factions could not settle their differences. Heavy losses of US Marines created problems at home. Meanwhile, then-prime minister Menahem Begin, 'Arafat, and Husayn rejected Reagan's plan.

Disillusioned with these efforts, the Administration entered a third period of low activity in the ME which continued up to February 1985. This was a natural course of policy — given the recent failures and disillusionment, and the belief that opportunities were lacking — rather than a mere response to the presidential election year. Only an initiative by regional forces, reasoned the US policymakers, would make American involvement worthwhile.

Such an initiative apparently appeared in the February 1985 Jordan-PLO accord that ushered in the fourth period. It suggested that two key Arab factions would cooperate in moving toward talks through a mechanism that might simultaneously implement the Jordanian option and bring PLO-approved Palestinians to negotiations. (See *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 195–200.)

But there were still major problems. Husayn and 'Arafat insisted on an international conference attended by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and all relevant Arab states. Washington and Jerusalem wanted direct negotiations, arguing that an all-inclusive international conference would be doomed to failure: Damascus could be expected to try to wreck the meeting by pushing the Arab side toward intransigence; while Moscow would try to seek Arab favor and undermine the moderates by raising maximalist demands.

There were other reasons for US skepticism. After all, a central goal of its regional policy had been to reduce Soviet influence. The major American advantage in the superpower competition had been its monopoly in the role of mediator. President Jimmy Carter's 1977 call for a Geneva conference with the US and USSR as co-chairs had been ridiculed as a senseless unilateral concession. Nor did Washington trust Moscow's interest in peace, fearing an international conference would be turned into a propaganda meeting where the Soviets would pose as the champions of the Arabs.

Nonetheless, during the six months after the 11 February accord, the US explored ways of solving the issue of Palestinian participation. The fundamental US approach on the question of representation was to give the PLO a choice: 'Arafat could either

find some format to indicate his willingness to recognize Israel or designate pro-'Arafat but non-PLO Palestinians to represent his interests in preliminary exchanges. After failing to assemble an acceptable joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Washington shifted its emphasis to gaining a compromise on the diplomatic framework for talks.

Shortly afterward, with the Israeli Government expressing its willingness to negotiate with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, Murphy flew to the ME to assess the situation. On a visit to Washington in late May 1985, Jordan's Husayn presented a comprehensive plan for moving the process forward. This four-stage blueprint demonstrated both the promise and the weaknesses of the current phase of the diplomatic process:

(1) The US would meet a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation including Palestinians who were not PLO members.

Israel was worried that such a meeting would constitute US recognition of the PLO without any commensurate Arab concession. The Israeli Government wanted no PLO members involved and argued that members of the Palestine National Council (PNC) should be counted as PLO members. The Administration was willing to meet a group that included even PNC members, but believed the encounter should take place only if there were a guarantee that it would make progress toward direct negotiations.

Husayn was asked to submit the names of potential Palestinian participants, and he, in turn, requested a list from 'Arafat. The result was disappointing: the PLO's list presented in July, even after Jordanian vetting, consisted almost entirely of PLO activists. When then-prime minister Shimon Peres accepted two of the proposed delegates, after rejecting the rest, the PLO withdrew the two men's names. Despite its less-demanding criteria, Washington also found the PLO-Jordan list unacceptable since almost all those named were clearly mid- and top-level PLO leaders. This fact contradicted not only the US position — no recognition of the PLO until it expressed a willingness to recognize Israel and ceased resorting to terror — but also Husayn's own formula.

(2) A US meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation would discuss recognition of the Palestinian right to self-determination within a confederation with Jordan. 'Arafat, according to Husayn, would then be ready to announce his willingness to recognize and negotiate with Israel by accepting Security Council Resolution 242.

Shultz wanted, but never obtained, PLO confirmation that 'Arafat would so act. 'Arafat's top colleagues repeatedly contradicted the king's assertion, making the US skeptical. Just as the Administration wanted a meeting between Murphy and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to lead toward direct negotiations, it also expected 'Arafat to respond with an unambiguous recognition of Resolutions 242 and 338. Events cast doubt on Husayn's ability to deliver on his own plan.

(3) After the exchange of recognition planned in Step 2, Husayn proposed that the US hold another meeting with a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation that would include PLO officials to discuss the details of an international peace conference. As already indicated, however, the statements of PLO leaders and the composition of the proposed delegation seemed to eliminate Step 2 entirely. The US Government was, in effect, asked to recognize the PLO and accept an international conference without prior assurances of any changed PLO policy or eventual direct negotiations.

(4) An international conference of the five permanent members of the Security Council plus Israel, the PLO, Jordan, Egypt, and Syria would convene to arrive at a

peace agreement. The US, opposed to an international conference, preferred that the fourth stage be direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. While Washington was more flexible on permitting PLO involvement, Peres was more willing to compromise on a multilateral negotiating framework and Soviet involvement.

Israel's response to Husayn's idea came in then-prime minister Peres's five-point plan on 11 June, calling for direct negotiations between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation, with US participation. The Security Council members would merely endorse the meeting without participating themselves. Commented Peres, "I believe that Husayn needs peace [and] that he cannot proceed without the Palestinians and, possibly in his opinion, without the PLO either."

The Administration thought the gap had narrowed considerably, but was still unable to resolve the problems of the joint delegation, PLO recognition of Israel, linkage between the steps Husayn proposed, and direct negotiations even within the framework of an international conference. This required a better offer from Husayn and 'Arafat. As Murphy put it in late June: "If 1985 is the year of opportunity, as Arab leaders say, then the Arabs themselves are going to have to make some hard decisions."

By July, the Arab failure to produce a list acceptable to either the US or Israel was dimming hopes for success. Building on its experience with the Reagan plan, the Administration put the onus for ensuring progress on the regional actors. Certainly, explained Murphy, there had been a "sea change" in the attitudes of some Arabs, but the timing for "a big push" was "not an exclusive American calendar."

Shortly afterward, Husayn told the UN: "We are prepared to negotiate, under appropriate auspices, with the Government of Israel, promptly and directly, under the basic tenets of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338" through an international conference that would serve as an umbrella for direct talks rather than as a substitute for them. In his own October 1985 speech at the UN, Peres accepted an international forum and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. This consensus, it was thought, might provide a basis for future efforts.

But hopes for a breakthrough faded. Jordanian Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i rejected any US demand that a meeting should lead to direct Arab-Israeli talks. The PLO had already reinterpreted the accord in a much more restrictive sense. Syrian pressure and terrorism against Jordan, PLO intransigence and internal conflicts, and the PLO's own terrorist activity (most notably the hijacking of the Italian cruise ship *Achille Lauro* in October) brought the initiative to an end when Husayn announced he was abandoning his efforts in March 1986.

Following Husayn's announcement that the joint communiqué initiative was dead, the Administration entered a fifth period that again gave low priority to the ME peace process. Negative experiences with the region in general — the Marines in Lebanon — and with the peace process in particular — the Reagan plan's failure — made the White House feel that the area was a patch of quicksand. The lack of clear opportunities or clear dangers, coupled with the urgency of arms control, US-Soviet relations, and Central America, meant that the ME was placed on the back burner.

The Administration was extremely cautious about becoming involved in a new ME initiative. It was skeptical about Arab attitudes, knew that the National Unity Government in Jerusalem was itself split on the issue, and was aware of the end of its own term in power. The Iran-Contra scandal not only preoccupied the White House,

but also seemed like another case where involvement in the ME inevitably meant political disaster.

Both Peres, now Israel's foreign minister, and Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak pressed for an international conference in their September 1986 meeting, forcing the US at least to consider the idea more seriously if not enthusiastically. In January 1987, after a trip through the region, Murphy said he felt the beginnings of the possibility that a conference might go somewhere. Thus, on 18 February, when visiting Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir met with Reagan in Washington, the president said that the US was prepared to consider an international conference as a way of stimulating direct talks. Having tried the selection of delegations first, in the joint communiqué effort, the Administration was now prepared to try to set up a negotiating framework first.

In April 1987, Foreign Minister Peres appealed to Shultz to travel to the region and work on promoting an international conference. Given these efforts at encouragement and pleas from Peres, Shultz continued to consider the idea and in June stressed his willingness to accept Soviet participation in such a conference. In Shultz's conception, the UN secretary-general would invite Israel, the Arab confrontation states, and the Security Council's permanent members to an opening session. There would be no veto or imposed settlement. There would be a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation and the PLO would have to accept Resolution 242 if it wanted to be represented, or it could choose delegates. This latter point corresponded to the joint communiqué proposal.

Peres went to Washington in September to discuss the matter further, and the following month Shultz traveled to Israel, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan to discuss plans for the peace process. He also met with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze and other officials in Moscow, although the ME was a secondary priority in these meetings preparatory to the coming Reagan-Gorbachev summit.

On the Palestinian aspect, Shultz stated: "The Palestinians must be involved in the peace process if it is to mean anything. There isn't any question about that. [But] it's also true there isn't a role in the peace process for people whose tactics are violent and refuse to renounce violence, who refuse to recognize that Israel is there as a state, and [are not] ready to talk and try to make peace."²²

Congress cited the PLO's involvement in terrorism when it passed legislation demanding the closure of the PLO bureau in Washington that operated under Arab League auspices. The State Department ordered that office to close in September 1987.

During this interregnum in 1987, some problems marked US-Israel relations, although they were generally resolved without serious, lasting damage to the alliance. The first was the Pollard case. Jonathan Pollard, a US navy intelligence analyst, was arrested in November 1985 and charged, along with his wife Anne Henderson Pollard, with passing classified information to Israel. Three Israeli officials were accused of involvement with Pollard. Israel said the case was a rogue operation and promised assistance. The Justice Department later complained, however, that Israel had not helped enough in the investigation.

On 4 June 1986, Pollard pleaded guilty. But despite his cooperation, he was sentenced to life imprisonment on 4 March 1987. His wife was given a five-year sentence. The severity of the sentences was attributed by many observers to Defense

Secretary Weinberger's position that the information passed by Pollard did the gravest danger to US national security. The case extended over 18 months, but the most intense publicity and the most serious bilateral tension occurred in the wake of the sentencing. The greatest point of friction was the fact that Col. Aviam Sela, named as Pollard's controller, had been promoted to command a major Israel air force base. The US Government publicly criticized this action, and Sela resigned a few weeks later.

A second issue was Israel's *Lavi* fighter plane, built in large part with US aid. Again, the controversy extended over several years, with Defense Department officials arguing that the plane was too costly for Israel, and unnecessary. But the most intense bilateral debate took place during the summer and autumn of 1987. After long resisting this viewpoint, for both defense and economic reasons, the Israeli Cabinet finally decided to abandon the project (see chapter on Israel). The US promised compensation by allowing Israeli companies to bid in some US defense procurement projects on terms equal to those enjoyed by Nato allies. There were also negotiations about US aid to Israel for research on defense against strategic missiles. Talks on these matters continued into 1988.

The basic US attitude toward the peace process in late 1987 was that there was little hope for progress based on the Administration's experience during the preceding years. The December Reagan-Gorbachev summit focused on arms control and did not spend any significant time on the peace process. With Reagan's term ending in January 1989, the peace process was again assigned a low priority.

However, the demonstrations that erupted in the Gaza Strip, in December 1987, and quickly spread to the West Bank, led to an upsurge of US activity beginning in January 1988. The American media gave extraordinarily broad coverage to the events in the territories, prodding public debate and government criticism of Israeli policy. On one occasion, the Administration voted for a resolution condemning Israel in the UN Security Council although it vetoed a number of other anti-Israel resolutions there.

Shultz and other State Department officials held extensive meetings with Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli leaders. Among the options for seeking diplomatic progress were the Camp David accords, the international conference model, and attempts to implement some interim autonomy measures. The Administration seemed to favor the last of these three alternatives, stressing also a central role for Husayn in any negotiations.

In response to the situation and as an indication of US engagement, Shultz produced a new plan, presented in January 1988, which combined elements of the Camp David accords, the Reagan plan, Husayn's proposals, and Peres's ideas. There would be negotiations beginning as early as July over granting limited autonomy to the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This would be implemented during a three-year transition period. An international forum of the five permanent members of the Security Council — the US, the USSR, Britain, France, and China — would convene to launch these talks, but would have no veto over the results. These would be followed within six months, or less, by peace talks, which would also be held within an international framework. Governing principles for this negotiation would be the exchange of "territory for peace" and Resolutions 242 and 338.

Although Shultz did not publicly stress the nature of Palestinian representation at

these meetings, he was in favor of it being in the form of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. At times he also seemed to suggest that a meeting co-hosted by the US and the USSR might be acceptable instead of the broader five-party structure.

Essentially, Egypt, Jordan, and Israeli Foreign Minister Peres supported the plan while Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, 'Arafat, and the Syrians were critical. (Jordan, however, began to speak about a separate Palestinian delegation.) Shamir questioned the timetable, the international forum, and the territory-for-peace formula. According to him, the future of the territories should be determined in the peace negotiations rather than prior to them. The PLO and Syria were outspokenly critical. Shultz could maintain that no party had said "no" to his proposals; but, by the same token, none took it up in a way calculated to bring progress.

The problem with the Shultz plan stemmed not from its specific components so much as the structural problems and divergent state and factional interests, as well as the mistrust that had stymied earlier efforts. Moreover, the uprising itself affected the stands of the various parties. The Administration's own limited life expectancy made some of its interlocutors willing to stall for time or, conversely, unwilling to commit themselves since there was no assurance about the continuity of US policy. In Washington, the feeling grew that any further progress would have to await the arrival of a new president in January 1989.

CONCLUSION

Despite the inevitable vicissitudes and uncertainties of ME politics, the overall strategic and political situation in the region was not unfavorable to US interests during the period under review. Terrorism, often aimed against Americans, hypnotized the media and caused a terrible loss in human terms but hardly destabilized the US's fundamental standing in the ME. Islamic fundamentalism had proved incapable of mounting successful or even serious revolutionary challenges to friendly regimes. The Lebanese civil war raged on, but the nightmare of absolute Syrian domination had faded. The Gulf War raged indecisively, but showed no sign of spreading or endangering oil exports. Most significantly, the US retained a wide variety of allies and was seen as the only plausible mediator of the Arab-Israeli conflict and protector of the Gulf Arab states, while the Soviet influence on both fronts remained limited.

Another conclusion accepted by the Reagan Administration was that regional forces had to take the lead in seeking to solve their own conflicts. The US could help this process but was unable to make a breakthrough against the resistance of those directly involved in any dispute. The Administration's experience made it disillusioned about the possibility of the PLO, Saudi Arabia, or Syria being willing to play a constructive role. US policymakers understood the importance of continuing efforts to move the peace process forward, but were more realistic about the constraints on success and the limited costs of failure.

While the strong US-Israel relationship was reinforced by Reagan's personal thinking, a key role in this trend was also played by the power of experience. Officials like Secretary of State Shultz were genuinely frustrated by their efforts to negotiate seriously with the Arabs, to bring the PLO into the diplomatic process, to gain assistance from Saudi Arabia, and to improve relations with states like Syria and Libya.

US regional objectives continued to be defined by four principles: (1) limiting Soviet influence while maximizing its own; (2) encouraging regional stability against the danger of war or radical revolutions; (3) supporting and strengthening allies; and (4) seeking the continued supply of oil at reasonable prices. While, as always, there were numerous points of danger and tension in the ME in 1987, the overall picture in terms of these four concerns was reasonably positive.

Some US experts argued that the strong US-Israel relationship constantly jeopardized all of these policy goals. They predicted imminent Marxist or fundamentalist revolts and the loss of the US's whole regional position if drastic policy changes were not made to incorporate a quick solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict on traditional Arab terms. Although nearly four decades of experience had demonstrated the fallaciousness of this argument and had led US policymakers to reject it, its appeal for some academics and analysts was still strong.

In fact, Washington's relative edge in the East-West competition rested on an ability to maintain good relations with a variety of ME countries — Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and even Iraq. This situation, in turn was based on the US's unique military, political, economic, and technological resources. Whether the issue was mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict or providing the needed training, equipment, and guarantees to underpin Persian Gulf security, the US enjoyed powerful advantages.

But in 1986–87, to an extent greater than ever before, American leaders in all political camps concluded from the regional situation and political framework that Washington could neither dictate terms nor produce magical solutions for the passionate rivalries and problems of the region.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. The source for the breaking of the story was an article in *al-Shira'*, 3 November — DR, 6 November 1986.
2. President's Special Review Board, *The Tower Commission Report* (New York, 1987), p. 73. Members of the commission were former senator John Tower, former secretary of state Edmund Muskie, and former national security adviser Brent Scowcroft.
3. *Ibid.*, pp. 18–19, 63.
4. Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair (Washington, 1987), p. 12.
5. Text in Department of State, Current Policy No. 890, "US Initiative to Iran," 13 November 1986.
6. *The Washington Times*, 25 November 1986.
7. *WP*, 1 December 1986.
8. *WP*, 17, 29 June 1987.
9. *WP*, 3, 30 June, 19 September 1987.
10. Christopher Madison, "A Reflagged Policy," *National Journal*, 28 November 1987.
11. *WP*, 3 June 1987.
12. Henry Kissinger, "Wandering in the Gulf," *WP*, 21 June 1987.
13. DR, 30 June 1987, p. J2.

14. Text in US Department of State, Current Policy No. 958, "International Shipping and the Iran-Iraq War," 19 May 1987.
15. Ibid.
16. DR, 20 May, p. C6. See also *WP*, 26 June, p. A25. Ambassador Sa'ud Nasir al-Sabah, KUNA, 26 October — DR, 27 October 1987, pp. 16–17; see also DR, 23 June 1987, p. J1.
17. *NYT*, 23, 26 September 1987.
18. *WP*, 18 October 1987.
19. See, for example, Loren Jenkins, "Iranians Attack Ship Near American Convoy," *WP*, 12 November 1987.
20. *The Economist*, 29 August; *WP*, 13 August 1987.
21. *WP*, 11 October; *NYT*, 16 October 1987.
22. *The Washington Times*, 16 October 1987.

The Soviet Union and the Middle East in 1987

ROBERT O. FREEDMAN

The year under review was an active one for Soviet diplomacy in the Middle East. Seeking to exploit American discomfiture over the Irangate scandal, Moscow stepped up its efforts to convene an international conference to settle the Arab-Israeli conflict and, in the process, expanded its contacts with Israel. In addition, after first tilting to the Iraqi side in the Iraqi-Iranian War, Moscow reversed position and tilted toward Iran after the US decision to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and provide them with a massive naval escort. The pro-Iranian tilt, however, did not appear to gain the Soviet Union any substantive influence in Iran while it proved increasingly counterproductive to Moscow's efforts to improve its position in the Arab world.

As 1987 began, the US was very much on the defensive in the Arab world. The revelations of US arms aid to Ayatollah Khomeyni's regime undermined Washington's position, not only among Gulf Arab states (whose ties to the US were, to a substantial degree, a reflection of their need for protection against Iran), but also in Egypt and Jordan, two friends of the US who maintained close ties with the Gulf Arabs (see essay on the US and the ME).¹ In addition, the Irangate affair made US efforts to isolate the Khomeyni regime through operation "Staunch" — a worldwide effort to ban arms sales to Iran — look ridiculous, while the "arms-for-hostages" aspect of the US-Iranian deal undercut the US position against international terrorism.

Moscow's major concern about Irangate — that it would lead to a reconciliation between Iran and the US — soon proved unfounded as Secretary of State George Shultz publicly revealed in late January that there had been a secret US-Iranian meeting in December 1986 in which the US told Iran that any further improvement in relations would be based solely on Iran's "willingness to mend its ways."² Given Iran's active prosecution of the war with Iraq and its continued support for international terrorism, a change in Iranian policy satisfactory to the US must have seemed to Moscow to be an unlikely prospect. Indeed, Shultz stated on 29 January that Iran had "very strong ties" with the group that, a week before, had kidnapped three American teachers from the American University of Beirut.³ Two weeks later, Iranian President 'Ali Khameneh'i ruled out any reconciliation with the US unless it ended its "hostility and hatred."⁴

Yet even as General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was seeking to exploit the US debacle over Irangate, he was aware that the Soviet position on the ME was not without its problems. In the first place, the Soviet presence in Afghanistan remained a major barrier to improved Soviet ties with Muslim states, and especially with the Arab world. This was brought home to Gorbachev not only by the continuing lopsided votes in the UN General Assembly calling for a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, but also by the Islamic conference which had met in Kuwait in late

January and called for the "total and unconditional" withdrawal of Soviet troops.⁵ The Islamic nations took this action — one of the few that the divided summit could agree upon — despite the Afghan regime's proclamation of a unilateral six-month cease-fire and its establishment of a National Reconciliation Commission. *Pravda* blamed this action on the influence of the "most conservative" members of the Islamic conference.⁶ Moscow was, however, pleased by the conference's decision to endorse the Soviet plan for an international conference on the ME attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council and the PLO.⁷

A second problem confronting Gorbachev was closer to home: the ethnic rioting in the Republic of Kazakhstan in Soviet Central Asia (a Muslim region) on 16–17 December 1986. The rioting followed the ouster of the Communist Party leader Dinmukhamed Kunaev, a Kazakh, and his replacement by an ethnic Russian, Gennady Kolbin.⁸ Initially the Soviet press was quick to blame the rioting on corrupt opponents of Gorbachev's *perestroika* (restructuring) program who incited young people to take to the streets carrying nationalist banners.⁹ Later in the year, however, *Pravda* was partly blaming the riots on the fact that "no vigorous work was done to expose the reactionary essence of Islam and its attempts to preserve outmoded traditions and notions to reinforce national aloofness."¹⁰

A third problem facing Gorbachev at the start of 1987 was continued instability in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), which had not yet recovered from the events of January 1986 when its former president, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, had attempted to murder his opponents within the South Yemeni Communist Party and a bloodbath ensued.¹¹ The new party leader, 'Ali Salim al-Bayd, journeyed to Moscow in early February for discussions with Gorbachev. The *Pravda* description of the talks as a "comradely, frank discussion" in which "negative as well as positive experiences in the revolutionary struggle" were discussed, indicated the tone of the talks.¹² Gorbachev reportedly lectured al-Bayd on the need to face up to past mistakes, not to move ahead too rapidly ("no revolution is secure against the desire of its vanguard to skip over unavoidable stages"), and to take into account South Yemen's "international position." This last point may well have been related to the continuing suspicions of the Aden regime on the part of its immediate neighbors — North Yemen (the Yemeni Arab Republic; YAR), Saudi Arabia and Oman — all of which Moscow was wooing. If indeed Moscow urged a slow and cautious pace on the PDRY leadership, the lesson might not have been too well learned, despite Bayd's promise to "spare no effort to strengthen security and stability in both parts of Yemen" and "continue work to strengthen relations with all neighboring countries on the basis of mutual respect, non-interference in internal affairs, and constructive cooperation."¹³ In mid-December 1987, the PDRY announced that 35 members of the previous South Yemeni regime had been sentenced to death, a development that angered the YAR, whose president, 'Ali Abdallah Salih, had earlier requested that the South Yemen regime cancel the trials and release the prisoners.¹⁴ The fact that former president 'Ali Nasir, a relative moderate who had encouraged good relations between South Yemen and its neighbors and who was now in exile in North Yemen, was among those sentenced to death, was clearly a blow to intra-Yemeni relations; it also had the potential of damaging relations between South Yemen and its other neighbors, something that would conflict with Moscow's goals in the Arabian Peninsula (see also chapter on the PDRY).

Yet another problem facing Moscow in early 1987 was the series of defeats suffered by its Libyan client in battles against the forces of Chad, which were supported by France and the US. (French planes bombed a Libyan-held airfield in northern Chad on 7 January in retaliation for Libyan bombings of southern Chad.)¹⁵ Gorbachev, who was now actively engaged in an effort to secure a major arms control agreement with the US, was in no mood to help Mu'ammar Qadhafi's regime with anything other than oral support; the USSR accordingly limited itself to urging a solution to the conflict through the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and denouncing US and French help to Chad, as an Afro-Asian people's solidarity organization demanded "the immediate end to imperialist interference in Chad's internal affairs."¹⁶

As Libya's military situation deteriorated (Chadian forces first pushed Libya out of northern Chad and, in August, invaded the disputed Aouzou Strip between the two countries; see chapter on Libya), the Libyan newspaper *al-Jamahiriyya* published an editorial in early January warning that "unless the Soviet Union takes measures against the ['imperialistic attack'] in Africa, friends and allies of the USSR will have no arguments to defend it against its enemies."¹⁷ However, neither this argument nor Qadhafi's offer to allow Soviet nuclear missiles to be based in Libya prompted the USSR to expand its support of Libya.¹⁸ The offer was made after Chadian soldiers captured a Libyan air base in northern Chad in late March. Qadhafi then turned to Druze warlord Walid Junblat for support and recruited 800 Druze soldiers from Lebanon to help bolster the Libyan military position in case the tentative OAU-mediated cease-fire, finally arranged in September, collapsed.¹⁹ Qadhafi also sought to strengthen his position by promoting a unity scheme with Algeria, but this, like many of his previous efforts at Arab unity, proved unsuccessful (see chapter on Libya). The one major meeting between Soviet and Libyan officials in 1987 took place in May when the Libyan foreign minister, Jadallah 'Aziz al-Tahir, visited Moscow. *Pravda's* description of the talks as having taken place in a "businesslike" atmosphere illustrated a relative lack of agreement, as did the fact that neither Qadhafi nor 'Abd al-Sallam Jallud, Libya's number two man, went to Moscow.²⁰

Another problem facing Moscow as 1987 began was the sharp drop in oil prices. Given the fact that the USSR depended on the sale of oil and natural gas for 50% of its hard currency earnings, the precipitous drop in petroleum prices in 1986 was clearly a blow to the already overburdened Soviet economy. Consequently Moscow welcomed efforts to stabilize prices, and an *Izvestiia* article in late December 1986 commented approvingly on plans to raise oil prices to \$18 a barrel:

Nor is the Soviet Union remaining aloof from efforts to stabilize and align prices on the world petroleum market. It has fought for the setting of just, stable and predictable prices and will continue to do so.²¹

One positive result for the USSR of the drop in oil prices and Opec's subsequent efforts to restore them was the January visit to Moscow of Saudi Arabian Oil Minister Hisham Nazir. Nazir went to the USSR to discuss the recent Opec decision and to request Moscow's support — as an oil exporter although not a member of Opec — for the decision. Nikolai Ryzhkov, the Soviet prime minister, in his meetings with Nazir stated that "the USSR approves of Opec's constructive efforts and takes them into account,"²² and Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov then announced that, "as a result of our talks with the Saudi oil minister, we are cutting

back our exports." Nazir was later quoted as saying that the cutback would be 7%.²³ Given the fact that the USSR had long wanted diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia, one of the most important countries in the Arab world, it was not surprising that Ryzkhov also took the opportunity to stress during Nazir's visit that the USSR wanted "normal relations and cooperation on an equal basis with all states," and that it favored mutually advantageous ties with Saudi Arabia in trade, science and culture, among other fields.²⁴

During his visit, Nazir also met with Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze, and one of the subjects they discussed was the rapidly escalating Gulf War that was a matter of great concern for both the USSR and Saudi Arabia. At the beginning of the year, Iran had launched another major offensive against Iraq, and, clearly in reaction to the offensive, Moscow began to tilt toward Iraq. Thus, on 9 January, the USSR issued its most detailed condemnation of the war to date. It was clearly timed as a reaction to the Iranian offensive, and, in its proposed solution to the war, was closer to the Iraqi than the Iranian position, calling as it did for a return to the pre-war borders, "non-interference in each other's internal affairs," and the right of every people "to independence and freedom" and "to choose its own way of life" — a clear rejection of the Iranian goal of deposing Saddam Husayn and setting up an Islamic republic in Iraq.²⁵ At the same time, the Soviet delegate to the UN, Alexander Belogonov, blamed Iran for continuing the war and characterized it as an aggressor nation that should be deprived of arms.²⁶ The new chill in Soviet-Iranian relations was also reflected in an article in *Pravda* which strongly criticized the mistreatment of jailed Iranian Communists.²⁷ Meanwhile, Soviet propaganda was also exploiting a *New York Times* report that the US had provided misleading intelligence information to Iraq,²⁸ something Iraq's First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan then blamed for the loss of the Faw peninsula to the Iranians in February 1986.²⁹ While the US denied Ramadan's charge, the leading Soviet commentator on the ME, Pavel Demchenko, writing in *Pravda* on 25 January, cited it as evidence that the US wanted to prolong the war so as to strengthen its position in the Gulf. Demchenko's article was also critical of Iran for launching its new offensive, and called upon Tehran to respond to the UN call for a cease-fire.

It was in this atmosphere that Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati traveled to Moscow in mid-February. Velayati met first with President Andrei Gromyko, who took a very tough line with him (*Pravda* described the atmosphere of their talks as "frank and businesslike"),³⁰ blaming Iran for continuing the Gulf War and for aiding Afghan insurgents from bases in its territory. Gromyko warned that Iran bore "full responsibility" for allowing the Afghan guerrillas to use its territory, and urged Velayati to influence the Afghans living in Iran to accept the Afghan Government's offer of national reconciliation.³¹ Velayati had an apparently more successful visit with Shevardnadze, resorting to a ploy Iran had used in the past to entice the USSR into better relations.³² The Iranian mentioned a number of economic projects for which his country sought Soviet assistance. As in the past, Moscow was apparently willing to be enticed; the *Pravda* report of the talks noted that the USSR had stated its readiness to consider Iran's requests "in a positive manner."³³

Trade was also a major issue in Velayati's talks with Ryzkhov; *Izvestiia's* report on the talks noted that both men had agreed that the existing level of Soviet-Iranian trade was below the "available opportunities."³⁴ Moscow's willingness to consider additional

aid to Iran may also have been linked to its concern about a possible Iranian move back to the US, given the failure of the January offensive and Iraqi bombing of Iranian cities. According to a Kuwaiti report, Velayati told Soviet officials that the Iraqi bombardment of Iranian cities had caused great destruction and serious damage and that it was likely to make Iran turn openly to the US.³⁵

In examining the Velayati visit, several important issues stand out. In the first place, while Iran's objective was to persuade Moscow to stop supplying arms to Iraq, Moscow had two major goals. It wanted to end the Iraqi-Iranian War and to reach a settlement in Afghanistan. Given Iran's position as a major opponent of the Afghan regime and as a base of support for its enemies, Moscow would welcome Iranian help in achieving a satisfactory settlement in Afghanistan. That Moscow received little support from Iran on this issue became clear less than two weeks later when a Persian-language broadcast from Moscow denounced Iran's leadership for holding "a special consultative meeting with leaders of Afghan counterrevolutionary bands who are ensconced in Iran," issuing "strict orders to prevent the return of Afghan emigrants to their homeland," and using the Army to prevent their return.³⁶ While Moscow was clearly angry with Iran for continuing to prosecute the war, it still had some hope of winning influence with the Khomeyni regime (and positioning itself for good relations with a successor regime). For this reason, and because of continuing concern that Iran might yet gravitate back to the US, Moscow continued to be willing to offer economic assistance to Iran, irrespective of the serious problems that continued to affect the relationship.

Nonetheless, by March 1987 it was clear that Moscow was tilting toward Iraq in the Gulf War, and this tilt was to continue until June, when the major US reflagging effort of Kuwaiti tankers once again prompted Moscow to try to court Iran. During the January-June period, Moscow sought to exploit the furor caused in the Arab world by the Irangate crisis by adopting an increasingly anti-Iranian stance. As mentioned above, the scandal had put the US on the diplomatic defensive in the ME as many of the Arab states that had sought its protection against Iran became bewildered by its "arms-for-hostages" diplomacy. This created something of a vacuum in ME diplomacy which Moscow sought to exploit in two ways. First, by agreeing to a Kuwaiti request to charter three of its ships, Moscow sought to demonstrate that, as in the Arab-Israeli conflict, while the US was arming the enemy of the Arabs, the USSR was aiding the Arabs themselves. Moscow also moved to improve ties with Egypt, an American ally, by rescheduling its military debt. The Egyptians in turn agreed not only to reestablish the Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Society but also to appoint Butrus Butrus-Ghali, Egypt's minister of state for foreign affairs, as its chairman (see also chapter on Egypt).³⁷ In addition, Anatoly Gromyko, son of the president and head of the Soviet Academy of Sciences' African Institute, who was in Cairo in mid-February for an Egyptian-Soviet symposium on Africa (and who met with President Husni Mubarak while there), was quoted in an interview in the Egyptian newspaper *al-Jumhuriyya* as saying:

In the Soviet estimation, Egypt is a friendly country that has great weight in international affairs. We are endeavoring to deepen cooperation with it in certain fields until relations attain the level of the 1950s and 1960s.³⁸

Moscow, however, clearly realized that Egypt was still an ally of the US. Indeed, an

Izvestiia article on 19 February, analyzing the visit of the US aircraft-carrier *Nimitz* to Alexandria, noted ruefully that the vessel "felt very confident in Egyptian waters." The article went on to say that the main US goal was to "irreversibly drive Egypt into the orbit of US policy in the ME. In its efforts to achieve this, the US is ensnaring Egypt not only by means of economic debts, but also by politically compromising it in the eyes of the Arab world, as the *Nimitz* has done, for instance."³⁹ The article seemed to reflect a current of thought in Moscow which, while acknowledging the need for the USSR to improve ties with Egypt, nonetheless continued to be concerned that Egypt, without renouncing Camp David, was increasingly being accepted back into the Arab fold; and that, despite Irangate, the danger still existed of another deal between Israel and her Arab neighbors based on the Camp David precedent, mediated by the US and endorsed by Egypt. For this reason, Moscow had another major incentive to promote an international conference to achieve a ME settlement at this time, and it began to step up its efforts to gain Israeli support for the conference.

The idea of an international conference was also increasingly welcome to Shimon Peres who, after stepping down as prime minister in the National Unity Government in October 1986, had now become foreign minister and vice premier. In addition, the US, with an Irangate-weakened Administration, was under increased pressure from Arab states such as Egypt and Jordan to agree to an international conference.⁴⁰ It was partly in order to deflect such pressure that Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir traveled to the US in mid-February where he branded the idea of an international conference, "a Soviet-inspired notion supported by radical Arabs."⁴¹ At the same time, however, Peres went off to Cairo where he and Mubarak called for an international conference in which Israel would have the right to approve the participants. Their call for an international conference was reinforced by the European Economic Community, which also called for such a conference.⁴²

For his part Shamir stepped up his criticism of the idea of such a conference; on 11 March his office published a formal statement repudiating it. The document was particularly critical of Soviet efforts to achieve an international conference, claiming that rumors of Soviet efforts to improve relations with Israel were essentially "disinformation," and noting that Moscow's goal all along had been a total Israeli withdrawal from the territories captured in the 1967 war.⁴³

As the internal Israeli debate on an international conference heated up (see chapter on Israel), Moscow began to increase its contacts with Israel to signal its desire for improved ties. The Soviet signals took several forms. On the diplomatic front, there was a meeting in Washington between Israeli Ambassador Meir Rosenne and Soviet Ambassador Yury Dubinin in late January in which Dubinin reiterated the Soviet desire for an international conference and reportedly indicated that Moscow was willing to be more forthcoming on Jewish emigration.⁴⁴ According to a report in the Israeli daily *Davar*, Dubinin also indicated that Moscow wanted to resume the diplomatic dialogue with Israel and would consider a visit to Israel by a consular delegation.⁴⁵ While these diplomatic issues were being discussed, Moscow sent a number of non-diplomatic delegations to Israel; however, given the report of their trips in the Soviet press, the visits clearly had a political function. Thus *Literaturnaya Gazeta* on 28 January discussed the visit of a Soviet delegation that signed an agreement with the Weizmann Institute concerning cooperation in genetic and cellular research.⁴⁶ In addition, *Izvestiia* correspondent Konstantin Geivandov wrote two

articles describing his January visit to Israel that were far less negative than previous Soviet reports on the country. He spoke positively of his meeting with a group of Knesset members (MKs) as "constructive and useful" and noted that the MKs had advocated the development of bilateral ties in the spheres of culture, science, and sports. He also commented positively on his meetings with members of Israel's peace camp, including *Shalom Achshav* (Peace Now) and *Yesh Gvul* (There is a Limit). While it also noted a number of negative things about Israel (especially its treatment of the Palestinians), the article was so different in tone from previous Soviet commentaries on Israel that it could be viewed as another indication of Moscow's interest in improved relations, and as a sign to the Soviet public and the international community that Moscow was preparing to upgrade its ties with Israel.⁴⁷

One of the issues the Soviet delegations could not avoid on their visits to Israel was the question of Jewish emigration from the USSR. Given the importance that Israelis attached to this subject, any major move by Moscow to increase the number allowed to leave was seen as a possible sign of the USSR's intention to improve relations. Clearly, however, Soviet-Jewish emigration was more than just a bilateral Soviet-Israeli issue. At the Reykjavik summit in October 1986, President Ronald Reagan had emphasized the issue of Soviet Jewry, thus reminding Gorbachev that one of the ways Moscow could demonstrate its desire for an improved relationship with the US was to increase the number of Soviet Jews allowed to leave the USSR. (Shultz's participation in a Passover Seder with refuseniks during his Moscow visit in mid-April 1987 made the same point.)

As Gorbachev decided to move rapidly for nuclear arms agreements with the US, he must have realized that an increase in Soviet-Jewish emigration would reap important political benefits in the US. At the same time the increase in emigration would — Gorbachev probably hoped — win important political benefits in Israel, at least from the Labor Party whose leader, Peres, had cited that as the price for Soviet participation in an international peace conference.⁴⁸

Thus, although a more restrictive decree went into effect on 1 January, limiting emigration to those with first-degree relatives (mother, father, sister, brother, child) abroad, statements by a number of Soviet officials indicated that emigration would rise. And indeed, after averaging fewer than 100 per month in 1986, the number of emigrants shot up to 470 in March 1987 and 717 in April, with a *Novosti* official, Sergei Ivanko, predicting an exodus of 10,000–12,000 by the end of the year.⁴⁹

It was in this atmosphere that two non-Israeli Jewish leaders, Morris Abram, president of both the National Conference on Soviet Jewry and the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, and Edgar Bronfman, president of the World Jewish Congress, flew to Moscow in late March and met with a number of Soviet officials, including Anatoly Dobrynin, the former ambassador to the US, who was now the director of the International Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). According to Abram, they received "assurances" from the USSR in a number of areas pertaining to Soviet Jewry, in return for their willingness to consider changes to the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments that limited trade with, and credits to, the USSR. Given the importance of this meeting, the assurances in the Abram report are listed below:⁵⁰

- (1) Soviet Jews with exit visas for Israel will travel via Romania on flights to be established.

- (2) All refuseniks and their families will be allowed to emigrate to Israel within a one-year period, except for legitimate national security cases. A procedure will be established, however, to review previous visa denials on national security grounds. This procedure may involve officials on a level as high as the Supreme Soviet.
- (3) First-degree relatives may emigrate for family reunification within an established time frame. There may be flexibility within the framework of the current narrow interpretation of "first-degree relative."
- (4) Cases of those refuseniks recently placed in "never allowed to emigrate" category will be reviewed.
- (5) All Jewish religious books may be imported into the USSR, and a recommended list of books will be submitted.
- (6) Synagogues will be opened on all sites where there is a demonstrated need.
- (7) Soviet Jews will be allowed greater access to rabbinical training. Some may even be allowed to study in the US.
- (8) The teaching of Hebrew in school or synagogue settings will be considered together with similar restrictions applied to other religious groups.
- (9) A kosher restaurant will be opened in Moscow, and liberal provisions will be made for ritual slaughter.

The Bronfman-Abram mission got a mixed reaction in Israel. While Peres warmly endorsed it, Shamir deprecated its value and Soviet-Jewry activists such as Anatoly Sharansky, Lev Elbert and Yuri Shtern, fearing that once the 10,000 refuseniks were allowed to leave the gates would close permanently, denounced it, with Elbert claiming it was a "trade of 3,500 families for 2 m. people waiting to leave."⁵¹

In arranging the meeting with Abram and Bronfman (although subsequently denying that any "deal" had been made),⁵² Moscow apparently had two goals. In the first place, with a new summit on the horizon because Gorbachev had "decoupled" the Strategic Defense Initiative ("Star Wars") from other arms agreements, and with the Soviet leader now energetically pushing his plan for an Intermediate-range Nuclear Arms agreement, the sharp increase in the number of Soviet Jews allowed to leave the USSR, the promise of a still greater exodus inherent in the Bronfman-Abram visit, and the Soviet decision to free almost all the jailed Prisoners of Zion (those imprisoned for wanting to go to Israel), clearly had major public-relations value in the US. In addition, the meeting gave political ammunition to Peres, who saw in increased immigration the price Moscow was paying to qualify for attendance at an international conference.

For his part, Shamir sought to counter this development by formally separating the issue of Soviet-Israeli relations from the Soviet-Jewry issue, a development that angered Soviet-Jewish activists in Israel.⁵³ Meanwhile, however, Peres pursued his efforts for an international conference. Meeting for the first time publicly with pro-PLO Palestinians, Peres claimed that the Palestinians had expressed the desire for Palestinian representatives acceptable to Israel.⁵⁴ At the same time, China, also evidently interested in an international conference, began formal diplomatic talks with Israel at the UN.⁵⁵ As momentum for the conference increased, the Soviets, following up the January talks between Dubinin and Rosenne, announced that they wanted to send a consular delegation to Israel (albeit without a reciprocal visit by an Israeli delegation),⁵⁶ and Peres stated that Moscow had already requested visas for the delegation.⁵⁷

In early April, as Peres set out to visit Spain and to attend the Socialist International meeting in Rome, he was actively pushing for an international conference, while Shamir, who was just as actively opposing such a conference, publicly stated that he hoped Peres's efforts to arrange one would fail.⁵⁸ It was thus in the atmosphere of the beginning of a domestic political crisis in Israel that Peres met with two high-ranking Soviet officials in Rome, Karen Brutents, deputy director of the International Department of the CPSU, and his ME adviser, Alexander Zotov. Peres later described the meeting as "the first serious direct dialogue between the two nations."⁵⁹ The talks created a major political stir in Israel. Although Peres agreed to keep the details of the six hours of discussions secret,⁶⁰ he gave the impression that major progress had been made both in terms of the exodus of Soviet Jews and of improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations. He went so far as to assert that "if there is no international peace conference within the next few months, the chance for peace could slip away."⁶¹ He also leaked the information that the USSR had spoken against any "coercion" by the superpowers in the context of an international peace conference, or by the conference itself; that Moscow had agreed to the idea of bilateral talks as part of the international conference; and that they had spoken of Palestinian representation at the conference in more general terms than just the PLO.⁶²

The Likud political counterattack was not long in coming. Even as Peres was meeting with the Soviet officials in Rome, the Likud chairman of the Knesset Subcommittee of Immigration, Uzi Landau, accused Peres of creating the impression that moves towards an international conference were a condition for Jewish emigration from the USSR.⁶³ Shamir was even sharper in his criticism on 10 April, denouncing the idea of an international conference as "national suicide."⁶⁴ The Labor Party, in a formal meeting several days later, responded by stating that it would not accept any restrictions in pursuit of the peace process and the resumption of emigration from the USSR, and asserted that Shamir's statement that the idea of an international conference had been conceived by Peres in a nightmare, might deal a blow to Israel's vital interests and the government's performance. The Labor Party also stated that Peres would submit a "practical proposal" for convening an international conference to the government within a few weeks.⁶⁵

For its part, the Likud, through a spokesman, Yossi Ahimeir, issued a statement that Israel's willingness to take part in the Geneva talks (the international conference planned for 1977) became irrelevant with the signing of the Camp David accords. The statement also noted that the Likud was the first to struggle for the cause of Soviet Jewry, and that the (Labor) Alignment's claim that the Likud was curbing the emigration of Soviet Jewry was "astonishing and ridiculous." Ahimeir also stated that "there is no connection whatsoever and there should be no connection between emigration and the concession of Judea and Samaria."⁶⁶ Shamir himself, seeking the support of Soviet-Jewish activists in Israel in his political battle to torpedo Peres's plan for an international conference, deprecated Peres's efforts to show that there had been a real change in Soviet policy. "There are only rumors and piecemeal reports about a few hundred Jews who have been allowed out, but this does not represent a change," Shamir asserted. "If the Soviet Union wants to improve its image and attain a different attitude from the West by changing its policy on Jewish emigration, it must open its gates and allow hundreds of thousands of Jews out without imposing any restrictions and qualifications. We must not sell the Jewish cause cheaply."⁶⁷

While the internal Israeli debate raged in April, Moscow was not idle elsewhere in the ME. On the one hand it took an active role in the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers (see essay on the PLO) to help the PLO regain a modicum of unity, as the Soviet ambassador to Algeria, Vasily Taratura, helped mediate disputes between Yasir 'Arafat and his erstwhile Palestinian enemies, George Habash of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Na'if Hawatima, of the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP).⁶⁸ The USSR obtained a seat on the PLO Executive Committee for the pro-Soviet Palestinian Communist Party whose representative, Sulayman Najab, would now play a role in determining PLO policy. This was possibly in return for Soviet help (an earlier conference in Czechoslovakia in September 1986 had begun the process of reunification),⁶⁹ or possibly because 'Arafat was more dependent on Moscow for support because of his poor relations with Syria (the Syrian-based Palestinian groups composed of the Abu Musa faction of al-Fath, al-Sa'iqa and the PFLP-GC refused to attend the PNC meeting). It could also have been due to the fact that Hawatima and Habash had pressured 'Arafat into agreeing — at least on paper — to sharply curtail ties with Egypt, as well as to renounce publicly his agreement of February 1985 with King Husayn.

On balance, the outcome of the PNC meeting in Algiers was a major success for the USSR. In the first place, the formal abrogation of the Husayn-'Arafat agreement⁷⁰ seemed to remove the danger, at least for the time being, of a US-mediated deal between Israel and a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation dominated by Husayn. Second, the partial reunification of the PLO with the effective dissolution of one of the main groups opposing 'Arafat, the Palestine National Salvation Front, was another step toward Palestinian unity, which Moscow considered the *sine qua non* for the anti-imperialist Arab unity it had sought for so long. Third, the resolutions at the conference had a distinctly pro-Soviet and anti-American tone.⁷¹ Not only did they call for the fostering of the joint Pan-Arab struggle against Imperialism and Zionism ("particularly the strategic US-Israeli alliance"), and for "strengthening military relations of alliance with the Socialist bloc countries, foremost of which is the Soviet Union," but they also supported Soviet proposals for ending the arms race. Perhaps most important, the PNC adopted the Soviet plan for an international conference with "full powers," in which the PLO would participate "on an equal footing," and also supported the Soviet plan for a preparatory committee to arrange it. Finally, Moscow could not but be satisfied with one of the immediate results of the conference — a sharp deterioration of relations between the PLO and Mubarak, whose reaction to what Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid called an act of "insolence" by the PNC was to shut all PLO offices in Egypt except those dealing with labor and women's affairs.⁷² (The PNC had "entrusted" the PLO Executive Committee to define Egyptian-Palestinian relations on the basis of the 16th PNC session of 1983, which had condemned Egypt for Camp David and stated that relations with Egypt would depend on "how far Egypt retreats from Camp David.")⁷³ Moscow may have felt that the PNC action against Egypt (however much 'Arafat tried to water it down) would constitute a barrier to any future cooperation between Egypt and 'Arafat on a US-sponsored peace initiative, while serving to further delegitimize the Camp David peace process.

While all these PNC developments could be seen as positive for the USSR, there was nonetheless a major problem for Moscow as a result of the PNC meeting — the

increasingly severe split between Syria's Hafiz al-Asad and 'Arafat. Even before the PNC meeting, relations between the two were deteriorating. Syrian-supported Amal troops had besieged the Palestinian refugee camps of Shatila and Burj al-Barajina from October 1986 until April 1987, as both Amal leader Nabih Barri and Asad shared the goal of preventing the reemergence of an independent Palestinian military presence in Lebanon. But as in 1985, the camp siege drove the PFLP and DFLP back toward 'Arafat as their forces joined to fight against Amal. Indeed, Asad may have ordered a truce and the lifting of the siege in early April in an unsuccessful attempt to prevent the PFLP and DFLP leaders from reconciling with 'Arafat.⁷⁴ Consequently, while a *Pravda* article by ME commentator Demchenko took a very positive view of the PNC meeting, it also called upon the PLO to improve its ties with Syria:

... Summarizing the course of the six days of, at times, stormy debate and the decisions made in Algiers, one comes to the conclusion that the PLO has demonstrated that it is a real force to be reckoned with. It succeeded in resolving many organizational problems and determining its political platform. The documents adopted point out the importance of rallying the Palestinian ranks on an anti-imperialist basis, reaffirm the rejection of capitulationist deals of the Camp David type, and voice support for the Soviet proposal to hold an international conference on the Middle East with the participation of all interested parties, including the PLO.

Naturally, the session should not answer all the questions and untie all the knots — this applies particularly to regularizing ties with Arab governments. I would especially like to note that the effectiveness of the program outlined will depend to a large extent on what the Palestinian liberation movement's relationship is like with the other forces opposing imperialism and Zionism, *first and foremost with Syria*.⁷⁵ (Author's emphasis.)

Moscow had the opportunity of trying to promote Syrian-Palestinian cooperation while the PNC meeting was still in progress, since on 24 April Asad began talks in Moscow with Gorbachev. During a dinner speech, Gorbachev frankly noted that the USSR was "saddened by the disunity, friction, and conflicts in the Arab world which are vigorously exploited by imperialists and their henchmen. Naturally, we saw a good sign in the current efforts to restore the unity of the PLO."⁷⁶ For his part, Asad made no gesture toward compromise with the PLO, noting only that Syria also supported Arab solidarity to confront imperialism and Zionism and was "working for a Palestinian national will on a similar basis."⁷⁷ The joint communiqué issued after the visit merely reiterated the previous Soviet-Syrian position on the Palestinian question: "The need to restore unity in the ranks of the Palestinian resistance movement on a principled, anti-imperialist platform was stressed."⁷⁸

But Palestinian affairs were not the only issue of controversy to arise during the Asad visit, as the *Pravda* description of the talks noted that they had taken place "in an atmosphere of friendship and mutual understanding."⁷⁹ Gorbachev was clearly out to signal to Israel Moscow's peaceful intentions, and the visit to the Kremlin by the Jewish State's most implacable enemy provided an excellent opportunity for him to do so. Thus Gorbachev lectured Asad on the need, in the nuclear age, to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict by political means. Gorbachev had also made the point earlier that day when he told Asad:

Today the realities of the nuclear age face us all with the need to coexist with each other, irrespective of whether we like each other or not and regardless of differences in our political and socioeconomic systems or ideological views... We see a just settlement of the Middle East conflict — one of the most complex and involved of the regional conflicts — along political tracks....⁸⁰

Gorbachev also made a major point about Soviet-Israeli relations:

Much has been said lately about relations between the Soviet Union and Israel, and a lot of lies have been spread too. Let me put it straight. The absence of such relations cannot be considered as normal. But they were severed by Israel in the first place. It happened as a result of the aggression against the Arab countries. We recognize without any reservation — to the same extent as with all other states — the right of Israel to a peaceful and secure existence. At the same time, like in the past, the Soviet Union is categorically opposed to Tel Aviv's policy of strength and annexation. It should be plain — changes in relations with Israel are conceivable only in the mainstream of the process of settlement in the Middle East. This issue cannot be taken out of such a context.⁸¹

While Gorbachev was emphasizing the need for a political and peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and indicating to Israel in the process that the resumption of diplomatic relations would not necessarily require a prior Israeli withdrawal, Asad was taking a much tougher line. Perhaps hoping to embarrass Gorbachev into increasing Soviet aid to Syria, to the point of the parity with Israel that Asad had long wanted, the Syrian leader emphasized that increasing US aid to Israel enabled it to continue to occupy Arab territories and resist an international conference.⁸² The Soviet-Syrian communiqué following the talks called for Israel's total withdrawal from all territories occupied since 1967, an independent Palestinian state, and a return of Palestinian refugees to their homes; it also repeated the Soviet call for an international conference under UN auspices, with a preparatory committee to arrange it.⁸³

Another issue discussed by the two leaders was the political influence of religious movements. In part, this may have reflected Moscow's displeasure that a number of Lebanese communists had been murdered by Islamic fundamentalists prior to the Syrian entry into West Beirut in mid-February to put down intracommunal fighting (an action praised by Moscow).⁸⁴ It may also have related to Moscow's hope that Syria would use its influence with Iran to help bring the Iraqi-Iranian War to an end. One of the major barriers to Arab unity had been Syrian (and Libyan) support of Iran while the rest of the Arab world supported Iraq; and Gorbachev may have used the first visit by Asad to the USSR in two years to press upon the Syrian leader the need to end the war. Interestingly, while Gorbachev stressed this point in his speech to Asad, Asad did not mention it in his dinner speech and the joint communiqué noted only that:

The cessation of the bloody conflict between Iraq and Iran, imposed upon two neighborly peoples, and which had bled the resources of these countries, would be a major contribution to the cause of the overall improvement of the situation in the Near and Middle East, and would strengthen the front of the forces struggling against imperialism and Zionism in this region.⁸⁵

Apparently, then, there was as much controversy as cooperation during the visit, although Gorbachev's comment at the beginning of his dinner speech, that the USSR had indicated its willingness to "assist Syria further in maintaining [its] defense capacity at the proper level," may have been aimed at reassuring the Syrian leader.⁸⁶ Nonetheless, despite a successful joint space flight in July, which the Soviet media exploited to demonstrate Soviet-Syrian and Soviet-Arab cooperation, tensions clearly remained between the two countries.⁸⁷ As in the past, there were Syrian complaints about insufficient Soviet military aid. The outspoken Syrian defense minister, Mustafa Talas, complained in a *Washington Post* interview that, during the April trip to Moscow in which he had accompanied Asad, "we had to negotiate, bargain, and fight bullet by bullet, cannon by cannon, and bomb by bomb and we still got the minimum of our needs."⁸⁸ While Western intelligence sources noted that Syria had acquired two squadrons (24) of MiG-29s from the USSR, Syria's Arab enemy Iraq got its planes first, and Talas admitted that a lack of financial resources was hampering Syria from reaching its goal of strategic parity with Israel. (In another *Washington Post* interview, Asad had reiterated that parity remained Syria's goal.)⁸⁹ Talas also asserted that Syria paid cash for Soviet weapons and did so to maintain its independence from Moscow. (He conveniently skipped over the fact that funds from Saudi Arabia had heretofore paid for most of Syria's Soviet arms.) Talas' comments may have been aimed at contrasting the Syrian-Soviet relationship with the Israeli-US one, because Israel was receiving a large part of its weaponry from the US free of charge.

At any rate, while Moscow, in late April, was seeking to profit from the decisions of the PNC and to use the Asad visit to encourage Syrian-PLO cooperation and to signal Israel that it genuinely wanted peace,⁹⁰ a full-fledged political crisis had erupted in Israel, with Peres using the issue of an international conference to try to bring down the National Unity Government. Peres went so far as to claim that Israel had "an opportunity that we have not had [for peace] since the creation of the State of Israel."⁹¹ However, he left open some very basic questions about the conference, such as: (1) Who would represent the Palestinians? Peres claimed Jordan had agreed to abandon the PLO, which had broken with it at the PNC conference in Algiers, but King Husayn, who reportedly had met secretly with Peres in London (see essay on the ME peace process), denied this.⁹² (2) What would be the role of the USSR at the conference? In none of its public statements had Moscow agreed to the basically ceremonial role Peres had described for it. (3) Would the conference as a whole have to confirm the decisions of the bilateral committees? The USSR had continued to indicate it wanted the conference as a whole to approve all bilateral agreements, in short, to be an "authoritative conference."

In any case, the debate, at least in the short run, became academic as Peres found he did not have sufficient Knesset votes to bring down the government on the issue, and by mid-May he announced he was not going to submit the plan for an international conference to the Cabinet.⁹³ In part, Peres's failure may have been due to the PNC meeting in Algiers where neither the resolutions adopted nor 'Arafat's rhetoric were conducive to getting Israel to participate in an international conference. The PNC resolutions advocated "armed struggle" and rejected Security Council Resolution 242, while referring to Israel as the "Zionist enemy," and 'Arafat called for a "united national state" like Canada and proclaimed that "this land, including Jerusalem, headed by Jerusalem, will remain Arab, Arab, Arab."⁹⁴ Such statements could only

strengthen Israeli opposition to international talks attended by the PLO.

Despite the fact that Peres was unable to force new elections over the conference issue, Moscow continued to demonstrate its interest in maintaining contacts with Israel. Immediately after Peres's political failure, the Soviet ambassador to the US, Dubinin, met Peres in Bronfman's Washington apartment to discuss the ME situation and the Israeli cabinet debates on the peace process.⁹⁵ (There were conflicting reports concerning who had requested the meeting.) Then, in July, a Soviet consular delegation arrived in Israel for a three-month stay. While clearly raising the level of their diplomatic contacts with Israel, Moscow played down the significance of this development; the head of the eight-member Soviet consular team, Yevgeny Antipov, deputy director of the Consular Directorate of the Soviet Foreign Service, stated: "Our mission is not diplomatic, not political. It is purely a technical task [to inventory the property of the Russian Orthodox Church and to handle the updating of passports]."⁹⁶

Perhaps to balance the impact of the delegation's visit, the USSR complained publicly about Israel's development of the *Jericho* II missile, which Moscow claimed could strike the USSR.⁹⁷ On balance, however, Moscow sought to slowly, if steadily, improve ties with Israel. Thus, there were numerous meetings between Soviet and Israeli officials (the longest talks — 10 hours — between a Peres adviser, Nimrod Novik, and Vladimir Tarasov of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, took place in mid-August).⁹⁸ And the Soviets did not even bother to deny the Soviet-Israeli contacts to the Arabs as Yuri Vorontsov, the first deputy foreign minister, spoke openly about them in a *Ruz al-Yusuf* interview,⁹⁹ as did Moscow Radio in an Arabic-language broadcast in late August.¹⁰⁰

In addition to the rhetoric, Moscow demonstrated its interest in improved ties with Israel by allowing a second East European ally, Hungary, to establish an interests section in September for low-level diplomatic relations with Israel. After a meeting between Peres and Shevardnadze at the UN at the end of September, Peres claimed that Shevardnadze had offered Israel a similar interests-section arrangement (which Peres rejected),¹⁰¹ and that the USSR did not insist that the PLO represent the Palestinians at an international peace conference.¹⁰² Given Peres's tendency to exaggerate Soviet offers, it was not surprising that Moscow publicly denied them, as an Israeli journalist, commenting on Peres's UN performance, noted critically.¹⁰³ Nonetheless, it was clear that Moscow was continuing to say different things to different audiences. On the one hand, it sought to reassure the Arabs by voting to exclude Israel from the General Assembly and hinting that 'Arafat would soon be visiting Moscow; at the same time, however, it moved to reassure Israel by extending the stay of its consular team there for an additional three months.¹⁰⁴ With both the US and Israeli elections now little more than a year away, Moscow was clearly positioning itself for a future diplomatic move by maintaining ties with all sides.

The USSR was to demonstrate similar flexibility in the spring and summer of 1987 in its policy toward the belligerents in the Gulf. During the spring, Soviet-Iranian relations, which had taken a negative turn following the January 1987 Iranian offensive, continued to deteriorate. As noted above, Moscow apparently tried to exploit Arab unhappiness with the US over the Irangate scandal and agreed to a Kuwaiti request to charter three Kuwaiti tankers, which it said it would escort with Soviet warships, if necessary, as if to demonstrate that if the US did not aid the Arabs

in time of need,¹⁰⁵ the USSR would. Indeed, as a follow-up to the charter announcement on 14 April, Moscow stated that its deputy foreign minister, Vladimir Petrovsky, would visit Kuwait, Iraq, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). Yet just as the US was later to encounter problems with Iran because of its reflagging operation, so too did the USSR. The day after the Soviet reflagging announcement, Iran's Foreign Ministry called the Soviet move "very dangerous."¹⁰⁶ And three weeks later, on 6 May, a Soviet freighter, the *Ivan Korotoyev*, was attacked, in a daylight raid by Iranian patrol boats (the attackers must have known it was a Soviet ship; Tass called the attack an act of "piracy").¹⁰⁷ Less than two weeks afterwards, a Soviet oil tanker, the *Marshal Chuikov*, which had been chartered by Kuwait, struck a mine in the Gulf.¹⁰⁸ These incidents elicited an angry Soviet response: Petrovsky, after returning from his tour of the Gulf Arab states, noted in an interview with Moscow News that the "USSR reserved the right to act according to international law [i.e., in self-defense] if provocative actions with regard to Soviet ships were repeated."¹⁰⁹

Moscow also complained about pro-Iranian forces in Afghanistan rejecting the Afghan Government's cease-fire appeal,¹¹⁰ and about an article in the Iranian newspaper *Jumhuriyye Islami* which claimed that the Soviet republics of Tadjikistan, Turkmen and Uzbekistan, as well as some districts in Georgia, were originally Iran's national territory and ought to be liberated.¹¹¹ The USSR also emphasized its opposition to Iran's efforts to export Islamic fundamentalism. President Gromyko, speaking to a visiting Arab delegation in late April, asserted that "no state had the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another, regardless of pretext."¹¹² And a Moscow Radio broadcast in Persian to Iran in early May noted sarcastically: "Tomorrow Afghanistan or even Turkey may be attacked on the basis of nonsensical pretexts such as a threat against traditional Islamic dress."¹¹³

Yet, despite the sharp Soviet criticism, Soviet-Iranian relations were to take a major turn for the better in mid-June as Moscow once again sought to improve ties; however, it appeared that, just as in the past, Iran was again exploiting the USSR for its own purposes. The cause of the Soviet policy change was Washington's decision not only to reflag 11 Kuwaiti tankers but also to protect them with a flotilla of the US Navy, which would provide a convoy for the ships from the Straits of Hormuz to Kuwait's territorial waters. Moscow saw in this a major American effort to block growing Soviet influence in the Gulf and to improve its ties with the Arabs after Irangate. In a statement on 30 May, Reagan took a strongly anti-Soviet and anti-Iranian position, vowing that "the use of the vital sea lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians. These lanes will not be allowed to come under the control of the Soviet Union."¹¹⁴ On the basis of its own experience with Iran, the USSR may have seen the US move as a source of US-Iranian tension.

Given Moscow's earlier concern that Iran's need for weapons would, as in the Irangate affair, lead it to a *rapprochement* with Washington, any US-Iranian tension over American assistance to Kuwait, a major ally of Iraq, could only be welcomed. At the same time, however, as the Iran-Iraq tanker war escalated, Moscow had to be concerned that the US would use the reflagging operation not only to redeem itself in the eyes of the Gulf Arabs, but also to obtain naval and air bases in the Gulf. Indeed, Moscow was to claim that the US used the accidental attack by Iraq on the US warship *Stark* in mid-May (see essay on the US and the ME) as a "Gulf of Tonkin ploy" to accomplish just such an objective.¹¹⁵ In addition, were Moscow overtly to tilt

toward Iran in the war, it would risk alienating states like Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, which it had been diplomatically courting. On the other hand, however, this must have appeared to Moscow to be an opportune time to win the influence it had long sought with the Khomeyni regime.

Iran was now isolated as never before under Khomeyni, with not only the US pitted against it, but most of the Arab world and Britain and France as well. For this reason, Moscow moved openly to improve relations with Tehran, while at the same time seeking to end the war and getting the American fleet out of the Gulf. In doing this, however, Moscow was careful not to alienate either the Gulf Arabs or the US, to which it had been urging its cooperation in solving regional conflicts.¹¹⁶ This was, however, to be a very difficult diplomatic task.

Moscow's first move to improve relations with Iran came during a Tehran visit by Vorontsov in mid-June. As if to reassure the Iranians, who tended to see the Persian Gulf as their area of dominant influence,¹¹⁷ Vorontsov announced on 6 June, before his trip, that the USSR would not augment its force of three warships in the Gulf.¹¹⁸ In Tehran, Vorontsov reportedly emphasized four major points: (1) the USSR did not have parallel interests to the US in the Gulf; (2) the US was planning projects against both the USSR and Iran in the Gulf; (3) the USSR did not want foreign (non-Gulf) military forces in the Gulf; and (4) the USSR had a great deal of respect for the Iranian Revolution.¹¹⁹

The Soviet representative also discussed a number of industrial projects Moscow was interested in helping Iran with, including the expansion of the capacity of the Isfahan metallurgical complex to 1.9m. tons and the completion and expansion of the Montagen power station.¹²⁰ In discussing these issues Moscow appeared to be seeking to broaden the level of state-to-state economic relations, which it hoped would lead to improved political relations, if not with the Khomeyni regime, then with its successor.¹²¹

Vorontsov received a relatively warm reception although *Majlis* Speaker Hashemi Rafsanjani reportedly told him that the US had used the USSR's "small action" in the Gulf as an excuse for adventurism.¹²² Nonetheless, in an English-language broadcast over Tehran radio — a possible attempt to signal the US that if it pushed Iran too hard, Iran might move into the Soviet camp—Prime Minister Husayn Musavi noted that Iran wanted "clear-cut and friendly relations with the USSR within the framework of [Iran's] principles," and expressed the hope that "the policies of the two anti-imperialist countries would be coordinated both at the regional and international levels."¹²³

Nonetheless, it was clear that Tehran was not changing its position on the situation in Afghanistan and the war with Iraq. A Tehran Persian-language broadcast noted that when Khomeyni met Vorontsov, in addition to calling for "an expansion of relations based on friendship and sincere cooperation" and "totally endorsing" Vorontsov's remarks about Soviet anxiety over US hegemony and its presence in the Gulf, Khameneh'i repeated the "firm Iranian position on the evacuation of Soviet troops from Afghanistan." Khameneh'i also stated that "our resolve to punish the [Iraqi] aggressor has become firmer in every way"¹²⁴ — a statement unlikely to give Moscow much encouragement that Iran was considering an end to the war.

Nonetheless, following Vorontsov's visit to Tehran and his subsequent visit to Baghdad, Moscow on 3 July issued a major new policy statement on the Iraqi-Iranian

War. In a clear demonstration of the similarity of Soviet and Iranian views on the issue, the USSR called for the withdrawal of all foreign ships from the Gulf. Moscow also asked Iran and Iraq to refrain from actions that threatened international shipping, and called for a cease-fire, for the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognized borders, and for UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar to play a "substantial role" in achieving a just settlement. That the Soviet effort was in large part an anti-American propaganda device, however, could be seen from the commentary accompanying the proposal:

The US wants to exploit the present alarming situation in the Persian Gulf area to achieve its long harbored plans of establishing military-political hegemony in this strategically important area of the world that Washington is trying to present as a sphere of US vital interests.

As to several Soviet warships staying in the Persian Gulf to which they in Washington refer, they have to stay in the Gulf for they accompany Soviet merchant ships and have nothing to do with the heightening of tension in the area.¹²⁵

However, just before Moscow issued its 3 July statement, there was a meeting in Moscow between US special envoy Vernon Walters and Deputy Foreign Minister Petrovsky to discuss the Gulf War, but it was clear from the Soviet statement of 3 July that Moscow saw the tactical advantages it might obtain from gaining influence in Iran to be more important than any joint cooperative efforts with the US to pressure Iran to end the war — a policy Moscow was to continue to follow. Thus, while Walters was to say, following his talks, that the US "can count on Moscow's vote for a UN resolution demanding a cease-fire," the US representative, in a news conference following his visit, did not note any Soviet agreement to impose sanctions against Iran if it rejected the cease-fire.¹²⁶

As might be expected, Iran greeted the Soviet proposal for foreign forces to leave the Gulf as "positive."¹²⁷ During a visit to Moscow in mid-July, the Iranian deputy foreign minister, Muhammad Larijani, discussed, among other things, cooperation in economic areas, including oil and gas.¹²⁸ On 20 July, soon after Larijani's departure, the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 598, which called for an immediate cease-fire in the Gulf War and the release of prisoners of war. In additional articles, however, it tilted somewhat toward the Soviet view by entrusting the UN secretary-general with a mediating mission, and urging all other states to "refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict." (Moscow later claimed that the US had violated this article by building up its forces in the Gulf.) Finally, given Iran's continuing desire to have Iraq condemned for starting the war, Moscow also succeeded in inserting an article about an "impartial body" of inquiry to determine responsibility for the conflict.¹²⁹ Given the document's tilt toward the Soviet position, it was not surprising that Moscow praised it,¹³⁰ while the US emphasized the need for sanctions against Iran if it failed to agree to a cease-fire.¹³¹

After the resolution was passed, Moscow adopted a strategy of delaying any attempt to impose sanctions in an obvious effort to win Iranian goodwill.¹³² As the US began its convoy operation, Soviet propaganda began to assert that the US naval buildup in the Gulf was as serious a cause of tension as the war itself.¹³³ In addition, Moscow asserted that the US buildup was a violation of the Security Council

resolution. Perhaps because it was concerned that the US was winning increased influence in the Gulf,¹³⁴ Moscow warned the Arab states there that the region could become a second Vietnam, intimating that just as Vietnam had suffered massive destruction, so too might the Arabs if they got too closely involved with Washington.¹³⁵ Moscow also became concerned at this time that America's allies, at first hesitant about the US naval escort, were now sending their own ships to the Gulf.

Moscow's tilt toward Iran could also be discerned in its evenhanded reporting of the riots in Mecca in late July¹³⁶ (for details see essay on Islamic affairs) — which did not improve Saudi-Soviet relations as the Iranians had publicly called for the “uprooting” of the Saudi royal family.¹³⁷ Vorontsov paid another visit to Tehran in early August. According to the Iranian account of the visit, Khameneh'i told him “our people will continue the war on the ground borders until the downfall of the aggressive Iraqi regime”¹³⁸ — a blunt rejection of Soviet efforts to achieve a cease-fire. Nonetheless, Iran needed the USSR to block follow-up Security Council action against it. So the Iranians made further gestures to give Moscow the impression it had won influence in Tehran. Thus, during the Vorontsov visit, there were discussions about the export of Iranian oil through the Black Sea, a possible second railroad link, and other aspects of economic cooperation, and Larijani praised Iranian-Soviet relations as “progressing and developing at a very good level.”¹³⁹

Meanwhile, as Soviet-Iranian relations improved, so did US-Arab relations, as a result of the growing American military presence in the Gulf — something ruefully noted by *Pravda* in late August.¹⁴⁰ During this period, Moscow sought to portray Iran as more moderate than it actually was, with a Tass broadcast on 9 August citing Iran's UN representative saying that his country did not plant mines in international waterways,¹⁴¹ and asserting that Iran had not specifically rejected Resolution 598.¹⁴²

By late August, with tension in the Gulf rising and with Iran still rejecting a cease-fire despite the mediating efforts of the UN secretary-general, Arab criticism of Moscow began to mount. Editorials in the Iraqi government newspaper *al-Thawra* called Soviet opposition to sanctions against Iran “shortsighted.”¹⁴³ A delegation of the Arab League headed by a Kuwaiti official went to Moscow on 7 September. While Moscow sought to blame the rise in tension on the US build-up in the Gulf, and proclaimed its full support for Resolution 598,¹⁴⁴ the final communiqué described the talks as having taken place in a “businesslike atmosphere” where a “frank exchange of opinions had taken place” — a clear indication of serious disagreement.¹⁴⁵ Moscow's sensitivity to Arab charges that it was protecting Iran was reflected in a 9 September *Pravda* article which condemned “attempts to cast a shadow on the Soviet Union's policy and drive a wedge in its relations with the Arab states.”¹⁴⁶

Yet at the very same time that Moscow was trying to reassure the Arabs, it was entertaining Iran's Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani, who had arrived in Moscow for talks on 9 September. (Perhaps to demonstrate an “evenhanded position,” Soviet officials met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq ‘Aziz the same day.) Commentators in Tehran noted that the two countries had agreed in principle to establish an Iranian oil pipeline through Soviet territory to the Black Sea, and to draw up plans for a railway network in eastern Iran, as well as for joint shipping in the Caspian Sea.¹⁴⁷

Clearly, Tehran was offering Moscow an increased economic stake in Iran in return for its support in the UN against the US, which Moscow continued to prove willing to give. Indeed, when the US destroyed an Iranian speedboat laying mines in

international waters on 21 September, Moscow gave the Iranian view of the incident, claiming that the ship was carrying food.¹⁴⁸ As tension — and Arab criticism of the USSR — increased, Moscow employed yet another diplomatic device. This was a call by Shevardnadze at the UN in late September for a UN force to replace the US and Nato forces in the Gulf.¹⁴⁹ Such a ploy, if successful, might have reduced Iranian-US tension, but it would also have reduced US influence in the Gulf, an important achievement for Moscow. In addition, it would have deflected pressure for sanctions against Iran, another of Moscow's goals. Not surprisingly, therefore, the US rejected the plan. Many US observers pointed out that UN forces had historically been effective as peacekeepers after a war had ended, but not in the middle of a conflict, as Unifil was demonstrating in Lebanon. In addition, there were such questions as command responsibility and rules of engagement that had to be worked out — clearly a time-consuming process that would further delay the consideration of sanctions.

For its part, Iran was showing a measure of appreciation for the Soviet policy, which included getting the Security Council to simultaneously look into the causes of the war (to determine who was to blame for it) and to work out a cease-fire.¹⁵⁰ Thus, on 1 October, the Iranian ambassador to Moscow, Naser Hayrani-Nobayr, gave a press conference in which he praised the USSR for wanting to pull Soviet troops out of Afghanistan, and criticized the US for wanting the war to continue.¹⁵¹ Two weeks later, the Soviet airline Aeroflot formally resumed flights to Tehran.¹⁵² Then, in mid-October, as the US was placing an embargo on virtually all imports from Iran, the Iranian oil minister visited Moscow and signed an agreement in principle for the supply of Iranian oil to be processed at Soviet refineries.¹⁵³

Meanwhile, the USSR sided with Iran during the two US-Iranian military confrontations in October, with Foreign Ministry spokesman Gerasimov describing the American attack on Iran's offshore oil platform on 19 October "a violation of the UN charter."¹⁵⁴ But while Moscow continued to tilt toward Iran, it also sought to shore up its relations with the Gulf Arabs, using, as it had in the past, its special relationship with Kuwait to this end. Thus on 15 October, during a Moscow visit by Kuwait's Oil Minister 'Ali al-Khalifa, the two countries signed a bilateral cooperation agreement.¹⁵⁵ If Kuwait, despite its unhappiness with the Soviet tilt toward Iran, had arranged Khalifa's visit to Moscow in the hope of deterring Iran from action against it, the attempt was not successful. Indeed, the day before the agreement was signed, on 14 October, Iran fired a missile into Kuwait that hit a tanker in its port. Moscow's response to the Iranian act took the form of a *Pravda* statement condemning the attack as "unacceptable from the standpoint of international law, politics and morality."¹⁵⁶

Nonetheless, as Arab displeasure with the USSR grew—Iraqi Foreign Minister 'Aziz, speaking at a news conference at the UN on 2 October, had rejected the Soviet effort to simultaneously effect a cease-fire and set up a commission to determine responsibility for the war,¹⁵⁷ and an Iraqi official was quoted as saying "there is a minicrisis in our relations with the Soviet Union"¹⁵⁸ — Moscow tried once again to achieve an end to the war. Thus Vorontsov traveled to Iraq, Kuwait and Iran at the end of October; but the Iranians sent an important signal of their unwillingness to end the war by launching a missile at Baghdad while Vorontsov was still in the Iraqi capital.¹⁵⁹ After Vorontsov's return to Moscow, Iranian Prime Minister Musavi appeared to put an end to Vorontsov's attempt to get Tehran to accept Resolution 598 by publicly stating: "We have no hope that the UN can do anything about the war."¹⁶⁰

Musavi's negative comment coincided with the opening of the Arab summit in Amman in early November (for details see essay on inter-Arab relations). The Gulf War dominated the conference, whose opening coincided with an Iranian missile strike against Baghdad, and the Arabs strongly condemned Iran in most of their resolutions.¹⁶¹ The central decision of the meeting — to allow each Arab state to make its own decision about restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt — was a major defeat for Soviet efforts to keep Egypt isolated in the Arab world. The Arabs felt that, despite Camp David, Egypt was needed as a counterweight to Iran. Indeed, in rapid succession the UAE, Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, North Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Mauritania restored ties with Egypt (see also chapter on Egypt). Relatively little attention was paid to the Arab-Israeli conflict at the summit, as the threat from Iran transcended what had previously been the Arab world's primary preoccupation — and the lever used by Moscow to increase its influence in the region.

Pravda's ME commentator, Demchenko, sought to put the best possible interpretation on the conference, noting that it was a step toward Arab unity and that it had endorsed the Soviet proposal to convene an international conference on the ME.¹⁶² Yuri Glukhov, also writing in *Pravda*, took a somewhat more negative view, noting that "the meeting's documents do not contain a single word condemning the policy of US imperialism." He also noted that Egypt was given "an opportunity to emerge from isolation, but there was no rehabilitation of Sadat's policy of separate deals."¹⁶³ Perhaps more reflective of Moscow's true feelings about the summit was the *Izvestiia* interview with Habash on 28 November:

We note with profound regret that for the first time in the history of inter-Arab summit meetings, the Amman meeting's final documents for some reason did not mention support for the Palestinian people's legitimate national rights, including their right to self-determination and the creation of an independent sovereign state with its capital in East Jerusalem.

Furthermore — the decision adopted in Amman to give each state the right to individually decide the question of restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt may lead to the involvement of other Arab countries in the Camp David cause. The meeting in no way condemned the build-up of the US military presence in the Persian Gulf. And, in general, it seemed to us that the influence of progressive, patriotic forces was less perceptible in the atmosphere of the summit meeting than at previous such meetings.¹⁶⁴

Given the strong anti-Iranian position taken by the summit (even Syria joined the Arab call to Iran to accept a cease-fire and withdraw from Iraqi territory), Moscow evidently felt it had to respond. Thus on 19 November, Moscow Radio, broadcasting to Iran in Persian, warned:

... We see the formation of a US Middle East strategy on the establishment of bases, as well as the extension of its ambitious hegemonism. In our opinion, this is exactly the very point which should be taken into consideration by those Arab circles that are opening the doors of their countries to US military presence, as well as by those Iranian dignitaries who continue to maintain their stand of 'war, war until victory,' and who are — irrespective of their inclinations — working against the interests of their peoples and those of regional and international security.¹⁶⁵

Then, in early December, following the signing of a protocol for the opening of shipping routes between Iranian and Soviet ports,¹⁶⁶ President Gromyko held a meeting with the Iranian ambassador to the USSR. Gromyko took a relatively hard line with the Iranian, noting that "you as an ambassador and the Iranian leadership made a great number of statements about the wish to end the war. But the war goes on. Iran is practically not carrying matters toward ending the war." Gromyko went on to warn that if Resolution 598 were not implemented, "the question of further steps toward ensuring the implementation of the decisions adopted by the Security Council might be put on the order of the day," and reminded the Iranian that at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, which was a few days off, the Iraqi-Iranian War would be discussed.¹⁶⁷ The tension inherent in the meeting was reflected in *Pravda's* notation that the talks took place in "a businesslike and frank atmosphere."¹⁶⁸

In addition to its calls to Iran to bring the war to an end, Moscow began to move on the diplomatic front to try to compensate for the events at the Arab summit which it saw as a gain for the US. Thus, in a press briefing on 30 November, Gerasimov went beyond the previous Soviet position on the Gulf War by stating that the USSR would be prepared to have a UN naval force not only escort ships in the Gulf, but also act to implement sanctions.¹⁶⁹ Gerasimov coupled this offer with a demand that Western nations enact legislation to prohibit both overt and covert trade in arms with any nation that violated Resolution 598. Some Americans, knowing the time it would take to get such legislation passed, saw this as yet another delaying tactic by Moscow. Other analysts again raised the problem of command and control inherent in any such UN force.¹⁷⁰ Nonetheless, Iran took the Soviet policy change seriously — and in a highly negative manner. On the eighth anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Iran permitted a group of Afghan demonstrators to attack the Soviet consulate in Isfahan.¹⁷¹ Moscow lodged a "strong protest" with Iran, claiming that the attack had been carried out by a "group of fanatical elements from the Afghan counterrevolutionaries who are based in Iran."¹⁷² One week later, a commentator on Iranian television took a highly caustic view of the change in Soviet strategy and warned Moscow not to continue its new policy:

... the Soviet Union feels that because of the possible threat to them posed by the continuation of the war, the reactionary Arab leaders are daily inclining more and more toward the US and the West. The culmination of this inclination could be seen in the Amman conference and the Gulf Cooperation Council summit. The Russians feel that if they continue their previous line, they may lose the astronomic loans from the Arabs and their future economic-political presence in Arab countries. They also feel that if they do not react more strongly toward Iran, the Americans will become the only defender among the Arab reactionaries, and this will pave the grounds for the US to take strategic steps where the future of the Middle East is concerned. At this juncture, the Soviet Union has altered its stand; it is gradually moving away from its previous position toward a more overt stand on the war. At the same time it is trying, as much as possible, to postpone the moment of decision.

Moscow's request to the UN secretary-general to pay another visit to the region stems precisely from this. But is this a logical policy at a time when the Americans are still prepared at the slightest smile from Tehran to sell out all the

Arabs for the sake of establishing a small relationship with Iran? What will the Russians gain from this stand? The US understands very well Iran's sensitive role in the region and if, under such conditions, the Russians join in the arms embargo, they will destroy all the bridges that have been built so far. Moreover, because of their intrinsic fear of communism and the natural compatibility between their systems and capitalism, the Arabs will certainly not turn toward the Soviet Union. The only outcome of the Russians' act can be that the Americans will benefit and their position will be strengthened.

The strength that Iran has shown in the past year in the Persian Gulf proves the seriousness of the remarks by our officials that if such a plan is implemented, all Persian Gulf ports will become obsolete. If the Russians go along with the Americans in this, they will be repeating the same mistake they once made when they leased their tankers to Kuwait. The difference, though, is that it is easy to make up for some mistakes, but difficult or impossible to do so for others.¹⁷³

In addition to its announced change of policy on sanctions, and perhaps also reacting to another overwhelming defeat in the UN on the Afghanistan issue,¹⁷⁴ Moscow moved to assuage Arab unhappiness with its strategy in other ways as well. Thus, it took a harder line on relations with Israel,¹⁷⁵ and, as if to make clear that there would be no Soviet-American deal on the ME at the expense of the Arabs at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit, the Soviet UN ambassador reiterated in late November the Soviet call for the PLO to participate fully in an international conference on the ME.¹⁷⁶

Moreover, Moscow, perhaps acknowledging the inevitability of Egypt's rejoining the Arab mainstream, sought to make the best of the situation. Thus, Moscow signed a cultural protocol with Egypt for the exchange of films and television programs on 22 October,¹⁷⁷ and less than a week later Soviet consulates were reopened in Alexandria and Port Said.¹⁷⁸ At the end of December Moscow signed a long-term trade pact with Egypt that doubled the trade between the two countries.¹⁷⁹ Even more important, however, was the fact that Egypt now became a regular stop on Soviet diplomatic trips to the ME, with important visits by Vorontsov in October 1987 and Karen Brutents in January 1988¹⁸⁰ as Moscow may have hoped to pull Egypt away from the US to a more neutral position.

The main Soviet diplomatic effort, however, came with the visit of King Husayn to Moscow in late December. The Soviet media sought to portray the Jordanian monarch's visit as an important example of Soviet-Arab friendship.¹⁸¹ Given the fact that *Pravda* described the talks as taking place in an atmosphere of "mutual understanding" and noted an "in-depth exchange of views,"¹⁸² there were clearly areas of disagreement between the two sides, most probably on the Iraqi-Iranian War as Husayn, after making a major gesture to Moscow by rejecting US plans to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict without the help of the USSR, then urged Gorbachev to accept an embargo on arms shipments to Iran.¹⁸³ Gorbachev hedged on this issue, noting only that the USSR was "not against discussion" of the embargo in the Security Council. The Soviet leader then sought to cast blame on the US, doubting whether "those who are shouting louder than anyone else for an embargo, and who, by the way, were found to be delivering arms secretly to Iran, are ready to observe it."¹⁸⁴

Fortunately for Moscow, a development that occurred at the time of the Husayn visit appeared at least partially to divert Arab attention from the Gulf War and refocus it on the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was the Palestinian uprising which began in Gaza on 9 December and quickly spread to the West Bank (see essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip). Initially, Moscow seemed as surprised by the uprising as the Israeli Government, although the USSR quickly moved, from a propaganda point of view, to exploit it. Thus a Soviet government report linked the Israeli "repression" of the protesters with the newly signed US-Israeli military cooperation agreement.¹⁸⁵ And Moscow also sought to exploit the US abstention on a Security Council resolution condemning Israeli actions in the West Bank and Gaza.¹⁸⁶ Whether Moscow could obtain anything more than propaganda points from the events in the occupied territories, however, remained to be seen.

In sum, 1987 was a year that started well for Moscow in the ME as Gorbachev sought to take advantage of the US mistakes in the Irangate scandal. However, by the end of the year, the Soviet policy of tilting toward Iran had not only cost it support in the Arab world, but had also not brought any tangible benefits in terms of influence in Iran. At the same time, despite a brief flirtation with Peres, Moscow seemed no closer to its goal of achieving an international conference on the ME than it had been at the start of the year.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. For a description of the development of the Iran-Contra (Irangate) scandal, see *Report of the Congressional Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1987).
2. Cited in report by David Shipler, *NYT*, 22 January 1987.
3. Cited in report by Elaine Sciolino, *NYT*, 30 January 1987.
4. Cited in an AP report, *WP*, 12 February 1987. See also Reuters report, *NYT*, 12 February 1987.
5. Cited in report by Jonathan Randal, *WP*, 30 January 1987.
6. *Pravda*, 30 January 1987.
7. *Ibid.*
8. For a Western view of the riots and their aftermath, see the reports by Celestine Bohlen, *WP*, 19 and 22 February 1987. Bohlen cites figures of two dead and 200 injured in the rioting.
9. Cf. *Izvestiia*, 10 January 1987, and *Literaturnaya Gazeta*, 14 January 1987. The latter is translated in the *CDSP*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 1987, pp. 8–9.
10. *Pravda*, 16 July 1987 (*CDSP*, Vol. 39, No. 28, p. 15). My interviews with Soviet scholars in Moscow in January 1988 also reflected this viewpoint, although the scholars were divided on the question of how serious a threat Islamic fundamentalism was to the USSR.
11. For a discussion of this event, see "Soviet Policy toward the Middle East in 1986," *MECS* 1986. In an article in *New Times*, Dmitry Zgersky noted that al-Bayd had stated that the PDRY Government was still busy coping with the consequences of the "fratricidal conflict" (*New Times*, No. 8, 1987, p. 9). See also Donald Ramotar, Salem Said, and Andrei Olitsky, "Democratic Yemen: After a Tragic Trial," *World Marxist Review*, Vol. 31, No. 1 (January 1988), pp. 132–39.
12. *Pravda*, 11 February 1987.
13. *Pravda*, 12 February — DR:SU, 13 February 1987.

14. Cf. report by Patrick Tyler, *WP*, 14 December 1987.
15. Cf. report by Richard Bernstein, *NYT*, 8 January 1987.
16. *Izvestiia*, 8 January 1987.
17. Cited in *DR*, 12 January 1987.
18. Cited in a report by James Baron, *NYT*, 23 March 1987.
19. Cf. report by Nora Boustany, *WP*, 21 September 1987. For a Soviet view of the fighting in Chad, see Dmitry Zgersky, "Chad: The Background to the Conflict," *New Times*, No. 34, 1987, pp. 13-14.
20. *Pravda*, 6 May 1987.
21. *Izvestiia*, 28 December 1986 — *CDSP*, Vol. 38, No. 52, p. 14.
22. *Pravda*, 22 January 1987.
23. Cited in report by Gary Lee, *WP*, 23 January 1987. See also report by Bill Keller, *NYT*, 23 January 1987.
24. *Pravda*, 22 January 1987.
25. For the text of the Soviet statement, see *Izvestiia*, 9 January — *DR:SU*, 9 January 1987. *Izvestiia*, on 16 January, condemned Iran for "stubbornly rejecting" appeals for a cease-fire and insisting on "war until victory" and replacing the Iraqi regime.
26. Cited in report by Elaine Sciolino, *NYT*, 12 January 1987.
27. *Pravda*, 29 January 1987.
28. Cf. report by Stephen Engelberg, *NYT*, 12 January 1987.
29. Cited in report by Patrick Tyler, *WP*, 22 January 1987.
30. *Pravda*, 14 February 1987.
31. *Ibid.*
32. On this point, see Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy toward the Middle East," in Robin Laird (ed.), *Soviet Foreign Policy* (New York: Academy of Political Science, 1987), pp. 194-95.
33. *Pravda*, 15 February 1987.
34. *Izvestiia*, 15 February 1987.
35. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 15 February — *DR:SU*, 24 February 1987.
36. R. Peace and Progress (in Persian to Iran; Igor Sheftunov, commentator), 21 February — *DR:SU*, 24 February 1987.
37. Cf. *Izvestiia*, 16 February 1987.
38. *Al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 17 February — *DR:SU*, 20 February 1987.
39. Translated in *DR:SU*, 24 February 1987.
40. Cf. report by David Ottaway, *WP*, 29 March 1987.
41. Cited in a report by Wolf Blitzer, *JP*, 20 February 1987. As might be expected, Moscow took a dim view of the Shamir visit. See Tass's English language report, 20 February — *DR:SU*, 27 February 1987.
42. Cited in a report by Benny Morris, Yossi Lempkowitz, and David Horovitz, *JP*, 24 February 1987.
43. For the text of this document, see *DR*, 23 March 1987.
44. Cf. Vol. in Hebrew, 30 January — *DR:SU*, 2 February 1987.
45. *Davar*, 3 February — *DR:SU*, 3 February 1987.
46. Cf. *DR:SU*, 3 February 1987, p. H-1.
47. Translated in *DR:SU*, 18 February 1987, pp. H-8 to H-11.
48. "Moscow and the Middle East in 1985," *MECS* 1984-85, p. 48.
49. Cited in Reuters report, *NYT*, 20 March 1987; 871 Jews, the highest monthly total in six years, left in May 1987.
50. Cited in National Conference on Soviet Jewry Report, New York City, 1 April 1987.
51. Cited in a report by Walter Ruby and Andy Court, *JP*, 2 April 1987.
52. Cf. Vol interview with Soviet Foreign Ministry Spokesman Gennady Gerasimov, 2 April 1987. (*DR*, 2 April 1987, p. I-1). See also the article by Henry Kamm, *NYT*, 3 April 1987.
53. Cf. Vol interview with Yitzhak Shamir, 26 March 1987 (*DR*, 27 March 1987, p. I-1). Shamir also played down the importance of the Bronfman-Abram visit (cf. report by Thomas Friedman, *NYT*, 1 April 1987).
54. Cf. report by Joe Greenberg, *JP*, 27 March 1987.
55. Reuters report, *NYT*, 29 March 1987. China's permanent UN representative, Li Luye, met

- with the director-general of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, Avraham Tamir. See also the report by David Landau and Walter Ruby, *JP*, 29 March 1987.
56. Vol interview with Peres, 2 April 1987 (DR, 3 April 1987, p. 1-1). In the interview, Peres noted other changes in Soviet policy, including the release of nearly all the Prisoners of Zion, the rise in exit permits from 100 to nearly 500 a month, and Soviet statements in diplomatic meetings that they wanted improved relations with Israel.
 57. Cf. Vol interview with Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman Gennady Gerasimov, 2 April 1987 (DR, 2 April 1987, p. 1-1).
 58. Vol, 5 April — DR, 6 April 1987, p. 1-1.
 59. Cited in report by John Tagliabue, *NYT*, 10 April 1987.
 60. Vol, 8 April — DR, 9 April 1987, p. 1-1.
 61. Vol, 9 April — DR, 10 April 1987, p. 1-3.
 62. This information, reported by "sources close to Peres," was discussed in the *JP*, 10 April 1987 in a report coauthored by Wolf Blitzer, David Horowitz, Jonathan Karp and Robert Rosenberg.
 63. Vol, 7 April — DR, 8 April 1987, p. 1-3.
 64. Cited in a report by Lea Levavi and Asher Wallfish, *JP*, 10 April 1987.
 65. Vol, 12 April — DR, 13 April 1987, p. 1-3.
 66. Ibid.
 67. R. IDF interview with Shamir, 13 April — DR, 13 April 1987, pp. 1-4/1-5.
 68. Cited in a report by Paul Delaney, *NYT*, 27 April 1987.
 69. Cited in a report by Peter Talmon, *JP*, 21 January 1987.
 70. For the text of the abrogation, see *JT*, 21 April 1987 (translated in DR, 21 April 1987, p. A-1 to A-4).
 71. For the text of the PNC resolutions, see Appendix I to essay on the PLO.
 72. Cited in a report by Paul Delaney, *NYT*, 28 April 1987.
 73. For an analysis of the 16th PNC, see Rashid Khalidi, "Palestinian Politics after the Exodus from Beirut," in Robert O. Freedman (ed.), *The Middle East Since the Israeli Invasion of Lebanon* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1986), pp. 240-41.
 74. Cf. report by Jim Muir, *CSM*, 9 April 1988. It should also be mentioned that even Syria's allies, Libya and Iran, criticized Syrian policies which had caused near starvation in the Palestinian camps.
 75. *Pravda*, 28 April — DR:SU, 6 May 1987, pp. H-2 to H-3.
 76. *Pravda*, 25 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-8.
 77. *Pravda*, 25 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-10.
 78. *Pravda*, 27 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-14.
 79. *Pravda*, 27 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-12.
 80. *Pravda*, 25 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-1.
 81. *Pravda*, 25 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-7.
 82. *Pravda*, 25 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-10.
 83. *Pravda*, 27 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-14.
 84. Cf. *Pravda*, 7 March 1987. According to an article by Ihsan Hijazi, *NYT*, 4 March 1987, Shi'i Muslim clerics had issued a religious edict calling for the killing of all communists.
 85. *Pravda*, 27 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-14.
 86. *Pravda*, 25 April — DR:SU, 28 April 1987, p. H-5.
 87. Cf. Vladimir Zhitomirsky, "A Splendid View of Syria," *New Times*, No. 31, 1987, p. 5 and *Pravda*, 25 July 1987.
 88. Cited in a report by Jim Hoagland and Patrick Tyler, *WP*, 25 September 1987.
 89. *WP*, 20 September 1987.
 90. During this period the USSR was also stepping up its cultural exchanges with Israel. Thus, in March, Moscow had sent its Gypsy Theatre Troupe to play in Israel; and, in April, Moscow invited a group of blind Israeli athletes to visit the USSR.
 91. Cited in a report by Thomas Friedman, *NYT*, 8 May 1987.
 92. Jordan's denial came in a statement by Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i. The text of the denial was printed in the *JP*, 5 May 1987. According to a report by David Shipler, *NYT*, 12 May 1987, Jordan had reportedly agreed to a limited role for the USSR in the conference which would be convened by the secretary-general of the UN based on Resolutions 242 and 338.

King Husayn, over the years, had repeatedly met with Israeli leaders, but could never bring himself to conclude a peace agreement with Israel. The meeting in London was just one more example of this.

93. Cf. report by Glen Frankel, *WP*, 15 May 1987.
94. Cf. KUNA, 25 April — DR, 27 April 1987, p. A-13, and VoP (Algiers), 26 April — DR, 27 April 1987, p. A-5.
95. Cited in an AP report, *WP*, 9 May 1987.
96. Cited in a report by Neil Lewis, *NYT*, 17 July 1987. See also the report by Mary Curtius, CSM, 16 July 1987, and the report in *JP*, 14 July 1987.
97. *Izvestiia*, 11 August 1987 and numerous R. Peace and Progress Hebrew-language broadcasts to Israel in July and August 1987.
98. Israel TV, 17 August — DR, 18 August 1987, pp. AA-1.
99. *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 17 August — DR:SU, 20 August 1987, p. E-3.
100. R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), 21 August — DR:SU, 24 August 1987, p. E-2.
101. Cited in a report in the *NYT*, 2 October 1987. Reportedly, Peres demanded full diplomatic relations, given the Soviet Union's importance in world politics. During interviews in Moscow in January 1988 with Soviet scholars knowledgeable about this issue, I ascertained that the offer had indeed come up in conversation; but it remains unclear whether the USSR made the offer or Peres himself brought it up as a trial balloon.
102. Cf. report in *WP* by John Goshko, 1 October 1987. See also AP report, *WP*, 3 October 1987.
103. Cf. report by Moshe Zak, *Ma'ariv*, 28 September — DR, 1 October 1987, p. 22.
104. Cf. report in *NYT*, 13 October 1987. During this period Moscow also released two long-term refuseniks, Ida Nudel and Vladimir Slepak, both of whom went to Israel.
105. For analyses of the Soviet decision, see the articles by Bill Keller, *NYT*, 15 April 1987, and Gary Lee, *WP*, 15 April 1987.
106. Cited in *WP*, 16 April 1987.
107. For descriptions of the attack and the Soviet response to it, see *NYT*, 9 May 1987, *Le Monde*, 10, 11 May 1987 (translated in *Guardian Weekly*, 17 May 1987); and AP report, *JP*, 18 May 1987.
108. Tass, 25 May — DR:SU, 26 May 1987, p. H-1.
109. Tass, 3 June — DR:SU, 4 June 1987, p. E-1.
110. Cf. *Izvestiia*, 1 June 1987.
111. Moscow Radio World Service (in English), 20 May — DR:SU, 20 May 1987, p. H-2. See also R. Peace and Progress (in Persian), 27 May — DR:SU, 9 June 1987, p. E-7.
112. *Pravda*, 30 April 1987.
113. R. Peace and Progress (in Persian), 8 May — DR:SU, 11 May 1987, p. H-3.
114. Reagan's statement explaining the reflagging was printed in the *NYT*, 30 May 1987. For background analyses on the US reflagging decision, see the reports by Don Oberdofer, *WP*, 29 May 1987, and Jonathan Randal, *WP*, 5 June 1987. The US Congress had become quite critical of the reflagging effort after the Iraqi attack on the USS *Stark* in May 1987.
115. Cf. *Izvestiia*, 29 May 1987.
116. As part of the "new thinking" now being proclaimed in Moscow, Soviet academics and other officials have urged the US to join in efforts to control regional conflicts rather than engage in zero-sum game competition for influence. (Cf. presentation by a Soviet academic delegation headed by Nodari Simoniya, of the Institute of Oriental Studies, and Aleksey Vasiliev, USA-Canada Institute, at the University of Maryland, 21 October 1987). This is also a point made by Gorbachev in his book, *Perestroika* (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), chapter 3.
117. On this point see R.K. Ramazani, "The Iran-Iraq War and the Persian Gulf Crisis," *Current History*, February 1988, pp. 63-64.
118. Cited in a report by Flora Lewis, *NYT*, 7 June 1987.
119. DR, 15 June 1987, pp. AA-1, and R. Tehran, 13 June — DR, 15 June 1987, p. S-1.
120. R. Tehran, 14 June — DR, 15 June 1987, p. S-1.
121. Cf. Robert O. Freedman, "Soviet Policy Toward the Persian Gulf from the Outbreak of the Iran-Iraq War to the Death of Konstantin Chernenko," in William J. Olson (ed.), *US Strategic Interests in the Gulf Region* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 43-80.

122. R. Tehran, 14 June — DR:SU, 15 June 1987, p. S-2.
123. IRNA, 14 June — DR, 15 June 1987, p. S-2.
124. R. Tehran, 15 June — DR, 15 June 1987, p. S-3.
125. *Pravda*, 4 July—DR:SU, 6 July 1987, pp. E-1, E-2.
126. Cited in a report by Gary Lee, *WP*, 3 July 1987.
127. IRNA, 18 July — DR:SU, 20 July 1987, p. E-3.
128. *Ibid.*, p. E-4.
129. For the text of the resolution, see *NYT*, 21 July 1987.
130. *Pravda*, 22 July 1987.
131. Cf. speech of Secretary Shultz at the UN, *NYT*, 21 July 1987.
132. Philip Taubman, in a report in the *NYT* on 23 July 1987, cites an unnamed Soviet official who stated that Moscow's interest in maintaining good relations with Iran might preclude an arms ban to force Iran to comply with the cease-fire.
133. Tass, 22 July — DR:SU, 23 July 1987, p. E-1; and Gorbachev's letter to Reagan, cited in a report by Gary Lee, *WP*, 22 July 1987.
134. Cf. article by Alexander Bovin, *Izvestiia*, 31 July 1987.
135. R. Peace and Progress (in Arabic), 1 August — DR:SU, 3 August 1987, p. A-4.
136. *Pravda*, 4 August 1987.
137. Cited in a report by John Kifner, *NYT*, 3 August 1987.
138. R. Tehran, 3 August — DR, 4 August 1987, p. S-11.
139. R. Tehran, 4 August — DR, 4 August 1987, p. S-12. See also the report by Jackson Diehl, *WP*, 5 August 1987, and Phillip Taubman, *NYT*, 5 August 1987.
140. *Pravda*, 24 August 1987.
141. Tass, 9 August — DR:SU, 10 August 1987, p. A-4.
142. Tass, 24 August — DR:SU, 25 August 1987, p. E-3.
143. Cited in *NYT*, 22 August 1987.
144. Tass, 8 September — DR:SU, 9 September 1987, p. 24.
145. *Pravda*, 10 September 1987. See also AFP, 10 September — DR:SU, 11 September 1987, p. 15. For a somewhat different view of Soviet policy toward the Iraqi-Iranian War, see Galia Golan, "Gorbachev's Middle East Strategy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Fall 1987), p. 57. Golan's view is that Moscow took a "fully supportive role" in UN efforts to bring about an end to the war.
146. *Pravda*, 9 September 1987.
147. R. Tehran, 8 September — DR:SU, 9 September 1987, pp. 22-23.
148. R. Moscow (in English), 23 September — DR:SU, 24 September 1987, p. 35.
149. R. Moscow (in English), 24 September — DR:SU, 25 September 1987, p. 27.
150. Cf. report by Michael J. Berlin, *WP*, 16 October 1987.
151. Tass, 1 October — DR:SU, 2 October 1987, p. 15.
152. *Izvestiia*, 18 October 1987.
153. Tass, 20 October — DR:SU, 21 October 1987, p. 5.
154. *Pravda*, 21 October 1987.
155. The agreement called for the creation of a permanent Soviet-Kuwaiti commission on economic, scientific, and technological cooperation in the areas of oil, pipe-line transport, irrigation, trade, health protection and other fields. Tass, 15 October — DR:SU, 16 October 1987, p. 35.
156. *Pravda*, 17 October 1987.
157. Cf. report by Elaine Sciolino, *NYT*, 3 October 1987.
158. *Ibid.*
159. *WP*, 31 October 1987.
160. Cited in an AP report, *NYT*, 6 November 1987.
161. For the text of the Amman summit resolutions, see INA, 12 November — DR, 13 November 1987, pp. 23-25.
162. *Pravda*, 15 November 1987.
163. *Pravda*, 14 November — DR:SU, 19 November 1987, p. 20.
164. *Izvestiia*, 28 November — DR:SU, 3 December 1987, p. 39.
165. DR:SU, 25 November 1987, p. 29.
166. R. Peace and Progress (in Persian), 28 November 1987 (Igor Sheftunov's commentary) —

- DR:SU, 1 December 1987, p. 47.
167. *Pravda*, 5 December — DR:SU, 7 December 1987, p. 44.
168. *Ibid.*
169. Tass, 30 November — DR:SU, 1 December 1987, p. 7.
170. For a discussion of the US reaction to the Soviet offer, see the reports by David Ottaway, *WP*, 16 December 1987, and David Shieler, *NYT*, 29 December 1987.
171. Cf. report by Celestine Bohlen, *WP*, 28 December 1987.
172. *Pravda*, 28 December 1987.
173. Tehran TV, 8 January — DR, 12 January 1988, p. 83.
174. On 10 November 1987, the UN General Assembly voted 123–19 (with 11 abstentions) for the withdrawal of foreign forces from Afghanistan. In 1986, 122 states voted in favor of the troop withdrawal (cf. report by Paul Lewis, *NYT*, 11 November 1987). The roll-call vote was also reported in the 11 November issue of the *NYT*.
175. Moscow, for example, rejected a US plan to have a meeting of Israel, and a Palestinian-Jordanian delegation at the Reagan-Gorbachev summit. (Cf. Moscow TV program, "The World Today," 29 October 1987, reiterating Shevardnadze's statement following the October 1987 visit of Shultz to Moscow that "rumors and talk to the effect that the USSR is not supporting the Arabs are fictitious and groundless from start to finish." — DR:SU, 2 November 1987, p. 31. See also the report by Thomas L. Friedman, *NYT*, 7 November 1987. See also R. IDF, 19 November — DR, 19 November 1987, p. 30.
176. Tass, 24 November — DR:SU, 25 November 1987, p. 16.
177. Tass, 22 October — DR:SU, 23 October 1987, p. 23.
178. Tass, 28 October — DR:SU, 29 October 1987, p. 36.
179. Reuters report, *NYT*, 28 December 1987.
180. Tass, 4 January — DR:SU, 5 January 1988, p. 24.
181. *Pravda*, 21 December 1987.
182. *Pravda*, 23 December 1987.
183. *Ibid.*
184. *Ibid.* (translated in DR:SU, 23 December 1987, p. 31).
185. *Pravda*, 20 December 1987.
186. *Pravda*, 24 December 1987.

ARAB-ISRAELI RELATIONS

The Middle East Peace Process

MORDECHAI GAZIT

The peace process in 1987 was hardly more fertile than in the preceding years. The US continued its services of good offices to the parties but most of the time the level and intensity of its exertions showed no expectation of quick results. US diplomats, as had become their habit, claimed that their quiet diplomatic work was laying the foundations for future progress. They were, so they explained, engaged in a patient and incremental diplomacy. Even modest results were more than welcome. A case in point was the agreement between Jordan and Israel on procedural problems concerning the international conference, in April 1987. There was, however, an element of the illusory even in that. Jordan was not really resigned to a tame, ceremonial conference. It seemed to insist on one of unlimited duration in which the five permanent members of the UN Security Council would have some meaningful role to play. Even Shimon Peres, vice premier of Israel, would have difficulty with this kind of conference. For Yitzhak Shamir, Israel's prime minister, this setting was absolute anathema. He feared that the conference might interfere directly or indirectly with Israel's freedom in a negotiation. The Palestinians and the Syrians were afraid of exactly the opposite, that the terms of reference of the conference would make it impossible for their friends, notably the Soviet Union, to lend them effective support.

In these circumstances it was not surprising that the US was reluctant to make an all out effort as Peres was hoping for. US Secretary of State George Shultz doubted that the Soviet Union would agree to a token conference or that the US could manage to resolve the issue of Palestinian representation just after the PLO's supreme organ, the Palestinian National Congress (PNC) passed resolutions which ran counter to what Israel, the US, and even Jordan could accept.

The odds were clearly not favorable to a major US peace initiative. Those who thought differently, such as former president Jimmy Carter, some Israelis close to Peres, and others, tended to blame the US for inaction. However, the unbending positions of several of the parties directly involved (the PLO, the Syrians, the Likud and some others in Israel) and the equally inflexible Soviet postures, hardly lent credence to such accusations.

JORDAN

In 1987 King Husayn of Jordan pursued the policy he announced in the Jordanian Parliament in November 1986 (see essay on the Middle East peace process, *MECS* 1986). On that occasion he explained that Jordan's policy would move along two tracks: one to bolster the stand of the Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the other to convene an international peace conference. A year later, the king described in parliament what had been accomplished during the period. Referring to

the first track of Jordan's policy, the development programs in the West Bank and Gaza, he mentioned his government's decision to supplement the salaries of teachers in government schools there (7,000 in the West Bank and 3,000 in Gaza). These teachers had been appointed after 1967 and were therefore not entitled to such payments. The purpose of this and other forms of aid was, according to the king, to "support the kinfolk's steadfastness and trench them on their land and national soil."¹ However, Jordan, even if it did not admit it, certainly hoped that its increased involvement in the occupied territories would restore some of its lost influence.

At the end of the year under review, it was possible to wonder whether this was not a vain hope. Prior to the outbreak of widespread violence in December 1987, one observer wrote that Jordan's renewed activities in the territories had not made a great difference, but "something was nevertheless happening there." Budget allocations to the towns of Jericho, Hebron, Ramallah and al-Birah, which had been frozen, were being made available again. More significantly, Jordan became less reticent about its role in Gaza.² The minister for the occupied territories revealed that Egypt "was almost relieved" that Jordan was assisting the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip. Indeed, in doing so it was actually helping Egypt itself.³

The second component of Jordanian policy was the relentless diplomatic effort to convene an international conference. However, in the two years since the break with 'Arafat, the king's diplomacy labored under a handicap. It consistently affirmed that Jordan would under no circumstances be a substitute for the Palestinians in negotiations, and declared that it would want the PLO to receive an invitation to the conference. But it assumed that the problem of who would represent the Palestinians would be resolved through the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.⁴ This assumption was totally unacceptable to the PLO. In defending it, the king and his ministers explained that it was not Jordan that objected to an independent Palestinian delegation but others, such as the US and Israel.⁵ Jordan provided no clear answer to the question of whether it would agree to the PLO suggestion (see section on the Palestinians and the PLO below), that the organization be part of an Arab delegation.

As a rule, Jordanian statements did not fail to refer to the PLO as the representative body of the Palestinians, but there were also cases when such references were omitted. One important example in which there was no mention of the PLO was the Jordanian-Israeli memorandum of 11 April 1987 (see below); another was Husayn's speech to the Jordanian Parliament on 10 October 1987.

The basic format for the conference did not undergo any change in 1987. Jordan continued to insist that all five permanent members of the UN Security Council should take part in it. The theory was that a conference with only the two superpowers, the US and the Soviet Union, alongside the Arab participants and Israel, would not constitute enough of a guarantee that the Arabs would be able to negotiate with Israel under the most favorable conditions. Only the participation of China, the UK and France could avert the danger that the US and the Soviet Union would give priority to the resolution of issues more directly of interest to them than the Arab-Israeli conflict. Otherwise, they might reach agreement on such matters as arms control, Afghanistan and the Strategic Defense Initiative "Star Wars" program in return for concessions benefiting Israel.⁶ Husayn viewed the five permanent members as the "protectors of a conference in which the negotiating partners are acting according to the directives of

UN resolutions." The role Husayn was prepared to reserve for the two superpowers was a "decisive" one. However, he believed that the US was not yet qualified to fulfill it because the change in its stand toward the conference, as envisioned by Jordan, was only "minimal," while that of the Soviet Union was "constructive."⁷ The UK and France, as members of the EEC, could be relied upon to reflect the community's positions which were in harmony with those of Jordan. As in the past, Husayn exerted much effort throughout 1987 to persuade the EEC to use its influence in Washington in favor of Jordan's concept of the conference. In this, he said, he was quite successful.⁸

All alternatives to that concept of the international conference whenever put forward by Israel's Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir or by US Secretary of State George Shultz were immediately rejected. The "Arab concept" of the conference was said to be the "only way" to achieve a settlement, and Israel and the US had "no right" to make any changes.⁹ Such was Jordan's attitude also when Shultz proposed in October to invite Jordan, Syria and Israel to Washington for a meeting that would take place simultaneously with the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in December.¹⁰ The US saw no point in raising this idea with the Soviets after a meeting between Shultz and Husayn in London failed to change the king's position.¹¹ Husayn said it was "natural" to reject such an idea.¹² As in the past, he assumed in 1987 a similarly negative attitude toward the Soviet proposal that preparatory meetings be held among the five permanent members of the Security Council prior to the international conference. Jordan was concerned that the participant members might disagree, thereby destroying the chances of ever holding the conference.¹³

Jordan continued to affirm in 1987 that Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 formed the only basis for any future negotiations and, therefore, for the convening of the conference. The resolutions had to be accepted in their entirety, and no exception could be taken to any of their elements. This demand was, of course, completely unacceptable to the PLO. Husayn explained that in insisting on the cruciality of these two resolutions Jordan was merely "reflecting the prerequisites of others" (i.e., Israel and the US in particular). Husayn felt that one way of dealing with the inadequacy of 242, which dealt only with the refugee aspect of the Palestine question, was to state explicitly that a framework for a suitable solution to all aspects of the question should encompass also that issue. This formula, although probably acceptable to Israel and the US (since it was based on the Palestine document of the Camp David accords) was far from satisfactory to the PLO.¹⁴

On 5 May, the *Boston Globe* reported that Husayn had "indicated that it was not realistic to expect to regain all the territory Israel captured in the Six-Day War 20 years ago." The Israeli media and sources supporting dovish opinion in Israel attached much importance to this report. They hoped it provided the long-awaited proof that a settlement based on territorial compromise with Jordan was possible. The Jordanian press reproduced the *Globe* article but deleted this sentence.¹⁵ Later in the year Husayn made another somewhat ambiguous statement. He said that Resolution 242 implied the equation territory for peace, and added that he "would not want to say very much beyond that." This was another pronouncement that tantalized the Israelis; except, however, the king was quick to add that the problem had to be solved in a manner "acceptable to future generations," so that they should feel that it is "in their interest to preserve peace for all time."¹⁶

The thrust of Jordanian public statements led to the unmistakable conclusion that

there was no change in the Jordanian position. Jordan, together with Palestinian representatives, would make peace with Israel but only in return for all of the West Bank and Gaza territories. Some minor border rectifications on a reciprocal basis could be possible, but nothing beyond that. The peace agreement would have to be comprehensive and include a settlement with Syria. Furthermore, Jordan had coordinated its position closely with Syria, which was said to be willing to participate in an international forum. Husayn said that he was convinced, after talking to Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, that the two were in agreement. He visualized Syria negotiating over the Golan Heights, and he indicated that Israeli withdrawal from there would have to be total.¹⁷ The occupied regions of southern Lebanon would also be part of any arrangement.¹⁸ And the demand that Arab sovereignty be reestablished in the Arab parts of Jerusalem was reiterated.¹⁹

The gulf between the Jordanian positions and those of Israel remained as wide as ever. However, it did not constitute a barrier to the diplomatic contacts with Israel that were being pursued throughout 1987, both via the US and directly. Although the Jordanians continued to deny that such meetings were being held, the Israelis and others had never been as discreet. (The late Moshe Dayan had years earlier established a precedent by describing fully one of his meetings with the king.²⁰) More surprising testimony that such talks were taking place was provided by Egypt's President Husni Mubarak, who revealed that the US, the Soviet Union and Israel had told him about them before Husayn did.²¹

On 11 April, Husayn met Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin in London. They agreed on a document setting down the procedural aspects of the international conference (for details see section on Israel below and Appendix II). While Peres did not explicitly confirm the meeting, he did refer publicly to the "London document."²² Husayn, and Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i who also participated in the meeting, never admitted that such a meeting had taken place. All they said was there existed a general agreement to hold a conference. By implication this included Israel as well.²³ The specific points that had been agreed to were not put in question at any time. Whenever the Jordanians mentioned them they simply presented them as unilateral Jordanian positions. It can be argued that what was agreed to lent itself readily to such a presentation. Most of the points had, in any case, been long-established Jordanian positions. The agreement with Israel merely showed that there was a convergence of interests. For example, Rifa'i announced as a unilateral Jordanian position already reached before the London meeting that the external participants would "not have the power to impose any decisions" and that a precondition for participation in the conference would be acceptance of the two Security Council resolutions. It was also in line with Jordan's basic policy for him to say that the PLO would represent the Palestinians at the conference only after accepting these resolutions, and to note that the Palestinians would be in a joint delegation with Jordan. All these elements were reflected in the London document, as was the general statement that Jordan was "committed to a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israel dispute."²⁴

A brief summary of the contents of the document was given by Husayn in media interviews. In one of them he observed that he "could not imagine that the conference itself would have any veto power, but we should not underestimate the moral weight exerted by the five big powers...to overcome difficulties during the course of the

negotiations.”²⁵ The text of the London document put it simply “... the international conference will not impose any solution or veto any agreement arrived at between the parties.” (See Appendix II.)

In 1987, as in the two preceding years, Jordan's efforts on behalf of the conference produced no practical results. At the end of the year the rioting in the territories overshadowed everything else. In addition, the resolution of the Amman summit conference (8–11 November) that called on all Arab countries to refrain from “concluding unilaterally any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict,”²⁶ was a new element which was bound to lead Jordan, in whose capital the resolution had been adopted, to look carefully in all directions before venturing to make any move.²⁷

THE PALESTINIANS AND THE PLO

The PLO, including its more moderate elements, drew one inescapable conclusion from the break with Jordan in 1986, namely, that it would never achieve its objectives on the basis of the 11 February 1985 Amman agreement (see *MECS* 1984–1985, pp. 195–200, and text on p. 523). Only by making the ultimate concession and renouncing the idea of self-determination, i.e., an independent Palestinian state, could it continue to cooperate with Jordan in the peace effort led by the US. This it was not prepared to do. In vain did Egypt counsel the PLO to accept Security Council Resolution 242, while clearly stating that it did so on condition that the resolution would lead to Palestinian self-determination (see section on Egypt below). The PLO rejected this advice. It could accept 242 only if amended or, alternatively, together with all other UN resolutions dealing with the Middle East conflict.²⁸ It was determined not to leave any doubt as to what kind of self-determination it was seeking. The PLO was not ready to settle for anything less than self-determination expressed in a Palestinian state, possibly confederated with Jordan.

For the PLO, there were three noteworthy events in the year under review. The 18th PNC, the supreme organ of that organization, which convened in April in Algiers (see chapter on the PLO); the Arab summit in Amman in November; and the prolonged riots in the West Bank and Gaza which erupted on 9 December. At the PNC, a consensus proved possible between the mainstream and radical elements since the council met after the cooperation between the PLO and Jordan had ended. The resolutions adopted reflected the consensus. The main decisions were: (1) the abrogation of the Amman agreement, thus excluding the possibility of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in any future negotiations for a settlement; (2) reiteration of the demand for self-determination and rejection of proposals such as the Reagan plan, autonomy and functional division of power (or condominium); (3) insistence on the right to represent the Palestinians in all negotiations on an “equal footing with other parties” in an authoritative international conference.²⁹ One of the reasons for the show of unity by the PNC was its concern over American diplomatic efforts which were going on even after the parting of ways between Husayn and ‘Arafat. Indeed, a mere ten days before the PNC opened, Husayn and Peres agreed on a document setting down the conditions under which the international conference would meet (see above). As expected these were quite different from anything the PLO could accept, because they limited the authority of the conference. But the PLO noted that Israel had, at least, consented to the conference idea.

At the Arab summit in his capital, Husayn treated 'Arafat with less consideration than his other guests. The final summit statement failed to contain the customary reference to the rights of the Palestinians to a state. In the conference resolutions, which were more important than the final statement, there was more than a hint that the Syrian views had prevailed.³⁰ (For the text of the statement and the resolutions, see essay on inter-Arab relations and appendices.) The mention of the need for the Arabs to reach strategic parity with Israel was a case in point. Syrian influence was even more clearly evident in the resolution enjoining separate agreements with Israel, a reminder that Syria would oppose a settlement that left it out. The increased Syrian say in Arab moves was, of course, a setback for the more moderate factors in the PLO. As far as the role of the PLO was concerned, the resolutions, unlike the final statement, did contain the usual reference to it and were thus satisfactory.

In the serious and continuing riots in the West Bank and Gaza, which showed no signs of ending as the year came to a close (see essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip), the population gave violent expression to its feelings of despair and deep frustration at the complete lack of movement toward a solution. This was the main message of the riots. It was directed at the Israelis and the world at large. However, the extended violence also contained another message which the PLO was quick to grasp. It was that the old PLO methods of armed struggle and terrorism had proven ineffective and the inhabitants had on their own found a considerably more effective method of resistance to Israeli rule. Assuming that this message was meant as a reproof to the PLO, 'Arafat countered it with the simple observation that "it was impossible to start a conflagration if the people did not want it." Now the people obviously wanted it.³¹ The PLO could point to the many years of its leadership and activity which had prepared the ground for what was now happening.

In 1986 and 1987 the Jordanians increased their involvement in the West Bank and to some extent in Gaza (see *MECS* 1986, essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, pp. 213–14). This pitted them against PLO supporters in the territories. 'Arafat, however, did not seem unduly concerned. On several occasions he said that the Jordanians were making little headway and that by all indications the PLO continued to enjoy wide popular support.³² Some Israeli analysts tended to think that, as the riots persisted, they would produce new leaders who would challenge not only the traditional pro-Jordanian leadership in the territories but also the PLO itself.³³ But this was far from certain. It could be argued that the PLO was too well entrenched to be seriously threatened.

In the course of the year, prior to the beginning of the riots in December, PLO activists made pessimistic assessments concerning the likelihood of imminent negotiations to settle the Palestine issue. They thought that the international conference would not meet in 1987 and perhaps not even in 1988.³⁴ Even so, this did not prevent the PLO from displaying flexibility where tactics were concerned, while its broader strategy remained unchanged. It presented its agreement to Palestinian representation in the international conference in a joint Arab delegation as a most important concession.³⁵ It insisted, however, that its participation and status should be equal to that of the other participants. Its first choice was clearly to participate in an independent delegation. In this, as on other matters, it counted on Soviet support. It discounted Israeli statements to the effect that the Soviets would not insist on PLO participation in the conference. 'Arafat reported that the Soviet foreign minister had

assured the PLO of Soviet support on a number of basic points: the implementation of Resolution 242, i.e., withdrawal of Israel from the territories; the attainment of Palestinian national rights, including that of self-determination; the fact that the PLO would be the one to decide on the form in which the Palestinians would participate in the conference; and, finally, that the conference would consist of a permanent plenary with committees for specific issues, including a committee for territorial and geographical questions.³⁶

The PLO would, no doubt, have liked to receive even stronger assurances from the Soviets. Yet it knew that Moscow would adopt policies that would take into account interests other than the PLO's. The Soviets would certainly have to consider Syrian and Jordanian interests and to a lesser extent those of Israel. 'Arafat sought comfort in Husayn's repeated declarations that Jordan would not participate in an international conference without the PLO, or in a private statement by the king that Jordan did not want to rule the West Bank again and that next time "there must be something completely different."³⁷ However, he also knew perfectly well that PLO ideas regarding the conference and the future of the West Bank and Gaza were not identical with those of Jordan.

There were other elements in the situation that were somewhat more encouraging to the PLO. International support for the kind of conference the PLO envisaged was growing apace. The UN General Assembly, the non-aligned countries, the Islamic Conference Organization, the Organization of African Unity, and the EEC had all expressed themselves in favor of a conference.³⁸ The PLO could therefore argue that it was unthinkable that in a conference where countries like Britain, France and China would be given important roles, the Palestinians should not be represented in a manner satisfactory to them. After all, the Palestinian issue would be the conference's top item.³⁹ PLO insistence on full powers to represent the Palestinians in negotiations was not motivated by mere considerations of prestige. It was absolutely convinced that, if it were forced to play a minor role in the negotiations, the talks would deal with the territorial aspect of the dispute (and focus on delineating the eastern border between Jordan and Israel) rather than with the Palestinian issue as a whole, including that of Palestinian diaspora.

The depth of PLO suspicion of Jordan's intentions could be gauged from an admission by a senior PLO activist, Abu Iyad (Salah Khalaf). According to him, the PLO could trust Egypt to take over the Gaza Strip from Israel should Israel agree to relinquish it. If this happened, the PLO was entirely confident that Egypt would soon give the Strip to the Palestinians. On the other hand, the Palestinians were reluctant to entrust the West Bank to Jordan in similar circumstances, since Jordan might not hand it over to the PLO. Thus the PLO was prepared to forgo the "Gaza First" proposal so as not to risk placing West Bank Palestinians under the rule of Hashemite Jordan.⁴⁰

At the end of the year under review, the PLO seemed unyielding in its positions. In the course of the year, it had refused to heed advice to consider compromise. Former US president Jimmy Carter exhorted Palestinian personalities in Jerusalem to take what was offered rather than continue "having nothing to this very day."⁴¹ A senior Egyptian diplomat warned that the PLO leadership might miss what he called the "peace train."⁴² Yet the PLO was encouraged by an apparent harbinger of change among Israelis of the refusal to accept the PLO as a partner in a settlement. In

September, Moshe Amirav, a young member of the Herut Central Committee, held a series of detailed discussions with prominent PLO supporters in Jerusalem. The young Israeli acted on his own, but it was significant that his thorough Herut background did not stop him from exchanging drafts with his Palestinian interlocutors in which it was suggested that a Palestinian entity, rather than mere autonomy, should be set up in the West Bank and Gaza. The entity would come into being in the first stage of a two-stage agreement and its capital would be in the Arab parts of Jerusalem.⁴³ Amirav was soon expelled from Herut, but a handful of Herut members did voice agreement with his quest.

EGYPT

As in the previous year, Egypt continued in 1987 to stress its adherence to peace with Israel. Any suggestion that the peace treaty be abrogated was firmly rejected. Such unilateral action would, to quote President Husni Mubarak, present Israel with a "lifetime opportunity."⁴⁴ By this he probably meant that the Arabs must be careful not to release Israel from the pressure to negotiate and make the concessions that a settlement required. Relations with Israel were an international commitment which Egypt would honor as long as Israel abided by the same commitment.⁴⁵ There was, however, an addendum to this stand. Egypt could not believe that peace with Israel would be stable and allowed to prosper as long as the Palestinian question remained unresolved.⁴⁶ Egyptian-Israeli relations would develop only when Israel gave practical meaning to its recognition — expressed at Camp David in 1978 — of the Palestinian people's legitimate rights.⁴⁷

Egypt denied the existence of a link between the hoped-for resumption of relations with the Arab countries and the state of its relations with Israel.⁴⁸ Nonetheless, the marked reluctance with which it dealt with Israel was bound to encourage decisions in Arab capitals, in the wake of the Amman summit, to restore diplomatic ties to their former ambassadorial level.

One senior Egyptian diplomat stated candidly that it was Egyptian policy to put pressure on Israel.⁴⁹ One way of doing this was through the Egyptian media which, as a rule, spared no criticism of Israel. Another was to reduce the number of high level meetings with Israelis to a bare minimum. The total for the year was three. The first took place on 25–27 February when Shimon Peres went to Cairo. It was a sequel to the Alexandria meeting five months earlier (see essay on the ME peace process and chapter on Egypt in *MECS* 1986). This time, however, Peres was no longer prime minister, but vice premier and foreign minister, having turned over the prime ministership to Yitzhak Shamir of the Likud. At Alexandria, Egypt and Israel had declared 1987 a year of negotiations for peace. The Cairo joint communiqué urged "steps to promote the peace process and reach an agreement on the convocation in 1987 of an international conference that will lead to direct negotiations."⁵⁰

Four months later, Mubarak met with Peres in Geneva. This time he admitted that there was nothing new regarding the efforts to convene an international conference, but he and Peres discussed what could still be done in 1987. Halfway through the year, the deadline they had set at Alexandria seemed hardly attainable. This was one of the reasons why Mubarak accepted a suggestion by Peres that Egypt's Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Majid come to Israel for further talks.⁵¹ The visit, two weeks later, failed to

produce any tangible results. 'Abd al-Majid told the Israeli media that he had come to Israel to garner support for the international conference and to convince Israelis that any other setting for negotiations was no longer possible.⁵²

Egyptian efforts did not center on Israel alone. There remained much to accomplish elsewhere. Formulas had to be devised so that the PLO would finally accept Resolution 242, thus enabling appropriate Palestinian representation at the international conference. Egypt sympathized with the PLO's refusal to accept the resolution, which made no mention of Palestinian self-determination. Yet Cairo urged the PLO to enumerate its demands, state its reservations, and make them an integral part of a statement accepting the resolution and the equally important Resolution 338.⁵³ Egypt maintained contacts with the PLO throughout the year, despite the temporary closure of all PLO offices in the country (a step taken in a show of displeasure with the PNC decision concerning Egypt, which the official Egyptian statement described as "aggressive"⁵⁴ — cf. chapter on Egypt).

Egypt's support for Palestinian self-determination was reiterated frequently, but not without the meaningful addition that the Palestinian state would be established within the framework of the Jordanian-Palestinian Amman accord of 11 February 1985, which provided for a state confederated with Jordan (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 195–200).⁵⁵ On one occasion Mubarak went considerably further when he said, without qualifying his statement, that Egypt was the only country in favor of a Palestinian state. He went on to reveal that "all Arab capitals were against an independent Palestinian state. Syria was no exception, this is what Moscow had told Egypt."⁵⁶ This statement, more than implying a change in Egyptian policy, was meant to remind the PLO that Egypt was still its best friend among the Arab countries.

There were clear limits, however, beyond which Egypt could not go in backing the PLO. Not only were there the Israeli and American positions to consider, but also those of Jordan. Egyptian diplomats had to steer a very difficult course. While constantly reassuring the PLO that it would participate in an international conference dealing with the Palestinian question and name the Palestinian representatives,⁵⁷ they also pointed out that among the various possible solutions to the problem of Palestinian representation "a proper and practical formula" was to begin the negotiations by means of a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.⁵⁸ Mubarak himself remarked that he had good reason to believe that the Soviets had not committed themselves to supporting independent PLO representation.⁵⁹ The PLO, however, kept insisting on its right to represent the Palestinians on an equal footing with all other delegations and rejected the idea of "shared participation" (see above).⁶⁰

Egyptian efforts to restore coordination between the PLO and Jordan intensified in the fall, some time before the Amman summit. Egypt considered the Amman accord of 1985 the only possible basis for a *rapprochement*; but while Husayn had merely suspended the accord in 1986 the PLO had altogether abrogated it. Egypt had to reconcile itself to the notion that the ideas contained in the Jordan-PLO accord would perhaps one day form the basis for a settlement, but not just yet.⁶¹ In the meantime, however, Egyptian diplomacy was opposed to any let-up in exertions to convene the conference, which it considered as absolutely the last means toward a settlement.⁶² In order to bypass the obstacles that kept thwarting its realization, Egypt suggested that the work of the conference be permitted to begin, and that the solution of the intractable issue be put off until a later stage.⁶³

Repeated statements to the effect that the conference would inevitably lead to direct negotiations were clearly intended to reassure Israel. 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid, Egypt's deputy prime minister and foreign minister, went so far as to say that the five permanent members of the Security Council would have "nothing to do with the negotiations and no role in their conduct." They would not be permitted to espouse solutions. Butrus Butrus-Ghali, the minister of state for foreign affairs, promised that Egypt would be the first to leave the conference if it suspected that "peace was not getting any nearer."⁶⁴ Even though Egypt believed that the five permanent Security Council members ought to play a modest and circumscribed role, it attached much importance to their presence. Egypt set great store by the participation of the US and the USSR, without whom the conference would prove fruitless. Only the Soviets could bring the Syrians to the negotiating table. Mubarak expressed his belief that the participation of the two superpowers would be "a guarantee for a solution."⁶⁵

Considering the depth of Egypt's commitment to the conference as envisioned by itself and Jordan, Cairo inevitably rejected all proposals made by Prime Minister Shamir to hold a regional conference to be attended by Israel, Egypt, Jordan, Syria, the Palestinians and the US.⁶⁶

SYRIA

In the year under review, Syria's economic difficulties continued to grow. Several years of drought, reductions in financial aid from Arab countries, and heavy military expenditures weighed heavily on the economy. Saudi Arabia's financial aid, which amounted to \$1 bn. in 1986, was reduced to \$500m. West German credits, measured in the hundreds of millions of dollars, were stopped with the imposition of European sanctions after Syria's terrorist role was established in a British court. Syria was left with practically no foreign currency reserves (see further in chapter on Syria). President Asad argued that these economic difficulties were not a cause for concern. Syria would manage to weather the storm; it was merely a matter of time.⁶⁷ However, the Syrian president still had to provide an answer in the interim period — hence his anxiety to improve his image in the US and other Western countries. He was severely limited in what he could do by his own unchanging attachment to Ba'thist ideology.

Yet some tactical flexibility was still possible. In March, when former president Carter visited Damascus, Asad authorized him to announce that Syria supported the notion of, and was ready to attend, an international conference, either as part of an Arab delegation or as a country in its own right. He did not even rule out direct negotiations with Israel within the context of the conference.⁶⁸ Syria had already agreed in 1973 to meet with Israel in a bilateral committee within the framework of the Geneva conference of that year. There was, therefore, in Asad's readiness less than met the eye. However, he did make his point. US Assistant Secretary Richard Murphy, an expert on Syria, was somewhat cautious. Murphy felt that the Syrian stand had not yet been thoroughly explored, but he understood that it envisioned a role for bilateral discussions.⁶⁹ Asad soon cleared up any possible misunderstandings. Syria's readiness to take part in a conference was not unconditional. It would do that after all the parties agreed to implement the UN resolutions. Only then would Syria enter into discussions to determine the detailed procedures for such a conference. This was clearly addressed to Israel, whose objective, the Syrians suspected, was to

conclude "partial, separate deals."⁷⁰ In the Syrian view, the conference ought to take place under UN "supervision" and enjoy jurisdiction. A mere umbrella for bilateral negotiations was out of the question.⁷¹

Relations between Asad and King Husayn continued to be good and the two leaders met several times (see essay on inter-Arab relations). It can be assumed that the understanding they had reached concerning any future settlement remained unchanged. They were committed to seek a comprehensive settlement and to avoid separate agreements. This identity of views explained Carter's observation that Asad seemed willing to let Husayn be the spokesman for the Arab side.⁷² There was no change in the Syrian position regarding the terms of a settlement. Asad committed himself, again, not to concede "a single inch" of the Golan Heights, even if it meant "fighting a hundred wars." He would reject all solutions that did not recognize Palestinian national rights.⁷³

Syria consented to participate in the Arab summit in Amman only when, at its insistence, the Arab-Israeli conflict was included in the conference's agenda. Initially, it was planned to confine the discussions to the Iraqi-Iranian War. At the conference, Asad agreed to some mild criticism of Iran, Syria's ally, in return for summit resolutions dealing with the Arab-Israeli conflict. The Syrian influence was quite evident. The Arab heads of state voiced their opposition to separate agreements with Israel and to any settlement that did not guarantee unconditional and complete Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories.⁷⁴ (See further in essay on inter-Arab relations.)

In 1987, Syria had to slow down its efforts to achieve strategic parity with Israel. Early in the year Asad said that Syria had made much headway in the six years since the program started, but had not yet reached its goal.⁷⁵ Asad presented this part of Syria's defense policy as a necessary adjunct to its "peace policy." Only when Israel realized that it no longer enjoyed military superiority would it "respond to the requirements of a just peace."⁷⁶

ISRAEL

The latent disagreement between the two main political parties, the Likud and Labor, over the best way to bring about negotiations with Jordan and the Palestinians came to a head early in 1987. In October of the previous year, in accordance with the 1984 rotation-of-power agreement between the Likud and Labor, Yitzhak Shamir took over the premiership from Shimon Peres. But the reversal of roles with Shamir did not prevent Peres, who was now vice prime minister and foreign minister, from pursuing his efforts to reach agreement with Husayn over an international conference. In this, both he and Husayn were assisted throughout by US diplomatic efforts. Late in January, Peres was able to announce details of a 10-point agreement with the US dealing with the composition and terms of reference of the conference (see Appendix I). Under the agreement, the conference would have no power to impose a solution, would not be a substitute for direct negotiations, and would not allow the participation of any states that did not have diplomatic relations with Israel. In the case of the Soviet Union, which had severed relations with Israel in 1967, it was additionally expected that it would have to grant Soviet Jews the right to emigrate. The question of who would participate in the conference was to be agreed upon unanimously. On 1

February, Peres reported to the Israeli Cabinet on this understanding. However, the Cabinet took no decision. The formal explanation given by Shamir was that the issue was still theoretical, since Peres was unable to provide the Cabinet with a concrete proposal on which it ought to take a position.⁷⁷

Shamir, however, made no bones about his own attitude as well as that of his party. He opposed the whole idea. An international conference was an old Soviet proposal which the Arabs had embraced. It was — so he said — totally objectionable from Israel's point of view. Israel ought to insist on direct negotiations unhampered by foreign elements whose negative attitude toward it was well known. Shamir would not veto diplomatic soundings to bring about negotiations, but in such preliminary efforts Peres would have to carefully avoid stating that Israel accepted the idea of an international conference.⁷⁸ Peres was far from ready to accept this ruling. He said over and over again that he would not cease his efforts, that he was not a civil servant employed by Shamir, but the leader of a major party on a par with Shamir's.⁷⁹ Furthermore, he argued, the Knesset had more than once approved his efforts on behalf of the conference, which in reality would be no more than a ceremonial opening.⁸⁰ Shamir, however, denied that the Knesset had ever specifically debated the issue. It had merely taken note of a statement by Peres when he was prime minister, and that statement did not refer exclusively to the conference.⁸¹ (For the domestic implications of the Shamir-Peres differences, see chapter on Israel.)

At the end of February, Peres went to Cairo. His talks with the Egyptian leaders were a follow-up to the discussions he had had with them when he was still prime minister (see *MECS* 1986, essay on the ME peace process). In a joint communiqué dated 27 February, reference was made to the international conference but in a manner designed not to create a final break with Shamir. It stated the need to "reach an agreement on the convocation in 1987 of an international conference that would lead to direct negotiations."⁸² The vagueness of the communiqué and the emphasis on direct negotiations left things where they had been when the Israeli Cabinet discussed the 10-point agreement. For Peres the visit to Cairo was useful because he could reiterate to his interlocutors his support for the conference idea and brief them on the narrowing of gaps between Israel and Jordan. He was hopeful that Israel could participate in a conference reasonably assured that it would not prejudice its interests.

Shamir was far from happy with Peres's endeavors. On 11 March, the Prime Minister's Office published a long document entitled "Why No International Conference."⁸³ It recalled that the basic guidelines of the National Unity Government, to which both Shamir and Peres were committed, contained no reference to such a conference. Hinting at Peres's attempts to ensure that the conference would function merely in a ceremonial capacity with no influence on the negotiations and their outcome, it stated its conviction that such efforts were doomed to failure. The conference would inevitably lead to an international consensus in favor of Israel's withdrawal to the 1967 lines and the establishment of a Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza. A sovereign state could never allow its fate to be decided by outsiders, unless it had no choice in the matter. This, however, was not Israel's case.

Three weeks before the publication of this document, Shamir visited Washington. It was on that occasion that he declared himself strongly opposed to the conference. Until then he had merely been reserved, skeptical and unenthusiastic. He now took an unambiguous stand because of a discernible change in the US position. Shamir met

with President Ronald Reagan and Secretary of State George Shultz. They told him that a "conference should be considered as a way leading to direct bilateral negotiations."⁸⁴ It was obvious that the Administration was no longer indifferent to the fact that US diplomacy had succeeded in bringing closer Israeli and Jordanian positions on terms of reference and procedure. Even though Shamir noted that the US was not yet giving its unqualified support to the idea of a conference and favored it only as a means leading to direct talks, he decided that the time had come for him to take a clear stand.⁸⁵ He disagreed with the US that it was worthwhile continuing to explore whether a conference could be useful at all.⁸⁶ Such ongoing endeavors were bound to be perceived in Israel as a defeat for Shamir's policies. Soon after talking to Shultz, and even prior to his meeting with Reagan, he revealed that he would call for elections if some people in Israel "continue to press for a conference."⁸⁷

At the time Shamir was in Washington, Israeli civil servants promoting the Peres line were making statements in favor of the conference. One of them announced that plans for a conference would continue and results could be expected "in a matter of months."⁸⁸ Such statements illustrated the growing split between Shamir and Peres. Shamir, for his part, reportedly said that the idea of a conference was the greatest foolishness Israel's diplomacy had conceived since 1948.⁸⁹

On 11 April, Husayn and Peres met in London and reached an understanding on a number of points concerning the conference (see section on Jordan above, and Appendix I). It was, in essence, a briefer version of the 10-point agreement. Peres affirmed that the agreed document was of unusual importance. It enabled Israel to begin open and direct negotiations with another Arab country, Jordan, after a brief opening of the international conference, which would be purely ceremonial. According to Peres, Palestinians would participate in the talks together with Jordan, but would have "no connection" with the PLO. The conference would have no powers of coercion. Furthermore, the negotiations with Jordan would not depend upon negotiations with Syria since the London document provided that every set of negotiations was to be bilateral and independent of any other negotiation with another country. He warned that to miss the opportunity that had finally become available could spell the death of the peace process for many years and perhaps forever. He admitted, however, that one issue remained unresolved — Soviet participation.⁹⁰

Some Israeli analysts, by no means opposed to Peres's policies, criticized him for excluding Shamir and the Likud from his Jordan-oriented diplomacy. It was a serious mistake, they noted, to behave as if his diplomatic efforts were a Labor Party monopoly. He had alienated Shamir unnecessarily by not asking him to take part in the meeting with Husayn. Also, it was wrong of Peres to have allowed the US ambassador in Israel to be the one to transmit to Shamir the London document on the terms of reference for the conference; he should have done this himself. Peres had briefly told Shamir about the document, but had not given him a copy.⁹¹ An aide close to Shamir observed that Peres's treatment of Shamir was "self-defeating."⁹²

In the course of the year, relations between the two leaders remained strained and were characterized by mutual distrust. Lacking the necessary majority in the Knesset to call for early elections, Peres was forced to make a difficult choice between leaving the Shamir government and returning to the opposition, as in the years 1977–84, or remaining inside and pursuing his own policies, to the extent that his subordinate role

would allow him. He chose the latter, explaining that it would be a mistake for Labor to leave the field uncontested to the Likud, a party which, in his view, pursued policies detrimental to the peace process and therefore dangerous to Israel.

Peres was certain that the London document was impressive enough to be endorsed by the Inner Cabinet of which he was a member. However, Labor held only five of the 10 votes in this body and it soon became obvious that not one of the Likud ministers would vote for the document, i.e., support the international conference idea. The Peres proposal was, therefore, not submitted to the vote. This was, in fact, a victory for Shamir, who immediately declared that Peres had no mandate to act in the international arena to further the conference idea.⁹³ Peres gave a totally different interpretation to the outcome of the cabinet deliberations. He argued that since Shamir had not asked the Cabinet to vote against a conference, there was no decision one way or the other. There was no change in the situation. He declared himself unafraid of Shamir who, as prime minister, could dismiss him but apparently preferred not to do so. Peres said that he was lawfully elected and was working for peace. The "basic guidelines" of the government called for an expansion of the peace process to include Jordan. There was no ban on continuing to work in that direction.⁹⁴

The extent of US support for the London document disappointed Peres. He had been informed that Shultz would visit the region to bridge the remaining gaps and persuade the reluctant Shamir not to oppose efforts to convene the conference.⁹⁵ However, a special Shamir envoy, Minister-without-Portfolio Moshe Arens, was sent to Washington to meet with Shultz (24 April), and persuaded him to postpone the visit. Shultz preferred not to come at a time when his visit could be construed as siding with Labor against Likud, and this when tensions between the two Israeli parties were at their highest.⁹⁶

The US did not remain altogether inactive. Early in May, Reagan sent a message to Shamir, urging him not to miss historical opportunities now existing in the region. According to Shamir's aides, Reagan was not referring specifically to the conference idea; they also mentioned that Arens had met with a sympathetic response in Washington when he explained Shamir's stand to Shultz.⁹⁷ A day or two later Shultz sent Shamir a document that contained responses to 19 questions Shamir had raised in connection with the international conference. It stated that the London document was an important paper reflecting years of discussion and was proof that Jordan was ready to negotiate seriously. Shultz's detailed replies were described by Labor as clearly supporting the line Peres had been advocating throughout. The Prime Minister's Office, however, complained that it did not contain answers to essential questions, such as whether it would be, to all intents and purposes, an international conference or a mere opening for direct negotiations. Also, PLO participation was not totally excluded.⁹⁸ (For more details, see section on the US below.)

It was obvious that, in accepting the international conference idea, Peres made an important concession to Jordan. In the Amman accord of February 1985 (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 195-200 and text on p. 523), Jordan and the PLO had committed themselves to negotiations under the auspices of a broad-based international conference. Sometime in 1985, Peres reached the conclusion that Jordan was not about to change its stand and that Israel would have to agree to this framework, albeit most reluctantly, if it wanted Jordan to be its negotiating partner. The decision taken, all that was left for Peres to do was to attempt to limit the dangers to Israel that were

inherent in this kind of international framework. Hence the 10-point agreement and, eventually, the London document. These understandings did not achieve the desired results. Shamir's opposition was only one cause. Equally, if not more important, was the refusal of the Soviet Union to accept Peres's condition. There remained, in addition, other unfulfilled Israeli expectations.

Peres pointed proudly to article C(2) in the London document which stated that the "negotiations would be conducted in bilateral committees directly." However, since Husayn had never shown any reluctance to meet Israeli leaders (see section on Jordan above), there was little new in his readiness to negotiate bilaterally unless it implied a willingness to make concessions. Indeed, as early as 1973, in preparing the Geneva peace conference, then secretary of state Henry Kissinger was able to persuade the parties, including Jordan, to negotiate bilaterally with Israel in sub-groups.⁹⁹

In the US-Israel Memorandum of Understanding of September 1975, the US undertook to ensure that all the substantive negotiations would be on a bilateral basis.¹⁰⁰ No doubt, the US gave this undertaking confident that this was a realistic objective. The London document also provided in article C(1) that the international conference would not impose solutions or veto any agreement arrived at between the parties. This was also less significant than it sounded. Clearly, the conference would not grant to any third party the right to veto an agreement freely negotiated between two parties. There was, however, nothing in this provision to prevent a third party from working to destroy an agreement it objected to by taking action outside the conference framework. A case in point was Syria's ability to sabotage the Israel-Lebanon agreement of 1983. The understanding concerning Palestinian representation, designed to prevent PLO participation, was merely a reiteration of established Jordanian positions: Jordan had suspended its agreement with the PLO in 1986 when that organization refused to declare its acceptance of the very same conditions (see *MECS* 1986, essay on the PLO). Clearly this was not a Jordanian concession made to Israel.

In judging the document, it has to be acknowledged that the very fact that Husayn and Peres had reached agreement at all was important. The significance of what had been agreed was another matter. It removed none of the real difficulties on the road to the conference. Jordan still insisted on the participation of all five permanent members of the Security Council. It was not certain at all that Jordan would consider itself committed to come to a conference if Peres failed to persuade the Soviet Union, for example, to be satisfied with an essentially symbolic, non-substantive role. The implication of this was that if Soviet attendance was a prerequisite for Jordan, as indeed it appeared to be, Peres's efforts to prepare the ground for the convocation of a conference of the kind he favored were unlikely to succeed.

The Soviet obstacle did not daunt Peres completely. As he saw it, there could be a conference even without the Soviets. Should agreement be reached for the international conference, or as he insisted on calling it, the "international opening," the Soviets would, so he believed, also come regardless of conditions.¹⁰¹ This assumption by Peres, if valid, meant that Jordan might eventually participate in a conference after the Soviets had left. Clearly the Soviet attitude seemed to cause him less concern than Shamir's. Interestingly, what divided Peres and Shamir during the year under review was the international conference rather than the question of which concrete proposals would be discussed there. Both leaders were ready to enter into an

agreement with Jordan and the Palestinians that would be "in the spirit of the Camp David accords [of 1978] which included the autonomy plan." However, various adjustments could be made to accommodate Jordan as this country had "an important role to play." Such a settlement could be patterned along functional lines.¹⁰² This was a position articulated by Shamir, but Peres had frequently proposed similar solutions. One of Shamir's aides admitted that there existed a point where the Shamir and Peres lines converged. Indeed, throughout the year, as in the preceding years, Peres said that any negotiation would begin with an interim arrangement which would provide self-rule for the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza. Interchangeably, he talked about a functional settlement. In brief, he explained to *The New York Times*, Israel's opening offer would follow the Camp David logic, which meant moving in stages. The first stage would constitute the transition period leading to a permanent settlement.¹⁰³

Whether or not the proposals that Shamir and Peres could jointly agree to make in the first stage of negotiations would be sufficiently attractive to Husayn remained a theoretical question. It could not be put to a concrete test because Husayn refused to negotiate outside the international framework. There was, however, also another reason why this congruity between the two Israeli camps was more apparent than real. It was unlikely that Husayn would seriously consider an interim agreement if it was not linked to the final agreement. This was a US observation.¹⁰⁴ Peres went even further. He thought that Husayn would not accept a functional agreement without being explicitly told that Israel was ready to make a "territorial compromise." In fact, this meant accepting Husayn's demand to "exchange territory for peace," which was anathema to Shamir.¹⁰⁵ He suspected, with ample proof to substantiate this suspicion, that the Jordanian formula concealed a Jordanian demand for *total* Israeli withdrawal. Peres, too, had apparently no illusions on this score. His vision of the final settlement, beyond the interim stage, was based on a confederation with Jordan. It would consist of two independent states, Israel and Jordan, with, between them, the West Bank as an entity controlled and run by both of them, viz., a condominium. None of them would have sovereignty over that shared territory. Israel's military border would be on the Jordan River, but there would be no international or economic boundary between Israel and Jordan. The Israeli settlements in the West Bank would remain where they were. With respect to the Gaza Strip, Peres seemed to be ready for a more far-reaching solution because of the grave demographic problem that it posed to Israel. In addition to Israel's prerequisite that the Jordan River be its military frontier, it would insist on a united Jerusalem remaining part of Israel.¹⁰⁶

In October, Shultz visited the region. He did not come with high hopes that he would be able to create momentum toward negotiations. His was essentially a fact-finding tour on his way to Moscow (see section on the US below). Peres, who since April had been clearly unhappy about Shultz's reluctance to lend unconditional support to the international conference idea, was disappointed again. Peres was, as a rule, careful not to criticize US policy publicly. Nevertheless, he did declare on one occasion to *The New York Times* that he would like to see more explicit support for the conference idea from the Reagan Administration.¹⁰⁷ Israeli commentators were less discreet in giving vent to Peres's frustrations. One of them wrote on the very day of Shultz's arrival in Israel that, by not supporting Peres, Shultz had in effect supported Shamir. A columnist close to Peres subsequently went so far as to blame the

disturbances in the territories on Shultz's inaction in the eight months since Husayn and Peres had reached agreement. The columnist blamed Shultz for having missed "the historic opportunity that had presented itself."¹⁰⁸

The diplomatic tactics which Peres pursued after his agreement with Husayn were designed to persuade the Soviet Union, China, the UK, and France to fall in with Israel's and Jordan's concept of the conference. He was able to make only limited progress with the Soviets (see section on the Soviet Union, below). China was less difficult, since, unlike the Soviet Union, it did not aspire to play an active role in the conference. Even so, it did not accept Israel's demand to establish diplomatic relations before the conference convened. The decision when to set up diplomatic ties with Israel was for China a separate issue.¹⁰⁹

France and Britain were more helpful. These two countries had good relations with both Israel and Jordan and were perfectly willing to support Israeli positions that were identical with Jordan's. As far back as 1988, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher had herself asked the PLO to accept the positions later mentioned in the London document (article C[4]). Thatcher gave expression to her wholehearted support of the conference in a letter to Shamir, in which she mentioned its non-coercive character.¹¹⁰ As for France, the insistence that the PLO should accept Resolutions 242 and 338 and abjure terrorism posed no problem at all: it was a traditional French position. President François Mitterrand said in a note to Peres, that it "seems unlikely that any of the parties concerned is opposed to the notion that, with the help of the conference, direct meetings should take place ... it ought not to be assumed that a conference whose objective it is to bring positions closer will arrogate to itself authority to impose its will on the parties."¹¹¹

These commitments, made by two leading EEC countries, were certainly important to Peres insofar as some of the terms of reference on the conference were concerned. They left intact, however, the basic EEC position embodied in the Venice Declaration of 1980, which called for the inclusion of the PLO in any peace negotiations and for Palestinian self-determination (see *MECS* 1979-80, pp. 72-74). In the year under review, the EEC reaffirmed its adherence to that declaration on several occasions.¹¹² On the positive side, Peres estimated that Europe would impress upon the Arabs that Israel had done all it could to enable progress toward the conference, and it was now their turn to make a countermove. Moreover, the European countries could, alongside the US, make it clear to the Soviet Union that they expected it to modify its positions before it could take part in the conference. Finally, the European countries, and the Federal Republic of Germany in particular, could bolster the peace process by means of economic initiative in the ME, within and outside the context of an international conference.¹¹³

Inasmuch as the Peres efforts in Europe were designed to bring the peace conference nearer, Shamir viewed them with disfavor. When it came to substance, Europe would support all the objectives to which he and the Likud were opposed. The European countries could not be trusted to help the US when it stood by Israel. The European voting record in the UN showed this clearly. Shamir also questioned Peres's basic assumption that Husayn was ready to enter into meaningful negotiations. Jordan was a vulnerable state. It mocked common sense to suppose that a country that desperately needed an international framework before beginning to negotiate would dare to defy radical Arab regimes and Palestinian terrorism on matters of substance.¹¹⁴

Kissinger, the man who had fathered the Geneva conference on the ME in 1973, expressed similar misgivings. He had grave doubts about "a large conference of countries whose stated positions are not sympathetic to [those] of even the most dovish people in Israel." Israel would find itself pressured and isolated. It was perilous to enter negotiations without having a desirable outcome. Once Israel entered into an international conference it would find it hard to walk away from it.¹¹⁵ A French critic of the conference idea remarked: "In the Middle East, opportunities for peace are so rare that they must be seized. But if noble concerns are based on false assumptions or wishful thinking the price of failure would be the defeat of peace seekers in Israel."¹¹⁶ This correct observation failed to relate to the question of whether the prolonged preparatory efforts to convene a conference did not raise false hopes among those who were just as interested in a settlement as the Israelis, namely the Palestinians. In the year under review, such hopes, however, were not to be fulfilled. Palestinian despair remained as deep as ever.

THE UNITED STATES

As in 1986, so also in the year under review, US diplomacy dealing with the ME peace process kept a low profile. Peres supporters in Israel were critical of this (see above). Jordan was critical too. The Reagan Administration was perfectly aware of the dangers involved in inaction. Reduced activity on its part made it easier for an activist Soviet Union to try to compete with the US in bringing peace to the region. National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci admitted in June 1987 that the Soviets were displaying considerable confidence in their ability to cultivate Western-oriented regimes. They were talking to the oil states in the area about fixing prices, offering them protection for their oil tankers, granting the Egyptians relief on their huge debt, offering Jordan and other moderate Arab states arms, and even attempting to seduce Israel by holding out the hope of diplomatic relations and more Jewish emigration. They were showing increasing interest in the peace process in order to ensure that they would become important players in the ME.¹¹⁷ Their insistence on an international conference served them well since the Arab countries and the PLO also favored such a setting. US reservations made it easy for the the Soviets to depict the Americans as opposed to peace. The conclusion was inevitable. The US could not afford to ignore this new Soviet dynamism and needed to be engaged again in the peace process. Reagan held a series of policy meetings in January and February and decided on a more intensive effort in the ME.¹¹⁸ It was not impossible to detect a link between this decision and the London document (see sections on Israel and Jordan above). Assistant Secretary of State for Middle Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy could claim that the US had not been a loser in terms of influence or leadership in the region, where there was a tendency to look to its leadership to advance the peace process.¹¹⁹

A realistic evaluation of US diplomatic efforts in the peace process in 1987 must acknowledge the presence of several formidable obstacles that could not be surmounted as easily and rapidly as regional and other countries sometimes claimed. Even if Shultz had not listened to Shamir's envoy (see section on Israel above) and had come to the region in May in order to see what could be done to give practical meaning to the London document, he would have probably found that he could accomplish nothing. Firstly, it was unlikely that he would have succeeded in bringing Shamir

around to Peres's concept of the conference. In fact, his efforts might well have caused the fall of the Israeli Cabinet and prompted elections. And this was something he was anxious to avoid. Secondly, he could not realistically hope to persuade the Soviet Union to accept a conference so structured that it would render it powerless to support its allies and friends. The Soviets had just shown at the Algiers PNC conference that some of their interests were diametrically opposed to those of Israel, Jordan and the US. They had encouraged the PLO there to become "even more radical and rejectionist," as Shultz pointed out.¹²⁰ Thirdly, since Jordan had failed in 1985 to find Palestinians to join it in the peace negotiations under the terms set by it, Shultz rated at nil the chances of Jordan succeeding any better this time, after the explicit rejection of those terms by the PNC. Finally, Shultz knew that the Soviets were still not ready to restore diplomatic relations with Israel and to allow Soviet Jews to emigrate more freely, as Peres demanded. This last demand was fully supported by the US. Compliance with it had become one of the yardsticks the US used to assess Soviet readiness to play a "constructive role" in the ME.¹²¹ Only when this happened would the US consider them eligible for participation in the international conference.

The basic US attitude toward the peace conference proposed by the Soviets and the Arabs was distinctly unenthusiastic.¹²² The US would accept a broad forum conference only if it was structured to lead rapidly to direct negotiations and did not interfere with negotiations between the parties or "try to overturn understandings reached between them." The reason why the US agreed to this kind of conference at all was because "all possible avenues" to direct negotiations needed to be explored.¹²³ When Reagan repeated this position in Shamir's presence (18 February),¹²⁴ it was taken as proof that the US position had undergone a change. In vain did Shultz point out that the "name of the game" remained direct negotiations, that there was no other "way in which the problem could be resolved," that an international conference attended by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and others who would tell the parties what to do, would just "not work, and the US opposed it." Shultz argued that all that the US was ready to accept was "some device that has the label 'international conference' on it, through which we can pass, that will for sure get us to direct negotiations." The reason for even this cautious endorsement of the broad-based conference idea was Husayn's insistence on a setting that would give him international legitimacy.¹²⁵ Most of the elements of the US position were identical with those that it had carefully negotiated over many months with Jordan and Israel (notably Peres). The only new point was the specific reference this time to all five permanent members of the Security Council. There was, however, no change in the US opposition to another proposal which the Soviets kept raising, namely the convening of a preparatory committee, consisting of Security Council members, to lay the ground for the conference. In this the US and Jordan saw eye to eye.¹²⁶

The US shift was too modest to enable significant progress during the Jordanian prime minister's visit to Washington in April. Nonetheless Rifa'i declared himself encouraged that the US and Jordan were now discussing procedural details and modalities pertaining to the conference and no longer debating the wisdom of holding a conference. Rifa'i made it clear that Jordan wanted a conference of "substance" and not a "subterfuge," suggesting that the "external participants," i.e., the five permanent Security Council members, would act as mediators even though they would not have the power to impose anything.¹²⁷ The obvious intention of those statements was to

distinguish between the Jordanian and the American positions. Shultz must have disappointed Rifa'i, since he did not say that he favored the conference idea as such. He explained that he was merely ready "to explore" how it could lead to bilateral negotiations.¹²⁸

It is clear that the London document which Husayn and Peres agreed upon, the latter *ad referendum*, only several days after Rifa'i's stay in Washington, did make some impression on the Administration. The State Department felt that "significant progress" had been made, but its spokesman was quick to add that it remained "unclear whether an international conference can, in fact, be arranged that leads promptly to direct negotiations and peace."¹²⁹ For Peres this kind of reserved US endorsement was not really satisfactory, for Shamir it was excessive. Their differences were also apparent in their reactions to the communications which Reagan and Shultz sent to Israel in the days before the Israeli Cabinet discussed the London document.¹³⁰ The American diplomatic communications highlighted all the positive elements of what had been achieved, but could not state with certainty that the international conference would be merely a means to direct negotiations. They could only reiterate the US's own position. Shultz wrote that the Soviet Union could have no doubt regarding the US position, namely that the conference ought not to be able to interfere with direct negotiations. The US could undertake not to participate in any conference that presumed to negotiate in the name of the parties or together with the parties.¹³¹ Shamir's argument, however, was that the US position was only one element, and despite its importance, it could not convince him to revise his anti-conference stand. Other issues were also far from resolved. The issue of Palestinian participation remained intractable. All in all, the matter had not yet reached the point where a vote by the Israeli Cabinet was called for. If Peres thought differently, it was up to him to make a concrete proposal which would be put to the vote. Peres, however, preferred not to risk a tie. The Cabinet accordingly took no decision (see section on Israel above).

The US felt that the London document, although significant, was not a breakthrough and did not justify the claim that peace was at hand. American officials were somewhat disappointed when Peres announced in May that he would force new elections if the Likud thwarted his move in the Cabinet. One of them said the US thought that what had been achieved was "not enough to withstand the blowtorch of Likud."¹³² Peres had apparently miscalculated.

This was a setback, but the US realized that, even if Israel had endorsed the London document, complete convergence of views on the modalities of the conference would still have been lacking. A visit by Shultz to the region in October convinced him that there was nothing that the US could do to advance the peace process in the short term. The kind of conference the Soviets were envisioning "was exactly the kind of conference the Israelis were shy of and he agreed with the Israelis." He wondered whether excessive consultations on modality problems were indeed the way to continue. Perhaps greater emphasis ought to be placed on substantive issues. However, these included territorial issues as well as questions of autonomy and were equally awesome.¹³³ Such unorthodox reflections were not about to be translated into concrete steps. In the meantime, Shultz made one more attempt to satisfy Husayn in his search for a negotiating framework that would provide him with international legitimacy. Shultz proposed that Shamir and Husayn meet in Washington under the joint

auspices of Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev during the superpower summit in December.¹³⁴ Shamir agreed, but Husayn refused.¹³⁵ After Husayn's rejection, Shultz saw no point in raising the suggestion with the Soviets or with the Syrian president, without whom such a meeting was unimaginable.

US officials were acutely aware that the lack of progress in the peace process, coupled with diplomatic inactivity, involved considerable danger. The growing appeal of radicalism among the younger generation in the West Bank and Gaza was noted and caused much concern.¹³⁶ As in the two preceding years, American diplomats continued to set great store by quiet diplomacy and incremental progress (see *MECS* 1986, essay on the ME peace process). The US ambassador in Israel, interviewed at the end of the year, promised that one day everyone would realize that the "groundwork carried out in this period was crucial for further progress ... till now quiet diplomacy was more important than shuttle diplomacy."¹³⁷ US diplomats drew some encouragement from what they viewed as an additional track of their ME policy. It was the effort to "help Jordan, Israel and reasonable Palestinian leaders on the West Bank and Gaza to improve the quality of life there." For this purpose \$30m. would be "squeezed out" of the US budget. Over a period of time, they hoped, this program would encourage the emergence of a more moderate leadership.¹³⁸

There was a certain amount of ambiguity in the US position. On the one hand, the US believed in and was committed to unhampered direct negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, and made efforts to bring this about. As Shultz put it, the US would insist "that there is no predetermined result or plan, so each party can advocate its preferred approach."¹³⁹ Furthermore, administration officials affirmed that the US would not interfere in the internal deliberations of the parties.¹⁴⁰ On the other hand, however, Shultz and other US officials made it clear that the Reagan initiative of September 1982 remained the valid US position and would be "taken to the table." The US would do so because it expected "others" to put forward their own views.¹⁴¹ For Israel, this meant that even its only ally, the US, would be forced by the very nature of a broadly-based international framework to take a position which Israel had either rejected (Likud) or been reserved about (Labor). For the US it meant an ongoing commitment to the only proposal which, in essentially the same form, had made possible an agreement between Israel and an Arab country, Egypt. A US president had been witness to this agreement and the US had then been involved in the detailed negotiations which followed (1979–82). Moreover, the US was not inclined to write off what had already been achieved.¹⁴²

THE SOVIET UNION

A careful reading of Soviet statements about the peace process during the course of the year appeared to indicate that the spirit of *glasnost* and *perestroika* had not yet greatly affected traditional Soviet positions. During the Washington summit between Reagan and Gorbachev in December, the Soviets affirmed in a position paper, which they released, that they continued to insist on three conditions for a ME settlement: Israel must return all the occupied territories; the Palestinian people must be accorded the right to self-determination; and equal security for all countries of the ME must be ensured. To reach such a settlement, an international conference was indispensable. It was to be attended by the permanent members of the UN Security Council and by all

sides involved in the conflict, including the PLO.¹⁴³ These were general statements, but in numerous speeches and interviews the Soviets clarified their thinking in greater detail:

- (a) The conference must not become a mere canopy for direct talks and for separate, partial agreements. The Soviets explained that the Arab countries and the PLO rejected exclusive reliance on bilateral negotiations since these would place them in an "unequal position in respect of the other side in the conflict."¹⁴⁴ Bilateral negotiations, while not totally excluded, were unsuitable for the solution of such "key issues" as Palestinian self-determination, the return of the Arab part of Jerusalem, and the question of international guarantees for a settlement. These problems required the formation of working groups with the participation of all the members of the conference.
- (b) The outcome of the working groups' discussions would be "examined" by the conference's plenary, and endorsed by "common consent."¹⁴⁵ The parties to the dispute need not fear that solutions would be imposed. No one would exercise veto power.¹⁴⁶
- (c) Concerning PLO participation, the Soviet attitude was modeled on that of the PLO itself. It was up to the PLO and the Arabs to decide how the PLO would be represented. There were three possibilities: an independent delegation; participation in a united Arab delegation, if the Arabs decided to have one; or in a joint Jordanian-PLO delegation.¹⁴⁷
- (d) All participating countries ought to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242. The PLO, however, should not be expected to do that, since the resolution "did not concern the PLO."¹⁴⁸
- (e) The Soviets supported Palestinian self-determination, but left it to the PLO and the Arabs to decide whether to express it in an independent state, within a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, or even in an Israeli-Palestinian confederation.¹⁴⁹
- (f) The question of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union was an internal Soviet matter. There was no connection whatsoever between it and the conference.¹⁵⁰ Israel and the US however, disagreed. They believed it to be one of the important indicators of Soviet intentions. More than 8,000 Jews were permitted to leave the Soviet Union in 1987, the highest number since 1981 but nowhere near the figures of the early 1970s.¹⁵¹

Israel repeatedly made unsuccessful attempts during the year to persuade the Soviets to restore diplomatic relations, severed since 1967. The Soviets took the line that relations between all countries, including Israel, were a normal thing. Israel was an acknowledged fact. The Soviet Union had broken off relations "because of Israel's continuous aggression against the Arab countries. Therefore resumption of relations was possible [only] if Israel changed its policy and removed the obstacle standing in the way of resumption of relations."¹⁵² Sometimes this stand was stated more harshly. The Soviet Union would discuss the issue of relations when Israel agreed to the principle of a peaceful settlement on the basis of withdrawal from all the territories.¹⁵³

Gorbachev himself declared at a dinner in Asad's honor in Moscow, on 24 April, that the absence of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel "cannot be considered normal." He noted that the Soviet Union recognized Israel's right to "peace and a secure existence," but added that "changes in relations with Israel were

conceivable only in the mainstream of the process of settlement in the Middle East."¹⁵⁴ The Soviets rejected all suggestions — by the US or Israel — that it restore diplomatic relations before the convening of the conference.¹⁵⁵

However, contacts with Israel became more frequent. A Soviet consular mission arrived in Israel in July, ostensibly to survey Russian property, but extended its stay and was still in the country at the end of the year. Soviet and Israeli diplomats met from time to time for extended conversations. Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met Peres at the UN in October. The Soviet ambassador in Washington and Karen Brutents, of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, met with Peres earlier in the year.

The main item on the Soviet agenda in all the talks was the international conference. When Vladimir Polyakov, head of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle East Department, met with Murphy in Geneva, on 6–7 July, he did not deviate at all from the Soviet concept of the conference. What was acceptable to the US, Israel and Jordan, and had been tentatively agreed in London in April, was rejected by Polyakov. He told Murphy that the Soviet position as well as that of the majority in the Security Council was that the permanent members ought to play a meaningful role in the conference. They would not agree to provide a mere umbrella for direct talks between Israel and the Arab delegations. The only good news was that the Soviets were trying to move Asad in the direction of negotiation. Gorbachev himself had advised him to show flexibility.¹⁵⁶ The Soviets were convinced that Syria favored the conference.¹⁵⁷ This was really not surprising since Syria had often expressed itself in favor of a UN-sponsored conference.

The Soviets felt they had scored a coup when they managed, after considerable effort, to restore unity between the various factions of the PLO.¹⁵⁸ After the PNC meeting in April (see section on the Palestinians and the PLO above), there was enough of a Palestinian consensus in support of the kind of conference the Soviets were promoting.

APPENDIX I: THE TEN PRINCIPLES AGREED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE UNITED STATES, JANUARY 1987¹⁵⁹

1. The conference will convene for a brief and limited time.
2. It will not have authority to impose a solution.
3. It will not have authority to nullify agreements reached between the parties bilaterally.
4. The negotiations will be conducted directly between the parties in committees, without the participation of the plenary.
5. Negotiations with one delegation will not depend upon negotiations with another delegation.
6. The basis for the negotiations will be UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.
7. The conference will convene only after the procedural questions have been agreed upon.
8. Prior agreement will be reached concerning the main participants and the accompanying delegations.
9. The participation of the USSR depends on its restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, [and] revising its attitude to the Jews in the Soviet Union, including permission to emigrate.
10. Every move will be coordinated with the US.¹⁶⁰

APPENDIX II: THE LONDON DOCUMENT OF UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN JORDAN AND ISRAEL, APRIL 1987¹⁶¹

Agreement between the Jordanian Government, which it approved before the US Government, and the Israeli foreign minister pending the approval — *ad referendum* — of the Israeli Government. Once they are publicized following an agreement between

the sides involved, clauses A and B will be regarded as US proposals accepted by Jordan and Israel. Clause C should be treated with utmost secrecy as a commitment to the US by the Jordanian Government, which will be forwarded to the Israeli Government.

- A. Invitation by the UN secretary-general.
- B. Resolutions of the international conference.
- C. The "modalities" agreed by Jordan and Israel.
- A. The secretary-general will issue invitations to the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to negotiate a peaceful settlement based on Resolutions 242 and 338 to bring comprehensive peace to the region, security to its states, and a response to the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.
- B. The participants in the conference agree that the purpose of the negotiations is to attain a peaceful solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and a peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem in all its aspects. The conference invites the parties to set up bilateral geographical committees to negotiate mutual issues.
- C. Jordan and Israel agreed that: (1) The international conference will not impose any solution and will not veto any agreement arrived at between the parties; (2) The negotiations will be conducted in bilateral committees directly; (3) The Palestine issue will be discussed in the committee of the Jordanian-Palestinian and Israeli delegations; (4) The Palestinian representatives will be included in the Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; (5) Participation in the conference will be based on acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 by the parties and renunciation of violence and terrorism; (6) Each committee will negotiate independently; (7) Other issues will be decided by mutual agreement between Jordan and Israel.

This memorandum of understanding is subject to approval of the respective governments of Israel and Jordan. This document will be shown and proposed to the US.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. R. Amman, 10 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
2. D. Rubinstein in *Davar*, 10 August 1987.
3. Marwah Dudin's interview in *The Jerusalem Star*, 19–25 February — DR, 26 February 1987.
4. Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i, *JT*, 9 April — DR, 10 April 1984.
5. Husayn's interview in *Profil*, 6 July — DR, 8 July, and al-Masri's interview in *al-Haqiqa*, 23 July — DR, 28 July 1987.
6. Rifa'i's interview in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 5 March — DR, 6 March; al-Masri, in an interview in *al-Ahram*, 3 April — DR, 7 April 1987, said: "...the presence of other countries such as the People's Republic of China, France and the UK will at least reduce the level of polarization and will give these three countries a greater role in making the conference a success rather than if it were restricted to the two superpowers."
7. Husayn's interview on Austrian TV, 30 June — DR, 1 July; interview in *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 1 July — DR, 2 July 1987.
8. See, e.g., statements by the French foreign minister to Jordan TV, 6 July — DR, 8 July; by the British foreign secretary to Jordan TV, 2 November — DR, 3 November; and al-Masri's interview in *al-Haqiqa*, 23 July — DR, 28 July 1987.
9. Al-Masri's interview in *al-Ra'y*, 11 August — DR, 12 August; also Muhammad al-Khatib, Jordan's minister of information, in an interview with AFP, *JT*, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1987.
10. *JP*, 8 November 1987.
11. The meeting was held on 19 October; R. Amman, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1987.
12. Interview in *al-Safir*, as reported in *Ma'ariv*, 14 December 1987.
13. Husayn's interview with R. L'Orient, R. Amman, 5 January — DR, 16 January; al-Masri's interview in *al-Ahram*, 3 April — DR, 7 April 1987.
14. Husayn's interviews and statements in *L'Espresso*, 18 January — DR, 22 January; in *Politique Internationale*, as reported in *al-Dustur*, Amman, 22 July — DR, 27 July; and to a Swiss correspondent rebroadcast by R. Amman, 17 September — DR, 18 September 1987.
15. *JT*, 6 May — DR, 6 May 1987.
16. See note 14 where reference is made to the *al-Dustur* interview.

17. Husayn to Austrian TV, 30 June — 1 July; Jordan TV, 17 September — DR, 18 September; Rifa'i to *JT*, 9–10 April — DR, 10 April 1987. At the Amman summit in November, Husayn stated in Asad's presence that Jordan had acted in coordination with Syria (*al-Ra'y*), 10 November — DR, 12 November 1987).
18. Rifa'i statement, R. Amman, 8 April — DR, 9 April 1987.
19. Husayn to *Profil*, 6 July — DR, 8 July 1987.
20. Moshe Dayan, *Breakthrough: A Personal Account of the Egypt-Israel Peace Negotiations* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1981), pp. 35–37. In his *Boston Globe* interview of 6 May, Husayn denied that he had met privately with Shimon Peres.
21. Interview in *al-Tadamun*, 13 June — DR, 17 June 1987.
22. *JP*, 3 December 1987.
23. Rifa'i replying to questions from JNA, 3 May — DR, 4 May 1987. In an interview with the BBC's Arabic language service on 4 November, he denied what he referred to as Shimon Peres's references to a "London document" concluded between Jordan and Israel.
24. Rifa'i's interview in *JT*, 9–10 April — DR, 10 April 1987.
25. Interview in *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 1 July — DR, 2 July 1987.
26. R. Damascus, 11 November — DR, 13 November; VoP (Baghdad), 13 November, 16 November 1987.
27. The Amman summit added prestige to Husayn but also had a constraining *noblesse oblige* effect.
28. Yasir 'Arafat's interview in *al-Hawadith*, 1 September — DR, 18 September 1987.
29. *JT*, 21 April — DR, 21 April 1987.
30. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 23 November 1987.
31. *Der Spiegel*, 21 December 1987.
32. E.g., 'Arafat's interview in *al-Hawadith*, 11 September — DR, 18 September 1987.
33. See *Ha'aretz*, 12 January 1988.
34. See, e.g., Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO Political Department, interviewed in *al-Raya*, 8 March — DR, 8 March; Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad), Fath Central Committee member, interviewed in *al-Anba*, 5 October — DR, 13 October 1987.
35. E.g., 'Arafat's interview in *The New York Review of Books*, 25 June, p. 42 and in *Danas*, 6 October — DR, 29 October 1987.
36. Ibid. 'Arafat said that these four points were contained in a report sent by Faruq Qaddumi on the basis of a meeting with the Soviet minister.
37. 'Arafat's interview in *The New York Review of Books*, see note 35.
38. 'Arafat's interview in *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 21 May — DR, 28 May, and his address to the UN Conference of Non-governmental Organizations on Palestine in Geneva, 7 September — DR, 14 September 1987.
39. Salah Khalaf's (Abu Iyad) interview in *al-Qabas*, 11 March — DR, 18 March; *al-Anba*, 5 October — DR, 13 October 1987.
40. Salah Khalaf in *al-Anba*, 5 October — DR, 12 October 1987.
41. *Ma'ariv*, 29 March 1987.
42. 'Usama al-Baz, *Ma'ariv*, 20 May 1987.
43. *Ha'aretz*, 23 September; Moshe Amirav's interview with R. IDF, 21 September — DR, 22 September; Dr. Serri Nusaybah's interview in *Ma'ariv*, 20 September 1987.
44. Mubarak's interview in *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 4 April — DR, 7 April 1987.
45. 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *'Uman*, 7 February — DR, 10 February 1987.
46. 'Abd al-Majid's statement before a joint meeting of the Arab Affairs, Foreign Affairs and National Security Committees of the People's Assembly, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1987.
47. Butrus-Ghali's interview in *al-Akhbar*, 26 March — DR, 31 March 1987.
48. See note 46.
49. 'Usama al-Baz, interview in *al-Qabas*, 10 January — DR, 16 January 1987.
50. Vol, 27 February — DR, 27 February 1987.
51. Mubarak's press statement, R. Cairo, 9 July — DR, 10 July, and MENA, 11 July — DR, 13 July 1987.
52. R. IDF, 1 July — SWB, 23 July; Vol, 23 July — DR, 24 July 1987.
53. E.g., 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *'Uman*, 7 February — DR, 10 February; Mubarak's

- interviews in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 9 April — DR, 23 April, and in *al-Tadamun*, 13 June — DR, 17 June 1987.
54. MENA, 27 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
 55. E.g., by Egypt's Prime Minister, 'Atif Sidqi, R. Cairo, 29 December — DR, 7 January 1987.
 56. Interview in *al-Tadamun*, 4 June — DR, 17 June 1987.
 57. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 26 September — DR, 6 October; *al-Majalla*, 30 September — DR, 14 October; MENA, 31 October — DR, 3 November 1987.
 58. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *al-Musawwar*, MENA, 27 May — DR, 28 May 1987.
 59. See note 57.
 60. PNC resolutions, in "Israel and Palestine Political Report" (Paris, May 1987) and text of the PNC Political Committee resolution, VoP (San'a), 26 April — DR, 27 April 1987.
 61. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *al-Majalla*, 30 September — DR, 14 October; Butrus-Ghali's interview in *al-Musawwar*, 2 October — DR, 8 October 1987.
 62. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *al-Tadamun*, 10–16 October — DR, 23 October 1987.
 63. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *al-Musawwar*, 29 May — DR, 8 June 1987.
 64. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *JP*, 22 July — SWB, 23 July and Butrus-Ghali in *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 24 June — DR, 25 June 1987.
 65. Al-Baz's interview in *al-Ushu' al-'Arabi*, MENA, 28 March — DR, 30 March; Butrus-Ghali, see note 21; Mubarak's interview in *al-Majalla*, MENA, 23 June — DR, 24 June 1987.
 66. See note 56; Mubarak's interview, Mubarak's speech, R. Cairo, 15 August — DR, 18 August 1987.
 67. Asad's interview in *WP*, 21 September — DR, 22 September 1987.
 68. *The Washington Quarterly*, Vol. 10, No. 3, Summer 1987.
 69. Murphy's interview reported in *JP*, 7 August 1987.
 70. Asad's interview in *WP*, 21 September — DR, 22 September 1987.
 71. R. Damascus, 30 September — DR, 2 October 1987 reporting on Syria's foreign minister's talk with Shultz. After a conversation with Shevardnadze, R. Damascus (26 September — DR, 28 September) announced that Syria and the Soviet Union shared the view that the conference should have "real powers."
 72. See note 69.
 73. Revolution Day address, R. Damascus, 8 March — DR, 9 March 1987.
 74. R. Damascus, 11 November — DR, 13 November; also, VoP (Baghdad), 13 November — DR, 16 November 1987.
 75. Interview in *al-Qabas*, 24 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
 76. See note 71.
 77. Peres's airport press conference, Vol, 28 January — DR, 29 January; Shamir's interview on Vol, 2 February — DR, 3 February; also, Vol, 9 February — DR, 10 February 1987.
 78. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 2 February 1987.
 79. Interview, Vol, 23 February — DR, 24 February 1987.
 80. E.g., Peres's interview on Israel TV, 18 February — DR, 19 February, and on Vol, 19 May — DR, 19 May 1987.
 81. Shamir Knesset statement, Government Press Office (GPO) text, 28 January 1987.
 82. R. IDF, 27 February — DR, 27 February 1987.
 83. GPO text, 11 March 1987.
 84. WF, 19 February 1987.
 85. Shamir's interview, Vol, 18 February — DR, 18 February 1987.
 86. *JP*, 19 February — DR, 19 February 1987.
 87. See note 79.
 88. Vol, interview with A. Tamir, 18 February — DR, 18 February 1987.
 89. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 5 March 1987.
 90. Interview, Vol, 22 April — DR, 23 April; interview in *Hadashot*, 3 May — DR, 4 May; Vol, 1 May — DR, 1 May 1987.
 91. Shai Feldman, *Davar*, 27 July; U. Benziman, *Ha'aretz*, 15, May; A. Eldar, *Ha'aretz*, 26 May 1987.
 92. Interview with Yosef Ben-Aharon, director-general of the Prime Minister's Office, *JP*, 21 May 1987.

93. GPO, 13, 15 May 1987. The Cabinet discussed the issue in two sessions, on 11 and 13 May.
94. Peres's interview, Israel TV, 13 May — DR, 14 May 1987.
95. *NYT*, 5 May; *Ha'aretz*, 16 October; *Davar*, 25 December 1987.
96. *JP*, 27 April — DR, 27 April; *Ha'aretz*, weekly supplement, 22 May 1987.
97. Vol, 1 May — DR, 1 May 1987.
98. Israel TV, 5 May — DR, 7 May; *Ma'ariv*, 7 May 1987.
99. Henry Kissinger, *Years of Upheaval* (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1982), pp. 767, 787.
100. *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1–16 November 1975, p. 27, 432.
101. Peres on "Meet the Press," 17 May; reported remarks Vol, 1 August — DR, 11 August 1987.
102. Ben-Aharon's interview in *Ha'aretz*, 24 July — DR, 28 July; Shamir's interview on R. IDF, 11 October — DR, 13 October 1987.
103. Peres's interviews: *NYT*, 8 May; Israel Educational TV, 7 May — DR, 8 May; Vol, GPO, 10 August 1987.
104. Israeli Minister Gad Ya'acobi, reporting a conversation with Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, Vol, 23 June — DR, 24 June 1987.
105. Peres's interview in *Davar*, 30 October 1987.
106. *Ibid.* In this interview with Haim Guri, Peres was unusually candid.
107. *NYT*, 5 May 1987.
108. Eldar, *Ha'aretz*, 16 October; H. Eshed, *Davar*, 25 December 1987.
109. Peres's interview on Vol, 1 July — DR, 1 July 1987 and 1 October — DR, 1 October 1987. In the July interview, Peres quoted a Chinese diplomat as having said that in the framework of the preparations for an international conference a solution could be found to the issue of diplomatic relations with Israel.
110. Vol, 28 July — DR, 29 July 1987. In October, in advance of Shultz's visit to Israel, Thatcher wrote to urge Reagan to support the conference (*JP*, 10 October 1987).
111. *Davar*, 29 June 1987.
112. E.g., in Brussels on 23 February and Copenhagen, 13 July 1987.
113. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 28 January — DR, 29 January; Ambassador Y. Meruz's article, *JP*, 25 June 1987.
114. Shamir's interview, Vol, 4 May — DR, 5 May 1987.
115. *The Forward*, 29 May 1987.
116. Dominique Moïsi, associate director of the Institut Français des Relations Internationales, *IHT*, 7 June 1987.
117. Frank Carlucci's address at a meeting of the National Association of Arab Americans, USIS official text, 17 June 1987. See also Robert Oakley's address to B'nai Brith, USIS transcript, 30 May 1987.
118. See Oakley's address mentioned in note 117.
119. Worldnet interview, 6 August, USIS transcript, 8 August 1987.
120. Shultz's remarks and questions and answers at the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (Aipac), USIS text, 18 May 1987.
121. White House deputy spokesman, 1 May 1987, USIS transcript. In another statement a White House spokesman said that normalization of relations between the Soviet Union and Israel would also be taken by the US as a good omen.
122. Assistant Secretary of State Murphy in reporting to a congressional subcommittee according to the *NYT*, 8 April 1987.
123. WF, 17 February 1987.
124. WF, 18 February 1987.
125. Shultz responding to questions during testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, 19 February 1987. WF, 19 February 1987.
126. Briefing on developments in the ME and South Africa, by State Department official, 23 March, USIS transcript, 24 March 1987.
127. Interview in *JT*, 9–10 April — DR, 10 April 1987.
128. *NYT*, 8 April 1987.
129. WF, News Briefs, 30 April, and also *ibid.*, 5 May 1987.
130. According to *JP*, 14 May 1987, Reagan's letter to Shamir was dated 27 April.

131. *JP* of 14 May 1987 quotes from the Shultz letter to Shamir.
132. *NYT*, 18 May 1987.
133. Shultz, as quoted by *WP*, 21 October; *JP*, 23 October; *Le Monde*, 22 October 1987.
134. *Boston Globe*, 23 October; Jordanian Minister to the royal court, 'Adnan Abu 'Awda, *WF*, 18 November 1987. Also, *NYT*, 7 November 1987.
135. Husayn's interview in *al-Safir* as quoted by *Ma'ariv*, 14 December 1987.
136. See, e.g., Oakley and Carlucci's speeches, note 117.
137. Ambassador Thomas L. Pickering's interview, *Davar*, weekend supplement, 25 December 1987.
138. See Carlucci and Oakley's addresses mentioned in note 117.
139. Shultz's address to Aipac, 18 May 1987. *WF*, 18 May 1987.
140. Murphy's address to the Foreign Policy Association in New York, 5 June 1987; USIS official text.
141. Shultz address to Aipac, Washington, 18 May 1987. *WF*, 18 May 1987.
142. The US special envoy to the talks, Ambassador Sol M. Linowitz, lists in his memoirs 25 areas where Israel and Egypt had agreed on powers and responsibilities to be granted to the Palestinian self-governing authority and says: "we were...four fifths of the way to an agreement, and the five major issues still on the table were all, I thought, capable of resolution" (*The Making of a Public Man* [Boston: Little, Brown, 1985], p. 234).
143. *Near East Report*, 14 December 1987.
144. Vladimir Vinogradov, minister for foreign affairs for the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, statement to the UN non-governmental organization meeting in Geneva, September 1987, *I & P*, October 1987.
145. Interview with Alexey B. Podtserob, spokesperson for ME affairs at the Soviet UN Mission, *American-Arab Affairs*, No. 20, 1987. Date of the interview 12 March 1987. Also, Alexander Pilonogov, Soviet ambassador to the UN, in interview, *al-Itihad*, 3 May 1987.
146. Alexander Zotov, consultant to the International Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party, *WF*, 19 November; also Alexander Zinchuk, Soviet ambassador in Jordan, R. Monte Carlo, 2 March — *DR*, 3 March 1987.
147. Stated by Pilonogov, see note 145.
148. Vladimir Polyakov, head of the Soviet Ministry's Middle East Department, interview, *CSM*, 28 May 1987.
149. *Ibid.*, note 145.
150. Both Podtserob and Pilonogov refer to this in their interviews, see note 145.
151. Figure was reported by the Geneva-based Intergovernmental Committee for Migration, reported by *JP*, 8 February 1988.
152. Statement made by Karen Brutents, deputy head of the Department of International Affairs of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, while touring the Persian Gulf countries, as reported in *Ma'ariv*, 23 January 1987.
153. Zinchuk, see note 146.
154. *Guardian Weekly*, 19 May 1987.
155. See note 148.
156. *JP*, 13, 14, 24 July; *Ma'ariv*, 17 July 1987.
157. Pilonogov (see note 145) said: "Syria's attitude on the conference is positive. Quite clearly positive."
158. Pilonogov (see note 145) said: "Yes, we worked most energetically for this objective, i.e., for the unity of the PLO, and we are very glad that our efforts were successful."
159. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 2 February 1987.
160. These guidelines were drawn up by the US and Israel to help them decide whether to participate in an international ME peace conference. They were reflected, in part, in the draft document produced in London by Israel and Jordan on 11 April 1987 (see Appendix II).
161. Based on the complete Hebrew text as published in *Ma'ariv*, 1 January 1988, and published in *Hatzofeh*, 15 June — *DR*, 16 June 1987.

Armed Operations

UZI RABI and JOSHUA TEITELBAUM

In the period under review, armed operations continued in Israel, in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and in Lebanon. Internationally, operations against Jewish and Israeli targets were few and far between. Armed activity was particularly intensive at the time of the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers in April, and the Arab summit in Amman in November. Major incidents are discussed below; details of other incidents may be found in the chronology of events at the end of this chapter.


ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

In addition to a significant intensification of Palestinian armed operations in Israel proper and in the West Bank and Gaza, a growing involvement by local inhabitants in *fida'i* activity was also discerned. It was mainly reflected in the increased number of operations by locally organized squads, which resorted more and more to home-made explosives because of their continuing shortage of arms. While the use of light arms was decreasing there was a significant rise in the number of incidents carried out with incendiary bombs and other home-made devices. Although Israel succeeded in exposing many locally organized squads, such squads still presented a serious problem to Israeli security forces because of their small size, which made them difficult to detect, and the apparent lack of any connection to a familiar Palestinian organization. Some of these squads affiliated themselves with Palestinian organizations after having carried out an attack; others had to perpetrate one in order to be accepted as members.

Concomitantly, the proportion of attacks carried out by squads connected with Palestinian organizations decreased. Those squads aimed their attacks at Israeli targets as well as at local Arabs suspected of collaborating with the Israeli authorities. The most prominent of these was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) group apprehended in May, while attempting to assassinate the mayor of Jenin; it was also responsible for several earlier assassinations, including those of the mayor of Nablus in March 1986 and of Israeli civilians and soldiers.¹ The involvement of Israeli Arabs in armed operations increased visibly. Several squads that were apprehended consisted of Arabs from both Israel and the West Bank and Gaza. One of these, also uncovered in May, was responsible for the planting of bombs in buses and at sites in Israel proper.² At times, Israeli Arabs also functioned as middlemen in recruiting people for *fida'i* organizations and selling stolen Israel Defense Forces (IDF) arms.³

Occasionally, the attackers directed their activities at locations frequented or inhabited by both Jews and Arabs in order to undermine their mutual relationship. East Jerusalem and Qalqiliya were favored sites; these Arab centers were frequented

Location of Major Fida'i Operations and other Incidents in South-Lebanon, 1987



by Jews, but as a result of the hostile activities, there was a dramatic decrease in the number of Jews who went there. Moreover, these attacks drew increasingly violent reactions from Jewish vigilantes.

Popular disturbances became more frequent and grew stormier toward the end of the year, when riots erupted throughout the administered territories and in several cases affected areas inhabited by Israeli Arabs. (For details see chapter on Israel, and essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip. This activity will not be dealt with here due to its generally popular nature.)

HOME-MADE DEVICES — A SUBSTITUTE FOR LIGHT ARMS

The greater use of home-made explosives as opposed to light arms may be largely attributed to the lack of arms over the years. The number of incendiary bomb attacks increased sharply, from 35 in 1986 to 140 in 1987. The attacks, which were carried out mainly in the West Bank and Gaza, were aimed at both civilian and military vehicles. Most attacks ended up causing minor damage; an exception was a lethal attack in April near Qalqiliya (see below). Attempts were also made to plant explosive charges and car bombs in Israel proper. Both types of activity were designed to hit crowded places. Lack of proficiency and increasingly common use were probably the reasons for the rise in the number of accidents—mainly premature detonation.

As in the previous year, knives continued to be used for lethal stabbings and were perhaps the most effective means at the attackers' disposal. Nineteen stabbing attempts resulted in two Israelis dying and 14 being injured. Stone throwing continued to be the easiest, and hence most widespread, means of attack. The lack of arms was also reflected in the growing demand for IDF weapons. Assaults on IDF soldiers doubled, from 11 in 1986 to 22 in 1987;⁴ in most cases an effort was made to steal the soldier's weapon. Stolen IDF weaponry was also discovered on several occasions in hidden caches.⁵

ONE TYPICAL EVENT: THE 12 APRIL INCENDIARY BOMB NEAR QALQILIYA

Many of the operational patterns discernible in 1987 converged in the firebombing, on 12 April, of a vehicle in which a family was traveling near Qalqiliya. The attack resulted in the death of a mother and son and the injury of four others.⁶ Local *fida'i* squads, probably encouraged by the results of the attack, intensified their use of incendiary bombs. Israeli visitors, feeling increasingly insecure, sharply reduced their visits to Qalqiliya — a flourishing commercial center — and its surroundings. Moreover, neighboring Jewish settlers initiated several retaliatory acts against the local Arabs. In May, several dozen settlers went on a destructive spree in Qalqiliya in response to another incendiary bomb attack.⁷ The mounting tension necessitated IDF intervention to reduce friction between local Arabs and Jewish settlers.

Several months later the man responsible for the 12 April attack, a Qalqiliya resident, was apprehended by security forces. During the interrogation it became clear that the attacker had initially acted on his own.⁸ After having made contact with a local Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) middleman, he was required to carry out an additional attack before being allowed to join the organization. An attack on 6 August, carried out at the same location and resulting in the injury of an Israeli woman, served to achieve this goal.⁹ The assailant also

participated in several acts of sabotage against Israeli targets and local Arabs who were suspected of collaboration with the authorities. The most prominent was an abortive attempt in May to plant a car bomb in Petah Tiqva.¹⁰ If the attack of 12 April proved frustrating to the security forces and caused a deep sense of insecurity among settlers, many local Arabs also felt uncomfortable. After the attacker's arrest, there was a general sense of relief and the mayor of Qalqiliya expressed the hope that relations with neighboring Jewish communities would improve and Israelis would return to shop in his town again.¹¹

ISLAMIC JIHAD — *FIDA'I* ACTIVITY OF A DIFFERENT NATURE

One manifestation of the Islamic revival in the region at large was an increase in violent *fida'i* activity. Spontaneity and boldness, typical of religiously-motivated operations, were noticed on several occasions, one of which was the attempt in February by a fundamentalist in Nablus to run over a group of IDF soldiers.¹² The most important development in 1987 in this regard was the increase in Islamic Jihad activities, a more institutionalized form of Islamic-motivated *fida'i* operations. Islamic Jihad emerged as one of the most vociferous organizations operating in the territories (see essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip). The organization, operating clandestinely, attacked Israeli civilians and soldiers as well as local residents suspected of collaboration. Islamic Jihad's center of activity was in the Gaza Strip. However, it has branched out into the West Bank and was known to have collaborated with local Fath activists — something which benefited both sides.¹³ While the former undertook to supply the personnel, the latter contributed financial means and operational experience. This pattern was apparent in the 1983 murder of a Hebron Yeshiva student, responsibility for which was claimed by the Palestinian Islamic Jihad.¹⁴ Additional operations followed, with responsibility being claimed by Islamic Jihad squads using slightly different names. One such operation was the October 1986 attack on IDF recruits just after a swearing-in ceremony at the Western Wall in Jerusalem (for details see essay on armed operations in MECS 1986). Another noteworthy incident was the attempt, in August 1987, to explode a car bomb in a suicide mission in Jerusalem. The girl who was to have been the driver was one of several Islamic Jihad members who had been trained under Fath sponsorship.¹⁵

Other operations carried out by the organization in 1987 included the fatal shooting of an Israeli civilian in May, and the August assassination of an IDF officer in an ambush, both in Gaza.¹⁶ Another clash in Gaza, between security forces and an Islamic Jihad squad, took place in October and resulted in the death of four Jihad men and an Israeli security man. This led to the uncovering of a network of Islamic Jihad cells in the Strip and the arrest of some 50 men.¹⁷ The highly diversified arms cache discovered after the clash indicated the Jihad's potential ability to carry out further violent operations.

LEBANON

Armed operations in South Lebanon against IDF and South Lebanese Army (SLA) targets grew bolder and more frequent in 1987. Operations were carried out primarily by Shi'i groups but also by Palestinian and left-wing organizations. The security zone witnessed daily incidents, including mortar fire, light-arms attacks and roadside

charges meant to hit IDF and SLA patrols. The most active organization in the arena was the Shi'i Hizballah (party of God), which launched most of its assaults against SLA strongholds. Its attacks were now marked by a significant change in operational patterns. Thorough reconnaissance, as well as extensive prior planning, indicated a shift from random to organized activity. However, most of the attacks were repulsed with IDF aid and resulted in a large number of casualties. Hizballah claimed responsibility for several Katyusha rockets fired into Israel, probably in retaliation for IDF intervention. A response of a different sort may have been the reported execution of a Lebanese Jew held hostage by the "Oppressed of the Earth," a group affiliated with Hizballah¹⁸ (for details of an earlier execution of this kind, see essay on armed operations in *MECS* 1986). Other hostages served as a means of applying pressure on Israel to halt its activity against the "Oppressed in Southern Lebanon."¹⁹ The organization seemed to have expanded its activity into the naval arena as well, clashing with an IDF patrol off the Lebanese coast on 13 December.²⁰ Naval mines were discovered on several occasions and were attributed to Hizballah. Both types of incident suggested methods used by Iran in the Persian Gulf. IDF sources noted, in this regard, that Hizballah's naval activity had already begun at the end of 1985 under Iranian patronage.²¹

Other noteworthy organizations which carried out operations against IDF and SLA targets acted mainly within the Lebanese National Resistance Front (LNRF; *Jabhat al-Muqawama al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya*), an umbrella framework including Shi'is, Palestinians and left-wing elements, most of them pro-Syrian. In addition to routine activities within the security zone, several groups affiliated with the LNRF made abortive attempts to infiltrate into Israel by land. The most prominent of these attempts took place on 16 September and resulted in the death of three IDF soldiers.²²

Fath activity in the security zone and across the border declined sharply due to its involvement in the ongoing "camps war" in Lebanon (for details, see essay on the PLO, and chapter on Lebanon). An increase in its activity, however, was noticed on the eve of the PNC meeting. Several attacks by al-Fath, which were meant either for demonstrative purposes, or to capture Israeli hostages to exchange for Palestinian prisoners, turned out to be abortive. Al-Fath collaborated with Hizballah occasionally, for instance in the 19 April attempt to infiltrate into Israel near Kibbutz Manara.²³

The effective sealing of the Israeli-Lebanese border, and the Israel Navy's efficiency, drove the organizations to explore an alternative route of infiltration—by air. A most successful operation of this kind was the 25 November hang-glider attack (see below). Attacks on Israeli targets were often followed by immediate Israel Air Force (IAF) retaliation. At times, Israeli preemptive strikes outside the security zone were initiated by both land and sea.

THE NIGHT OF THE HANG GLIDERS

On the night of 25 November, an attempt to infiltrate into Israel was made by two men flying motorized hang gliders. One of them was discovered and shot after having landed inside the security zone. The other landed near a military camp on the outskirts of Kiryat Shmona. Upon landing he opened fire on a passing military vehicle, killing an officer and injuring a woman soldier. He then broke into the camp, shooting and

hurling hand grenades. The attack resulted in the death of five more soldiers and the injury of six others; the attacker was then shot dead.²⁴

The attack was not the first of its kind: similar methods were used in March and April 1981 by the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), led by Muhammad Zaidan 'Abbas (Abu al-'Abbas), who split off from Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) in 1977. Both ended in failure.²⁵ The November 1987 attack, on the other hand, turned out to be the most lethal in years. It was also the first successful operation initiated through Lebanon since the Israeli withdrawal from that country in February 1985. Responsibility for the attack was claimed by the PFLP-GC. A spokesman for the organization said that the attack took place in response to "the deviationist policy in the Palestinian arena and to all those who are advocating an international conference," thus emphasizing that the liberation of Palestine could be achieved only by such operations.²⁶ In light of the above, it was certainly not a coincidence that the attack came less than a fortnight after the Arab summit in Amman. Israel, for its part, was shocked and embarrassed. The IDF launched an extensive investigation within its ranks, and those found responsible for negligence were punished.²⁷

In its evidently careful preparation and spectacular execution, the attack resembled Jibril's previous operations. However, unlike previous operations, which were directed against civilians, the hang-glider attack was carried out against a military target. It should be noted also that the PFLP-GC had refrained from attacking Israel proper since the 1982 Lebanon War, restricting its operations to assaults within the security zone.²⁸ Yet, Jibril became involved with Israel on two different occasions—the May 1985 prisoner exchange (see appendix to essay on armed operations, *MECS* 1984–85), and the February 1986 Libyan jet interception (see essay on armed operations in *MECS* 1986). According to IDF sources, PFLP-GC members had been training to fly hang gliders in Syria. The attackers presumably took off from the Syrian-controlled Biqā' Valley.²⁹ Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir pointed to Syria as the principal culprit behind the attack. Obviously, he said, "the organization which...perpetrated these murder[s]... [could not] carry this out without the auspices and help of the Syrians."³⁰ Shamir also attributed the latest waves of disturbances in the West Bank and Gaza to the aftermath of the attack.³¹ Unlike previous attacks, this one was not followed immediately by a retaliatory act. Several observers suggested that the US might have asked Israel not to do anything to complicate the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington.³²

THE INTERNATIONAL ARENA

There was a decline in operations against Jewish and Israeli targets abroad. This corresponded with the broader decline in operations by Middle Eastern groups against Western targets, which, in turn, may have been due to the exposure of direct Syrian and Libyan involvement in terrorist operations (on state-sponsored terrorism, see essay on armed operations in *MECS* 1986). Organizations had probably been ordered by their sponsoring states, mainly Syria, to curtail their activity in the international arena.³³ This might also serve as an explanation for the fact that these groups shifted a significant portion of their activity to Lebanon. One exception to this was the seajacking of a Belgian yacht in November by Abu Nidal's group. It was

apparently a case of mistaken identity, since Abu Nidal had intended to kidnap Israeli citizens.³⁴ The PLO, still conscious of the political damage done by the *Achille Lauro* and Larnaca affairs (see essay on armed operations in *MECS* 1984–85), continued to maintain a low profile abroad. Abu al-'Abbas stated: "We will carry out armed attacks only in Israel. The *Achille Lauro* belongs to the past. We have asked public opinion to forgive us for victims."³⁵

Extremist Shi'i organizations, affiliated with Iranian-oriented Lebanese Hizballah, continued their efforts to establish terror networks in Western Europe. This tendency was countered by improved European and American intelligence coordination. Noteworthy in this regard was the uncovering of two squads in Turkey and Italy, which were planning to carry out attacks against Israeli and Jewish institutions in Western Europe.³⁶

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS³⁷

The following chronological listing of armed operations is based primarily on IDF sources, but draws also on Israeli and Arab media sources. It includes incidents resulting in casualties, as well as a few other incidents which are illustrative of the trends prevailing in the reviewed arenas.

The first part deals with *fida'i* operations in Israel and in the West Bank and Gaza. The second covers incidents in Lebanon which involved the IDF. For clashes between groups operating within Lebanon, see chapter on Lebanon. For location of sites where incidents occurred in Lebanon, see map on p. 104.

ISRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA

Date	Place	Description
1 January 1987	Jerusalem	Two incendiary bombs were thrown at a bus, wounding three Israelis.
17 January	Jerusalem	Two Israelis were stabbed and wounded in the Old City market by a squad affiliated with the PFLP. A wave of anti-Arab riots subsequently erupted, lasting several days.
1 February	Near Haifa	Nine Israelis were wounded when a bomb exploded in a bus. The PLO claimed responsibility.
15 February	Kefar-Saba	Several Arabs were wounded when an explosive charge went off prematurely in their car. They apparently meant to place a booby-trapped car near a local hospital. The activators were part of a Fath squad apprehended in May.
19 February	'Askar refugee camp (south of Nablus)	Two IDF soldiers were wounded when a local driver attempted to run them over. The driver was killed.
22 February	Jerusalem	Twelve IDF soldiers and five Arab residents were wounded by a hand grenade, hurled at an IDF vehicle.
12 April	Alfei Menashe (near Qalqiliya)	An incendiary bomb was thrown at an Israeli vehicle, killing two Israelis and wounding four others (see description in text above).
25 April	Gaza	An incendiary bomb wounded three Israeli Arabs in their vehicle.
1 May	Hebron	An Israeli was stabbed and slightly wounded in the local market.
8 May	Kiryat Gat	Three Israelis were slightly wounded by an explosive charge planted at a cafe.
14 May	Gaza	A <i>fida'i</i> preparing an explosive device was wounded by its premature detonation. (His arrest led to the uncovering of local squad that dealt with roadside charges.)

18 May	Gaza	Six Islamic Jihad members escaped from a local prison. They returned to <i>fida'i</i> activity and were apparently involved in incidents which took place in Gaza during May, August and October.
20 May	Eilon-Moreh (West Bank)	An eight-year-old Israeli boy, who had been brutally murdered, was found in a cave.
23 May	Jerusalem	An Israeli taxi driver was stabbed and wounded.
24 May	Gaza	An Israeli was stabbed and wounded at a local market by an Islamic Jihad squad.
25 May	Gaza	An Israeli was shot dead at the local market. The attack was carried out by one of the escapees mentioned above.
1 June	Jerusalem	A bus driver was wounded in an incendiary bomb attack on his vehicle.
4 June	Hebron	An Israeli youth was stabbed and slightly wounded at the local market.
5 June	East of Tel Aviv	A hand grenade was thrown at a bus by a squad of Israeli Arabs affiliated with the PFLP.
10 June	Hebron	An Israeli driver was slightly wounded by an incendiary bomb.
12 June	Ramat Gan	Two Israelis were wounded by an explosive charge.
16 June	Petah Tiqva	A <i>fida'i</i> was killed handling a charge that exploded prematurely.
20 June	West Bank	A squad affiliated with the PFLP was uncovered while attempting to assassinate the mayor of Jenin.
26 June	Near Kefar-Saba	A hitch-hiking soldier was stabbed and wounded in an attempt to steal his weapon. Two Israeli Arabs were held as suspects.
27 June	Haifa	A charge that exploded on the beach resulted in the injury of two Israelis, a mother and son.
28 June	East Jerusalem	A child was wounded in a vehicle by an incendiary bomb.
3 July	Kefar Silver (near Ashqelon)	Two Israelis were wounded by an explosive charge planted at a bus by a Fath squad. (The squad was uncovered in August).
4 July	Qalqiliya	Nine Israelis, five Israeli Arabs, and a local resident were wounded by a bomb planted at a local restaurant. Responsibility was claimed by the PLO.
10 July	Jaffa	Two Israelis were stabbed and wounded.
11 July	Gaza	An Israeli Arab, apparently mistaken for a Jew, was stabbed and wounded in the local market.
21 July	Jaffa	A bus driver was wounded when a bomb exploded in his vehicle.
2 August	Gaza	An IDF soldier was ambushed and shot dead by an Islamic Jihad squad. Two of the attackers escaped from Gaza prison in May 1988.
6 August	Near Qalqiliya	Two Israelis were wounded when an incendiary bomb was thrown at their vehicle.
14 August	Nablus	An Arab youth was shot and injured while attempting to throw an incendiary bomb at an IDF patrol.
16 August	Gaza	A military vehicle was ambushed and its two passengers were shot and wounded, apparently by an Islamic Jihad group.
16 August	The village of Tal (West Bank)	An Israeli was assaulted with a club and wounded.
22 August	Near Nablus	An IDF soldier was attacked at a bus stop and wounded by two assailants.
27 August	Tel Aviv	An Arab bus driver was wounded while preparing an explosive device.
20 September	Qalqiliya	An IDF soldier was wounded when an incendiary bomb was thrown at a bus.
22 September	Ramat Hasharon	Two Israeli youths were stabbed and slightly wounded by two Arabs. The PFLP-GC claimed credit for the attack.
25 September	Megiddo junction	An IDF soldier was stabbed to death and his weapon was stolen. The attacker was apprehended.
28 September	Bayt Saffafa (near Jerusalem)	An Israeli taxi driver was stabbed and wounded by three Arab passengers.

6 October	Gaza	Four Islamic Jihad members were killed in a clash with Israeli security forces. An Israeli was also killed. Following this event a large network of Islamic Jihad was exposed.
9 October	Old City of Jerusalem	An Israeli was shot at close range by a PFLP squad and died several days later.
24 October	The village of Faruq (near Nablus)	A local resident, who assaulted IDF soldiers in an attempt to steal weapons, was shot and wounded.
31 October	Tiberias	Two Israelis were wounded by an explosive charge planted on the shore of the lake.
1 November	Haifa	Two IDF soldiers were stabbed and wounded by Arabs while traveling in a taxi.
8 November	Far'a refugee camp (West Bank)	A local woman was wounded during an attempt to stab an IDF soldier and steal his weapon.
22 November	Bethlehem	An IDF soldier was wounded by an incendiary bomb thrown at a bus.
6 December	Gaza	An Israeli was stabbed to death. Al-Fath's "Force 17" took credit.
7 December	The village of Dahariyya (near Hebron)	An attempt to run over a group of IDF soldiers resulted in the injury of the driver of the vehicle.
10 December	Balata refugee camp (near Nablus)	A local woman was wounded while attempting to stab an Israeli soldier.
12 December	Gaza	One local resident was killed and two were wounded while attempting to stab an IDF soldier.
16 December	Rafah	An IDF soldier was stabbed and wounded. The two attackers were also wounded.
28 December	Jerusalem	An Israeli was stabbed and slightly wounded in the Old City.
29 December	Nablus	An IDF soldier was stabbed and wounded by a local youth.
30 December	Or-Yehuda (near Petah Tiqva)	Two Israelis were wounded by a booby-trapped envelope, one of 10 such envelopes sent from Turkey to various addresses in Israel.

LEBANON

<i>Date</i>	<i>Place</i>	<i>Description</i>
12 January 1987	South of Sidon	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases.
12 January	Security zone	One IDF soldier was wounded when his tank hit a mine.
13 January	Biq'a Valley	IDF planes raided Palestinian installations.
20 January	Markaba (central sector)	Three armed men were killed in a clash with IDF soldiers.
5 February	Tibnit	Two armed men were killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.
6 February	Tibnit	Three IDF soldiers were wounded and five armed men were killed in a clash.
7 February	North of Beaufort Castle	One SLA soldier was killed and three were wounded in a Hizballah assault on an SLA post. An IDF patrol clashed with the attackers, killing five of them.
7 February		Israel navy units intercepted a vessel on its way from Cyprus to Lebanon. Fifty members of al-Fath were arrested on board.
12 February	Sidon	IAF planes attacked Palestinian bases.
13 February	'Ayn al-Hilwa	IAF planes attacked Palestinian bases.
13 February	West of Markaba (central sector)	Four armed men were killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.
15 February	East of Sidon	One man was killed and three were wounded when IDF planes raided Palestinian installations.
12 March	Northwest of Bint Jubayl	One IDF soldier was killed and another was wounded in a clash with armed men. Responsibility was claimed by the Shi'i organization, al-Amal.
17 March	South of Sidon	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases.
20 March	Central sector	Three IDF soldiers were slightly wounded by a mortar shelling.
20 March	South of 'Aynata	Two IDF soldiers were slightly wounded by a roadside charge.
20 March	Sidon	IAF planes attacked Palestinian installations.
22 March	North of the security zone	Five IDF soldiers were wounded and three armed men were killed in a clash.
30 March	North of the security zone	Three armed men were killed in two clashes with an IDF patrol.

9 April	'Ayn al-Hilwa	IAF planes attacked Palestinian installations.
11 April	Qantara (northwest of Tibnin)	Two IDF soldiers were killed and two were wounded in an ambush. Responsibility was claimed by Hizballah. The IDF retaliated with air raids on Palestinian installations in Sidon. Five men were killed.
18 April	Qantara (northwest of Tibnin)	Eighteen Hizballah men were killed during an attack on SLA strongholds. The attackers were repulsed with the IDF's help. Four IDF soldiers were slightly wounded.
19 April	Near Kibbutz Manara	Two IDF soldiers were killed in a clash with a Fath squad. The squad meant to infiltrate into Israel, take hostages, and bargain for the release of Palestinian prisoners. IAF planes retaliated by bombarding Palestinian installations around Tyre.
23 April	East of Sidon	IAF planes twice raided Palestinian installations. Twelve men were reportedly injured.
24 April	North of security zone	One IDF soldier was wounded by a Katyusha rocket attack.
1 May	East of Sidon	IAF planes attacked Palestinian installations, killing between 13 and 15, and wounding 35-37.
6 May	South of Sidon	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases. Eight men were reported killed and 28 wounded.
7 May	North of Kibbutz Hanita	Two members of al-Fath were killed and three were wounded in a clash with an IDF patrol. The squad meant to carry out a spectacular attack in Nahariyya. IAF planes attacked Palestinian bases in Sidon. Lebanese sources put the casualties at 12 dead and 60 wounded.
Mid-May	East of Sidon	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases several times.
20 May	Security zone	Four IDF soldiers were wounded by a roadside charge.
24 May	Maghdusha (south of Sidon)	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases.
25 May	The village of Hula (north of the security zone)	One armed man was killed in a clash with an IDF patrol while attempting to infiltrate into the security zone.
31 May	Northern border of the the security zone	Mortar shelling by Hizballah caused the injury of six IDF soldiers. Meanwhile, assaults on three SLA strongholds near Jizzin killed eight SLA soldiers and eight Hizballah men. Three Hizballah men killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.
4 June	South of the village of Huna (central sector)	
7 June	Northern border of the security zone	One IDF soldier was killed and two were wounded by a roadside charge. Responsibility was claimed by the LNRF.
17 June	'Ayn al-Hilwa	IAF planes raided a PFLP-GC base. One man was killed and five were wounded.
17 June	The village of Qabrikha (northwest of Tibnin)	IAF planes raided a Hizballah base.
17 June	North of Hasbaya	Three Hizballah men were killed in a clash with an IDF patrol while attempting to infiltrate into the security zone.
1 July	Central sector	An IDF soldier was wounded by small-arms fire.
3 July	The village of 'Amiq (Biq'a Valley)	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases.
4 July	Security zone	Two members of al-Sa'iqa were killed in a clash with SLA soldiers in the security zone, on their way to infiltrate into Israel where they planned to carry out a spectacular operation.
6 July	The village of Ya'tar (north of the security zone)	Four Hizballah men were killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.
23 July	Central sector	An armed man was killed in a clash with IDF soldiers.
24 July	Qar'un Lake (eastern sector)	IAF planes destroyed a vessel belonging to the Syrian Social Nationalist Party.
26 July	Near Sidon	An IDF commando unit landed from the sea and clashed with members of the left-wing Popular Nasserite Organization, killing seven and wounding four others.
9 August	Northwest of Tibnin	Palestinian installations were raided by IAF planes.
10 August	Central sector	Six IDF soldiers were wounded by mortar fire. Al-Amal claimed responsibility.

11 August	Ba'albak	Seven men were killed and two were wounded when IAF planes raided Shi'i installations.
28 August	Ya'tar	Five IDF soldiers were wounded in a clash with members of al-Amal.
29 August	Ya'tar	Five members of al-Amal were killed in two clashes with IDF soldiers during an IDF-launched preemptive operation.
2 September	Bint Jubayl	One IDF soldier was wounded by a roadside charge.
5 September		IAF planes raided Palestinian, Shi'i and left-wing targets. Some 50 men were reportedly killed and 60 wounded, most of them members of al-Fath.
5 September	Central sector	One armed man was killed and another wounded in a clash with an IDF patrol.
8 September	Tyre	IAF planes raided Palestinian bases.
16 September	The foothills of Dov mountain (by Shab'a)	Three IDF soldiers were killed and four were wounded in a clash with an LNRF squad, comprising mainly DFLP members, which was on its way to carry out an attack inside Israel.
24 September	North of 'Ayshiyya	One IDF soldier was wounded by small-arms fire.
25 September	Bint Jubayl	Two Hizballah men were killed by IDF forces during an attempt to plant roadside charges.
26 September	Bint Jubayl	One IDF soldier was wounded when his vehicle hit a mine.
3 October	Security zone	A local resident, who tried to run over a group of IDF soldiers with his car, was shot dead.
10 October	Biq'a Valley	IAF planes raided PFLP bases.
13 October	Shuba	One Hizballah man was killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.
20 October	South of Markaba	Three armed men were killed in a clash with IDF soldiers.
24 October	'Ali Taher Mountain	Two armed men were killed in a clash with IDF forces while attempting to infiltrate into the security zone.
27 October	Barr Ilyas	IAF planes attacked Palestinian bases.
6 November	North of the security zone	An IDF force raided two Shi'i villages, killing three Hizballah men.
6 November		Israel navy units intercepted two Fath vessels on their way to Lebanon. Several Fath members on board were detained and brought to Israel.
8 November	'Ali Taher Mountain	One IDF soldier was killed when his vehicle hit a mine.
14 November	North of 'Ayshiyya	Three DFLP members were killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.
16 November		Israeli navy units intercepted two vessels. Fath members were detained on board.
16 November	South of Sidon	IAF planes attacked Palestinian bases. One armed man was killed and three were wounded.
19 November	North of the security zone	Three IDF soldiers were wounded by mortar shelling.
25 November	Near Kiryat Shmona	The hang-gliders' attack (for details, see above).
27 November	South of Sidon	Six armed men were killed when IAF planes raided Palestinian bases.
8 December	Rashaf (central sector)	One IDF soldier was killed and another was wounded when their vehicle hit a mine.
11 December	Off the Lebanese coast	A clash between a Hizballah speedboat and an Israel navy patrol resulted in the death of an IDF soldier. The speedboat was destroyed and its four crew members were killed.
15 December	Near Maydun (outside the security zone)	Several Hizballah men were killed and one IDF soldier was wounded in a clash.
17 December	Hasbaya	Six armed men were killed by an IDF patrol helping to repulse an attack on an SLA stronghold.
25 December	Jordan Valley (near Kibbutz Ma'oz-Haim)	Three PLF members were intercepted by the IDF while attempting to infiltrate into Israel.
29 December	The village of Arnun	One armed man was killed and another was wounded in a clash with an IDF patrol. Both casualties were apparently members of al-Amal.
30 December	Bint Jubayl	Two armed men were killed in a clash with an IDF patrol.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *Ma'ariv*, 21 June; *Ha'aretz*, 21 June; *FT*, 20 June 1987.
2. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 29 May — DR, 2 June 1987.
3. *JP*, 22 June; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 24 November 1987; *Ha'aretz*, 19 February; *Ma'ariv*, 19 February 1987.
4. *Ma'ariv*, 22 January 1988.
5. See, for example, *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 19 October 1987.
6. *Ma'ariv*, 13 April; *Ha'aretz*, 13 April 1987.
7. *Ma'ariv*, 6 April 1987.
8. *Ma'ariv*, 10 December 1987.
9. *Ha'aretz*, 7 August 1987.
10. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 12 February 1988.
11. *JP*, 10 December 1987.
12. *Ha'aretz*, 19 February; *Ma'ariv*, 19 February 1987.
13. Michal Sela, "Islamic Terror," *Koteret Rashit*, 21 October 1987.
14. *JP*, 8 July 1983.
15. *Ha'aretz*, 26 August; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 29 September 1987.
16. *Ma'ariv*, 26 May, 3 August 1987.
17. For details of the clash, see *JP*, 9 October; *Ha'aretz*, 9 October; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 16 October 1987.
18. *Ma'ariv*, 13 January 1987.
19. R. Beirut, 9 April — DR, 10 April 1987.
20. *Vol.*, 11 December — DR, 11 December 1987.
21. *JP*, 13 December 1987.
22. *The Times*, 17 September; *Ma'ariv*, 17 September 1987.
23. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 21 April; *JP*, 26 April 1987.
24. *Ma'ariv*, 26 November; *Ha'aretz*, 27 November; *JP*, 27 November 1987.
25. *JP*, 27 November 1987.
26. Voice of the Mountain, 26 November — SWB, 28 November 1987.
27. R. IDF, 26 November — SWB, 28 November 1987.
28. *JP*, 27 November 1987.
29. *Ha'aretz*, 29 November 1987.
30. R. IDF, 26 November — SWB, 28 November 1987.
31. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 26 January 1988.
32. *Ma'ariv*, 2 December; KUNA, 6 December — DR, 7 December 1987.
33. USIS, 29 June 1987.
34. *JP*, 10 November; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 9 November 1987.
35. *JP*, 24 April 1987.
36. *Ha'aretz*, 24 February, 6 March 1987.
37. The chronology was compiled with the assistance of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, and Yohai Sela.

INTRAREGIONAL AND MUSLIM AFFAIRS

Inter-Arab Relations

BRUCE MADDY-WEITZMAN

The oscillating nature of inter-Arab politics was again evident in 1987. Inter-Arab divisions had become rigidified in 1980–86; the Arab states had failed in 1986 — for the fourth consecutive year — to convene a fully attended summit conference to formulate collective policy. But in 1987, inter-Arab alignments seemed less etched in stone than previously, even though there were no fundamental shifts in orientation by any of the states. There was an exceptional amount of dialogue during the year among Arab rivals, at both the bilateral and multilateral levels.

More than any other factor, it was the expansion of the Iraqi-Iranian War and the concomitant challenges posed by Iran to the existing Arab order that galvanized inter-Arab diplomacy into action.

To a great extent, the focus was on Syria, the leader of a minority, oppositionist bloc on nearly every major issue facing the Arab system in 1980s (the Gulf War, the Arab-Israeli conflict, the question of Egypt's place in the Arab world, and the role of the superpowers in the region). The combination of the intensifying crisis in the Gulf (with corresponding Arab pressure to reduce its support for Iran) and serious economic difficulties at home compelled Damascus to make a tactical course correction to demonstrate greater responsiveness to Arab entreaties. It now heeded the calls of the Arab majority coalition (led in this case by Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates [UAE]) for a dialogue with Iraq, and acquiesced in the convening, in November, of the long-delayed Arab summit conference, which was devoted overwhelmingly to the conflict in the Gulf.

The summit itself, held in Amman, was a personal triumph for Jordan's King Husayn. He, perhaps more than any other Arab leader, had repeatedly articulated the feelings of frustration and weakness besetting both Arab decision-makers and intellectuals regarding their inability to cope with the myriad challenges posed by non-Arab regional and global powers. The remedy, in the view of Husayn and many others, was as old as the ideology of Arab nationalism itself: Arab solidarity, in word and deed. In promoting "joint Arab action," Husayn was peripatetic: he had 23 meetings in 1987 with the presidents of Syria, Iraq, and Egypt. It remained to be seen, however, whether the Amman summit would mark the beginning of more sustained inter-Arab cooperation, or merely a temporary respite from the incessant backbiting, competition, and fragmentation that had dominated inter-Arab affairs during the 1980s.

Whatever the case, the Amman summit will be remembered as marking the formal culmination of Egypt's decade-long efforts to break down the boycott and isolation imposed on it in the late 1970s following its agreements with Israel. Here, too, the war in the Gulf was a decisive factor: the greater the danger posed by the war's escalation, the greater the Arab appreciation of Egypt's ability to act as a counterweight to Iran,

and the accompanying readiness to ignore, if only temporarily, Cairo's peace strategy.

Despite the centrality of the Gulf War (and the resultant relegation of Arab-Israeli relations to a position of secondary importance), most Arab states also continued to be preoccupied with subregional matters. In the Maghrib, the year was one of intensified dialogue as well. Libya's troubles in Chad and the continuing state of uncertainty in Sudan decisively shaped the political dynamics in the Nile Valley-East Africa region. Lebanon remained a Syrian bailiwick, although an Arab League-appointed committee did contribute to ending the "war of the camps". (For details, see chapter on Lebanon.) The south of the Arabian Peninsula was isolated, on the whole, from wider Arab affairs, although the new leadership in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) did indicate a very slight interest in moving away from the radical fringes of the Arab spectrum. (For details, see chapter on the PDRY.) Finally, although the Gulf War was an all-Arab concern of the first magnitude, it had a particular impact, at times divisive, on relations within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC; see also chapter on the Gulf states).

THE ISLAMIC CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION'S SUMMIT IN KUWAIT

The Islamic Conference Organization's (ICO) fifth summit, held in Kuwait from 26–29 January, provided the year's first arena for intensified bilateral and multilateral diplomacy among Arab leaders. (For the wider aspects of the meeting, see essay on Islamic affairs.) In particular, it marked another achievement in Egyptian foreign policy. Since 1984, the ICO had served as a convenient "back door" for Egypt to reestablish its centrality in the Arab and Islamic world (see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 127–30; 1984–85, pp. 146–47; 1986, p. 93). The process was capped by an invitation from the emir of Kuwait, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, to Husni Mubarak to attend the summit personally — even though Kuwait had not yet restored full diplomatic ties with Egypt. In his welcoming address to the summit, the Kuwaiti emir placed special emphasis on Mubarak's presence, stressing the unbreakable historical ties binding their two countries.¹

Polite words aside, Mubarak's presence was linked to regional anxieties concerning the Iraqi-Iranian War. It was perhaps fitting, therefore, that the specter of Iran's latest offensive towards Basra hung over the gathering. With the front only 80 km. away, the booming of artillery cannon could be heard during the evening hours.² The Iranians themselves boycotted the summit, on the ground that Kuwait's support for Iraq made it an inappropriate venue.³ To further drive home their unhappiness, the Iranians inspired a number of sabotage missions against Kuwaiti oil installations and within Kuwait City itself, and there were threats to shoot down the airliners of arriving participants. These acts injected further nervousness and urgency into the proceedings. Even the PLO head, Yasir 'Arafat, acknowledged that the Gulf War was the "immediate central issue, alongside the Palestine question."⁴

In contrast to Egypt, Syria had found the ICO an uncongenial forum throughout the 1980s.⁵ In light of the expansion of the Gulf War and Mubarak's impending participation, the Kuwait summit promised to be no exception. Nonetheless, the Syrians used the pre-summit preparatory sessions to actively defend their unpopular positions on the war, on Egypt's participation, and on the absolute priority of the

Arab-Israeli conflict. Twice they attempted to challenge the legitimacy of Egypt's participation, on the grounds that it had not complied with past ICO resolutions condemning the Camp David accords and the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The first challenge came in a committee meeting drawing up the agenda for the preparatory foreign ministers' conference. For good measure, Syria also proposed to condemn the July 1986 meeting between Morocco's King Hasan (chairman of the ICO's Jerusalem Committee) and Israel's prime minister, Shimon Peres.⁶ When the attempt failed, the Syrian delegation, undeterred, submitted its proposals directly to the foreign ministers' conference (22–25 January), again unsuccessfully. In doing so, it clashed sharply with the Egyptian delegation and elicited strong condemnations from the Egyptian and Moroccan media.⁷

Ironically, perhaps, Syria's attacks on Egypt came against the background of quiet probings between the two sides. Egyptian demands reportedly included the end to their mutual propaganda war, the establishment of an interests section in each other's capital, and Syrian acquiescence in other Arab states' renewal of full diplomatic ties with Egypt.⁸ The Syrians, for their part, reiterated their insistence that Egypt renounce, *a priori*, its agreements with Israel. According to an Egyptian newspaper, Mubarak delegated former Arab League Secretary-General Mahmud Ri'ad to Damascus three weeks before the Kuwait summit to both explore Syria's readiness to coordinate future diplomatic efforts in the Arab-Israeli sphere, and warn the Syrians that anti-Egyptian behavior at the summit would not go unanswered.⁹ However, he found no signs of flexibility there.

Notwithstanding the chasm separating the two countries, the summit did provide some personal drama: a short meeting between Mubarak and Hafiz al-Asad, the first meeting between Egyptian and Syrian presidents since Anwar al-Sadat informed Asad in November 1977 that he was about to journey to Jerusalem. According to Mubarak, the meeting was a chance encounter which he initiated after coming upon Asad in one of the lounges adjacent to the conference chamber;¹⁰ others insisted that it had been prearranged by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.¹¹ In his description of the meeting, Mubarak reported that he and Asad had exchanged both personal compliments as former comrades-in-arms and mutual barbs. A measure of agreement was also achieved, he claimed. Asad, said Mubarak, was in favor of regaining the Golan Heights through peaceful means. He was also amenable to Mubarak's suggestion that Mahmud Ri'ad visit Damascus again for further talks, provided other Arab representatives were amenable as well. Mubarak said he had consented on condition that the Syrian summit delegation stop insulting Egypt.¹² As it happened, however, the suggested Ri'ad visit never materialized; the Syrians, for their part, insisted that the Mubarak-Asad meeting had been only a matter of protocol, without significance.¹³

Asad had arranged to deliver his summit address immediately before Mubarak, through switching speaking turns with the president of the PDRY. The speech was as Asad had advertised to Mubarak: a sharp attack on Egypt's agreements with Israel, on its illegitimate participation in ICO activities, and, for good measure, on the Hasan-Peres meeting. Various Arab League and ICO resolutions had, he declared, laid down "common rules" prohibiting separate agreements and normalization of relations with Israel. "We adhere to he who adheres to these resolutions... [it is] deviation which causes separation."¹⁴

The summit participants braced themselves for an Egyptian counterattack. However, Mubarak took the highroad. To the applause of the participants, he declared that he would not reply to Asad's accusations in order not to spoil the summit's atmosphere of Islamic unity.¹⁵ The Egyptians did carry out their earlier threats to "expose" alleged meetings over the previous five years between senior Syrian and Israeli officials (including some between Asad's brother Rif'at and Ariel Sharon).¹⁶ However, the "revelations" had little impact.

For Syria, the summit's final resolutions were at best a mixed bag. The call for member states to cut their diplomatic and commercial ties with Israel was directed mainly at those African states which had recently resumed them, while Egypt was not mentioned by name. The Hasan-Peres meeting, a particularly sore point for Syria, was not even discussed by the summiteers.¹⁷ On the Iraqi-Iranian War, the ICO's call on Iran to accept previous ICO and UN Security Council resolutions to end the conflict were met with Syrian reservations during the preparatory foreign ministers' meeting.¹⁸ Moreover, unlike on past occasions, none of its Arab fellow-travelers — not even Libya — joined it. (The Libyans were in the process of moving away from their previous all-out support of Iran — see below. They were also interested in winning sympathy for their position on Chad.) The summit resolutions also reiterated the ICO members' unhappiness with the Soviet "military occupation" of Afghanistan, something which the Syrians had continually sought to downplay, if not justify. Most unsettling, perhaps, was the summit's call for an "end to all aggression" against the Palestinian camps in Lebanon, accompanied by an explicit reference to Syria's patronage of the Amal Shi'ite militia that was besieging them.¹⁹ On the plus side, the Syrians could draw satisfaction from the ICO's support for their suggestion to convene an international conference to define terrorism, for the Syrian-led struggle against the Camp David accords, and for the convocation of an international conference to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Mubarak-Asad encounter was the most significant of the numerous bilateral and multilateral Arab discussions that took place in Kuwait. Still, there were others of note, including those between Asad and Lebanon's President Amin Jumayyil, and between King Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat. There was also speculation that an Arab summit would convene, either on the sidelines or immediately afterward (notwithstanding the absence of Morocco's King Hasan, Iraq's Saddam Husayn and Libya's Mu'ammarr al-Qadhdhafi).²⁰ However, existing differences remained too great to overcome: while some states, such as Jordan and Iraq, preferred to hold the summit in order to settle the outstanding issues facing the Arab world, others, particularly Saudi Arabia (slated since September 1982 to host the long-delayed summit) favored achieving Arab reconciliation on outstanding issues before convening, so as to avoid a Syrian-led boycott.²¹ As it happened, a minisummit of Arab leaders — Asad, King Husayn, Saudi Arabia's King Fahd, the emir of Kuwait, and Algeria's President Chedli Benjedid — did meet on 28 January, but with no concrete results. Plans for a limited Arab summit in Abu Dhabi, with the participation of Mubarak (who visited there upon the summit's conclusion) failed to materialize.²²

THE ROAD TO AMMAN

SYRIAN-IRAQI RECONCILIATION EFFORTS

No inter-Arab dispute had garnered more attention in recent years from would-be Arab mediators than that between Syria and Iraq. A Syrian-Iraqi thaw, it was hoped, would influence Iran in the direction of a cease-fire in its war against Iraq. Moreover, it would make possible the holding of the long-delayed Arab summit conference, at which, ideally, a renewed all-Arab consensus could be fashioned to address the numerous issues facing the Arab world (the Gulf War, Arab-Israeli relations and Egypt's role in the system). In June 1986, a meeting between the Iraqi and Syrian foreign ministers was almost held under Jordanian auspices, only to be canceled by Syria at the last moment (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 98–101). Nonetheless, King Husayn, backed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, continued to press for a high-level Syrian-Iraqi meeting during the rest of 1986 and the early months of 1987. By the spring, circumstances were more favorable, for four reasons:

- (1) The threat of an Iranian breakthrough towards Basra, and the concurrent escalation of tension between Iran and Kuwait over Kuwait's support for Iraq and its request for American reflagging of its oil tankers (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War) made Damascus more eager than ever to mitigate Arab anger over its alliance with Iran.
- (2) Syria's acute economic crisis necessitated greater responsiveness to the entreaties of the GCC states, Syria's most likely financial benefactors.
- (3) Syrian-Iranian disagreements in Lebanon and over the matter of Syrian debts were at a peak.
- (4) The Soviet Union decided to take a more active role in encouraging Syria and Iraq to patch up their differences.

Thus, on 27 April, Asad (on his way home from Moscow) and Iraqi President Saddam Husayn met near Jordan's common frontier with Iraq and Saudi Arabia. It was their first tête-à-tête since the collapse of Syrian-Iraqi unity efforts in 1979. Official accounts of their talks were never published; even the fact that they took place was denied for some time by the parties. A reasonably credible account of what transpired could, however, be pieced together from what was leaked to various Arab newspapers and weeklies.

There were two rounds of talks — one attended by King Husayn and Saudi Crown Prince 'Abdallah, the other purely a two-man affair. Together, they lasted from anywhere between five and 13 hours. A considerable measure of agreement was apparently reached on bilateral issues, including:

- (1) The lessening of support for opposition groups working out of their respective capitals (as a gesture in this regard, Damascus canceled a scheduled conference of Iraqi opposition forces).
- (2) A gradual halt to their respective media campaigns against each other.
- (3) The allocation of Euphrates River water, in light of problems caused by Turkish overexploitation.
- (4) The exchange of political prisoners.
- (5) Further ministerial-level meetings, to discuss, among other things, the terms of reopening the Iraqi pipeline across Syria which Damascus had closed down in 1982 as part of an Iranian-Syrian "squeeze" against Iraq (see *MECS*, 1981–82, p. 233).

Regarding the last point, 'Abdallah reportedly expressed his country's willingness to replace Iran as Syria's oil supplier, including shipping 50,000 barrels a day for use in Syrian refineries until the Iraqi pipeline could resume operation.

At least two other high-level meetings were held subsequent to the Asad-Saddam summit: one, some 10 days later, between Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz and Syrian Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam (the two may also have met secretly in Moscow in April to prepare the Asad-Saddam meeting); and the other between 'Aziz and his Syrian counterpart, Faruq al-Shar', in early June. Some reports also spoke of meetings between the interior ministers of the two countries, and between technical experts on oil-related and other issues. Throughout May and June, Jordan's King Husayn and Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i devoted considerable energy toward convening another Asad-Saddam summit to publicly consolidate what had been achieved behind the scenes. Such a meeting, they hoped, would result in the ratification of economic and bilateral security arrangements and the drawing up of a "political agreement."

However, it was precisely this last matter that blocked a reconciliation, just as it had in 1986. Iraq insisted that Syria end its support for Iran and adopt at least a "neutral" position; Syria, for its part, stuck to its long-held policy that it could only do so subsequent to a renewal of the "special relations" between the two countries, i.e., relations based on their October 1978 "Charter for Joint National Action." (For the charter's genesis, suspension, and text, see *MECS* 1978-79, pp. 236-40, 268-70; for a discussion of the rationale behind Syrian thinking, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 98-99). For Baghdad, this was a nonstarter. Thus, their dialogue remained unconsummated during the summer months.²³

In fact, a new peak of animosity was reached on 28 July, when a Syrian MiG-21 jet was shot down over Iraqi territory and its pilot captured. The Syrians bitterly criticized the downing, claiming that the pilot had merely lost his way.²⁴ The Iraqis, for their part, submitted an official memorandum to the Arab League secretariat, complaining that the violation was only the latest in a series of incidents over a number of years.²⁵ If a pro-Iraqi Arab weekly was to be believed, the plane was downed because it flew too close to a large phosphate complex where Iraq probably manufactured its chemical weapons.²⁶ The pilot was quickly returned to Syria,²⁷ but the propaganda war between the two countries continued unabated.²⁸

IRAN, SYRIA, AND LIBYA: AN ALIGNMENT UNDER STRAIN

In 1987, numerous disagreements between Syria, Libya, and Iran — the central members of the region's "oppositionist" grouping through most of the 1980s — cast doubt at times on the long-term durability of their alignment. One tangible indication of their fraying relations was their failure to hold a tripartite foreign ministers' meeting (five had been held during the previous two years).

For a number of years, three foci of tension had resulted in bouts of tension between Syria and Iran:

- (1) Syrian nervousness over Iran's continued offensives against Iraqi territory and sporadic actions against the GCC states, especially Kuwait.
- (2) Mounting Syrian debts to Iran and the question of the stability of Iranian oil supplies to Syria.
- (3) Lebanon.

All these factors were present in 1987, particularly in the early months, yet none led to a radical alteration of the strategic alliance against Iraq.

Never were Syrian-Iranian differences in Lebanon demonstrated so vividly as in mid-February. Following the seizure of more than a score of Syrian soldiers and security personnel in West Beirut by the Iranian-backed Hizballah Shi'i militia (see chapter on Lebanon), the Syrian Army retaliated on 24 February by storming a Hizballah barracks, leaving 23 dead. A number of high-ranking Iranian ministers hurried to Damascus for consultations, while Iranian President 'Ali Khameneh'i called on Syria to punish the perpetrators of the "calamity" if it did not want its "prestige" to be damaged.²⁹ After a considerable dialogue, the two countries managed to reach an uneasy *modus vivendi* geared to avoid further confrontations in Lebanon.³⁰ (For additional details of Syrian-Iranian relations there, see chapter on Lebanon.)

Concerning the oil debt, the 1986 sequence of events repeated itself. Once again, the Syrians used Arab mediation efforts and inducements as a lever to extract new concessions from the reluctant Iranians. In mid-April, one Arab source reported that the last load of Iranian crude contracted for by Syria — 260,000 tons — had been delivered during the first week of March, and that Iran would renew the contract only if Syria had settled its \$1.7 bn. — \$2 bn. debt.³¹ At the same time, the preparations for the Asad-Saddam meeting were at their peak, and Saudi Arabia was dangling offers to compensate Syria for the lost Iranian oil and possibly help it to settle its debts. However, just as in 1986, the Iranians concluded that it was preferable to avoid driving Syria into the arms of the anti-Iranian Arab majority. Thus, during a visit to Tehran on 2 May, Syria's oil minister signed an agreement whereby Syria would receive from Iran 1m. tons of free crude oil during the coming 12 months and purchase another 2m. tons, plus or minus 25%, at a discount.³² Economic and commercial ties were further broadened in the following month, during a visit by an Iranian delegation led by the minister of commerce and the minister of economy. The fifth annual joint meeting of the Iranian-Syrian Committee for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation resulted in the signing of new contracts for Syrian exports to Iran (mostly cloth, textiles, chemicals, and machinery) and an agreement to conduct feasibility studies for a number of joint economic and investment projects.³³ Further developments in the economic sphere included a visit by Syria's minister of economy and foreign trade to Tehran on 18 September, and by Iran's prime minister, Husayn Musavi, to Damascus on 18 October; the latter resulted in an agreement to form further joint committees dealing with economic, political, and cultural affairs, and to develop bilateral ties in the information sphere.³⁴

As for Syria's position on the Gulf War, Damascus continued to pursue what one Arab weekly called a "half-open door policy," namely the dispatching of conflicting signals, according to the needs of the moment, but without making the fundamental shift sought by Syria's Arab interlocutors. In late February, an Arab source with known access to upper echelons in Syria reported that Asad had condemned Iran's recent offensive on Basra to Iranian visiting Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati.³⁵ Some months later, during a bout of heightened Iranian-Kuwaiti tension, 'Umrān Adham, Syria's envoy to the EEC and a close adviser to Asad, declared that Syria would take up arms to defend Kuwait if it were attacked.³⁶ On the other hand, the Iranians continued to make public declarations following meetings with Syrian officials that Syrian and Iranian positions on various regional issues were identical

and that Syria's support for the Iranian Revolution remained firm.³⁷ Usually, the Syrians chose to neither confirm nor deny the Iranian statements. (For Syria's stand on the Gulf War at the emergency Arab foreign ministers' and summit conferences, see below.)

Libya, for its part, veered away from its previously complete identification with Iran against Iraq. Behind the Libyan shift was a desire to lessen its isolation in the Arab world following the American bombing raid in April 1986 and its setbacks in Chad. Not coincidentally, it was also more in line with Algeria's position (for the warming of Algerian-Libyan ties, see section on Maghrib affairs, below).

The first indication of Libya's changing position on the Gulf War came on the eve of the ICO summit, when Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi proposed the creation of an Islamic peacekeeping force, to be drawn from Nigeria, Indonesia, and Algeria, to separate the combatants.³⁸ The Iranians heaped scorn on the idea; consequently, Qadhafi quickly, and angrily, withdrew the proposal. Moreover, he charged that Iran's arms deals with the US and Israel revealed the existence of a "fifth column" in the ranks of the Iranian Revolution.³⁹

Qadhafi showed his increasing ambivalence toward Iran on numerous subsequent occasions. Libya's posture towards the Iranian Revolution, he declared, was "unshaken," for the revolution "has been a triumph over imperialism"; Iran's leaders are "our allies, our brothers, and we respect them." However, he declared, the shelling of Baghdad and Basra was unacceptable. Moreover, the war had turned into a "real threat to Iraq, which is an Arab state. This is a real dilemma for us as a revolution." The continuation of the war, Qadhafi feared, might also bring about the collapse of Iran's leadership and its replacement by the US of a pro-American one. In this regard, the Libyans stood four-square behind Iran in its confrontation with the US in the Gulf. Thus, out of Libya's concern for both Iran and Iraq, and "despite the fifth column" in Iran, it would continue to seek the end of the war.⁴⁰ Whereas Qadhafi had always blamed Saddam Husayn for starting the war, he now claimed that Libya had no evidence regarding who was the aggressor, and was content to restate each side's version of who had initiated the hostilities. What was necessary, he repeated, was to stop the war and compensate both Iran and Iraq "regardless of the reasons that led to this conflict."⁴¹

As part of the effort to contain and wind down the war, Qadhafi declared that Libya had made several protests to Iran following attacks against Kuwaiti targets and provocations against Saudi oil tankers.⁴² As for Libya's military support for Iran, the Libyans privately told Iraq that they had already stopped supplying arms to Iran. A number of reports also mentioned Qadhafi demanding — unsuccessfully — that Iran allow Libyan antiaircraft and missile battery crews to return home.⁴³

Parallel to Libya's distancing itself from its previously unswerving support for Iran came a renewed dialogue with Iraq. At first, this dialogue was conducted out of the public eye. Subjects under discussion included not only the Gulf War but also each country's support for the other's various opposition groups.⁴⁴ It is not known whether they reached any understanding on the latter. In any case, the dialogue became public on 7–8 September, with a visit to Baghdad by the secretary of Libya's People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison, Jadallah 'Azuz al-Talhi. The joint communiqué issued at the end of the visit stressed the two sides' desire to "build fraternal relations" and develop them "in all fields." It also called on Iran to accept UN Security Council Resolution

598 demanding a cease-fire in the Gulf War (see below).⁴⁵ On 22 October, the Libyan Embassy in Baghdad renewed its activities; shortly afterward, the Iraqi Embassy in Tripoli did likewise. According to Qadhdhafi, Iraqi-Libyan relations were now "back to normal."⁴⁶ (For Iraq's formal severing of diplomatic ties, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 120–21).

Nonetheless, Libya remained far removed from the center of the Arab spectrum, reserving some of its harshest verbiage for Saudi Arabia. This was especially evidenced in the aftermath of the Iranian-Saudi confrontation in Mecca. (For Libya's behavior following the Mecca riots and at the emergency Arab foreign ministers' and summit conferences, see below.)

Libyan-Syrian relations were occasionally clouded by disagreements over Syria's continued backing for the Amal Shi'i militia's siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon, and by the actions of Syrian troops against the Lebanese left in West Beirut (see chapter on Lebanon). Syria, declared Qadhdhafi, could halt the war of the camps at any time: "She can arm whoever she wants and disarm whoever she wants... We rely upon Syria to proceed from its revolutionary and unionist posture." No matter what happened, he continued, "we stand on the side of the camps and beside the Palestinians."⁴⁷ (For Libya's renewed dialogue with 'Arafat, see essay on the PLO.) Lebanon was the scene of Libyan-Syrian tension in another way as well: the Libyans were still upset by the murder of a Libyan diplomat in the Biqa' Valley, an area under Syrian control, in December 1986.⁴⁸ Still, Libya kept its disagreements with Syria under wraps. In general, it stood by Syria on regional issues, and supported its efforts to widen the agenda of the proposed Arab summit that was designed to concentrate — against their wishes — on the Gulf War (see below). In return, Syrian backing apparently included the dispatching of 40 pilots to fly reconnaissance missions over Chad, following Qadhdhafi's urgent request for assistance.⁴⁹

THE ESCALATION OF THE GULF CRISIS

The Gulf War was, to a large extent, internationalized during the first half of 1987. Increasing attacks by both Iraq and Iran on oil tankers plying the Gulf, Iranian bombing and missile attacks against Kuwaiti targets, and encouragement of subversive groups within Kuwait, as well as Iran's efforts to mine the sea lanes, resulted in three important developments:

- (1) Kuwait's "reflagging" decision, namely, its readiness to put its tanker fleet temporarily under American flags and therefore under the American military umbrella.
- (2) The decision by the Americans, followed by their West European allies, to considerably boost their naval presence in the Gulf.
- (3) Security Council Resolution 598 of 20 July, calling for an immediate cease-fire in the Gulf War, to be followed by negotiations for a peaceful settlement based on the return of all forces to the international border, an exchange of prisoners, and the appointment of a special commission to determine the causes of the war. (The Iranians insisted that the commission be appointed prior to a cease-fire.) Failure to comply with the resolution carried the possibility of sanctions, including an arms embargo.

As a consequence of these developments there were periodic military confrontations between the US and Iran (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Arab reaction to the

foreign presence in the Gulf and to occasional US military actions against Iranian targets divided along well-established lines, with Syria and Libya siding strongly with Iran,⁵⁰ and most of the other Arab countries quietly, if ambivalently, welcoming America's demonstration of power on behalf of the Arab Gulf states. Another result was the stepped-up efforts of the Arab League's seven-member committee (first established in 1984) to persuade the international community, particularly the five permanent members of the Security Council, to take concrete measures against Iran. In addition, there was a steady increase in Iranian condemnations of, and threats against, Kuwait. In a show of support for one of their members, the GCC Ministerial Council meeting of 6–8 June reaffirmed the participants' commitment to the GCC's Basic Statute stipulating that "any violation against the security of any member state is an aggression against all members," which would confront it "together, with all [the] means at their disposal." The council session also vaguely endorsed the reflagging decision, while restating the members' "continued readiness... to [help create] a bridge that would lead to a peaceful settlement" of the Iraqi-Iranian War.⁵¹ (For further details, see chapter on the Gulf states.) However, a further escalation of the crisis was about to reveal significant differences within the GCC regarding the best way of dealing with Iran.

THE MECCA INCIDENT

On 31 July, Iranian-Arab relations took another turn for the worse, when clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security forces in Mecca left hundreds of Iranians dead. (For a detailed account of the incident, see essay on Islamic activities.) This provoked an unprecedented exchange of invective between Saudi Arabia and Iran, and the ransacking of the Saudi and Kuwaiti embassies in Tehran. Almost all Arab governments accepted Saudi Arabia's version of the incident, for which they blamed the Iranians, and quickly contacted King Fahd to express their support. An Egyptian radio commentary described it as "an ugly crime against Islam," while Mubarak called for an emergency ICO summit. Kuwait's prime minister voiced the suspicion that Iran intended to disrupt Saudi internal security. Saddam Husayn declared that the incident proved that "even when the Iranian rulers say they have a religion, it is not the Islamic religion."⁵² Even Asad was reported by the Saudis to have "expressed his regret" for the incident, calling the pilgrims' behavior "unacceptable from any quarter."⁵³ The Syrians themselves avoided public statements, while sending Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar' to Tehran for discussions with Iranian leaders. Algeria adopted a similarly low profile, although it received an Iranian diplomat in mid-August, and offered no challenge to an Iranian statement claiming that Algeria sympathized with the pilgrims.⁵⁴ (By contrast, Sudan officially protested against the Iranian claim of Sudanese support.)⁵⁵ Only Libya took an avowedly anti-Saudi (and thus pro-Iranian) stance, in keeping with Qadhafi's populist, iconoclastic version of Islam.⁵⁶

THE ARAB LEAGUE EMERGENCY FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING

At this point, Tunisia called for an emergency meeting of the Arab League Council, at the foreign ministers' level. Kuwait agreed to host the meeting,⁵⁷ which was originally planned for 15 August. It was postponed to 23 August due to scheduling conflicts and the need for further preparatory consultations. These were spearheaded by UAE

President Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayan, who, along with Syria and Algeria, sought to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Shaykh Zayid also seconded Jordanian efforts to reconcile Syria and Iraq.⁵⁸ The venue was also changed to Tunis: some Arab leaders were apparently reluctant to antagonize Iran by convening in Kuwait.

The importance of the meeting could be gauged by the fact that no less than 18 countries were represented by their foreign ministers; Algeria sent its health minister, and only Libya and Lebanon were represented by non-ministerial officials.

Fittingly, in the wake of Mecca, it was Saudi Arabia that took the lead in pushing for decisive anti-Iranian steps. In his opening speech to the gathering, Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal sharply castigated Iran for its policies of "subversion and terrorism" — in Mecca, in the Gulf, in Kuwait, and in Lebanon. "Silence," he declared, was "no longer of any use." What was required was a "unified and unanimous Arab stance."⁵⁹ Accordingly, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait championed a draft resolution calling on the Arab states to break off diplomatic relations with Iran. The Kuwaiti foreign minister also called for the convening of an emergency Arab summit conference to formulate policy at the highest level.⁶⁰

Fifteen members were reported to favor the breaking of diplomatic ties with Iran.⁶¹ However, five were strongly opposed: Syria, Libya, Algeria, and two GCC states — the UAE and Oman. The ties of the latter two to Iran had remained stronger than those of the other GCC states. Consequently, their view continued to be that Iranian-Arab relations could best be repaired by keeping channels open to Tehran. (For an elaboration on the differences among the GCC states with regard to Iran, see chapter on the Gulf states.) The PDRY, which usually followed Syria's lead, kept a low profile. However, its foreign minister did participate in a meeting of Syrian, Libyan, and Algerian delegation heads on the eve of the conference to coordinate positions, providing a faint reminder of the now-moribund "Steadfastness Front."⁶² (For the front's rise and decline, see *MECS* 1977–78, pp. 215–24; 1978–79, p. 244; 1979–80, pp. 178–87; 1980–81, pp. 251–54; 1981–82, pp. 244–47; 1982–83, p. 196.) Syria's al-Shar' declared that the draft resolution "legitimizes the foreign military presence" in the Gulf and "entrenches Arab dismemberment."⁶³ He also blamed Iraq for starting the war. Iraq's Foreign Minister 'Aziz reacted sharply, claiming that Iran had been planning in 1980 a war against the Arab states, declaring that the Syrian voice being heard in the foreign ministers' sessions was "a Persian voice... rather [than] an Arab [one]."⁶⁴

The serious disagreements which had emerged rankled the Saudis considerably, leading to a rare public expression of frustration. The conference's difficulties in achieving "positive results," stated a Radio Riyadh commentary, proved that "the goal of Arab unity, for which the Arab League was founded, is merely a dream that cannot be trusted."⁶⁵ Indeed, the conference's final resolution stopped short of what the Saudis were advocating, although its condemnations of Iran were unprecedented in their severity. As a compromise between the supporters and opponents of concrete anti-Iranian measures, it was decided that the emergency session would remain open, and that the foreign ministers would reconvene no later than 20 September in order "to examine future Arab-Iranian relations" in light of Iran's attitude, particularly regarding the Security Council's call for an immediate cease-fire. The conference also charged its chairman, Sa'ud al-Faysal, and Arab League secretary-general, Chedli Klibi, with conducting consultations on the holding of an Arab summit.⁶⁶

As was so often the case, inter-Arab divisions had forced the defanging of a conference resolution. Some of the advocates of stringent action tried nevertheless to paint the resolution in a positive light: the Saudis called it "balanced," and Klibi warned that Iran's failure to change would lead to the breaking of ties.⁶⁷ Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri was more forthright, calling the resolutions good but "incomplete," while King Husayn strongly backed any Arab League action to sever diplomatic relations unless Iran agreed to a cease-fire by 20 September.⁶⁸ (Jordan, Mauritania, and Tunisia had already done so in 1987; Egypt expelled the Iranian diplomat in charge of its interests section in the Swiss embassy.) The Iranians, for their part, applauded the "realism and independence" of Syria, Libya, Algeria, Oman, and the UAE, who together had succeeded in disrupting an anti-Iranian, US-backed "conspiracy" in Tunis.⁶⁹

In the weeks leading up to 20 September, the Saudi media continued to attack Iran in order to maintain the anti-Iranian diplomatic momentum that had been achieved in Tunis. Saudi anti-Iranian broadsides included not only references to current misdeeds, but also its seizure in 1971 of three small Gulf islands belonging to the UAE, and its illegitimate rule over "Arabistan" (the southern Iranian province of Khuzistan). Neither of these parts of the Arab patrimony, declared Radio Riyadh, were to be conceded to the "Persian race." For good measure, it also evoked the unsuccessful efforts of the pre-Islamic Persian state of Khosraw to colonize the Arab mainland. For the Saudis, this was an almost unprecedented identification with pre-Islamic Arab history, a period always referred to as "*jahiliyya*" (the age of darkness).⁷⁰

On 20 September, Arab foreign ministers reconvened in Tunis as scheduled, one day before the 88th regular biannual session of the Arab League Council. Iran had shown no sign during the intervening weeks of heeding Arab and UN calls for a cease-fire; Iraq, for its part, had initiated a new round of bombings of Iranian oil facilities and tankers, much to Saudi Arabia's displeasure.⁷¹ The shelling of a Saudi oil tanker by Iran on 20 September reinforced the Arab foreign ministers' sense of urgency. Consequently, they ended their one-day session with a decision to hold an emergency summit in Amman in early November. Explaining the decision, the concluding council statement stressed that the Gulf War constituted "the core of the Arab nation's concerns" in view of the dangers posed by its likely continuation and expansion. The summit, the statement said, would "examine developments in the Iraq-Iran War from all angles, the persistent threats to Arab states of the Gulf region and the dangers aggravated by the continuation of these events."⁷²

THE AMMAN SUMMIT

As a gesture to Syria, the foreign ministers' resolution calling for the convening of a summit also stressed that the continuation of the Gulf War "weaken[s] the capacity of the Arab nation to confront the main challenge represented by Israeli aggression."⁷³ However, this was not enough for Damascus. Syria, backed by Algeria and Libya, insisted that it would not participate in a summit whose agenda failed to include the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁷⁴ To ensure full participation, the agenda was formally broadened, and on 12 October, Asad notified Jordan's prime minister of his decision to attend.⁷⁵ While Jordan had made the required gesture, it was Syria that had altered its position. Damascus realized that attempting to replay past scenarios in which it had

stopped the summit from convening was no longer prudent. Given the escalation of the crisis with Iran and its own economic troubles, Syria could ill afford to defy openly the widely felt Arab need for a summit. At that point, the Syrian leadership concluded that it could better defend its country's interests from within rather than outside the Arab consensus. In addition, Damascus believed that the summit might well prove to be the appropriate setting for consummating the Syrian-Iraqi dialogue in ways not inimical to it. Syria could also take comfort in the fact that it would not stand alone in its search for an Arab-Iranian dialogue. Both Algeria and the UAE continued to advocate flexibility in Arab efforts to induce Iran to accept a cease-fire, instead of imposing diplomatic sanctions. One preliminary suggestion in this direction was to send an Arab delegation to Tehran on behalf of the summit, which would attempt to persuade Iranian leaders to agree to a political settlement.⁷⁶ Thus, even the fact that the return of Egypt to the Arab fold was likely to be insisted upon — by the GCC states, by Iraq, and by Jordan — was not powerful enough to induce a Syrian boycott of the summit. Circumstances had changed.

King Husayn took pains to ensure a fully attended summit of Arab "kings, presidents, and emirs." But there were hitches. To encourage Libyan participation, Amman restored diplomatic relations with Tripoli on 23 September. Nonetheless, Qadhdhafi — who had never been enamored of Arab summit forums — confirmed on 2 November what Husayn must have suspected earlier, that he would not personally attend. "After seven years of the Gulf War," he asked, "what is the emergency?" The real emergency summit, Qadhdhafi insisted, should have been convened in April 1986 following the US bombing of Libya (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 96–98). Moreover, the Amman summit was not really aimed at ending the Iraqi-Iranian War; rather it was designed to protect American interests. In fact, Qadhdhafi declared, the destruction of Kuwaiti and Saudi oil exports gladdened Libyan hearts, for they were of benefit only to the US and Israel.⁷⁷

More disturbing to Husayn than Qadhdhafi's refusal to attend was the behavior of his two fellow monarchs, Saudi Arabia's Fahd and Morocco's Hasan. The Saudis had been in the forefront of efforts during the previous months to take decisive action against Iran. By the eve of the summit, however, it was clear to Riyadh that no Arab consensus on sanctions was achievable. Thus, in a return to its more traditional posture of cautiousness, Riyadh announced on 3 November that Crown Prince 'Abdallah would attend the summit in Fahd's stead. A follow-up statement denied that there was anything unusual in the decision, or that Fahd's health was a factor in his staying home.⁷⁸

Morocco's Hasan had been in the forefront for Arab summitry and the efforts to break the inter-Arab and Arab-Israeli stalemates for much of the 1980s. On the eve of the Amman summit, however, he expressed considerable pessimism, not only about the value of Arab summits but about the future of the Arab nation. Divisions had worsened, he stated, since he had convened the rump summit at Casablanca in 1985 (see *MECS* 1984–84, pp. 111–16), when the Gulf War "had yet to have an impact on Arab society." The problem, he continued, was not who would attend but how to achieve a "unity of intentions." "Each of us," he lamented, "has already decided to include in his address and speeches every justification for not meeting his commitments" to collective Arab interests. Even the GCC, which formerly had been a model for subregional cooperation envied by the Maghrib states, was now facing

serious choices due to divisions over Iran. Divisions within the PLO were also criticized by Hasan. In sum, "the danger is that in the coming years, my sons or I may find ourselves in search of an identity. Am I an Arab? There is no Arab nation. Am I a Muslim? There is no Islamic unity."⁷⁹ Hasan, therefore, chose to stay home, delegating his son, Crown Prince Sidi Muhammad, in his stead. For the first time since the 1980 gathering of Arab leaders in Amman, King Hasan would not be playing a central role in an Arab summit.

In his opening speech, Husayn called on the participants to overcome "the disunity and feuding" which were "the root of the malaise" afflicting the Arab world. Only by doing so, he said, could they hope to confront "the challenges and threats to our national security in the Gulf, Palestine, and Lebanon."⁸⁰ Following his speech, the summit went into closed session, where Husayn called for "a clear and firm resolution reflecting our determination to end [the Gulf] war," and an agreement on the "mechanism" for its implementation. He also called for an end to the ostracism of Egypt, "our big sister," from the Arab League and "the Arab body," and for the implementation of Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 in order to solve the Arab-Israeli conflict.⁸¹ At the end of that session, the Jordanian foreign minister and official summit spokesman emerged to announce that Husayn had officially designated the gathering the "Summit of Consent and Agreement" (*qimmat al-wifaq wal-ittifaq*).⁸²

The aptness of Husayn's designation would depend largely on the dynamics of a dialogue between Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad.⁸³ Consequently, the second day of the summit found them, separately and together, at the center of attention. Each spoke at length during the closed morning session. Asad concentrated on restating Syria's opposition to lifting Egypt's suspension from the Arab League, due to what he described as the restrictions the Camp David accords imposed on Egypt's commitment to the Arab League Charter and the 1950 Joint Defense Pact.⁸⁴ Saddam, for his part, repeatedly criticized Syria, along with Libya, for its alliance with Iran — "the vile foreign aggressor"; for its efforts to dominate the PLO; and for its imposed "trusteeship" over Lebanon. He refrained, however, from referring to either of them by name. In another indirect criticism of Syria's oppositionist stance in Arab affairs, he called on the assembled leaders not to allow the lack of an absolute Arab consensus on major issues to impede the will of the majority, a call that had been made periodically during the 1980s by Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Iraq, and Morocco. In addition, he argued that the 1978 Baghdad summit resolutions ostracizing Egypt should now be superseded, on account of the "changing and dynamic political situation" in Egypt and in the region.⁸⁵

That afternoon, the wheels of inter-Arab diplomacy moved into higher gear: Asad and Saddam participated in a four-hour minisummit hosted by the Jordanian monarch in his hotel suite; other participants were Saudi Arabia's 'Abdallah, Algeria's President Chedli Benjedid, the emir of Kuwait, and the presidents of the UAE and the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR). That evening, Asad and Saddam attended a dinner banquet hosted by King Husayn. In a report later denied by Syria, they were also said to have held private talks later that same evening.⁸⁶ The following day, the Iraqi and Syrian foreign ministers met for several hours in the presence of Arab League Secretary-General Klibi, and in the evening, Saddam and Asad met again under the auspices of the Jordanian monarch.

The first reports of the Asad-Saddam meetings were almost breathless with excitement. The meetings were said to have been conducted in a tension-free atmosphere, concluding with a "public embrace" which sealed a "historic reconciliation" between the two long-time adversaries.⁸⁷ The Iraqis were more cautious in their initial public statements.⁸⁸ The Syrians remained silent. Nonetheless, the very occurrence of the meetings seemed to bode well for the summit's chances of achieving consensual resolutions.

As expected, the two main issues of contention were the Gulf War and Egypt's official return to Arab ranks. Syria sought to modify the summit's planned endorsement of Security Council Resolution 598 in a way that would be acceptable to Iran — namely, to avoid referring to the chronological sequence of the Security Council's formulation, according to which there was to be a cease-fire before an international commission was appointed to determine who was to blame for starting the war.⁸⁹ Asad also sought support to send to Tehran a delegation of Arab leaders which he himself would perhaps head, to persuade the Iranian leadership to move toward a political settlement. But the Iraqis insisted that the resolution be implemented in full, and in the stated sequence. Saddam also repeated his earlier demand that Syria adopt a neutral stand on the Gulf War, which would serve as a starting point toward establishing more fraternal ties.⁹⁰

As for the question of Egypt, the Syrians preferred to postpone addressing the entire matter until the long-delayed ordinary summit was held.⁹¹ Failing this, they insisted that Egypt's membership in the Arab League remain frozen, and warned that any attempt to reinstate Egypt would "do away with any positive results" that the conference might achieve.⁹² Support for this stand came from Libya, the PDRY and, to a lesser extent, Algeria and Tunisia.⁹³

As has often been the case at Arab summits, the final balance sheet was mixed, with no absolute winners or losers. On the Iraqi-Iranian War, the final statement and resolutions called on both Iran and the Security Council to fully implement Resolution 598, "in accordance with the sequence of its clauses," as the Iraqis had demanded. As expected, Iran was condemned for its continued occupation of Iraqi territory, its "repeated attacks" against Kuwait, and its "acts of sabotage and rioting" in Mecca. Arab leaders also affirmed their readiness to carry out their obligations toward Iraq in accordance with the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defense Pact. (At the 1982 Fez summit, carrying out these obligations had been made conditional on Iran's continuation of the war.) In addition, they affirmed a similar obligation toward the GCC states should Iran continue its attacks against them. No mention was made of the Syrian foreign minister's demand for a condemnation of the presence of US naval forces.⁹⁴ Syria, on the other hand, could take comfort in the fact that the matter of diplomatic sanctions against Iran had not been addressed. Moreover, having paid the required lip service to Arab solidarity, Syria had defused, for the time being, accusations of blocking the implementation of the hallowed "joint Arab action."

The decision on relations with Egypt, although a compromise of sorts, was nonetheless an Egyptian victory of the first magnitude. Egypt's membership in the Arab League remained suspended, as Syria had insisted. However, Asad did concede to the summit's declaration that the issue of diplomatic relations between Arab League members and Egypt were within the provenance of each individual state. In effect, this annulled the decision taken at Baghdad nine years earlier to collectively

break off diplomatic ties with Cairo. Only Libya's Jallud opposed the compromise, despite Asad's efforts to persuade him otherwise.⁹⁵ Indeed, Jallud played the role of odd man out throughout the summit, prompting Saddam to complain that Libya continued to equate Iraq with Iran, and Arabs with Persians.⁹⁶ Upon Jallud's arrival home, Libya immediately announced its rejection of the summit's resolutions on both Iran and Egypt.

The resolution on Egypt had an immediate impact. On the eve of the summit, five Arab League members (Sudan, Oman, Somalia, Jordan, and Djibouti) maintained full diplomatic relations with Egypt (the first three had never adhered to the Baghdad decisions), while nearly all the others (apart from Syria and Libya, and perhaps the PDRY) had either maintained a high-level interests section or gradually upgraded their representation to the status of embassies in all but name. The Amman summit's decision gave them the formal go-ahead to reestablish open ties. Thus, nine Arab League members, led by the UAE, followed in quick succession by Iraq, Kuwait, Morocco, the YAR, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania, and Qatar, restored full diplomatic relations in rapid succession during the next two weeks. Tunisia initially shied away from full relations in deference to Algeria, and thus limited itself to upgrading the personal rank of its representative in Cairo to ambassador;⁹⁷ Algeria remained reluctant to buck openly Syrian and Libyan resistance to the idea. At the close of 1987, only Syria, Libya, the PDRY, Algeria, Tunisia, and Lebanon did not have full diplomatic ties with Cairo.⁹⁸ (See also chapter on Egypt.)

The remaining summit resolutions, which dealt with the Arab-Israeli conflict and Lebanon, broke little ground. On the former, the summit reiterated Syrian-sponsored formulations calling for the achievement of "strategic parity" with Israel. It also endorsed the convening of an international peace conference under UN auspices, and with the PLO participating on an equal footing with the other delegations. (For the summit's so-called "secret resolutions," see immediately below.)

King Husayn and the Jordanian media repeatedly snubbed 'Arafat, to the point where he refused to attend the dinner Husayn hosted for delegation heads. 'Arafat's anger did have some effect — by the end of the summit, Husayn had met with him three times, and 'Arafat was again optimistic in his declarations regarding the future of PLO-Jordanian relations. His treatment by the king and the centrality of Gulf matters during summit discussions demonstrated, again, that the Palestinian issue no longer had unchallenged priority on the collective Arab agenda. It also seemed that the PLO's status was less secure than previously.

To repair its tarnished image, the PLO disseminated the text of the summit's "secret resolutions," giving them more forthright backing than had been apparent in the summit's final statement. The reference was apparently to the summit's stipulation regarding "the inadmissibility of any Arab side unilaterally concluding any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict," and a reiteration of the previous summit resolutions, particularly those taken at Fez in 1982, regarding the necessity of the Palestinian Arabs exercising their "inalienable national rights." On the face of it, the resolutions seemed to limit Jordan's freedom of action in pursuing a settlement. On the other hand, the Jordanians had already publicly committed themselves to oppose unilateral settlements (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 118) and endorsed the Fez resolutions. Formally, the establishment of an Arab "rule of the game" prohibiting unilateral settlements with Israel went back to April 1950.⁹⁹

On Lebanon, the summit called for further dialogue among the Lebanese factions, endorsed Syria's continued efforts to help reach reconciliation there, and demanded Israel's withdrawal from South Lebanon in accordance with UN Security Council resolutions. (For the texts of the summit's final statement and resolutions, see Appendix.)

Two important subjects were not mentioned in the final statement and resolutions, and one was mentioned only in passing. The first concerned the matter of Arab aid to Syria. The 1978 Baghdad summit had allocated \$3.3 bn. annually to Syria, Jordan, the PLO, and West Bank and Gaza Palestinians for a period of 10 years (and was thus due to expire in 1988); \$1.8 bn. was to go to Syria. As it happened, aid levels dropped off considerably during the 1980s, and the Syrians now sought a renewed commitment. There were contradictory reports on whether they obtained it. Some spoke of massive pledges (between \$2.5 bn. and \$4 bn., with \$300m. being paid as a first installment) by Arab oil-producing states as a sweetener for Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation and Syrian adherence to the declared Arab consensus against Iran. However, the 1978 agreement was apparently not renewed — aid agreements were henceforth to be made on a bilateral basis. It appeared likely that lower amounts of aid were pledged than Syria had requested, and payments were to be made in stages, according to regional developments and Syrian behavior.¹⁰⁰

The second subject that went unmentioned was the future of Syrian-Iraqi relations (see below).

Lebanon's economic crisis was mentioned only briefly. The official explanation was that the league had already resolved, during its regular September council meeting, to provide Lebanon with emergency aid.¹⁰¹ (This had not yet been done at the time of the summit.)

King Husayn was almost euphoric in his closing statement and post-summit press conference. The Arab world, he proclaimed, had "lived through a long night... now we are happy, confident, and hopeful that we are living in a new dawn all over the Arab homeland." The summit had made "tremendous progress" in overcoming Arab differences and in placing the Arab nation's "higher pan-Arab [*'qawmiyya'*] interests over more narrow regional [*'qutriyya'*] ones." What was required now was "nurture, care, and continuous efforts," through periodic, regular meetings on both the bilateral and multilateral levels, in order to consolidate the "rebirth of our march."¹⁰²

For Husayn himself, the summit was indeed a triumph. It marked the climax of his two-year effort to achieve a modicum of consensus on the Gulf War and on Egypt's return to the Arab fold, and the beginnings, at least, of a Syrian-Iraqi *rapprochement*. On Arab-Israeli issues, he could be satisfied with the endorsement of the idea of an international peace conference, and with the absence of any stipulation barring the formation of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to participate in it. In historical terms, the summit marked the culmination of Jordan's tireless efforts to win region-wide legitimacy for the ruling Hashemite house, after years of pariah status.

For the Arab world as a whole, the very fact that a fully attended gathering had been held after a five-year hiatus, and had arrived at agreed resolutions, was a considerable achievement. Nonetheless, it was widely understood that the summit's long-term importance could be evaluated only in light of future developments, not least in the sphere of Syrian-Iraqi relations. Jordanian officials were generally optimistic in their post-summit comments, predicting further bilateral meetings, the

cessation of mutual propaganda attacks, and the restoration of diplomatic relations as part of a general normalization process. Also likely to be on the agenda was the reopening of the Iraqi oil pipeline traversing Syria, even though the Iraqis were not immediately in need of the extra export capacity that it would provide.¹⁰³

Iraqi officials were also cautiously optimistic regarding the Syrian position. Even before the summit ended, First Deputy Premier Taha Yasin Ramadan spoke of a "positive" change in the Syrian position, "a change... [which] became clearer as the... proceedings continued."¹⁰⁴ Upon the summit's conclusion, the Iraqi media were lavish in their praise of its achievements.¹⁰⁵

However, the Syrians quickly threw cold water on any exaggerated expectations which Arab leaders and the media may have held. Syria's balancing act between the Arab world and Iran still seemed to be a dominant theme of its foreign policy. Foreign Minister Shar' quickly declared that Syria did not support the Arab summit's condemnation of Iran, and criticized Secretary-General Klibi for not mentioning Syria's reservations during his reading of the summit's final statement. The Saddam-Asad tête-à-tête, he emphasized, "should not be given more importance than it deserves." In any case, he said, Syria's alliance with Iran was still in force, a point underscored by his visit to Tehran on 16 November. However, President Asad said that if the Gulf states were attacked, he was prepared to send Syrian forces to help them defend themselves.¹⁰⁶

On 21 November, a semi-official Syrian trade delegation traveled to Baghdad — the first concrete result of their summit dialogue, apart from the cessation of their propaganda campaigns against each other and the renewal of telephone links between their capitals.¹⁰⁷ King Husayn, however, was concerned about the lack of more tangible progress, such as the renewal of diplomatic relations, which the Jordanians believed should be a first step in the normalization process.¹⁰⁸ He hurried to Damascus and Baghdad on 25 and 30 November, respectively, to try to speed things up. Saudi Arabia's Crown Prince 'Abdallah also lent a hand, flying to Baghdad on 19 December and to Damascus the next day. In mid-December, a border meeting between senior Iraqi and Syrian security officials was reportedly held.¹⁰⁹ Yet, by the end of the year, the extent of the thaw achieved at the summit between Baghdad and Damascus still remained an open question.

EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD

In many ways, 1987 was the most successful year for Egyptian foreign policy since the late 1970s. Between the ICO summit in January and the Arab summit in November, Egypt was successful in dismantling most of the remaining anti-Egyptian sanctions established at the Baghdad conferences of 1978–79. On the formal level, the only thing left after the Amman summit was to lift Egypt's suspension from the Arab League. Although this was undoubtedly desired, Egypt's achievements permitted Mubarak to dismiss scornfully the league's importance: "We do not want it... let that failure... stay in Tunis."¹¹⁰ (For Egypt's relations with the Arab world, see also chapter on Egypt.)

EGYPT, THE GULF WAR, AND ITS CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL SECURITY

Egypt's successes were directly linked to the escalation of the Iraqi-Iranian War. Almost since its beginning, the war had provided Egypt with a convenient avenue for reentry into Arab affairs. This had taken place by degrees, first through its military and manpower assistance to Iraq, and then — as the war turned in Iran's favor and expanded into the Gulf — through its more modest military aid to, and declarations of support for, the GCC states. The result was that Egypt's value, both as a potential and actual counterweight to Iran, had come to be appreciated in wide sections of the Arab world. In 1987, Cairo's substantive and declarative support for Iraq and the GCC states continued. Moreover, the possibility of Egyptian military intervention in support of Kuwait in the event of an Iranian attack was repeatedly alluded to in official statements and in the Arab and Western media. Egyptian officials, for their part, preferred ambiguity to clarity when discussing the subject.

Egypt's assistance to Iraq was particularly visible during the early part of the year. Iran's "Karbala Five" offensive in mid-January led to visits to Iraq by Egyptian Defense Minister Dr. Hatim Abu Ghazala, and chief of staff, Lt. Gen Ibrahim al-'Urabi, and to Iraq's dispatching a high-level military delegation to Cairo. These consultations resulted in an emergency Egyptian airlift of weapons and supplies. Egypt also reportedly agreed to sell Iraq advanced antiaircraft missile batteries, transport helicopters, trainer aircraft, tanks, and armored vehicles. In addition, Egyptian military experts and engineers were said to have been delegated to advise Iraqi field commanders; and Cairo was reportedly studying an Iraqi request to open special lines for the production of military spare parts.¹¹¹ (Egypt consistently denied that any of their active military personnel were fighting in Iraq.) Abu Ghazala later revealed that Egypt had, during the past few years, exported to Iran large quantities of Egyptian-produced, tactical ground-to-ground missiles. He also stated that Egypt had on several occasions drawn on its strategic reserves of arms and ammunition in order to help Iraq through periods of crisis.¹¹²

Egyptian help included sending experts to train Kuwaiti antimissile missile units, which was especially important considering Iran's sporadic *Silkworm* attacks on Kuwaiti targets. Three high-level Egyptian military delegations, the last one led by Defense Minister Abu Ghazala, visited Kuwait during the last quarter of 1987 (the second and third followed the Amman summit and the restoration of full diplomatic ties) to discuss Kuwaiti defense needs. Egypt, in turn, sought to revive full financial backing from the Gulf states for its arms-producing Arab Industrial Organization.¹¹³ At the very end of the year, a Kuwaiti newspaper (whose editor in chief had been vocally pro-Egyptian for some years) stated that Egypt and the GCC states had agreed to Egypt's dispatching 10,000 demobilized troops to assist GCC armed forces in return for payment, over three years, of \$4.5 bn. of Egypt's military debt. Cairo denied the report, while noting that the presence of former Egyptian military men in GCC countries was an individual matter only.¹¹⁴

Egyptian officials were consistently evasive as to whether, and in what circumstances, Egypt would consider dispatching troops to the Gulf. They did emphasize, however, that Egyptian national security was bound up with containing Iran and protecting the Arab Gulf states. Abu Ghazala explained the matter thus: Iran's strategy was to fragment Iraq into three "statelets" ["*duwaylat*"] — a Shi'i entity

around Basra, Najaf, and Karbala; a Sunni entity in central Iraq; and a Kurdish ministate in the north. Moreover, the Khomeyni regime sought to undermine the Gulf countries through terrorism and internal subversion. Once Iran had established its hegemony over the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula, the Red Sea and Suez Canal areas would become the next "hotbed of tension and confrontation." This "Persian strategy," Abu Ghazala said, meshed with Israel's policies and was part of "a single onslaught against the Arab world."¹¹⁵

Mubarak elaborated further on Egypt's security concepts in his speech before the People's Assembly on 12 October. "Egypt's role," he said, "is to effectively contribute toward protecting the Arab world's national security, safeguarding its vital strategic interests, and cementing cooperation and cohesion among its people." To do so, the Arab countries were required to:

1. Formulate a comprehensive view of "supreme national goals" and a strategy to confront the dangers facing them.
2. Keep Arab decision-making free from "foreign factors and alien influences."
3. Respect the principal Arab charters governing their mutual relations, particularly the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defense Pact.
4. Commit themselves to the principle of mutual respect and noninterference in each other's internal affairs.
5. Agree on a formula for conducting relations with non-Arab countries in the region, which should "reject claims of regional expansion, hegemony, domination, and theories of supremacy."
6. Deepen Arab solidarity by settling Arab disputes peacefully, without resort to either force or foreign mediators.
7. Preserve the Arab nation's resources and strengthen the development process, particularly in the realm of science and technology.

In many ways, Mubarak's views were an updated version of Egypt's position in the post-1945, pre-Nasir era of Arab politics. Then, as now, Egyptian leaders like Nahhas Pasha said Egypt's role was to be above internecine inter-Arab squabbles, even as they strove for Egyptian preeminence in Arab regional politics. Then, as now, the watchword was Arab "solidarity," as opposed to "unity." This point was made explicitly by Mubarak: "We must," he said, "reexamine our views [on unity], to see if we are really serious [about] the ideas we propose and the slogans we propound. If we try to deceive anyone, we will only be deceiving ourselves." Then, as now, the pillars of Egyptian regional policy were the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defense Pact. Mubarak emphasized this point too: "No fair man can deny that Egypt has always remained in the vanguard of Arab forces that have adhered to these charters. Egypt will remain loyal to them and protect them because it played the major role in bringing them into existence."¹¹⁶ The Amman summit showed that Egypt's views on regional security were broadly shared by much of the Arab world.

EGYPT, JORDAN, AND THE ARAB-ISRAELI PEACE PROCESS

The failure to make progress on Arab-Israeli issues continued to be a source of disappointment to Egypt. Ever since the autumn of 1984, when Jordan renewed full diplomatic relations with Egypt, Cairo had attempted to encourage a common Jordanian-PLO approach to possible peace negotiations. However, Cairo's self-defined supporting role was of little use once the Husayn-'Arafat dialogue was

suspended in February 1986. If anything, PLO-Jordanian estrangement deepened during 1987, leaving Egypt with even less leverage than previously. In general, Cairo placed the onus for this state of affairs mainly on the PLO, rather than Jordan. The low point in Egyptian-PLO relations came in the spring, when the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algeria canceled the 1985 Husayn-'Arafat agreement, condemned Egypt's peace with Israel, and reiterated a previous PNC resolution calling for cooperation with Egyptian opposition groups. In response, Egypt closed down the PLO's offices in Cairo. But, as had happened before, the atmosphere between the PLO and Egypt cleared up again later in the year. Yasir 'Arafat's meeting with Mubarak at the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit in Addis Ababa, in August, his statements in praise of Mubarak's defense of Palestinian rights, and the PLO's support for Egypt's return to the Arab League,¹¹⁷ seemed to have repaired some of the damage. Toward the end of the year, the PLO's offices were reopened. (For further details, see essays on the peace process and the PLO, and chapter on Egypt.)

As part of their continuing efforts to coordinate policies, Husayn and Mubarak met on eight separate occasions during 1987, bringing the total number of meetings between them since October 1984 to 26. In addition, the fact that Egypt and Jordan were generally of one mind with regard to both the Gulf War and the Arab-Israeli conflict was a boon to their bilateral relations. The gamut of plans for economic cooperation and development were reviewed by the sixth and seventh sessions of the Egyptian-Jordanian Joint Higher Committee, which met in May and December. By the end of July, the total number of agreements and protocols signed by the two countries since October 1984 had reached 24; the total value of their bilateral trade had grown from \$16m. in 1984 to \$35m. in 1986 and \$27.8m. during the first half of 1987, with aspirations to reach \$250m. in annual exchange.¹¹⁸ Particularly noteworthy in the economic sphere in 1987 was the setting up of a joint holding company for investment and development, headquartered in Amman, with \$50m. in capital to be shared equally between the two countries.¹¹⁹ (For more on Egyptian-Jordanian bilateral relations, see chapter on Egypt.)

THE EGYPT-SUDAN-LIBYA TRIANGLE

Egypt's immediate neighbors remained particularly troublesome. Much of Cairo's worries centered on Sudan: the overthrow of Ja'far al-Numayri in April 1985 had inaugurated a period of continuous flux in Sudanese politics, in which the first casualty was the formerly cozy state of Egyptian-Sudanese relations. The uncertainty continued to be felt in 1987. On the other hand, Egypt could take comfort in the fact that Libya's efforts to entrench itself in post-Numayri Sudan seemed less threatening than previously. This was partly due to the same inherent difficulties that Egypt was encountering with the multiple strands of Sudanese political life. It was also partly due to Libya's escalating problems in Chad and the negative spillover effects they had on Libyan-Sudanese relations, highlighted by the continued Libyan presence in Sudan's Darfur region bordering on Libya and Chad. (See chapters on Libya and Sudan.) Egyptian-Libyan relations continued on their stormy course.

Egyptian-Sudanese relations contained two main problem areas:

- (1) The question of the continued validity of their 1976 Joint Defense Pact (their 1982 Nile Valley Integration Charter had been effectively suspended during 1986).

- (2) Egypt's continued refusal to extradite Numayri to Sudan to stand trial, despite Sudanese insistence that Numayri did not qualify as a political refugee deserving asylum under the terms of the Egyptian constitution.¹²⁰

Bilateral trade relations were also of concern. An agreement signed on 21 July stipulated that \$120m. of Egyptian products were to be exported to Sudan during the next 12 months, and \$80m. of Sudanese products to Egypt.¹²¹ Shortly afterward, however, commerce was completely suspended for a time, mainly because of Sudan's worries over its overall imbalance of trade and disputes with Egypt over dollar exchange rates.¹²²

Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi's long-delayed official visit to Cairo took place on 18–22 February. It resulted in the signing of a "Brotherhood Charter" intended to place Egyptian-Sudanese relations on more solid ground. These were to be based on the two countries' "special, predestined relationship embodied by the immortal Nile River, their heritage of civilization, their common struggle, and their strategic interests." Ongoing consultations were to take place under the auspices of a "joint higher committee" at the prime ministerial level, which would meet twice a year, and specialized ministerial committees.¹²³ Upon his return to Khartoum, Mahdi told the Constituent Assembly that the charter's failure to refer to previous institutions and agreements established during the Numayri era meant that they had been canceled. His government, he continued, "had rescued Sudan from a relationship of subordination and dependency... relations [with Egypt] were now on the basis of mutual interest."¹²⁴ On a number of occasions during the year, Mahdi repeated his contention that the 1976 defense pact was no longer in force. By contrast, other Sudanese officials such as Foreign Minister Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad insisted that the pact was still valid and that it favored Sudan, an indication of the multiple voices of Sudan's fragile coalition government. The Sudanese foreign minister also spoke in terms similar to those of Egypt's defense minister regarding the Iranian threat to the Red Sea region.¹²⁵ In this area, too, he differed with Mahdi, whose views on the need for greater dialogue between the Sunni and Shi'i branches of Islam added to his desire for ties between Khartoum and Tehran.¹²⁶

Although irritated by those who spoke of the pact's annulment, Egyptian officials and the pro-government media usually played down the pact's importance. They also insisted that Sudan was its primary beneficiary: one Egyptian weekly stated that Sudan had received \$52m.-worth of weapons under the pact's terms since Numayri's overthrow.¹²⁷ Mubarak declared that Sudan could do as it wished; as for Egypt, "we will not be saddened and our relations will not be affected" by the pact's abrogation.¹²⁸ Adding to the muddled picture were periodic reports in the Sudanese media that Egyptian troops were stationed in a number of locations in Sudan's eastern provinces under the terms of the supposedly defunct Joint Defense Pact. Egypt denied the reports.¹²⁹

Despite the continued uncertainty, Egyptian-Sudanese contacts persisted, on the ministerial level and in nongovernmental sectors. For example, 21,000 Sudanese students were reportedly studying in Egypt, 2,500 of them on Egyptian grants; another 20,000 were studying in the Khartoum branch of the University of Cairo. Egyptian teachers were said to be in charge of 21 Sudanese schools.¹³⁰ On the diplomatic front, Egypt, at Khartoum's request, also attempted — with some success — to reduce the border tension between Sudan and Ethiopia¹³¹ (see chapter on Sudan).

Nonetheless, dissatisfaction in Cairo with the existing state of affairs, and particularly with the coalition of anti-Egyptian forces in Sudan, was evident below the surface. The policy debate apparently focused on two possible courses of action: either to limit relations further, as Sudan was an economic, political, and military liability for Egypt, or to take new initiatives to help shape Sudan's future, both via Sudanese political parties and the economic, cultural, and educational realms¹³² (on Egyptian-Sudanese bilateral relations, see also chapter on Egypt).

Egypt and Libya remained poles apart, at odds over every regional and foreign policy issue and over their respective regional roles. Cairo and Tripoli supported each other's opposition movements. Libya reserved some of its most heated propaganda for Egypt. Cairo was more restrained, but occasionally lashed out at Tripoli as well. The defections of two Libyan helicopter crews and one C-130 transport crew to Egypt created further strains, as Libya accused Egypt of "air piracy" and "psychological torture" against the crews.¹³³ Libya then attempted to bargain over their return (and that of their aircraft) for the release of three Egyptians held by Libya.¹³⁴ (For further details, see chapter on Egypt.) However, channels for Egyptian-Libyan dialogue apparently remained open, with one Arabic-language weekly reporting on a three-hour meeting in Algeria between a top adviser to Qadhdhafi and a senior member of Egypt's People's Assembly,¹³⁵ but with no visible results. According to Mubarak, Qadhdhafi had contacted him "more than 20 times" during Mubarak's first six-year term as president, ostensibly seeking a *rapprochement*, but, said Mubarak, "I do not believe him."¹³⁶

MAGHRIB AFFAIRS

Relations among the Maghrib countries continued to have a dynamic flavor during 1987. Overall, there was less tension in the region than in previous years, for there was no major crisis. Rather, the dynamism which seemed to be a permanent feature of intra-Maghrib politics stemmed mainly from the efforts of Algeria, Libya, and Morocco to improve their respective regional positions through dialogue.

Building the "Greater Arab Maghrib" continued to be a much-proclaimed goal by all parties. However, no steps towards creating an institutional framework — whether along the desired lines of the GCC or even on a more modest basis, such as a consultative parliament from among Maghrib political parties — were registered. Nor did Tunisia's efforts to convene a meeting of the five Maghrib heads of state bear fruit.

Of secondary importance to immediate developments, but more important in historical terms for both the Maghrib and Arab affairs as a whole, was the bloodless removal from power on 7 November of Tunisia's 84-year-old president, Habib Bourguiba. Bourguiba had led Tunisia to independence in 1956 and had ruled ever since. He had outlasted all the other veteran Arab nationalists of his generation, who had long since passed from the scene. His removal — on the grounds of senility — was generally seen in the Arab world as both inevitable and necessary given his erratic efforts to cope with Tunisia's mounting domestic problems, and particularly those involving Islamic fundamentalist opposition groups (see essay on Islamic activities). Far-reaching changes were not expected under the new leadership, either domestically or in foreign policy. However, the efforts of Tunisia's Westernized political elite to

cope with the twin challenges posed by economic difficulties and the Islamic opposition would surely bear watching.

ALGERIA, MOROCCO, AND THE WESTERN SAHARA

The war between Morocco and the Algerian-backed Polisario movement, now in its 13th year, continued intermittently, and at times fiercely. Morocco's hold over much of the territory was not seriously challenged on the ground. Nonetheless, Polisario continued to achieve diplomatic gains: its government-in-exile, the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), was now recognized by 70 countries. It also maintained its seat in the OAU which Morocco, consequently, continued to boycott.

A round of heavy fighting broke out on 25 February between Moroccan and Polisario forces. In this instance, it was part of Polisario's efforts to disturb Morocco's building of its sixth defensive wall, a system designed to ensure Moroccan control of the populated areas by blocking Polisario penetrations from Algerian and Mauritanian territory. Predictably, the clashes exacerbated tensions between Morocco and Algeria, Polisario's patron and host, and again raised the specter of a Moroccan-Algerian confrontation. However, both Algeria and Rabat were conscious of this possibility, and thus welcomed the active mediation of Saudi Arabia's King Fahd. His efforts began on 12 March with visits to both countries. One month later, on 21 April, a senior adviser to King Hasan, Ahmad Ben Suda, met with Algeria's President Benjedid in Algiers.¹³⁷

Two weeks later, on 4 May, the dialogue was climaxed by a tripartite Algerian-Saudi-Moroccan summit, hosted by Fahd, in a specially constructed tent straddling the Algerian-Moroccan border adjacent to the Moroccan town of Oujda, 600 km. northeast of Rabat. The actual discussions between Hasan, Benjedid, and Fahd were of short duration, concentrating almost entirely on the Western Sahara issue. There was no breakthrough on defining the terms for holding the long-delayed referendum that would determine the area's future. However, the two leaders did apparently agree to avoid a direct military confrontation between their countries, whatever the circumstances, and to cease propaganda and diplomatic attacks against each other.¹³⁸ Agreement was also reached on the formation of a joint committee to be headed by their foreign ministers. At the summit's close, a short joint communiqué was issued, in which Algeria and Morocco pledged to continue their dialogue, with the aim of solving existing problems.¹³⁹ The very fact that they issued a joint communiqué was significant — their previous meeting in February 1983 had not concluded with one. In fact, it was the first Moroccan-Algerian joint communiqué since diplomatic relations were broken off in 1976.

Signs of a continuing dialogue were evident in the following months, as was encouragement from Saudi Arabia. On 25 May, the two countries exchanged prisoners of war taken during various border incidents over the years. Algeria released 150 Moroccan soldiers in return for 102 of its own nationals.¹⁴⁰ Cross-border family visits were quietly permitted for Algerian and Moroccan civilians in their border regions.¹⁴¹ On the diplomatic level, their respective foreign ministers exchanged visits: Algeria's Ahmad Talib Ibrahim met Hasan in Rabat on 11 July; Morocco's 'Abd al-Latif al-Filali reciprocated on 21 November. The result, said Hasan, was an agreement to form "think-tank committees" to deal with various economic, trade, and border issues.¹⁴² On 17 December, Foreign Ministry officials from the two countries held

talks in Casablanca, partly in order to define the agenda for the foreign ministers' committee agreed on earlier in the year but still not convened.¹⁴³

In previous years, Algeria had made an improvement in Moroccan-Algerian relations conditional on progress in the Western Sahara issue. This seemed to be less of a condition in 1987, even as both sides reiterated their established positions and blamed each other for the lack of progress.¹⁴⁴ Even here there was evidence of movement, stemming from a new diplomatic initiative on the Western Sahara launched under the joint auspices of the UN secretary-general and the president of the OAU. In late November, a UN-OAU "technical commission" was dispatched to Morocco, Algeria, and the Western Sahara to study all the possible problems involved in organizing the long-delayed referendum, first endorsed by the OAU in 1981, to determine the area's future.¹⁴⁵ Its conclusions, not yet published at year's end, were likely to have a significant influence on the next phase of the conflict and on the course of Moroccan-Algerian relations.

Libyan-Moroccan relations remained cool, following the breakup in 1986 of their short-lived union. Rabat was on guard against the possible renewal of Libyan military support for Polisario, but there was no conclusive evidence by year's end to indicate whether or not Tripoli was heeding its warnings against doing so.¹⁴⁶ Ideologically, Qadhdhafi adhered to his long-standing position against the creation of another "artificial" Arab state. If, however, Polisario turned its struggle into a "revolutionary war," with the object of "liberating Morocco and [realizing] socialism and Arab unity, and the establishment of a popular '*jamahiri*' regime in Morocco," then he would support it.¹⁴⁷ In any event, Libya's attention was, for the moment, directed elsewhere.

Moroccan-Mauritanian relations, which had had to contend with numerous bouts of tension over the years due to Mauritania's nervous balancing act between Morocco and the Polisario movement, were calmer in 1987. Morocco assured Mauritania that its defensive measures against Polisario infiltration along their common border would not involve any encroachment on Mauritanian territory, and that it did not intend to pursue a policy of cross-border pursuit against Polisario fighters.¹⁴⁸ Mauritania's endemic domestic instability, which made it the weakest of all Maghrib states, was highlighted again by an abortive coup in late October.

ALGERIA, LIBYA, AND TUNISIA

In general, Algeria's activist, confident posture in the Maghrib reflected its overall approach to foreign policy, exemplified elsewhere by (a) Algiers's efforts to promote unity among various Palestinian factions, climaxing in its hosting of the PNC meeting (see essay on the PLO); (b) its active role in nudging its Syrian ally to lift a siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon; and (c) its renewed efforts to mediate between Iraq and Iran. Algeria's attempts to encourage Libya to repair the damage stemming from the 1985 crisis between Libya and Tunisia also bore fruit (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 132-34).

Algeria's *rapprochement* with Libya, begun in 1986, continued apace, although their ultimate aims were not identical. Frequent exchanges of high-level visits (headed by Qadhdhafi's four-day sojourn in Algeria from 28 June-1 July, and two meetings of their "Joint Executive Committee" [composed of members of the Algerian Council of Ministers and Libya's General People's Committee]) — the conclusion of a number of cooperation agreements, and the abolition of visa requirements for each other's

nationals were all part of what both sides characterized as "unionist steps." Yet, significant differences remained over the meaning of "unity." Qadhdhafi, consistent as ever in his ideology, sought to move quickly and with far-reaching effect to forge at least a federated political framework. He went so far as to claim that the two countries would bring it into being on 1 November.¹⁴⁹ The Algerians, for their part, preferred a slower peace, beginning with economic cooperation and integration, to be followed gradually by political steps.¹⁵⁰ For Algiers, their 1983 Fraternity and Concord Treaty with Tunisia and Mauritania (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 215) continued to serve as an ideal model. To underscore this point, Algiers hosted a meeting of the three signatories' foreign ministers on 20 December, after which they confirmed the principle of opening up the treaty to all Maghrib countries.¹⁵¹ In effect, Algeria was attempting to nudge Libya in the direction of more conventional interstate relations, even while employing the rhetoric of unity and agreeing to discuss Libyan proposals in the political realm.¹⁵² For the moment, Libya found it expedient to avoid disputes over the final goal of the process and also to respond favorably to Algerian suggestions that it repair its ties with Tunisia.

Tunisia's dialogue with Libya over compensation to Tunisian workers expelled from Libya in 1985 and the reimbursement of Tunisian funds in Libya — including LD9m. to Tunis Air — proceeded amicably. Direct flights between the two countries were resumed in September. In October, consular ties were resumed and the border was reopened. Libya also agreed to pay LD6m. in indemnities to the more than 30,000 expelled workers. Bilateral ties were given a further boost during mid-December at a meeting in Tunis of the two countries' Trade and Economic Cooperation Committee. The climax came on 28 December with the restoration of diplomatic relations.¹⁵³ One day later, Tunisian Foreign Minister Muhammad Mestiri announced that consultations were under way regarding Libya's joining the Algerian-Tunisian-Mauritanian Fraternity Treaty. However, the memory of past troubles with Libya was still fresh. Acceptance of Libya, Mestiri said, depended on Tripoli's adherence to the treaty's principles of noninterference in each other's internal affairs, acknowledging the territorial integrity of all signatories, "and, above all, respect for sovereignty."¹⁵⁴

CONCLUSION

Even as he maneuvered to improve his battered regional standing, Qadhdhafi continued to claim to be the "trustee" of Gamal 'Abd al-Nasir's heritage of pan-Arabism and Arab unity.¹⁵⁵ Well aware that his unity proposals had long fallen on deaf ears, he tried a new tack. On 1 September, he proposed the establishment of an Arab federation (*al-Ittihad al-'Arabi*), whose "presidential council" would consist of the leaders of the member countries. They were to meet once every six months, each time under the chairmanship of a different leader.¹⁵⁶

He had, he declared, learned the lesson of the Arab League: it was the only Arab institution that had succeeded because it had avoided interfering in the internal affairs of its member countries. So, too, would his federation: only the population within a particular country would have the right to overthrow its regime.¹⁵⁷ However, Qadhdhafi's efforts to square the circle — i.e., combine the Arab League framework, which placed supreme value on the sovereignty of its members, with this latest variation on his long-standing call for Arab unity — created barely a ripple in the

Arab world. Ironically, too, Qadhdhafi's unprecedented complimentary remarks about the Arab League were juxtaposed against the most serious budget crisis the league had ever faced. With the majority of the states in arrears (Libya itself had not paid its allotted share for five years), the league was forced to implement serious cutbacks in its personnel and offices overseas and delay salary payments to a number of its diplomats, while all that there was of its projected new headquarters in Tunis was a hole in the ground.¹⁵⁸

More important for the Arab leaders were the problems at hand. While the Amman summit had provided at least a temporary respite from inter-Arab divisions, major question marks hung over the future course of regional politics, and the degree of Arab solidarity at the end of 1987. In the Gulf, Syria launched a new initiative in late December designed to bring about a GCC-Iranian dialogue, and to reinforce its own regional standing. For the moment, in the absence of UN sanctions against Iran, the GCC states were willing to go along with the Syrian effort, thus implicitly stating that the Amman summit's anti-Iranian resolutions were not in themselves sufficient to end the war. As part of this new effort, the GCC's summit conference of 26–29 December refrained from calling for harsher steps against Iran, something noted with satisfaction by Tehran,¹⁵⁹ but undoubtedly with dismay in Baghdad. The collective Arab agenda also threatened to become more crowded at the end of 1987, with the uprising ('*intifada*') launched in December in the Israeli-controlled West Bank and Gaza, only a few weeks after the Palestinian issue had been relegated to secondary status by the Amman summit. (For details, see essays on the peace process and the West Bank and Gaza.)

APPENDIX: FINAL STATEMENT AND RESOLUTIONS OF THE EXTRAORDINARY ARAB SUMMIT CONFERENCE HELD IN AMMAN, 8–11 NOVEMBER 1987

Statement read over Amman Television, 11 November 1987

Resolutions 1–5 issued by the Iraqi News Agency, 12 November 1987

Resolution 6 broadcast by Voice of Palestine (Baghdad), 13 November 1987

Resolution 7 broadcast by Voice of Palestine (Sana'), 14 November 1987

Pursuant to the will of the Arab countries' leaders expressed in the resolution the Arab League Council adopted in its extraordinary session which resumed in Tunis on 26 Muharram 1408 Hijra, corresponding to 20 September 1987, and in response to an invitation from His Majesty King Husayn Ibn Talal, king of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the Jordanian capital of Amman hosted an extraordinary session of the Arab summit which convened from 17–20 Rabi' al-Awwal 1408, corresponding to 8–11 November 1987.

From the premise of our historical responsibility and pan-Arab principles, based on the relations of brotherhood and the interconnection of security, political, and economic interests and the interconnection of history and civilization; out of an awareness of the sensitive and difficult stage the Arab homeland is experiencing and of the challenges against the Arab homeland's present and future which pose a threat to its existence; and realizing that the state of division and fragmentation causes a weakness that dissipates the Arab nation's resources and exhausts its potentialities, the issue of Arab solidarity has been the focus of the Arab leaders' attention. They discussed its various aspects and pinpointed its weak and strong points. They stressed the need to support and enhance it and allotted it priority. Their viewpoints were in agreement on this issue and they agreed that Arab solidarity is the only way to achieve the Arab nation's dignity and pride and to ward off danger and harm from it.

The leaders unanimously agreed to overcome differences and to eliminate the causes of weakness and factors of dismemberment and division. From the premise of their loyalty to their homeland and their genuine affiliation to their nationalism, they decided to adopt Arab solidarity as a basis for a joint Arab action whose objective is to embody the unity of their stand, build the capabilities of the Arab nation, and provide it with factors of strength and impregnability.

After listening to His Majesty King Husayn's speech at the first closed session of the summit, the leaders decided to consider the speech in which his majesty launched the slogan of reconciliation and accord as the title of the summit, as an official document of the summit. They reiterated their abidance by the need to support Arab-African cooperation. They condemned the

terrorism and racial discrimination which the racist regime in South Africa is carrying out. They also reiterated their support for the struggle of the people in South Africa and Namibia.

In adherence to the Arab League Charter, the Joint Defense Pact, and the Arab solidarity charter; to emphasize the determination to protect pan-Arab security and to safeguard Arab territory; and in an atmosphere filled with the spirit of fraternity and love which prevailed at the Amman summit, the Iraq-Iran war and the situation in the Gulf topped the summit agenda. The leaders expressed their concern over the continuation of the war and expressed their dissatisfaction with the Iranian regime's insistence on continuing it and on going too far in provoking and threatening the Arabian Gulf states.

The conference condemned Iran for occupying part of Iraqi territory and its procrastination in accepting UN Security Council Resolution 598. The conferees called upon Iran to accept and fully implement this resolution in accordance with the sequence of its clauses. They appealed to the international community to assume its responsibilities, exert effective efforts, and adopt the necessary measures to make the Iranian regime respond to the peace calls.

The conference also announced its solidarity with Iraq and its appreciation of its acceptance of Security Council Resolution 598 and its response to all peace initiatives. It also stressed its solidarity with and support for Iraq in protecting its territory and waters and in defending its legitimate rights.

The leaders reviewed the developments in the Gulf area and the serious consequences resulting from Iranian threats, provocations, and aggressions. The conference announced its solidarity with Kuwait in confronting the Iranian regime's aggression. It also announced its denunciation of the bloody, criminal incidents perpetrated by Iranians in the holy mosque of Mecca. The conference affirmed its support for Kuwait in all of the measures it has taken to protect its territory and waters and to guarantee its security and stability. The conference announced its support for Kuwait in confronting the Iranian regime's threats and aggressions.

The conference also affirmed its complete support for Saudi Arabia and its full support for the measures taken by Saudi Arabia to provide a suitable atmosphere so pilgrims may perform pilgrimage rites in peace and humility, and to prevent any encroachment on the sanctity of the holy mosque and Muslims' feelings. The leaders affirmed their rejection of any riotous acts in holy places that would violate pilgrims' security and safety and encroach on the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia. The conference called on Islamic countries and governments to adopt this stand and to stand against incorrect practices which contradict Islamic teachings.

The conference also discussed the Arab-Israeli conflict and reviewed its developments in Arab and international areas. The conference reiterated that the Palestinian cause is the essence and basis of the conflict and that peace in the Middle East can only be achieved through regaining all occupied Arab territory, particularly Jerusalem, through restoring the Palestinian people's national, inalienable rights and through resolving the Palestinian issue from all its aspects.

The summit announced that reinforcing the Arabs' capability, building their intrinsic strength, entrenching their solidarity, and embodying the unity of their stands are essential factors to confront the Israeli danger threatening the entire Arab nation and exposing its existence and future to harm and danger. Within the framework of supporting peaceful efforts and attempts to achieve a just, permanent peace in the Middle East within international legitimacy and UN resolutions on the basis of regaining all the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories and the Palestinian people's national inalienable rights, the leaders supported the convocation of an international peace conference under UN auspices and the participation of all the concerned parties, including the PLO, the Palestinian people's sole, legitimate representative, on an equal footing, as well as the permanent Security Council members. This is because the international conference is the only appropriate way to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict in a peaceful, just, and comprehensive settlement.

The leaders expressed deep admiration and appreciation to the Palestinian people in the occupied Arab territories and praised their steadfastness, struggle and their adherence to their land, and renewed their commitment to support them. The leaders discussed the Lebanese crisis and its tragic complications for the fraternal Arab Lebanese people. The leaders emphasized their concern for Lebanon's endeavors to help Lebanon overcome its crisis and restore its sovereignty and welfare.

The leaders also discussed the issue of international terrorism. They voiced condemnation of all forms of international terrorism regardless of its origin. They affirmed their conviction of the justice of the people's struggle to achieve independence and sovereignty and restore their freedom and legitimate rights. The leaders believe that the prerequisites, demands, and conditions of pan-Arab security cannot be realized except through full solidarity covering the entire Arab homeland and enabling the mobilization of the Arab nation's capabilities and resources to achieve pan-Arab objectives. The leaders also believe in the unity of hope, aspirations, and common views regarding the dangers threatening Arab existence and future in terms of evil and hostile intentions.

Thus the leaders decided that diplomatic relations between any Arab League member state and the Arab Republic of Egypt is a sovereign act decided by each state in accordance with its constitution and laws.

The summit reviewed the historical relations between the two divine religions, Islam and Christianity, embodied in Jerusalem, the symbol of peace. The summit also reviewed Israel's practices and its transparent attempts at blackmail. The summit called on the members states to intensify dialogue with the Vatican to gain its support. The summit also called on His Majesty King Husayn, the summit's chairman, to undertake contacts with the Vatican on behalf of the Arab leaders.

The leaders expressed their gratitude to the generous Jordanian people and their great king for their warm hospitality, reception, and perfect preparations. They also expressed appreciation of His Majesty King Husayn's wise leadership, which created a clear, brotherly climate for the summit and facilitated its success.

1. Resolution on the Iraq-Iran War

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab countries meeting within the framework of the extraordinary Arab summit conference held in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 8-11 November 1987;

While affirming their serious concern about the dangerous threats posed to pan-Arab security and stressing the important

position occupied by the Iraq-Iran War in the heart of the Arab nation's concerns, due to the grave dangers its continuation poses to the nation and its fateful issues;

Recalling the resolution of the 12th Arab summit conference which was held in Fez in September 1982; announcing the Arab countries' readiness to implement their obligations under the Arab League Charter and the Joint Defense Pact in case of the continuation of the war waged by Iran against Iraq;

Considering any attack on any Arab country as an attack on all Arab countries, stating that maintaining the Arab countries' independence, territorial integrity, and sanctity of their international borders as a duty which must be honored and fulfilled by all Arab states through all available means;

And confirming adherence to these obligations in the final statement of the extraordinary Arab summit conference held in Casablanca in August 1985, as well as to the resolutions issued by the Arab League Council in its ordinary and extraordinary sessions, the last of which being the resolution issued on 6 April 1987 and the resolution issued on 25 August 1987;

Noting Iran's insistence on continuing the war against Iraq and not responding to Arab and international peace initiatives as well as the resolutions issued by international organizations;

Realizing the grave dangers threatening the whole pan-Arab security as a result of this aggressive behavior and insistence on continuing it;

Acting from a full sense of pan-Arab responsibility, abiding by the unity of Arab destiny;

Realizing the need to adhere to principles of Arab solidarity necessitated by the current state, understanding that this situation poses a serious threat to pan-Arab security, which requires a commitment to what is stipulated by the Arab League Charter and the Treaty of Joint Defense and Economic Cooperation among the Arab League states, decide:

- (1) To condemn and reject the continuation of Iran's occupation of Arab territory in Iraq in view of the fact this constitutes a flagrant aggression against the sovereignty of an Arab League member state and an encroachment of its territorial safety.
- (2) To show a complete solidarity with Iraq and stand alongside it in its legitimate defense of its territory and sovereignty.
- (3) To express the Arab countries' readiness to implement their obligations toward Iraq and among themselves in accordance with the Arab League Charter and the Treaty of Joint Defense, and Economic Cooperation among Arab League states.
- (4) To support Security Council Resolution 598 and fully back efforts to implement it in its entirety in a manner leading to the resolution of all aspects of the dispute.

2. Resolution on the Implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 for 1987

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states meeting within the framework of the extraordinary Arab summit conference in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 8-11 November 1987, while expressing their deep concern over the continuation of the war against an Arab League member state's sovereignty and territorial security in violation of the rules of the international law and the UN Charter and resolutions — a war which is threatening to expand its operational theater, endangering the sovereignty and security of other Arab League member states, and threatening stability and security in the entire region and exposing it to the most serious dangers;

Expressing their deep concern over the Iranian attacks on ships and the ports of nonbelligerent Arab Gulf states and over Iran's refusal to abide by UN Security Council Resolution 552 of 1984 which expresses the stand of the international community toward freedom of navigation in waterways;

Expressing their strong dissatisfaction with Iran's continued refusal to respond to Arab and international peace initiatives and resolutions issued by international organizations;

Referring to the Arab League Council Resolution 4, 646-DP87-C3-6/4; 1987 which included a just basis for ending the conflict between Iraq and Iran and called on the UN Security Council to respond to the will of the international community and consequently assume its responsibilities in accordance with the provisions of the UN Charter and to embark on an effective and binding action to achieve lasting and comprehensive peace between the two countries without delay;

And, noting with extreme satisfaction that the UN Security Council has unanimously adopted Resolution 598 on 20 July 1987, which includes the bases stated in the aforementioned Arab League resolution, decide:

- (1) To strongly support UN Security Council Resolution 598 of 1987.
- (2) To express appreciation for Iraq's response to this resolution and its readiness to cooperate with the UN secretary-general with good intentions to achieve a just, comprehensive, lasting, and honorable solution to the conflict.
- (3) To call on the UN Security Council to work without hesitation to implement Resolution 598 as an indivisible whole, in letter and spirit, and in accordance with the sequence of its operative clauses, based on its jurisdiction in accordance with the UN Charter, to achieve a just and comprehensive peace between the two countries and in the region. The Arab kings, presidents, and emirs also express their support for the UN secretary-general's efforts in this regard.
- (4) To call strongly for guaranteeing the freedom of international navigation in the Arabian Gulf in accordance with the rules of international law, to condemn the planting of mines in international waterways and the territorial waters of nonbelligerent states, and to call for noninterference with ships leaving to or from these states in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 552 of 1984.

3. Resolution on Attacks on Arab Gulf States

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states meeting within the framework of the extraordinary Arab summit conference held in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 16-19 Rabi' al-Awwal 1408 Hijra, corresponding to 8-11 November 1987;

Having studied with care and concern the Iranian attacks and threats against the Arab Gulf states, especially the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia;

And acting in accordance with the provisions of the Arab League Charter and the principles and bases defined by Arab summit conferences which affirm the sanctity of Arab soil, its common security, and the necessity for Arab solidarity in facing any kind of attack against any Arab state and considering such an attack as directed against all Arab states and that the responsibility of preserving the Arab states' independence and territorial integrity is the duty of all Arab states which they must assume and perform by all available means;

Expressing their extreme concern and sorrow over the continuation of the Iraq-Iran War due to Iran's rejection of all peace initiatives and appeals as well as the international resolutions which call for bringing the war to an end and achieving peace between the two countries, including those resolutions issued within the framework of the Arab League;

Announcing their absolute rejection of Iran's attempt to expand this war as well as their total rejection of its continuation;

Strongly denouncing Iran's continuous interference in the internal affairs of the Arabian Gulf states and other Arab states and the Iranian Government's adoption of the policy of subversion and actions harming the internal security of some Arab states, decide:

- (1) To denounce and condemn Iran's repeated attacks on the State of Kuwait and its territorial integrity and consider them as directed against the whole Arab nation.
- (2) To affirm the Arab states' determination to implement their obligations toward the Arab Gulf states in accordance with Article (6) of the Arab League Charter and Article (2) of the Joint Defense Pact should Iran continue these attacks, and to firmly stand by the Arab Gulf states against these attacks.
- (3) To reconsider economic and trade relations between Arab states which supply Iran with arms should Iran continue its attacks against the Arab Gulf states.
- (4) To condemn Iran's interference in the internal affairs of the Arab Gulf states and its resort to violence and terrorism to cause problems and disturbances in these states.
- (5) To support Kuwait in its efforts to protect its security, territorial integrity, and commercial interests.
- (6) To call urgently for guaranteeing the freedom of navigation in the Arab Gulf in accordance with the rules of international law, to condemn the laying of mines in international waterways and the territorial waters of nonbelligerent states, and also to call for noninterference with ships moving between nonbelligerent states in accordance with Security Council Resolution 552 of 1984.

4. Resolution on the Riots and Sedition Carried out by the Iranians in the Pilgrimage Season of the Year 1407 Hijra, corresponding to 1987

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states, meeting within the framework of the extraordinary Arab summit held in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 16–19 Rabi' al-Awwal 1408 Hijra, corresponding to 8–11 November 1987;

While strongly condemning the acts of sabotage and rioting which the Iranians carried out in holy Mecca in the pilgrimage season of the year 1407 Hijra and which undermined the sanctity of the holy places, the rituals and rules of pilgrimage, and the security and safety of the pilgrims of the holy house of God;

After taking cognizance of the attached explanatory memorandum submitted by the delegation of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the conference:

- (1) Emphasizes its full solidarity with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and its complete support for the measures it is taking to provide an appropriate atmosphere for the pilgrims of the house of God to perform the *hajj* rituals in security and submission, and to prevent any encroachment on the sanctity of the house of God and Muslims' feelings. It also rejects any riots in holy places that would undermine the security and safety of pilgrims and the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
- (2) Stresses the rights of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to take whatever measures it deems fit to prevent the recurrence of such incidents.
- (3) Emphasizes that the pilgrimage season and religious occasions should not be exploited to stage demonstrations and processions and raise slogans, that the sanctity of the house of God should be observed, and that rituals should be respected and revered to maintain the unity and cohesion of the Muslims.
- (4) Calls on Islamic states and governments to adopt this attitude and stand against wrong practices which conflict with the teachings of the true Islamic religion.

5. Resolution on Relations with Egypt

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states, meeting within the framework of the extraordinary summit conference held in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 8–11 November 1987, discussed the third point on their agenda, concerning relations with Egypt. Following a detailed and fraternal discussion, they decided that the diplomatic relationship between any Arab League member state and Egypt is an act of sovereignty decided by every state in accordance with its constitution and laws and is not [within] the jurisdiction of the Arab League.

6. Resolution on the Arab-Israeli Conflict

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states meeting within the framework of the extraordinary summit conference held in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 8–11 November 1987, considering that the Palestinian question is the Arabs' cause and the crux of the Arab-Israeli conflict and that struggle for the sake of regaining usurped Arab rights in Palestinian territory and other occupied Arab territories is a pan-Arab responsibility; since the Zionist danger is not only targeted against the confrontation states but threatens the destiny and existence of the whole Arab nation; in view of Israel's continued perpetration of repressive practices in the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories;

and in light of its persistent pursuit of its hostile and expansionist policy, decide:

- (1) To pool the Arab states' capabilities and resources for the sake of reinforcing the capabilities and energies of the states and forces that are confronting Israel on all levels to help end its continued aggression against the Arab nation and regain usurped Arab rights in Palestine and occupied Arab territories.
- (2) To achieve strategic parity with Israel within the framework of an effective Arab solidarity to confront the Zionist danger, which threatens the Arab nation's destiny and existence, and to force Israel to accept the UN resolutions seeking to establish a just and comprehensive peace in the region.
- (3) To provide material and moral support to the persistent heroic struggle being waged by the Palestinian people in occupied Palestine, in the Golan Heights, and South Lebanon in their confrontation of Israeli occupation.
- (4) To urge all Arab parties to abide by Arab summit resolutions stipulating the inadmissibility of any Arab side unilaterally concluding any solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and rejecting any peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict that does not guarantee full and unconditional Israeli withdrawal from all occupied Palestinian and Arab territories and that does not call for enabling the Palestinian Arab people to exercise their inalienable national rights in accordance with Arab summit resolutions, especially those adopted at the Fez summit in 1982.
- (5) To condemn the US Government's decision to close the Palestine information office in Washington.

7. Resolution on Peace Conference

Their majesties, excellencies, and highnesses the kings, presidents, and emirs of the Arab states, meeting within the framework of the extraordinary summit conference held in Amman, the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from 8–11 November 1987, out of commitment to the objectives and bases defined by the resolutions of Arab summit conferences concerning the Arab-Israeli conflict; in view of Israel's failure to accept UN resolutions to establish a just and comprehensive peace in the region; proceeding from the Arab nation's determination to pool its resources and capabilities to confront the Zionist challenge posed to its fate and existence; and out of commitment to the Arab nation's approach toward peace defined in the Arab peace plan approved at the 1982 Fez summit with the aim of achieving a just and comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict guaranteeing the regaining of the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories as well as resolving the Palestine question in all its aspects on the basis of international legitimacy, decide:

The convening of an international conference for peace in the Middle East under UN auspices, called for by the UN secretary-general and attended by the five permanent Security Council member states along with all parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on an equal footing, is the appropriate way to settle the conflict in a comprehensive, just, and peaceful manner.

This settlement will guarantee the return of occupied Palestinian and Arab territories, the resolution of the Palestine question in all its aspects, and the attainment of the inalienable national rights of the Palestinian Arab people.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. It was in the 1940s, he recalled, that Egyptian government-funded teachers laid down the foundations of Kuwait's educational system. (*Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 January — DR, 28 January 1987.)
2. Reuters, reported by *Ma'ariv*, 26 January 1987.
3. E.g., statements by Iran's Foreign Minister Velayati and Majlis Speaker Rafsanjani, IRNA, 28, 30 December 1986 — SWB, 30 December 1986, 1 January 1987. Subsequently, Iran's Acting Foreign Minister Muhammad Besharati claimed that Kuwait had "bribed" Muslim countries into attending the summit, with one [unnamed] African country having obtained \$200m. (IRNA, 27 May — DR, 27 May 1987.)
4. *Al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 31 January — DR, 4 February 1987.
5. For Syria's boycott of the ICO emergency foreign ministers' meeting in January 1980, called to condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, see Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The Fragmentation of Arab Politics," *Orbis*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer, 1981).
6. KUNA, 21 January — DR, 22 January 1987.
7. R. Cairo, 26 January — DR, 27 January; *al-Bayan*, Casablanca, and *L'Opinion*, Rabat, cited by AFP, 28 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
8. *Al-Majalla*, 7 January 1987.
9. *Al-Musawwar*, 30 January 1987.
10. Mubarak's Police Day anniversary speech, R. Cairo, 1 February — DR, 3 February 1987.
11. *JT*, 29 January — DR, 29 January 1987.

12. R. Cairo, 1 February — DR, 3 February 1987.
13. R. Damascus, 28 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
14. Asad did, however, refrain from personally attacking Mubarak, referring to him as "my brother." (Damascus TV, 28 January — DR, 4 February 1987.)
15. R. Cairo, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
16. R. Cairo, 26 January — DR, 27 January; *al-Musawwar*, 30 January; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 17 February 1987.
17. Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir's post-summit press conference, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
18. INA, 24 January — DR, 27 January 1987.
19. Riyadh TV, 29 January, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January; *al-Thawra*, Damascus, 30 January 1987.
20. *Al-Bayan*, Dubai, 10 January, cited by QNA, 10 January; GNA, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
21. KUNA, 27 January, JT, 29 January — DR, 28, 29 January 1987.
22. VoA, 1 February 1987.
23. *Al-Qabas International*, 8 May, 3, 10 June, and 6, 18 July — DR, 20 July, 1–2 August; *al-Bayan*, Dubai, 19 May — DR, 21 May; *al-Watan*, 8 June; *al-Akhbar*, 12 June — DR, 15 June; *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 22 June; *al-Shira'*, 22 June 1987.
24. R. Damascus, 28 July — SWB, 30 July 1987.
25. INA, 28 July — SWB, 30 July 1987.
26. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 3 August 1987.
27. The return took place at a point along their common frontier, without intermediaries — an indication that their dialogue during the previous months had not been completely in vain. (*Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 6 August 1987.)
28. Some examples: a Syrian newspaper compared Saddam Husayn to Adolph Hitler, both in (a) his use of chemical weapons against Iran and the Iraqi Kurdish opposition, and (b) his attempt to deny responsibility for starting the war with Iran, just as Hitler wanted the Allies to sign a peace treaty with Germany and not demand an unconditional surrender. (*Tishrin*, 21 September 1987.) In a representative Iraqi newspaper commentary, Asad was characterized as a "terrorist" who had murdered political opponents such as former Ba'th leader Salah al-Din al-Bitar and Lebanon's Druze chieftain Kamal Junblat, and intimidated and sometimes eliminated various Arab journalists in Lebanon. (*Al-Jumhuriyya*, Baghdad, 9 October 1987.)
29. R. Tehran, 6 March — SWB, 9 March 1987.
30. *Al-Qabas*, 9 May 1987.
31. Ibid., 18 April 1987.
32. R. Tehran, 2 May — SWB, 12 May 1987.
33. IRNA, 19 June — DR, 23 June 1987.
34. IRNA, Damascus TV, 19 October — SWB, 21 October 1987.
35. R. Monte Carlo, 27 September 1987.
36. JP, 7 August 1987.
37. R. Tehran, 12 May — SWB, 13 May; IRNA, 12 July — DR, 13 July; *The Guardian*, 13 July 1987.
38. *Al-Watan*, quoted by KUNA, 25 January — SWB, 26 January 1987.
39. Tripoli TV, 2 February — SWB, 4 February 1987.
40. Qadhdhafi's speech to the General People's Congress, Tripoli TV, 2 March — DR, 3 March; interview with *al-Hurriyya*, text read over Tripoli TV, 24 March — DR, 25 March; speech on anniversary of students' revolution in Libya, Tripoli TV, 7 April — DR, 9 April; interview in *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 June — DR, 29 June; JANA, 25 September — DR, 25 September 1987.
41. Interview in *al-Khalij*, 28 September — DR, 30 September 1987.
42. Interview in *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 June — DR, 29 June 1987.
43. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 10 May — DR, 13 May; MENA, 7 May (citing Libyan opposition sources) — DR, 8 May; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 1 June, quoted by KUNA, 1 June — DR, 2 June 1987.
44. *Al-Majalla*, 18–24 March — DR, 25 March; *al-Musawwar*, 3 July; *al-Shira'*, 30 July 1987.

45. R. Tehran and INA, 10 September — DR, 11 September 1987.
46. Interview in *al-Khalij*, 28 September — DR, 30 September 1987.
47. Interview in *al-Hurriyya*, text read over Tripoli TV, 24 March — DR, 25 March 1987.
48. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 5 January 1987.
49. MENA, 29 September — DR, 1 October 1987.
50. E.g., R. Damascus, 30 August — SWB, 1 September; *al-Ba'th*, 20 October, quoted by R. Damascus, 20 October — SWB, 21 October; JANA, 25 September — SWB, 26 September 1987.
51. SPA, 8 June — DR, 9 June 1987.
52. R. Cairo, 2 August — SWB, 5 August; interview with Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah, *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, and *Arab Times*, text published by KUNA, 15 August — SWB, 18 August; INA, 11 August — SWB, 13 August 1987.
53. SPA, 2 August — DR, 3 August 1987.
54. R. Tehran, 15 August — SWB, 17 August 1987.
55. SUNA, 12 August — SWB, 14 August 1987.
56. There was nothing in Islam, declared Qadhdhafi, entitling a particular "tribe" (i.e., the House of Sa'ud) to monopolize the power and wealth granted to all Muslims. Nor was it "Islamic," he said, that members of a royal family receive at birth a monthly salary equivalent to the annual expenditures of a Somali or Mauritanian village. Mecca, stated the Libyans, should be placed under an Islamic administration, requiring no passports or visas from any Muslim visitors: either Mecca "belongs to all Arabs and Muslims, or it is in the same situation as Jerusalem." (*Al-Zahfal-Akhdar*, cited by JANA, 3 August — DR, 5 August; *al-Jamahiriyya*, 7 August, cited by Tripoli TV, 7 August — SWB, 10 August 1987.)
57. R. Tunis, 8 August 1987.
58. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 23 August — DR, 25 August 1987.
59. SPA, 23 August — DR, 25 August 1987.
60. KUNA, 24 August — DR, 25 August 1987.
61. INA, 24 August — DR, 25 August 1987.
62. R. Damascus, 25 August 1987.
63. R. Damascus, 25 August — DR, 26 August 1987.
64. INA, 26 August — DR, 26 August; *al-Majalla*, 2 September 1987.
65. R. Riyadh, 25 August — DR, 26 August 1987.
66. For the text of the resolutions, see SPA, 25 August — DR, 26 August 1987. According to Jordanian Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri, Syria and Libya expressed reservations "on sentences, not paragraphs" of the resolutions. (*Al-Ra'y*, 1 September — DR, 3 September 1987.
67. SPA, KUNA, 25 August — DR, 26 August 1987.
68. Amman TV, 27 August — SWB, 29 August; *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 6 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
69. R. Tehran, 26, 27 August — DR, 27, 28 August 1987.
70. R. Riyadh, 1, 8 September — DR, 8, 9 September 1987.
71. *IHT*, 4 September 1987.
72. SPA, 20 September — DR, 21 September 1987.
73. Ibid.
74. R. Damascus, 21 September — DR, 21 September; JANA, 27 September — DR, 28 September; interviews with Algerian Foreign Minister Talib Ibrahim, *al-Khalij*, 11 October, *al-Hawadith*, London, 23 October — DR, 16, 30 October; interview with UAE president, Shaykh Zayid, *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, quoted by GNA, 7 November 1987.
75. R. Damascus, 14 October — SWB, 16 October 1987.
76. *Al-Qabas International*, 17 November 1987.
77. Tripoli TV, 2 November — DR, 3 November 1987.
78. SPA, 3, 5 November — DR, 4, 5 November 1987.
79. Interview with *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 4 November, quoted by MAP, 4 November — DR, 5 November 1987.
80. Amman TV, 8 November — DR, 9 November 1987.
81. *Al-Ra'y*, 10 November — DR, 12 November 1987.

82. R. Amman, 8 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
83. According to one report, the dialogue almost never took place at all: Saddam Husayn was said to have threatened an early walkout of the summit in protest against a lack of stronger Arab backing. King Husayn, assisted by the UAE's Shaykh Nuhayan, reportedly persuaded Saddam to remain. (R. Beirut, 9 November 1987.)
84. R. Monte Carlo, 10 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
85. INA, 9 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
86. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 11 November; R. Damascus, 11 November — DR, 13 November 1987.
87. AFP, 9 November; R. Monte Carlo, 10 November; *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 10 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
88. Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz characterized the initial dialogue as "serious," and "an appropriate prelude" to resolving outstanding issues. (*Al-Ra'y*, 10 November — DR, 10 November 1987.)
89. *JT*, 11 November — DR, 12 November 1987.
90. *JT*, 11 November; *al-Qabas*, 14 November — DR, 12, 17 November 1987.
91. KUNA, 19 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
92. R. Damascus, 10 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
93. KUNA, 10 November — DR, 12 November 1987.
94. Asad himself reportedly withdrew the Syrian demand during the drafting of the final statement. (*Al-Qabas*, 14 November — DR, 17 November 1987.)
95. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 16 November 1987.
96. Interview with Taha Yasin Ramadan, *al-Anba*, 10 November — DR, 16 November 1987.
97. AFP, 19 November — DR, 20 November 1987.
98. Egypt was disappointed with Algeria's failure to renew relations, particularly since Benjedid and Mubarak had met amicably at the OAU's July summit in Addis Ababa. (*Al-Musawwar*, 20 November 1987.) As for Lebanon, President Jumayyil had defied Syria by flying to Cairo on 24–25 October for talks with Husni Mubarak. This act of independence did not extend, however, to renewing full diplomatic ties with Cairo.
99. Bruce Maddy-Weitzman, "The Crystallization of an Arab State System: Inter-Arab Politics, 1945–1954" (PhD thesis, Tel Aviv University, 1987), pp. 338–43.
100. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 11 November, *MEES*, 16 November, quoted by AFP, 17 November, *al-Tadamon*, 21 November — DR, 16, 18, 27 November; *al-Dustur*, London, 7 December 1987.
101. QNA, 23 November; *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 4 December 1987.
102. Amman TV, 11 November — DR, 13 November.
103. BBC, 13 November, cited by *JT*, 14 November — DR, 16 November; *al-Qabas*, 14 November, *JT*, 14, 24 November — DR, 17, 23, 25 November; *al-Mustaqbal*, 21 November — DR, 23 November 1987.
104. *JT*, 11 November — DR, 12 November 1987.
105. *Al-Thawra*, Baghdad, 12 November, quoted by INA, 12 November — DR, 12 November 1987.
106. R. Monte Carlo, 13 November, *al-Mustaqbal*, 21 November — DR, 13, 23 November; R. Damascus, 12 November, IRNA, 16 November — DR, 13, 17 November 1987.
107. *Ha'arets*, 30 December 1987.
108. Interview with Jordanian Foreign Minister al-Masri, *al-Mustaqbal*, 21 November — DR, 23 November 1987.
109. *Al-Watan*, 14 December, cited by QNA, 14 December — SWB, 15 December 1987.
110. Interview with Mubarak, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 29 May — DR, 5 June 1987.
111. KUNA, 13 January; *al-Majalla*, 28 January–3 February — DR, 5 February 1987.
112. MENA, 11 August — SWB, 13 August; *al-Musawwar*, 28 August — DR, 1 September 1987.
113. *JP*, 20 November 1987.
114. *Al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 31 December 1987 — DR, 4 January 1988; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 1 January, cited by ENA, 1 January — DR, 4 January 1988.
115. Interview in *al-Musawwar*, 28 August — DR, 1 September 1987.
116. Speech to the People's Assembly, R. Cairo, 12 October — DR, 16 October 1987.

117. *Akhir Sa'a*, 7 October — quoted by MENA, 7 October 1987.
118. *Al-Ra'y*, 24 July 1987.
119. R. Amman, 30 August — DR, 31 August 1987.
120. Interview with Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, *al-Tadamun*, 3–9 January — DR, 15 January 1987.
121. *Al-Ahram*, 21 July 1987.
122. *Middle East Times*, 14 September 1987.
123. MENA, 21 February — SWB, 23 February 1987.
124. SUNA, 24 January — SWB, 26 February 1987.
125. *Al-Musawwar*, 4 September, cited by MENA, 2 September — DR, 4 September 1987.
126. *Al-Tadamun*, 3–9 January — DR, 15 January 1987.
127. *October*, 15 February 1987. In late March 1987, Egypt reportedly airlifted military supplies to Sudan to strengthen it against Libya's military activities in Sudan's border area adjoining Libya and Chad. (*Ma'ariv*, 30 March 1987.)
128. Interview in *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, published in conjunction with *al-Dustur*, Amman, 28 October — DR, 29 October 1987.
129. E.g., *al-Ayyam*, quoted by SUNA, 14 May — SWB, 16 May; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 6 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
130. *October*, 15 February 1987.
131. MENA, 18 July — DR, 20 July; *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 26 July 1987.
132. Commentary by Salah al-Din Hafiz, *al-Ahram*, 26 August 1987.
133. JANA, 5 March — SWB, 6 March, DR, 17 March 1987.
134. Egypt said that the captive Egyptians were two soldiers who lost their way and an Egyptian frontier Bedouin who was grazing his herd. (*Al-Akhbar*, 6 April, cited by MENA, 6 April — DR, 6 April 1987.) One of them subsequently died in captivity; Egypt, for its part, returned the C-130 aircraft. According to a pro-government Egyptian weekly, *Qadhdhafi* reneged on a promise made to the presidents of Algeria and the YAR that he would release the Egyptian captives upon receipt of the plane. (Interview with Mubarak in *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, published in conjunction with *al-Dustur*, Amman, 28 October — DR, 29 October; *al-Musawwar*, 30 October 1987.)
135. *Al-Majalla*, 22–28 July — DR, 29 July 1987.
136. Interview in *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 29 May — DR, 5 June 1987.
137. Ben Suda was part of the Moroccan delegation observing the proceedings of the PNC meeting. Later that same day, the Moroccan delegation departed in anger following the PLO's granting permission, most likely at Algeria's insistence, to SADR's president, Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz, to address the gathering. The incident caused a minicrisis in Moroccan-PLO relations. However, it had no effect on the developing Algerian-Moroccan dialogue. (*JA*, 6 May; *al-Majalla*, 13 May 1987.)
138. *Al-Qabas International*, 7 May; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 8 May, quoted by KUNA, 8 May — DR, 11 May.
139. SPA, 4 May — DR, 5 May 1987.
140. R. Algiers, 25 May — DR, 26 May 1987. An Arabic-language weekly reported that Morocco had asked for the return of 480 prisoners, the majority being held by Polisario. Algeria claimed uninvolved but offered to mediate between them. (*Al-Majalla*, 10 June 1987.)
141. *Al-Watan*, 15 June 1987.
142. R. Rabat, 4 December — DR, 7 December 1987.
143. MAP, 17 December — DR, 22 December 1987.
144. "Benjedid's style," Hasan told an interviewer, "is more appropriate than his diplomacy... I do not understand why Algeria has so stubbornly insisted on sticking its nose into [the Western Sahara] affair." (Interview with Swedish TV, reported by R. Rabat, 17 November — DR, 18 November 1987.) For an Algerian commentary emphasizing Algeria's "principled stand" on achieving "a political solution... through negotiations" and Morocco's obstruction, see APS, 7 November — SWB, 12 November 1987.
145. In a statement which was more accommodating in tone than previous Moroccan declarations, Hasan pledged to engage in "dialogue and negotiations" with Polisario following the referendum, whatever its results. (Interview with Swedish TV, *ibid.*) However,

- Morocco showed no signs of wavering in its insistence that its Army and administrative apparatus remain in the Western Sahara during the referendum. (Foreign Minister al-Filali's interview with R. France Internationale, 1 December, reported by MAP, 2 December — DR, 3 December 1987.)
146. Hasan's interview with the Club de la Presse of Europe One Radio, 10 April, reported by R. Rabat, 12 April — SWB, 15 April; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 4 May 1987. One indication that relations had not reverted to their previously hostile state was the presence of one of Qadhdhafi's daughters at the wedding celebration of Hasan's daughter. (*Al-Majalla*, 17 June 1987.)
 147. *Al-Ittihad*, *ibid*.
 148. Qadhdhafi's speech at the opening session of the conference of Arab opposition parties, Tripoli TV, 12 December — SWB, 15 December 1987.
 149. Qadhdhafi's Anniversary of the Revolution speech, Tripoli TV, 1 September — DR, 3 September 1987.
 150. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 10 October — DR, 26 October 1987.
 151. The three ministers agreed to meet regularly, with the next gathering scheduled for Nouakchott. (R. Algiers, 20 December — DR, 21 December 1987.)
 152. A 24-page draft proposal establishing a presidential council, joint parliament, executive ministerial council and high court was reportedly completed in September and circulated for perusal among other Maghrib states and at the Arab League. Tunisia was said to have rejected an Algerian-tendered invitation to join. (*Al-Qabas*, 21 September; *The Guardian*, 8 October 1987.)
 153. *Al-Sabah*, 9 September, quoted by MENA, 9 September; R. Tunis, 13 December — SWB, 22 December; *The Guardian*, 29 December 1987. One week later, Qadhdhafi thanked Benjedid for his help in bringing about the restoration of relations. (JANA, 4 January — SWB, 6 January 1988.)
 154. R. Tunis, R. France Internationale, 29 December — SWB, 31 December 1987.
 155. Qadhdhafi's speech on the 35th anniversary of the Egyptian Free Officers' (23 July 1952) *Coup d'État* (Tripoli TV, 23 July — SWB, 25 July 1987.)
 156. Qadhdhafi's 1 September Anniversary of the Revolution speech, Tripoli TV, 2 September — DR, 3 September 1987.
 157. Tripoli TV, 14 December — SWB, 16 December 1987.
 158. *MM*, 5 January; *al-Majalla*, 4 March 1987.
 159. R. Tehran, 30 December — SWB, 1 January 1988.

Islam's Enduring Feud

MARTIN KRAMER

The struggle for primacy in modern Islam, conducted within and among Muslim states, has not generally taken the form of a sectarian contest. Battle lines have not been drawn precisely along the traditional lines of Islamic sectarian strife. Yet beneath the internal debate on the true meaning of Islam, there remains a substratum of distrust rooted in ancient prejudice. The most virulent form of this distrust afflicts the mutual perceptions of Sunnis and Shi'is. On both sides of the divide, none dare speak the name of this bigotry. For most Muslims, it is considered bad form to dwell openly upon the differences between Sunni and Shi'i Islam, and the mere enumeration of these differences is often denounced as part of an imperialist plot to foment division. This reflects the influence of ecumenism upon the intellectual climate of contemporary Islam, a climate now inhospitable to overt sectarian polemics.

Yet the principal division in contemporary Islam closely paralleled the principal division of medieval Islam. Where the Mesopotamian lowlands met the Zagros mountains, the awakening of Islam had already produced a devastating war between Muslim Iranians and Muslim Iraqis, along the same frontier of Islamic history's great internecine struggle between Safavids and Ottomans. In 1987, it was the turn of Mecca to witness the reenactment of Islamic history. But unlike the annual reenactment of the drama of Karbala, in which Shi'is inflict wounds upon themselves to evoke the passion of a battle lost over one thousand years ago, the drama at Mecca was all too real. What had been a polemical war of words between Saudi and Iranian Islam took on the virulent character of a blood feud between Sunni and Shi'i Islam. The events of 1987 demonstrated the tenacious hold of sectarian hatred upon the imagination of contemporary Islam.

ISLAMIC SUMMIT CONFERENCE IN KUWAIT

The plunge into violence was preceded by a ritual attempt to find Islam's common political ground. The Islamic Conference Organization (ICO), bound by its charter to convene an Islamic summit conference every three years, again faced the difficult prospect of a summit. ICO diplomacy was a casualty of the war between two member states, Iran and Iraq, a conflict which had defied all ICO attempts at mediation. Still, most of the ICO member states did see some benefit in periodic Islamic conferences, which provided regular opportunities for these states to attempt to influence one another, declare their policy preferences, and register expressions of Muslim solidarity. Islamic summits were especially important, since few diplomatic forums provided the opportunity to bring together so many heads of states in conflict. The host this time was Kuwait, for a gathering that met from 26–29 January.¹ (For the ICO's difficulties since the outbreak of the Gulf War, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 283–84, 298–301;

1982–83, pp. 235–37; 1983–84, pp. 158–65; 1984–85, pp. 146–48; 1986, pp. 127–30. This essay deals with the Kuwait summit's significance for the Muslim world and the ICO itself; for the summit's role in inter-Arab affairs, see essay on inter-Arab relations.)

In many respects, the summit replayed scenes from the two previous Islamic summits, held in Ta'if in January 1981 and Casablanca in January 1984. Once again, the organizers made obligatory but fruitless attempts to secure Iranian participation. Since the Islamic Revolution, Iran had adopted an indifferent attitude toward the ICO, first because of the organization's close dependence upon Saudi Arabia, and later because of the ICO's stand in favor of an immediate cease-fire in the Gulf War and the withdrawal of both sides to international borders. As a result, Islamic Iran had never attended an Islamic summit. Still, ICO Secretary-General Sharifuddin Pirzada (himself a Pakistani) felt obligated to try to secure Iran's participation. The geographic proximity of the summit to the war front added to the urgency of this mission. As Jordan's King Husayn later noted during the summit: "Isn't it a terrible irony that we sit here in this comfortable air-conditioned hall while missiles and shells are thundering within earshot of us — missiles and shells we know are fired by Muslims against other Muslims?"²

In November 1986, the ICO convened its "Islamic Good Offices Committee" under Gambian President Dawda Jawara, to consider a peace initiative as part of the summit preparations.³ Pirzada then spent the last days of December 1986 in Iran, running from Iranian leader to Iranian leader — including Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati, Prime Minister Husayn Musavi, *Majlis* Speaker 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani, and President 'Ali Khameneh'i. These had apparently decided against attending the summit, since any Iranian delegation would face intense pressure from Muslim states anxious to see the war ended in accordance with past ICO resolutions. But Iranian leaders justified their decision by claiming that Kuwait did not constitute a sufficiently neutral site for the conference. Velayati told Pirzada: "If you think Kuwait can compensate for its past mistakes and adopt a neutral stance, we will take into consideration the level of Iran's participation at the conference, if any."⁴ Kuwait did have an interest in the success of the conference, but could not be expected to alter a fundamental policy to win Iran's possible participation in the summit.

Once Iran made known its refusal, its Shi'i supporters in Beirut began to issue all kinds of threats against the conference. A Saudi businessman was kidnapped and held in Beirut for 56 days, in a move reportedly connected with the summit.⁵ A previously unknown group claimed credit for bombings at an oil complex in southern Kuwait on the eve of the summit, as well as a bombing in the city. The Kuwaiti authorities later arrested 11 people, apparently Kuwaiti Shi'is of Iranian origin, in connection with the oil-field attack.⁶ Mindful of the possibility of violence, Kuwait took exceptional security measures as the summit approached.

Pirzada had greater success wherever he combined forces with the summit host, and especially with Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah and other personal envoys from the emir of Kuwait. The Kuwaitis used all of their considerable influence to assure a maximum turnout. In the end, 27 of the ICO's 46 member states were represented by heads of state, the highest proportion since the first Islamic summit in 1969. Eight member states were represented by their vice presidents or prime ministers; eight others were represented by foreign ministers or

presidents of national assemblies. The PLO, a full member of the ICO, was represented by its chairman, Yasir 'Arafat. The only two absent member states were Afghanistan, suspended from the ICO since 1980, and Iran.⁷

Despite Iran's absence, Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad did elect to attend the conference. By now, this had become a familiar Syrian-Iranian maneuver. To keep the Gulf War off the agenda, Iran would absent itself from ICO gatherings, but Syria would attend in order to channel all discussion away from the Gulf and toward the question of Palestine's liberation. Despite the ample precedent for this method, rumors persisted that Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had bought Syrian participation.⁸

The summit preparations, and the summit itself, subsequently revolved around inter-Arab maneuvering, especially between Egypt and Syria. (For more details on this dimension of the summit, see essay on inter-Arab relations and chapter on Egypt.) Most of the ICO's diplomacy over the previous three years had revolved around this same axis. The previous summit at Casablanca, in January 1984, had restored Egypt to the ICO after a five-year suspension which followed the Camp David accords — a restoration vigorously opposed by Syria, but reflecting the will of the majority of the ICO's member states. Since that summit, Egypt had participated in all the conferences of ICO foreign ministers. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak's participation in the Kuwait summit signaled the final stage in the readmission of Egypt. The fact that Asad publicly shook Mubarak's hand (and briefly met with Mubarak privately) did not signify a full reconciliation,⁹ but it did demonstrate Syria's reluctant resignation to the fact of Egypt's restoration to the ICO.¹⁰

This did not mean that Mubarak and Asad did not skirmish at Kuwait. Indeed, the little excitement the conference did generate grew from their attempts to outmaneuver each other (and from Syrian-Egyptian clashes in the meeting of foreign ministers that immediately preceded the summit). Asad continued to demand that Egypt revoke the Camp David accords, and maintained that Egypt stood in violation of past ICO resolutions.¹¹ Mubarak came to Kuwait with alleged proof that Syria, despite its claim to purity, maintained numerous open channels to Israel.¹² These charges found their way into the deliberations, but both sides exercised a certain measure of restraint in making them.

On the issue of Palestine, the summit did little more than reiterate past resolutions. Here, however, Egyptian diplomacy scored a number of points, winning a resolution in favor of an international conference to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. This was balanced, for Syria's sake, by the reiteration of a previous resolution condemning all relations with Israel — even though Egypt's own presence demonstrated that such relations were no bar to ICO membership. The position of the ICO on the issue of Palestine constituted a confusing amalgam of contradictory resolutions that reflected the profound disagreement among member states. It was clear from this confusion that, in dealing with Palestine, the ICO had given up the quest for consensus. Instead, ICO conferences endorsed virtually every conceivable option, including *jihad*, the Fez plan, and a full-blown peace conference. At Kuwait, too, both Asad and Mubarak were rewarded with resolutions they could take home and present as triumphs of their own diplomatic tact.

For 'Arafat, who already possessed an ample supply of ICO resolutions, it generally sufficed that the ICO recognized him as a head of state. By now he knew the ways of the ICO, and had settled into the comfortable routine of elder statesman. He did

receive a resolution condemning Amal's siege of Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon (see chapter on Lebanon), a resolution that carried an implicit criticism of Syria. The summit expressed its "strong condemnation of the continuation of the siege imposed by Amal militias, which are backed by Syria, on Palestinian camps."¹³ Arafat also met with King Husayn for the first time in almost a year, prompting inevitable speculation about renewed cooperation between the two rivals (see essay on the PLO and chapter on Jordan).

As for the Gulf War, no progress could be made in the absence of Iran, and the summit simply reiterated past resolutions. The summit "expressed satisfaction with Iraq's standpoint in accepting the ICO resolutions," and called on Iran to "announce its acceptance of these resolutions and agree to end the war and settle the conflict by peaceful means."¹⁴ But the Good Offices Committee remained moribund, and the ICO undertook no new initiatives following the summit. Later in the year, Arafat called for an emergency Islamic summit to mediate an end to the war. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia viewed the proposal favorably.¹⁵ But nothing came of this initiative. The summit also approved the draft charter of the ICO's Islamic Court of Justice, an idea inspired by the Gulf War. Kuwait's foreign minister declared that the court would be "fully established" by the sixth summit.¹⁶

On the matter of Afghanistan, the summit slightly moderated the ICO's stance, in recognition of the declared Soviet intention to withdraw from Afghanistan. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet sent a cable of greetings and support to the summit, declaring that the USSR "does not intend to keep for long in Afghanistan the troops it sent to that country."¹⁷ Alongside the ICO's demand for an "immediate withdrawal" — the language of past ICO resolutions — the summit welcomed the intensive UN efforts then under way to resolve the conflict.¹⁸ Afghan resistance leaders were reassured of the ICO's moral support, but they still attended the conference only as guests, not as members or even as observers. In short, the issue of Afghanistan did not figure near the head of the ICO's agenda. The Soviets expressed satisfaction with the positive reception given to their message to the summit,¹⁹ and *Pravda's* editorial on the summit viewed it favorably, noting that the Afghan question "was not raised like the Western countries hoped it would be."²⁰ In February, Pirzada visited Moscow, his second visit in as many years, confirming the continuation of an earlier trend toward dialogue with the Soviet Union.²¹ After Pirzada's visit, the emir of Kuwait sent a cable to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet on behalf of the ICO, expressing appreciation for the Soviet intention to withdraw forces from Afghanistan "as soon as a political solution is found."²²

The Kuwait meeting therefore loomed as the most inconsequential Islamic summit held to date. For Mubarak, of course, it represented one more step in Egypt's restoration to Arab-Islamic legitimacy, a restoration achieved on his own terms. But a monumental effort had been required to bring about this incremental improvement in Egypt's standing. In a way, the preoccupation with Egypt, which had also characterized the previous summit, represented another step in the transformation of the ICO. Some commentators astutely observed that the Kuwait conference was not so much an Islamic summit as an Arab summit attended by "observers" from non-Arab Islamic states.²³ The ICO no longer served its original purpose of lining up non-Arab Muslim support for an Arab consensus on Palestine. It now functioned as an alternative forum for the thrashing out of Arab differences.

Another noteworthy feature of ICO summitry as demonstrated in Kuwait was the incredible expenditure on the part of the host state. The conference complex built by Kuwait for the summit cost \$400m. Erected 10 km. from the city, this 500,000-sq. m. palace included luxurious apartments, an exclusive shopping mall, a 100,000-book library, a clinic and an emergency hospital staffed by 340 doctors, all surrounded by palm trees from Basra and dwarf chrysanthemums from the US. No doubt the complex would be used for other functions in the future, and its cost hardly represented expenditure on the summit alone. Yet the fact remained that states were willing to spend vast sums on conference halls while the ICO itself struggled financially between summit conferences. (On the ICO's financial difficulties, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 130–31.) Kuwait's extravagance had been exceeded only by that of Saudi Arabia, which had spent \$1 bn. on facilities for the Ta'if Islamic summit six years earlier. It could be argued that one of the ICO's most tangible achievements in the 1980s was to accelerate the construction of luxurious conference facilities — temples of talk — in a few rich Muslim states.

The Kuwait summit, by its reiteration of past summit resolutions, emphasized the impasse of Muslim solidarity and Islam's failure to heal its self-inflicted wounds. It would be remembered as the sumptuous summit convened while the shells fell. As Kuwait's foreign minister declared on the eve of the summit, "I wonder with all honesty and sincerity how our ranks will unite, how our efforts will coalesce, and how the principles of our organization will be achieved as long as that war [between Iran and Iraq] undermines the body of our Islamic world."²⁴ Jordan's Husayn posed the same question: "How meaningful is Islamic solidarity if Muslims continue to slaughter each other? What value will economic development have if we allow our Muslim brethren to continue to fight one another? And what value will the ICO have if it fails to put an end to this communal strife and to unify the ranks and rechannel the energies of the Muslims to face the common enemies of Islam?"²⁵ These painful questions received no clear answer at Kuwait.

The ICO's other activities were restricted not so much by politics as by the lack of money. Member states continued to evade their proportional commitments to financing the organization, and the ICO's Secretariat remained dependent on Saudi funding: Pirzada put the Saudi share at 20% of the ICO's general budget.²⁶ Saudi Arabia reportedly made it clear to the ICO Secretariat that it was no longer prepared to serve as paymaster, and that every member state had to shoulder its fair share of the costs.²⁷ But the pinch was felt more in the subsidiary organs of the ICO. The ICO's International Islamic News Agency continued its slide into debt (see *MECS* 1986, p. 131). The agency owed SR9m., mostly to Italian firms, and an additional SR2m. to Saudi Arabia for telecommunications services.²⁸ During the year, Pirzada made a special appeal to member states to bail out the troubled agency.²⁹ The Islamic Solidarity Fund (ISF), established in 1974, had cut back its operations because of insufficient funds. Since its creation, the ISF had spent \$112m. on universities, clinics, mosques, and disaster relief. But according to the chairman of the ISF's Permanent Council, financial difficulties faced by the ISF's principal contributors (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates, Iraq, and Libya) had caused a precipitous drop in the ISF's income. It now launched a new campaign to raise funds from states that had not been major contributors in the past.³⁰ The financial health of other subsidiary organizations and projects remained uncertain.

Ultimately, the politics of Muslim solidarity represented a rebellion against modern history, and against the power of the West. The ICO had set for itself a monumental task. In the 18 years since the first Islamic summit at Rabat, had the Muslim world achieved greater unity, diminished its dependence on the West, resolved more of its own conflicts peacefully, or made the return of Jerusalem more likely? It was difficult to argue that it had, impossible to prove that it had not. But few doubted that the confident 1970s had been kinder to the organization than the strife-torn 1980s. The mission of the ICO was to survive into the 1990s, into the era of Muslim reconciliation that would hopefully follow a settlement of the Gulf conflict. And so the ICO joined the ranks of those many other international organizations devoted first and foremost to their own survival.

THE MARCH OF SUNNI ISLAM

As in the past, the self-appointed guardians of Sunni Islam continued to wage a subtle but systematic campaign against the revolutionary doctrines and ideas disseminated by Iran. This campaign rarely took the form of overt sectarian polemics, but it rested upon the unspoken conviction that Shi'ism represented a deviation from true Islam. Those same Sunnis who championed the ideal of Muslim political unity seemed determined to do everything to exclude adherents of Shi'ism from the consensus of Islam, attesting to the tenacity of old prejudices.

This Sunni attempt to excommunicate revolutionary Shi'is from the community of Islam took several organized forms during the first half of the year. The Mecca-based Muslim World League (MWL; *Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami*) stood at the center of the anti-Shi'i agitation, which was a by-product of the MWL's larger effort to establish Saudi Islam as definitive orthodoxy. (On the MWL, see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 295-97; 1982-83, pp. 246-47; 1983-84, pp. 165-66; 1984-85, p. 149; 1986, pp. 132-33.)³¹ As in the past, the MWL sought to achieve its aims through the sponsorship of Islamic associations, mosques, and conferences around the world. This campaign acquired a new urgency following the Mecca incident. (On the activities of the MWL in response to the incident, see below.)

The MWL celebrated its 25th anniversary in 1987, and this provided an opportunity to take stock of its achievements. This it tended to do in quantitative terms; nonetheless some of the figures did provide insight into the scope of the MWL's activities. The MWL's governing Constituent Council had met 27 times since the MWL's establishment in 1962. The MWL's Supreme World Council of Mosques annually dispensed SR25m. provided by the Saudi Government for mosques worldwide. The MWL employed 936 Muslim missionaries throughout the world: 336 served in Africa; 295 in Indonesia; 206 in the rest of Asia and the Pacific; and 99 in Europe and the Americas. Salaries and other expenses for these missionaries cost the MWL some SR15m. a year. The MWL trained imams, *khatibs*, and missionaries in two-year courses in its own training center in Mecca, providing students with board, books, flight tickets, and a monthly stipend of SR800. Each year, about 1,000 Muslims from around the world attended the pilgrimage as guests of the MWL. The MWL had also organized 15 international Islamic "seminars" during pilgrimage seasons. A special department for projects and subsidies annually dispensed SR6m. to Muslim associations and organizations. The MWL was about to occupy new premises, a

28,000-sq. m. office building constructed with a grant from the Saudi Ministry of Finance and National Economy.³² The MWL was established long before the Iranian Revolution, but its rapid expansion reflected the Saudi preoccupation with deflecting Iran's claim to speak for true Islam.

The MWL did not stand alone. Other regimes that felt similarly threatened by Iran's revolutionary interpretation of Islam sponsored similar activities, albeit on a smaller scale. Thus, Egypt sought to demonstrate the supposed primacy of its religious establishment and the theological university of al-Azhar in Cairo. The central figures in this effort remained the Shaykh al-Azhar, Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd al-Haqq, and the minister of religious endowments (*awqaf*), Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub. As Mahjub admitted, the difficulty Egypt faced in disseminating its vision of Islam stemmed from the country's dire economic state. Given Egypt's limited resources, it could extend little material support to Muslims abroad. Instead, it did its best to provide Muslim missionaries and literature wherever these were in short supply.³³ A growing measure of cooperation also characterized relations between Egypt's Ministry of Religious Endowments and the MWL. In their division of labor, the MWL provided finance and Egypt provided manpower to Islamic mosques and centers around the world.³⁴

Egypt regarded Africa in particular as its realm of Islamic influence, and continued to invest resources in disseminating Egyptian Islam through personal contacts and the media. The African service of Egypt's state-run radio broadcast religious programs in Hausa, Yoruba, Wolof, Bambara, Swahili, Somali, and Afar. The content of these broadcasts was determined in consultation with those authorities in al-Azhar responsible for Islamic missionary activities abroad.³⁵ Numerous students from Black Africa also studied at al-Azhar, but very little scholarship money was available for them, and most lived in poverty. In August, a demonstration by these students demanding a rise in their stipends turned into a riot, in the course of which 24 buildings were destroyed in the dormitory city for foreigners.³⁶

The Shaykh al-Azhar continued to pronounce himself ready to mediate an end to the war between Iran and Iraq.³⁷ After the Mecca incident (see below), Pakistan and Jordan apparently encouraged the shaykh to convene an international conference of Muslim 'ulama to seek an end to the war.³⁸ Since Jadd al-Haqq had acquired a reputation for outspoken criticism of the Iranian regime (see *MECS* 1986, p. 135), it seemed probable that the actual intention was not to promote mediation at all, but to arrange the condemnation of Iran by the most authoritative Sunni gathering that could be assembled. The conference did not meet. By their professed positions both before and after the Mecca incident, the Shaykh al-Azhar and Egypt's other religious institutions expressed their solidarity with the campaign to isolate Iran. But they saw no reason to take the lead in this campaign and, by so doing, become the target of an intensified Iranian counterassault against their own standing in Islam.

Morocco, perhaps due to its distance from Iran and the traditional religious prestige of the monarchy, took a bolder stand against Iran. King Hasan did not hesitate to speak his mind on the inferior standing of the Shi'a in Islam. To Hasan's mind, the Shi'a did not represent a threat to the Arab world, but "the danger is in misleading the Africans and Asians." They might adopt Shi'ism out of naïveté: "They do not understand Arabic and they think that this is true Islam." Hasan called for a meeting of Sunni and Shi'i theologians to define the differences between the two schools and see whether a *modus vivendi* might be found.³⁹ Hasan also sponsored the

first "Islamic Conference for Friday Prayer Leaders (*khatibs*)" which met in Fez in April and attracted over 100 participants, particularly from Tunisia, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. This conference constituted a Sunni response to the conferences of Friday prayer leaders organized in the past by Iran. The Fez gathering took the position suggested to it by Hasan in his opening speech, in which he argued that purely political problems had no place in the Friday sermon — a position completely at odds with that of the Imam Khomeyni. In his speech to the conference, Hasan alluded to his view that the Iranians had distorted Islam because of their imperfect understanding of Arabic: "Knowing Arabic would avoid the emergence of a caste which would inescapably threaten the spontaneity of the daily cult by transforming itself into a clerical hierarchy."⁴⁰ In Hasan's view, just such a hierarchy misruled Iran.

The definitions of Islam embraced by all these gatherings were not necessarily narrow. Sunnis constituted 90% of all Muslims, most of whom felt quite comfortable with interpretations of Islam that emerged from conferences in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Morocco. But these definitions constituted virtual excommunications of Shi'i Islam, and they fanned the prejudices that would burst into flames later in the year.

THE TRANSNATIONAL MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

The Sunni Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest of the Muslim fundamentalist schools, had been transnational in composition almost since its inception. Its branches, although often operating under various names, shared a set of common principles about aims and strategy. They favored the establishment of Islamic states throughout the Muslim world, but they were gradual rather than revolutionary in their approach. Most of these groups were involved in campaigns for the implementation of Islamic Law within existing political frameworks. At the same time, they extended moral and material assistance to Muslim "liberation" movements in armed confrontation with non-Muslim forces (as in Afghanistan and the Philippines). In recent years, leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood from many countries had found ways of promoting regular consultation by convening Islamic conferences. (For past examples, see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 174; 1986, p. 146.) Auspices were provided by the Islamic Council of Europe, an organization that promoted liaison between these groups. So extensive were the operations of this organization that it now billed itself as the World Islamic Council (*al-Majlis al-Islami al-'Alami*).

The World Islamic Council convened a conference in Khartoum from 2–4 February.⁴¹ Former Saudi diplomat Salim 'Azzam, secretary-general of the council, arranged the conference with the active cooperation of Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, great-grandson of the Sudanese Mahdi. Educated at Oxford, al-Sadiq al-Mahdi had cooperated with the Islamic Council of Europe before his rise to power. Numerous Muslim Brotherhood leaders attended the Khartoum conference, including Hasan al-Turabi (leader of the Sudanese Muslim Brotherhood); Khurshid Ahmad (disciple of the late Mawlana Mawdudi and theoretician of Islamic economics); Necmettin Erbakan (founder of Turkey's fundamentalist National Salvation Party); 'Abd al-Rahman Khalifa (leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan); and Burhan al-Din Rabbani (Afghan resistance leader).

The conference debated the means to establish an Islamic order, and concluded with a final communiqué calling for the implementation of *Shari'a* law throughout the Muslim world and the liberation of all occupied Muslim lands. Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi

also promised the implementation of Islamic Law in Sudan. An international Islamic conference devoted to this same question had been convened by Ja'far al-Numayri in September 1984, shortly before he was deposed from the presidency (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 167). This new conference, convened with the support of the new regime, gathered a completely different crowd of fundamentalists to discuss the same issue. These activists were generally independent of state control, and they enjoyed recognized standing as theoreticians.

But many questions remained unanswered about their precise relationship with Saudi Arabia and especially their rumored flirtations with Iran.⁴² Once again, rumors circulated about contacts between Iranian representatives and leading Muslim Brothers.⁴³ The spirit of ecumenism kindled in the 19th century by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani had not died out altogether in the Sunni Muslim world, surviving in certain fundamentalist movements that challenged official Islam; and Iran was not without success in opening channels to some of these movements (see below). But that spirit labored under the heavy weight of traditional prejudice, fanned by the high functionaries of state-sponsored Sunni Islam.

LIBYA'S ISLAMIC CALL

Libya's Mu'ammar al-Qadhdhafi continued his campaign to promote his highly idiosyncratic vision of Islam in lands beyond Libya. Libya had as much weight in world oil markets as it lacked importance in the historical evolution of Islam. Yet Qadhdhafi considered himself a final authority on Islam, enforcing his highly personal brand of the faith as state doctrine. The result was neither Sunnism nor Shi'ism, but a new synthesis of Qadhdhafi's own making.

Qadhdhafi employed two methods to spread his message. First, he was an indefatigable traveler, especially to Africa, and on these trips he took every opportunity to appear in mosques and define Islam.⁴⁴ Second, he sponsored the World Islamic Call Society (WICS; *Jam'iyyat al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya al-'Alamiyya*), the Tripoli-based missionary organization structured along the same lines as the Saudi MWL. (For recent developments in the WICS, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 293–94; 1982–83, p. 245; 1984–95, p. 161; 1986, pp. 146–47.) This organization constituted the principal channel for funneling Libyan support to Islamic groups elsewhere, especially in Africa and Southeast Asia.

The WICS intensified its activities in 1987. It organized "caravans" composed of preachers, doctors, and Arabic teachers, which were especially important in Africa, where they dispensed free medical care and religious preaching in equal measure. The WICS sponsored its own Islamic college in Libya (established in 1974), with branches in Damascus (established in 1982) and London (established in 1986). The college offered 104 scholarships in 1987, which were divided between nationals of 33 countries in Africa, Asia, and Europe. Since its establishment, the Tripoli center had graduated 350 preachers; its rapid growth had necessitated new facilities, which were scheduled for completion in 1987. The Damascus branch enrolled 800 students, and had graduated 154, some of whom joined the continuing activities of the WICS. This Syrian connection had particular significance, since its development complemented the close political ties between Libya and Syria. The WICS operated in Damascus with the support of the chief mufti of Syria, Shaykh Ahmad Kiftaru, who also visited

Libya during the year. The new London branch enrolled 25 students.⁴⁵ The WICS also sponsored its own Islamic schools and centers in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, the Malagasy Republic, and Tanzania. It participated in the establishment of Islamic centers in Benin, Botswana, Mozambique, New Caledonia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe. The WICS also supported "Islamic hospitals" in the Philippines and Bangladesh.⁴⁶

In addition to lesser conferences organized during the year, the WICS convened the fifth session of its International Council in Tripoli from 15–19 June, and the sixth session in Malé, the capital of the Maldives, from 7–12 December.⁴⁷ During the Tripoli session, Qadhdhafi received the assembled guests in an elaborate tent set up for the occasion. On this and other occasions, Qadhdhafi outlined the ideological concepts of world politics embraced by the WICS, drawing a straightforward analogy between present-day Western governments and the Crusaders. The US, France, Britain, and Italy were reenacting the Crusades out of a fundamental religious antipathy to Islam, and the Muslims were duty bound to respond with *jihad*.⁴⁸

Despite these efforts to promote his vision of Islam, the Libyan leader faced an Islamic opposition at home, and it too used the slogan of *jihad*. In one particularly vivid display of Muslim righteousness, six members of a clandestine *jihad* group — "enemies of God" — were hanged on Libyan television before a chanting crowd of teenagers.⁴⁹ (For details on opposition trends, see chapter on Libya.) As in Iran and Saudi Arabia, public punishment still accompanied persuasion in bids to define the precise contours of the faith — just as it had when the mystic Hallaj was put to death on the gibbet in 10th-century Baghdad.

IRAN'S MUSLIM MESSAGE

Iran continued to seek out constituencies among discontented Muslims beyond its frontiers. In doing so, it posed the most serious challenge to the Saudi bid for primacy in contemporary Islam. Yet, as 1987 unfolded, Iranians who favored the "export" of Islamic Revolution had to contend with several unexpected setbacks — on the war front in the Gulf, in Lebanon, in European capitals, and finally in Mecca. In each instance, Iran faced stiff resistance from those who did not wish to see it dictate the course of Islam. There was less and less official tolerance of Iranian activism, both in the wider Muslim world and in Europe. Muslim movements sympathetic toward Iran were subjected to campaigns of harassment, arrest, torture, deportation, and murder. Yet Iran could do very little on behalf of these Muslims. Encouraged by Iran to adopt militantly uncompromising positions, many Muslims in Iran's international network now found themselves under siege. The export of revolution had become a dangerous business. (On the past evolution of Iran's pan-Islamic policy, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 288–92; 1982–83, pp. 238–43; 1983–84, pp. 167–74; 1984–85, pp. 151–60; 1986, pp. 136–46. Iran's relations with Muslim movements are examined in this essay. For other aspects of Iran's regional policy, see chapter on Iran and essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War.)

The struggle within Iran over control of ties with Muslim movements did not abate. This contest pitted Khomeyni's designated successor, Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri, against Khomeyni's representative on the Supreme Defense Council, Hujjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani. In 1987, one of Montazeri's players

was removed from the contest: the free-lance revolutionary, Mehdi Hashemi. Hashemi had coordinated a wide range of revolutionary activities in the Muslim world, with the support and acquiescence of Montazeri's bureau. His arrest in 1986 dealt a severe blow to Montazeri's own efforts to control this aspect of Iranian policy (see *MECS* 1986, p. 138). In September 1987, Hashemi was executed for his alleged crimes. But this did not deliver a decisive blow to Montazeri's continuing attempts to dominate the export of the revolution. The February 1987 publication of the Tower Commission's report on US-Iranian negotiations (see essay on the US and the Middle East) dealt a counterblow to Rafsanjani. This tended to even the score between them.⁵⁰ (For more on the domestic balance of power, see chapter on Iran.)

Hashemi's undoing was the work of Hujjat al-Islam Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri, who headed the Ministry of Intelligence and Internal Security (*Vezerate Ettela'at va Amniat Kishvar*; VEVAK), which came to play a growing role in the struggle over the state concession for exported revolution. (On Reyshahri's entry into the field, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 138–39.) According to a defecting Iranian who had worked in VEVAK,⁵¹ Reyshahri took over Hashemi's task of liaison with foreign Muslims, by posting agents in Iranian embassies and in the field. It conducted much of this activity in Europe, through Iran's UN mission in Geneva, and also in Beirut. VEVAK reportedly had a monthly budget of \$17m. to run its network, and closely coordinated its operations with the Foreign Ministry. VEVAK reportedly took over most of the functions of the Supreme Islamic Revolutionary Council, which had operated out of Montazeri's office. (On the council, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 173–74; 1984–85, p. 152.)

In fact, neither Rafsanjani nor Montazeri were in a position to control all the Iranian institutions and individuals in touch with Muslim movements in places as diverse as the southern suburbs of Beirut, the North African quarters of Paris, and the highlands of Afghanistan. These included not only VEVAK but also the Foreign Ministry, the Revolutionary Guards (RG), the Martyrs' Foundation, the Ministry of Islamic Guidance, the personal representatives of Khomeyni and Montazeri, and numerous special emissaries. It was difficult to distinguish a clear chain of command in this thicket of revolutionary activism, although everyone entangled in it was convinced that his activities conformed to the will of Khomeyni.

The task of all these activists was made more difficult by the stalemate in the Gulf War. At the start of new offensives, such as "Karbala Five" early in the year, Iran conducted a parallel propaganda campaign, in this case to turn the much-touted drive on Basra to political advantage.⁵² Iran especially directed this message at the Shi'is of Lebanon, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the smaller Arab Gulf states, many of whom sat on the ideological fence awaiting the outcome of the struggle on the front. The majority of these Shi'is refused to be moved by the mere promise of victory, or even by initial gains in the first days or weeks of a major offensive. The export of the revolution therefore had to circumvent the stalemate in the war, and rely on every means of persuasion at Iran's disposal.

MUSLIM GUESTS IN TEHRAN

In Iran itself, the usual calendar of events — conferences, anniversaries, special occasions — brought numerous Muslim visitors to the country. Most of these were Shi'is who had visited the country several times. This was the case with the majority of

those who attended the fifth annual Conference on Islamic Thought in Tehran from 29–31 January. The Iranians aimed the gathering against the Islamic summit in Kuwait, which met at the same time, and which Iran refused to attend (see above). The participants condemned “all rigged meetings and conferences” — an obvious reference to the Islamic summit — and declared that all decisions by such bodies were “bereft of legal or religious legitimacy.” The conferees also condemned Iraq’s conduct of the war and the Iraqi regime, and pledged full support for Iran’s Islamic Revolution and its leaders.⁵³ As in the past, the Lebanese Shi’i participants held a separate meeting with Montazeri.⁵⁴ The conference therefore did not differ in any respect from its predecessors. (On the previous conference, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 140–41.)

The annual conference was but one event by which Iran marked the anniversary of the revolution. Iran always invited numerous foreign Muslim guests to attend the anniversary celebrations, and one of these left a revealing account of his February 1987 visit.⁵⁵ Yusuf al-Badri, a Muslim Brother member of the Egyptian People’s Assembly, wanted to be an envoy of peace in the Gulf. In visiting Iran, he also hoped to find “a true reflection of Islam.” His Iranian escort recognized him on arrival: “As soon as he saw me he said: ‘You are Shaykh Yusuf al-Badri. You were born at such and such a place, educated at such and such an institute, graduated from such and such a college, studied such and such a subject, and worked at such and such a school.’” Badri was interviewed on television and radio, and by the press. With other foreign guests, he attended a gathering addressed by Khomeyni in Tehran and visited Montazeri in Qom. The visit to Khomeyni’s famous *husayniyya*, although a standard feature of such tours, did not appear on the program. “They woke us up just before dawn and took us to a square. Then they whispered in our ears, saying that we were going to visit Khomeyni.” This technique was apparently meant to maximize the emotional impact of the encounter with Khomeyni.

Badri, like numerous other visitors, was favorably impressed by certain things, but his itinerary was carefully controlled. He was taken to visit model prisons and the homes of martyrs, but his hosts did not permit him to walk the streets unescorted. In Badri’s case, certain remarks by his hosts against Egypt angered him, and he returned home with severe criticisms. But many other guests, especially Shi’is, came back with glowing reports. It was also clear from Badri’s account that a systematic study of Muslim movements elsewhere had been made in Iran, and that Iran maintained dossiers on leading Muslim activists throughout the world.

The techniques of manipulative hospitality reported by Badri — flattery of the guest by detailed knowledge of his work, reception by leading political figures of persons who do not warrant such attention in their own countries, the over-organization of the itinerary to preclude random sightseeing, the visits to prisons reminiscent of Potemkin villages — imitated similar techniques first mastered by the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba. The program of visits by foreigners (also arranged for potentially sympathetic non-Muslims) represented the cornerstone of the effort to export revolution by persuasion.⁵⁶

Once persuaded, these Muslims had to be organized for action. In some cases, organizations already existed, and Iran formed alliances with them. But wherever possible, Iran organized sympathizers under its direct control. In 1987, the Iranian press called on Muslims to “shoulder their responsibilities and set up Hizballah resistance groups throughout the world.”⁵⁷ The name Hizballah — the “Party of

God" — had been made famous in Lebanon, where it denoted an Iranian-supported faction of Lebanese Shi'is (see below). But in the lexicon of the Islamic Revolution, Hizballah was universally applicable to all who accepted Khomeyni as the absolute authority in temporal and spiritual matters. During 1987, statements began to appear in the name of branches of Hizballah in other countries. Hizballah of the Hijaz, in a statement from Beirut, claimed credit for an explosion at a Saudi gas plant that killed one person in August. The statement threatened to turn Saudi palaces and US warships into graves.⁵⁸ Hizballah of Kuwait also published its program, calling for the overthrow of the ruling house.⁵⁹ Already during the previous year, the creation of a Hizballah of Iraq had been reported (see *MECS* 1986, p. 145). Hizballah had never been confined to Lebanon; as a leader of Lebanon's Hizballah once explained, the Lebanese branch "is an extension of the aspirations of adherents of Hizballah throughout the Islamic world."⁶⁰ But while the transnational character of Hizballah had been asserted in theory, Iraqi, Saudi, and Kuwaiti Shi'i opposition groups were known by other names, even when they enjoyed Iranian support. The generalization of the term Hizballah appeared to be an Iranian attempt to bring order into the complicated world of Shi'i underground groups, and reflected Iran's wish to see all these groups submit to Iranian discipline. The size and structure of these other branches of Hizballah remained unknown, but it was noteworthy that the term saw increasing use outside Lebanon, as a generic designation for Muslims loyal to Khomeyni and principles of the Islamic Revolution.

IRAN IN LEBANON

The spreading use of the name Hizballah could be attributed to the fact that Lebanon's Hizballah was the most successful Iranian venture outside the country's borders. Between 1982 and 1987, Hizballah in Lebanon had grown unimpeded, at the expense of the rival Shi'i movement Amal, Lebanon's other sects, and those neighboring states that had interests in Lebanon. Hizballah relied for moral support on the preaching of a group of Lebanese Shi'i *'ulama* who had embraced the tenets of the Iranian Revolution with few or no reservations. According to one Shi'i cleric in Hizballah, the gains made by the movement during its first four years would have taken 50 years to achieve had it not been for Islamic Iran's support.⁶¹ Hizballah's declared aim was the inclusion of Lebanon in one great Islamic state; its mission at this stage of the struggle was to organize supporters and undermine Israel's "security zone" in South Lebanon. (For Iran's role in the creation of Lebanon's Hizballah and the movement's growth, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 171–73; 1984–85, pp. 155–59; 1986, pp. 139–44.)⁶²

Hizballah formally professed obedience, not to Iran, but to Khomeyni. The political theory to which Hizballah subscribed was the theory of government by the just jurisconsult, the *wali al-faqih*. This was the same theory elaborated by Khomeyni in his famous tract on Islamic government, and it was the theory enshrined in the constitution of the Islamic Republic of Iran. Its fundamental assumptions were Shi'i, in that it emphasized the passage of authority to the just jurisconsult in the absence of the Twelfth Imam. According to the leading clerics in Hizballah, the authority of the *wali al-faqih* knew no limits. As Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah explained in a lecture on the subject,

the *faqih* is the guardian during the absence [of the Twelfth Imam], and the

extent of his authority is wider than that of any other person... We must obey the *wali al-faqih*; disagreement with him is not permitted... his wisdom derives from God and the family of the Prophet, and he approaches the divine... When the *wali al-faqih* orders someone to obey and that person disobeys, that is insubordination against the imam. When the *wali al-faqih* orders that someone be obeyed, such obedience is obligatory.⁶³

Iran's emissaries in Lebanon therefore spoke and acted in the name of the Imam Khomeyni. The Iranian Embassy in Beirut coordinated overall strategy with the Lebanese Shi'i clerics on whom Iran relied to convey its message in the local vernacular of Islam. In March 1987, Ahmad Dastmalchiyan took up his position as Iranian ambassador, the first Iranian ambassador posted to Beirut in four years.⁶⁴ (Lebanon had broken diplomatic ties in 1982 over the refusal of Iran to withdraw its RG.) Dastmalchiyan's task was to keep up the pretense of correct diplomacy while encouraging Hizballah to undermine the very government to which he was accredited.

But the question of whether Dastmalchiyan should present his credentials to Lebanese President Amin Jumayyil generated much heat in Hizballah. Most of the true believers opposed such a move, regarding it as Iranian recognition of the Lebanese Government. But others in the movement thought that in light of growing Syrian pressure on Hizballah (see below), the opening of a channel to the government might have advantages. In the end, Dastmalchiyan did present his credentials in a formal ceremony, leaving some of Iran's supporters in Hizballah befuddled. These published a statement expressing their "surprise" at seeing Dastmalchiyan appear before Jumayyil, who was "crowned by the Israeli invaders just as Antoine Lahad was crowned." Khomeyni had declared Jumayyil's government "illegal," they claimed, and this position had been officially conveyed to the Muslims of Lebanon. Dastmalchiyan's act contradicted the will of the imam.⁶⁵

At the same time, Iran faced another sort of difficulty in Hizballah, with those who did not offer Khomeyni their blind allegiance. These found inspiration in the teachings of Ayatollah Sayyid Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah. Fadlallah continued to deny any formal connection with Hizballah, but Iran depended on Fadlallah's brilliant Arabic rhetoric to carry its message to Hizballah and beyond. His popularity with the rank and file of the movement was undeniable, and rested upon his exceptional oratorical skill and a degree of erudition not matched by any cleric in Hizballah. But Fadlallah was an imperfect medium, for he had his own agenda, and he often spoke and acted without consulting Iran. Because Fadlallah spoke only for himself and not for Hizballah, it could never be assumed that his specific positions represented any significant body of opinion within the movement.

Fadlallah's original formulations were sometimes models of lucidity, and at other times nearly impenetrable. But he had a fairly straightforward view of the authority of Khomeyni. Fadlallah respected and admired the leader of the Islamic Revolution. "The Imam Khomeyni represents an authority. He is a great and inspiring Islamic leader, and, as such, we hold him in high esteem, and believe that he represents a mature and inspiring Islamic leadership."⁶⁶ Yet by this short profession of admiration, Fadlallah dissented from the absolute allegiance offered by the clerics of Hizballah. Khomeyni represented "an authority" but not the sole or absolute authority for Muslims everywhere. He was "inspiring" but not divinely inspired. It was indeed rare

for Fadlallah even to mention Khomeyni unless specifically asked for an opinion by an interviewer. Unlike most of Hizballah's clerics, professions of allegiance to Khomeyni were not part of his repertoire.

Reports circulated during the year that Iran had decided to cut back on support for Fadlallah, whose independence did not suit its taste.⁶⁷ In truth, Fadlallah inspired confidence in some Iranians, contempt in others. He enjoyed the support of Dastmalchiyan, and had good ties with Rafsanjani. But Montazeri's supporters and some of the younger clerics in Hizballah suspected Fadlallah of insufficient zeal for Khomeyni and the tenets of the Islamic Revolution. This conflict came to the surface in the debate over hostage-holding in Hizballah. Fadlallah believed that the holding of hostages harmed Hizballah's cause and encouraged those Syrians who wanted to destroy the movement. But other clerics in Hizballah had a vested interest in kidnapping, which they had encouraged and sanctioned.⁶⁸ They began to criticize Fadlallah, arguing that Hizballah was waging an "open war" (*ma'raka mafzuha*) — a total war — against the West. Sayyid Ibrahim al-Amin, angered by Fadlallah's criticism of kidnapping, asked why certain persons criticized the kidnappings more often than they denounced Israel's "crimes." The battle waged by Hizballah was an "open" one, declared Amin, and the oppressed had a right to confront the US (as well as France and Israel) "with the relevant methods they choose." As Amin pointed out, Khomeyni himself had not condemned the kidnappings in Lebanon, just as he had acquiesced in the takeover of the US Embassy in Tehran in 1979. "The imam neither protested this action nor said it was wrong."⁶⁹ For Amin, this constituted inferential evidence that kidnapping was a permissible and even commendable way of conducting a political struggle.

The debate in Hizballah over Khomeyni's true will found no resolution. But it did not occur in a vacuum. Various Iranian emissaries dispensed economic and military assistance to Hizballah, and they also interpreted Khomeyni's will for their clients. A remarkably candid account of the economic aid appeared in a January interview with the general director of the Beirut office of the Martyrs' Foundation.⁷⁰ The foundation's purpose in Lebanon, according to this official, was to meet all the needs of dependents of persons killed or wounded either while "fighting Israel or its agents" or as a result of such fighting. The fighter could go to battle knowing that if he were "martyred," his family would be cared for. According to the figures published on this occasion, the Martyrs' Foundation had spent £L78.5m. in Lebanon during the four-year period from late 1982 to late 1986. This included monthly pensions for the families of "martyrs" — supporters of Hizballah killed in the line of duty or in the cross-fire. The widow of a civilian martyr received £L800 a month, and £L150 for each child; if her husband was killed fighting in Hizballah's ranks, she received an additional £L1,000 a month. The foundation paid 70% of the medical expenses of injured civilians, and 100% of the medical expenses of wounded fighters. In 1984, the foundation established a girls' vocational school for the daughters of martyrs, where they learned English, typing, sewing, knitting, Islamic culture, and Qur'an. A similar institution was later opened in the Biq'a Valley. The foundation also funded several workshops which employed dependents of martyrs. The foundation subsidized the purchase of schoolbooks, school supplies, and covered the repair of homes damaged in Israeli or other attacks. It also covered the costs of visits to Iran and to the Shi'i shrine of Zaynab in Damascus.⁷¹ From its two offices in Beirut, the foundation supervised

branch offices in Ba'albak, the western Bīqa', Tripoli, Tyre, and Nabatiyya. This influx of funds was supplemented by other sources; reports spoke of a special disbursement of \$90m. made by Iran to people in the security branch of Hizballah.⁷² These sums had an impact in a country where the government had ceased to offer many basic social services. But all the benefits provided by the Martyrs' Foundation served the *jihad*, not the Lebanese State.

Military training and supply remained the responsibility of the Iranian RG, who conducted regular training courses in camps in the Bīqa' Valley. During 1987, the RG also took up residence outside the Bīqa' Valley, in the port city of Tyre in South Lebanon.⁷³ Through this move, Iran hoped to expand its influence in South Lebanon, where it had the fewest cadres and faced the stiff opposition of the rival Shi'i militia, Amal. But it did not engage in direct action against the South Lebanese Army or Israeli forces. There seemed to be an Iranian reluctance to enter situations where Iranian and Israeli forces might clash, especially on ground where Israel had a clear advantage. And so the RG could only promise to join the Islamic Resistance on the field of battle after the RG had triumphed on Islam's other front. According to Husayn al-Musawi, leader of Islamic Amal (an element of Hizballah), the RG were under orders not to engage Israel directly, since "they are far from supply routes." But once victory was achieved in the Gulf, those routes would be shortened, and the RG would become "the vanguard of the holy struggle which will liberate Jerusalem... They will form the main army that will do the fighting, but the circumstances are not ripe for that now."⁷⁴ The Iranian slogan that the road to Jerusalem led through Baghdad had operative significance. "Saddam [Husayn] will fail," declared Hizballah spokesman Ibrahim al-Amin during Iran's "Karbala Five" offensive against Basra early in 1987. "We must ready ourselves to become soldiers in the Army of Jerusalem."⁷⁵

But before Hizballah could join the "Army of Jerusalem," it had to deal with the armies of Damascus, which already controlled Iran's access to Hizballah via the Bīqa' Valley. Syria and Hizballah had clashed before in the Bīqa' Valley, but now the locus of conflict shifted to West Beirut. Nothing so threatened the continued growth of the movement as the confrontation with Syria, which viewed Hizballah's calls for an Islamic Lebanon with plain hostility. (For past Syrian-Hizballah tension, see *MECS* 1986, p. 143. For the Syrian move on West Beirut in the Syrian and Lebanese contexts, see chapters on Syria and Lebanon.)

On 24 February, Syrian forces and Hizballah clashed as never before, after 7,000 Syrian troops entered West Beirut in force and issued an ultimatum to the various armed factions to evacuate their headquarters. According to Syria's version of the events, its forces came under fire from members of Hizballah at the movement's Fathallah barracks.⁷⁶ Hizballah's account differed in every respect. According to Hizballah's statement, its members had actually evacuated the Fathallah barracks, but the Syrians then entered an adjacent building where Hizballah members had taken refuge.⁷⁷ Fadlallah insisted that "not one shot was fired at the Syrians. It was a cold-blooded massacre."⁷⁸ In any event, 23 members of Hizballah died at Syrian hands.

The killings had a tremendous impact in the southern suburbs of Beirut. Some 50,000 people attended the funerals of the victims. Two days after the killings, the leading figures in Hizballah assembled to review the events. At the end of their deliberations, they issued a statement declaring that what had occurred was not a

"security incident," as the Syrians would have it, but an unjustifiable massacre.⁷⁹ A number of individuals made still more impassioned statements in the immediate aftermath of the killings, and anti-Syrian sentiment reached a peak in the southern suburbs.⁸⁰

Paradoxically, the entry of Syrian troops into West Beirut and the virtual Syrian siege of the southern suburbs had a sobering effect on the leaders of Hizballah. They did not forget the Syrian regime's siege of the provincial city of Hamah in 1982, or Syria's ruthless handling of Muslim fundamentalist opposition in Tripoli in 1985 and 1986. Most of Hizballah's leaders accordingly urged restraint on their followers. Fadlallah, while taking a firm position that the incident was indeed a massacre, called not for revenge but for the trial of those Syrian troops who had committed the crime. Iran also sent an emissary to Damascus in the person of Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Mohtashempur, a former ambassador to Syria and one of the chief architects of the Syrian-Iranian alliance.⁸¹ And a month after the clash, Syrian President Asad met for three hours with Hizballah's principal leaders.⁸² According to one participant in that meeting, Hizballah's "Syrian brothers" declared the Fathallah massacre "an isolated incident resulting from an erroneous reaction."⁸³ The Syrians, in a reversal, had discreetly admitted error, and Hizballah stopped insinuating that the massacre was a premeditated act. The breakdown of the alliance had been averted. But the episode could only remind Hizballah how much its vision of an Islamic Lebanon depended on the goodwill of Asad's Arab nationalist, Ba'thist regime.

For Hizballah, the confrontation with Syria applied a break to the movement's remarkable growth. From the outset, Hizballah had sought to escape Syria's stifling grip. Established in the Biqa' Valley, Hizballah shifted its center to Beirut in order to escape Syrian control. In 1987, Syria came to Beirut and placed Hizballah under virtual siege on several occasions, leading Hizballah to seek alternative refuge in South Lebanon. But Hizballah faced a formidable opponent there in the form of Syria's client, Amal, and confrontation loomed on the horizon. Lebanon had been Iran's great success story in the export of revolution, and a compensation for frustration in the Gulf War. But now serious obstacles blocked Iran in Lebanon; Hizballah's halcyon days were over.

IRAN'S LESSER CLIENTS

Iran's material and emotional investment in Lebanon's Hizballah far surpassed its support for any other Muslim movement. But Iran had a wide regional agenda, and it sought ties with other Muslim groups — Shi'i and Sunni — which were prepared to accept the wisdom and, ultimately, the guidance of Iran.

Certainly the oldest of these partnerships involved the Iraqi Shi'i opposition to the regime of Saddam Husayn. Since the outbreak of the war, most of the leaders of this opposition had taken refuge in Tehran, where Iranian controllers kept them on a tight leash. (On Iran and the Iraqi Shi'i opposition, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 151–52; 1986, pp. 144–45.) In 1987, new evidence surfaced of disillusionment in the ranks of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition groups, which were concerned about their continued independence and that of their country in the event of an Iranian victory. This sentiment especially affected the veterans of the independent-minded *Da'wa* movement, which had arisen years before Iran's Islamic Revolution. Many of these activists refused to acknowledge Khomeyni's absolute authority, and some chose to

operate in Europe. But the principal figures in the Iraqi Shi'i opposition remained in Tehran, under the nominal leadership of Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, head of the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI). In his opinion, "to locate ourselves in Europe would reduce our struggle to mere rhetoric, a war fought in symposiums or forums, confined to theoretical debates and empty slogans."⁸⁴

But by the end of 1987, serious differences had arisen between the Iraqi Shi'i exiles and their Iranian hosts. Iran did not permit SAIRI to distribute its newspaper, *al-Shahada*, to Iraqi prisoners of war. Schools set up by the Iraqi exiles were shut by the Iranian authorities. Iraqi Shi'i units which fought on the front alongside Iranian units complained of discrimination in the provision of matériel. And Iraqi exiles were subjected to interrogation at Tehran Airport before being allowed to travel.⁸⁵ The ranks of the Iraqi Shi'i opposition also remained divided, between adherents of *al-Da'wa* and the smaller Islamic Action Organization (*Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami*). (On their differences, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 170–71; 1986, pp. 144–45.) The latter group, also based in Tehran, was strongly pan-Islamic and more subservient to Khomeyni's line. It published many communiqués on military actions it had allegedly undertaken within Iraqi territory, in a bid to establish its credentials as an element in any future Islamic government in all or part of Iraq.

In the past, Iran's ties with Sunni movements had been limited to the Islamic Unification Movement (*Harakat al-Tawhid al-Islami*) of Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban in Tripoli, Lebanon. (For the background of this relationship, see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 157.) Sha'ban continued to receive Iranian support. An office of the Martyrs' Foundation operated in Tripoli, and provided the families of Sunni martyrs with the same aid dispensed to Shi'i martyrs elsewhere in Lebanon.⁸⁶ But Sha'ban played an ambiguous role during the year. He continued to profess allegiance to Iran, and met with numerous Iranian officials. But he also began to build bridges to the Saudis, most notably during his attendance at the pilgrimage. After the Mecca incident (see below), Sha'ban met with the Saudi interior minister, Prince Na'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, with the MWL secretary-general, 'Abdallah 'Umar Nasif, and even with the greatest foe of Shi'ism, Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Baz.⁸⁷ According to Sha'ban's own account, he hoped to serve as an instrument for the reconciliation of Sunnis and Shi'is, and he acted with the full knowledge of Iran.⁸⁸ But his long stay in Saudi Arabia aroused the suspicions of some in Hizballah, who felt that Sha'ban wanted to play both sides of the court.⁸⁹

The MWL invited Sha'ban to return to Mecca in October for a conference, and he accepted. But when he realized that the conference (discussed below) would be a clear-cut demonstration against Iran, he bowed out, urging the conference to adopt ecumenical resolutions and to send delegations to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran.⁹⁰ Sha'ban then attended a counterconference in Tehran (also discussed below), where he announced that Iran represented the only regime based on true Islamic ideas and principles.⁹¹ Still, Sha'ban openly dissented from the Iranian demand that Mecca be turned over to an international Muslim body.⁹² Despite the intensification of sectarian antagonisms, Islamic Iran managed to hold on to the allegiance of Sha'ban, but it was not clear how long he would remain firmly in Iran's camp.

However, by 1987 Iran's ties with Sunnis did not remain confined to Sha'ban. Iran made a special effort to establish links with Islamic movements in Egypt and Tunisia, in the conviction that both countries were in a prerevolutionary state. The US

reportedly leaked an intelligence report to the Egyptian authorities that contained many details of Iran's ties with Egyptian fundamentalists. According to the report, several of these Egyptians visited Tehran in February (in connection with the revolution's anniversary celebrations; see above). There they agreed to prepare a comprehensive study on establishing a branch of Hizballah in Egypt, to be submitted to Iran's minister of intelligence and internal security, Muhammad Muhammadi-Reyshahri (on whom, see above). According to the US report, the principal channel for Iranian support of Egyptian fundamentalists was the Iranian Interests Office in Cairo, under one Mahmud Mohtadi.⁹³ On 13 May, Egypt closed the office and ordered Mohtadi to leave.⁹⁴ Egyptian security authorities subsequently arrested members of two "terrorist" groups allegedly connected with Iran.⁹⁵ Skeptics argued that Egypt's Interior Ministry simply wished to discredit these groups and other individuals by associating them with Iran.⁹⁶ But while the extent of actual Iranian involvement was difficult to determine, an ideological affinity undoubtedly existed between Iran and radical fundamentalists in Egypt.

In March, Tunisian security authorities arrested many members of the Islamic Tendency Movement (*Harakat al-Ittihad al-Islami*; known widely by the French acronym of its name, MTI).⁹⁷ These arrests included the leader of the movement, Rashid al-Ghanushi. Tunisian authorities in the past had argued that a link existed between the MTI and Iran (see *MECS* 1984-85, p. 160). Following the 1987 arrests, the authorities again made the same charge, claiming that the Iranian Embassy in Tunis had made payments to an MTI member. An MTI leader who had taken refuge in France, and spoke on behalf of the movement, denied that the MTI maintained any such connection, and claimed that the Tunisian authorities made up the charge to discredit the movement.⁹⁸ In his own interrogation, Ghanushi made no reference to Iran.⁹⁹ But the Iranian media took up the MTI's cause, and the Beirut-based Islamic Jihad threatened the Tunisian Government with retaliation before and after two MTI members were executed in October.¹⁰⁰

In a separate affair, six Tunisians (who were not connected with the MTI) were arrested in Paris in March, in connection with the breakup of a violent cell that had carried out the bombings which terrorized Paris between December 1985 and September 1986. The controller of this ring was an Iranian intelligence official in the guise of an embassy interpreter, but the actual operatives included Lebanese Shi'is, Tunisians, and Moroccans. They were employed by Iran as additional instruments of low-intensity warfare against France, alongside the continued holding of French hostages in Lebanon. (On the crisis in Iranian-French relations, see chapter on Iran.) Iran was known to use Lebanese and Iraqi Shi'is for such operations, but the presence of Tunisians in the ring represented a breakthrough for Iran, and Tunis responded by severing relations with Tehran. According to the Tunisian authorities, Iran's diplomats in Tunis had circulated tracts calling for the overthrow of the government, recruited followers in the university and mosques, and sent Tunisian fundamentalists on visits to Iran.¹⁰¹ But even after relations were severed, the Tunisian authorities continued to uncover what they called "Khomeyniite" groups.¹⁰²

Through support for Sunni fundamentalist groups in Egypt and Tunisia, Iran sought to bridge the gap between Sunni and Shi'i Islam and win a wider following in the Muslim world. The search for the second Islamic revolution, which began in Iraq and then encompassed Lebanon, had reached Sunni ground. But just as Iran began to

break down the sectarian divide, events in Mecca unleashed the full force of the pent-up sectarian hatreds.

THE PILGRIMAGE OF 1987: DEATH IN MECCA

Since Iran's revolution, the pilgrimage had been a source of persistent conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Each year, Iran sought to transform the pilgrimage into a demonstration of solidarity against the enemies of Islam — who, by definition, were Iran's own adversaries. The Saudis sought to restrict pilgrims to their religious rites, even as they made subtle propaganda among them. In the very first years after the Iranian Revolution, violent clashes between Iranian pilgrims and Saudi security authorities were commonplace. Later Iran and Saudi Arabia had reached an informal understanding which regulated their conduct. As the pilgrimage season of 1987 drew near, there seemed to be no cause to conclude that this understanding would not be respected. Indeed, the past two seasons had been marked by a high level of cooperation between the Saudi authorities and Iranian pilgrims. (For the development of the pilgrimage controversy since Iran's revolution, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 284–88, 301–3; 1982–83, pp. 238, 249–51; 1983–84, pp. 175–77; 1984–85, pp. 161–64; 1986, pp. 149–51. This chapter reconstructs the course of events during the 1987 pilgrimage. For the impact in Saudi Arabia and Iran and additional information, see chapters on Saudi Arabia and Iran.)¹⁰³

Nonetheless, the Saudi authorities were alarmed by a speech made at the beginning of July by Hujjat al-Islam Musavi-Kho'iniha, Khomeyni's former pilgrimage representative. Kho'iniha had presided over the most turbulent pilgrimage seasons. His replacement as pilgrimage supervisor and his appointment as prosecutor-general in 1985 was probably intended to reduce the chances of confrontation in Mecca. But he was still a powerful figure in Iran and a champion of extremists who opposed all limitations on Iran's pilgrims. His speech was plainly provocative. This year, he declared, "a mere march or demonstration will not suffice." Iran should not simply "gather a certain number of people who might support the views of the Islamic Republic." Kho'iniha demanded that Saudi Arabia allow Khomeyni's pilgrimage representative to enter the Great Mosque in Mecca for one night, and there conduct a referendum among the throngs of pilgrims over the decision of the emir of Kuwait to invite foreign escorts for Kuwaiti tankers (see chapter on the Gulf states). At the same time, Khomeyni's representative would explain Iran's case in the Gulf War. "All we ask is that the Saudi Government not oppose this, nor send its guards to the Great Mosque. Let us see what happens. We will try it for one year."¹⁰⁴

The Saudi authorities now had grounds to suspect that some of Iran's pilgrims might attempt a takeover of the Great Mosque, as a political maneuver to score points against Kuwait and the US. Kho'iniha's statement touched a raw nerve, and immediately elicited a warning from an unnamed official source in Saudi Arabia. The source noted that Saudi Arabia supported numerous other forums for the expression of Muslim opinion on various matters, even during the pilgrimage. But such consultations in the Great Mosque would constitute an innovation in Islam, and "anyone who attempts to innovate in Islam will go to hell." Saudi Arabia would shoulder its responsibility for safeguarding the Islamic shrines in Mecca and Medina.¹⁰⁵ Kho'iniha's statement put the Saudi security apparatus on a high state of alert.

But Kho'iniha's demand did not figure in the negotiations between the Saudi Ministry of Pilgrimage Affairs and Khomeyni's official pilgrimage representative, Mehdi Karrubi. As Khomeyni's spokesman, Karrubi asked only that Iran be allowed to conduct its demonstration in Mecca as in past years. An Iranian official even covered the route of the planned demonstration with a Saudi official, and it clearly ended 1.5 km. short of the Great Mosque. But the Saudi authorities remained deeply suspicious, and pressured Karrubi to cancel the march, lest violence break out. On the eve of the demonstration, Karrubi refused to cancel it, and declared that "in the event of disorder and disruption, the responsibility for this will be fully with the Saudi Government."¹⁰⁶ Two days before the planned demonstration, the Iranian media published Khomeyni's annual message to the pilgrims. While longer and more high-strung than the messages of recent years, it did not constitute a major departure from the understanding regarding the pilgrimage itself. Khomeyni included the customary plea to pilgrims that they "avoid clashes, insults, and disputes," and warned against those intent on disruption "who might embark on spontaneous moves."¹⁰⁷

On the afternoon of 31 July, the demonstration in Mecca began in the usual fashion, with slogans and speeches. The march commenced upon the conclusion of the speeches; as in the past, it was led by *chador*-clad women and war invalids. At or near the end of the planned route, the march came upon a cordon of Saudi riot police and National Guardsmen who refused to allow the procession to go any further. This dangerous situation became explosive in the wake of two developments. Some within the crowd of Iranian pilgrims chose this moment to echo Kho'iniha's provocative demand, and called upon the marchers to continue to the Great Mosque. At the same time, unidentified persons in an adjacent parking garage began to pelt the Iranian demonstrators with bricks, pieces of concrete, and iron bars. This exacerbated the situation on the confrontation line between the pilgrims and the police, and both sides began to exchange blows, the police using truncheons and electric prods, the demonstrators using sticks, knives, and rocks. Because Karrubi and the other Iranian officials had not positioned themselves at the head of the march, they had no control over the conduct of Iran's pilgrims at the crucial point of contact with Saudi police. During the ensuing confrontation, the Saudis backed down temporarily, and the crowd surged forward. According to American intelligence sources, the tide was finally turned by reinforcements from the National Guard, who fired teargas shells into the crowd and then opened fire with pistols and automatic weapons.¹⁰⁸ The Saudis have denied firing on the demonstrators or even using teargas, claiming instead that the demonstrators, once dispersed, surged in retreat. According to the Saudis, those who died were trampled to death. According to official Saudi figures, 402 people died in the clash, including 275 Iranian pilgrims, 85 Saudi police, and 42 pilgrims from other countries. Iran claimed that 400 Iranian pilgrims died, and that several thousand were injured.

This reconstruction rests upon a selective reading of the contradictory accounts provided by Iranian and Saudi sources.¹⁰⁹ As no independent investigation will ever be conducted, important details will remain in doubt. But no evidence has been produced by Saudi Arabia or Iran to establish that the other side acted deliberately or with premeditation in order to provoke violence. The evidence now available indicates that a group of undisciplined Iranian pilgrims, acting under the influence of at least one provocative statement by a leading Iranian official, wished to enter the Great

Mosque as demonstrators. The Saudi security authorities, who had been alerted to this possibility but lacked self-confidence in the face of provocation, employed excessive force to thwart the Iranian crowd.

While the cause is open to dispute, there could be no doubt about the effect of the deaths at Mecca in revalidating hoary prejudices. The accusations that flew in every direction after the incident had few parallels in their intensity. The Saudis sought to remind Sunnis of an old piece of Sunni lore which holds that Shi'is are obliged by their belief to defile holy shrines. Saudi Interior Minister Prince Na'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz relied upon Sunni prejudice when he charged that the real objective of the Iranian pilgrims was "to spoil the pilgrimage, because, as is known, the pilgrimage is done only if the Great Mosque is entered." Iranian "sedition" inside the Great Mosque would have made it impossible for other pilgrims to have carried out the required circumambulations in the Great Mosque. "The pilgrimage would have been spoiled."¹¹⁰ There is no evidence that the Iranian demonstrators, even those who wished to carry their protest into the Great Mosque, intended to ruin the rite for other pilgrims. But, by his charge, Na'if sought to associate the Iranian demonstrators with the legendary Shi'i "defilers" of the Great Mosque.

Iranian statements pandered to the belief still held by Shi'is that the fanatic Saudis were driven by their own misguided beliefs to kill innocent Shi'i pilgrims. Khomeyni declared that the Saudi rulers, "these vile and ungodly Wahhabis, are like daggers which have always pierced the heart of the Muslims from the back," and announced that Mecca was in the hands of "a band of heretics."¹¹¹ Once more, the Saudis were transformed into what Rafsanjani called "Wahhabi hooligans." Rafsanjani recalled the 19th-century Wahhabi massacres (of Shi'is) in Najaf and Karbala, the Wahhabi destruction of Islamic monuments in Medina (venerated by Shi'is), and the Wahhabi burning of libraries (containing Shi'i works). The Wahhabis "will commit any kind of crime. I ask you to pay more attention to the history of that evil clique so that you can see what kind of creatures they have been in the course of their history."¹¹² This represented a deliberate attempt to fuel a present crisis with the memory of past sectarian hatreds.

It is impossible here to discuss the full range of reactions by governments, movements, and individuals across the vast expanse of Islam. Many more themes emerged in this vicious polemic. But, as a rule, Muslims tended to interpret the deaths in Mecca within their respective sectarian traditions, a fact underlined in the attempts of Saudi Arabia and Iran to explain their arguments to other Muslims in rival Islamic conferences.

DUELING CONFERENCES AFTER MECCA

Following the Mecca tragedy, both Saudi Arabia and Iran conducted large-scale campaigns to influence Muslim opinion abroad. The Saudi Government entrusted the task in large part to the MWL (see above), which convened its "Third General Islamic Conference" from 11–15 October. Despite the title given to this assembly, it constituted an extraordinary session. By its (revised) constitution, the MWL was supposed to convene such a "general" conference every five years, and the conference was supposed to select the members of the MWL's governing Constituent Council. In practice, the MWL had long ceased to convene such conferences: the first met in 1962,

the second in 1965.¹¹³ Since that time, the Constituent Council had been self-perpetuating. But following the killings in Mecca, the moment had come for the MWL to call upon all those who owed it a debt, and so it convened a forum that had been moribund for 22 years.

More than 600 supporters and clients of the MWL from 134 countries attended the conference. The event was opened by Saudi King Fahd, who explained that the MWL and other bodies had the new responsibility of protecting Islamic societies against extremism, insensibility, and abnormal practices — all transparent references to the alleged conduct of Iran.¹¹⁴ As expected, the conference decided to condemn Iran alone for the Mecca incident: the Iranian Government — a government “accustomed to terrorism and a thirst for Muslim blood” — “solely bears the responsibility for the outrage in God’s holy mosque.” The measures taken by the Saudi authorities “to quell the sedition and to contain the fires of wickedness were legitimate.” Finally, the conferees called upon the Saudi Government to bar entry to any group, Iranian or non-Iranian, that did not respect the sanctity of the pilgrimage and adhere to Saudi regulations for public security.¹¹⁵ The conference thus served the dual purpose of legitimizing the Saudi measures to quell the Iranian riot, and sanctioning any future Saudi decision to bar Iran’s pilgrims from the country.

The conference was immediately attacked by Iran as one more attempt by the Saudis to “buy the religion of Muslims.”¹¹⁶ Shi’i opposition sources embarked on a renewed campaign to discredit the MWL, charging that the Saudis had spent \$470m. on the conference, and that total expenses were liable to reach \$700m.¹¹⁷ They claimed that the missionary enterprise of the MWL was not to save Muslims from conversion to Christianity, but to battle Shi’ism everywhere.¹¹⁸ The conference, far from being Islamic, had a narrow Sunni, Wahhabi, and Saudi orientation, said its critics; it was a conference of men of religion who served the rulers, not the religion.¹¹⁹

Iran responded in kind by convening an “International Congress on Safeguarding the Sanctity and Security of the Holy *Haram*,” under the auspices of the Ministry of Islamic Guidance and the Foreign Ministry. When Iran’s Foreign Minister Velayati announced that the conference would be convened, he said it would explore ways of entrusting the superintendence of the holy shrines in Mecca and Medina to an organization of Muslim nations.¹²⁰ The conference, which met from 23–27 November in Tehran, did precisely that.¹²¹

In opening the gathering of 300 participants from 36 countries, Iranian President ‘Ali Khameneh’i declared Mecca unsafe under Saudi custodianship, and urged the participants to seek a solution.¹²² Rafsanjani went still further in his address to the delegates, calling for the “liberation” of Mecca and the establishment of an “Islamic International” which would govern Mecca as a free city. Were the Saudis to set up a “competent government,” it would not be necessary to separate Mecca from the rest of Arabia, but the existing regime in the holy cities was unacceptable.¹²³ Ayatollah Montazeri, who met with the foreign guests, gave a broadly political speech, denouncing the Saudis as “a bunch of English agents from Najd who have no respect either for the House of God or for the pilgrims who are the guests of God.” Just as Jerusalem would be liberated from the “claws of usurping Israel,” Mecca and Medina would be liberated from the “claws of Al Sa’ud.”¹²⁴ Participants included Lebanon’s Fadlallah and other Hizballah figures; Shaykh Sa’id Sha’ban; SAIRI leader

Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim; Pakistani Shi'i leader 'Arif al-Husayni; and the director of the Muslim Institute in London, Kalim Siddiqui.

The resolutions of the conference declared Khomeyni to be "the only leader in the Islamic world who can save the Islamic nation and bring about its unity." The participants demanded that Mecca be placed under the rule of men of religion, whose administration would be established by an Islamic conference "to be convened soon." One resolution declared that the naming of an Islamic land after the "corrupt" Saudi family constituted "an insult to the religion itself"; another called on the Muslim clerics who had "sold their religion to the Saudi rulers" to repent their error. Finally, the conference resolved to establish a permanent secretariat to supervise the implementation of its resolutions.¹²⁵

The gatherings organized by the Saudi-backed MWL and Iran's Ministry of Islamic Guidance were not convened to heal the old sectarian wound opened at Mecca. By these two conferences, Saudi Arabia and Iran sought to exclude each other from Islam itself, by securing the approval of Muslims from throughout the world. It was precisely in anticipation of such a confrontation that Saudi Arabia and Iran had built extensive networks of Islamic support and sympathy throughout the world. They now brought every asset into play.

By the year's end, the Muslim world had advanced by the largest possible stride toward a state of absolute division. This had only meant bloodshed. Iran had tested the limits in Beirut and Mecca; in doing so, it had set the stage for two massacres of those whom it had mobilized in its bid for Muslim primacy. The cold-blooded shootings in Beirut and Mecca established beyond doubt that Iran's opponents in the Arab world would not hesitate to reenact the tragic drama of Karbala when threatened.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. For another account of the summit, see Avriel Butovsky, "The Fifth Summit of the Organization of the Islamic Conference", *IJA Research Reports*, May 1987.
2. Husayn's speech, R. Amman, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
3. Text of committee statement, SPA, 11 November — DR, 13 November 1986.
4. IRNA, 28 December — SWB, 30 December 1986.
5. *IHT*, 21–22 March 1987.
6. AFP, 22 January — DR, 22 January; AFP, 24, 25 January — DR, 27 January; *NYT*, 1 February 1987.
7. Breakdown in *Le Monde*, 28 January 1987.
8. *FR*, 26 March 1987. The amount of the "bribe" is put here at \$500m.
9. Details of the encounter in *al-Ahram*, 29, 30 January; *October*, 1 February; *al-Qabas*, 4 February 1987.
10. Although Syria, in a pro forma manner, proposed that the ICO "reconsider" Egypt's membership in the agenda-drafting preliminaries to the summit. Egypt, in a countermove, proposed condemnation of Syria for human rights violations. Both proposals were swiftly defeated, as Syria and Egypt knew they would be. KUNA, 21 January — DR, 22 January; *Akhir Sa'a*, 28 January 1987.
11. Asad's speech, Damascus TV, 27 January — DR, 29 January; Damascus TV, 28 January — DR, 4 February 1987.

12. Mubarak's remarks prior to summit, MENA, 19 January — DR, 20 January 1987. Egypt claimed to possess proof that, beginning in 1982, Rif'at al-Asad and other Syrian official figures had met with Ariel Sharon, then Israel's defense minister, and other Israeli officials. On Egypt's charges, see *al-Musawwar*, 30 January; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 17 February 1987.
13. Text of resolution, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
14. Text of resolution, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
15. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 18 July; *al-Bayadir al-Siyasi*, 15 August 1987.
16. KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
17. Tass, 25 January 1987.
18. Text of resolution, KUNA, 29 January — DR, 30 January 1987.
19. Tass, 3 February 1987.
20. *Pravda*, 7 February, quoted by Tass, 7 February 1987.
21. Visit reported in *Saudi Gazette*, 12 February 1987.
22. Tass, 2 March 1987.
23. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 26 January 1987.
24. Sabah's speech, KUNA, 22 January — DR, 23 January 1987.
25. Husayn's speech, R. Amman, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
26. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 20 August 1987.
27. *MM*, 19 January 1987.
28. *Al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 25 November 1987.
29. *Al-Liwa al-Islami*, 3 September 1987.
30. Details on the ISF's difficulties, *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, Kuwait, 23 January 1987.
31. The MWL is the subject of a thorough *Habilitationsschrift* recently completed by Dr. Reinhard Schulze.
32. Details and figures from special 25th anniversary issue of *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 5 October 1987. Still, MWL Secretary-General Dr. 'Umar Nasif, in the same issue, complained of an insufficient budget, a lack of efficient workers, and the absence of readiness for voluntary work among members of Muslim communities.
33. Interview with Mahjub, *Sawt al-'Arab*, 4 January 1987.
34. See report on Mahjub's meeting with Nasif, *al-Ahram*, 3 September 1987.
35. *Al-Nur*, 5 August 1987.
36. *Al-Ahram*, 9 August; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 19 August 1987.
37. *Al-Idha'a wa'l-Tilfiziyyun*, 13 December 1986.
38. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 28 September; *al-Liwa al-Islami*, 1 October 1987.
39. Interview with King Hasan, *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 4 November 1987.
40. *JP*, 15 April; additional details in *Majallat al-Azhar*, May 1987.
41. Details in *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 3, 5 February 1987.
42. According to certain sources, the meetings in Ahmad Ben Bella's apartment in Lausanne in May 1986 (reported in *MECS* 1986, p. 146) were attended by Salim 'Azzam, Fadlallah, and an Iranian intelligence official; *Insight*, 8 September 1987.
43. *NAD*, 23 November 1987, reported that the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood leader 'Adnan Sa'd al-Din was in contact with Iranian officials in Geneva.
44. These mosque visits abroad are catalogued in *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 2 September 1987.
45. Details on the college and its branches, *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 2 September 1987.
46. *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 13 May 1987.
47. *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 18, 20, 23, 25 June; *al-Da'wa al-Islamiyya*, 9 December 1987.
48. See Qadhdhafi's speech to the conference of the WICS's preachers in West Africa, R. Tripoli, 12 January — DR, 13 January 1987.
49. Tripoli TV, 17 February — SWB, 19 February 1987.
50. For perceptive accounts of developments in the Rafsanjani-Montazeri struggle, see *Le Monde*, 8 April; *The Economist*, 9 May 1987.
51. *The Washington Times*, 10 July 1987.
52. See, for example, *al-'Ahd*, 16, 23, 30 January 1987.
53. R. Tehran, 1 February — SWB, 3 February 1987.
54. *Al-'Ahd*, 30 January 1987.
55. Interview with Yusuf al-Badri, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 18 September 1987.

56. These techniques are discussed by Paul Hollander, *Political Pilgrims: Travels of Western Intellectuals to the Soviet Union, China, and Cuba* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981).
57. *JI* as cited by AFP, 21 August — DR, 21 August 1987.
58. R. Tehran, SPA, 26 August — DR, 27 August 1987.
59. *FR*, May; statement by Kuwait Hizballah also carried by *al-'Ahd*, 27 March 1987.
60. *Kayhan*, 27 July 1986.
61. Speech by Shaykh 'Ali Yasin, *al-'Ahd*, 28 February 1986.
62. The account in *CSM*, 5 August 1987, is also well informed.
63. Lecture by Sayyid Hasan Nasrallah, *al-'Ahd*, 24 April 1987.
64. Details of Hizballah's reception of Dastmalchiyan, *al-'Ahd*, 13 March 1987.
65. Text of statement, *al-Shira'*, 16 June 1987.
66. Interview with Fadlallah, *Monday Morning*, 15–21 October 1984.
67. *Al-Qabas*, 3 November; *FR*, 12 November 1987.
68. The internal debate in Hizballah over hostage-taking is considered in greater detail by Martin Kramer, "La morale du Hizbollah et sa logique," *Maghreb-Machrek*, No. 119, March-April-May 1988, pp. 39–59.
69. Ibrahim al-Amin's speech, quoted by UPI, 30 June 1987.
70. Interview in *al-'Ahd*, 23 January 1987.
71. A major visit of 150 families of Lebanese Shi'i martyrs took place in April 1987; *al-'Ahd*, 17, 24 April; R. Tehran, 27 April — SWB, 30 April; photograph of members of families at Zaynab mausoleum, *al-'Ahd*, 14 February 1987.
72. To 'Aqil Hamiyya and 'Imad Mughniyya, according to *FR*, 12 November 1987.
73. AFP, 5 July — DR, 7 July 1987.
74. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *NAD*, 10–16 June 1985.
75. Speech by Ibrahim al-Amin, *al-'Ahd*, 23 January 1987.
76. Interview with Ghazi Kan'an, *Le Quotidien de Paris*, 6 March 1987.
77. AFP, 25 February 1987.
78. Interview with Fadlallah, *Libération*, 13 March 1987.
79. Accounts in *al-Nahar*, 26, 27 February 1987.
80. Statements made in reaction to the killings and photographs of the "martyrs" in *al-'Ahd*, 28 February, 6 March 1987.
81. *Al-'Ahd*, 13 March 1987.
82. Shaykhs Subhi al-Tufayli and Ibrahim al-Amin, Islamic Amal leader Husayn al-Musawi, and Hizballah security official al-Hajj Husayn Khalil. Meeting reported in *al-'Ahd*, 27 March 1987.
83. Interview with Husayn al-Musawi, *al-Majalla*, 8–14 April 1987.
84. Interview with Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, *Middle East Insight*, May-June 1987.
85. *Al-Badil al-Islami*, No. 10, cited by *al-Shira'*, 12 October 1987. *Al-Badil al-Islami* was an Iraqi Shi'i opposition newspaper which began publication in Beirut in 1987. It reflected the attitudes of *al-Da'wa*, free from all Iranian constraints.
86. Interview with the director of the Tripoli office, *al-Surush li'l-'Alam al-'Arabi*, 15 Ramadan—15 Shawwal 1407.
87. *Al-Shira'*, 17 August 1987.
88. Interview with Sha'ban, *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya*, 25 September; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, November 1987.
89. *Al-Shira'*, 31 August 1987.
90. Text of Sha'ban's letter, *al-Tali'a al-Islamiyya*, 2 November; *al-'Ahd*, 23 October 1987.
91. *Al-'Ahd*, 27 November 1987.
92. Interview with Sha'ban, *al-Wahda al-Islamiyya*, 25 September; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, November 1987.
93. Details of the report, *al-Ahrar*, 18 May — DR, 22 May; *al-Wafd*, 4 June — DR, 9 June 1987.
94. MENA, 13 May — DR, 14 May 1987.
95. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 18 May, 15 July; *al-Safir*, 11 July 1987.
96. *Al-Wafd*, 18 September 1987, citing "responsible security sources."
97. The case is summarized in *JA*, 9 September; other details in *FR*, 2 April 1987.

98. Interview with *al-Majalla*, 28 September 1987.
99. Text in *al-Tali'a al-Islamiyya*, October 1987.
100. *IHT*, 29 September; *Le Monde*, 9 October 1987.
101. *IHT*, 23 June 1987.
102. R. Tunis, 26 May — DR, 28 May; 16 July — SWB, 18 July 1987.
103. For the historical background to this controversy, see Martin Kramer, "Tragedy in Mecca," *Orbis: A Journal of World Affairs*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (Spring 1988), pp. 231–47, and the article by Martin Kramer in *NYT*, 5 August 1987.
104. Text of speech, R. Tehran, 2 July — SWB, 4 July 1987.
105. SPA, 3 July — SWB, 6 July 1987.
106. R. Tehran, 30 July — SWB, 1 August 1987.
107. Text of speech, R. Tehran, 29, 30, 31 July — SWB, 31 July, 1, 3 August; Arabic text of the speech, *al-'Ahd*, 2 August 1987.
108. Report on the assessment of American intelligence sources, *NYT*, 6 September 1987.
109. The most detailed eyewitness account from a pro-Iranian perspective is that of the Pakistani Shi'i journalist Mushahid Hussain, which appeared in *W/P*, 20 August 1987. The Saudi director-general of public security, Gen. 'Abdallah ibn 'Abd al-Rahman al-Shaykh, provided the most comprehensive Saudi account in a statement which prefaced a special Saudi documentary film on the incident, aired on Saudi TV on 20 August 1987.
110. Na'if press conference, SPA, 25 August — SWB, 27 August 1987.
111. Khomeyni's message to Karrubi, R. Tehran, 3 August — SWB, 5 August 1987.
112. Text of Rafsanjani's speech to protest march in Tehran, R. Tehran, 2 August — SWB, 4 August 1987.
113. Dates and details on previous conferences, *Akhbar al-'Alam al-Islami*, 5 October 1987.
114. Text of Fahd's speech, R. Riyadh, 13 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
115. Text of communiqué, SPA, 15 October — DR, 16 October 1987.
116. *Al-'Ahd*, 23 October 1987.
117. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, October 1987.
118. *Ibid.*, November 1987.
119. *Ibid.*, October 1987.
120. IRNA, 10 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
121. Details in *al-'Ahd*, 27 November, 4 December 1987.
122. Khamene'i's remarks, R. Tehran, 23 November — DR, 25 November 1987.
123. Rafsanjani's speech, R. Tehran, 26 November — DR, 28 November 1987.
124. Montazeri's speech, R. Tehran, 27 November — DR, 30 November 1987.
125. Text of resolutions and other details, *al-'Ahd*, 4 December 1987.

The Iraqi-Iranian War

GIDEON GERA

Well into its eighth year in 1987, the Iraqi-Iranian War was still locked in strategic stalemate. The concluding wisdom of 1986, that Iran had not won but could not lose the war, and that Iraq had not lost but could not win it, had been reaffirmed after further escalation (cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 161). In its efforts to compel Iran to desist from the war, Iraq brought about greater involvement by other countries, including the US and the USSR. Indeed, internationalization was a main feature of this conflict during the year under review.

MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS

Both belligerents continued their military buildup since they did not expect an early end to the war. Iraq directed its efforts mainly at improving its defenses and its offensive arsenal — a new first-line aircraft, the Soviet MiG-29, was received, and the range of ground-to-ground missiles was increased.¹ Iran made an overall effort to augment its offensive capabilities, particularly by expanding the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). The corps built a naval force, mobilized volunteers for year-round combat, controlled irregular warfare inside Iraq, and, in November, began to set up a big reserve force to overcome an obvious lack of trained manpower and to make possible more sustained large-scale offensives. Furthermore, the IRGC supervised at least part of Iran's expanding armaments industry and arms procurement. During the year, Iran reportedly enlarged its arms purchases from Communist countries both in Europe and the Far East. China seemed to have become the major supplier, delivering \$1 bn. worth of arms, more than half of all imports in 1987.²

Iraq continued its efforts to stop the war by encouraging and supporting diplomatic moves towards that end; by continuing its defensive strategy along the front; and by aggressively employing its air superiority against Iranian economic targets, especially those associated with Iran's oil exports (which were the source of more than 90% of its foreign exchange). Any attempt to separate the "tanker war" in the Gulf from the land war, in which Iran kept the initiative, contradicted Iraqi interests: "Iraq never sought to link security in the Gulf with the ending of the war. However...these problems cannot be solved *separately*....Any attempt to separate Gulf security from the war would be an illusion," stated President Saddam Husayn. His foreign minister told the UN secretary-general that "Iran has always tried to compartmentalize the war and Iraq has rejected this." In the words of an Iraqi military spokesman, Iran's rulers could not "tailor a war according to their modest measurements...and could not suggest that Iraq fight a ground war but not on sea."³

No change occurred in the well-known Iranian war aims: punishment of the

aggressor (sometimes referred to as "delivery of the Iraqis from Saddam Husayn"),⁴ and payment of war reparations. Iran's strategy was aggressive attrition on land and prudent retaliation in the Gulf. Conscious of its vulnerability there, Iran sought to separate the two theaters of operations. As President Khameneh'i put it in June: "The issue of security in the Gulf should be separated from the issue of the war, since involving the Persian Gulf in the war would be a step towards making it an international issue."⁵

On land the Iranian military effort in 1987 consisted of one major offensive and the continuous probing of Iraqi defenses by limited attacks at various points, forcing them to be constantly on alert all along the 1,200-km. front. In the mountainous north the Iranians stepped up their guerrilla operations, making much use of their Kurdish allies.⁶


The major Iranian offensive of the year was "Karbala Five," launched toward Basra on 6 January. Advancing along the northern bank of the Shatt al-'Arab, leapfrogging the adjacent islands, and southwest of Fishlake, the Iranians approached the southern suburbs of the city in fierce battles. But faced with a closely coordinated Iraqi defense in depth, which exploited greater firepower and technical superiority, the Iranian offensive lost its momentum after a few days. Probably realizing that Basra would not be taken, Majlis Speaker 'Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani declared on 19 January that that was not the object of the offensive.⁷ The object was subsequently said to be the demoralization of the Iraqi regime and the partial destruction of its war machine.⁸

However, the Iraqis could not dislodge the Iranians from their position 10–12 km. east of Basra. Iran officially terminated the offensive on 26 February, claiming to have occupied 155 sq. km. of Iraqi territory, but fighting continued on a smaller scale.⁹ A further limited Iranian offensive, codenamed "Karbala Eight," did not achieve much.

Although the Iranians reportedly improved the combat coordination of their forces, they still lacked the operational and logistical capabilities to exploit an initial breakthrough. They also took enormous casualties. It seemed that the Iranian leadership drew the lessons: surprise in offensive was essential to prevent casualties. Furthermore, "when we suddenly want to bring several thousand combatants to the war zone and use a vast amount of military resources, we must be relatively sure...of victory."¹⁰

With the approach of autumn there were fresh rumors of an impending offensive on Basra. On 13 November, the Iranian "Supreme War Support Council" proclaimed a "new phase" in the war, for which volunteers were mobilized and money was collected. A capability was to be created for continuous and incessant operations. This was taken to mean that another offensive was imminent. Indeed, Iraq warned against such a development, and the Pentagon echoed the possibility, but it did not materialize until April 1988.¹¹

No major action occurred in the central sector, where the open ground favored Iraqi superiority in armor and in the air. But the Iranian regular Army and the IRGC continued their probing attacks there, and all along the mountainous northern sector, throughout the year. (Their principal efforts were code named "Karbala" Six, Seven and Ten, and "Fath One.") One major achievement was the capture of the town of Mawat, on the road to Sulaymaniya; this was described by Rafsanjani as the opening of "a canal" into the depths of Kurdistan.¹²

Battle Lines in the Gulf

Iranian exclusion zone:
Iran declared its coastal water to be a war zone. Passage of ships bound for Iraq was prohibited.



Area where the tanker Bridgeton hit a mine, July 24



Iraqi war zone:
Iraq declared it will attack any vessel inside this area, especially tankers docking at Kharg Island.



Area where the frigate Stark was hit by a missile, May 17



U.S. Navy staging area

The ongoing pressure on the northern provinces of Iraq was maintained directly by Kurdish irregulars, both Mas'ud Barazani's Kurdish Democratic Party and Jalal Talabani's Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, and by the pro-Iranian Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SAIRI; cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 160). In early summer, the Iranian leadership decided to step up these operations and established a special headquarters (Ramadan Headquarters) to command and control them. The objectives were to spread the war inside Iraq and disrupt Iraqi lines of communication.¹³ The Iranians possibly also reacted against a similar Iraqi endeavor (see below).

These operations, code-named "Fath," "Zafar" and "Ashura," were summed up by the IRGC commander at the end of 1987: operations were carried out deep inside many Iraqi provinces, against economic, military, and police targets. The first operation ("Fath One") was an attack on oil and military installations in Kirkuk, as an "oil crisis" was needed to increase prices. According to the commander, "the attacking forces increased from a few to groups 200–300 strong," which occupied some areas for 24–48 hours.¹⁴ Even if these operations had no lasting strategic effect, they contributed to Iraqi concerns about the security of their oil installations and thus continued to pin down a considerable number of their troops. These troops were also used in violent punitive actions against the Kurdish population.

The Iraqis resorted to similar tactics by employing the Iranian *Mujahidine Khalq* in raids on IRGC positions inside Iranian Kurdistan. In June 1987, the leader of the *Mujahidin*, Mas'ud Rajavi, established the Iranian National Liberation Army (INLA) and was publicly congratulated by Saddam Husayn.¹⁵ INLA raids continued throughout the year on most sectors of the front.¹⁶ The Iraqis also used Kurds loyal to them—the Kurdish Democratic Party of Iran—to countervail the Iranian Kurdish efforts.¹⁷ They also fomented trouble in Baluchistan through a group called *Mujahidine Baluchestan*.¹⁸

Poison gas was again used by Iraq in 1987—during the Iranian offensive on Basra in late February (confirmed by a UN team),¹⁹ and on the northern sector in late June.²⁰ An Iraqi claim that Iran had used poison gas in April could not be confirmed by a UN team.²¹ However, the Iranian prime minister confirmed at the end of the year that chemical weapons could be manufactured (according to another version—were manufactured) in Iran.²²

The Iraqi Air Force continued to exploit its well-established superiority in two efforts of strategic significance, while extensively supporting Iraqi ground forces:

- (1) Hurting the Iranian economy and morale by hitting industries, infrastructure and, intermittently, population centers.
- (2) Disrupting Iranian oil exports by attacking oil installations and shipping in the Gulf.

The fierce battle near Basra in January was accompanied by a further round of the "war of cities." Cities deep in Iran were attacked, including Tehran, Isfahan, Shiraz, Tabriz and, for the first time, the holy city of Qom (11 January). The Iranian response was perforce limited mainly to intense artillery bombardments on Basra and other towns near the front, and to infrequent and feeble air raids. Iran, however, employed another weapon, which it had used sparingly during 1986—*Scud-B* missiles. Some 10 of these were fired into Baghdad between 11 January and 17 February. Their exact effect was unknown, but they probably contributed to the Iraqi decision to halt the raids for a fortnight. Iran immediately followed suit. Furthermore, on 15 February

the Iranians for the first time downed an Iraqi MiG-25 high-altitude fighter over Isfahan with an SA-2 missile, thus forcing the Iraqis to reconsider their air tactics.²³ Before observing a lull from mid-July to the second week of August, the Iraqis carried out a few further attacks in depth, especially against oil installations.

Frustrated by Iranian "procrastination" on Security Council Resolution 598 (see below), Iraq resumed air attacks on Iranian economic targets on 10 August (attacks in the Gulf were renewed on 29 August). The intent was now clear — to coerce Iran into accepting a settlement according to Resolution 598. Despite repeated Iranian warnings that further attacks on their cities would lead to retaliation against Baghdad, the Iraqis stepped up their raids (hitting Tehran on 29 September). Their mood was expressed by Iraqi Minister of Information Latif Jasim: "We are capable of demolishing Iran brick by brick...We do this daily...We have decided to return Iran to...relying on rugs rather than on oil."²⁴

On 3 October, the Iranians resumed launching missiles into Baghdad, firing at least seven that month (on 13 October, a primary school in Baghdad was hit and 29 children were killed). These attacks were possibly in retaliation for successful Iraqi raids in the Gulf. On 8 November, the Iranians fired the last missiles of 1987 into the Iraqi capital, "on the eve of the US-inspired Arab summit in Amman."²⁵ To keep up the psychological impact of these attacks, the Iranians claimed to be "almost on the verge of self-sufficiency in *Scud* missiles."²⁶ The Iraqis countered by threatening to use their newly tested ground-to-ground missile, with a range of 650 km., against Tehran.²⁷ (This threat was apparently carried out in the spring of 1988, when a new round of the war of the cities occurred). On 17 and 19 November, the Iraqis thrice raided the unfinished Iranian nuclear-power plant at Bushehr (they had previously attacked it on 24 March 1985). The Iranians tried to create a Chernobyl-type scare about radioactive fallout but were soon shown to be wrong.²⁸

Although they occasionally did considerable damage, it seemed that the Iraqi air and missile attacks did not attain their objective, both because they were not intense or destructive enough and because the Iranians enhanced their air-defense and retaliatory capabilities.

THE TANKER WAR

In the context of its objective to force a settlement, Iraq's other principal effort in the air — to disrupt oil exports — assumed greater strategic significance than it had in 1986.²⁹ It was intended not only to cut Iran's financial lifeline but also to provoke foreign involvement. The operational targets were oil installations along the Gulf and shipping.

The Kharg Island terminal, through which more than 80% of Iranian oil was exported, was frequently hit by the Iraqis but never really put out of action. Less frequent — since special flying skills and mid-air refueling were required — were raids on the Larak Island transshipment center in the Straits of Hormuz and other oil centers in the lower Gulf (such as Sirri, Lavan and the Rakhsh oil fields).³⁰ The Iraqi Air Force concentrated more on Iranian ships, especially on the tankers shuttling between Kharg and Larak. During March and April they caused serious damage to the shuttle fleet, but they paused for a month following their inadvertent attack on the US frigate *Stark* on 17 May, and then for six weeks during and after the Security

Council deliberations on Resolution 598. The Iraqis resumed their attacks on 29 August, in defiance of Western protests, having realized not only that the respite had failed to produce any political advance, but also that Iran had exploited it to increase its oil exports from 1.6 m. barrels per day (b/d) to 2m b/d.³¹ During the last four months of the year, Iraqi assaults on tankers and Iranian retaliatory acts increased, reaching a record of 34–36 ships attacked by both sides in December.³² But despite occasional successes, Iraqi attacks were not very effective and Iranian oil exports were not reduced to a level (less than 1m b/d?) that would make it really difficult to continue the war. On the contrary; the bulk of the Iranian shuttle fleet rose from 16 tankers in August to 20 in November and 25 in January 1988, in addition to seven or eight supertankers serving as storage vessels at Larak.³³

Well aware of its dependence on free navigation for the export of its oil, Iran based its strategy in the Gulf on the premise that "the security of the Persian Gulf is indivisible; either there is security...for everyone or for no one." The strategy was reactive-retaliatory: "If any ships are hit by Iraq, any ship that belongs to Iraq or countries supporting [it] will suffer the same fate."³⁴ In implementing this strategy Iran employed the following means:

- (1) Controlling access to the Gulf. For years the Iranian Navy had been checking vessels entering the Gulf for contraband and sometimes detaining them. In September Iran officially extended its sphere of operations 600 km. eastwards, into the Sea of Oman.³⁵ To emphasize their resoluteness, the Iranians deployed Chinese-made HY-2 *Silkworm* shore-to-ship missiles near the Straits in March. Considered a serious threat to ships, these missiles were not used in 1987.³⁶
- (2) Minelaying. Since January 1987, some 80 mines were reportedly neutralized in the Gulf and near Fujayra, and up to 10 ships were hit (including one Soviet and one Iranian tanker). The best known of these was the newly reflagged tanker *Bridgeton*, on 24 July. Most of the mines were of an obsolescent Soviet type, probably obtained from Libya and North Korea. Although they talked about placing mines, the Iranians were careful not to admit responsibility for any of them. But their culpability became a matter of public knowledge when a minelaying ship, the *Iran Ajr*, was put out of action by the Americans on 21 September and 26 of its crew were captured (see essay on the US and the Middle East). Since then, no further minelaying was confirmed.³⁷ One may assume that the tense atmosphere in the Gulf led the Iranians to discontinue this indiscriminate practice.
- (3) Direct attacks on ships by the regular Navy, by helicopter, and especially by the recently established naval force of the IRGC. The accelerated deployment of this force was well publicized by the Iranians. It was said to have at least five bases along the Gulf, set up since June and tested for combat readiness in early August. It was mainly equipped with Swedish-made speedboats, of which it had about 50, armed with machine guns, light rockets and *Stinger* portable antiaircraft missiles (their provenance was not adequately explained, to the US's considerable annoyance).³⁸

For some time already, the addressees of the Iranian strategy in the Gulf were clear — Kuwait and, to a lesser degree (at least until the Mecca incident on 31 July), Saudi Arabia. These countries had contributed up to \$50 bn. to the Iraqi war effort and sold oil from the neutral zone on behalf of Iraq. Furthermore, Iraq had made extensive use

of Kuwaiti port facilities, especially for its military procurements, and had often overflowed Kuwaiti shores.³⁹ The corollary of these activities was to push Kuwait to look for international help; and this was neither unintended nor unwelcomed by the Iraqis. Later in the year, they conceded that the resultant international military presence in the Gulf was positive, as it prevented Iran from imposing its hegemony there.⁴⁰

Hence the ongoing Iranian counterendeavor to dissociate Kuwait (and Saudi Arabia) from Iraq, necessarily by force. The Iranians targeted their attacks in the Gulf on ships trading with Kuwait (according to one statistic, 22 out of 27 ships attacked between September 1986 and April 1987),⁴¹ arguing that "if our ships are hit, the ships of Iraq's partners will be hit," and that a Kuwaiti ship transporting Iraqi oil is the same as an Iraqi ship. Their demand was simple: Kuwait should declare it no longer had anything to do with Iraq.⁴² The Iranian threats were acutely perceived by the Kuwaitis, who began losing money. Their answer was to approach simultaneously both the US and USSR, seeking the protection of their flags, i.e., to reflag the majority of the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Corporation's 21 tankers. This was done in December 1986. The Soviets responded swiftly, and in January 1987 a Kuwaiti delegation went to Moscow, where it was agreed to reflag 11 tankers. The US answer, although positive in principle, left the Coast Guard to work out formalities; but this was quickly revised when the Soviet response became known. Washington's decision, to reflag 11 Kuwaiti tankers and provide them with American naval protection, was communicated to Kuwait in early March (cf. essay on the US and the ME). The Kuwaitis then changed their deal with Moscow, which was signed on 10 April; they were to charter three Soviet tankers for a year with the option of increasing the number to five, and to reflag some of theirs.⁴³

In retrospect, it seems that the approach to Moscow was designed by the Kuwaitis to enlist US support. The Kuwaitis were delighted to have achieved a "balance" between the superpowers, according to their long-standing policy; both would protect Kuwaiti oil exports and the Soviets would continue to safeguard the shipment of arms from the Soviet Bloc.⁴⁴ Officially, however, the Kuwaitis presented this as "a purely commercial operation, aimed at ensuring the continued transportation of Kuwaiti oil to its markets and the fulfillment of Kuwaiti contractual commitments."⁴⁵ Later in the year, Kuwait reflagged two tankers in Britain. The reflagged tankers carried mainly natural gas and refined petroleum products.⁴⁶

The US decision to reflag and protect, i.e., provide a convoy for, Kuwaiti tankers, though presented as "a limited expansion of the US Navy's long-standing commitment to protect American-flag shipping,"⁴⁷ led to a major naval operation involving up to 40 ships (most of which were in position near the Gulf) and costing \$20 m. per month. Threat assessment included various Iranian reactions: the *Silkworms* near the Straits of Hormuz, and threats from the air and ships, but apparently not the scope of mining encountered. The first convoy sailed on 22 July, and on 24 July the 400,000-ton tanker *Bridgeton* — the first reflagged tanker — struck a mine (for location, see map). This led to the launching of a considerable anti-mine effort. An additional risk faced by the US Navy in the narrow Gulf had been tragically underlined on 17 May, when an Iraqi aircraft, apparently inadvertently, fired two missiles at the frigate *Stark*, killing 37 of its crew. (The problem of how to avoid similar mishaps had still not been resolved nine months later.)⁴⁸

Increasing tactical and logistical problems and the array of forces led to the setting up of a special American Command — the Joint Task Force Middle East — in August. In addition to its convoy and related activities, the task force carried out three operations against the Iranians: the already mentioned strike against the minelaying ship on 21 September; the sinking of three speedboats on 8 October; and the destruction of two oil platforms at the Rakhsh maritime oil field on 19 October (in retaliation for a missile hit on a reflagged tanker in a Kuwaiti port). The US emphasized publicly, however, that no escalation was intended.⁴⁹ Altogether, from 22 July–31 December 1987, the US Navy escorted 22 convoys up and down the Gulf without losing a single tanker (the *Bridgeton* later returned to service). This operation was continued in 1988.

There was little publicly acknowledged help given to the US operation by the Gulf states (the exception being the well-known arrangements with Bahrain). But in June the US and Saudi Arabia agreed on a cooperative arrangement to cover the southern Gulf with Saudi AWACS flights.⁵⁰ While refusing to allow base facilities on their territory, the Kuwaitis (and other Gulf states) extended ship repair and other logistical facilities; later in the year Kuwait began to supply free oil to US ships. This reduced the monthly operating cost by \$5m.⁵¹

When the US asked its Nato allies for support, especially in minesweeping, they demurred at first, not having been consulted prior to the operation. But increasing mining incidents at the beginning of August caused first Britain and France and then Italy, Belgium, and the Netherlands to dispatch to the Gulf up to 34 combat vessels. Still the West Europeans were worried about being sucked into real fighting and reluctant to be identified with the pro-Iraqi tilt of the US.⁵²

At the beginning of 1988 the US began to reduce its forces in the Gulf (the admirals had been arguing for months that this should be done because of the cost), considering that “the threat has changed.”⁵³ The allies did the same.

During all this time the Soviet Navy kept a low profile in the Gulf; its routine presence there consisted of four to five warships. No attacks on Soviet ships occurred after May.⁵⁴

The US reflagging operation posed a double challenge to Iran — to keep up its pressure on Kuwait by offsetting the value of American protection while avoiding a dangerous head-on clash with the US in the Gulf. The Iranian response was one of prudent retaliation. Two months before convoying began, the Iranian prime minister warned Kuwait that it remained vulnerable “even under [a] superpower flag.”⁵⁵ Ignoring the convoyed tankers, Iran attacked 16 unescorted ships carrying oil to or from Kuwait in the period from 22 July until the end of the year. In December, when attacks peaked, Kuwait was concerned it would not be able to meet its contracts of crude.⁵⁶ After the Iraqis resumed the tanker war at the end of August, Iran escalated its punishment of Kuwait (while carefully warning the UN secretary-general that its retaliatory measures may include facilities serving to equip Iraq),⁵⁷ by launching several *Silkworm* missiles on the oil-terminal of Mina Ahmadi (4 September, 15, 16, 22 October, 7 December). At first the Iranians disingenuously said these shots were divine or caused by invisible hands. But Rafsanjani later addressed the issue squarely: “The Kuwaiti assertion of neutrality is a lie...you brought the US to the region...[one may ask] if the US attacked oil rigs, why should you hit Kuwait? The answer is US interests. Ahmadi platform is of greatest interest to the US.”⁵⁸ Furthermore, the

Iranians accused the Kuwaiti regime of treason against Islam and warned it of a coming popular revolt, possibly meaning that Iranian subversion in Kuwait would continue.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, diplomatic relations between Iran and Kuwait were not broken.

Since the initiation of the US operation, the Iranians predicted the direst consequences for it, repeatedly evoking the tragic fate of the Marines in Lebanon in 1983. On joining the operation, the British and French were told not to expect any political consideration.⁶⁰ After the US actions against Iranian vessels and oil rigs, Iran's leaders vowed vengeance and accused the US of starting an "all-out war" against Iran.⁶¹ On the other hand the operation was described as a mere propaganda show, carried out to divert public opinion in the US from other issues. The "political weakness of the US domestic front" was evoked in many variations.⁶² Yet the dominant Iranian signal to the US was restraint and a wish to avoid confrontation. Since the first American escorted convoy hit a mine, not a single escorted tanker was attacked by Iran. This was explicit policy, expressed repeatedly by the leadership. Analyzing the aims of the US presence in the Gulf, Rafsanjani, for one, stated that Iran did not seek to confront the US or to launch hostilities against it. After the attack on the *Iran Ajr*, he said: "Our people shouted 'revenge.' But our officials and military are acting in accordance with a sensible Islamic policy." In a later interview he reiterated that Iran was not going to fight the US over its presence in the Gulf.⁶³

This policy reflected the basic interest of Iran in free navigation in the Gulf, which was obviously served by US conveying. It also minimized the risk of serious American retaliation against military and oil installations. Intensified hostilities against Kuwait would have served Iraq better than Iran: they could push the Gulf states toward greater cooperation with the US, increase the risk of US intervention, and harm Iran in the Arab world (undermining Syria's position and strengthening that of Egypt).

How effective was Western involvement in the tanker war? Rather than restraining the belligerents, the augmented presence of foreign warships in the Gulf coincided with stepped up attacks during the second half of 1987. The Iranians, who had predicted the ineffectiveness of the foreign presence, pointed this out.⁶⁴ Up to 9 June, 49 ships were attacked; from 9 June to 3 September, 30 ships; from then until the end of the year, another 99. Altogether, 178 ships were attacked in 1987 (compared with 80 in 1986), the responsibility almost equally divided between the belligerents; and 108 seamen—including the 37 on the *Stark*—perished (as against 52 in 1986).⁶⁵ Although freight costs more than trebled and insurance premiums rose constantly, there was no difficulty in chartering new vessels to replace damaged ones. Moreover, the price of crude oil was lower at the beginning of 1988 than a year earlier. Thus it seemed that, despite increasing losses, the tanker war had hardly any impact outside the region.⁶⁶

Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, however, were increasingly worried. They wanted the US to extend its protection to all neutral shipping in the Gulf in order to forestall Iranian attacks. To overcome US reluctance, they contended that Iran would otherwise be achieving its cause. The question of US steadfastness was also raised, the precedent of Lebanon still being fresh in the memory. During his visit to the Gulf in January 1988, US Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci reportedly stipulated more Arab political and public support for the Western role, including funding and better land facilities for resupply and intelligence operations.⁶⁷ It appeared as if a vicious circle had been created. Against Arab pressure for greater commitment, the US

pressed for more facilities, thus raising Arab expectations that the US would end the war or contain Iran.

The tanker war was only one aspect, albeit an important one, of the Gulf Arabs' perception of the growing Iranian political and military threat. Altogether their relationship with Iran was ambivalent. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Oman enjoyed a thriving trade and maintained a political dialogue with Iran, unlike Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. Yet even these last two were against a total rupture with Iran. The Mecca incident (see chapter on Saudi Arabia) embittered relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran and caused the former to call for a collective Arab break with the latter. After months of preparation, an Arab summit conference convened in Amman on 8–11 November 1987, with the war and the situation in the Gulf topping the agenda; but it failed to put pressure on Iran to end the war. Iran was censured for its procrastination in fully implementing Resolution 598 (see below), for occupying some Iraqi territory, and threatening and provoking the Gulf states, but the members of the Arab League were asked neither to break diplomatic relations with it nor to impose sanctions on it. Instead they "appealed to the international community to assume its responsibilities...and adopt the necessary measures to make the Iranians respond to peace calls."⁶⁸ (See further in essay on inter-Arab relations.) But by lifting the diplomatic boycott on Egypt, the summit facilitated the shift of the northern Gulf states towards that country, enabling them to harness its military and industrial potential for their security. (The Egyptians, for their part, were ready to maximize the concomitant political and economic advantages—see chapter on Egypt). High-level Egyptian visits to the Gulf (the defense minister in mid-December and President Husni Mubarak in mid-January 1988) followed responsive high-level declarations. An agreement was reached to reequip Kuwaiti air defenses and train personnel, and military cooperation was discussed with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the UAE. Yet, in practical terms, Egypt could hardly affect the balance of power in the Gulf. Furthermore, Egyptian officials remained skeptical about the likelihood of publicly committing Egyptian forces to combat in the war; they conceived their role as one designed "to deter, not to expand the war."⁶⁹

The annual Gulf Cooperation Council summit, which was held from 26–29 December, six weeks after the Arab summit (see chapter on the Gulf states), likewise refrained from adopting concrete steps against Iran and urged the "international community" to take the necessary steps in the Security Council. Iran was not denounced but called upon to observe mutual respect and good neighborliness.⁷⁰ Small wonder that this communiqué was ill received in Baghdad. Apparently, a more conciliatory attitude towards Iran prevailed in Saudi Arabia (despite severe accusations by King Fahd during the summit and a violent media campaign since August), possibly reflecting the almost banal truth that it would have to go on living with Iran, which would remain a regional power under whatever regime. Taken together with Western disinclination to protect all shipping in the Gulf and Soviet obstruction of a UN arms embargo (see below), Iran's policy of prudent retaliation seemed effective at the beginning of 1988.

SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598

The war was repeatedly debated by the UN Security Council, which had adopted its most recent resolution (582) calling for an end to hostilities on 8 October 1986 (cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 161). A further appeal on 17 January 1987 was rejected by Iran. The increasing concern about the consequences of a possible Iranian military breakthrough and the continuing tanker war led to weeks of consultations among the council's five permanent members, who drafted a more forceful text and presented it to the other members at the end of June. On 20 July, Resolution 598 was unanimously adopted (for text, see Appendix 1), calling for three main things: an immediate cease-fire; withdrawal of both armies within their own borders; and the establishment of "an impartial body" to allocate responsibility for the start of the war. No provision for enforcement was included, but a companion resolution to impose an arms embargo on any uncomplying party was expected to be considered within two months. It was quickly observed, however, that unanimity on a world-wide embargo would pose many problems. Many countries — including Security Council members — profited from the arms trade generated by the war, and the clandestinity of the trade made enforcement difficult.⁷¹

Resolution 598 became the cornerstone of diplomatic activity since Iraq accepted it right away (its text contained the provisions offered in Saddam Husayn's "open letter to the Iranian people" of 21 January),⁷² calling for its speedy and integrated implementation and suggesting a timetable. Baghdad started to press for sanctions against Iran when it began to procrastinate, and later resumed air attacks.⁷³ The Iranian reaction was ambivalent. While accepting an integral implementation, it asked to restructure the resolution according to its interests. Precedence should be given to the identification of the aggressor by the "impartial body," and no gratuitous gains be presented to the Iraqis.⁷⁴ To gain time, the Iranians began discussions with the secretary-general, who visited Tehran and Baghdad on 12–13 and 14–15 September, respectively. Further rounds of discussions served only to underline the wide gap between the parties, and the secretary-general finally reported his failure to the Security Council in mid-December. The Iraqis demanded the implementation of the various provisions in sequential order, considering the Iranian demand for an altered precedence as clear rejection. They understood that a delay in the formal cease-fire meant a postponement of the withdrawal, leaving the Iranians on the Faw peninsula and at the gates of Basra. Indeed, the Iranians questioned the feasibility of a withdrawal, because "internationally recognized boundaries between Iran and Iraq are yet to be determined," since Iraq had nullified the 1975 Algiers accord. Confident that Iraq would be identified as the party responsible for the war, the Iranians furthermore linked withdrawal to the payment of reparations.⁷⁵ (For the different reactions to the resolution by the two parties, see further in Appendix II).

Since September, the US had been urging unsuccessfully for the imposition of a Security Council arms embargo on Iran, but was continuously blocked by the USSR. The official Soviet position was that the war should be halted by balanced action, using the UN; that 598 was a balanced foundation for an equitable settlement; that Iran should take "practical steps" toward peace; and that if negotiations started there was no need for "other measures." The USSR insisted on the withdrawal of all warships of non-littoral states from the Gulf, where a UN peacekeeping naval force

should be established.⁷⁶ This latter suggestion did not receive US support. The Iraqis criticized the Soviet attitude, while the Iranians pointed to the uselessness of an embargo.⁷⁷

At the end of the year, it seemed that Iranian tactics at the UN (characterized as "thump and talk" diplomacy) had been successful in warding off an internationally decided arms embargo and any imposed solution. They skillfully outmaneuvered the Iraqis and the US (with the help of the Soviets), proving to be more sophisticated than expected by many observers.⁷⁸ The Iranian leadership frankly explained its positions: Rafsanjani commented on the demand that a cease-fire should precede the appointment of the commission to identify the aggressor: "Every ignorant person knows that if we laid down our weapons, if soldiers returned to their homes...no one in this world would bother to identify the aggressor."⁷⁹ The commander of the IRGC argued: "The objective of 598 was to make Iran reply officially in writing that it either accepted or rejected it," in order to enable the passage of the arms embargo resolution against Iran. "However, we delayed its response for two months...." Ambiguous points were raised (such as the question of the international boundary) to demonstrate that implementation was questionable.⁸⁰

THE SUPERPOWERS AND THE CONFLICT

The increased political and military involvement of the superpowers in the Gulf conflict during 1987 calls for a brief summary of their postures there.

The USSR endeavored to increase its foothold in the region and to legitimize it. It quickly acceded to the Kuwaiti request to transport part of their oil, trying to capitalize on the apparent US loss of credibility in the Arab Gulf following the "Irangate affair" (cf. essay on the US and the ME). Later, the expanded US naval presence was depicted by the Soviets as exacerbating regional tensions, while they themselves adopted non-confrontational tactics "on the water." The accelerated diplomatic activity related to the war (which included several high-ranking visits to and from the region) was used by the Soviets to improve relations with Iran, responding to the latter's overtures. They blocked Security Council action on an arms embargo resolution as premature and advocated a balanced and mediated solution to the war, preferably under their auspices but at least with their participation. To underline their legitimate role in the area, they expressed their readiness to join in eventual peacekeeping operations. While the Iranians voiced their satisfaction, the Iraqis began publicly to criticize the Soviets. By way of its roving ambassador for the ME, Mikhail Sytenko, the USSR assured Iraq in mid-December of its continuing support and described relations with Iran as being on a lower level than before the war.⁸¹ Yet, at the beginning of 1988, the USSR's balancing act between the belligerents was in questionable shape and its freedom of maneuver between them was limited. (See also essay on the Soviet Union and the ME.)

Reflecting long-standing US national security interests in the Gulf, President Reagan defined four policy objectives: (1) Maintaining freedom of navigation; (2) Strengthening moderate Arab states; (3) Reducing the influence of anti-Western powers such as the USSR and Iran; and (4) Assuring access to oil for the US and its allies. The "most serious, immediate threat" to US interests was posed by Iran's continuation and escalation of the war, which gave the USSR "the opportunity to

advance its regional agenda." Therefore, "an Iranian victory is not in the US interest."⁸² US strategy consisted of the following: (1) Diplomatic efforts to end the war and meanwhile halt arms sales to Iran; (2) Support of moderate Arab states, by escorting ships in the Gulf and deterring the potential spillover of the war to third parties; (3) Limiting Soviet influence and presence; and (4) Halting all Iranian imports to the US.⁸³ The implementation of this strategy was constrained by domestic opposition, the costs involved, the risk of escalation with Iran and US casualties, and a measure of dependence on Iraqi strategy and operations. Yet the principal US achievements were the demonstrated projection of power into the Gulf, deterring the Iranians and worrying the Soviets, and the sense of restored credibility among pro-Western Arabs.⁸⁴ Credibility seemed to have figured highly in US deliberation and remained a potent argument of those who asked for more US involvement. One issue, however, was not contested by the US and Iran: they both supported free navigation in the Gulf. (See also essay on the US and the ME.)

BALANCE AND OUTLOOK

The war, "the longest and bloodiest since World War II," and "the fourth largest of the 20th century in the number of deaths,"⁸⁵ escalated to new peaks of virulence. Early in 1988 there was still no end to it in sight, and both parties seemed determined to fight on bitterly, if only to forestall unacceptable solutions. Civilian populations were increasingly hit. An illuminating detail: after seven years of carnage, during which both sides maintained skeleton embassies in their respective capitals, Iran finally severed all relations and brought home its personnel from Baghdad in October.⁸⁶

No reliable data on casualties are available, estimates being of c. 1.5m. losses (Iraq was said to have suffered 150,000–200,000 killed, 500,000 wounded and 70,000 captured). The scale of Iranian losses was indicated by an official statement that gave the number of casualties among the clergy during the seven years up to 22 September 1987 as 1,757 killed, 6,471 injured, and 281 missing or captured.⁸⁷

To recapitulate the principal developments during the year:

- (1) Iranian ground forces consolidated their foothold about 10 km. east of Basra and stepped up guerrilla operations (with their Kurdish allies) in northern Iraq.
- (2) The Iraqi Air Force increased the range and scope of its attack, in Iran and the lower Gulf. Iran retaliated mainly against Kuwaiti oil exports.
- (3) Kuwait asked for and received superpower protection for some of its oil exports, initiating a major US and Western naval operation. Thus the potential for serious escalation was created in the Gulf.
- (4) The unanimously adopted Security Council Resolution 598, calling for an immediate cease-fire and withdrawal to international boundaries, was accepted by Iraq and practically stalled by Iran. A follow-up resolution to impose an arms embargo on Tehran was blocked by the USSR, which was aiming to increase its foothold in the region.

Altogether, it was not a bad year for Iraq after it withstood the assault on Basra. The economy appeared to be in a better shape, more efficiently geared to the war effort. Iraq's overall defensive strategy, combined with aggressive air operations, contained the Iranians and contrived to increase international involvement — which was probably intended to constrain the Iranians. Yet, at the end of the year, Iraq

seemed to be back where it had started. Increased international involvement did not stop the war, and the briefly promising alignment of Arab states on the issue of the war broke up; worse, some Gulf states even began to engage in bridge-building towards Tehran. Thus the basic problem of the Iraqi regime was its staying power. Could its ability to deny victory to the adversary be considered at least a temporary form of victory?

As Iran's leaders did not budge from their well-known war aim of ridding Iraq of Saddam Husayn, their basic problem in 1987 was to maintain the offensive at the level of the previous years. After their failure to take Basra in January, they made no further serious attempt to do so; their achievements during the year were mainly defensive and their leaders said so publicly. They insisted that coastal and air-defense missiles had become operational, that US weaknesses in the region had been exposed and its conspiracy at the UN had been despoiled, and that Iraq's use of chemical weapons was internationally condemned. In other words, Iran successfully avoided the risks of international isolation—both political in the Arab and UN context, and military in the US context, and kept the Gulf open for its oil exports.⁸⁸ Iranian leaders portrayed their country as facing an international conspiracy directed by the US and aimed at preserving Saddam, imposing peace on Iran, and discrediting the Islamic Revolution.⁸⁹ Their exhortations, especially after the "new phase" in the war was proclaimed in mid-November, appeared to echo war weariness among their people.⁹⁰ However, no real political or economic crisis developed.

The much promised large-scale Iranian offensive did not materialize during the winter of 1987–88, although a considerable force was assembled near Basra from December.⁹¹ Speculation about the delay turned from secret deals with some of the Arab states to the necessity of fending off an arms embargo with Soviet help, and to various military considerations (including a possible lack of trained manpower) as 1988 progressed. Obviously, a much-delayed, token or even foiled offensive could change the outlook. For Iran it meant that decisive action (assuming that such a thing was at all possible) had been postponed. For Iraq it signified continuing attrition and the possible fading away of international attention to the conflict.⁹²

Where did all this lead to? Since no party had changed its attitudes, a negotiated solution seemed to be far away; but so did an Iranian victory. Thus the outlook was one of continuing stalemate. Despite its proven vulnerability to deep penetration attacks, Iran was served by stalemate and attrition. Therefore periodic Iraqi attempts to escalate the fighting (similar to the missile exchange on cities in the spring of 1988) were to be expected. Such flare-ups exacerbated hostility, but were neither decisive nor sufficiently serious to bring about superpower intervention on the scale hoped for by Iraq. The possibilities beyond stalemate are a major change in Tehran or a no-peace no-war cease-fire, or both, either in 1988 or later.

APPENDIX I: THE CEASE-FIRE RESOLUTION⁹³

The Security Council, reaffirming its Resolution 582 (1986);

Deeply concerned that, despite its calls for a cease-fire, the conflict between Iran and Iraq continues unabated, with further heavy loss of human life and material destruction;

Deploping the initiation and continuation of the conflict;

Deploping also the bombing of purely civilian population centers, attacks on neutral shipping or civilian aircraft, the violation of international humanitarian law and other laws of armed conflict, and, in particular, the use of chemical weapons contrary to obligations under the 1925 Geneva Protocol;

Deeply concerned that further escalation and widening of the conflict may take place;
 Determined to bring to an end all military actions between Iran and Iraq;
 Convinced that a comprehensive, just, honorable and durable settlement should be achieved between Iran and Iraq;
 Recalling the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and in particular the obligation of all member states to settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security and justice are not endangered;
 Determining that there exists a breach of the peace as regards the conflict between Iran and Iraq;
 Acting under Articles 39 and 40 of the Charter of the United Nations;

1. Demands that, as a first step toward a negotiated settlement, Iran and Iraq observe an immediate cease-fire, discontinue all military actions on land, at sea and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognized boundaries without delay;
2. Requests the secretary-general to dispatch a team of United Nations observers to verify, confirm and supervise the cease-fire and withdrawal and further requests the secretary-general to make the necessary arrangements in consultation with the parties and to submit a report thereon to the Security Council;
3. Urges that prisoners of war be released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities in accordance with the Third Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949;
4. Calls upon Iran and Iraq to cooperate with the secretary-general in implementing this resolution and in mediation efforts to achieve a comprehensive, just and honorable settlement, acceptable to both sides, of all outstanding issues in accordance with the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations;
5. Calls upon all other states to exercise the utmost restraint and to refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict and thus to facilitate the implementation of the present resolution;
6. Requests the secretary-general to explore, in consultation with Iran and Iraq, the question of entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible;
7. Recognizes the magnitude of the damage inflicted during the conflict and the need for reconstruction efforts with appropriate international assistance once the conflict is ended and in this regard requests the secretary-general to assign a team of experts to study the question of reconstruction and to report to the Security Council;
8. Further requests the secretary-general to examine in consultation with Iran and Iraq and with other states of the region measures to enhance the security and stability of the region;
9. Requests the secretary-general to keep the Security Council informed on the implementation of this resolution;
10. Decides to meet again as necessary to consider further steps to insure compliance with this resolution.

APPENDIX II: SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 598 — COMPARISON OF IRAQI AND IRANIAN POSITIONS ON MAIN PARAGRAPHS⁹⁴

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Iraqi Position</i>	<i>Iranian Position</i>
1. Overall attitude.	Accepted as "an integral whole." ⁹⁵ Ready to implement as an integrated whole in the sequential order of the text. Undertook to cooperate with the secretary-general	Accepted implementation on the basis of an integrated approach. Undertook to cooperate with the secretary-general.
2. §1 Immediate cease-fire as a first step, (secretary-general to establish agreed timetable) and withdrawal without delay to internationally recognized boundaries.	Immediate cease-fire and use of ports and coasts. ⁹⁶ Rejection of undeclared cease-fire. Withdrawal proposed within 10 days of cease-fire. Withdrawal inter-connected with cease-fire.	Cease-fire the first step: undeclared during the work of the "impartial body" to identify aggressor. Formal cease-fire upon identification of responsible party. International boundaries between Iran and Iraq yet to be determined since the latter nullified the 1975 Algiers accord. Correlation and coincidence between withdrawal and the realization of the

<i>Subject</i>	<i>Iraqi Position</i>	<i>Iranian Position</i>
		consequences of responsibility for the conflict, particularly reparation of damages.
3. §3 Release and repatriation of prisoners of war.	Proposed within eight weeks of cease-fire. ⁸⁷	Civilian detainees and missing also to be dealt with.
4. §4 Both sides to cooperate with secretary-general in implementing resolution.	Accepted.	Accepted.
5. §5 Other states to exercise utmost restraint and to refrain from acts which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict.		Violated by the US by dispatching warships. Provision of implementation to be incorporated by secretary-general. ⁸⁸
6. §6 Secretary-general to explore entrusting an impartial body with inquiring into responsibility for the conflict and to report as soon as possible.	Body to be judicial in nature.	Precedence of this provision to all others. ⁸⁹ Identification of responsibility to be linked to cease-fire (see above).
7. §8 Measures to enhance security and stability of the region to be examined.		Identification of Iraq as the aggressor remains a first step toward a just and durable peace.
8. §10 Security Council to reconvene as necessary to consider further steps to ensure compliance with this resolution.	Sanctions to be immediately imposed on Iran as it had rejected the resolution. This was argued by Iraq since the beginning of August. ¹⁰⁰	To be drawn up and implemented so that at the end of the present war all responsibilities and potential for future aggression in the region will be uprooted.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *The Economist*, 26 December 1987.
2. R. Tehran, 30 November 1987; *IHT*, 14 March 1988; Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, USIS, 16 March 1988.
3. *Le Matin*, 31 July — DR, 7 August; INA, 29 August — SWB, 1 September; INA, 5 October — DR, 5 October 1987.

4. Rafsanjani, R. Tehran, 27 September — SWB, 29 September 1987.
5. R. Tehran, 15 June — DR, 16 June 1987.
6. See the explicit statement by Mohsen Reja'i to *Kayhan*, 29 June — DR, 7 July 1987.
7. R. Tehran, 16 January — SWB, 19 January 1987.
8. *Le Monde*, 17 February 1987; *Kayhan al-'Arabi*, 7 March 1987.
9. IRNA, 26 February — SWB, 28 February 1987.
10. Rafsanjani, *NYT*, 5 July 1987.
11. *Kayhan*, 7 November; R. Tehran, 16, 21 November — DR, 16, 23 November; R. Tehran, 12, 16 November — DR, 12, 16 November; INA, 28 November — DR, 30 November, R. Tehran, 30 November — DR, 2 December; *Le Monde*, 17–18 January 1988; on the Iraqi preparations for that contingency — *The Economist*, 26 December 1987.
12. R. Tehran, 29 November — DR, 1 December 1987.
13. *Kayhan*, 29 June — DR, 7 July; IRNA, 7, 8 July — DR, 8, 9 July; R. Tehran, IRNA, 18 September — DR, 18 September; R. Tehran, 5 October — DR, 5 October 1987.
14. R. Tehran, 30 November — SWB, 2 December 1987.
15. INA, 19 June — DR, 19, 23 June; R. Baghdad (VoM), 8 July — SWB, 10 July 1987.
16. Cf. *The Economist*, 26 December 1987.
17. E.g., INA, 8 September — SWB, 11 September; R. Baghdad, 4 October — SWB, 9 October 1987.
18. INA, 27 July, 7 August — DR, 29 July, 11 August; R. Baghdad (VoM), 26 October — DR, 28 October 1987.
19. R. Tehran, 24 February — DR, 25 February, SWB, R. Tehran, 29 April, IRNA, 15 May 1987.
20. IRNA, 28 June — SWB, 30 June; IRNA, 13, 14 July — SWB, 15, 16 July 1987.
21. *IHT*, 14 May 1987.
22. *IHT*, 28 December 1987; *Le Monde*, 1 January 1988.
23. R. Tehran, 15, 25 February — SWB, 17, 27 February; *Kayhan*, 28 May — DR, 10 June 1987.
24. *Al-Tadamon*, 3 October — DR, 21 October 1987.
25. IRNA, 8 November — DR, 9 November 1987.
26. *Kayhan*, 15 October — DR, 22 October 1987.
27. *NYT*, 5 August 1987; GNA, 6 October; INA, 26 November — DR, 27 November 1987.
28. IRNA, 17, 18 November — DR, 17, 19 November; *NYT*, 18 November 1987.
29. Iraq escalated the tanker war in 1984, after shifting its oil exports to pipelines.
30. *The Economist*, 17 October 1987.
31. *MEES*, 7 September 1987.
32. *IHT*, 8 January 1988.
33. *The Economist*, 10 October; *WSJ*, 29 September, 4 October; *MEES*, 7 September 1987, 11 January 1988.
34. Khameneh'i, R. Tehran, 8 June, 3 July — DR, 8 June, 6 July 1987.
35. R. Tehran, 21 September — SWB, 23 September 1987.
36. *Le Monde*, 20 March; R. Tehran, 24 March — DR, 12 June, 7 July; *The Economist*, 3 October 1987.
37. *Le Monde*, 27 October; *NYT*, 28 September, 6 December 1987. The US Navy found and destroyed 28 of them during 1987 — *IHT*, 2–3 April 1988.
38. *Kayhan*, 28 May — DR, 10 June; R. Tehran, 25 June — DR, 25 June; IRNA, 28 June — DR, 29 June; *NYT*, 2 August; *IHT*, 7 August; *Le Monde*, 21 May 1987.
39. *The Guardian*, 17 May; *The Economist*, 27 June; R. Tehran, 24 July — DR, 27 July 1987.
40. *Al-Hawadith*, London, 2 June — DR, 20 October 1987.
41. *The Guardian*, 19 May 1987.
42. Rafsanjani, R., Tehran, 24 July — DR, 27 July; Khameneh'i, R. Tehran, 3 July — DR, 6 July 1987.
43. *The Guardian*, 19 May; *MEES*, 20 April, 15 June; *NYT*, 22 July, 19 October 1987.
44. *The Guardian*, 19 May 1987.
45. Kuwaiti Prime Minister Shaykh Sa'd 'Abdallah al-Sabah, KUNA, 20 July — DR, 20 July 1987.
46. *IHT*, 18 January 1988.

47. *DSB*, October 1987, p. 42.
48. *IHT*, 17, 19 February 1988.
49. *NYT*, 20 October 1987.
50. *WF*, 22 June 1987.
51. *The Economist*, 10 October; *MEES*, 19 October 1987; *USIS Report*, 17 February 1988.
52. *IHT*, 18 November 1987, 12, 19 January 1988.
53. *IHT*, 7 January 1988; *USIS News Report*, 17 February 1988.
54. *NYT*, 7 July 1987; *IHT*, 12 January 1988.
55. R. Tehran, 6 May — DR, 7 May 1987.
56. *IHT*, 18, 23 January 1988.
57. IRNA, 30 August — SWB, 1 September 1987.
58. Tehran TV, 23 October — DR, 26 October 1987.
59. R. Tehran, 8 September — SWB, 10 September; R. Tehran, 3 December — DR, 3 December 1987.
60. E.g., R. Tehran, 12 August — DR, 13 August 1987.
61. R. Tehran, 15 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
62. E.g., Rafsanjani, R. Tehran, 27 July — SWB, 28 July 1987.
63. R. Tehran, 21 August—SWB, 22 August; R. Tehran, 2 October — DR, 5 October; *The Times*, 17 December 1987.
64. Rafsanjani, *Le Monde*, 21 May; Khameneh'i, R. Tehran, 6 November — SWB, 9 November 1987.
65. All data based on Lloyds of London. *MEES*, 15 June, 7 September 1987; *IHT*, 5 January 1988.
66. *WSJ*, 29 September, 6 October 1987; *The Economist*, 5 March 1988; *Le Monde*, 4 February 1988.
67. *IHT*, 6, 7, 12, 19 January 1988.
68. R. Amman, 11 December — DR, 13 December 1987.
69. *The Economist*, 21 November, 19 December 1987; *IHT*, 4, 9–10, 26–27 January 1988.
70. SPA, 29 December 1987.
71. *NYT*, 21 July 1987; cf. Michael Brzoska, "Profiteering on the Iran-Iraq War," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists*, June 1987, pp. 42–45.
72. INA, 21 January — SWB, 22 January 1987.
73. INA, 20, 22 July — DR, 21, 23 July 1987.
74. IRNA, 20 July, R. Tehran, 22 July — DR, 21, 23 July 1987.
75. Reuters, 18 September, 3 November 1987.
76. President Gromyko, Tass, 22 December — DR:SU, 22 December 1987; cf. Ambassador Sytenko, GNA, 16 December — DR, 17 December 1987.
77. R. Tehran, 20 November — SWB, 23 November; R. Tehran, 11 December — DR, 11 December 1987; cf. *The Economist*, 16 January 1988.
78. Gary Sick, "Iran's Quest for Superpower Status," *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1987, p. 714. Cf. *NYT*, 22 August; *The Guardian*, 25 September 1987.
79. R. Tehran, 2 October — DR, 5 October 1987.
80. R. Tehran, 30 November — SWB, 2 December 1987.
81. GNA, 16 December — DR, 17 December 1987.
82. *National Security Strategy of the United States* (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 29; *DSB*, October 1987, p. 43.
83. *Ibid.*, passim; *Secretary of Defense Annual Report*, USIA, 23 February 1988.
84. Assistant Secretary of State Murphy, USIS, 16 March 1988.
85. Efraim Kersh, *The Iran-Iraq War: A Military Analysis*, Adelphi Paper 220 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1987), p. 62; Daniel Pipes, *IHT*, 2 December 1987.
86. IRNA, 3 October — SWB, 5 October 1987.
87. *The Economist*, 13 February 1988; *IHT*, 5 February 1988; R. Tehran, 14 December — DR, 15 December 1987.
88. E.g., the commander of the IRGC, Mohsin Reja'i, R. Tehran, 30 November — SWB, 2 December 1987.

89. R. Tehran, 4, 8 September — SWB, 7, 10 September; R. Tehran, 4 October — DR, 5 October 1987.
90. E.g., Mohsin Reja'i, R. Tehran, 30 November — SWB, 2 December; Rafsanjani, IRNA, 22 November — DR, 23 November 1987.
91. *IHT*, 27 January 1988.
92. *IHT*, 27 January, 3 March 1988.
93. *NYT*, 21 July 1987.
94. Unless indicated in the table, the sources are: secretary-general's oral report to the Security Council — Reuters, 18 September 1987; responses by Iran and Iraq to secretary-general's latest peace proposals — Reuters, 3 November 1987.
95. INA, 22 July — DR, 23 July 1987.
96. ENA, 27 July — DR, 28 July 1987.
97. Ibid.
98. R. Tehran, 21, 22 July — DR, 21, 23 July 1987.
99. R. Tehran, 22 July — DR, 23 July 1987.
100. INA, 1 August — DR, 3 August 1987.

PALESTINIAN ISSUES

The Palestine Liberation Organization

JOSHUA TEITELBAUM

The year under review was marked by internal reconciliation in the PLO, culminating in the convening of the 18th Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers in April. The process had begun in 1986, following King Husayn of Jordan's 19 February speech, which brought political coordination between the two parties to an official halt. Actually, during the period between the signing of the Amman agreement in February 1985 and Husayn's speech there had been no coordination at all; the PLO and Jordan attempted, rather, to co-opt and restrain each other (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 195-209; 1986, pp. 165-72). During the first half of 1987 the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) continued its efforts to bring the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and Yasir 'Arafat's al-Fath organization together, as this was the *sine qua non* for the convening of the PNC. As in 1986, discussion centered on several issues, but the main sticking point remained the Fath's refusal to publicly and unequivocally abrogate the Amman agreement. This obstacle was finally overcome, and the PNC was convened in what was certainly a victory for 'Arafat. Organizational reforms adopted at the PNC did not limit 'Arafat's room to maneuver, and he continued to do as he saw fit in all important spheres.

The "camps war" continued more or less unabated in Lebanon. The Palestinians increased their presence there and held their own against the Syrian-backed Amal militia. While the November Arab summit in Amman relegated the Palestinian issue to a lower priority and Husayn snubbed 'Arafat, the Palestinian problem was rescued from marginalization by the uprising that began in Gaza and the West Bank in December.

THE EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

BASIC POSITIONS: THE DOCUMENTS OF TUNIS AND TRIPOLI

George Habash, secretary-general of the PFLP, and Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad), a senior Fath Central Committee member, had already met in late 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 193-94) in what was one of the first major breakthroughs on the way to internal reconciliation and the convening of the PNC. While al-Fath, the DFLP, Muhammad 'Abbas' (Abu al-'Abbas) faction of the Palestine Liberation Front (PLF), the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) and the Arab Liberation Front (ALF) had more or less agreed to convene the PNC, the PFLP remained the main spoiler. It held out for al-Fath concessions on a clear and public abrogation of the Amman agreement, on the nature of Jordanian-PLO relations in general, and on collective leadership and relations with Egypt.

The PLO's cancellation of the Amman agreement was primarily of symbolic significance for the PFLP, since in any case Husayn had officially "suspended" it in his February 1986 speech. Yet it was perceived as the true litmus test of 'Arafat's real intentions to put a halt to what had become known as the politics of "yes and no" (*la'am*; see *MECS* 1982-83, p. 296; 1986, p. 174). 'Arafat was prepared to cancel the Amman agreement, but only if the PFLP returned to the fold. The cat-and-mouse game played in 1986 thus continued for the first part of 1987; the PFLP would not commit itself to attend the PNC before the PLO canceled the agreement, while 'Arafat continued to refuse to make such a move until the PFLP announced it would attend the PNC.

The Soviet Union, which had opposed the Amman agreement as American-orchestrated, had apparently promised 'Arafat that it would pressure Syria and the PFLP to cooperate in convening the PNC if he rejected Husayn's pressure to accept UN Security Council Resolution 242 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 171). Indeed, it continued to be active in pressing for internal reconciliation. Algeria, an ally of the USSR, had already offered its capital as a venue for the PNC, and was to be the true handmaiden of *rapprochement*.

'Arafat's strategy was simple. At least at this stage, he reckoned, his Jordanian option had run its course; the Hashemite king was now asking too much of him, since recognition of Resolution 242 implied recognition of Israel's right to exist (see below and chapter on Jordan). He therefore turned inward, to repair the internal PLO damage caused by his policy since he was forced out of Beirut in 1982 and Tripoli in 1983. 'Arafat and his supporters in the Fath mainstream stressed that the very fact that Husayn had suspended the Amman agreement was a vindication of 'Arafat's determination not to make any concessions of historical significance. It was thus time to regroup on the Palestinian front and prevent Husayn from increasing his influence in the West Bank and trying to develop an alternative leadership there.

'Arafat's main goal during the reconciliation process was to achieve the greatest degree of unity at the lowest possible cost to his and al-Fath's preeminence in the PLO, to relations with Jordan and Egypt, and to the PLO's standing in any future attempt at a peace settlement. Al-Fath entered the process from a position of strength, since it already had the DFLP on its side. Its leaders constantly announced that they would hold the PNC with any faction that showed up,¹ a position that threatened the PELP. If this occurred, the PFLP would be in the same trouble as it was after the 17th PNC in Amman, in November 1984, when it lost its position on the PLO's Executive Committee (EC) and therefore any chance of limiting 'Arafat's room to maneuver. On the issue of instituting the "collective leadership" demanded by the PFLP and the DFLP — as agreed to by al-Fath in the Aden accords of 1984 (see *MECS* 1983-84, pp. 219-21) and subsequently ignored by its leadership — Fath replied disingenuously that the EC was already a collective leadership.² On the issue of relations with Jordan, al-Fath was prepared to abrogate the Amman agreement, but to go no further. Yet it insisted that this should not be a precondition for attending the comprehensive national dialogue, as demanded by the PFLP, since it was only one of the "details [that could be agreed upon] during the dialogue."³ In keeping with the policy of guarding one's options, 'Arafat wanted to keep channels of communication open.

The PFLP continued to doubt al-Fath's sincerity, and accused 'Arafat of trying to revive the Amman agreement through Egyptian mediation. Statements such as

'Arafat made to Reuters in mid-March — that any Palestinian, not only a PLO representative, could participate in an international peace conference — were evidence in the eyes of the PFLP that the Fath Central Committee's contacts with it were only tactics. "This is precisely the reason why we are demanding that the agreement be abrogated in a public and official manner," stressed George Habash. Al-Fath's promises that the agreement would be canceled at the PNC were likewise evidence of its lack of seriousness, Habash said, since "our Palestinian masses know full well that the Amman agreement was signed by the Executive Committee and not by the Palestine National Council." As the comprehensive national dialogue that the PFLP was asked to join would precede the PNC, Habash stated that the Front did not want to "cheat our masses" by attending if it was not assured of success. This necessitated the cancellation of the Amman agreement. Habash went still further: the comprehensive national dialogue would have to include a critical survey of the development of the revolution since 1965, although not everything would be a topic of discussion, "since in that case the issue of treason itself would be a part of the dialogue." Habash was thus signaling that if al-Fath wanted a comprehensive dialogue it would not be a whitewash, but a true discussion of its erring ways.⁴

The PFLP also set forth another condition for participation in the dialogue: since it did not recognize the legality of the 17th PNC in Amman, the next PNC could not be consecutive in number, namely, the 18th.⁵ This, of course, was unacceptable to the Fath, as it would have made the EC formed at the 17th PNC illegitimate and invalidated its work since 1984. Fath Central Committee member Salah Khalaf (Abu Iyad) noted that al-Fath was "not represented at the first three Palestine National Council sessions during the time of the late Ahmad al-Shuqayri [first head of the PLO]. When we joined the Palestine National Council at a later time we did not annul the previous sessions."⁶

Na'if Hawatima's DFLP continued, as it had done in the previous year, to take the position of mediator — aided by the Soviet Union, Algeria and, to some extent, Libya — between al-Fath and the PFLP. Most of its statements were carefully balanced to establish itself in the center, and thus it was critical of both sides. According to Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh, the DFLP deputy secretary-general, the Prague Declaration of September 1986 (which the DFLP interpreted as having annulled the Amman agreement) was opposed by two "deviationist" trends: the "capitulationist" one (of al-Fath) which was still "captivated by American solutions" on the one hand, and the "extremist and adventurist" trend (of the PFLP and the smaller radical organizations) on the other. Both sides had committed cardinal sins: al-Fath had pursued "individualist" policies outside of the Palestinian consensus, resulting in the Amman agreement, and had refused to take steps to show that it was abiding by the Prague Declaration; the PFLP had also erred grievously by going outside the PLO and joining the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF). It was thus time to return, via an unconditional and comprehensive national dialogue, to the PLO's national program.⁷

One of the milestones on the way to the PNC was the convening of the fifth General Congress of the General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists, a constituent organization of the PLO, at the al-Sanawbar Palace in Algiers on 8 February. The congress resembled a mini-PNC, and in many ways was a trial run for the 18th PNC. Al-Fath insisted on calling it the fifth General Congress, as it followed the fourth

General Congress held in San'a in April 1984.⁸ Upon the PFLP's demand, however, the preparatory meeting crowned it the "Unified Congress," omitting "the fifth." This was because the fourth General Congress had been boycotted by the Front, was an "illegal" forum and had been convened under "rightist slogans." Later, the PFLP accused al-Fath of not abiding by this decision and publishing material in the name of the fifth General Congress.⁹ Both Fath and the PFLP portrayed the congress as their contribution to unity, yet it was fraught with internecine fighting.¹⁰ 'Arafat's speech at the congress dealt exclusively with the war of the camps¹¹ and did not touch on the issue perceived by the PFLP to be the basis of the division in the PLO, namely 'Arafat's own acceptance of "American solutions." This, the PFLP magazine *al-Hadaf* commented, proved "the lack of seriousness of the Palestinian right [i.e., 'Arafat's Fath] concerning the return of unity to the PLO."¹² The major success of the congress was the very fact that it took place with the participation of all of the major factions.

Meetings between officials of the various Palestinian factions were held throughout the first part of the year in Tripoli, Tunis and Algiers; the frequency of these meetings indicated the increased pace of the preparatory work. Algerian President Chedli Benjedid and Libyan leader Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi used their personal authority to bring the sides together.

The Fath-dominated bloc — the Fath, the ALF, and Muhammad 'Abbas' PLF faction — held its meetings with the DFLP and the PCP in Algiers and Tunis. While the DFLP had trumpeted the Prague Declaration as amounting to al-Fath's retraction of the Amman agreement, it knew that it needed more concessions and guarantees from al-Fath to bring the PFLP into the fold. Discussions in Tunis and Algiers thus centered primarily on the modalities for the cancellation of the agreement, but other organizational and political issues were also debated.

These negotiations moved into high gear at talks that opened in Tunis on 9 March.¹³ On 16 March the organizations signed the "Tunis document," which was to serve as a working paper for the comprehensive national dialogue to precede the PNC. It was agreed that the dialogue would begin on 10 April, and the PNC on 20 April;¹⁴ the agreement was approved by the PLO's EC.¹⁵ The Tunis document included certain concessions by 'Arafat, mostly on organizational points that were designed to limit his power. Al-Fath agreed in the document to allow the Central Council (CC) — the intermediate body between the PNC and the EC — to be elected by the PNC instead of being appointed by the EC. The CC would be empowered to supervise the implementation of PNC resolutions and to oversee the work of the EC. The EC itself would be expanded (and thus would presumably include more representatives from radical factions) and an actions board (*hay'at 'amal*) would be established to make decisions on a day-to-day basis between meetings of the EC. The organization of PLO departments and institutions would be done on the basis of full representation of all organizations (*bi-asas...jabhawī*). These points were along the general lines of the Aden accords for the creation of the collective leadership demanded by many factions. 'Arafat agreed to these restrictions in order to facilitate the convening of the PNC; the most restrictive of them were not implemented.

Al-Fath consented to abolish the Amman agreement at the PNC. This was the first explicit Fath commitment to do so (in the Prague Declaration, al-Fath had conceded only that the Amman agreement "was no longer operative"); yet al-Fath remained firm that it would do so only at the PNC and not during the dialogue. There was,

therefore, some progress on this point, but the specific modalities for canceling remained unclear. 'Abd Rabbuh, deputy secretary-general of the DFLP, revealed what appeared to have been agreed upon in private: an announcement of al-Fath's commitment to recall the agreement would come during the dialogue; the official and public affirmation of the cancellation would come at the PNC.¹⁶

PLO participation at an international conference was to be on "an independent basis and on an equal footing with the other parties" (*'ala asas mustaqill wa-mutakafi' ma' al-atraf al-ma'aniyya al-ukhra*). This formulation, which had appeared in the Prague Declaration, represented a harder line, going beyond the resolutions of the Amman PNC (see *MECS* 1984-85, p. 192) and implying that the PLO would not participate in a Jordanian or even an all-Arab delegation. The Tunis document stressed that the EC would be chosen at the pre-PNC national dialogue, with the obvious implication for the radical factions that if they did not attend the dialogue they would be left out of the EC once again. The parties to the Tunis document agreed to disagree on the thorny issue of relations with Egypt, postponing a discussion of the subject until the comprehensive dialogue. The way now seemed free of major obstacles. On 20 March it was officially announced that the EC had begun to issue invitations to the dialogue, to begin on 10 April, and the PNC, to convene on 20 April.¹⁷

The Syrian — and Libyan-supported groups, members of the PNSF — the PFLP, Ahmad Jibril's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), Abu Nidal's Fath-Revolutionary Council, Samir Ghawsha's Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), former PNC chairman Khalid al-Fahum, and Tal'at Ya'qub's faction of the PLF — met in Tripoli in February and March. The DFLP was also a party to these negotiations. Conspicuous by their absence were the Syrian-run al-Sa'iqa organization and the Fath Uprising (the Fath rebels) led by Sa'id Musa Muragha (Abu Musa). The former's absence was a sign of Syrian displeasure with the meetings in Tripoli; Muragha arrived in Tripoli but left, reportedly in protest at the presence of Wazir at the anniversary celebrations of the Jamahiriyya in early March.¹⁸ On the sidelines of the Tripoli meetings, Wazir met with Habash in Tripoli and Algiers.¹⁹

Negotiations in the Libyan capital, carried on intensively from 19-23 March, finally resulted in the "Tripoli document,"²⁰ which reflected the basic views of the PNSF. While not including such extreme demands as had been made in the past, such as the specific exclusion of 'Arafat, the Tripoli document represented a point of view far more radical than the Tunis document on both the political and the organizational levels. In the political sphere, the organizations agreed to adhere to the resolutions of the Rabat (1974) and Baghdad (1978) summits — but no mention was made of the Fez summit (1982). All the radical factions, except the DFLP, had previously rejected the Fez resolutions, whose seventh clause implied recognition of Israel. In the resolutions of the 16th PNC (attended by all factions), they had consented to recognize the Fez resolutions as the "minimum for political movement" (see *MECS* 1982-83, p. 319). The Tripoli document expressed loyalty to the legitimate (*shariyya*) PNCs "until the 16th session," and demanded a halt to all diplomatic ties with Egypt. Of course, it was required that the Amman agreement be abolished.

On organizational matters, the parties to the Tripoli document went far beyond the Tunis document, demanding several changes that were clearly unacceptable to 'Arafat. Behind these demands lay a fundamental difference between the radical factions (in

this case, including the DFLP) and al-Fath in their respective perceptions of the very nature of the PLO as an organization. The radicals saw the PLO as a broad national front, a true umbrella organization representative of all views. Al-Fath, on the other hand, regarded it as an institution where the majority view — that of al-Fath — should prevail. The PFLP, for example, often accused 'Arafat of trying to give the PLO a one-dimensional character by instituting "right-wing policies" — those of al-Fath. The DFLP felt the same way, and Hawatima expressed the hope that with the new PNC "we will be able to rebuild the whole of the PLO's institutions on a wide frontal base."²¹ The Tripoli demands should be seen in this light. The document specifically stated that there was a need to put an end to "unilateral political decision-making [since the PLO] is a national front in need of a reliable collective leadership." The mechanism for doing this, as outlined in the Tripoli document, was to give the CC and the PNC much more power over the EC than it originally had, even beyond what was agreed to by al-Fath in Tunis. For instance, the CC would be empowered to freeze the membership of up to one third of EC members; the CC would have decision-making powers (in Tunis it was agreed only that the CC would "supervise" the EC); and the PNC would draw up bylaws for the EC (in Tunis: the EC would draw up its own bylaws). Moreover, membership in the next PNC would be based on the 16th session; in other words, as it was before the 17th, where 'Arafat packed the PNC with his supporters (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 187). As will be remembered, in Tunis it was agreed to establish an "actions board" to run the daily affairs of the EC; in Tripoli however, the parties demanded a secretariat-general (*amana 'amma*), implying much more than an actions board, which would form a collective working leadership.

As noted above, much of the Tripoli document consisted of the detailed reservations of each party to various clauses.²² The most important point in these reservations centered on the modalities for the cancellation of the Amman agreement. Several factions continued to demand that this be done before the pre-PNC dialogue; the PFLP, however, agreed to accept abrogation at the first round of the dialogue, if this were accompanied by Arab guarantees. These were apparently provided by Qadhdhafi and Benjedid. It was reported that al-Fath had provided Qadhdhafi with a written promise to abrogate, and following that Qadhdhafi had threatened those groups which enjoyed Libyan aid that they would lose it if they did not attend the PNC. This, of course, included the PFLP,²³ the most significant radical faction. The PFLP was now prepared to enter the dialogue. Here, then, was the meeting point between Tunis and Tripoli.

THE COMPREHENSIVE NATIONAL DIALOGUE AND THE ABROGATION OF THE AMMAN AGREEMENT

The time between the signing of the Tripoli document and the convening of the pre-PNC dialogue on 13 April (postponed from 10 April, the date originally announced) was spent in trying to solve some of the outstanding problems between the parties. Habash met with Wazir in Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers in early April. The most serious sticking point was relations with Egypt. The PFLP continued to have its doubts about al-Fath's willingness to curtail relations with Cairo, and saw Fath Central Committee member Hani al-Hasan's visit there in late March as evidence of al-Fath's "disregard for the efforts to renew unity" (on relations with Egypt, see below).²⁴ The PFLP, based in Damascus, tried to enlist Syrian support for the

convening of the PNC. Having more or less agreed to participate in the dialogue, it continued to insist that its participation in the PNC be based on the Tripoli document, which, while not satisfying Syrian demands for the ouster of 'Arafat, would seriously limit his room to maneuver if implemented.²⁵ The Soviets were also involved in reconciliation efforts at this stage, receiving a Fath-DFLP delegation which left for Moscow on 3 April, and trying to cool Syrian opposition.²⁶

Al-Fath and the DFLP, however, had their minds set on getting the dialogue under way. 'Arafat had stayed out of reconciliation negotiations with the other factions, preferring to leave them to his associates. On 11 April, Hawatima and 'Arafat met in Algiers — the first known meeting between them since just before the signing of the Amman agreement in February 1985.²⁷ On 12 April, Benjedid gathered all the factions that were to participate in the dialogue, and later that day 'Arafat and Habash finally met face-to-face. During this meeting 'Arafat confirmed the decision of the Fath Central Committee and its Revolutionary Council to cancel the Amman agreement, and also promised that the EC would convene to abrogate it officially before the PNC convened. In Habash's words, "this allowed us in the PFLP to take part in the dialogue."²⁸

The dialogue finally opened the following day, with the participation of al-Fath, the DFLP, the PFLP, the PCP, Sabri al-Banna's (Abu Nidal) Fath-Revolutionary Council, both factions of the PLF, the ALF and the PPSF. Although technically the dialogue was not part of the PNC, it signaled that reconciliation was well on its way. Outstanding issues included getting Syrian consent and defining the nature of relations with Egypt, but, the Tripoli document aside, the PFLP was no longer out in the cold. Habash had met with 'Arafat, a pariah in the eyes of Syria and much of the PNSF, and there was no turning back.

Efforts were made during the dialogue to get Syrian acceptance, if not support, for the PNC. Syria, however, was operating in an opposite direction and trying to foil the PNC. On the eve of the discussions, Hawatima, Habash and Ya'qub received "invitations" to return to Damascus; they refused.²⁹ Hawatima and Habash, in particular, while at times enjoying Syrian support and sometimes dependent on Syria, were by no means puppets. They realized that there might be a price to pay for their independence, but they were willing to risk it since the reconciliation effort had the backing of Algeria and Libya. Syria also put pressure on Habash by having several activists in his own organization publish *Communiqué Number One* in which PFLP members attacked his views.³⁰ The main Palestinian conveying the Syrian point of view was PNSF leader and former PNC Chairman Fahum. His participation would mean Syrian consent, but he was demanding an endorsement of the Tripoli document and the sending of a delegation to Damascus. "Anyone who participates in the Algiers conference on any basis other than the Tripoli document," he emphasized, "will find that the Damascus gates are closed."³¹ As noted, the Tripoli document was a non-starter, so there was no chance of a reconciliation with Damascus on the eve of the PNC. Many Palestinians saw these Syrian moves — probably correctly — as simply an attempt to delay the PNC.³²

While little was published on the content of the dialogue itself, from what did filter out it was clear that the talks were characterized by a surprising amount of self-criticism and soul-searching. Abu 'Ali Mustafa al-Zibri, deputy secretary-general of the PFLP, admitted that in the past the PFLP had believed that Palestinian unity should be

founded on a strategic relationship with Syria, yet now it held that Palestinian unity was the key to relations with Syria. He added that the PFLP's previous preconditions for participating in the dialogue were wrong, since the dialogue itself was necessary. Mustafa apologized for previous personal attacks on 'Arafat in which he was accused of being a traitor — these were incorrect as had been al-Fath's accusations that the factions that opposed 'Arafat were stooges of Arab regimes. Salah Khalaf, on behalf of al-Fath, admitted that al-Fath's political assessments had not always been correct. Such self-reproach by major figures in both factions created an optimistic atmosphere for the convening of the PNC.³³

At the beginning of the dialogue, Habash had insisted that the PLO break off relations with Egypt as a prerequisite for PFLP participation in the PNC.³⁴ The front later softened its position, consenting to allow the problem to be settled by the new EC on the basis of previous PNC resolutions, a formula that left sufficient ambiguity to overcome this temporary obstacle. Habash said that the PFLP had decided to continue its "serious and indefatigable struggle to provide all the factors necessary for a national unity" from within the PLO framework.³⁵ Relations with Egypt was one of the issues on which Fath stood as firm as it could. Khalid al-Hasan, a senior Fath member and adviser to 'Arafat, put it succinctly: "There will be no cut in relations with Egypt; we are not that stupid."³⁶

Al-Fath was also intent on opposing moves to institute a collective leadership of the type envisaged in the Tripoli document. There were rumors at the dialogue that if the radical factions insisted on this, 'Arafat would "resign," as he had during the Amman PNC.³⁷ They did not insist. At the end of the dialogue it was clear that al-Fath had succeeded in fending off some of the more far-reaching claims for a collective leadership.

On the sidelines of the reconciliation dialogue, two minor dramas played themselves out. Sabri al-Banna's group, the Fath-Revolutionary Council, had been participating in meetings of the radical factions held in Tripoli, and was represented by the organization's spokesman, 'Atif Abu Bakr. The Tripoli document had demanded that Banna's organization be included in the PNC. "Well informed sources" were quoted as saying that Banna himself had met with Wazir in Algiers on 11 April.³⁸ Algeria and Libya were involved in mediation efforts. Al-Fath demanded that Banna stop armed operations overseas and attacks on Palestinian personalities. Palestinian sources said that the growing contacts between the two organizations were the result of increased cooperation in the camps war in Lebanon and the tension in relations between the Fath-Revolutionary Council and Syria, after the latter limited the former's activities on Syrian territory. Al-Fath eventually broke off the talks due to opposition within the ranks. Many in al-Fath and other organizations opposed the representation of Banna's group out of concern for the PLO's international image (see below).³⁹ The other event on the sidelines was the beginning of a *rapprochement* between the Ya'qub and 'Abbas factions of the PLF, the result of efforts by Libya and Algeria. In the summer, it was officially announced that the two wings had merged. Ya'qub became PLF secretary-general and 'Abbas became deputy secretary-general.⁴⁰

During the reconciliation dialogue the parties reached agreement on a working paper,⁴¹ which was no more than a copy of the Tunis document — and thus a relative victory for 'Arafat. As noted above, concessions, albeit minor ones, were made in the organizational and, to some extent, in the political sphere. As promised, on the eve of

the PNC (19 April) the EC officially abrogated the Amman agreement, stressing that "since this agreement has actually become impractical in reality, [the EC] considers the agreement null and void."⁴² (For the Jordanian reaction, see chapter on Jordan.) On the same day, Habash announced that the PNSF had been disbanded. However, the spokesman for the PNSF claimed that the PFLP's bolting of the alliance did not mean its disbanding.⁴³ But Habash's act robbed the PNSF of any claim to represent a significant segment of Palestinians.

'Arafat, with his unique sense of political theater, sent a three-man Fath squad to infiltrate Israel's northern border on the night of 19 April. They crossed the border near Kibbutz Manara, and succeeded in killing two IDF soldiers before they themselves were shot dead.⁴⁴

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL: PROCEEDINGS

The 18th PNC met from 20–26 April at the al-Sanawbar Palace, about 15 km. west of Algiers. Participating were all of the factions which had participated in the pre-PNC dialogue, except for the PPSF and the Fath-Revolutionary Council. In stark contrast to the 17th PNC, which had convened under slogans suggesting open defiance of Syria (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 187–88), the 18th PNC met under the slogans of "national unity" (*al-wahda al-wataniyya*) and "the steadfastness of the Palestinian camps and our people's struggle in the occupied land" (*sumud al-mukharramat al-filastiniyya wa-nidal sha'buna fi al-ard al-muhtalla*). The convening of the PNC was a tribute to 'Arafat's political acumen as well as to his durability as a symbol of Palestinian nationalism. In Amman in 1984, 'Arafat had succeeded in convening a PNC that gave legitimacy to his negotiations with Jordan, which led to the Amman agreement, despite fierce Syrian opposition. This phase had ended, and 'Arafat had again been able to convene a PNC on his terms. To again become central players in the Palestinian arena, Habash and Hawatima had no choice but to go through 'Arafat and al-Fath. 'Arafat, for his part, had to pay a minor political and organizational price for their participation, but it was a price he could surely afford.

Following the opening speech by the chairman of the PNC, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, 'Arafat addressed the plenum. He paid tribute to Algeria, the USSR and Libya (Qadhdhafi actually boycotted the PNC in protest against the rejection of the Tripoli document)⁴⁵ for their efforts to facilitate reconciliation. Swept-up in the enthusiasm of reunification, 'Arafat departed from his usually diplomatic formulations of al-Fath's final goals: "The pledge, the pledge is the pledge — the Palestinian rifle shall not be laid down until we reach Palestine, all Palestine." He did not mince words: "This Palestinian land will remain Arab, Arab." On the other hand, he did not repeat the demand for independent Palestinian representation at an international conference, noting only the need for "equal footing."⁴⁶ This was a retreat from the agreed-upon formulation in the Tunis document, indicating that the latter may have been a tactical concession to get the parties to the PNC. Indeed, "equal footing" was the position announced in the final statement of the Amman PNC, which had been boycotted by the radicals (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 225).

In deference to his Algerian hosts — or perhaps in response to direct pressure from them — 'Arafat invited Muhammad 'Abd al-'Aziz, secretary-general of the Polisario Front, to address the PNC. In his speech, 'Abd al-'Aziz compared the struggle of the

Saharan people against Morocco to that of the Palestinians⁴⁷ (for the Moroccan reaction and PLO response, see below).

On the organizational level, the PCP was admitted to the PNC for the first time. This was in keeping with the Tunis document. This was not accomplished, however, without some grumbling, as several factions believed that this would be a precedent for the entrance of other organizations and parties.⁴⁸ The PCP agreed to join the armed struggle and to abide by the Palestine National Charter and the PNC resolutions.⁴⁹ In agreeing to this step, al-Fath paid a debt to the Soviet Union as well as to the DFLP with which the PCP had formed the Democratic Alliance. The PCP was given seven seats in the PNC⁵⁰ and, even more significantly, a position on the EC (see below). Among the independents admitted to the PNC were three representatives of Islamic trends associated in one way or another with Islamic Jihad⁵¹ (see essay on the West Bank and the Gaza Strip).

One of the main demands made by the DFLP and the PFLP was that the CC be given more authority over the EC as a step toward the democratization of the PLO and the establishment of a collective leadership. 'Arafat and al-Fath did their best to water down all efforts in this regard. A drafting committee had come up with organizational changes that went far beyond anything 'Arafat was prepared to accept. In the draft, the CC was to be empowered to "control and supervise" the EC and to freeze membership in it.⁵² The end result was more favorable to 'Arafat: the CC, in keeping with the Tunis document, was empowered only to "follow up and observe" the work of the EC; it was not given power to freeze membership.⁵³ The CC was expanded to 75 members and was elected by the PNC instead of the EC, as had been the previous practice. The composition of the CC was agreed upon ahead of time and put to a voice vote of the PNC. Although some technical concessions were made by 'Arafat on the issue of the CC's makeup, its powers remained limited, and it met rarely. (Its first meeting after the PNC was not held until October.) 'Arafat had effectively quashed the attempt to increase the power of the CC over the EC.

Concerning the membership of the EC, 'Arafat had a tougher battle. Habash and Hawatima tried to expand the number of members from 15 to 20 in order to give more representation to the radical factions,⁵⁴ but 'Arafat prevailed again. The actions board, which Hawatima conceived as being "the day-to-day collective leadership, which has in its control the political and diplomatic as well as the military, organizational and financial decision[s],"⁵⁵ was also watered down by al-Fath. 'Arafat succeeded in having this body termed *lajnat 'amal* (action committee) in order to downgrade its importance, and it was only allowed to follow up but not control the EC. 'Arafat's aim was to prevent this body from having any decision-making powers and from conflicting with the powers of the EC itself. In the end, 'Arafat won out, and the EC was entrusted with forming the actions committee within three months.⁵⁶ 'Arafat naturally had a majority in the EC and, by the end of the year, there was no indication that this had been done.

The EC formed by the PNC comprised 15 members, one more (from the PCP) than the EC approved at the 17th PNC. The portfolios were announced in May.⁵⁷ (Asterisks indicate new members.)

1. Yasir 'Arafat (Fath) — chairman of the EC and head of the Military Department.
2. Faruq al-Qaddumi (Fath) — Political Department.
3. Jamal al-Sawrani (independent) — secretary and head of the Administrative Affairs Department.

4. Mahmud 'Abbas (Fath) — Arab and International Relations Department.
5. Muhammad Milhim (independent) — Occupied Homeland Affairs Department.
6. 'Abd al-Razzaq al-Yahya (independent) — Education, Economy Departments.
7. Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh (DFLP)* — Information Department.
8. Abu 'Ali Mustafa al-Zibri (PFLP)* — Repatriates' Affairs Department.
9. Sulayman al-Najjab (PCP)* — Social Affairs Department.
10. 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad (ALF) — Labor and Popular Organizations Department.
11. 'Abdallah Hurani (independent)* — Cultural Affairs Department.
12. Mahmud Darwish (independent)* — chairman of the Supreme Council for Culture, Heritage and Information.
13. Bishop Iliya Khuri (independent).
14. Muhammad 'Abbas (PLF).
15. Jawid al-Ghusayn (independent) — chairman of the Board of the Palestine National Fund.⁵⁸

It was clear from the makeup of the new PNC that 'Arafat had maintained control. Al-Fath had three seats and was supported by the representatives of the PLF and the ALF, as well as the independents, giving 'Arafat an effective majority.

THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL: RESOLUTIONS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE

The issue on which 'Arafat probably made the biggest formal concession was relations with Egypt. The resolution on Egypt (for full text of political resolutions, see Appendix I) was prefaced by an acknowledgment of Egypt's "historic role" in fighting Zionism, inserted by 'Arafat to soften the blow of the operative clause in the resolution. This clause called upon the EC to define relations with Egypt "in accordance with the successive PNC resolutions, especially those of the sixteenth session." The latter had called on the EC "to develop PLO relations with Egyptian nationalist, democratic, and popular forces" (see *MECS* 1982–83, p. 319) — in other words, with the Egyptian opposition. Moreover, the 16th PNC had ordered the EC to define relations with Egypt on the basis of Cairo's abandonment of the Camp David policy. In the resolutions of the 18th PNC there were built-in safeguards that provided room for 'Arafat to maneuver — the resolution charged the EC with defining relations, and 'Arafat had a majority there. All that the radicals could hope to do, then, was to exert influence, but they could not dictate.

Disagreements over the language of the resolution on Egypt precipitated much controversy at the PNC. Under pressure from Egypt, 'Arafat tried to have the resolution amended, but was only partially successful, and the DFLP and PFLP threatened to walk out if a hard-line resolution was not approved.⁵⁹ Agreement was finally reached at a meeting between Habash and 'Arafat in the presence of the Soviet ambassador to Algeria, Vasily Taratuta,⁶⁰ indicating the importance attached by the Soviets to Palestinian reconciliation. In the end, 'Arafat agreed to the hard-line version, in what was probably a trade-off for fewer restrictions on him in the organizational sphere. The Egyptian delegation walked out in protest against the resolution⁶¹ (see further below).

On the issue of the nature of PLO representation at an international peace conference, 'Arafat succeeded in having the words "on an independent basis" (this had been the language in the Tunis document) eliminated from a draft,⁶² so that the final

one stipulated only that the PLO be represented "on an equal footing" with the other parties. Such language left the PLO the option of being included in an all-Arab delegation, or even being represented equally in a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. Al-Fath had been prepared to accept such a delegation in 1985, and although it did not include it in its published version of the Amman agreement, the Jordanians did (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 198).

The PLO reiterated its standard rejection of UN Security Council Resolution 242, not counting it among the resolutions that might form the basis for negotiations at the conference. 'Arafat had specifically accepted Resolution 242 — as long as it was coupled with other UN resolutions — during negotiations with Husayn in early 1986, at the non-aligned summit in Harare in September 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 201), and in Geneva in September 1987 (see below). Yet such a formulation would have been impossible at the PNC of "national unity," where the lowest common denominator had to prevail. In any event, 'Arafat preferred for the time being to concentrate on internal unity, since coordination with Jordan and achieving US recognition of the PLO now seemed remote (for further discussion of the PLO view of the international conference, see below).

Concerning Jordan, the resolution reflected the cooling of bilateral relations and the strong influence of the hard-line factions, yet did not burn any bridges and certainly kept options open. Reacting to Jordan's plans to increase its influence in the West Bank and among Palestinian refugees in Jordan (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 175–81), the resolution specifically stated that the PLO was the Palestinian people's "sole and legitimate representative inside and *outside* the occupied territories" (emphasis added). The resolution reiterated previous PNC decisions that future relations with Jordan should be based on confederal ties between two independent states.

As expected, the resolution on relations with Syria was more conciliatory than that of the 17th PNC, calling for a "correcting" of relations (see below). A special resolution was included on Lebanon, justifying the Palestinian presence there.

'Arafat emerged as the true victor from the 18th PNC. In the organizational sphere he had made some concessions, but they did not go beyond the cosmetic. That the radical organizations could achieve no more was a testimony to al-Fath's true dominance of the Palestinian scene. Habash and Hawatima were eager to return to the PLO, if only to try to keep 'Arafat away from solutions they found unpalatable. But their only option was simple persuasion, since 'Arafat was strong enough to prevent serious structural changes that would bind him beyond what he considered acceptable. The radicals would have to rely on those sharing their views within al-Fath itself to restrain 'Arafat. As noted above, the actions board was apparently never constituted, and probably went the way of the Aden accords and the various committees formed by the CC after the 17th PNC. These committees were supposed to keep a close watch on 'Arafat, but there was no evidence that they ever met or did any serious work (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 191–92). While Hawatima heralded the "reforms" as meaning the end "of the period of individualist domination of PLO affairs,"⁶³ the organizational changes of the 18th PNC produced far less than a true collective leadership and the "broad national front" desired by the radicals.

In the political sphere, 'Arafat's most substantial compromise was in the resolution dealing with Egypt. But even on this issue he later acted true to form by doing as he pleased. 'Arafat maintained an open dialogue with Egypt and even met President

Husni Mubarak in Addis Ababa. As far as the international conference was concerned, 'Arafat's Fath had again succeeded in heading off formulations that would have limited him too much.

The importance of the 18th PNC lay more in the 'Arafat-dominated "unity" that was achieved than in the nature or the language of the resolutions. Again it was demonstrated that, in many senses, 'Arafat was the PLO. He would have to be more considerate of the views of the radicals, but little more than that. By bringing in the PFLP he had broken up the PNSF, or at least reduced it to insignificance, and thus brought all important Palestinian organizations under his wing. It was a co-optive move, as they were less of a danger to him there. This gained time for 'Arafat, almost an undefined grace period during which he could do pretty much as he pleased since the radicals would not be willing to risk another break. As long as the peace process was stalemated and the PLO was not being called upon to make concessions, 'Arafat preferred to close ranks and concentrate on true common denominators, such as pursuing the armed struggle in the occupied territories and from Lebanon. Increasing his presence in Lebanon was also a major priority.

By his maneuvering and with the aid of the Soviet Union, 'Arafat had forced Syria into accepting the PNC as a *fait accompli*. Rather than further alienating Syria from the PLO, the PNC left Syria with fewer Palestinian cards, and the rest of the year did see some minor progress towards some kind of PLO-Syrian *rapprochement*.

The 18th PNC was also the first such gathering since the war of the camps began in 1985. Palestinian organizations had been fighting side-by-side for two years against al-Amal, which was supported by Syria. While political considerations were the main factors behind the reconciliation, there could be no doubt that the emotive effect of being brothers-in-arms facing a common threat pushed the reconciliation along.

DEVELOPMENTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

INTERORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS

The PNC had the immediate result of toning down the rhetorical battles between the important organizations within the PLO. Minor groups such as the PFLP-GC, al-Sa'iqa, and the Fath rebels continued to protest and to attack 'Arafat, and Fahum tried to convene a "second session" of the PNC in Damascus, but all this was of little significance. A PFLP-GC spokesman protested — correctly — that the configuration of the EC gave 'Arafat the ability to make unilateral decisions.⁶⁴

During the PNC, Hawatima had hailed proposed organizational reforms as "ending the era of individualist domination of PLO affairs" (see above); but following the PNC and the approval of less restrictive reforms than originally proposed, Hawatima was considerably less sanguine. A major issue on the agenda of the DFLP after the PNC, noted Hawatima, was "the continuation of our struggle to democratize the institutions of the PLO and to create real democracy inside these institutions."⁶⁵ He continued to talk about the actions committee as if it were about to be formed,⁶⁶ but this never happened. 'Arafat, when pressed on the committee issue by Bilal al-Hasan (the editor of the Palestinian magazine *al-Yawm al-Sabi'* and the brother of Fath Central Committee members Hani and Khalid al-Hasan), evaded the question. He

said: "Who fabricated this against me? *Et tu Brute!* No Palestinian decision was taken without the Executive Committees's approval." Khalaf spoke less cryptically: "We feel that since an agreement has been reached on the basic political issue, the political leadership should have the freedom to act."⁶⁷ The organizational reforms of the PNC thus fell by the wayside.

Habash admitted that the PFLP did not achieve much in the organizational sphere, but what was achieved would serve as a basis for further struggle.⁶⁸ For the PFLP, the main goal after the PNC was to bring about a reconciliation between 'Arafat and Syria.⁶⁹ It was not about to destroy this chance by pushing 'Arafat too far on organizational matters.

As noted, the rhetorical level was kept low during the year. Real protests were concentrated on 'Arafat's insistence on maintaining and even improving relations with Cairo. The Politburo of the DFLP passed a resolution protesting against the PLO leadership's contacts with Egypt,⁷⁰ while the PFLP stressed that such behavior showed that 'Arafat was not keeping his promise in the political and organizational spheres.⁷¹

Banna's Fath-Revolutionary Council made an attempt during the year to reach some kind of *modus vivendi* with al-Fath. In all likelihood, the reason behind this change in al-Banna's position was the change in Syria's position on his organization. Syria, apparently in response to the widespread damaging publicity concerning the connection between the two, removed Banna from Damascus and closed his offices there during the year. Banna relocated his operations to Syrian-controlled areas of Lebanon; reports had him at various times in Tripoli, West Beirut, and the Biqa' Valley,⁷² and it was also indicated that he had set up his organization in the refugee camps surrounding Sidon.⁷³ Banna's main interest at that point became to establish and consolidate his presence there; this necessarily led him to become active on the Palestinian side in the war of the camps against al-Amal, which was supported by the Syrians, his former benefactors. The Fath-Revolutionary Council, until then essentially an underground group, began to adopt some of the manners and symbols of the organizations in Lebanon. It established a militia that functioned openly with a flag and uniforms, and its officers began to grant interviews to the press.⁷⁴ One report suggested that Banna could muster about 700 fighters in Lebanon.⁷⁵

These two factors — estrangement from Syria and the related need to establish a presence in Lebanon — seemed to lie behind the Fath-Revolutionary Council's attempts to come to terms with the Fath mainstream. Libyan pressure, on both al-Fath and on the Fath-Revolutionary Council, was probably also behind this development. Banna may have also calculated that he had nothing to lose by going over to the anti-Syrian Palestinian camp, since the PFLP had more or less already done so.

As noted above, Banna's organization was a party to the Tripoli document, which had specified that the Fath-Revolutionary Council should be represented independently in the PNC. In negotiations with al-Fath prior to the PNC, the organization's spokesman, Bakr, met with Wazir, and Khalaf admitted meeting Banna himself in Algiers, just prior to the PNC in April.⁷⁶ Banna noted in an interview that he had met with 'Arafat.⁷⁷ It seemed that al-Fath was interested, at least to some extent, in co-opting Banna. The latter, however, demanded a seat on the EC, and this 'Arafat was not willing to give. Al-Fath was also not prepared to grant the Fath-

Revolutionary Council independent representation, offering entrance to the PNC only from within al-Fath.⁷⁸ Banna was thus denied participation in the PNC. According to Khalaf, however, Banna did promise to forgo terrorism and armed operations outside the occupied territories for 10 months in a kind of test of his intentions. Khalaf also said that the death sentence passed on Banna by al-Fath was now a mere "detail."⁷⁹ Promise or no promise, Banna distinguished between what he termed "criminal terrorism" and "revolutionary violence," indicating that he was not going to forgo his activities.⁸⁰ The hijacking of the yacht *Silco* in November (see essay on armed operations) showed that Banna did not even wait 10 months.

INTERNAL TENSIONS WITHIN AL-FATH AND THE POPULAR FRONT FOR THE LIBERATION OF PALESTINE

Within al-Fath, 1987 saw tension in two spheres: among the leadership, notably between 'Arafat, Khalid al-Hasan, Khalaf, and Wazir, all members of the Fath Central Committee; and on the local level between Fath operatives in the camps of 'Ayn al-Hilwa and Miya wa-Miya near Sidon. These two arenas of intra-Fath fighting were connected, the rivalries among the leadership having repercussions in Lebanon and resulting in assassinations.

Over the years, leaders of al-Fath had gathered followings and developed personal power bases. They differed, many times quite openly, on matters of policy. Toward the end of 1986 and throughout much of 1987, Khalid al-Hasan, considered to be one of the most influential Fath political strategists, seemed to have become slightly estranged from 'Arafat, apparently over the efforts to effect a *rapprochement* with the radicals. During 1987 Hasan assumed a lower profile, giving fewer interviews to the press. According to one report, he had boycotted meetings of the Palestinian leadership since mid-summer 1986.⁸¹ Hasan has traditionally supported an extremely pragmatic — but certainly not moderate — approach in PLO politics, and attacked the radicals for their dogmatism and lack of realism. Such was the case with his reaction to their response to the signing of the Amman agreement, on which he wrote a book supporting it.⁸² Although Hasan refused to comment on the reasons for his decreased public activity, it seems likely that he may have disagreed with 'Arafat's willingness to cancel the Amman agreement and with his readiness to take a harder line toward Egypt as a concession to the radicals. After the PNC, Hasan adopted the most liberal interpretations of the resolutions concerning Egypt and Jordan. For him, the importance of the PNC was not in the reconciliation with the radicals, but in 'Arafat's triumph since "the decision of those who returned to the PLO was a recognition of the leadership qualities and integrity of the man."⁸³ An incident illustrative of the disagreement between 'Arafat and Hasan occurred in May, when Radio Rabat reported a statement by Hasan in which he gave the impression of an official PLO apology for the presence and speech of a Polisario representative at the PNC.⁸⁴ Wafa, the Palestinian news agency, was quick to issue a denial by the EC spokesman, stressing that al-Hasan was not authorized to speak for the EC and that the Polisario representative had been present "according to the wishes of the Palestinians."⁸⁵ (It is noteworthy that Hasan's brother Hani received the same treatment after his comments on the Budapest meetings with Israeli leftists. See below.)

There were also reports during the year of tension between 'Arafat and Khalaf.⁸⁶ The strain stemmed mostly from Khalaf's opposition to 'Arafat's relations with Egypt

and the ensuing price of a *rapprochement* with Syria. Khalaf was very blunt in this regard. Speaking on relations with Syria on Hungarian television, he asked: "Do you want to know what issue will put 'Arafat and the new leadership to the test? It is the issue of the Egyptian relationship. President [Hafiz al-] Asad also spoke about this."⁸⁷ In a later interview, Khalaf admitted that it was 'Arafat who stood in the way of Syria's renewing of relations with the PLO.⁸⁸ In June, following anti-Egyptian remarks by Khalaf, 'Arafat acted as before and ordered the editor of Wafa, Sulayman Ibrahim, to issue a statement in the name of the PLO spokesman stressing that such remarks were not authorized. It was reported that Ibrahim was on Khalaf's side and refused to issue the announcement, upon which 'Arafat dismissed him. The Wafa statement was finally issued on 19 June.⁸⁹ Paradoxically, such vocal disagreements actually served 'Arafat. They reflected an important truth — namely, that the PLO was not monolithic. One PLO or Fath official could issue a statement attacking or appeasing one party, and 'Arafat could then say that that was not PLO policy. Meanwhile, the previous statement had already had its effect.

The Palestinian predicament in Lebanon produced a further complication in the form of rivalries between low-level Fath officials there. The fact that high-level Fath personalities were not on the scene contributed to the free hand of the local commanders. It appears that the rivalries were personal and generated by resentment which fighters, who had been in Lebanon for a long time, felt towards newcomers from Force 17, who had been appointed by 'Arafat. Zayd Wahba (Abu Usama), the head of al-Fath in Lebanon, was believed to have been behind the death of Hasan al-Haybi, the commander of Force 17 in Lebanon. Haybi was killed in early March near Sidon.⁹⁰ Rasim al-Ghul, who had been sent by 'Arafat to replace Haybi in April, was kidnapped and murdered in August. (Ghul had left Lebanon with most PLO fighters in 1982; he and Haybi were close to 'Arafat and Khalaf.)⁹¹ Wahba was implicated in the killing, as was Jamal Sulayman, commander of the 500-strong "Ayn al-Hilwa Martyrs' Battalion" (*Katibat Shuhada 'Ayn al-Hilwa*), ensconced on the hills east of Sidon. (Sulayman had remained in Lebanon after the 1982 war.) Both were close to Wazir. Sulayman, Wahba, and Abu 'Ali Shahin, a top Fath political official in Lebanon, were reportedly ordered to go to Tunisia to face the wrath of 'Arafat, but they refused to do so, citing the objective difficulties faced by Palestinian fighters in leaving and entering Lebanon.⁹² An assassination attempt on Shahin, assumed to be connected to the infighting, was made on 26 August.⁹³

In all probability, the Fath leadership was not directly behind these battles, which were generated by underlings. Wahba, while fiercely denying personal involvement in the infighting, was clear on the real reasons behind it: "There are elements who have arrived in the area who are not acceptable to the Palestinians and the Lebanese... Some came of their own accord and some were ordered to do so... The return of these people has had a negative effect organizationally and caused disagreements which led to assassinations."⁹⁴

Another interesting development in al-Fath was the evidence of increasing support for the "Islamic trend." Al-Fath had always been the organization with the strongest attachment to Islamic discourse and motifs, and has studiously avoided the use of the term "secular" in its statements in Arabic.⁹⁵ Representatives of the Islamic trend were elected to the CC at the PNC, and there was no reason why al-Fath should not exploit the appeal of Islam to many in the territories. In 1986 it had become clear that al-Fath

was initiating cooperation with groups in the territories who went under the rubric "Islamic Jihad." The Islamic Jihad cell responsible for the attack in October 1986 on IDF troops just after a swearing-in ceremony at the Western Wall had been recruited by Fath operatives in Jordan (see *MECS* 1986, essay on armed operations). Wazir was the man in charge of operations executed jointly with Islamic Jihad, and probably operated through Shaykh As'ad Bayud al-Tamimi, a former imam at al-Aqsa Mosque who was deported in 1970 and now resides in Jordan. Tamimi was known to be maintaining contacts with Islamic Jihad, al-Fath and Iran⁹⁶ (see also essays on the West Bank and Gaza Strip and on armed operations).

Toward the end of 1987, Fath apparently set up an Islamic department, headed by Sa'id al-Mazin (Abu Hisham), who was identified as 'Arafat's "adviser on Islamic affairs."⁹⁷ This may have been an effort by 'Arafat to further capitalize on the rising popularity of Islam as a form of political expression in the territories, as well as a move to check the growing influence of Wazir in Palestinian Islamic circles.

The year under review also saw tension within the PFLP. As noted above, the PNC had been a catalyst for internal dissent within the PFLP, mostly as a result of Syrian pressure on those remaining in Damascus. It was reported that Abu Mahir al-Yamani, a PFLP Politburo member and former member of the PLO EC, was threatening a split in the organization if Habash did not insist on a tough line toward Egypt. Yamani vehemently denied the report.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, it was probable that Habash was sensitive to positions within his organizations as well as those of the Syrians.

More serious infighting in the PFLP was sparked by the presence of Bassam Abu Sharif, likewise a member of the Politburo, at 'Arafat's meeting with Mubarak in Addis Ababa in July. The PFLP promptly dismissed him from the Politburo and all organizational bodies. Abu Sharif, who was a part of the Palestinian delegation to the Organization of African Unity (OAU) summit, expressed shock at the decision and denied that he had participated in the meeting; a PLO official confirmed that Abu Sharif had not met Mubarak.⁹⁹ Abu Sharif had been critical of Syrian policy since 1983, and had opposed the formation of the Syrian-backed PNSF. In doing so he had incurred the wrath of the staunchly pro-Syrian Abu 'Ali Mustafa, who was engaged in a power struggle with him. Sources in the PFLP said that Abu Sharif had known in advance about the meeting with Mubarak but had failed to inform his organization.¹⁰⁰ It could be assumed that Abu Sharif knew the gravity of his deed and was prepared to leave the PFLP. Less than a month after his expulsion, he was rewarded by al-Fath and was appointed press adviser to 'Arafat. He gained notoriety in early 1988 as the man in charge of the PLO's ill-fated attempt to sail a "Ship of Returnees" to Israel.¹⁰¹

THE PEACE PROCESS, MEETINGS WITH ISRAELIS, AND THE ARMED STRUGGLE

As in the past, political action surrounding efforts to convene an international peace conference, meetings with leftist (including Zionist) Israelis, and the armed struggle were central components of PLO policy. These activities were not contradictory, but rather complementary, and were all geared toward the establishment of a Palestinian state in all of Palestine, albeit in stages (for past evidence of this view, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 193, 209–11). It was widely perceived that time was on the side of the Palestinians, as long as the PLO continued to be the sole Palestinian partner in future

negotiations. In this respect, the PLO was particularly anxious to prevent any West Bank leaders or Jordan from negotiating on behalf of the Palestinians. As long as there was activity in the international arena on the issue of an international conference, the PLO wanted to be a part of it, and under the best terms it could achieve. Meetings with Israelis were part of the same struggle, and PLO leaders made it clear when speaking to Arab audiences that these meetings were aimed at exploiting political divisions in Israel and weakening it from within. The armed struggle was the military side of the same effort, which, after the 18th PNC, seemed to become more central in the political discourse of the PLO. PLO leaders expressed their views differently on the relative importance of each of these three components.

THE PLO, RESOLUTION 242, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

Although the 18th PNC made clear the continued rejection of Resolution 242, 'Arafat — mostly in interviews to the foreign press,¹⁰² and when addressing international forums — repeated a formula that was first used in 1986, whereby he called for an international conference and specifically mentioned 242 and 338 as comprising one of the bases for the conference. At the conference of non-governmental organizations on Palestine held in Geneva in early September, he called for an international peace conference under UN auspices "on the basis of international legality as well as the international resolutions approved by the UN relevant to the Palestinian cause and the Middle East crisis and the resolutions of the Security Council, including Resolutions 242 and 338."¹⁰³ Significantly, the reference to 242 and 338 were omitted from the version of the same speech broadcast on the Voice of Palestine.¹⁰⁴ This indicated that, after the PNC, 'Arafat felt less comfortable in expressing this formula to an Arab (and Palestinian) audience. 'Arafat also used this formula in a letter to a less-publicized UN-sponsored conference on Palestine held in New York in June.¹⁰⁵ Clarifications were not long in coming. EC member Muhammad Milhim, in a statement that reflected the general view of the 'Arafat mainstream with al-Fath (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 199–200), stressed that the PLO supported 242 only insofar as the principle of Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories was concerned. Any international conference, he continued, could be based on 242 only if this were coupled with Palestinian self-determination and/or other UN resolutions recognizing legitimate Palestinian rights and the 1947 partition resolution.¹⁰⁶ EC member Qaddumi, head of the PLO Political Department, expressed the harder line within al-Fath. In an earlier statement, he made it clear that 242 and 338 could not be bases for an international conference, as this could be convened only on the basis of UN resolutions "on the Palestine question [i.e., not 242]."¹⁰⁷

'Arafat continued during the year to make what appeared to be relatively forthcoming statements on readiness to make peace with Israel. These, too, were made to foreign audiences. In an interview on Hungarian television, he stated: "Either we implement the UN resolutions, word for word, or we begin a dialogue with Israel at the international conference and we work out a new kind of solution."¹⁰⁸ (It should be emphasized that when the PLO mentions UN resolutions it is referring not only to the 1947 partition plan but also to resolutions on Palestinian self-determination and the right of return, such as General Assembly Resolution 3236.)¹⁰⁹ At a World Council of Churches meeting toward the end of the year, 'Arafat offered Israel mutual recognition, saying "If Israel recognizes me I will sit with it and give it anything it

wants."¹¹⁰ Similar statements were made in interviews with *Newsweek* and the Swedish paper *Sid-Svenska Dagbladet*.¹¹¹ The statement of this nature that gained the greatest publicity was made during a meeting with Israeli leftists in Geneva during the non-governmental organizations' conference in September. According to Charlie Biton, a communist member of the Knesset (MK), 'Arafat told him to pass on to the Israeli Government the message that he would negotiate with Israel directly, even outside the framework of an international conference, if Israel met certain conditions.¹¹² The sending of the message was categorically denied by EC member Mahmud 'Abbas, PLO spokesman Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahman, and, finally 'Arafat himself.¹¹³

'Arafat was careful never to recognize Israel, and his statements should be viewed in the context of his efforts to keep all his options open and to appear pragmatic and flexible. But 'Arafat did not operate in a Palestinian or Arab vacuum, and the overall view of the PLO and al-Fath can only be assessed by examining the totality of opinions in the Palestinian arena. 'Arafat was the only Palestinian leader to express himself in this manner on Resolution 242 and Israel.

Even more importantly — 'Arafat's statements and the controversy over 242 aside — it was clear that the PLO leadership continued to see the international conference as only a phase in, or vehicle for, the total liberation of Palestine. If there was political activity involving the Palestinian issue, then the PLO wanted to be party to it. Indeed, the PLO differentiated between political action, where no significant concessions were made, and a political settlement.¹¹⁴ Such was the case with the Amman agreement which dealt with the conference issue. Khalaf, who had opposed the agreement, when called upon to defend the accord on behalf of al-Fath stated that "[it] was a framework for political action and not a political solution... The agreement allowed us to gain time in the present struggle."¹¹⁵ Wazir, in an interview stressing the importance of armed struggle, made the PLO policy clear: "We explicitly state that we will push our way into every international arena, media gathering, or diplomatic and political field in order to impose our cause... We have stated repeatedly that political action is one thing and political solution and settlements are another."¹¹⁶

Khalid al-Hasan was also clear on this. An independent PLO presence at an international conference, he maintained, would mean the establishment of a Palestinian state. That was why the PLO supported the idea of a conference with effective powers. Yet the international conference was only an "interim aim" in the phased struggle.¹¹⁷ Khalaf echoed this, affirming that "the international conference called for by the PLO is only a framework for a political move to back the armed struggle, which will enable us to sit in the conference in a strong position and not a begging position." He went on to stress that the international conference was a way to avoid direct negotiations,¹¹⁸ which, of course, would mean recognition of Israel.

In 1987 the international conference was the only serious item on the ME political agenda; hence the PLO had to play a part in it. But PLO leaders, while insisting on participation, put little store in the possibility that the conference they envisaged would come to fruition, or that any satisfactory settlement would be reached in the near future. Khalaf stressed that a settlement could be reached only if the Arabs were strong and united, and that was not the case. Referring apparently to 'Arafat, Khalaf said that there were those in the Palestinian leadership who did not want to die without giving the people anything, as had been the case with Hajj Amin al-Husayni

(pre-1948 leader of the Palestinians). But, he suggested, this was not an acceptable approach as it led to capitulatory solutions. Alluding to Jordanian efforts to resume control of the West Bank, he said that if in order to liberate the territory it had to be returned to the king, thus erasing national rights, it was better to continue the occupation so the next generation could continue the struggle. Tactically, Khalaf added, it was counterproductive to talk about an imminent settlement, as it permitted the masses to relax and believe that a solution was at hand. It was better to consider a settlement as remote so the Palestinians could prepare for a long struggle.¹¹⁹ Milhim, for the same reasons as Khalaf, was just as pessimistic about the chances of an acceptable solution being on the horizon, stressing that time was on the side of the Palestinians.¹²⁰

Habash was the most gloomy of them all, expressing the need for a far-reaching, Marxist solution. A true settlement was a long way off; it necessitated political, social and economic transformations in the Arab world as well as an imposed transformation of Israeli society. It was thus "our patriotic and pan-Arab duty to explain these facts to our people as clearly as possible and not to be satisfied with raising false and misleading hopes."¹²¹ He supported the international conference formula as it militated against separate solutions and was supported by the Soviet Union, but emphasized that "until the balance of power changed... no formula will achieve the objective."¹²²

As noted above, the PNC resolution on Palestinian representation at an international conference stated that this should be on an "equal footing with the other parties." Even prior to the PNC, 'Arafat, who had worked to have the language "independent representation" removed from the resolution, called for a united Arab delegation.¹²³ After the PNC he continued in this vein, but specifically ruled out a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation.¹²⁴ The language, however, did leave this option open, and al-Fath had been prepared in the past to accept a delegation with the Jordanians as long as they were represented equally in it (see above). 'Arafat, then, was simply playing *realpolitik*; he had left the possibility of such a delegation open, but since coordination with Jordan had been suspended and the peace process was stalemated, he saw no reason to rock the PLO boat. But there was no way of telling whether, if the opportunity presented itself and it looked as if Jordan might go it alone, he would again support a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation in order to restrain the Hashemites.

Khalaf, Qaddumi and Wazir differed slightly from 'Arafat on this point. They interpreted the resolution to mean either independent PLO representation or representation within a united Arab delegation.¹²⁵ Hawatima was less flexible, stressing that the PNC had not adopted the idea of a united Arab delegation and instead had "advocated" independent representation; the Palestinians were mature enough to go it alone without Arab patronage. Habash, predictably, was the most radical and most explicit of them all. He told *Der Spiegel*: "Listen carefully! There is only one single Palestinian delegation, and it will be determined by the PLO. It will be an absolutely independent delegation that has nothing to do with other delegations."¹²⁶

RELATIONS WITH ISRAELI "DEMOCRATIC FORCES"

The 18th PNC had approved a resolution calling for contacts with "Israeli democratic forces." This was more flexible than previous PNC resolutions on this issue (see *MECS*, 1984-85, pp. 193-94) in that it implied a widening of the circle of Israelis with

whom it was permissible to meet.¹²⁷ There was a slight increase in contacts with Israeli leftists in 1987, with two meetings, one in Budapest in June and the other in Geneva in September. During these meetings the Israelis expressed their public recognition of the PLO and the PLO leaders congratulated the Israelis for their courage in defying an Israeli law which forbids Israelis to meet with PLO members. There were also indications that 'Arafat was seeking to widen contacts even beyond the Israeli left, as evidenced by feelers sent out to Peace Now, Moshe Amirav of Herut and Ezer Weizman of Labor (see below). In 1986 there had been one meeting with leftists in Costinesti, Romania.

The issue of meeting with Israelis was widely discussed by the PLO leadership. Most of al-Fath, when called upon to explain the goal behind such contacts, stressed that they were a means to sow confusion in Israeli society and thus served the Palestinian cause. Milhim, for one, supported the contacts in principle as they were "one of the ways to challenge the racist Israeli Government and an effort to exploit the contradictions at the heart of Zionist society." Yet he did not set much store in the possibility of achieving substantial results from such meetings. In any event, he concluded, "such a relationship is a form of political struggle and nothing more."¹²⁸ Similar sentiments were echoed by Mahmud 'Abbas, who was apparently put in charge of such contacts and was present at the Budapest meeting. He said: "This was the method employed by the Vietnamese against the US; they had important forces which aided them and joined them inside the US."¹²⁹ 'Abbas supported the contacts since they were with groups which were coming to realize that Israel, due to demographic factors, could not control the Palestinians forever. Although he admitted that those willing to meet the PLO were still marginal in Israeli society, he believed that they did represent the seeds of change.¹³⁰ Khalid al-Hasan expressed similar views, but maintained that contacts should not come at the expense of organizational strife.¹³¹ Khalaf, who also was in Budapest, agreed more or less with Hasan, supporting such contacts as long as they did not cause internal controversy and did not serve the interests of those who advocated establishing relations with Israel.¹³² The Voice of Palestine, representing 'Arafat's views, was clear on the issue. Referring to the Budapest meeting, it stated that such meetings exposed the true position of both wings of the Israeli Government which purported to speak of peace while depicting the PLO as terrorists. The meetings cast the PLO as seekers of peace, thus "unmasking the true face of the Israeli enemy [by] Israeli hands."¹³³

Dissenting views within al-Fath were heard from Hani al-Hasan and Sabri Jiryis, the editor of the PLO journal *Shu'un Filastiniyya*. The former vehemently criticized the Budapest meeting: "I believe what took place in Budapest was political absurdity... and does not represent a reasonable policy." PLO priority, he explained, should be in settling relations with the Arab countries, "otherwise we will fall into a big political illusion that we will pay dearly for in the end." The EC issued a statement disavowing Hasan's stand.¹³⁴ Jiryis, in a *Shu'un Filastiniyya* article that was extremely critical of the PLO leadership in all fields, attacked it for its contacts with Israelis: they were only reflections of the PLO weakness and the Zionists made fun of these efforts. Those Israelis such as MKs Abba Eban, Weizman and Yossi Sarid, who raised voices of reason, could not change the views of the Zionist masses that were strongly anti-Palestinian. Even David Ben-Gurion, who suggested after the 1967 war that Israel return all the territories except Jerusalem in exchange for a peace treaty with the

Arabs, soon found himself politically isolated. This was proof that anti-Palestinian views were deep seated. Concluding this argument with a sarcastic allusion to the Palestinian leadership, he wrote that such views were not determined by Israeli leaders as they were not the product of a "central committee," "politburo," "national council" or "dialogue" which led to "national unity" (quotation marks in text). Israel's leaders followed the people; the "Israeli regime... was not some wretched popular union which [it] was possible to 'guide'"¹³⁵

Hawatima and Habash had more or less agreed with each other on the issue. They did not disapprove of contacts with Israelis, as long as the latter were hostile to Zionism. They did not believe that contacts could effect any sort of change in Israeli society. *Al-Hadaf* explained that the PFLP had opposed the resolution of the 18th PNC on this issue because it did not insist that contacts be held only with anti-Zionists. Contacts with Zionists resulted in concessions exemplified by Mahmud 'Abbas, whom the magazine quoted as expressing "Palestinian readiness for a cease-fire when negotiations begin with Israel within an international conference."¹³⁶

Among the most interesting developments during the year were the feelers extended to Israeli politicians in the political mainstream. These all came directly from 'Arafat and were rooted in the same principles as were the seemingly flexible statements on 242 and direct negotiations (see above). In April, Weizman brought up the topic of an Israeli-Palestinian confederation or federation. (In the past Weizman had expressed readiness to negotiate with the PLO if it rejected terrorism and recognized 242.) 'Arafat responded with a proposal for a binational democratic state.¹³⁷ In a week, 'Arafat had blown up Weizman's statements into a "proposal" relayed to him by a third party at the PNC.¹³⁸ By September, he was saying that he had had "contacts" with Weizman and that Weizman had written him a letter during the PNC.¹³⁹ Weizman denied everything, calling 'Arafat a liar.¹⁴⁰

'Arafat also stated that the PLO was in contact with Peace Now,¹⁴¹ and it was reported that he had expressed interest in meeting with Herut member Amirav, who had had contacts with West Bank PLO supporters.¹⁴² (On the internal Israeli ramifications of Amirav's contacts, see chapter on Israel.) While such moves were sure to arouse the ire of many in the Palestinian organizations, they were typical of 'Arafat's ultrapragmatism, which was his policy as long as concessions of historical dimensions were not involved.

THE ARMED STRUGGLE

The 18th PNC called for "continuing struggle in all its armed, popular and political forms." This language illustrated the PLO perception that all these were legitimate forms of struggle and were complementary (see also *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 209-11). The priority granted — in rhetoric — to the armed struggle was evident from the fact that it was mentioned first. Given the political situation, in which coordination with Jordan was suspended, and the perception that the kind of conference envisaged by the PLO was not in the offing, the armed struggle gained a more prominent place in PLO discourse. This was, of course, due also to the reconciliation with the hard-line factions that had always harbored suspicions concerning al-Fath's "political struggle." This may have had the effect of increasing the number of locally organized armed operations (see essay on armed operations).

The Voice of Palestine was the principal medium during the year for carrying the

banner of the armed struggle. It repeated the main theme of the PLO's perception of that struggle: "Just as the rifle's bullet contributes to the achieving of victory, so does the struggle in the political and diplomatic arena. [The political struggle] must accompany the rifle's bullet in order to achieve victory and reap the fruits of the bullets."¹⁴³ Nevertheless, the PLO often gave priority to the armed struggle as the "correct option," which had to be escalated.¹⁴⁴

Jiryis was scathing in his criticism of what he saw as the PLO's overly flexible approach to the question of armed struggle, expanding on a theme on which he and Yazid Khalaf had written earlier in *Shu'un Filastiniyya* (see MECS 1984–85, pp. 210–11). Jiryis took issue with the formula on the armed struggle adopted at the PNC, since it went too far and might serve as a justification for replacing the armed struggle with political action. He believed that the formulation in the Tripoli document, which mentioned specifically the priority given to military action, was preferable. Formulations aside, he continued, the PLO had become so involved in political action that it had forgotten how to fight: "it was like the raven that wanted to imitate the way the dove walked and did not succeed — and when he discovered this and tried to walk in his own manner again he found that he had forgotten how to do it." It was as if the PLO had become one of the world's "peace movements." PLO military operations were too infrequent, too haphazard, and too ill-planned. The organization needed an overall strategy for armed struggle and clear goals. More importantly, operations had to be constant, even if kept on a "low flame." Jiryis suggested the formation of several new bodies, among them a "war council" (*majlis harbi*) which would be staffed by experts and coordinate armed operations. Making clear his views and priorities, he insisted that members of another body he suggested — the "dialogue committee" (*hay'at al-hiwar*) — be forbidden to join sessions of the war council since the council was to be secret and not the right forum for "idle chatter."¹⁴⁵

THE PLO AND THE ARAB WORLD

Since the loss of its base in Lebanon in 1982, which was followed by a Syrian-sponsored rebellion in its ranks, al-Fath had tried to realign itself with those in the Arab world opposed to Syria, primarily Egypt and Jordan. But relations with Jordan had become difficult in 1986 and remained cool in 1987. At the extraordinary Arab summit in Amman in November, the PLO and the Palestinian problem were the subjects of studied inattention. After its problems with Jordan, the PLO became more interested in internal consolidation. Part of the price for that, however, had to be paid in Egyptian coin. Egypt reacted harshly (see below), but relations remained good due to 'Arafat's ignoring of the PNC resolutions. The PLO grew closer to Libya and Algeria and the PNC incident with the Polisario created a conflict with Morocco. Syria reacted with greater restraint to the PNC than expected, but relations with it remained cold, despite some attempts at reconciliation.

EGYPT: PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL POSTURING AND 'ARAFAT'S PRIORITIES

Prior to the PNC, relations with Egypt consisted primarily of Egyptian efforts to involve the PLO in the peace process and influence it to accept 242. This included efforts to achieve a Jordanian-Palestinian reconciliation and prevent the PLO from

officially abrogating the Amman agreement (see essay on the ME peace process).¹⁴⁶

The Egyptians took great umbrage at the PNC resolutions on Egypt (for details see above), and immediately closed down PLO offices in their country. In Cairo's statement announcing the closure, Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Isamat 'Abd al-Majid took the Palestinians to task for their "ingratitude for the sacrifices made by Egypt to support the Palestinian people in their struggle."¹⁴⁷ Similar sentiments were echoed by the major Egyptian newspapers.¹⁴⁸ The weekly *Akhir Sa'a* was particularly harsh: "Why did Egypt have to sacrifice thousands [of soldiers] for the Palestinian cause when in return the Palestinians stabbed her in the back?"¹⁴⁹ The Egyptian commentator Ahmad Baha al-Din noted that the PNC had placed Egyptian democratic forces in the same basket as those of Israel, and thus the Egyptian political leadership headed by Mubarak in the same basket with Shamir (see further in chapter on Egypt).¹⁵⁰

Al-Fath's reactions to the Egyptian move were predictably moderate and restrained. The Voice of Palestine expressed only the "amazement" of Palestinian leaders.¹⁵¹ Hani al-Hasan, who visited Egypt several times during the year, said that he was "satisfied"¹⁵² with Mubarak's speech on the issue in late April, in which he castigated the PLO for trying to drive a wedge between the Egyptian people and its leadership.¹⁵³ The speech and the closing of the offices were roundly condemned by the DFLP¹⁵⁴ and the PFLP.¹⁵⁵

As noted above, the resolution on Egypt, while certainly hard-line, was engineered to allow 'Arafat to do more or less what he wished: it gave the power to define relations to the EC, where 'Arafat had an absolute majority. 'Arafat was thus in no way bound by the PFLP's interpretation of the resolution, which according to Habash meant "suspending relations with Egypt until the Egyptian regime abandoned the Camp David agreement."¹⁵⁶ At his first press conference following the PNC, 'Arafat referred to relations with Egypt as "something I am proud of."¹⁵⁷ He was confident that the crisis in relations "was no more than a summer cloud and that relations between the two would be restored to their previous state."¹⁵⁸ At the first EC meeting after the PNC, a statement was issued which, *inter alia*, expressed "strong appreciation for the role of Egypt and its president and Egypt's sacrifices in defending the Palestinian people."¹⁵⁹ The PFLP maintained that the statement on Egypt was a violation of the PNC resolution.¹⁶⁰

During the year the PLO leadership grew demonstratively closer to Egypt. 'Arafat held three meetings with Mubarak during the OAU summit in Addis Ababa in late July. Palestinian sources described the meetings as "more than a reconciliation,"¹⁶¹ and 'Arafat stated at the summit that differences with Cairo were nothing but a "family misunderstanding."¹⁶²

'Arafat took every opportunity to praise Egypt and Mubarak. He expressed pleasure at the November Arab summit's decision to allow countries to reestablish relations with Egypt, and went still further to note that "in my opinion a decision should have been made to allow the return of Egypt to the Arab League."¹⁶³ In the same vein, 'Arafat actually endorsed Mubarak's reelection. He let Khalaf cover his pro-Syrian flank; Khalaf told the PFLP organ *al-Hadaf* that PLO-Egyptian relations were going "from bad to worse."¹⁶⁴ 'Arafat himself, meanwhile, described Egyptian-Palestinian relations as being at their zenith.¹⁶⁵

'Arafat's behavior was a slap in the face to the PFLP and showed how little he cared

for that organization's opinion when it came to important topics such as relations with Egypt. During the summer and toward the end of the year there were reports that 'Arafat was planning to visit Egypt.¹⁶⁶ PNC Chairman Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'i'h actually did so in late November.¹⁶⁷ Habash threatened to "take steps" if 'Arafat went to Egypt.¹⁶⁸

Not long after the Addis Ababa meeting it was reported that some of the PLO offices in Cairo were functioning again.¹⁶⁹ On 29 November, the 40th anniversary of the 1947 UN decision to partition Palestine, the offices were officially reopened and the PLO flag was ceremoniously raised.¹⁷⁰ Thus, as the PNC resolution was being relegated to history, relations between the PLO mainstream and Egypt seemed to be returning to what they had been before the PNC.

SYRIA: NO BASIC CHANGE

The return of the PFLP to the fold and the consequent uselessness of the Syrian-backed PNSF left Damascus without any real claim to represent the Palestinians. Moreover, the PNC had the full backing of Syria's Soviet patron. Damascus was therefore reserved in its criticism of the PNC, and did not cut off relations with Habash. Relations with al-Fath and the other factions, including the DFLP, remained cool and even hostile, yet there were some informal contacts between Fath and Damascus. The continued Syrian pressure (via al-Amal) on the Palestinians in Lebanon — complicated by the fact that pro- and anti-'Arafat factions were fighting together — and Asad's personal animosity toward 'Arafat precluded any real dialogue.

Throughout the year, Syria continued to harass and imprison DFLP and Fath/'Arafat members living there. This activity gained momentum prior to the PNC. *Filastin al-Thawra* published an extensive list compiled by the "Committee for the Defense of Palestinian Fighters Imprisoned in Syria" naming many of the "some 2,000" Palestinians arrested. It was reported that many had been tortured and had died.¹⁷¹ In March "informed Palestinian sources" were quoted as saying that the DFLP — whose relations with the Syrians had been cool for a while — had begun to transfer all its political, military and security documents from its headquarters to the Soviet embassy as a precaution against Syrian reactions to its role in the reconciliation efforts.¹⁷² (Several years earlier the organization had transferred the editorial offices of its publication, *al-Hurriyya*, to Nicosia.) There were indications that when Habash and Hawatima left Damascus for the PNC in Algeria, they suspected that they might not be allowed to return, and consequently, it was reported, they took their families with them.¹⁷³

One of the main reasons for what amounted to Syria's non-reaction to the PNC was Soviet pressure. While the PNC was gathered in Algiers, Asad went to Moscow for his first official visit in nearly two years. The visit itself may have been a Soviet payoff for Asad's not going too far to prevent the convening of the PNC. The joint communiqué issued in Moscow described the unity achieved among the Palestinians in Algiers as a positive step.¹⁷⁴

Immediately following the PNC the Syrians sent an angry signal, asking DFLP and PFLP leaders to delay their return to Damascus; there were even reports that they had been told not to return at all.¹⁷⁵ In the event, concrete steps — including banning of entry, arrest and expulsion — were carried out against high-level leaders of the DFLP, the PCP and the PLF.¹⁷⁶ But Asad's own interest in maintaining an open

channel to at least one important Palestinian organization, along with Soviet influence, prevented serious measures against the most pro-Syrian organization at the PNC, the PFLP. In early May, Habash was allowed to return to Damascus, where he met with Asad.¹⁷⁷ Following the meeting Habash said that PLO reconciliation with Syria would depend on the future behaviour of the PLO.¹⁷⁸

The PNC resolution had expressed a desire for "correcting and establishing relations between the PLO and Syria... on the basis of equality and mutual respect." Yet Fath leaders, while paying lip service to the need to improve relations with Damascus, were not optimistic as Syria evinced no change in its basic position.¹⁷⁹ *Filastin al-Thawra* continued to publish reports of the serious maltreatment of 'Arafat supporters in Syrian prisons.¹⁸⁰ In July reports appeared concerning secret meetings between Wazir and Syrian Vice President 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam.¹⁸¹ There was more publicity in October, prior to the Amman summit, concerning discussions where Fath was represented by CC member Hasib al-Sabbagh, a businessman living in the US and Walid al-Khalidi, a professor at an American university. These meetings were confirmed by PLO and Syrian officials.¹⁸² Wazir described these contacts as "positive," since they were evidence of Syrian willingness to begin a dialogue.¹⁸³ The Palestinians and the Syrians exchanged memorandums, the existence of which was confirmed by 'Arafat.¹⁸⁴ In the published texts of these memorandums, there was evidence of a will to improve relations and continue the dialogue, but the basic positions remained the same. The PLO implied that it would accept being represented in a joint Arab delegation to an international conference; the Syrians opposed separate Palestinian representation. Nevertheless, the PLO felt it necessary to repeat a theme appearing in the Palestinian National Covenant — namely, that the Palestinian assertion of a separate national identity did not contradict the pan-Arab nature of its commitment to fight Zionism. This was because Syria traditionally challenged the Palestinians' right to independent decision-making since it perceived the issue as a pan-Arab (i.e., Syrian) issue. Syria presented the PLO's EC with a set of questions for clarification.¹⁸⁵ These exchanges, the short meeting between Asad and 'Arafat at the Amman summit, and the Syrian gesture of releasing close to 150 'Arafat supporters imprisoned since 1983,¹⁸⁶ contributed to the cautious optimism expressed by Khalaf.¹⁸⁷

There was, however, no substantive change in PLO-Syrian relations during the year. The real nature of these relations was reflected in a blistering Voice of Palestine attack on Syria, which was accused of standing for "Arab fragmentation" by supporting Iran against Iraq; of supporting al-Amal against the Palestinians; and of fomenting Palestinian dissension. The true character of Syrian intentions was reflected in the punishing of the Damascus-based factions that attended the PNC. Given these Syrian positions, the station commented, all talk of normalizing relations was distorted and erroneous.¹⁸⁸

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH JORDAN

The PLO and Jordan continued during 1987 to be locked in a mutual embrace which neither could afford to break. As stated elsewhere, their period of "coordination" in 1985–86 had been nothing more than a ferociously complicated attempt to "neutralize, co-opt and subvert one another" (see *MECS*, 1984–85, pp. 195–209, 512–18; 1986, pp. 165–73).¹⁸⁹ In 1987 the PLO remained convinced that Jordan could make no significant strides toward a settlement without the PLO, and would not be sufficiently

strong to force West Bankers to go along without the PLO. Jordan, said Hani al-Hasan, "will have no choice but to turn again to the PLO."¹⁹⁰ Such statements of bravado notwithstanding, it appeared that the only factor preventing a serious new PLO approach to Jordan during the year was the fact that the settlement process had more or less lost its momentum. In such a situation, the PLO could afford to invest its energy in internal reconciliation, where close relations with Jordan were a hindrance.

At the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) summit in Kuwait in late January, the Saudis were the handmaidens of a meeting between 'Arafat and King Husayn, their first since early 1986. 'Arafat referred to the meeting as contributing to the "opening of a new chapter" in Jordanian-Palestinian relations.¹⁹¹ The Saudis — in their traditional role of maintaining the consensus and smoothing ruffled Arab feathers — were apparently not interested in seeing Jordan's controversial, unilateral (i.e., without the PLO), development plan for the West Bank (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 177–78) go through. They thus made a \$9.5m. contribution to revive the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee that disbursed funds to the West Bank.¹⁹²

The Palestinian side in the committee meetings, which began in mid-February, was represented by Wazir, who had been unceremoniously deported from Jordan in 1986 as part of the steps Husayn took against the PLO (see *MECS* 1986, p. 179). Wazir played up the significance of the meetings, saying that they opened "new horizons" and were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding.¹⁹³ The Jordanians reacted in the opposite manner, hardly giving any coverage to the meetings and ignoring the presence of Wazir. The few references they made to the meetings were laconic and devoid of any optimism about the future of mutual relations. The committee met again in mid-December.¹⁹⁴ In any event, the meetings had been forced on the sides by the Saudis. Jordan and the PLO met in order to decide what to do with the funds, and that was all; the meetings signaled no significant change in relations between them.

Relations were cool during the year, but without the constant outbursts of hostility on the part of the PLO as was the case toward Syria. The PLO was concerned about concrete Jordanian moves to undermine its influence in the West Bank and in Jordan, such as the new election law allowing representatives from the Palestinian refugee camps to be elected to the Jordanian Parliament (see *MECS* 1986, p. 176). According to the PLO, this altered the temporary status of the camps and was tantamount to settling the refugees in Jordan when they should be awaiting the return to Palestine.¹⁹⁵

On one occasion during the year it appeared as if the PLO and Jordan might be ready to begin another round of political talks. In July Hani al-Hasan visited Jordan, and it was widely reported that Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i had proposed to him a plan for PLO participation in an international conference. There was nothing new in the plan, however, and the PLO and Jordan never officially acknowledged the meeting.¹⁹⁶

The major event relating to PLO relations with the Arab world — or non-event as far as the PLO was concerned — was the extraordinary Arab summit held in Amman in November (see essay on inter-Arab relations). Husayn met with 'Arafat, but visibly snubbed him as far as protocol was concerned; the summit itself gave far more attention to the Iraqi-Iranian War than to the Palestinian issue. The major affront to 'Arafat at the summit may have been an oversight, but probably was not. In the English text of the summit resolution on the international conference distributed to foreign reporters, the phrase describing the PLO as "the sole legitimate representative

of the Palestinian people" was omitted. When asked about this, 'Arafat said it was deliberate, but then, wishing to avoid a confrontation, added that it was the work of "small employees."¹⁹⁷ Paradoxically, or perhaps because he was posturing, 'Arafat termed the summit a success. He seemed to have been comforted by the adoption of what he referred to as "important resolutions which were not published."¹⁹⁸ Fortunately for the PLO, the summit was not the note on which the year ended for the ME. Indeed, the year ended with three weeks of massive protests in Gaza and the West Bank which continued into 1988 and put the Palestinian issue right back at the top of the agenda. The PLO was the primary and immediate beneficiary (see below).

The Jordanians continued to support the activities of 'Atallah 'Atallah (Abu al-Za'im), a former Fath official who had set up a "rectification movement" in 1986 in Jordan (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 181–84), but by the end of the year there were signs that they were tiring of him.¹⁹⁹ He announced the forming of his own news agency, *al-Buraq* (the name of the Prophet's horse on which he ascended to heaven during his night journey to Jerusalem; it is also the Muslim name for the Western Wall of the *Haram al-Sharif* or Temple Mount),²⁰⁰ and continued the publication of his colorful newspaper, *al-Quds*. He represented no threat to the PLO, and his activity was simply a Jordanian way of annoying the organization. There were, however, people who wanted to put him out of business, as evidenced by two reported attempts on his life.²⁰¹

LIBYA: A STEADY IMPROVEMENT IN RELATIONS

Libyan diplomatic involvement on the Palestinian side of the camps war in Lebanon, which began in 1986 and continued in 1987 — an effort spearheaded by Libya's second-in-command, Staff Maj. 'Abd al-Salam Jallud — combined with Tripoli's efforts at Palestinian reconciliation to produce closer contacts between the PLO leadership and Qadhdhafi. The improving relations were all the more remarkable when it is recalled that, during the height of the war in Lebanon, Qadhdhafi had counseled the PLO "to commit suicide rather than accept disgrace." The Libyan leader was accused by the PLO of not supplying promised weapons which may have changed the course of the war (see *MECS* 1981–81, p. 340). Libyan motivation for this change was most probably generated by a desire to return to a more active role in the mainstream of inter-Arab politics; involvement in the Palestinian and Lebanese arenas has long been considered a vehicle for attaining predominance in inter-Arab politics.

Wazir, who handled most of the contacts with Libya on behalf of the PLO and Fath leadership, visited Tripoli in early February. The visit was termed "successful" by the PLO and was described as helpful in restoring relations.²⁰² Wazir returned to Libya in March for meetings with Palestinian factions and to participate in the Libyan national celebrations. Qadhdhafi's desire to improve relations with the Fath mainstream was evident from reports that Wazir received "very special treatment," staying in a special residence and moving with an official entourage.²⁰³

According to reports, Libya leaned heavily on the PFLP to attend the PNC, threatening to cut off funds if it did not do so.²⁰⁴ Libya was rewarded by al-Fath with statements praising Qadhdhafi's efforts and contribution to Palestinian unity. Qadhdhafi came in for special mention during 'Arafat's opening PNC speech and in the PNC's final statement.²⁰⁵ According to Palestinian sources, the PLO office in Tripoli was reopened following a visit there by Wazir in May.²⁰⁶

TENSIONS WITH TUNISIA AND MOROCCO

Relations with Tunisia were tense during the year, although the PLO maintained its political and administrative offices and headquarters there; the military offices had been closed and fighters had left formally toward the end of 1985 (on the deterioration of relations in previous years, see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 224; 1986, p. 197). Meetings of the PLO's EC and CC were divided fairly equally between Baghdad and Tunis.

Seeking to avoid a confrontation with its uncomfortable host, the PLO expressed understanding for Tunisia's difficulties with the Palestinian presence. "The Palestinian burden," noted 'Arafat, "is not something that everyone can bear."²⁰⁷ The PLO tried to keep a low profile; Khalaf stated that there were only 300 PLO personnel living in Tunis.²⁰⁸ The number may have been higher, but probably not by much.

Following the ouster of President Habib Bourguiba in November and the assumption of power by Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali, there were reports that Tunisia wanted to be rid of the PLO presence altogether. Wazir denied that there were any difficulties. In any event, no moves were made in this direction during the year.²⁰⁹

Morocco reacted angrily to the presence and the speech of a Polisario representative at the PNC by closing PLO offices there. In an address to the nation, King Hasan II castigated the Palestinians and said that the Moroccan delegation had been tricked; he announced that he had instructed all Moroccan representatives to walk out of any international gathering when a Palestinian rose to speak.²¹⁰ Khalid al-Hasan was sent to appease the Moroccans, issuing both what he²¹¹ and the Moroccans considered an apology. The PLO, however, issued a statement saying that Khalid al-Hasan did not speak for the EC (see above). After a cooling-off period, relations began to improve, and a PLO delegation headed by EC member Mahmud 'Abbas visited Morocco in late October.²¹² In early January 1988, 'Arafat spoke at the ICO's Jerusalem Committee meeting in 'Ifra, Morocco. It was reported that he met there with King Hasan.²¹³

THE PLO AND THE SUPERPOWERS

Following the break of the "coordination" between Jordan and the PLO in 1986, the Soviet Union, which had opposed these US-sponsored moves (see *MECS* 1986, p. 171), began intensive efforts to aid internal reconciliation by influencing Syria and the radicals within the PLO. Indeed, it was Soviet pressure that was partly responsible for tempering the Syrian reaction to the 18th PNC.

The PLO had two main goals in its policy toward the Soviets after the PNC: (1) to influence the Soviets to effect a reconciliation with Syria; (2) to gain Soviet assurances that it would not agree to an international conference that did not have authority and effective powers. After the cancellation of the Amman agreement at the PNC, 'Arafat also expected an invitation to visit Moscow as a sign of Soviet support for his leadership.

In June, Qaddumi led a PLO delegation to the USSR which resulted in a joint communiqué, which was evidence of improved relations. In the communiqué the Soviets expressed appreciation for the results of the 18th PNC and accepted the PLO's concept of an international conference. Most importantly, it noted that a delegation led by 'Arafat would visit the Soviet Union.²¹⁴ Al-Fath played up the joint communiqué and particularly the last point in its media.²¹⁵ Significantly, the PFLP left 'Arafat's future visit out of its version of the communiqué.²¹⁶

'Arafat arrived in Moscow in early November to participate in the 70th anniversary celebrations of the October Revolution. It was his first working visit to the Soviet Union in five years, and he had a short meeting with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.²¹⁷ It appeared as if, for the time being, the Soviet Union was once again fully behind 'Arafat.

The US and the PLO continued their traditional mutual animosity during the year. The Reagan Administration, not wanting to close the door to the PLO any more than it already was, was forced into an awkward situation in 1987 when Congress passed an amendment (HB 2332 in the House and SB 1203 in the Senate) to the Department of State Authorization Bill providing for the closure of the PLO information office in Washington and its observer mission at the UN in New York (the former had been established in 1978, the latter in 1974). The Administration tried to head off the legislation, offering a compromise whereby only the Washington office would be closed.²¹⁸ They did just that on 15 September, ordering the office to pack up and cease operation in 30 days.²¹⁹ The PLO termed the order a "terrorist act."²²⁰ The office appealed the closure order to Federal District Court, aided by the American Civil Liberties Union, but the court upheld State's order, and the office was shut down.²²¹ Meanwhile, in December, Congress passed the amendment in its full form, regardless of the State Department's efforts.²²² The PLO began gearing up in the UN for a fight to preserve its observer mission, which by the end of the year had still not been closed.

THE PALESTINIAN PRESENCE IN LEBANON

Returning to Lebanon continued in 1987 to be the top priority for 'Arafat. Most of his problems since the 1982 war could be traced to the loss of his independent base, and he was determined to reestablish his presence there. The main opposition to this came from the Syrian-backed al-Amal Shi'ite militia which, since 1985, had been engaging the Palestinians in what had come to be known as the "camps war" (see *MECS*, 1984-85, pp. 219-22; 1986, pp. 194-97). The war continued throughout the year, with several cease-fires. The war theaters were the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut (Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajina); Sidon, its environs and nearby camps of 'Ayn al-Hilwa and Miya wa-Miya; and the camp of Rashidiyya near Tyre.

The presence of pro-'Arafat fighters and other Palestinian groups increased in 1987. Reports in May mentioned that 'Arafat had about 2,200 men under arms in the Sidon area, 1,500 in Beirut and about 150 around Tyre. Other organizations had about 1,500 in Sidon, 1,000 in Beirut and about 350 near Tyre. There were other concentrations of fighters in the Syrian-controlled areas of the Biqa' and Tripoli.²²³ All Palestinians fought together against al-Amal.

The PLO had often claimed that its right to return to Lebanon was based on the Cairo Agreement of 3 November 1969, which had been signed between 'Arafat and the commander of the Lebanese Army under the auspices of Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir and authorized the armed Palestinian presence in Lebanon. It was therefore put in an awkward position when, on 21 May, Shi'i and Christian deputies of the Lebanese Parliament formed a coalition and canceled the agreement.²²⁴ The move was quite symbolic in that it removed one of the milestones on the road to the formation of the PLO ministate that ended in 1982, but it had no practical effect. The PLO was

outraged, claiming that the "abrogation of the agreement by one side is an illegal... action."²²⁵

The Palestinians improved their infrastructure, acquiring equipment for international radio communications²²⁶ and, according to 'Arafat, even succeeded in smuggling in SAM-7 shoulder-fired ground-to-air missiles.²²⁷ The PLO continued during the year to use all channels to infiltrate its men (on these channels, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 194-95); the tacit alliance with Amin Jumayyil and the Lebanese Forces remained in force, and Karim Bakradouni, deputy commander of the Lebanese Forces, confirmed that he had met with 'Arafat in Baghdad in September.²²⁸

Al-Fath augmented its cooperation during the year with the Iranian-backed Hizballah, both finding common cause against the Syrians and al-Amal. There were reports that 'Arafat supporters had entered the Hizballah stronghold in the Bir al-'Abd section of Beirut, and were coordinating moves with Iranian officials in Lebanon.²²⁹ 'Arafat did not deny his coordination with Hizballah, pointing out that "we see an ally in any element that helps us in confronting Israeli and American aggression."²³⁰

The war took a horrible toll on the refugee camps, which were subject to siege and bombardment by al-Amal. It was reported that Sabra was practically deserted and that Shatila was "a wasteland of grey ruins and dust."²³¹

As the year opened, 'Arafat loyalists had still not withdrawn from Maghdusha, a strategic town overlooking Sidon from the east, which had been captured in 1986. 'Arafat's stated position was that he would not withdraw until al-Amal lifted the siege from the refugee camps, particularly Rashidiyya. Al-Amal, for its part, was not about to lift the siege until 'Arafat's forces withdrew. An agreement was finally worked out in late January and they did withdraw, but maintained several strongholds east of Sidon. Al-Amal's goal, however, was to make life so miserable in the camps that no one would want to live there. It therefore lifted the siege of the camps only temporarily, and continued to bombard them.

On 22 February Syria deployed troops in West Beirut, and later "observers" in the Sidon area. Predictably, 'Arafat claimed that the deployment was aimed at preventing "the collapse of the Amal gangs" and "liquidating the PLO and... the Palestinian camps in Lebanon."²³²

An agreement for a cease-fire and settlement reached in September²³³ did not last long, as the Palestinians refused to withdraw from their posts east of Sidon. It became increasingly apparent that the PLO could outfight and outlast al-Amal, as long as Syria did not get directly involved in the fighting.

The fighting continued as the year drew to a close. Al-Amal was incapable of dislodging the Palestinian forces; their return to Lebanon, in strength, was a *fait accompli* that al-Amal could do nothing about. (For domestic Lebanese repercussions of the war of the camps, see chapter on Lebanon.)

THE PLO AND THE UPRISING IN THE TERRITORIES

The PLO's claim to represent all the Palestinians was founded to a great extent on the support it enjoyed in the cities, villages and camps of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The PLO, therefore, did all it could to prevent any unilateral activities on the part of West Bank leaders that might be construed as attempts to create a local leadership as

an alternative to the PLO. Such a situation, in the PLO's view, would turn the conflict into one of borders between a Palestinian state and Israel, thus ignoring "national rights" such as the right of return and the right to self-determination of all Palestinians, including those in Jordan and Israel.²³⁴

This was the case in the summer, when the PLO rejected Hana Siniora's proposal that Arabs participate in the Jerusalem municipal elections and use their political power to show the Israelis what might happen if they maintained their presence in East Jerusalem (see essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip). According to the PLO, despite the good intention behind the proposal, it was not well thought out and "involve[d] grave dangers which no one can accept... These ideas are abnormal, strange and wrong."²³⁵ The PFLP made its view quite clear. In a statement claiming credit for burning cars belonging to the Siniora family, the PFLP said that "if Siniora does not desist from making such statements and does not return to the course of Palestinian nationalism, he will be referred to the people's courts."²³⁶

While it was clear that the uprising in the territories, which broke out in the second week of December and continued into 1988 (see essay on West Bank and Gaza Strip), was not the result of preplanning by the PLO, it was equally clear that the PLO was the one to profit from it the most. The uprising was a windfall for the PLO in that it put the Palestinian issue back on the international agenda after the Arabs had reduced its priority at the Amman summit. As the uprising continued it became apparent that a young, local leadership was developing, which accepted the PLO as the organizational manifestation of Palestinian nationalism and 'Arafat as the leader of the movement, but was not blindly doing the bidding of the PLO.²³⁷ This was understood by the PLO, which had no choice but to acknowledge the new leadership, which in any case was serving the short-term interests of the organization. Khalaf, fully aware of the PLO's delicate situation, stated that "the uprising in the occupied land does not need a decision from outside. This uprising is an expression of the Palestinian people's anger at the occupation and oppression."²³⁸ Khalid al-Hasan was even more blunt, and his statements showed some of the bitterness he felt toward the leadership (see above). The uprising, he stated, could teach the Palestinian leadership a lesson in the capabilities of the people. He noted that the PLO was coordinating action with the local leadership, but added that the latter was more qualified to make decisions in the field. At the same time, he asserted that the population was fully behind the PLO, since the PLO was an idea and the essence of the struggle.²³⁹ The Voice of Palestine, which broadcast constant messages of encouragement to the territories on behalf of 'Arafat and the leadership, was quick to point out that the demonstrators were raising the PLO's banner and pictures of 'Arafat.²⁴⁰

Al-Fath was encouraged by the soul-searching and dissension in Israel concerning the uprising, as it justified those in the organization who held the view that there was something to be gained by encouraging opposition — even Zionist — circles. The uprising was making inroads into society, wrote *Filastin al-Thawra*, and was forcing Israel to think about the cost-effectiveness of the occupation; in the long run it would not be military power that would end the occupation, but an evaluation of whether it was really worth remaining in the territories.²⁴¹

The uprising raised another issue that had appeared from time to time — the question of a provisional government-in-exile. In the past, this question was usually raised by Arab leaders seeking a way to control the PLO and had always been firmly

rejected as an Arab plot. The organization had traditionally rejected such a government-in-exile since it would have created the need to answer too many difficult questions, such as who would be in it, and what would be the role of the residents of the territories. When Egypt's Anwar al-Sadat proposed a government-in-exile in 1981, the leadership rejected it as premature; the time for it would be just prior to the liberation of Palestine.²⁴²

The sense that the events in the territories were monumental and that the Palestinians were on the verge of victory elicited a Palestinian debate on the issue. This time it was different, as Palestinians themselves were initiating the discussion. The leadership was divided; the most enthusiastic response came from the DFLP and Hani al-Hasan,²⁴³ but the prevailing view, expressed by Wazir, Khalaf and Khalid al-Hasan, was that it was still too early and that the discussion concerning the formation of a government-in-exile would draw attention away from the uprising.²⁴⁴ 'Arafat took the middle ground. He wanted the residents of the territories to see that the PLO was responsive, seriously considering the implications of the uprising, and exploring all ways to end the occupation. He said that the PLO would set up a provisional government "soon," and that it was being examined in detail by the leadership.²⁴⁵ It was reported that the EC had met to discuss the issue of a government-in-exile on 23 December.²⁴⁶

The uprising in the territories spread and became more violent as the year drew to a close, acquiring almost a permanent and routine nature. In 1988 it was to be the main focus of PLO attention.

APPENDIX I: RESOLUTIONS OF THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE OF THE EIGHTEENTH PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL²⁴⁷

Proceeding from the Palestinian national charter and in harmony with the PNC resolutions, we emphasize the following principles as a basis for Palestinian national action within the framework of the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian Arab people:

I. On the Palestinian Level

1. Adhering to the Palestinian Arab people's national inalienable rights to repatriation, self-determination, and establishment of an independent state on the Palestinian national soil whose capital is Jerusalem. Commitment to the PLO's political program which is aimed at attaining these rights.
2. Adhering to the PLO as the sole legitimate representative for our people and rejecting deputization, procuration, and sharing of participation in Palestinian representation. Rejecting and resisting any alternative to the PLO.
3. Adhering to the PLO's independence and rejecting trusteeship, containment, annexation, and interference in its internal affairs.
4. Continuing struggle in all its armed, popular, and political forms for the sake of attaining our national objectives, liberating the Palestinian and Arab lands from the Israeli occupation, and confronting the hostile schemes of the imperialist-Zionist alliance in our region, particularly the strategic US-Israeli alliance, as a genuine expression of our people's national liberation movement, which antagonizes imperialism, colonialism and Zionism.
5. Continued rejection of the Security Council Resolution 242, which is not considered a good basis for a settlement of the Palestine question because it deals with it as if it were an issue of refugees and ignores the Palestinian people's national inalienable rights.
6. Rejecting and resisting all solutions and plans aimed at liquidating our Palestine question, including the Camp David accords, Reagan's autonomy plan, and the interplay of roles [*al-taqasum al-wazifi*] in all its forms.
7. Adhering to the Arab summits' resolutions on the Palestine question, particularly the Rabat 1974 summit, and considering the Arab peace plan approved by the Fez 1982 summit and confirmed by the extraordinary Casablanca summit as a framework for Arab action on the international level to achieve a solution to the Palestine question and to regain the occupied Arab territories.

8. Taking into consideration UN Resolutions 35, 38, 48/41 regarding the convocation of an international conference for peace in the Middle East, and UN resolutions on the Palestine question, the PNC supports the convocation of an international conference within the framework of the UN and under its auspices to be attended by the permanent member states of the UN Security Council and the parties to the conflict in the region, including the PLO, on equal footing with the other parties. The PNC stresses that the international conference should have full powers. The PNC also expresses support for the proposal to form a preparatory committee, and calls for swift action to form and convene this committee. In this regard, the PNC expresses appreciation for the fifth ICO summit conference in Kuwait, the eighth non-aligned conference in Harare and the coordination committee stemming from it, and the OAU summit in Addis Ababa, which expressed support for the convocation of the international conference, the preparatory committee and for the efforts to convene this conference.

9. Enhancing the unity of all the national institutions and forces inside the occupied homeland under the PLO, promoting their joint struggle action against the Zionist enemy, the Zionist iron-fist policy, the autonomy plan, the interplay of roles, normalization, the so-called development plan, and the attempts to create alternatives to the PLO, including the establishment of municipal councils, and supporting the steadfastness of our people who are represented by their national forces and institutions.

10. Reinforcing the unity of action regarding the reorganizing of the situation in our camps in Lebanon, the defending of these camps, entrenching the unity of our people in them under the PLO, adhering to our people's rights in Lebanon regarding their residence, work, movement, and the freedom of political and social action, rejecting the attempts to expel and disarm our people, stressing our people's right to struggle against the Zionist enemy, to protect themselves, and to defend their camps in accordance with the Cairo agreement and its annexes, which organize relations between the PLO and the Lebanese Republic, and contributing along with our Lebanese brothers and their nationalist forces to resisting the Israeli occupation in Lebanon.

11. Protecting our people, taking care of their affairs wherever they reside, adhering to their rights of residence, mobility, work, education, health, and security in accordance with the Arab League resolutions and the declaration on human rights, guaranteeing the freedom of political action in embodiment of Arab brotherhood ties and pan-Arab affiliation, and bolstering their cohesion with their Arab brothers.

II. On the Arab Level

1. Bolstering Arab solidarity on the basis of the Arab summit resolutions and adhering to the charters of the joint Arab action and the Joint Defense Pact to mobilize potential to liberate the occupied Arab territories and to confront the Zionist aggression and the US schemes to impose control over the Arab nation.

2. Consolidating the relations of alliance with the Arab liberation movement forces on the basis of action to attain the objectives of the joint pan-Arab struggle against imperialism and Zionism and to reorganize the Arab front, which participates in the Palestinian revolution to enable it to perform its pan-Arab role of supporting and protecting the revolution.

3. Supporting the struggle of the Lebanese people and their nationalist forces against the Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon and for the sake of Lebanon's unity, Arab affiliation, independence, and for enhancing the Palestinian-Lebanese militant struggle.

Special Resolution

The PNC expresses pride and appreciation for the fraternal Lebanese people, emphasizes the importance of pursuing the alliance with the heroic Lebanese National Movement under brother Walid Junblat and the other nationalist and Islamic leaders and forces with which we have fought and continue to fight to liberate Lebanese territory from the Zionist occupation, and stresses to them that the Palestinian revolution will remain a support for their program and for the continuation of the joint confrontation in the same militant trench against the Israeli aggression and occupation, and for Lebanon's unity, Arab affiliation, and independence.

4. Correcting and establishing relations between the PLO and Syria on the basis of the struggle objectives hostile to imperialism and Zionism, and in accordance with Arab summit resolutions, particularly the Rabat and Fez summit resolutions, and on the basis of equality and mutual respect leading to militant Palestinian-Syrian relations as well as close Arab relations.

5. The Iraqi-Iranian War. Working to halt the Iraqi-Iranian War, because it is a destructive war to the two neighboring Muslim people from which only imperialism and Zionism benefit. This war seeks to exhaust Arab efforts and resources from the principal arena of confrontation of the Zionist aggression, which is backed by US imperialism against the Arab nation and the Islamic countries. While valuing Iraq's peace initiatives seeking to halt this war, establish relations of good neighborliness between the two countries based on total respect for the sovereignty of each of them, on the non-interference by either side in the domestic affairs of the other, and with respect to their political and social potentialities, the PNC stands at fraternal Iraq's side in defending its land and any Arab land that is the target of foreign aggression and invasion. The PNC also condemns Iran's occupation of Iraqi territory and the US-Israeli collusion for perpetuating this war through the US and Israeli arms deals to Iran.

6. Jordan. Reaffirming the special and distinctive relations that link the fraternal Palestinian and Jordanian people and working to develop these relations in a manner that will be in line with the pan-Arab interests of the two people and those of our Arab nation, and consolidating their joint struggle for the enhancement of Jordan's independence and against the Zionist designs of expansion at the expense of its territory, and for the attainment of the Palestinian people's inalienable rights, including their right to repatriation, self-determination, the establishment of the independent Palestinian state, and the abidance by the PNC resolutions pertaining to the relationship with Jordan on the basis that the PLO is the Palestinian people's sole and legitimate representative inside and outside the occupied territories as was affirmed by the 1974 Fez summit resolution. Reaffirming that any future relationship with Jordan should be based on confederal bases between two independent states; and stressing adherence to the bases that were approved by the 15th PNC session and the Baghdad summit resolutions concerning bolstering steadfastness, including the Palestinian-Jordanian Joint Committee.

7. Egypt. While stressing the historic role of Egypt and its great people within the framework of the Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy, the sacrifices of the fraternal Egyptian people and its heroic Army in defense of the Palestinian people and their national rights, Egypt's struggle to achieve Arab unity and liberation from colonialism and Zionism, Egypt's struggle to liberate the occupied Arab and Palestinian territories in all circles and arenas, and while also appreciating Egypt's pan-Arab and international position and the importance of Egypt's return to the Arab fold and its assumption of its natural role in the Arab arena, the PNC has entrusted the PLO EC with the task of defining the bases for Palestinian-Egyptian relations in accordance with the successive PNC resolutions, especially those of the 16th session, which contain certain positions and principles of Palestinian struggle, foremost of which are the right to self-determination, repatriation, and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state and that the PLO is the sole legitimate representative as well as in light of the Arab summit conferences' resolutions to achieve the Palestinian people's goals and inalienable national rights, which have been stressed by these Arab resolutions in the service of the Palestinian and Arab struggle against the Zionist enemy and its supporters.

III. On the International Level

1. Bolstering relations of alliance with the world liberation movements.

2. Cooperating closely with the Islamic, African, and non-aligned countries, and activating the PLO's action in these countries to promote relations with them and gain further support for the Palestinian struggle.

3. Strengthening militant relations of alliance with the socialist bloc countries, foremost of which is the Soviet Union, as well as with the People's Republic of China.

4. Supporting peoples struggling against imperialism and racism for the sake of their national liberation, especially in southern and South West Africa, Central America, and Latin America, condemning the aggressive alliance between the racist regimes in Tel Aviv and South Africa against the Arab nation and the African peoples, strongly supporting the African frontline countries in their struggle against the racist Pretorian regime, and strongly supporting the South African and Namibian peoples.

5. Working with all means in the international arena to expose the Zionist racism exercised in our occupied homeland. This racism was confirmed by the historic UN Resolution 3379 in 1975 stating that Zionism is a form of racism, and working to abort the Zionist-imperialist move to cancel this resolution.

6. Working to develop positive positions toward our cause in West European circles, in Japan, in Australia, and in Canada, and strengthening relations with democratic parties and forces in the capitalist countries that support our firm national rights.

7. Joining world peoples in the struggle for world peace and international *détente*, stopping the arms race, averting the danger of a nuclear war, supporting Soviet initiatives in this regard, and exposing the dangers of Israeli nuclear armament in cooperation with South Africa against the region and world peace.

8. Developing relations with Israeli democratic forces supporting the Palestinian people's struggle against Israeli occupation and expansion and the inalienable national rights of our people, including their rights to repatriation and self-determination as well as the establishment of their independent state, and recognizing the PLO as the sole, legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. Condemning all US imperialist-backed Zionist attempts to drive Jews in a number of countries to emigrate to occupied Palestine, and calling upon all honorable forces to stand up to these feverish propagandist campaigns and their harmful effects.

9. In its 18th session, the PNC appreciates the efforts made by the UN Committee to help the Palestinian people exercise their inalienable rights in cooperation with various UN bodies, especially in organizing periodic symposia and news conferences with a view to educating world public opinion about the true objectives of the Palestinian people's struggle. The PNC appreciates the efforts of non-governmental bodies throughout the world to bolster the struggle of the Palestinian people to realize their inalienable rights in Palestine.

Resolutions

The PNC would like to express most profound thanks and appreciation to sisterly Algeria — president, government, and people — for Algeria's noble, pan-Arab stand on the Palestinian revolution and people in the common pan-Arab battle for liberation and return. Proceeding from the common Arab destiny and common struggle against the usurper Zionist enemy, Arab solidarity, and the camaraderie of struggle between Algeria and Palestine, the PNC proudly recognizes Algeria's pioneering, pan-Arab role of promoting Palestinian national unity on the heroic land of Algeria. The Algerian President Chedli Benjedid crowned his genuine pan-Arab initiative on promoting the Palestinian national unity by welcoming and playing host to the comprehensive national dialogue in the Algerian capital.

Highly appreciating these pioneering stands toward our people and revolution, which mark a watershed in the common pan-Arab battle, the PNC would like to stress, on behalf of the Palestinian people and the PLO, that these pioneering Algerian stands are a true expression of Algeria's pan-Arab commitment — president, government, party, and people — to the Palestinian armed revolution and people. The PNC extends heartfelt warm greetings to sisterly Algeria, and promises the country of 1,500,000 martyrs that it will continue the struggle until our people and nation achieve victory and the flag of Palestine flutters over Jerusalem. Greetings to the sons of Algeria who have embraced the revolutionaries of Palestine, as they consolidate their unity and close their ranks under the banner of the struggle for a free independent Palestine.

A Statement on Lebanon and the Camps' Steadfastness

The PNC sends greetings of appreciation and pride to our steadfast masses in the camps in Lebanon and to our brave fighters who have honorably and heroically confronted the fierce onslaught waged by the Amal movement leadership and by those supporting it with the aim of destroying and disarming our camps as a prelude to their evacuation at a time when Israel is carrying out savage raids on our camps to achieve the same objectives.


Our people's steadfastness in these camps has once and for all confirmed the impossibility of liquidating our people, canceling

their institutions, or undermining the continuity of their struggle to achieve their constant aims. Moreover, this war aimed to classify the population, which is bound to peddle the schemes of the Zionist-imperialist alliance by establishing sectarian statelets, and which the nationalist, honorable Lebanese masses and forces continue to resist. Naturally, this was not neglected by the kind masses of the Shi'i sect who were described by Imam Musa al-Sadr [a Shi'i leader] as a deprived people in their homeland and for whom he asked to care. Proceeding from its charter and resolutions, the PNC reaffirms its pan-Arab stand on fraternal Lebanon as an Arab country whose sovereignty, independence, and the unity of its lands and people we respect. The PNC, in fulfillment of its central cause and of the sanguinary cohesion between the Palestinian and Lebanese people who have waged together the most honorable battles against the common Zionist enemy, affirms the continuity of our joint struggle to complete the liberation of southern Lebanon along with the Lebanese and all our Arab peoples until Palestine is liberated, until the Palestinian people return to their land, and until the Palestinian banners are raised in holy Jerusalem. The PNC views that the civil and national rights of our masses in Lebanon have been confirmed and entrenched through various agreements both at Arab summits and in bilateral relations. The PNC affirms that our people's security in Lebanon, along with their legitimate gains, have been confirmed by the unity of fate shared by the two fraternal peoples. This is an opportunity to extend greetings of joint struggle to all nationalist and Islamic forces. The PNC looks forward to the Syrian forces present in the camps' areas shouldering their responsibilities in accordance with the agreements guaranteeing security for our people and their right to protect themselves against any attempts to attack them, besiege our camps, or prevent our people from exercising their right to movement outside these camps in search of their right to an honorable living.

The PNC does not forget the efforts of the honorable foreign friends who supported our people during the tribulation, which has brought great international reaction. The PNC presents to the EC an urgent recommendation to reconstruct the camps in Lebanon and to compensate for the grave material losses caused by the recent war.

O steadfast kinfolk in Lebanon. O Arab Lebanese people. With your sacrifices you have written legends; by the unity of your stand you have preserved both the cause and the destiny; and the mingling of your blood has laid down a solid base for national and pan-Arab unity. Today, the eyes of the whole world are upon you, seeing Palestine and Lebanon in you, and inspiring from your will the determination to continue along the road. O colleagues of martyrs. O colleagues of 'Ali Abu Tawq. O brothers and kinfolk. We support you as you also support us. Tomorrow, the children of Shatila, Rashidiyya, Burj al-Barajina, and 'Ayn al-Hilwa, will remember the bitter days that entrenched our belief in the liberation of Palestine, the Arabism of Lebanon, the unity of Arabs, and the coming victory, God willing. We support you and we will meet. Glory and immortality to the righteous martyrs. Long live a free, Arab Lebanon! Long live a free, Arab Palestine!

APPENDIX II: ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE PLO²⁴⁸



NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. See e.g., Mahmud 'Abbas' (Fath EC member) interview with *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 31 March 1987.
2. 'Arafat to VoP, (Baghdad), 1 April — DR, 2 April; Mahmud 'Abbas to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 31 March 1987.
3. Khalaf to *al-Mustaqbal*, 11 April 1987.
4. Habash to *al-Qabas International*, 18 February; PFLP spokesman to R. Monte Carlo, 19 March 1987.
5. *Al-Qabas*, 17 March 1987.
6. Khalaf to *al-Mustaqbal*, 11 April 1987.
7. Yasir 'Abd Rabbuh to *al-Qabas*, 22 February 1987.
8. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 24 January 1987.
9. *Al-Hadaf*, Damascus, 16, 23 February 1987.
10. For a report on the congress, see *Kull al-'Arab*, 25 February 1987.
11. VoP (Baghdad), 9 February — DR, 10 February 1987.
12. *Al-Hadaf*, Damascus, 23 February 1987.
13. VoP (San'a), 10 March — DR, 11 March; *JP*, 11 March 1987.
14. For the full text, see *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, May-June 1987, pp. 159–61; *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 20 April 1987.
15. *Al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 20 March 1987.
16. 'Abd Rabbuh to *al-Watan*, 17 March 1987.
17. VoP (San'a), 20 March — DR, 23 March 1987.
18. R. Monte Carlo, 2 March; Tanjug, 1 March — DR, 2 March; *al-Khalij*, 15 March 1987.
19. VoP (San'a), 6 March — DR, 9 March; VoP (Algiers), 10 March — DR, 11 March 1987.
20. Full Arabic text in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, May-June 1987, pp. 161–65 and in *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 20 April 1987; for English translation see JANA, 26 March — DR, 27 March 1987.
21. *Al-Hadaf*, Damasucs, 16 February; Hawatima to R. Algiers, 13 April — DR, 14 April 1987.
22. For a detailed analysis of each faction's position, see *al-Watan*, 29 March 1987.
23. Hawatima to KUNA, 29 March — SWB, 31 March; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 5 April; *al-Shira'*, 6 April 1987.
24. R. Monte Carlo, 25 April 1987.
25. KUNA, 28 March; R. Monte Carlo, 2 April 1987.
26. *JT*, 4 April 1987.
27. *Ha'aretz*, 13 April 1987.
28. Habash to R. Algiers, 13 April — DR, 14 April 1987.
29. R. Abu Dhabi, 12 April — DR, 13 April; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 12 April 1987.
30. *Al-Sayyad*, 17 April 1987.
31. Fahum to R. Monte Carlo, 19 April; KUNA, 18 April — DR, 20 April 1987. For the purported text of a telephone conversation between Fahum and 'Arafat, see *al-Qabas*, 18 April 1987.
32. *JT*, 15 April 1987.
33. *Al-Ra'y*, 16 April; APS, 16 April 1987.
34. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 15 April 1987.
35. Habash to R. Monte Carlo, 20 April — DR, 20 April; *al-Ra'y*, 16 April 1987.
36. Khalid al-Hasan to *WP*, 20 April 1987.
37. KUNA, 19 April — DR, 20 April; R. Monte Carlo, 20 April 1987.
38. GNA, 13 April — DR, 13 April; *al-Qabas International*, 16 April 1987.
39. *Al-Majalla*, 22 April; *al-Qabas International*, 16 April; *al-Ra'y*, 14 April; KUNA, 20 April — DR, 20 April; for interviews with Banna see *al-Qabas*, 7 May; *al-Tadamun*, 9 May 1987.

40. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 10 April; *al-Majalla*, 13 May; VoP (San'a), 2 July — SWB, 4 July 1987.
41. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 18 April 1987.
42. VoP (San'a), 21 April — SWB, 23 April 1987.
43. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 21 April; R. Monte Carlo, 20 April 1987.
44. VoP (Baghdad), 20 April — DR, 21 April; *The Times*, 20 April 1987.
45. R. Monte Carlo, 20 April — SWB, 22 April 1987.
46. Text of speech broadcast on VoP (Algiers), 20 April — DR, 21 April 1987.
47. Text of speech broadcast on VoP (Algiers), 21 April — DR, 22 April 1987.
48. See, for example, the objections of ALF Secretary-General 'Abd al-Rahim Ahmad, INA, 24 April — DR, 24 April 1987.
49. R. Monte Carlo, 23 April 1987.
50. GNA, 23 April — DR, 24 April 1987.
51. R. Monte Carlo, 23 April; 'Abd al-Hamid al Sa'ih to *al-Akhbar*, 15 December; PNC Deputy Speaker Salim al-Za'nun to *Al-Majalla*, 25 November 1987.
52. R. Algiers, 21 April — SWB, 23 April 1987.
53. R. Algiers, 25 April — SWB, 27 April 1987.
54. *NYT*, 26 April 1987.
55. Hawatima to R. Algiers, 21 April — SWB, 23 April 1987.
56. R. Algiers, 25 April — SWB, 27 April 1987.
57. VoP (Baghdad), 21 May — SWB, 25 May 1987.
58. VoP (Algiers), 26 April — DR, 27 April 1987.
59. *JT*, 26 April 1987.
60. *LAT*, *NYT*, 27 April 1987.
61. AFP, 25 April — SWB, 27 April 1987.
62. R. Monte Carlo, 26 April — DR, 27 April; *JP*, 29 April 1987.
63. R. Algiers, 21 April — SWB, 23 April 1987.
64. PFLP-GC spokesman to R. Monte Carlo, 27 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
65. Hawatima to *al-Anba*, 9 May 1987.
66. Hawatima to *NAD*, 18 May 1987.
67. VoP (Baghdad), 25 May — DR, 27 May; Khalaf to *al-Anba*, 3 October 1987.
68. Habash to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 12 May, and to *al-Hawadith*, 5 June 1987.
69. *Al-Hadaf*, Damascus, 4 May 1987.
70. *Al-Hurriyya*, 10 August 1987.
71. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 11 September 1987.
72. *Davar*, 26 June; *Ma'ariv*, 1 July 1987.
73. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 11 September 1987.
74. *Koteret Rashit*, 11 November; *al-'Amal*, 4 October 1987.
75. *Davar*, 10 November 1987.
76. Khalaf to Budapest TV, 24 May — SWB, 27 May; *al-Mustaqbal*, 25 April 1987.
77. Banna to *al-Qabas*, 7 May; see also *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 13 November 1987.
78. *FR*, 30 April; *al-Mustaqbal*, 25 April 1987.
79. Khalaf to Budapest TV, 24 May — SWB, 27 May 1987.
80. See interviews with Banna in *al-Anba*, 12 May; *al-Qabas*, 7 May; *al-Tadamun*, 9 May 1987.
81. *Al-Bayan*, Dubai, 10 March 1987.
82. Asher Susser, "Double Jeopardy: PLO Strategy toward Israel and Jordan," *Policy Papers*, No. 8, Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 1987.
83. Hasan to *al-Majalla*, 27 May 1987.
84. R. Rabat, 21 May — SWB, 23 May; R. Monte Carlo, 22 May 1987.
85. MENA, 23 May; GNA, 25 May; MAP, 30 May — DR, 1 June 1987.
86. See e.g., GNA, *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 27 June 1987.
87. Khalaf to Budapest TV, 24 May — SWB, 27 May 1987.
88. KUNA, 4 October 1987.
89. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, GNA, 27 June 1987.
90. Voice of Free Lebanon, 4 March; *JP*, *al-Nahar*, 6 March; *Ma'ariv*, 21 October 1987.
91. *JP*, 23 August; *al-Nahar*, 22 August; *Ha'aretz*, 23 August, 17 September 1987.

92. *Ha'aretz*, 23 August 1987.
93. *JP*, 27 August; KUNA, 24 August; *Ha'aretz*, 17 September; *al-Shira*, 7 September 1987. See also *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 27, 28 August 1987.
94. Zayd Wahba to *al-Ussu' al-'Arabi*, 19 October 1987.
95. Susser, op. cit., p. 33.
96. *Ma'ariv*, 21 October 1987; Wazir to *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 28 December 1987; Eli Rekhess, "The Iranian Impact on the Islamic Jihad Movement in the Gaza Strip," paper delivered at a conference on "The Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World," sponsored by the Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, January 1988. On the connection to al-Fath see also *JP*, 27 August, 21 October 1987, 3 February 1988; and IDF Spokesman (Information Branch), Background Paper, January 1988.
97. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 17 December 1987.
98. *Al-Ra'y*, 22, 23 April; R. Algiers, 22 April 1987.
99. R. Monte Carlo, 30 July — DR, 31 July; R. Monte Carlo, 1 August — DR, 4 August; VoP (Baghdad), 3 August 1987.
100. *JT*, 2 August; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, *al-Bayadir al-Siyasi*, 15 August 1987.
101. *Al-Majalla*, 19 August; *al-Watan*, 17 November 1987; *Ha'aretz*, 19 February 1987.
102. See e.g., 'Arafat's interview with *Le Soir*, 18 June — DR, 23 June; interview with a correspondent of Israel Communist Party paper, cited in *JP*, 9 November 1987.
103. *JP*, 8 August 1987.
104. VoP (Algiers), 7 September — DR, 14 September 1987.
105. *Ha'aretz*, 24 June; *La Revue du Liban et de l'Orient Arabe*, 27 June 1987.
106. Milhim to QNA, 9 September — DR, 10 September 1987.
107. Qaddumi to VoP (Baghdad), 24 March — DR, 25 March 1987.
108. 'Arafat to Budapest TV, 13 September — DR, 15 September 1987.
109. Susser, op. cit., p. 13.
110. *Ha'aretz*, 3 November 1987.
111. 'Arafat to *Newsweek*, quoted in *JP*, 21 December; 'Arafat to *Sid-Svenska Dagbladet*, quoted in *Ha'aretz*, 1 July 1987.
112. VoI, 9 September — DR, 9 September; *Ma'ariv*, 9 September; *JP*, 11 September; Biton to Israel TV, 12 September — SWB, 12 September 1987.
113. 'Abbas to *al-Watan*, 10 September; 'Abd al-Rahman on R. Monte Carlo, 10 September — DR, 10 September, and to *The Guardian*, 11 September; 'Arafat to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, cited by GNA, 27 September 1987.
114. Susser, op. cit., p. 45.
115. Report on Khalaf's remarks on VoP (Baghdad), 16 April — DR, 20 April 1987.
116. Wazir to *al-Qabas*, 25 June — DR, 29 June 1987.
117. Hasan to R. Monte Carlo, 20 May 1981; on the PLO's concept of "phased struggle," see Susser, op. cit., pp. 12–17.
118. QNA, 30 March — DR, 1 April 1987.
119. Khalaf to *al-Qabas*, 11 March 1987.
120. Milhim to *al-Qabas*, 18 March 1987.
121. Habash to *al-Qabas*, 18 March 1987.
122. Habash to *al-Tadamun*, 30 May; see also his interview with VoP (Algiers), 11 May — DR, 12 May 1987.
123. 'Arafat to *The Independent*, 4 March, and to *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 28 March, cited by R. Monte Carlo, 27 March 1987.
124. 'Arafat to *Le Soir*, 18 June — DR, 23 June; to *al-Watan*, 28 September 1987.
125. Khalaf to *al-Qabas*, 30 March, and to *al-Anba*, 5 October; Qaddumi, quoted by Tanjug, 30 September; Wazir to *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 17 November 1987.
126. Hawatima to *al-Majalis*, 16 May; Habash to *Der Spiegel*, 11 May — DR, 13 May 1987.
127. Susser, op. cit., p. 57; *JP*, 11 September; *Ha'aretz*, 18 September 1987.
128. Milhim to *al-Qabas*, 5 April 1987.
129. 'Abbas to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 31 March 1987.
130. 'Abbas to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 31 March; see also *JP*, 11 September 1987.
131. Hasan to *al-Qabas*, 5 April 1987.
132. Khalaf to *al-Qabas*, 5 April 1987.

133. VoP (Baghdad), 14 June — SWB 16 June 1987.
134. Hani al-Hasan to KUNA, 16 June — SWB, 20 June; EC statement, VoP (San'a), 20 June — DR, 22 June 1987.
135. *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, May-June 1987, pp. 3-32; the issue of meetings with Israelis is discussed on pp. 22-25.
136. Hawatima and Habash to *al-Qabas*, 5 April; *al-Hadaf*, Damascus, 22 June 1987.
137. KUNA, 25 April — DR, 27 April; QNA, 27 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
138. *The Times*, 5 May 1987.
139. Budapest TV, 13 September — DR, 15 September; R. Monte Carlo, 8 September — DR, 9 September 1987.
140. Vol, 14 September — DR, 14 September 1987.
141. R. Monte Carlo, 8 September — DR, 9 September; *Ha'aretz*, 9 September 1987.
142. *Ha'aretz*, 18 September; *JP*, 20 September 1987.
143. VoP (Baghdad), 3 August 1987.
144. VoP (Baghdad), 31 August; see also an entire broadcast devoted to the centrality of the armed struggle, VoP (Baghdad), 13 July 1987.
145. See Jiryis's article in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, op. cit.
146. *Ha'aretz*, 13 April 1987.
147. MENA, 27 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
148. *Al-Ahram*, 26 April; *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 25 April; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, *al-Akhbar*, 27 April 1987.
149. *Akhir Sa'a*, 6 May 1987.
150. R. Cairo, 26 April — SWB, 28 April 1987.
151. VoP (Algiers), 29 April — SWB, 1 May 1987.
152. R. Monte Carlo, 1 May — DR, 4 May 1987.
153. For the text of the speech, see R. Cairo, 30 April — SWB, 4 May 1987.
154. R. Monte Carlo, 1 May — DR, 4 May; R. Monte Carlo, 28 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
155. R. Monte Carlo, 2 May — DR, 4 May; R. Monte Carlo, 28 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
156. Habash to *al-Tadamun*, 30 May — DR, 3 June 1987.
157. APS, 27 April — DR, 28 April 1987.
158. GNA, 8 May — SWB, 11 May 1987.
159. VoP (Baghdad), 18 May — DR, 19 May 1987.
160. R. Monte Carlo, 18 May — DR, 19 May 1987.
161. MENA, 27 July — DR, 28 July 1987.
162. PANA, 28 July — DR, 29 July 1987.
163. 'Arafat to 'Ukaz, 13 November; see also statements to *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 19 September; QNA, 1 October — DR, 1 October 1987.
164. KUNA, 24 October — SWB, 27 October 1987.
165. MENA, 7 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
166. *Al-Majalla*, 28 October 1987.
167. MENA, 25 November — DR, 27 November 1987.
168. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 10 August; see also R. Monte Carlo, 21 December — DR, 22 December 1987.
169. *Ha'aretz*, 25 August 1987.
170. MENA, 29 November — DR, 30 November; *The Guardian*, *FT*, *Ma'ariv*, *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 30 November 1987.
171. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 11 April 1987.
172. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 3 March 1987.
173. *FR*, 30 May 1987.
174. *FT*, 24 April; *NYT*, 24 May 1987.
175. *Al-Khalij*, 29 April; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 9 May; R. Monte Carlo, 29, 30 April — DR, 30 April 1987.
176. GNA, 5 May — DR, 5 May; *Ha'aretz*, 22 May; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 9 May 1987.
177. *NYT*, *The Guardian*, 6 May; for a report on the content of the talks, see *al-Usub al-'Arabi*, 18 May 1987.
178. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 9 May 1987.
179. Mahmud 'Abbas to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, carried by KUNA, 15 May — DR, 18 May;

- Wazir to VoP (Algiers), 11 May — DR, 12 May 1987.
180. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 25 July 1987.
 181. R. Monte Carlo, VoP (Baghdad), 11 July — DR, 12 July 1987.
 182. R. Monte Carlo, 19 October — DR, 20 October; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 2 November 1987.
 183. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 30 October 1987.
 184. VoP (Algiers), 28 October — SWB, 28 October 1987.
 185. The memorandums were published in *al-Bayan*, Dubai, 28, 29 November 1987.
 186. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 3 December 1987.
 187. Khalaf to *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 4 December 1987.
 188. VoP (Baghdad), 29 October — DR, 3 November 1987.
 189. Susser, op. cit., p. 58.
 190. Hani al-Hasan to *al-Anba*, 12 January 1987.
 191. *JP*, 1 February 1987.
 192. R. Monte Carlo, 15 February — DR, 17 February 1987.
 193. R. Monte Carlo, 17 February — DR, 18 February 1987.
 194. R. Amman, 17 February — DR, 18 February; *NYT*, 17 February; R. Amman, 17 December — DR, 19 December 1987.
 195. VoP (Algiers), 24 June — SWB, 26 June; *al-Sakhra*, 30 June; MENA, 24 June; 'Abd Rabbuh, cited in GNA, 17 May 1987.
 196. KUNA, 8 July; *al-Qabas*, 13 July; AFP, 16 July — DR, 17 July 1987.
 197. See Thomas Friedman's account of the moment of 'Arafat's realization that the English text was different, *NYT*, 12 November 1987.
 198. 'Arafat to *al-Ukaz*, 13 November; *Ha'aretz*, 15 November 1987.
 199. *Al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 16 November 1987.
 200. R. Monte Carlo, 7 January — SWB, 9 January 1987.
 201. KUNA, 23 January; *al-Sha'b*, Jerusalem, 26 January; *al-Qabas*, 15 March 1987.
 202. KUNA, 4 February; VoP (San'a), 15 February — DR, 17 February 1987.
 203. *Al-Qabas*, 8 March; *NYT*, 10 March 1987.
 204. *Al-Shira'*, 6 April 1987. According to *al-Shira'*, Libya was the main source of funding for the PFLP.
 205. R. Algiers, 20 April; VoP (Algiers), 26 April — DR, 27 April 1987.
 206. *NYT*, 6 May; GNA, 5 May — DR, 5 May; *JP*, 9 May 1987.
 207. 'Arafat to *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, broadcast on VoP (Baghdad), 30 January — DR, 5 February 1987.
 208. *The Times*, 16 July; Khalaf to *NYT*, 24 June 1987.
 209. See e.g., *JP*, 19 November; al-Wazir to *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 25 November 1987.
 210. R. Rabat, 21 April — DR, 24 April 1987.
 211. Khalid al-Hasan to R. Monte Carlo, 20 May — SWB, 25 May 1987.
 212. VoP (Baghdad), 26 October — DR, 28 October 1987.
 213. R. Rabat, 5 January — DR, 7 January; AFP, 5 January 1987.
 214. Tass, 25 June 1987.
 215. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 4 July 1987.
 216. *Al-Hadaf*, Damascus, 6 July 1987.
 217. VoP (Algiers), 3 November — DR, 4 November; *Ha'aretz*, 6 November 1987.
 218. *WP*, 8 August 1987.
 219. *NYT*, 16 September 1987.
 220. VoP (San'a), 17 September — DR, 18 September 1987.
 221. *NYT*, 3 December 1987.
 222. *WSJ*, 28 December 1987.
 223. *Ha'aretz*, 13, 15 May; *JP*, 18 May 1987.
 224. *IHT*, 22 May; for the text of the abrogation, see *al-Nahar*, 16 June 1987.
 225. VoP (Baghdad), 23 May — SWB, 26 May; see also EC statement, VoP (San'a), 20 June — DR, 22 June 1987.
 226. *Al-Shira'*, 16 November 1987.
 227. *The Guardian*, 8 May 1987.
 228. Bakradouni in *al-Nahar*, 25 September; R. Monte Carlo, 22 September — DR, 23 September 1987.

229. *Ha'aretz*, 27 August; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 10 November 1987.
230. 'Arafat to *al-Hawadith*, 20 September 1987.
231. *The Times*, 21 March 1987.
232. VoP (Baghdad), 26 February — DR, 27 February; INA, 25 February — DR, 26 February 1987.
233. *JP*, 14 September 1987.
234. Susser, op. cit., pp. 56–58.
235. VoP (Baghdad), 11 June — DR, 15 June 1987.
236. R. Monte Carlo, 21 June — DR, 22 June 1987.
237. *NYT*, 14 December 1987.
238. Khalaf to *al-Ushu' al-'Arabi*, 14 December 1987.
239. Khalid al-Hasan to *al-Sayyad*, 1 January 1988.
240. VoP (Baghdad), 13 December 1987.
241. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 7 January 1987.
242. Shafiq al-Hut in *Shu'un Filastiniyya*, April 1981, pp. 3–8; *al-Hawadith*, 27 February 1981; for Sadat's proposal, see MENA, 13 February — DR, 17 February 1981.
243. Rabbuh to AFP, 23 December — DR, 24 December; Hani al-Hasan in *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, quoted in *The Guardian*, 29 December 1987.
244. Wazir to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 29 December; Khalaf to R. Monte Carlo, 23 December — DR, 24 December; Khalid al-Hasan to *al-Qabas*, 26 December 1987.
245. R. Beirut, 4 January — DR, 6 January 1988; AFP, 24 December 1987.
246. R. Monte Carlo, 23 December — DR, 23 December; *JP*, 24 December 1987.
247. VoP (Algiers), 26 April — DR, 27 April 1987.
248. *Al-Sakhra*, 21 April 1987.

The West Bank and the Gaza Strip

ELIE REKHESS

THE ISRAELI GOVERNMENT AND THE LOCAL POPULATION

THE DETERIORATING SECURITY SITUATION: JANUARY-NOVEMBER 1987

There was a significant rise in violence in the occupied territories during the year, which reached a peak in the popular uprising or *intifada* that began in December. With the exception of the end of the year riots, PLO factions and dissident groups claimed responsibility for nearly all violent acts against Israeli targets. Yet, much of the violence appeared to have been spontaneous and locally generated.

According to figures compiled by the US Department of State, 42 Palestinians were killed in 1987 (of whom 22 died in the December riots) and approximately 300 were wounded by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) or other security forces. Palestinians were believed responsible for the killing of two IDF soldiers and six Israeli civilians.¹

During the year there was also a noted escalation in violent incidents carried out by Jewish settlers. These included the shooting of Palestinians, their use of unauthorized armed patrols, physical harassment, and attacks on refugee camps.²

The first major wave of disturbances erupted in the Gaza Strip in February and later spread to the West Bank. The riots, which lasted for 14 consecutive days, were described by IDF officers as "a deliberately organized response"³ to the plight of the Shi'i-besieged Palestinians in the refugee camps of Lebanon. The protest in Gaza came in response to the deportation of a local activist accused of leading the Fath youth movement (see below). The worst clashes in the Strip occurred in the southern city of Khan Yunis when two Palestinians were shot and seriously wounded. The unrest was fueled by the death of a Gaza youth killed by security forces after resisting arrest in an alleged stone-throwing incident. Riots later spread to the West Bank, curfews were imposed on several refugee camps, and the Civil Administration closed down five West Bank universities.⁴

A second massive cycle of violence began in early April as demonstrations were staged in solidarity with hunger-striking Palestinian prisoners. Sit-ins organized at Red Cross offices in major West Bank towns prompted border police and IDF involvement.⁵ The security situation deteriorated rapidly when, on 11 April, a molotov cocktail was thrown at an Israeli car near Qalqiliyya. The vehicle, carrying a Jewish settler family from the West Bank settlement of Alpehi Menashe, was set alight: the mother, Ofra Moses, was burned to death and her husband and two children sustained serious burns. One of the children subsequently died. The bomb was hurled from the edge of a citrus grove near the village of Habla. Shortly after the incident the Army used bulldozers to clear Arab-owned orchards near Qalqiliyya in retaliation for the

killing. A curfew was imposed on the town and dozens were arrested.⁶ (For further details, see essay on armed operations.)

Enraged Jewish settlers rampaged through the town of Qalqiliyya, breaking windows and setting cars on fire. They appealed to the government demanding the adoption of harsh measures, including the deportation of pro-PLO leaders, the demolition of three rows of houses in sensitive sites such as refugee camps where traffic was attacked, and the imposition of a minimum five-year prison term on all stone throwers. The settlers also called on the government to step up the pace of Jewish settlement in the area.⁷

Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin pledged to take "all legal means to enforce law and order, prevent terror, and continue an unremitting war against the various terror elements."⁸

Following the Qalqiliyya incident the riots spread to other West Bank locations. A serious clash occurred on 13 April at Bir Zayt University when, according to an IDF spokesman, hundreds of students began to throw stones at soldiers, burn tires and block roads. Attempting to break up the protest, troops eventually opened fire with live ammunition. A 24-year-old student, Musa Hanafi, was killed.⁹

After a short period of calm, trouble erupted again at the beginning of May. Following continuous petrol-bomb attacks on Israeli vehicles, armed settlers ran through the streets of Qalqiliyya shouting "Death to Arabs." They shattered windows, pelted shops with stones, and emptied garbage cans in the streets. One Gush Emunim leader, Daniella Weiss, who participated in the rampage told *The Jerusalem Post* that settlers would continue to react against anti-Jewish attacks in the territories. "We will not keep silent in the face of even a single stone, because every stone and every petrol bomb is an attempted murder," she said.¹⁰

Similar action against the inhabitants of al-Duhaysha refugee camp was taken by Jewish settlers from Qiryat Arba' in early June. The Duhaysha camp had long been a center of Palestinian resistance and a trouble spot. Its residents often hurled stones at Jewish traffic on the nearby Hebron-Bethlehem highway. (For past incidents between settlers and local residents, see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 236-37).

On the night of 6 June, some 50 settlers with guns and clubs rampaged through the camp after a Jewish woman was injured by a stone thrown at a bus near the camp. They opened fire, smashed windows and solar-heating panels, burned cars and slashed car tires, hurled stones and destroyed property. Settlers reportedly refused to obey the Army's orders. While rampaging through the camp, many chanted slogans calling for the resignation of the defense minister.¹¹ Thirteen settlers were detained.

Maj. Gen. Amram Mitzna, OC Central Command, sharply condemned the rampage. He described it as "a despicable act," the likes of which neither he nor any other veteran in the region could recall. Mitzna dismissed as "a lie" claims by settlers that their action had been a response to having stones thrown at them while they were demonstrating in the camp.¹²

The event caused a public storm in Israel. *The Guardian* reported (9 June) that the far-right sought to exploit the case to underline its old argument that Israeli security circles were too lenient with Palestinian troublemakers in the territories. Right-wing criticism of the Army and the defense establishment had often been voiced in past years.

Press reports hinted that the relations between the Jewish settlers and the Army had

deteriorated since Gen. Dan Shomron was appointed chief of staff. Shomron allegedly believed that some of the settlers were interested in stirring up trouble in the West Bank, and thus distracted the Army from urgent military duties.¹³

Sporadic acts of terror continued to be directed at Israeli targets during the spring and summer. In late May, Jalil Jurasi, a contractor from a Negev village who had come to pick up Palestinian laborers, was shot dead at close range in Gaza.¹⁴ In early August, a 21-year-old military police officer, Capt. Ron Tal, was murdered as he drove through the crowded market of Gaza's Palestine Square. Tal was shot at point-blank range with a pistol in broad daylight. Exceptional measures were taken after the killing. The Army clamped a curfew on the entire Gaza Strip. This step was the first collective punishment in the area for several years. The restrictions closed the Gaza district and prevented about 60,000 workers from leaving their homes.¹⁵

On 7 October, Israeli security forces killed four Palestinian gunmen in a shoot-out in Gaza. An Israeli General Security Service agent was also killed in the exchange of fire. The Palestinian gang, described as "intricate and dangerous," belonged to the Islamic Jihad movement in the Gaza Strip. One of the four, Sami Shaykh Khalil, was believed to be the one who shot Tal (see above). The authorities later demolished the homes of the four gunmen.¹⁶ The killings set off a wave of demonstrations and violence. According to Palestinian sources, approximately 30 Gaza residents were wounded by IDF soldiers. The riots culminated in street clashes outside the Gaza Islamic University, where troops opened fire on students who burned tires.¹⁷

The October cycle of violence spread to the West Bank, where, on 10 October, Inayat Hindi, a Ramallah mother of eight, was shot dead by Border Police. The incident began as schoolchildren staged a demonstration in protest against clashes between Muslims and Israeli police on Jerusalem's Temple Mount. The students set up roadblocks, waved Palestinian flags, and held up portraits of PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat.¹⁸ Israeli military officials, the *International Herald Tribune* reported, acknowledged that the woman was an innocent bystander and said they regretted her death. Another fatal incident occurred in late October when a Bethlehem University student was shot by an IDF sniper after troops were surrounded by a mob of rioters.¹⁹

In early November, the IDF imposed curfews on the Balata refugee camp in the West Bank "to quell unrest linked to the opening of the Arab summit conference in Amman"²⁰ (see below). The step was taken after dozens of youths blocked roads, burned tires and threw stones at troops. The Balata refugee camp was a major trouble spot throughout the year. In early June the Army carried out a major sweep of the camp, arresting dozens of suspected troublemakers. The raid followed a period of intensified petrol-bomb attacks and road closures by local protesters. The operation was reportedly stopped after troops met with vigorous resistance.²¹

The security situation deteriorated also in Gaza where, on 10 November, a 17-year-old girl was killed by settlers who opened fire on stone throwers during a demonstration in the town of Dayr al-Balakh.²² (For details of the violent incidents of December, see below).

ADMINISTRATIVE DETENTION AND DEPORTATION

The extensive use of six-month administrative detention and deportation continued in 1987. The government thus pursued its August 1985 decision to renew the implementation of these punitive measures against subversive elements, in an attempt

to break the organizational framework of the PLO in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

Following the deportation of the East Jerusalem journalist Akram Haniyya, in late December 1986 (see *MECS* 1986 p. 206), an expulsion order was issued against Muhammad Yusuf Dakhlan. Dakhlan, the leader of Fath's *Shabiba* youth movement in the Gaza Strip, was expelled to Jordan on 26 January 1987. He was allegedly responsible for organizing unrest in the region, having received "instructions and funds from PLO operatives abroad."²³

In late May, Ahmad Nasir, Dakhlan's predecessor as head of the Gaza *Shabiba* movement, was also expelled to Jordan. Nasir, who was released in the May 1985 exchange of prisoners was said to have encouraged Gaza youth to engage in armed struggle. The IDF spokesman contended that he had "instigated and bore responsibility for numerous disturbances in the Gaza Strip."²⁴

Several West Bank PLO activists were also served with deportation orders during the first months of the year. Among them were two prominent student leaders: Khalil Ashur, 45, a student at al-Najah University and a former security prisoner, and Marwan al-Barghuthi, head of the Bir Zayt student's council. The latter, according to the IDF spokesman, "maintained contacts with hostile elements inside and outside the West Bank... [and organized] activities to promote the aims of the Fath organization."²⁵

In September and November, further deportation orders were issued against Palestinian leaders. These included 'Abd al-Nasir 'Abd al-'Aziz, a prisoner who was said to be an activist of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP); Mubarak Awad, a Palestinian-American advocate of non-violent resistance to the Israeli occupation; Jamal Hindi, a PLO leader at the Jenin refugee camp who was claimed to have organized disturbances in the camps and at al-Najah University; and 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Awda, a Muslim preacher from Gaza and the spiritual leader of the militant Islamic Jihad movement there.²⁶ Israeli observers noted that none of the four had been accused of involvement in terror attacks. Rather, they were suspected of incitement, organizing unrest, and being leaders of hostile Palestinian organizations.²⁷

The deportation of the four activists, however, was postponed after they appealed to the Military Review Board and to the High Court of Justice.

A large-scale, almost unprecedented wave of arrests occurred between 13 and 16 April, following the killing of Ofra Moses (see above). Approximately 170 Palestinian activists from all parts of the West Bank were detained. Nine known figures were placed under administrative detention, among them Faysal Husayni, head of the East Jerusalem Arab Studies Society; Ma'mun al-Sayyid, a former *al-Fajr* editor; and Saman Khuri and Salah Zuhaira, two senior journalists and members of the Arab Journalists' Association. All were suspected of activity on behalf of the PLO and of organizing recent disturbances.²⁸

The most prominent administrative detainee was Husayni. He had long been seen by the Israeli authorities as the senior Fath representative in the West Bank and as a "figurehead of the nationalist camp," although he was careful to avoid overtly illegal activities. Foreign correspondents reported that Husayni seemed to have annoyed the authorities by serving as secretary of the "Committee Confronting the Iron-fist Policy," an *ad hoc* body of Palestinian and left-wing Israelis opposing repression in the territories.²⁹

Husayni was released in July 1987 but rearrested in September and placed under

administrative detention again for six months. The security authorities alleged that he had been involved in planning illegal activities against the state. The charge was upheld by the Jerusalem District Court. Husayni's arrest in September evoked wide condemnation both in the territories and in Israel.³⁰

In what was interpreted as a goodwill gesture to mark *'Id al-Adha*, festival of sacrifice, the Army released, in August, some 160 West Bank prisoners, most of whom were about to complete their terms. The list included several administrative detainees, among them George Hazbun, secretary of the Union of Public Institution Workers in Bethlehem and the deputy head of the General Federation of Labor Unions in the West Bank.

Estimates differed concerning the overall number of deportees and administrative detainees in the period prior to the December uprising. Palestinian sources claimed that 44 people had been deported since August 1985, and a total of 292 detention orders had been issued. Security sources, who admitted that measures had been increasing, said that 18 deportation orders had been issued since August 1985, and by early December 1987 (prior to the uprising) there were 50 administrative detainees from the West Bank and from Gaza.³¹

The Israeli policy regarding administrative detention drew sharp criticism, especially from international human rights groups which claimed that such measures were justifiable only when applied against people "actively engaged in violence against Israelis and not against political activists." Security officials nevertheless reaffirmed the Israeli policy emphasizing that "even persons involved in transmitting messages and funds, mediating disputes [between PLO-oriented factions], and building PLO-backed institutions [were] liable to face deportation or administrative detention."³² They insisted, however, that a careful legal and security check be made before each such decision was taken, "to ensure the measure [was] only taken as a last resort, when no other means [had] been found to curtail the hostile activity."³³

WEST BANK UNIVERSITIES

The relationship between the Israeli authorities and West Bank universities deteriorated significantly during the period under review. The student bodies at the various institutions of higher learning had further consolidated themselves as a recognized leadership composed of hard-core activists with deep ideological commitment to both secular Palestinian nationalism and Islamic fundamentalism.

At Bir Zayt University, student power was divided. The elections to the student council in January illustrated the division of power between three major groups. The majority of votes (41.5%) was given to the "Maghdusha Martyrs' List," a coalition of pro-Fath (*Shabiba*) elements and communist supporters. The rest of the vote was distributed between a nationalist "rejectionist" list (24.5%) and the Islamic bloc (34%).³⁴

The *Shabiba* youth movement also won the student elections at al-Najah University on 27 July. It received 47.2% of the vote and all 11 seats on the student council. The group's major opponent, the Islamic bloc, registered a significant achievement, winning 41.2% of the vote. Three other blocs representing radical views accounted for less than 12% of the votes. Following the elections, the political controversies between the two competing factions at al-Najah, the secular nationalists and the Islamics, were exacerbated. Clashes erupted in August after the Islamic bloc decided to suspend

classes unilaterally for a day to celebrate the Muslim New Year. Upset by the students' inability to reconcile their differences and respect regulations, al-Najah's board of trustees decided in September to close the university until the situation quietened down.³⁵

Nine months earlier, in January, al-Najah was closed for a week by the military government. The preemptive closure was intended to prevent violent riots reportedly planned by Fath supporters. The decision marked a new approach. In the past, colleges were closed only after disturbances had occurred or inflammatory material had been seized. According to the new line, it was preferable to shut down institutions of higher learning for a specific period than to allow the creation of centers of friction.³⁶

The al-Najah administration strongly condemned the measures, considering them "unjustified and unreasonable."³⁷ The heads of West Bank universities met with Rabin and rejected the pretext that students were planning political gatherings. Rabin responded that Israel could not afford to allow the universities to be the region's main source of unrest. The participants argued that the defense minister was threatening to close down permanently the Palestinian institutions of higher education if the riots continued.³⁸

Al-Najah students nevertheless challenged Rabin's warnings when, in late January, they organized a mass demonstration in support of al-Fath. The university was closed for a month, starting 10 February.

The increasing tension between the authorities and the universities spread in the course of the year to other institutions. In April, Bir Zayt was closed for an unprecedented four months after clashes between troops and demonstrating students in which one student was shot dead (see above). The closure was, according to Palestinian sources, "the longest and most punitive in the history of the university."³⁹ The institution was reopened on 13 August. Bir Zayt's president, Gabi Baramki, told *The Jerusalem Post* that the university had suffered both academic and financial losses from the closure, which he called "a collective punishment... directed at the academic process itself."⁴⁰

Following the reopening of the university, the West Bank military commander said that the closure had proved to be an effective signal to other Palestinian campuses. He hoped Bir Zayt students had "learned the lesson" and would refrain from creating disturbances. The commander placed much of the responsibility on the universities themselves: "If the administration [was] not capable of controlling the students... the defense establishment would perhaps have no alternative but to close down the campus permanently." But the president of the university rejected this view, arguing that the administration could not police its students.⁴¹

Similar action was taken by the military authorities in late October against Bethlehem University. The college was closed for three months after troops shot and wounded two students while breaking up a riot on the campus. One of the students subsequently died (see above). The disturbances broke out during a demonstration to mark the anniversary of the killing of 49 Arab villagers by Israeli forces on the eve of the 1956 Sinai campaign. Earlier in the year, the university was shut down on five occasions for a total of 30 days.⁴²

The West Bank Council for Higher Education strongly condemned the action. Isma'il Taziz, head of the council, said Israel's policy in the territories was conducted according to "jungle rules" similar to those of the South African regime. Antun

Sansur, the deputy president of Bethlehem University, called the closure a "draconic decision" and strongly denounced the collective punishment.⁴³

LABOR UNIONS AND THE PRESS

In 1987 the authorities pursued their policy of acting against West Bank and Gaza Strip trade unions, in an attempt to curb their growing influence (see *MECS* 1986, p. 205). The first confrontation occurred in February when the Gaza Strip Union of Carpentry and Construction Workers held its election in total defiance of an Israeli ban.

There were six labor unions in Gaza, formed under Egyptian rule in 1966. They were proscribed by the military government in the aftermath of the occupation in 1967 and remained closed until 1980, when the authorities ceded to local and international pressure and allowed them to function partially. The restrictions that were imposed prevented them from enrolling new members or holding new elections.

The Israeli authorities opposed elections to the unions because they "encourage[d] hostile elements." Military sources said that trade unionists were only interested in exploiting the unions in order to "strengthen the infrastructure of the PLO-affiliated organizations in the area."⁴⁴

In April, union elections were again held in Gaza, this time by commercial and public service workers, "despite the efforts of the military authorities who dispatched soldiers to prevent people from entering the union office." Four unionists were arrested and charged with incitement: Tal'at Lafi; 'Aish 'Ubayd; Tawfiq al-Mabhuh; and Mustafa al-Barbar. Soldiers tried to block the balloting and the authorities later refused to acknowledge the results.⁴⁵

In the West Bank the authorities also continued to apply harsh measures against union activists, claiming that certain unions served as a cover for "organizational efforts and subversive activity by [al-]Fath." According to 'Adil Ghanim, head of the General Federation of Labor Unions in the West Bank, unionists were "regularly placed under town arrest and... union officers were subject to occasional searches."⁴⁶

The authorities continued to react firmly against the East Jerusalem press. According to the State Department, at least 20 editorials and commentaries were censored in 1987. Several Palestinian journalists were interrogated about allegedly inflammatory articles or for failing to submit articles to the censors. The censor, according to the American report, also prevented East Jerusalem Arabic papers from printing stories about alleged Israeli torture of Palestinian prisoners.⁴⁷

In 1987, two newspapers were denied the right to be distributed in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. In mid-November two Arabic dailies, *al-Sh'ab* and *al-Fajr*, were banned from distribution for one week because of the publication of a signed statement addressed to Arab leaders at the Amman summit, expressing open support for the PLO.⁴⁸ (See below.)

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS

Unlike the previous year, which saw intensified economic activity generated by the defense ministry and the Civil Administration, there were almost no economic measures initiated by the Israeli authorities in 1987. The considerable efforts of the government to register involvement in what it called the "quality of life" in the territories (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 207-8) had significantly diminished. The major

economic breakthrough that was achieved in 1987, namely the direct export of West Bank and Gaza goods to the European Economic Community (EEC), had been, to a large extent, forced upon the authorities.

On 3 November 1986 the Cairo-Amman Bank opened its Nablus branch, becoming the first West Bank financial institution to resume business since the June 1967 war. (For the alleged Israeli-Jordanian cooperation that led to this development, and the reaction of the local population, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 216-17). During the period under review, the Nablus branch widened the scope of its financial activity. In January 1987, official Israeli sources announced that West Bank residents had already opened more than 1,000 accounts there.⁴⁹

Since its reestablishment, the Nablus bank was used by Jordan as the main channel for transferring funds and salaries to both government employees and pro-Jordanian personalities and institutions in the West Bank. Due to the success of the Nablus center, a branch of the bank was opened in Ramalla in September 1987.

The major economic issue that preoccupied the Israeli authorities was the export of agricultural goods from the territories to Europe. At the beginning of the year, Israel had made it clear to EEC representatives that it opposed the establishment of direct contacts between them and Palestinians in the territories. In August, however, the Israelis reversed their stand. *The Financial Times* reported that, under renewed pressures from the EEC, the government had backed down from its refusal to allow the export of West Bank-Gaza agricultural goods through Israeli ports. The decision to relax a 15-year ban on allowing Palestinian produce to compete with Israeli exports was made by a three-man ministerial committee.⁵⁰

In October, during a visit to Israel by Claude Cheysson, the EEC commissioner, it was agreed that the export of agricultural produce would be administered by the local West Bank and Gaza Strip chambers of commerce. A final agreement was officially signed in December, by which the inhabitants of the territories were permitted to market their produce directly to EEC countries, rather than through Israeli firms. The agreement stated that the products would have labels listing the region in the territories from which they originated, instead of the standard label on all produce exported from Israel.⁵¹

On 26 June, Joel Greenberg, *The Jerusalem Post's* reporter on West Bank-Gaza affairs, first published the news of a major Israeli water-drilling scheme in the southern region of the West Bank. According to the report, the project, which was planned near Herodion, southeast of Bethlehem, was "expected to lead to the pumping of 18 million cubic meters of water annually for use mostly in Jerusalem and Jewish settlements." Sources associated with the project told *The Jerusalem Post* "it could deplete the water in wells used by Arab communities in the area, while only making a small quantity of the pumped water available to the Arab villages and towns."⁵²

News of the project evoked general anger and sharp condemnation in the territories. Israeli ambitions, wrote *al-Fajr*, were apparently not restricted to "expanding into Arab territory by confiscating land, emptying it of its population and then filling it with settlements. They also extend to what [is] underneath this land." The water project, *al-Fajr* maintained, added "a new link to the suffocating chain that hang[s] around the neck of the Palestinian people in the occupied territories." It was nothing more than "water theft," *al-Fajr* concluded.⁵³

Arab mayors in the Bethlehem region strongly deplored the scheme and called

upon the Israeli authorities to cancel it. They issued a statement that the project would "drain and deplete the five artesian wells now feeding the Bethlehem and Hebron areas." The Israeli scheme, they added, posed "a great danger to the physical existence of the Arabs in the region."⁵⁴

Also opposed to the scheme was Foreign Minister Shimon Peres. As a central protagonist of the policy to improve the quality of life he was reported to be "concerned by signs that the drilling [was] designed to obtain water for the inhabitants of Israel proper rather than for those of the territories."⁵⁵

The West Bank Civil Administration had made its agreement to the project conditional on "compensation and the provision of an alternative water supply for Arab communities whose wells could be depleted by the project." According to *The Jerusalem Post*, the Administration was demanding from the Israeli Water Company guarantees of sufficient water at an "equitable price" to the demands of the the Arab towns and villages.⁵⁶

Commenting on the controversial scheme, the coordinator of government activities in the territories promised: "If Arab rights [are] harmed... [Israel will] not allow this project to get under way."⁵⁷

Not convinced by Israeli declarations that the water-drilling project would benefit West Bank residents as well as Israelis, the mayors of Bethlehem, Bayt Jala and Bayt Sahur organized a protest campaign. As a result, Egypt, the EEC, the UN and the US submitted to the Israeli Government letters of protest, stating that the scheme violated international law. The official American opposition had apparently persuaded the contracting US-based oil-drilling firm to withdraw its initial commitment to carry out the project.⁵⁸

HEADS OF CIVIL ADMINISTRATION REPLACED

On 15 September, Brig. Gen. Ephraim Sneh announced his resignation as head of the West Bank Civil Administration. While no official reasons were given for this, commentators in the Israeli press hinted that it "was prompted by sharp policy disagreements with the coordinator of activities in the territories, Shmuel Goren." The most recent difference of opinion between the two occurred over the water-drilling scheme, to which Sneh had reportedly been opposed. Sneh, *The Jerusalem Post* wrote, was considered a "liberal administrator." He maintained contacts with a broad range of Palestinians, including moderate PLO supporters, and was said "to be at odds with Goren on some of the tougher Israeli policies in the territories."⁵⁹

Prominent Palestinian personalities in the West Bank, *The Jerusalem Post* further reported, expressed sorrow over Sneh's departure. However, Arab sources in East Jerusalem, presumably representing the more radical line of PLO supporters, told *al-Fajr* that under Sneh's administration Palestinian institutions were harassed more than before, the universities were closed for longer periods, and administrative detention and deportations were reinstituted.⁶⁰

Sneh was replaced in October by Brig. Gen. Yesha'ayahu (Shailee) Erez, who had served as head of the Civil Administration in the Gaza Strip. His post in Gaza was filled in November by Brig. Gen. Aryeh Ramot.

JORDAN'S INVOLVEMENT IN WEST BANK-GAZA AFFAIRS

In the period under review, Jordan increased its efforts to enhance its influence in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip through the following channels: (a) the actual implementation of the five-year development plan; (b) action against anti-Jordanian elements; and (c) support for the pro-Jordanians.

THE FIVE-YEAR DEVELOPMENT PLAN

(For the details of the plan introduced in August 1986 and the initial reactions in the West Bank, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 214–16).

In the absence of a national executive body to represent the inhabitants of the West Bank, Jordan administratively divided the region into eight separate districts in January 1987 and formed committees to supervise the implementation and execution of development projects. The committees, grouping senior Jordanian government employees appointed prior to the 1967 war, were largely given supervisory roles. Their future task was to put forward proposals for development projects, in consultation with local experts in sectors such as health, education, agriculture, etc.

The Jordanian minister for the occupied territories, Marwan Dudin, who described the new framework as “flexible,” promised that the committees would follow “tried and tested procedures” used in the East Bank for issuing tenders and making purchases. They would also act against any possible malpractice by certifying that contractors had completed phases of projects before payments were forwarded by the Jordanian Government through the Cairo-Amman Bank in Nablus.

In an effort to promote the new structure, Dudin met with several West Bank mayors who visited Amman, among them Elias Freij of Bethlehem and Hafiz Tuqan of Nablus. He assured them that his ministry was eager “to assist in implementing urgent and necessary projects in the occupied territories that would serve the greatest number of citizens.”⁶¹

Funds were the major obstacle delaying the implementation of the scheme. In late 1986, Jordan stressed that the successful launching of the \$1.3 bn. development plan depended on aid from the West. In early 1987, the plan had garnered firm commitment for only about \$15m. from the US and Britain; \$30m. came from Jordan itself. In March, Dudin said that France, Italy and West Germany had promised to contribute still undisclosed amounts. He rejected reporters’ suggestions that Jordan had been having trouble raising foreign funds for the plan, but later conceded that spending in 1987 might only amount to between \$60m. and \$80m.⁶² Despite repeated statements by Jordanian officials to the effect that funds were being transferred to the territories, it appeared that very little was done. In May, the first draft of the plan which originally put total outlay at well over a billion dollars was scaled down to some \$900m. In October, *The Jerusalem Post* wrote that US officials were reportedly concerned that “American funds given to Jordan for the territories [had not] made their way there.”⁶³

In response, Jordan launched a wide-ranging information campaign, claiming that it had issued tenders for projects worth over \$4m. in the West Bank and Gaza. The projects, according to *al-Nahar*, included water and electrification schemes, road building, and aid for schools and hospitals.⁶⁴ In addition, Jordan announced that an additional \$13m. had already been channeled to the territories. Half of the sum was

for the payment of salaries to government-employed teachers. From January 1987, Jordan began to pay the salaries not only of teachers employed prior to the 1967 war, as was the case in the past, but also to those who entered government service after 1965.⁶⁵

Considerable efforts were also directed toward the Gaza Strip. Previously the Jordanians showed only lukewarm interest in Gaza, mostly through the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee and the Philanthropic Society run by the former mayor of Gaza, Rashad al-Shawa. His office dealt mainly with issuing Jordanian travel documents for Gaza residents. In 1987, Jordan's involvement in Gazan affairs became more and more evident. The Gaza Strip "area of operation" was included in the five-year plan and was listed as a separate region in the new geographical division of districts (see above).⁶⁶

In February, Dudin received in Amman a delegation from the Gaza Philanthropic Society led by Shawa. The minister declared that, following instructions from King Husayn, his government was paying "every attention" to the Gaza Strip and working to help the population there "remain firm against Zionist schemes and difficult economic circumstances."⁶⁷

Upon his return to Gaza in March, Shawa declared that Jordan was planning to spend \$5.25m. on projects in the region, as part of its five-year plan for the territories. He added that Jordan had earmarked a total of \$10.5m. for aid to the Strip in fiscal 1987. The money was to be spent on projects involving housing, small industries, schools, the water supply, and hospital equipment. "The funding [fell] short of what was anticipated when the Jordanian plan was announced," he said, "but money given [would] definitely help."⁶⁸

Shawa also referred to the reconvening in Amman in mid-February of the Joint Jordanian-Palestinian Committee, which had been suspended since the break in Jordanian-PLO relations in February 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 210). He assessed that the meeting would not produce results as long as there was political disagreement between the parties. Aid from the committee, he nevertheless added, "would not hinder or obstruct the distribution of Jordanian development aid.... The people here [were] ready to receive aid from any donors."⁶⁹

SANCTIONS AGAINST ANTI-JORDANIAN ELEMENTS

Parallel to the intensified efforts to improve its political standing through economic means, Jordan continued to act firmly against West Bank dissident figures and centers. As in past years, it employed a variety of personal and collective sanctions. For example, Jordan's authorities prevented the entrance to that country of senior pro-PLO activists such as Jacques Hazmo, the editor of the East Jerusalem weekly *al-Bayadir al-Siyasi*, and the Gaza lawyer Fa'iz Abu Rahma. Substantial pressure was put on acknowledged PLO supporters to adopt a more moderate stance toward the Jordanian regime. Pro-PLO personalities like Sa'id Kan'an of Nablus and Dr. Salah Bustani and Khalid 'Usayli of Hebron took part in late 1986 and early 1987 in Jordan's information campaign to promote the five-year plan.⁷⁰

Jordan continued to impose severe restrictions on Palestinian figures who had been deported to the East Bank. According to *al-Fajr*, the authorities in Amman refused to issue identity documents for Marwan al-Barghuthi, the Bir Zayt student leader who was expelled by Israel. Intelligence officials, the same source added, were regularly

interrogating Barghuthi and other West Bank-Gaza deportees such as Khalil Ashur and Ahmed Nasir.⁷¹

Special attention was focused on dissident, anti-Jordanian elements in the Muslim religious establishment in East Jerusalem and the West Bank. Steps were taken against Shaykh Akrama al-Sabri, a former member of the outlawed National Guidance Committee. Sabri, head of the Preaching Department of the Higher Muslim Council, was on Jordan's Ministry of Religious Affairs payroll. His participation in the April 1987 Palestine National Council (PNC) in Algiers as a member of the PLO delegation aroused Jordan's anger and led to his dismissal from his influential position. Other West Bank religious officials, whose loyalty to Amman was questioned, had to contend with similar sanctions.⁷²

THE PRO-JORDANIANS

In the summer of 1987, local Palestinian and Israeli publications reported that a group of pro-Hashemite personalities was preparing to launch a new political movement that would endorse Jordanian political moves in the area. According to *The Jerusalem Post*, the group lobbied for PLO renunciation of terrorism and acceptance of Security Council Resolution 242, the convening of an international peace conference, and the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. The participants, mostly businessmen and professionals, expressed support for the Jordanian monarch while favoring the PLO's participation with Jordan in the peace process. The group reportedly consulted with Jordanian envoys and planned to promote its ideas in the press, mainly through the East Jerusalem daily, *al-Nahar*. (For the establishment of this publication, see *MECS* 1986, p. 214.)

It also planned to set up public institutions such as research centers, workers' unions, and cultural and social organizations to rival PLO-controlled institutions in the West Bank. Israeli commentators noted that "the planned activities of the Jordanian-backed group [were] the first serious attempt in years to challenge the PLO at the grassroots level in the territories." The setting up of such a body had been considered in Amman and locally for some time but was made operational following "assessments that the time was ripe for an appeal to Palestinian public opinion frustrated by the lack of political alternatives proposed by the PLO."⁷³

The group, occasionally named the "Palestinian-Jordanian National Coalition," was expected to include mayors and heads of local councils and "a number of influential figures who [occupied] government-run posts."⁷⁴

In late August 1987, a meeting was held between Foreign Minister Peres and West Bank pro-Jordanian personalities. The latter included the editor of *al-Nahar*, 'Uthman al-Khallaq, lawyer Isam al-Anani, Umat al-Masri, Tahsin Faris, Ahmad J'abani and Dr. Zuhdi Ghazzala. They told Peres that they were for the renewal of relations between Husayn and Yasir 'Arafat so that a joint Jordanian-Palestinian representation could be worked out in preparation for the convention of an international conference.

The activities of the pro-Jordanian lobby for the establishment of a new political organization and the meeting between Peres and Jordan's sympathizers in the West Bank were sharply condemned by local PLO circles. The East Jerusalem weekly, *al-Fajr*, expressed deep concern about "efforts which [the Jordanian] regime [was] exerting to enlist support for its policy which [was] at odds with that of the PLO and the overwhelming majority of Palestinians."⁷⁵ The paper believed these moves were an

attempt "to establish [an] alternative leadership to the PLO, using an Israeli-Jordanian scenario which [ran] counter to the will of the Palestinian people."⁷⁶ A similar denunciation came from Bashir Barghuthi, the Communist editor of the East Jerusalem weekly, *al-Tali'a*. He argued that Peres, in addition to trying to deepen the division in the Palestinian ranks, wanted to show the international community that there were Palestinians who accepted his policy. Addressing himself to those who attended the meeting with Peres, Barghuthi said: "Whoever violate[d] the decisions of [the] Algiers PNC session [did] not effectively recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."⁷⁷

Another attempt to set up a pro-Jordanian body was made in late September 1987 by Jamil al-'Amla, head of the Hebron Area Village League. He announced his intention to establish a new political grouping, the Jordanian-Palestinian Confederal Party, which would stand for peaceful coexistence between Israel and the inhabitants of the West Bank in coordination with Jordan. "We will have faith in His Majesty King Husayn and believe in a Jordanian-Palestinian confederal union," he said, expressing strong opposition to PLO-sponsored terrorism.⁷⁸ He denied any contact between the proposed new organization and the Israel-backed village leagues, the largest of which he himself headed.

Pro-PLO circles in the West Bank, however, viewed the new body as a mere extension of the village leagues. *Al-Fajr* argued that the new party was established "to serve Israeli interests in the region and to participate in direct negotiations between Israel and Jordan over the future of the occupied territories."⁷⁹

Sharp criticism also came from Jordan's loyalists in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. The editor of *al-Nahar*, Khallaq, directed his attack at what was "remaining of the village leagues," which, he argued, had been totally discredited by the local population.⁸⁰ "We warn such people against this opportunistic body which, since its inception, has only known how to... undermine the inspirations of our Palestinian people."⁸¹

'Amla's efforts were soon foiled by the Israeli authorities. On 28 September, the office of the coordinator of government activities in the territories reiterated the government's policy that permission would not be granted to establish political parties in the territories.

It seemed that the government's negative approach to 'Amla's initiative was based on the assessment that he enjoyed little popularity and therefore had little chance of competing either against the PLO's supporters or the more traditional Jordan loyalists. Cabinet members attempted to strengthen their relations with the latter. In mid-September Rabin conferred in Nablus with 'Abd al-Rahim Sirtawi, the director of a new Jordanian-backed college in Nablus, Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman Shunar, a senior government health services official, and businessman Dr. Ibrahim 'Abd al-Hadi. Press reports indicated that these meetings were "intended to boost Jordan's efforts" to enhance its position in the area.⁸² Rabin held similar meetings in October and in early December, when he met with seven members of the Jordanian Parliament residing in the West Bank. During the meeting, the first of its kind, Rabin told the group, which included Tahsin al-Faris of Nablus and Edward Khamis of Bethlehem, that they should step up their activity in the territories. Israel's policy, he said, was to encourage "moderate personalities."⁸³

VIEWS AND ATTITUDES

THE ALGIERS CONVENTION OF THE PALESTINE NATIONAL COUNCIL

The 18th session of the PNC in Algiers in April 1987 was warmly welcomed in the territories. PLO loyalists stressed what they called Yasir 'Arafat's outstanding success in reunifying Palestinian ranks.⁸⁴ The heightened hopes and expectations were reflected in an editorial in *al-Fajr*, which said: "The Palestinians are now able to build their revolutionary stand free of the ghosts of Camp David and of questionable agreements." All agreed, the paper went on, that it would be a significant event as it would dispel the atmosphere of divisiveness and enable the Palestinian leadership to take appropriate political initiatives. Splits and mutual accusations between rival factions resulted in weakness, and not only outside Palestine, *al-Fajr* wrote; "division became the norm" in the occupied territories too. Criticizing the contradictory political loyalties and orientations of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza, the paper commented: "We have now four parallel labor unions and a similar number of women's organizations and federations of voluntary committees. We have two parallel artist's unions, two writers' unions and three lawyers' unions."⁸⁵

West Bank supporters of the PLO argued that moves at the PNC to unify the organization would promote ME peace prospects rather than harm them. According to *The Jerusalem Post*, they rejected Israeli assessments that 'Arafat's renewed alliance with PLO radicals would damage the peace process.⁸⁶

The PLO's abrogation of the 1985 Amman accords during the Algiers convention provoked a political dispute in the territories. Those associated with the more radical pro-Syrian factions and the Fath-supporting elements rallied behind the Algiers decision, making the following arguments: the cancellation did not mean that the PLO was unwilling to participate in peaceful efforts; the action was not directed against the Jordanian people but against the regime in Amman; it was only a death sentence for an accord already frozen by Husayn in February 1986 (for the suspension of the accords by Husayn, see *MECS* 1986, p. 210-11); the abrogation was the price paid to promote Syrian participation in the peace process; and the Amman accords were only serving a tactical goal, mainly to help the PLO break the stalemate that had existed since 1983.⁸⁷

Those sympathetic to Jordan expressed opposite attitudes. Freij, for example, openly called on the PLO to maintain the agreement. He challenged the PLO's leadership, saying that the decision was "a wrong step and a mistaken political action which [would] have negative effects on the citizens in the occupied territories and on Jordanian-Palestinian relations."⁸⁸ Other prominent pro-Jordanians such as Shawa and Dr. Yasir Ubayd, Jordan's chief health administrator in the West Bank, spoke in similar terms: "Ties with Jordan and Egypt should be strengthened rather than weakened....[The cancellation] create[d] a split between the Palestinians and the Jordanian people. It weaken[ed] the Arab position with regard to the international peace conference."⁸⁹

The final resolution adopted by the PNC resulted in divergent reactions in the territories. Local personalities siding with the left-wing Palestinian organizations welcomed the closing of the ranks effected by 'Arafat, George Habash and Na'if Hawatima. Israeli observers predicted that the external PLO unity achieved in Algiers would also be reflected in the territories, and that differences between rival Palestinian

groups would diminish. One indication of the new trend was given by Bassam Shak'a, the pro-Syrian former mayor of Nablus. After years of boycotting the East Jerusalem press aligned with the mainstream PLO line, he reversed his policy in April and granted an interview to *al-Fajr*. He also expressed satisfaction with the PNC resolutions that rejected the American-Israeli concept of an international peace conference.⁹⁰

Left-wing followers were also encouraged by the PNC decision to widen relations between the PLO and the Soviet Union. It was the "correct direction," said Dr. Ahmad Natsha of Hebron, a Soviet sympathizer. The pro-Soviet orientation of the PLO, he hoped, would help prepare the way for reconciliation between the PLO leadership and Syria. Syria, Natsha explained, was opposed to imperialism and would be considered an ally of the Soviet Union.⁹¹

The inclusion of the Palestine Communist Party (PCP) as a recognized faction in the PLO was enthusiastically welcomed by the West Bank-Gaza communists. Palestinian commentators interpreted the change of policy towards the PCP as a sign of a moderate PLO line. The PCP did not participate in or favor armed struggle, *al-Fajr* wrote. It was the first to call for a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and for a two-state solution, i.e., recognition of Israel, at a time when other factions were "making pie-in-the-sky demands without any consideration of the realities of the Middle East." By recognizing the Palestinian communists and giving them their share of seats in the PNC, the paper concluded, the executive committee had "made sure this important movement receive[d] appropriate credit and recognition."⁹²

Jordan's supporters, as expected, held different views. They had mostly denounced the decision to cut ties with Egypt. The step was "a joke," said Shawa, adding that the PNC's resolutions were an indication of a "dictatorship enforced by the minority on the majority."⁹³ The closure of the PLO offices in Cairo and the new crisis in Egyptian-Palestinian relations were viewed with great concern by some followers of the mainstream PLO factions. These groups, similarly disturbed by the growing cooperation between 'Arafat and the PLO's pro-Syrian factions, were disappointed with the results of the PNC, feeling that the price paid for achieving "national unity" was too high. They expressed the hope that, following the Algiers convention, the Amman-Damascus relationship would improve, and that Jordan and Syria would coordinate positions with Egypt to promote PLO participation in an international conference. Moderate PLO supporters such as Hana Siniora and Abu Rahma, known for their pragmatic attitudes, were frustrated and disillusioned with the Algiers resolutions which, they believed, reflected the strengthening of a more radical — and even militant — trend within the PLO leadership. "We have failed," some of them told Ori Nir, the *Ha'aretz* correspondent in the territories. The Israeli unwillingness "to advance toward us" and the rejection of the "forgotten Amman accords" by all other parties (namely Syria, Jordan, and the PLO) had made "our pragmatic line" irrelevant, they concluded.⁹⁴

THE SINIORA INITIATIVE

A short time before the PNC convened in Algiers, Siniora illustrated his more realistic approach when, together with three other West Bank Palestinians, he signed a joint political statement with senior members of the Israeli Labor Party. The statement,

which was relatively moderate, failed to mention the PLO and spoke, rather, about the "legitimate security rights of Israel and the legitimate national rights of the Palestinian people." It called on "all responsible parties to put an end to continued stagnation and to initiate... the process leading to [a] comprehensive, just and durable peace." Negotiations to reach settlements, the statement concluded, should be conducted "within the framework of an agreed international conference and directly between recognized and legitimate representatives of Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian people."⁹⁵

Siniora's move was vehemently criticized by various PLO supporters in the territories, who accused him of having bypassed the PLO. Several months later, at the beginning of June, he caused a much greater political storm when he announced his intention to lead a Palestinian list to run in the November 1988 municipal elections in Jerusalem.

Ever since 1967, when East Jerusalem was annexed to Israel, the vast majority of the city's Arab population refrained from voting in the municipal elections as a way of emphasizing their rejection of Israeli sovereignty over the Arab quarters of East Jerusalem. In 1987, there were nearly 135,000 Arabs living in the eastern part of the city.⁹⁶ Siniora explained that his move "was meant as a local initiative to break the deadlock in the Middle East and provoke discussions among Israelis and Palestinians about the implications of Israel's extended rule in the territories."⁹⁷ This did not mean that the Arabs "relinquished sovereignty over East Jerusalem," he explained, adding that he believed Jerusalem should be an undivided city with dual sovereignty, "the capital of both a Palestinian state and of Israel."⁹⁸ Siniora estimated that he could win up to seven seats in the 31-seat municipal council, "wielding power similar to that of religious factions in the Knesset."⁹⁹

The idea was enthusiastically welcomed by parts of the Israeli public. Yehuda Litani, the ME editor of *The Jerusalem Post*, described it as "a revolutionary statement." He wrote: "For the past 20 years, Palestinians in the territories and in East Jerusalem have called for either an armed struggle against Israel or a peace process involving the superpowers, the Arab states and the PLO." Now, Litani continued, a Palestinian leader belonging to the PLO was calling on his people for the first time to participate in the political process within the Israeli establishment.¹⁰⁰ Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek also spoke approvingly of Siniora's initiative.

The unexpectedness of the proposal aroused heated discussions among Israelis. Within the two large political parties views differed on whether the initiative was "good or bad for Israel." Moderate politicians in both camps welcomed the initiative. Several Likud Knesset members, on the other hand, decided to submit a law barring any person from running for municipal office unless he was an Israeli citizen and had sworn allegiance to the State of Israel.¹⁰¹

A cooler reaction came from the Palestinians in East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. One of the first to oppose the proposal was Sari Nusayba, a professor of philosophy at Bir Zayt University. According to *The Jerusalem Post*, it was Nusayba who had first mentioned the idea, challenging the Israelis with the implications of their continued rule over the territories.¹⁰² However, Nusayba hurriedly dissociated himself from Siniora's proposal, saying it was a "one-man show," an immature step "taken without prior discussion and endorsement by the Palestinian community."¹⁰³ The proposal could be realistic, he nevertheless added, if: (a) the idea

was sponsored by the PLO as part of a broader demand for political rights throughout the territories, or (b) the ME peace process failed, after which a new Palestinian strategy might be adopted.¹⁰⁴

Siniora's proposal elicited sharp denunciations from the entire range of the West Bank political spectrum: left-wingers, pro-Syrians, PLO supporters and pro-Jordanians. Even figures known to be close to Siniora's world view dissociated themselves from his idea.¹⁰⁵ "Our problem," explained Mustafa 'Abd al-Nabi al-Natsha, "was not a municipal one but a political problem... participation in the elections to [the Jerusalem] municipality meant recognition of the annexation."¹⁰⁶ A typical reaction appeared in the East Jerusalem daily, *al-Sha'b*, reflecting the more militant wing of al-Fath. "Is it reasonable," the paper asked, "that we should accept the legality of the unification of Jerusalem, when we were not consulted about it? Is it reasonable that the world, including the US, should oppose the illegal annexation of Arab Jerusalem instead of us whose cause it is? Can we separate Jerusalem from the rest of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip?"¹⁰⁷

Pro-Jordanians were also adamantly opposed. *Al-Nahar*, the central organ of Husayn's loyalists in East Jerusalem, ridiculed the fact that the person chosen by 'Arafat to represent the Palestinians in future peace negotiations was the one who was ready to legitimize Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem. Anwar al-Khatib, the former Jordanian governor of Jerusalem, regarded the proposal as "no more than a joke." "We will never participate in a 'united Jerusalem,'" he said. "Our current payment of city taxes [was] imposed on us by force. The municipality [was] not an area for political gains."¹⁰⁸

A central question that had preoccupied the public both in the territories and in Israel was whether the PLO had been consulted and had given Siniora its prior approval. For his part, Siniora insisted all along that his idea was a personal initiative, not connected with the PLO. An official PLO statement totally rejecting the initiative came from Baghdad six days after Siniora made his announcement. The lengthy delay aroused much speculation.¹⁰⁹

Da'ud Kuttab, in a news analysis published in *al-Fajr*, assumed that the PLO had not known of Siniora's idea beforehand and had not given him the green light. Kuttab gave three possible reasons for the PLO's delay in rejecting the proposal:

- (1) The PLO could not publicly oppose a Palestinian individual whom it had chosen as a member of a delegation to mediate between itself and the US.
- (2) The PLO wanted to know what the local Palestinian response would be.
- (3) The PLO wanted to see how Siniora's suggestions would fare among the Israelis.¹¹⁰

A diametrically opposed interpretation was given by Moshe Zak, a former editor of *Ma'ariv*, who claimed that Siniora had managed to fool the Israeli political system. Siniora acted under the directives of the "PLO's department of psychological warfare," Zak argued. He was not seriously interested in the actual implementation of his proposal; it was nothing more than a PLO-inspired trial balloon. Siniora succeeded, with the assistance of anxious Israeli politicians, in acquainting the international community with the Palestinian claim to Jerusalem, the writer concluded.¹¹¹

The question whether it was a private proposal or a PLO-coordinated act remained unanswered. Following the fierce protests from almost all political quarters in the territories and outside, Siniora's activity subsided considerably. He was finally

persuaded to withdraw his proposal in late June, after two of his cars were set ablaze at the entrance to his residence in north Jerusalem. The Syrian-backed PFLP claimed responsibility for the arson. A slogan daubed on a wall near the cars and signed by the organization read: "Jerusalem will remain the capital of Palestine."¹¹²

According to *The Jerusalem Post*, some political observers contended that the PFLP had acted against Siniora in an attempt to bolster its standing in the territories following the capture in June of the PFLP squad responsible for the March 1986 murder of Zafir al-Masri, the former mayor of Nablus, and the killing of two Israelis.¹¹³

A violent assault against Prof. Nusayba in September was similarly attributed to PFLP activists. The attack came in response to secret talks he held with Likud Central Committee member Moshe Amirav on "expanded self-rule for Palestinians in the territories...as an interim solution to the Israeli-Arab conflict."¹¹⁴ In these meetings, which had been held regularly since May, Nusayba, a moderate PLO supporter, was joined by Faysal al-Husayni, head of the Arab Studies Society, and by Salah Zuhayka, an editor of the East Jerusalem pro-militant *Fath* daily, *al-Sha'b*.

THE POLITICAL PROCESS

It seems that the unity achieved in the PNC between mainstream PLO factions and representatives of the more radical left-wing organizations, on the one hand, and the cold reception given to Siniora's initiative, on the other, left their imprint on the delicate balance of political power in the West Bank. The change was clearly noticeable in the negative response of the more moderate pro-PLO leaders to an invitation to meet with Secretary of State George Shultz when he visited Israel in October. Among those who boycotted the scheduled meeting were Natsha, Ghazzala, Kan'an, Fa'iz Qawasima, Radwan Abu Ayyash, Hana al-Atrash, Suhayl Jad'un and Kamal Hasuna.

Israeli commentators felt that the group's members had acted according to a PLO dictate, and that by adopting a more militant stand had demonstrated their favorable attitude toward the USSR, in conformity with the newly approved pro-Soviet line adopted by the PLO leadership at the PNC convention in Algiers. The Palestinians' refusal drew a rebuke from Shultz for "acting in contradiction to their stated desire to be heard."¹¹⁵

In a statement published in the East Jerusalem press, spokesmen for the group explained that, in their view, the US role in the ME peace efforts had lost its moral imperative. They urged the American Administration to reappraise its policy of ignoring the PLO and the national rights of the Palestinian people. The only way to start the peace process, according to the statement, was to convene an international conference "under the supervision of the United Nations and with the participation of the five permanent members of the Security Council, along with the direct participation of the parties in the conflict, including the PLO, which is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people."

The Palestinian people rejected Security Council Resolution 242, it was further stated, and insisted on their right to self-determination and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, as well as on their right to choose their own representatives "without Israeli or other pressure or custodianship." The statement expressed Palestinian frustration with Shultz's previous attempts to promote the concept of improving the socioeconomic situation in the territories, saying: "We

believe that occupation and improvement of the quality of life [are] two conflicting issues. In order for one to survive, the other has to vanish. Thus any attempt to continue such talk would be direct encouragement for the continuation of the occupation".¹¹⁶

The strong pro-PLO overtones were again discerned in early November when a group of local leaders met with French Prime Minister Jacques Chirac in Jerusalem. Eight members of the Palestinian delegation, all acknowledged supporters of the PLO mainstream, handed Chirac a memorandum expressing uncontested support for the PLO and rejecting Resolution 242. Three prominent pro-Jordanians who attended the meeting, Freij, Shawa, and Hikmat al-Masri, declined to sign the statement because it failed to mention Jordan's role in the Palestinian question and because it rejected 242.¹¹⁷

THE AMMAN SUMMIT

The traditional division between the pro-Jordanians and the pro-PLO camp came to the fore again in mid-November, when the various political groupings consolidated their positions toward the convention of the Arab summit in Amman. More than 700 Husayn loyalists signed a memorandum published in *al-Nahar* in which they emphasized the unity of the East and the West Banks of the Jordan as well as the kingdom's crucial role in solving the Palestinian problem. The signatories urged the participants of the summit to agree to the establishment of a Palestinian-Jordanian confederation. Despite the fact that the statement acknowledged the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians it was condemned by the rival camp.¹¹⁸

The circles associated with the PLO published a memorandum of their own in which they urged "the Arab leaders to join ranks and support the PLO to accomplish the national interests of the Palestinian people and the Arabs in general." Referring indirectly to Husayn and rejecting any Jordanian claim to represent the Palestinians, the statement asserted that no one but the PLO "shares in the right to speak on behalf of our people." The signatories further rejected "dubious settlements, whether they referred to [the Israeli concept of] 'sharing in the administration' or the so-called [Jordanian] 'development plan' or attempts to create a quisling, alternative leadership in an effort to circumvent the PLO and undermine our people's national rights."¹¹⁹

The summit had aroused great expectations in the territories. "We still have faith in the ability of the Arab people," wrote *al-Fajr*,¹²⁰ "to persuade their leaders to put their differences aside and to put the interests of their people...before their own." *Al-Quds* similarly joined "the voices of hope...emanating from the Atlantic to the Gulf, calling for an end to the long period of darkness that troubled the Arab world."¹²¹

The mood changed, however, when the summit resolutions were made known and it became clear that the Palestinian issue had been neglected. Disappointment and despair replaced the previous optimism and hope. "The Arab leaders gave superficial attention to the Palestinian cause and failed to issue a clear statement of support for the Palestinian struggle," protested *al-Fajr*.¹²² *Al-Sha'b's* editorial also viewed the outcome of the summit in a negative light, noting that the extraordinary summit did its work in "a very ordinary manner" by issuing a statement containing a series of resolutions in the traditional mode of previous Arab summits. The paper took a dim view of the summit's achievements: "The vague outcome reached by the summit's organizers constitute[d] another manifestation of the state of impotence and ignominy

prevailing in the Arab world...The summit was never and will never be a place for practical solutions."¹²³

Not surprisingly, much more optimism was expressed in the pro-Jordanian *al-Nahar*. The paper wrote that the summit had achieved what the Arab people had not expected, the opening of a new page in inter-Arab relations. The paper hailed "the Iraqi-Syrian reconciliation, the restoration of Palestinian-Jordanian dialogue and revival of coordination efforts between...the Jordanians and the Palestinians." *Al-Nahar* further maintained that the residents of the occupied territories felt, after studying the summit statement, that the first step toward liberation had been taken, and hoped that "the Arab brothers would continue on the same path paved by the Amman summit toward a united and promising Arab future."¹²⁴

The popular uprising that swept the territories shortly after the summit concluded, and the rebellious process that developed from it, made speculations such as *al-Nahar's* totally irrelevant to the situation in the West Bank and Gaza.

THE DECEMBER 1987 UPRISING

THE COURSE OF EVENTS

The popular uprising in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, which came to be known as the *intifada*, broke out on 9 December. The riots began in the Jibaliyya refugee camp in the north of the Gaza Strip when thousands of protesters marched in the streets, mourning four Gazans killed by an Israeli truck in a road accident. During the demonstrations, students hurled stones at Israeli troops. Later, petrol bombs were thrown at Israeli patrols. The soldiers shot at the rioting masses, causing the death of two youths and the injury of many others.

Rioting spread in the following days throughout the Strip and the West Bank. The security situation rapidly deteriorated when thousands of demonstrators began to challenge troops in most daring and provocative ways. Dozens of soldiers were injured when rioters attacked them with stones, rocks, cement blocks, bricks and iron bars. Numerous petrol bombs were hurled at IDF patrols and at Israeli civilian vehicles. Egged buses carrying both Jewish settlers and laborers employed in Israel were set alight. As the unrest mounted in the latter part of December, classes were disrupted and more residents took to the streets, confronting Israeli security forces in unprecedentedly fierce clashes. Masked students incited fellow Palestinians to riot. They erected roadblocks, burned tires and hoisted Palestinian flags. Youths taunted the soldiers and shouted such threats as: "We will slaughter you and drink your blood."¹²⁵

The riots spread in a chain reaction: incidents with heavy casualties in one locality triggered more incidents elsewhere. In mid-December, the riots moved to the Arab quarters of Jerusalem, marking a new phase in the uprising. The most serious riots erupted in the densely populated refugee camps in southern Gaza and in the West Bank (Balatta, Duhaysha, and Jalazun).

By the end of December, at least 22 Palestinians had been shot dead by troops and 158 had been injured. Fifty Israelis, mostly soldiers and policemen, were hurt in the disturbances.¹²⁶ (For the IDF's conduct in dispersing the demonstrators, see below.)

IMMEDIATE CAUSES

The massive riots were triggered by a series of incidents that occurred inside and outside the territories in the period immediately prior to 9 December. The spark that ignited the trouble came on 8 December when a semi-trailer driven by an Israeli Jew, struck and killed four Gazans near the Jibaliyya refugee camp. Rumors spread that the driver had intentionally smashed into the two Arab vehicles in which the Gazans were traveling in order to avenge the fatal stabbing of an Israeli salesman, Shlomo Saqal, in central Gaza on 6 December. Tension had already been high since a Palestinian schoolgirl was shot dead by an Israeli settler on 10 November¹²⁷ (see above).

Palestinian morale was given a substantial boost in late November following the hang-glider attack on an IDF camp in upper Galilee in which six soldiers were killed. Palestinians in the territories reportedly expressed "widespread satisfaction" over the operation, describing it as "a daring and painful blow at Israel's military defenses."¹²⁸ The success of the operation definitely encouraged Palestinians in the territories and led them to believe that the Israelis could be beaten.

At the initial stage of the uprising, defense sources linked the disturbances to the usual incitement and violent agitation that occurred in the wake of incidents in which Arabs were killed in confrontations with security forces or Jewish settlers.¹²⁹ (For the security situation in November, see above.)

Shmuel Goren, the coordinator of government activities in the territories, argued that, as in past years, tension had generally built up to a peak at the end of November, because of the anniversary of the 1947 UN vote on the the partition of Palestine, and again toward the end of the year, because of Fath Day, which the Palestinians mark on 1 January.¹³⁰

An explanation that was often given by military spokesmen at that stage was that the outbursts of violence were caused by external agitation and in response to PLO incitement. Israeli officials, such as Dr. Yossi Beillin, the director-general of the Foreign Ministry, contended that the riots reflected attempts by the PLO to recapture its lost primacy in the wake of the Arab summit.¹³¹

It seems, however, that there was little to back the theory that it was the PLO which had fomented the uprising from the start. The riots erupted at a time when the PLO was relatively weak, having suffered a blow at the Amman summit. Press reports indicated that 'Arafat was surprised by the course of events and especially by the vigor and intensity of the local Palestinian resistance.

The PLO did not spearhead the violence; rather it followed the events and tried to fuel the flames. It was three or four days after the riots began that the PLO leadership reacted.¹³² In late December, Rabin himself seemed to accept the view that the PLO had merely jumped on the bandwagon.¹³³

Despite the PLO's attempts to claim credit for organizing the disturbances, the *intifada* was, first and foremost, something more spontaneous: a genuine, locally initiated uprising. It seems that, by December, pressure in the occupied territories had reached bursting point. The violence was motivated by rage against the Israeli occupation which had been accumulating for 20 years.

The marginal role of PLO headquarters in the initial stages of the uprising was also evident from the fact that the established pro-PLO leaders in the territories were almost totally absent from the scene when the riots erupted. Both the more radical

figures, such as Shak'a and the more moderate ones, such as Siniora, had little say in the beginning. Moreover, the first demonstrations were directed against the occupation, and were hardly manifestations of the PLO.¹³⁴

Second-echelon PLO activists began to be involved in organizing the unrest only at a later stage, towards the end of December and the beginning of January 1988, in cooperation with other political circles. Such coordination was apparently achieved in the Gaza Strip between Fath cell leaders and local Muslim fundamentalists. Members of the Islamic movement in Gaza came to play a major role in organizing the mass protest.

Representatives of the Islamic fundamentalist movement were included in the prestigious "coordinating committees" which directed the riots since December 1987. Activists of the Islamic Jihad terror organization reportedly incited crowds to demonstrate after the Friday services in the Jerusalem Mount Temple mosque. *Allahu Akbar*, the traditional Muslim call for *jihad*, holy war, was repeatedly cited from the minarets of the area's numerous mosques.

The active involvement of Islamic elements in the national awakening of the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, indicated that opposition to the Israeli occupation was becoming more and more intensely charged with Islamic sentiment.¹³⁵

THE NATURE OF THE UPRISING

One of the most salient characteristics of the uprising was the engagement of the younger generation in daring confrontations with troops, undeterred by the consequences of their actions. The change was already noticeable in previous years. In 1985, for example, both Israeli and foreign observers emphasized the increase in the number of home-made petrol bombs used in attacks against Israeli vehicles. The level and ferocity of the attacks against Israeli targets had intensified radically that year. Some commentators, such as Yosef Zuriel, argued late in September 1985 that the increase in Arab violence stemmed from a sociopolitical change, namely, "the rise of [a] new, more militant generation of West Bank Palestinians who had grown up under Israeli occupation and had gradually developed a deep hatred for the Israelis" (see *MECS* 1984-85, p. 235). Similar observations were made in 1986, when it was noted that "the more frequent and sporadic use of molotov cocktails and knives indicated that the new generation of Palestinian youth in the West Bank had managed to overcome the barrier of fear in confronting the IDF" (see *MECS* 1986, p. 203).

The same line of thought appeared in the reports of Thomas Friedman, *The New York Times* correspondent in Israel, who analyzed the situation in the territories in January 1987. He found two striking themes in the thinking of the new Palestinian generation: (a) that their violence against Israeli targets was simply the politics of revenge; (b) that the direct contact with Israel had radicalized their views. The most important factor shaping the attitudes of the new generation, Friedman wrote, seemed to be the feeling that they had lost control over their own future, both as individuals and as a collective.¹³⁶ In April, eight months before the *intifada* erupted, Friedman correctly observed again: "Palestinian residents of the occupied territories, frustrated at the fact that no solution, either diplomatic or military, to their situation seems to be in the offing, and seeing no direction coming from Palestinians abroad, seem to be taking matters into their own hands."¹³⁷

Dr. Meron Benvenisti, head of the West Bank and Gaza Strip Data Base Project, had similarly analyzed the changing conditions. In his annual report, released three months before the uprising began, he said:

The Israeli authorities might be better served by accepting the violence as individual and spontaneous acts emanating from a growing sense of despair and frustration. This require[s] the recognition that the problem [is] no longer limited to breaking up organized terrorist cells but [has] evolved into population control....The conflict [can] no longer be maintained militarily....Though the overwhelming majority support the nationalist stance of the PLO, the Palestinian population [is] now acting of its own accord.¹³⁸

One of the first Israeli observers to note the radical change shortly after the riots began was Prof. Yehoshua Porat, a Hebrew University historian who, on 13 December, said that the disturbances appeared to be the first signs of a "civil uprising of the population."¹³⁹ He was later joined by commentators who pointed to the fact that the territories were on the verge of a civil revolt. They emphasized the solidarity between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the active participation of women and elderly men in clashes with the troops, the wide and decisive response to the calls to strike, and the noted escalation in the vigorous attacks against soldiers.¹⁴⁰

These views sharply contradicted the opinion put forward by defense officials during the first stages of the unrest, that the violence was merely the peak in a periodic cycle of unrest. Despite the scope of the disturbances and the spreading riots, the defense establishment rejected all talk of a civilian uprising. The first to dispute charges that the Palestinians were embarking on rebellion was Goren, the coordinator of government activities in the territories. He argued that a rebellion implied, *inter alia*, a breakdown in communication between the local inhabitants and the Civil Administration, but "there was absolutely no such situation." Workers, according to Goren, continued to arrive for work in Israel, the Jordan River bridges remained open, and the mayors maintained contact with the authorities.¹⁴¹

During a cabinet meeting on 13 December, senior IDF sources expressed similar views, saying they did not see "even the beginning of a rebellion," but rather "a rush of events centered [in] various locations and instigated by a minority." The Defense Ministry thesis, which proved in 1988 to be totally wrong, was adopted by the prime minister, Yitzhak Shamir, who also dismissed any talk of revolt.¹⁴²

While, during the first stages, there had been some justification for Israeli claims that the dimensions of the riots were being exaggerated, by the end of December it had become clear that these arguments were no longer tenable.¹⁴³ "There [was] already a civil war going on," wrote Friedman, "although few Israelis and few outsiders [were] prepared to admit or accept that fact."¹⁴⁴

THE RESPONSE OF THE ARMY

In the first stages of the uprising, between 9 and 21 December, the Army employed conventional means to quell the riots. The troops tried to restore order and disperse rioters with tear gas and rubber bullets. As the situation deteriorated and the attacks launched by individual demonstrators and massive crowds became more violent, beleaguered troops fired live ammunition at assailants, in many cases in order to extricate themselves after having been besieged by mobs. The result was an

unprecedented death toll for the territories in a short period of time. However, conventional measures failed to produce significant results as the unrest continued to spread rapidly. The Army was taken by surprise by the scope, duration, and intensity of the riots that swept through the territories.¹⁴⁵ When Rabin returned to Israel on 21 December, after an 11-day visit to the US, a change of policy was expected; indeed, on 22 December, a day after the defense minister's arrival, a series of new "tough" guidelines was introduced. (Rabin was later criticized for not having returned home immediately after the trouble began.) The defense establishment decided to use "every legitimate means to the fullest extent" to maintain law and order. The new line was not presented as a change in policy but as an "emphatic implementation of given means to achieve stability."¹⁴⁶ Rabin explained that "any measure in accordance with Army orders was justified if it achieved its goal of stopping trouble."¹⁴⁷ Speaking in the Knesset, the defense minister stressed that he was determined to put down the rioting even if it damaged Israel's image abroad. He promised that whenever the law allowed arrests, they would be made, and that whenever there could be expulsions, people would be deported.¹⁴⁸

The new "operational guidelines" included the following elements:

- (1) Mass arrests (see discussion below).
- (2) Deportations. Security officials were divided on whether to proceed with the expulsion of Palestinian activists. Those opposed claimed that the use of deportation had never been proven to have a deterrent effect, and expressed concern that dozens of deportations would only spark further riots. At the end of the period under review, the Cabinet was still deferring a decision on the issue.¹⁴⁹
- (3) Increased military presence. Additional troops were deployed throughout the territories. The reinforcements included top-echelon units of paratroopers and the elite infantry Giv'ati Brigade.
- (4) Reorganization of command. Several high-ranking officers were moved to the Gaza Strip from other areas. OC Central Command, Maj. Gen. Mitzna assumed direct responsibility for security matters in the West Bank.¹⁵⁰
- (5) New equipment. The chief of staff announced that new riot-control equipment, including special helmets, shields and clubs, would be supplied to the troops.
- (6) Sealing off troubled locations. The entrance to violence-prone refugee camps, such as Duhaysha, was blocked with barrels and barbed wire.
- (7) Closure of schools. The Army ordered shut some 900 schools in order to prevent them from becoming assembly and departure points for riots.¹⁵¹
- (8) Closure of universities. Maj. Gen. Mitzna ordered a month's closure of four institutions of higher learning on the grounds that they had been centers of disturbances.
- (9) Action against the press. The IDF banned for one month the distribution in the West Bank of the East Jerusalem newspaper, *al-Quds*, because of alleged censorship violations and breaches of public security.¹⁵²

According to Hirsh Goodman, *The Jerusalem Post's* defense correspondent, "the decision to strengthen Israel's military hold on the territories came after several days of internal debate in the defense establishment." While one school held that the Army should "strive to limit its points of confrontation with the Palestinian population, an opposite view argued that this would be interpreted as weakness and advocated a show of force." Rabin, Goodman wrote, "cast his vote with those who demanded

stringent action." He opted for the "merciless" suppression of riots with all necessary means, including firearms; yet he also demanded limitations on their use.¹⁵³

The use of live ammunition by troops and the large number of Palestinians killed since the uprising began (22 by 21 December) had drawn widespread domestic and international criticism. Soldiers were accused of having indiscriminately shot Arab demonstrators, contrary to IDF regulations. Many casualties could have been avoided, it was argued, had the Army been properly equipped and trained in riot control.¹⁵⁴ In reply, Gen. Shomron contended that the standing orders regarding opening fire on rioters were being strictly observed as before. The soldiers had shown restraint, he said, "but sometimes, in extreme situations, they had no choice but to fire."¹⁵⁵ Yet despite the announced strict limitation on the use of live ammunition, this had "perforce become the most common method of dispersing riots in the West Bank and Gaza Strip."¹⁵⁶

Following the Defense Ministry's decision to carry out massive arrests (see above), and because Israel's security prisons were already overcrowded, the military authorities opened two extra tent-camp detention centers to accommodate the expected new influx of prisoners. The newly opened centers were near the West Bank village of Dahariyya, and near the Gaza refugee camp of al-Shati.¹⁵⁷

In a sweep that was described as "the largest since Israel took control of the territories,"¹⁵⁸ nearly 1,000 suspects were detained. Press reports indicated that the Army had apparently used wiretapping, informers, and videotapes of the rioting to identify Palestinian youths involved in the disturbances. Most of those who were rounded up by the Army were between 14 and 17 years old.¹⁵⁹

The suspected organizers of the riots were immediately prosecuted in military courts. The first trials opened on 25 December. Those who were found guilty were sentenced to jail terms of between one month and two years. The sentences handed out by the courts were considered by the locals to be much more severe than those for comparable offenses in the past.¹⁶⁰ Defense officials claimed that the rapid punishment of offenders was meant to be a deterrent. Arab lawyers in Gaza and the West Bank declared a boycott of the trials, saying that the courts were not allowing evidence for the defense to be introduced and were processing the cases extremely quickly.¹⁶¹

By the end of December, three weeks after it all began, it became obvious that the rioting in the territories was not merely a routine wave of protest fomented by the PLO from the outside. Rather, it was a genuine and spontaneous popular uprising against the Israeli occupation, carried out by the frustrated younger Palestinian generation that had been born after the 1967 war. The rebelling youngsters caused the security forces to lose at least partial control of the areas. They made tangible gains in putting the Palestinian issue back at the top of the international agenda. Many rightly felt "a sense of pride and newfound confidence," having successfully challenged the IDF for an unprecedented length of time.¹⁶²

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Report submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives by the Department of State, February 1987 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 1, 191.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 1, 190.
3. *JP*, 18 February 1987.
4. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 6, 20 February; *Ha'aretz*, 12 February; *The Guardian*; *JP*, 18 February; *Ma'ariv*, 20 February 1987.
5. *JP*, 16 September 1987.
6. Israel TV, 11 April — *DR*, 13 April; *FT*, 13 April; *JP*, 15 April 1987.
7. *Hadashot*, *The Guardian*, 13 April 1987.
8. *IHT*, 14 April 1987.
9. Vol, 13 April — *DR*, 14 April; *NYT*, 14 April; *Ha'aretz*, 15 April 1987.
10. *Davar*, 8 May; cited in *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 10 May 1987.
11. *The Guardian*, 9 June; *The Economist*, 13 June 1987.
12. Vol, 7 June — *DR*, 8 June; *JP*, 8, 9 June 1988.
13. *The Economist*, *ibid.*
14. *Ha'aretz*, 25 May; *The Guardian*, 26 May 1987.
15. *Ma'ariv*, *Ha'aretz*, *JP*, 4 August; *Newsweek*, 31 August 1987.
16. *Ha'aretz*, 9 October; *JP*, 30 October 1987.
17. *Ha'aretz*, *JP*, 11, 13 October 1987.
18. *JP*, 11 October; *NYT*, 13 October 1987.
19. *IHT*, 13 October; *JP*, 29, 30 October; *Ha'aretz*, 1 November 1987.
20. *JP*, 9 November 1987.
21. *Ma'ariv*, *Hadashot*, *JP*, 1 June 1987.
22. *The Times*, *JP*, 11 November 1987.
23. *JP*, *Ha'aretz*, 27 January 1987.
24. *JP*, 1 June 1987.
25. *The Guardian*, 26 March; *JP*, 28 April 1987.
26. *JP*, *Ma'ariv*, *Ha'aretz*, 9 September; *JP*, 12, 19 November; *NYT*, 19 November 1987.
27. *JP*, 6 December 1987.
28. *Hadashot*, *NYT*, *JP*, 15 April; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 19 April 1987.
29. *The Guardian*, 14 September 1987.
30. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 30 August, 6, 20 September; *Ma'ariv*, 9 October 1987.
31. The higher figures of the Palestinian sources stem from the inclusion of Palestinians released in the 1985 exchange of prisoners and later deported. *JP*, 6 December 1987.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Ibid.*
34. *Davar*, 9 January; *Ha'aretz*, 25 January; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 30 January; *JP*, 20 February 1987.
35. *Ha'aretz*, 27 July; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 2 August, 13 September 1987.
36. Vol, 4 January — *DR*, 5 January 1987.
37. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 9 January 1987.
38. *Ha'aretz*, 23 January 1987.
39. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 16 August 1987.
40. *JP*, 14 August 1987.
41. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), *ibid.*
42. *The Times*, 30 October 1987.
43. *Ha'aretz*, 17 November; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 22 November 1987.
44. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 27 February, 12 April; *JP*, 5 April 1987.
45. *JP*, *Hadashot*, 5 April; *al-Tali'a*, East Jerusalem, 9 April 1987.

46. *JP*, 17 June 1987.
47. Department of State Report, March 1988, p. 1, 194.
48. *Al-Sha'b*, East Jerusalem, 13 November; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), *Davar*, 15 November 1987.
49. *Ha'aretz*, 6 January; *JP*, 7 January 1987.
50. *FT*, 28 August 1987. The decision was warmly welcomed by Jordan. See *JT*, 29 August 1987.
51. R. IDF, 12 October — SWB, 14 October; *al-Quds*, 2 December; Vol, 12 December — SWB, 22 December 1987.
52. *JP*, 26, 28 June 1987.
53. *Al-Fajr*, 27 June; *al-Nahar*, 1 July; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 5 July 1987.
54. *JP*, 30 June 1987.
55. *Al-Nahar*, 4 July; *al-Sha'b*, 6 July; *JP*, 9 July 1987. For Egypt's stand see *al-Ahram*, 1 August, and also Kamal Nasser, "Israel's Water Policies Deprive Palestinians," *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 16 August 1987.
56. *JP*, 3 July 1987.
57. *Ibid.*, 7 July 1987.
58. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 30 August; *Ha'aretz*, 20 November 1987.
59. *JP*, 15, 16 September 1987.
60. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 15 November 1987.
61. Jordan TV, 20 February — DR, 3 March; *JT*, 10 March 1987.
62. R. Amman, 27 January — SWB, 31 January; *JP*, 12 March 1987.
63. *JP*, 23 October 1987.
64. *Ibid.*
65. *Ma'ariv*, 29 January; *Davar*, 10 August 1987.
66. R. Amman, 27 January — SWB, 31 January; *JT*, 10 March; *Davar*, 10 August 1987.
67. R. Amman, 9 February — SWB, 11 February 1987.
68. *JP*, 11, 12 March; *Ha'aretz*, 11 March 1987.
69. *JP*, 11 March. On the meetings of the committee see: *Ha'aretz*, 15 January; *JP*, 18 February; *Ma'ariv*, 23 February 1987.
70. Arye Shalev, *Ha'aretz*, 14 January 1987.
71. *Al-Fajr*, 13 July — DR, 23 July 1987.
72. *Hadashot*, 8 June; *Davar*, 10 August 1987.
73. *JP*, 30 June; *'Al-Hamishmar*, 15 July 1987.
74. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 9 August 1987.
75. *Al-Fajr*, 30 August 1987.
76. *Ibid.*
77. *Ibid.*
78. Vol, 27 September — SWB, 1 October; *Ha'aretz*, 28 September 1987.
79. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 20 September 1987.
80. Vol, 29 September — DR, 1 October 1987.
81. Cited in *Ha'aretz*, 28 September 1987.
82. *'Al-Hamishmar*, 16 September 1987.
83. *Ha'aretz*, 14 October; *Davar*, 4 December 1987.
84. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 27 March; *Ma'ariv*, 23 April 1987.
85. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 19 April 1987.
86. *JP*, *al-Quds*, 23 April 1987.
87. See statements by 'Awda Ghantisi, Radwan Abu Ayyash, Bashir Barghuthi and Hana Siniora, *al-Quds*, 15 April; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 19 April; *Zo Haderech*, 22 April; *JP*, 23 April 1987.
88. Vol, 23 April — SWB, 27 April 1987.
89. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 19 April; *JP*, 23 April 1987.
90. *Ha'aretz*, 27 April; *Ma'ariv*, 29 April 1987.
91. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 19 April 1987.
92. *Ibid.*, 26 April 1987.
93. Vol, 26 April — DR, 27 April 1987.
94. *Ibid.*, *Ha'aretz*, 27 April 1987.
95. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 3 April 1987. The Israeli participants: Members of Knesset Ora

Namir, Abba Eban, Rafi Edri and Binyamin Ben-Eliezer.

96. *Newsweek*, 29 June 1987.
97. *JP*, 5 June 1987.
98. *Ibid.*
99. *Ha'aretz*, *Davar*, 7 June 1976.
100. *JP*, *ibid.*
101. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 14 June 1987.
102. *JP*, *ibid.*
103. *Ibid.*, 12 June 1987.
104. *JP*, *Ma'ariv*, 7 June; *Ha'aretz*, 12 June; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 14 June 1987.
105. *Davar*, 15 July 1987.
106. *Ha'aretz*, 7 June 1987.
107. Cited by *JP*, 12 June 1987.
108. *Ma'ariv*, 7 June; *JP*, 12 June 1987.
109. Vol. 11 June — DR, 11 June; *Davar*, 12 June; *al-Fajr* (English ed.), 14 June 1987.
110. *Al-Fajr*, *ibid.*
111. *Ma'ariv*, 12 June 1987.
112. R. IDF, 21 June — DR, 22 June; *JP*, 22 June 1987.
113. *JP*, 21, 22 June; *al-Nahar*, 22 June; *Hadashot*, 3 August 1987.
114. *JP*, *Ha'aretz*, *Davar*, 22 September 1987.
115. *NYT*, 19 December; *Hadashot*, 23 October 1987.
116. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 25 October 1987.
117. *Ibid.*, 8 November 1987.
118. *Ha'aretz*, 9 November; *Ma'ariv*, 10 November 1987.
119. *Al-Fajr* (English ed.), 15 November 1987.
120. *Ibid.*, 8 November 1987.
121. Cited *ibid.*, 15 November 1987.
122. *Ibid.*, 25 November 1987.
123. *Al-Sha'b*, East Jerusalem, 12 November 1987.
124. *Al-Nahar*, 12 November — DR, 13 November 1987.
125. *JP*, 11 December 1987.
126. *The Times*, 28 December; *The Guardian*, 29 December; *NYT*, 30 December 1987.
127. *JP*, 11, 13 December; *NYT*, 12 December 1987.
128. *JP*, 27 November 1987.
129. *Ha'aretz*, 11 December 1987.
130. *Ha'aretz*, *JP*, 14 December 1987.
131. *Ma'ariv*, *JP*, 18 December 1987.
132. Ze'ev Schiff, *Ha'aretz*, 18 December; Yehuda Litani, *JP*, 20 December; Ehud Ya'ari, *Koteret Rashit*, 30 December 1987.
133. *Davar*, 29 December 1987.
134. *Koteret Rashit*, *ibid.*
135. *JP*, 29 January 1988.
136. *NYT*, 12 January 1987.
137. *Ibid.*, 14 April 1987.
138. *Ha'aretz*, 13 September; *JP*, 16 September 1987.
139. Interviewed by Elaine Ruth Fletcher, *JP*, 14 December 1987.
140. Ori Nir, *Ha'aretz*, 14 December 1987.
141. *Ma'ariv*, 13 December; *JP*, 14 December 1987.
142. *JP*, 14 December 1987.
143. *The Guardian*, 19 December 1987.
144. *NYT*, 27 December 1987.
145. *JP*, 27 December; *NYT*, 30 December 1987.
146. *JP*, 23 December 1987.
147. *The Times*, 24 December 1987.
148. *Ibid.*
149. *JP*, 27 December; *Ha'aretz*, *The Guardian*, 29 December; *NYT*, 30 December; *The Times*, 31 December 1987.

150. *JP*, 20, 23 December 1987.
151. *IHT*, 24 December 1987.
152. *JP*, *Ha'aretz*, 23 December 1987.
153. *JP*, 23 December 1987.
154. *FT*, 22 December 1987.
155. *JP*, 23 December 1987.
156. *FT*, *ibid.*
157. *The Times*, 24 December 1987.
158. *JP*, 24 December; *NYT*, 26 December 1987.
159. *NYT*, 26, 30, 31 December; *JP*, 27 December; *Ha'aretz*, 28 December 1987.
160. *The Times*, 31 December 1987.
161. *Ibid.*, *Ha'aretz*, *The Times*, 28 December 1987.
162. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, *Ha'aretz*, *JP*, 25 December 1987.

MIDDLE EAST ECONOMIC ISSUES

Middle East Oil Developments

BENJAMIN SHWADRAN

INTRODUCTION

Before fully assessing developments in 1987 it is necessary briefly to review the circumstances of the December 1986 Opec conference of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries in Geneva and its decisions.

The "fair share" of the world oil market for Opec, promoted and very vigorously advocated by Saudi Arabia, which meant practically a free market policy and unbridled competition, obviously failed.¹ The two cartel instruments of price and production controls were abandoned. The majority of Opec members resorted to the netback system and the spot market prices to dispose of their crude oil. The outcome was the collapse of the oil price structure during the middle of 1986.

A new policy had to be adopted, and it was decided to return to the cartel controls of production and price. However, the deep divisions within Opec complicated matters. Iran, supported by Algeria and Libya, wanted to cut production drastically, thus restoring the price of crude oil to the level of \$28 a barrel. This, of course, meant heavy production cuts in the shares of the big producers: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE). The swing producer would have to be Saudi Arabia. Moreover, since Saudi Arabia's light oil was the marker crude of Opec in establishing the price structure, it inevitably made that country the swing producer. It therefore demanded that the marker crude of Opec be based on a basket of crudes. Saudi Oil Minister Hisham Nazir declared unequivocally that under no circumstances would his country agree to become the swing producer again.

Another major division was created by the conflict between Iran and Iraq over the latter's quota level. Iraq insisted that, as long as the war with Iran lasted, it be given a production quota equal to that of Iran; and Iran just as determinedly rejected Iraq's request.

The issue of the quota determinants created further conflict. The traditional criteria were: oil reserves, production capacity, and historical production. The Ministerial Quota Committee composed of Nigeria, Indonesia, and the UAE was requested to broaden the base and add to the list such factors as population, dependence on oil revenue, domestic oil consumption, production cost, and external debt. The committee, which was to have reported to the conference, decided that it needed more time to work on precise definitions of the eight criteria.

Since Opec members produced crude oil above what was considered optimal for market stability, to maintain the fixed price of \$18 a barrel as advocated by Saudi Arabia would be impossible unless heavy cuts in production were seriously and promptly undertaken, for the current market price was \$14-\$15 a barrel. The magnitude of the division in Opec between the big producers and between the smaller ones was menacing indeed. Finally, if it were agreed to establish a fixed price, what

should be done about commitments of members in netback deals and contracts based on spot market prices?

The conference opened on 11 December. After nine days of acrimonious debate and endless negotiations, an agreement was signed on 20 December by 12 members. Iraq refused to sign. The agreement provided for fixed prices for 24 crudes based on a marker crude arrived at from a basket of seven crudes, six Opec and Mexico. The overall production ceiling was set at 15.8m. barrels a day (b/d) during the first and second quarters of 1987, it was to rise to 16.6m.b/d during the third quarter and 18.3m.b/d in the fourth quarter, making a yearly average of 16.63m.b/d. Iraq was granted a quota of 1.2m.b/d. The agreement would not be binding if one member violated its terms. The 1986 overall ceiling of 17m.b/d was to expire on 31 December. Although Saudi Arabia refused to reduce its production level, it agreed to a 7.5% cut across the board for all members. From 1 January 1987 a fixed price system was to be established based on the reference price of \$18 per barrel. The Ministerial Differentials Committee — UAE (chairman), Algeria, Kuwait, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia — recommended that the differentials structure be reviewed periodically.

Members were given a month to notify their customers of the termination of the netback deals and the market-related (spot) pricing, which would be replaced on 1 February 1987 by Opec-fixed official prices. Those involved were Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Nigeria, Algeria, and the UAE.²

Since March 1982, when Opec decided to resort to production control in order to maintain the official price, failure was inevitable because of members' cheating on production and price levels, raising the former and lowering the latter. All the measures devised by the conference and its various ministerial committees to eliminate cheating came to nothing, because of the sovereign nature of Opec membership and the unbridgeable divisions within the organization. Now, after the disaster of the price collapse in the later part of 1986, had the members learned their lessons? Were they ready to overlook their different interests, discipline themselves to maintain the fixed prices, and adhere strictly to their production quotas? Would they give up all the various subterfuges to avoid the official limitations of production and price, such as barter,³ countertrade, destinationless cargoes, and netback deals? What was Opec going to do about the non-Opec producers, which it constantly blamed for the crisis?

PRICE AND PRODUCTION

At first the oil market believed that Opec members had really changed, and on 15 December 1986, when it appeared that Opec members were reaching agreement, prices in world markets rose to \$16.60 a barrel from \$14–\$15. However, when sharp differences emerged between Iran and Iraq over the latter's quota, and Iran demanded Iraq's suspension from the organization for refusing to accept the assigned quota, the world oil market price fell to \$15.85 a barrel. The final Opec accord impressed observers, and on 21 December, *The New York Times* noted that "the agreement appears to reduce production by one million barrels a day to roughly 16 million." Only two days after the accord was signed, oil prices in world markets jumped to \$18 a barrel.

In the middle of January, in the wake of Saudi Arabia's decision to make diplomatic contact with the USSR by sending Oil Minister Hisham Nazir to Moscow to ask

support for Opec measures by cutting Soviet exports to the West, prices jumped to \$18–\$20 a barrel. The vagaries of the price movement in that short period of time demonstrated that the changes were not based on economic facts of demand but on psychological speculation about Opec behavior. Although the agreement had been signed late in December, it was not to go into effect until 1 February; during January members were to continue with their former contracts, prices and deals.

In February, serious difficulties began to develop. The long-term contract customers, especially those of Saudi Arabia, refused to lift the contractual quantities with the new fixed Opec prices. If prices dropped, they would be obliged to pay the higher rate. They wanted to sign one-month *ad hoc* contracts instead of the five-month arrangements.

In mid-February, the oil market weakened. The spot market price for the North Sea Brent brand declined to \$17.50 a barrel, about \$1.50 below that required by Opec. *The New York Times* reported in March that Opec production in February was around 14m.b/d, 1.8m.b/d below the 15.8m.b/d decided upon in Geneva two months before. Saudi Arabia produced 2.9m.b/d instead of the 4.13m.b/d quota.⁴

During the last week of February the spot price for North Sea Brent dropped to \$16.40, about \$2.60 below the Opec fixed price. Netback at Rotterdam dropped to \$14.13 a barrel, \$3.39 below the official price. Early in March, the oil ministers of Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and Nigeria issued statements reaffirming their confidence in the organization's ability to hold to \$18 a barrel in the face of market pressure.

On 7 March prices in New York jumped to \$18 a barrel, for it was reported that Opec had cut production to below the 15.8m.b/d ceiling. Opec oil production during the first quarter averaged 15.7m.b/d; it rose to 16.6m.b/d in April. The rise was mostly the result of Saudi Arabia's increase from 2.9m.b/d in February, to 3m.b/d in March, to 4.1m.b/d in April.⁵ In May, production began to climb sharply, averaging over 17m.b/d, 1.3m.b/d above the ceiling of 15.8m.b/d.

Some of the radical Opec members pressed for higher prices. On 19 May, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia declared that crude oil prices should remain at the current level for at least for two years. He warned that "any steep increase in the price of oil means that we will face the same uncertainties in the oil market as when prices were raised before."⁶

NON-OPEC PRODUCERS

From the beginning of the third crisis in early 1982, Opec's major problem, after the indiscipline of its members, was the magnitude of the production level and the impact on the oil industry of the non-Opec producers. Their importance was increasing rapidly as they were acquiring markets at Opec's expense, as it were. Through the long crisis, different Opec leaders attempted to bring the non-Opec producers, if not to join, at least to cooperate with the organization's policies of production and prices. Their efforts failed, especially with the big producers, although they argued that such cooperation would benefit all producers.

Now that Opec abandoned all former objectives and aimed at market stability, it would be worthwhile to try again. Nazir was sent, early in January, to Moscow, Cairo and Oslo, and later also to London and Washington to persuade the non-Opec

producers to reduce oil output in order to stabilize the market. To strengthen his oil minister's hand, Fahd, in an interview on 18 January with the Kuwait daily *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, stressed that the "only increases in oil output must be in response to market demand and not as a result of competitive production, since this causes great harm to both Opec and non-Opec producers."⁷

Nazir was successful in Moscow,⁸ Oslo and Cairo. The three promised to cut production on exports by about 7.5%. But all refused to adopt Opec fixed prices for their crude. In London, Nazir met on 26 January with Energy Minister Alick Buchanan-Smith but failed to produce a change in British oil policy to cooperate with Opec. On 4 February, the British energy minister reported in New York that at his meeting with Nazir he had stressed the fact that Britain was a major consumer of oil as well as a producer and that as a result "the British economy has benefited from lower oil prices." The oil industry also benefited, for "drilling costs have come down and our offshore operations have become efficient."⁹

On the same day, his US counterpart, Energy Secretary John Herrington, took a belligerent position. Speaking in Davos, Switzerland, he urged the US's allies to build up their oil stockpiles and develop oil supplies outside the Persian Gulf, in order to counter the threat of growing dependence on Opec in general and the Gulf producers in particular. He declared:

The same forces that tried to push the world's energy-consuming nations into an era of limits and economic dependence are at work again today.... Opec's market share is up, and we have all seen the forecasts showing that the Persian Gulf could again be supplying half the world's oil by the late 1990s. This is virtually the same situation the world faced in 1979, a time when market manipulation tripled the price of oil and helped throw the world economy into recession. As a result, we stand at the crossroads for the energy industry and for energy security. The very competitiveness and future health of the world oil industry is on the line — and with them the world's prosperity and security.¹⁰

Nonetheless Fahd tried again. On 12 March, he declared that "non-Opec countries must keep Opec in a framework of common interest so that there is no type of competition which could prove harmful."¹¹

When the war between Iran and Iraq intensified and dangerously interfered with navigation in the Gulf, Kuwait appealed to the USSR and the US for help. The Soviet Union leased three tankers to Kuwait and promised military protection. The US decided to take drastic action. It increased its naval forces in the Gulf and was ready to reflag Kuwaiti tankers and provide convoy services for them. The motives for this action, as given by President Ronald Reagan, were: to guarantee freedom of navigation in international waters; to ensure the flow of oil to the US (15% of imports) and to the Western allies (70%); and to prevent the Soviet Union from penetrating the Gulf.¹² Whatever the motives were for the Soviet measures and the American action, the consequences for oil price and production levels were far-reaching, and developed rapidly as the midyear Opec conference was approached.

25–27 JUNE 1987 VIENNA CONFERENCE

The 81st Opec conference, which opened in Vienna on 25 June, faced the two basic issues of the organization: production level and price level. The December 1986 accord set a production ceiling of 15.8m.b/d for the first two quarters of 1978 which was to be increased to 16.6m.b/d in the third quarter. But members did not adhere to their quotas. Actual production levels up to May reached an average of 16.5m.b/d, and in May and June the average rose to 17m.b/d, 1.3m.b/d in excess of the official limit.¹³

The question arose of what to do about overall production ceilings for the third and fourth quarters. Should they be as provided in the December accord or should they be modified? The positions of the members followed their basic divisions. The radicals, Iran, Algeria,¹⁴ and Libya advocated restricting production, which would increase the price, while the conservative group led by Saudi Arabia urged that the organization follow the schedule agreed upon in the December accord. On the issue of price, the divisions followed clearly the groupings' interests. The radicals led by Iran called for more than \$18 a barrel. The conservatives, led by Saudi Arabia, advocated keeping the price at \$18 for the next two years.

The conference opened in Vienna on 25 June, and after only two days of discussion decided to increase the third quarter ceiling to 16.6m. b/d, but not to increase the ceiling for the fourth quarter,¹⁵ which would be maintained at the level of the third quarter. It seemed that the decision not to increase the ceiling for the fourth quarter was a victory for Iran and its radical allies. On the other hand, the decision of the conference not to increase the price above \$18 appeared to be a victory for the conservatives. The conference had achieved a balance between the two groupings.

As Opec's major objective had become market stability, the conference was faced with the possibility of dramatic changes in the oil market. In order to prevent this the conference set up a five-man ministerial committee, comprising representatives of Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Venezuela, Algeria, and Indonesia, to "monitor the price evolution in the market in relation to the Opec price structure." In the event of "any significant change in market prices," the committee would immediately call for an extraordinary conference, "with a view to deciding on the necessary Opec production levels during the remaining period of the year, which would secure the desired market stability."¹⁶ The conference established a three-man Quota Compliance Ministerial Committee — Indonesia, Nigeria, and Venezuela — to "undertake visits to member countries in order to motivate them to comply with the terms of the agreement."¹⁷

The Iraqi-Iranian War has seriously affected the oil production and export capacity of both countries, for they destroyed each other's production and, more disastrously, loading facilities in the Persian Gulf ports and outlets. Iraq, however, had the advantage of its strategic pipeline which carried oil from the south and the north to the outlets on the eastern Mediterranean. After Syria closed the Iraqi pipeline, the only outlet for Iraqi oil was through Turkey, but the capacity was limited. As the war continued the capacity was enlarged, and Iraq's output increased. In addition, Saudi Arabia permitted Iraq to build a pipeline from its oil fields to the Saudi Arabian inland Petroline, with its terminal at Yanbu' on the Red Sea. Ultimately Iraq was to build a parallel line to Saudi Arabia's Petroline with its own terminal near Yanbu'. These facilities would greatly increase Iraq's production and export levels and would,

no doubt, endanger Opec's objective of market stability. Since Iraq refused to sign the 1986 Opec agreement, it was under no obligation to limit production. Should its oil output increase substantially, it would endanger the Opec price structure. Iran, on the other hand, with greater oil production capacity than Iraq, had no pipeline outlets and had to contend with heavy Iraqi bombardments of its facilities in the Gulf.

When Opec instituted overall production ceilings, the Iranian quota was greater than Iraq's, for Iran produced greater quantities than Iraq.¹⁸ As long as its outlet facilities were limited, Iraq did not press for a greater quota. However, when these facilities were expanded Iraq demanded — as long as the war lasted — a quota equal to that of Iran. Having been denied the request, Iraq refused to sign the agreement; as a result it was free to produce as much as its facilities would permit.

In a move to bring Iraq back into the Opec fold before that country's export capacity made it almost impossible to do so, Kuwait suggested, with the backing of Saudi Arabia, that the Iraqi quota for the fourth quarter be equal to Iran's. In order to increase the overall ceiling, the other members would contribute from their quotas to make up Iraq's increase.¹⁹ Iran flatly turned down the suggestion, and Iraq remained outside the Opec quota system.

The next conference was to meet in Vienna on 9 December.²⁰

FROM CONFERENCE TO CONFERENCE

The midyear Opec conference dealt with all the outstanding issues detailed above, but it did not tackle the major internal issue: members' cheating on production, which was evident from the overall monthly production levels, and on fixed prices, which were apparently only adhered to by Saudi Arabia, with the result that its production level fell far below its quota during the first months of the year. All the conference did about cheating was to name the three-man Quota Compliance Ministerial Committee which was to visit member countries and motivate them to comply with the terms of the agreement. Opec obviously was not willing or was powerless to prevent cheating.²¹

Meanwhile, developments in the Gulf — US moves to protect Kuwaiti tankers, and the Iranian countermoves (see essay on the US and the ME) — had a psychological effect on the oil buyers, who ordered more than consumption rates necessitated. They aimed to stockpile against future shortages, and the inevitable result was an increase in prices, which in turn caused increases in production.

The tension in the Gulf rose when Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca on 31 July and riots broke out, leaving hundreds of Iranians dead or wounded. The Saudi Arabian interior minister charged in Jidda early in September that the Iranians "masterminded the bloody situation in the holy sanctuary...[because] of bitter envy of this country."²² These two forces disturbed both prices and production levels in the Gulf and in Opec.

PRICES AND PRODUCTION

Early in July, oil prices surged to above \$21 a barrel in the US. The rally in the price was sparked by the Iranian gunboat attack on a US operated supertanker. *The Wall Street Journal* noted, "the highest spot and future prices have led several US oil companies to hike the price they pay for West Texas Intermediate (WTI), the bellwether domestic crude." Crude for August delivery rose to \$21.23 a barrel, North

Sea Brent crude for August rose to \$19.60 a barrel.²³ About a week later *The New York Times* reported that, driven by fear that the war between Iran and Iraq could disrupt oil supplies from the ME, world oil prices had moved above \$22 a barrel in volatile trading.²⁴

The situation in the Gulf did not deteriorate as was feared, and prices fell as rapidly as they rose. Late in August prices of crude oil — both WTI and North Sea Brent — plunged by \$2–\$3 a barrel, and Gulf crudes were quoted in the market 50 cents below the official prices. Reporting on the developments in the world oil markets about three weeks after its previous report, *The New York Times* said:

Despite all the alarms and headlines about the crisis in the Gulf, the fact remains that global supplies of oil and products are more than ample for the foreseeable future....This has been the biggest factor weighing on prices of crude oil and derivative products in recent days. As long as oil continues to flow from the region the supply-demand fundamentals will outweigh all other factors in determining prices.²⁵

Production was nevertheless steadily mounting. Late in August a number of Opec states, including Iran, complained to the organization's president, Rikman Lukman, about overproduction by other Opec members. At the end of August it was estimated that the total production level for the month would be 19.7m.b/d over 3m.b/d above the official 16.6m.b/d, and more than 1m.b/d of the July estimate of 18.6m.b/d. The bulk of the increase came from the Gulf area.²⁶

At the end of August production was reported to have jumped to more than 20m.b/d, but at the same time oil companies were balking at paying about \$20 a barrel. They preferred to draw down inventories.²⁷ In the first week of September prices tumbled to below \$18 a barrel; North Sea Brent went down to \$17.10 a barrel. Opec leaders were worried that the Gulf conflict would make it difficult to control price and production levels.²⁸ On 13 September it was reported that Saudi Arabia, Opec's pivotal member, had exceeded its quota in August, and oil prices dropped below \$19 a barrel in the world markets.²⁹

PRE-DECEMBER 9–14 VIENNA CONFERENCE

In September basic differences appeared between the Opec groupings as they prepared for the approaching conference. As early as 14 September, the Iranian deputy oil minister, Husayn Kazem-pur Ardebili, declared that his country would press for \$22 a barrel at the December conference. He claimed that there was already a consensus among the member countries for more than \$20 a barrel. He challenged the Saudis by asserting that there were two ways of defending the fixed price: either the Saudis exerted pressure on the members that overproduced, or they reverted to the role of swing producer. Since Saudi Arabia refused to become the swing producer again, it had to use its good offices and contacts with those countries to stop this overproduction.³⁰

About a month later, after a visit by the Quota Compliance Ministerial Committee to the Gulf member states, a split on the price issue became evident. Iranian Oil Minister Gholam-Reza Agazadeh told the committee in categorical terms that his country insisted on an increase of \$2–\$3 in the Opec reference price from the beginning of 1988, from \$18 to \$20 a barrel, to offset the fall in the value of the dollar.

Indonesia and Nigeria were inclined to agree with Iran. Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states were determined to maintain the \$18 price.³¹

On 23 October, speaking at the *International Herald Tribune* oil conference in London, Lukman stressed the likelihood of a price increase in December in order to compensate for the depreciation of the dollar. This was opposed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. A month later, on 22 November, Iran's deputy oil minister declared that a consensus was emerging within Opec to raise the reference price to \$20 a barrel at the forthcoming conference, and that there were indications that even Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were considering a price increase.

Kuwait's oil minister, 'Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, flatly denied the Iranian claim regarding his country's position on the price issue. He said: "We have not been in contact with the Iranians, and we don't know who gave them the mistaken impression. Our position is firm in keeping the \$18 per barrel Opec price unchanged, and this is not something we would be willing to change our minds about." Two days later, the Saudi oil minister asserted that the statements attributed to Ardebili were "devoid of truth." Saudi Arabia publicly stated that it "will not agree to a price increase before the end of 1988 and only if it is established that the oil market will bear this as a result of real increase in demand." Indonesia and Iraq supported Saudi Arabia.³²

The battle lines between Iran and Saudi Arabia were becoming clearer. On 1 December, the Iranian oil minister stated in Tehran that the forthcoming conference in Vienna would be difficult since Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and their supporters would attempt to damage the interests of Iran by pushing for lower prices. He maintained that present instability was the "irresponsible and tension-creating moves by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC]" which have "flooded the market so that the price will not go up, while at the same time making unfounded accusations that Iran was selling oil at discounts." The Iranian minister made it clear that his country's position would be for a price increase. "Iran will endorse no decision which falls short of compensating for the slump in the dollar's value." Iran would propose a \$2 a barrel increase.

The next day, 2 December, the Saudi oil minister replied. He noted that oil prices in the world markets were not rising but steadily moving down, and there was no economic logic in demanding higher prices at a time when supply exceeded demand and the producers were giving large discounts. He declared, "Iran started exceeding its quota back in May and was giving hidden discounts before that date, now it gives discounts openly and continuously." Nazir reiterated that at the Vienna meeting his country would not be party to any agreement which was not based on sound economic logic and arrived at in an objective manner. He concluded by saying that the oil market knew the truth about Iran's practices, both in respect of violating its quota and giving discounts, and these facts were reported every day in the specialized oil publications.³³

In a volatile market like that of oil in 1987 the long-term contracts for specific lifting quantities became a major problem for Opec producers. Their customers refused to sign the contracts for fear that the market price would drop and they would be forced to pay the Opec fixed prices. Some producers were willing to adopt the market price in their long-term contracts. Saudi Arabia granted some concessions — not specified — to their major customers. Iran was especially affected. Very eager to obtain revenue for its war effort, it at first granted practically market prices to the non-contract

customers. Later on, it granted similar terms to the long-term contract customers west of Suez. Iran had a considerable number of customers in the Far East, especially in Japan. When their contracts expired many of the Japanese companies refused to renew them. In November 1987, the Iranian National Oil Company offered substantial discounts based on the market prices of Oman and Dubai to all customers east of Suez. It was about \$1 a barrel less than the official Opec price.³⁴

Iran also resorted to the device of "destinationless" or "homeless" cargoes. As customers refused to lift their oil from Iranian terminals and outlets in the dangerous Gulf, Iran sent out oil cargoes; parts were stored offshore, and parts were in tankers that were used as floating storage vessels. Customers would pick up the oil, either from the tankers at sea or from the land storage stations. The prices charged were never divulged, nor was it clear whether the oil so exported was within or extra quota. This practice started early in October. According to market sources there were in the middle of November about 20m. barrels of unsold Iranian crude. This created a general tendency for customers to press for market-related prices instead of term contracts with official prices.³⁵

Some of the non-Opec producers, who had committed themselves to cut production in cooperation with Opec, began to renege on their promises during the second half of the year. At the end of July, Opec's president expressed regret that some of the non-Opec countries were now failing to live up to their promises. Lukman explained:

It is true that some non-Opec countries are not living up to what they promised. When the market is strong, maybe they think 'OK, Opec is doing well, its production restrained, so maybe we can push out a bit more.' That is taking advantage of Opec's efforts and reaping the benefits for themselves. They should realize that they too, like Opec, have a responsibility to restrain production, particularly at this time when we are trying to reestablish confidence in market stability. They cannot expect Opec to do the job alone.³⁶

It is not clear which of the non-Opec producers he was referring to. Norway, whose original commitment was for the first half of 1987, announced on 10 July that, as a result of Opec's decision to reduce the four-quarter ceiling planned for 18.3m.b/d to 16.6m.b/d, it would extend its 7.5% cut to the end of the year.³⁷ Again, on 30 October, while in Riyadh, the Norwegian oil minister said that his country would continue to support Opec's stabilization program with its 7.5% cut in production.³⁸ Could it be that the USSR went back on its promise?³⁹ Or was Lukman referring to the small producers such as Oman, Malaysia, and Mexico? But his argument against the non-Opec producers could very well also apply to Opec member states which did not abide by their quotas.

9-14 DECEMBER 1987 VIENNA CONFERENCE

The outlook from the very beginning was pessimistic. Two days before the opening of the conference, the *Middle East Economic Survey (MEES)* said:

Even with the best will in the world it would be difficult to categorize the prospects for the forthcoming 9 December conference in Vienna as anything but gloomy. Although there is a truly desperate need among the Opec exporters

for a creditable new agreement on prices and production control for next year, the chances for it actually coming to pass appear to be comprehensively blocked by a network of economic and political mine fields.⁴⁰

The New York Times, which had been very optimistic at the conclusion of the midyear conference, reported on the battle between Iran and Saudi Arabia after the opening of the December gathering and concluded: "Beyond that, Opec was grappling with a widespread cheating on production quotas by its members. Market experts said that unless Opec can establish firmer discipline, oil prices by spring could tumble as low as \$12."⁴¹

The 82nd conference opened on 9 December. After three days of exceptional debate, the difficulties and differences were very wide and deep. All the meeting could produce was a proposal that called for "a roll-over" agreement. On 11 December, it appeared to be acceptable to 11 of the 13 members. Iraq was to be exempt from quota limitations; the position of Iran was not clear. The agreement was worked out by the five key countries—Indonesia, Kuwait, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, and Venezuela. It provided for the continuation of the \$18 a barrel Opec reference price. Iran's demand for an increase to \$20 was rejected. The roll over of the existing quotas covered 12 countries, Iraq was excluded, and the provision of 1.54m.b/d quota for Iraq was deleted. Should Iran refuse to sign, its quota of 2.369m.b/d would also be excluded. The overall production for the 11 members was to be 12.691m.b/d. The *MEES* correspondent remarked about the proposal: "For Opec as a whole the roll-over solution is obviously no more than a better-than-nothing expedient which will do little to improve the prevailing laxity in price and production discipline."⁴²

On 14 December, the agreement was signed by 12 members for the first six months of 1988, with an overall production ceiling of 15.6m.b/d compared with the previous 16.6m.b/d which included Iraq. In case of a "significant change in market prices that would affect the price stability" the Ministerial Price Monitoring Committee was to call for an extraordinary meeting of the conference to decide on action.⁴³ The conference also decided to reinstate a production monitoring system and employ an outside auditor (previously established in 1984 and abandoned in March 1986).⁴⁴

The next conference was to be convened in Vienna on 8 June 1988.⁴⁵

The consequences of the conference decisions were not slow in coming. Oil prices dropped sharply, reaching their lowest levels in 10 months because Opec failed to stop its members from cheating on prices and on production levels. The price of WTI dropped to \$15.58 on 18 December, from \$18.31 a week earlier.⁴⁶ Obviously, under such conditions, it would be impossible for the most ardent Opec price supporter to sell its oil at \$18 a barrel. A number of Opec producers adopted the market price. Saudi Arabia was on the horns of a dilemma: if it stuck to the official price it would lose customers, with even the four American Aramco companies refusing to lift their contract quantities; and it emphatically stated that it would not reduce production and serve as the swing producer. The only solution was to adopt the spot market price.

After the conference, Nazir told a press conference that Saudi Arabia would never be the swing producer. He also acknowledged that term buyers were justifiedly concerned about potential losses when market prices fell below official levels. *MEES* reported that Saudi Arabia had given pretty firm verbal assurances to its four Aramco customers that they would receive fair treatment on prices and on a retroactive basis,

provided that they continued lifting their full contract volume. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait warned that they would adopt the market price rather than lose customers.⁴⁷

Before assessing the ME oil developments in the ME in 1987, it is necessary to deal with the impact of the Opec price evolution on the US.⁴⁸

OPEC PRICE IMPACT ON THE UNITED STATES

In 1986, the US concern with oil development in the ME centered on the collapse of the price structure. There were two troublesome issues: the effect on the oil states and the oil companies, and national security. The price collapse affected the economic structure of the oil sector. It increased oil imports and reduced domestic oil production. A number of specialists saw in the situation a danger to national security in the 1990s. They predicted that, with increased consumption, most of the non-Opec production — including the US's — would dry up. Opec, with its tremendous reserves, would become the dominant oil supplier. The West, including the US, would be at the mercy of Opec as never before. The only solution to both issues was for the US to impose an oil import tax based on the difference between the reduced oil price and the \$28 a barrel rate. It was a device that would cure all ills. It would strengthen the oil sector of the country; it would reduce oil consumption — because of the high price — and enforce the regime of oil conservation started with the high Opec prices in the late 1970s. It would stimulate the oil industry to develop new sources, and it would increase government revenue, even to the point of significantly reducing — if not wiping out — the national deficit. And, of course, it would guarantee national security.

However, the Reagan Administration was not ready to impose such a tax. Although the levy would no doubt help and protect the oil interests, it would place a burden of \$65 bn.-\$75 bn. a year on consumers. Moreover, the international repercussions from an oil import tax could spell disaster. So the Administration was divided and no action was taken.

In 1987 — aside from American involvement in Gulf shipping security — the issues were the same as those raised in 1986 (see essays on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and on the US and the ME). National security specialists pursued the same line they did. President Reagan ordered a study of the oil supply sources in the US. On 17 March, Energy Secretary Herrington issued a coordinated and interagency report *Energy Security*. It saw in continued dependence on ME oil a security threat for the rest of the century or longer. Government institutions were needed to reduce the vulnerability. It recommended financial incentives to raise domestic production by 1m.b/d. The Energy Department rejected the idea of an import fee. The Administration saw in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve an important instrument for the US's oil security which should be increasingly emphasized. The report concluded that unless steps were taken to resuscitate the US oil industry and exploit alternative energy sources, the nation would be faced with a threat to its security.⁴⁹

The various departments of the US Government agreed that oil imports were constantly increasing while domestic production was steadily declining. The price of oil (which settled in November at \$18-\$20 a barrel), was too low to discourage consumption. Imports were also rising because the costs of funding and producing oil were higher in the US than any other country — eight to 10 times higher in some cases.⁵⁰

All agreed that the solution must be increased domestic production, reduced imports, and consumption. But the methods differed. The old specialists still advocated an import tax, except that they called it a fee of \$5–\$10 a barrel. The vested oil interests changed their position: a price of \$20–\$22 a barrel would be sufficient to continue operations, but there would have to be the discontinuance of the windfall levy, the removal of all ecological restrictions, and the opening to exploration and exploitation of all closed areas. This would enable them to expand oil resources to increase domestic production. Their position was supported by Donald Hodel, secretary of the Interior Department.

What scared most of those dealing with the problem was the reemergence of Opec in the 1990s as the most powerful oil supplier, more dangerous and more menacing than ever. Hodel warned: "Opec is being placed in the driver's seat. The US is in for a major oil price shock." The frightening possibility was that by the mid-1990s, as the US became dependent on foreign oil for more of its consumption, Opec would suddenly and steeply raise prices, throwing the economy into chaos. Hodel urged the government to open up part of the 19m. acre Arctic Natural Wildlife Refuge in Alaska to oil exploration, and other areas dear to the environmentalists.⁵¹

Herrington disagreed with Hodel that the US faced the threat of a return to "long lines at gasoline pumps," such as existed during the oil embargo in 1973.⁵² The situation in 1987 was quite different from that of 1979, when oil buyers panicked as the Iranian Revolution cut 5m. b/d from the world supply and consumer countries had no place to turn to. Now consumer countries could exercise market powers. The US spent \$18 bn. to store 530m. barrels of oil in caverns; Japan had nearly 150m. barrels in storage; West Germany more than 50m. Herrington stressed "the difference is night and day compared with the 1970s." If a disruption as serious as that of 1979 should occur, "our policy is to draw from [the strategic reserve] early and put the oil into the marketplace with intent to dampen the oil-price shock." Up to 3m. barrels a day could be flowing quickly from reserves. The system was tested in November 1985 when 1m. barrels were sold to refiners. With the Japanese and the Germans, the US "could put 5 million barrels a day on the market."⁵³

The various interests in the US did not force the issue in 1987, and no strong measures were adopted.⁵⁴

ASSESSMENT

Basic economic forces brought on the Opec crisis that began at the end of 1981 and still persisted in 1987. When oil prices were low, its use in the home, in transportation, and in industry constantly grew. No serious efforts were made to find and develop alternatives for oil. Moreover, since oil production in the ME was cheap, no attempt was made to obtain oil from sources that were very costly to produce, for it would have been impossible to compete with or replace ME oil. And as ME oil was relatively cheap compared with other sources of energy, no effort was made to conserve it.

The 1950s and 1960s saw tremendous expansion in ME oil production.⁵⁵ Beginning with the 1970s, when Opec started to increase oil prices very rapidly, over 400% in 1973 alone, it came upon the consumers unexpectedly and caught them short; they had no choice but to pay the inflated prices. Prices kept climbing. The Iranian Revolution in 1979, which eliminated some 5m. b/d from the world oil market, caused prices to climb

to over \$40 a barrel. When the producers saw that consumers were paying the high prices, they thought their oil was priceless. With the enormous wealth that was flowing into their coffers because of their oil power, the ME oil-producers were reaching for financial power and political power.

Opec producers did not realize that while they were constantly increasing oil prices, practically at whim, a steady process was in motion which would ultimately undermine their position. Oil conservation in all its forms had been spreading, and it soon affected the daily life of consumers. At the same time, frantic efforts were made to find alternatives to oil. As the price rose, new and costly oil sources were developed and brought into the market — the North Sea oil development was the classic example. Although the process had been going on long before 1981, by the end of that year the demand for ME oil began to fall, and with it the price. This reached its lowest point in July 1986 when a barrel of oil sold for less than \$10.

Throughout the long crisis most Opec leaders failed, or refused, to recognize that the crisis was the direct outcome of their high prices.⁵⁶ They tried to blame the non-Opec producers and consumer conspiracies. Consequently they adopted the cartel practice of controlling production fixing prices. But as noted above, most of the members were cheating. During 1987, most of the members cheated on production levels and were accused of cheating on prices by granting discounts from the fixed Opec rates. In addition, some employed various subterfuges to evade the Opec agreements.

Nonetheless, a number of observers were persuaded that Opec was on the road to stability and that the oil market would not be subject to convulsions as the stated objective of Opec.⁵⁷ But the world oil market was far from stable. Two factors caused its volatility: the military tension in the Gulf, which could interrupt the flow of oil to Western alliance consumers, and the internal tensions in Opec. When the tensions subsided, prices would drop. Since the price movements, up and down, were not caused by changes in demand for oil, the customers became speculators or even gamblers. The pattern of development could be formulated as a vicious circle. When the buyers believed that prices would rise, they increased their orders against future higher prices or even shortages. The increased liftings caused the market prices to go up. The producers in turn would increase production to meet the orders of the customers. When the tension subsided, the oil glut would inevitably reduce prices to much lower levels than before the rise. When the customers believed that prices were coming down, they would order much below the demand level and draw down stock to meet the demand, and prices would come down. This pattern characterized the volatility of production and price movements; paradoxically, the lower the price fell, the more some producers increased production in order to equal the previous revenue level. This, of course, would cause the price to fall further.

SAUDI ARABIA

A most interesting development occurred in Saudi Arabia's policy position in 1987. In spite of the fact that Saudi Arabia had the greatest oil reserves of all Opec countries, in spite of the fact that it had the greatest oil production capacity in Opec, and in spite of the fact that it was the richest of all Opec members, its oil policies in Opec were, until 1987, failures.

It should be noted that because of its general state of development, and its gigantic oil reserves, it would have to depend on oil for a very long time. It therefore followed that it should pursue policies that would enable it to market its oil for a very extended period. Prices had to be competitive with alternatives — should the price rise too high, its only source of wealth would dry up.

Saudi Arabia pursued this policy consistently throughout the period since 1973. In October of that year, Saudi Arabia was the leader in the embargo. It wanted a boost in the price of oil. When this was achieved by a 70% increase, Saudi Arabia was satisfied and was determined to call off the embargo and return to normal operations. But it could not stop the march. By the end of the year, Opec prices were increased 400%. This alarmed Saudi Arabia, and it was determined to reduce prices or at least freeze them. From that time until 1982, the Saudis fought Opec's price increases and failed. When Opec raised the price, Saudi Arabia would continue with the old price. This was more than welcomed by its customers. In the end, Saudi Arabia would raise the price to that of Opec, hoping that the other members would not raise their prices too and that the uniform price would be reestablished. But the others increased the price to maintain the difference. As long as there was a demand for oil, this process continued.

However, when demand dropped and a glut developed in the market, Saudi Arabia raised its price (in October 1982) to \$34 a barrel, and the other members came down to \$34 and a uniform price was reestablished. But from that moment on Opec's story was one of decline. To halt this decline, Saudi Arabia became the "swing producer." This reduced its production from about 8.5m.b/d to about 2m.b/d. Opec's price and production levels were maintained at Saudi Arabia's expense, as were those of the non-Opec producers, for Opec was the swing producer for them. Saudi Arabia then came up with the "fair share" of the market policy which contained a price war threat for both Opec and non-Opec producers. The fair share policy was a total failure and brought on the price collapse.

In January 1987, the old policy of price and production controls was reinstated. The battle continued. The two major antagonists were Iran and Saudi Arabia. Iran, for its own immediate interests, wanted to cut production (mostly that of Saudi Arabia that had the highest quota), and increase prices. Throughout the year, Saudi Arabia fought its opponents on production violation and the \$18 price. Iran was interested in increased revenue, and not in long-range consequences; it therefore insisted on an increase in price. Saudi Arabia, more concerned with the future, concluded that \$18 a barrel was the ideal price. It was sufficient for Opec producers to continue operating to maintain market stability, but too low for the non-Opec producers — especially the US — to develop additional oil sources. With the help of the GCC members, Saudi Arabia succeeded in keeping the Opec price at \$18 a barrel. A victory for Saudi Arabia.

But neither Saudi Arabia nor Opec as a whole succeeded in 1987 in imposing lasting discipline on the members in terms of production and price agreements.

HASTY PANIC PREDICTIONS

Some assertions and warnings of doom concerning ME oil and the repercussions on Western countries, especially the US, were unfounded or highly exaggerated. When the US came to the aid of Kuwait in the Gulf against Iran, great fear was expressed

about the danger of the closure of the Straits of Hormuz, which would bottle up the oil in the Gulf and deprive the Western nations of their supply. This was confirmed by Kuwait's oil minister, who warned in the middle of August of the dire consequences that would result from the cutoff of oil supplies from the Gulf. It would be impossible for the industrialized nations of the world to replace the 10m.b/d of crude oil that were flowing at the time from the Gulf area; nor could the oil producers outside the region fill the resulting gap.⁵⁸

This statement was a great exaggeration, reckless and motivated by selfish interests. Saudi Arabia and Iraq sent their oil through pipelines, and their capacity could be doubled and trebled; Kuwait itself could either easily link up with Saudi Arabia or send its oil through the Gulf of Oman; Bahrain could easily connect with Saudi Arabia; and even the UAE could, through a pipeline, avoid the Gulf. The two producers to be seriously affected would be Iran and Qatar. And that would hardly be a catastrophe.

In an interview in *Barron's*, Herrington said, "One of the major developments in the Gulf today is going to be the ability of the producing countries to move oil out of the Gulf by pipeline. You are going to see as much as seven million barrels a day by the early nineties."⁵⁹ Nor should the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) lines through Syria and Lebanon and the Tapline be totally written off.

All the various figures about the future decline in production in the US and the increased imports from the Gulf were just guesses, and some of these guesses were based on unsubstantiated assumptions. For in spite of the great agitation about the drop in new exploration and in production, and the dire predictions about the threat of Opec, the US did practically nothing about it. The oil companies were slowly returning to their exploration operations. And imports and consumption did not increase at the levels predicted.

The *Petroleum Economist* pointed out that consumption in 1986 showed its first real increase (2.5%) for nearly a decade, brought about by the temporary slump in prices. But the fact remains that consumption was still 8% lower than at its peak in 1979. This had to be compared with the forecasts that were being made at the time, which estimated that consumption would by now have reached twice the level actually achieved.⁶⁰

Practically all the doom reports had no empirical basis, and they were not taken seriously. Some of the estimates and forecasts had been proved wrong. Oil consumers would not abandon all the conservation achievements and rush headlong to reckless oil consumption. Nor would the Western world wait for the 1990s and submit to Opec domination. The Algerian minister of energy and petrochemical industries, Belkacem Nabi, told his colleagues on 22 April 1986:

I believe we are making an obvious political mistake in believing that the future of this industry lies with the Gulf states alone. The Western countries will not wait from now until 1990, for example, to allow a group of Arab countries to dominate their destiny.⁶¹

MISCELLANY

IRAN

In the first stages of the war with Iraq, the oil production of both belligerents fell below the Opec quotas, for they destroyed each other's oil-loading facilities and outlets. Iraq, however, had oil pipeline facilities through Syria and Turkey. For a short time, Syria permitted Iraq to use the pipeline in its territory. But in April 1982 Syria closed the line, and Iraq depended only on the Turkish line which initially had a limited capacity. As noted, Iraq greatly expanded this pipeline's capacity as the war progressed, and Saudi Arabia extended its inland Petroline facilities for Iraqi oil exports.

Iran, on the other hand, had no pipeline outlets. As Iraq bombarded its loading and port facilities, Iran sought new outlets for its oil exports. One such possibility was the USSR. On 19 July 1987, the Iranian premier, Mir-Husayn Musavi, declared that Iran and the Soviet Union had held "positive talks" on a plan to ship oil across Soviet territory via the Black Sea.⁶²

Early in August, Iran announced that it had agreed with the USSR to open a railroad and a pipeline linking the two countries. *The Wall Street Journal* noted that these two strategic links would provide the Soviets with something that Iran had historically denied the Russians: access to a warm-water port on the Gulf. The pipeline would enable Iran to export oil to, and import it from, the Soviet Union.⁶³

In December, Iran reported that a new barter deal was concluded with the USSR. Iran was to supply 100,000 b/d crude in exchange for 40,000 b/d of oil products — to be delivered to ports on the Caspian. This followed damage to the Isfahan refinery.⁶⁴

JORDAN

After almost 80 years of oil exploration by various oil companies, oil was discovered in Jordan at the end of 1986. In October 1987, it was reported that the oil produced during the year from the new wells amounted to 14,513 tons.⁶⁵

KUWAIT

Kuwait was one of the first of the ME oil producers to expand its oil interests beyond its borders. It was also one of the first to buy in foreign companies. The Kuwait Petroleum Company (KPC), which after 1976 became a Kuwait-owned company, entered the UK internal petroleum market in October 1986, and in 1987 continued to acquire additional facilities. In March, it was reported that Kuwait aimed to achieve a market share of between 5% and 7%.⁶⁶

The 1973 crisis reached its apex in 1976 with the practical nationalization of the oil industry. Three phases of the industry — refining, transportation, and marketing — were part of the foreign integrated companies, and flourished because of the very high profits from the production phase. After 1976 the tankers, refineries, and even some of the local distribution facilities were no longer profitable and were offered for sale. The ME producers, having gained control of the production phase, were determined to gain full control of the downstream phases of the industry. They acquired these facilities, in most cases at overpriced rates, either singly or collectively through the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.

In May, summarizing the oil operations of KPC abroad, the *Petroleum Economist*

reported that Kuwait had concluded a deal with Ultramar's Golden Eagle distribution network in the UK, at a cost of \$76.6m. KPC was to take ownership of 35 additional service stations and the right to supply a further 430 dealer-owned outlets. KPC also agreed to take over 389 BP service stations in Denmark. Kuwait was to acquire in Denmark 23% of the local gasoline marketing. In Europe as a whole the number of KPC outlets, under the trademark Q-8, reached 4,500, spread across six countries, and two ex-Gulf oil corporation refineries in Denmark and the Netherlands. In the Far East, Kuwait's operations were limited to supplying aviation fuel in Hong Kong and bulk distribution through Singapore.⁶⁷

Investments abroad had become the most outstanding source of income for Kuwait. In July 1987, the Central Bank of Kuwait published figures for fiscal year 1985-86 which revealed that government income from investments had more than doubled during the year. It reached an all-time high of \$8.5 bn., exceeding for the first time the government oil revenue of \$7.2 bn.⁶⁸

MIDDLE EAST ARAB INVESTMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The US Treasury Department reported in January 1987 that the amount of petrodollars invested by the Arab oil-producing countries had dropped by 3% during the first half of 1986, from \$61.6 bn. to \$59.6 bn. The highest level was reached at the end of 1982, when it amounted to \$82.17 bn., and it had been declining since then.

The amount was composed of:

US Government Bonds	\$ 30.00 bn.
Commercial Company Bonds	2.42 bn.
Company Shares	7.39 bn.
Bank Deposits	7.47 bn.
US Government Obligations	5.68 bn.
Companies' Obligations	2.24 bn.
Direct Investments	4.42 bn.
Total	\$ 59.62 bn.

US investments in the Arab oil-producing countries amounted to \$79.13 bn. at the end of 1985.⁶⁹

NORTH YEMEN

North Yemen joined the league of ME oil exporters when it inaugurated on 9 December its first oil export pipeline linking the Alif oil field, discovered in 1984, to the terminal at Ra's Isa on the Red Sea. The 440-km. pipeline had a capacity of 225,000 b/d with provision for expansion to double output. The first crude was pumped into the line on 20 November.⁷⁰

OPEC INDEBTEDNESS

Opec's president, Rilvanu Lukman, told the Swedish Institute of International Affairs in Stockholm on 1 June that Opec's total external debt in 1985 was \$172 bn., some 25% of the overall indebtedness of the developing world.

Opec oil exports had fallen by 53% in the first half of the decade. The current account surplus of \$110 bn. in 1980 had turned into an \$18 bn. deficit in 1986.⁷¹

OPEC REVENUE

Peter Holmes, chairman of Shell Transport and Trading Company, told a London conference on 8 May 1987 that the revenue of Opec countries as a group fell from \$282 bn. in 1980 to \$133 bn. in 1985, and \$75 bn. in 1986, a drop of 73%.⁷²

TABLE 1: OPEC PRODUCTION AS REPORTED BY MEMBER COUNTRIES
(Thousand b/d)

	June	July	August
Algeria	635.4	666.4	664.1
Ecuador	110.0	51.2	180.0
Gabon	151.6	149.0	149.5
Indonesia	1,131.9	1,191.8	1,188.7
Iran	2,248.6	2,337.5	2,355.6
Iraq	2,225.0	2,227.0	2,200.0*
Kuwait	948.0	999.2	995.6
Libya	949.4	997.2	996.7
Nigeria	1,320.1	1,317.6	1,320.9
Qatar	350.0*	375.0*	400.0*
Saudi Arabia	3,885.0	4,217.9	4,241.7
UAE	1,300.0*	1,370.9*	1,550.0*
Venezuela	1,495.0	1,571.0	1,571.0
Total Opec	16,750.0	17,470.8	17,813.8

SOURCE: *MEES*, 21 September 1987.

* Estimates based on secondary sources.

TABLE 2: OPEC PRODUCTION AS REPORTED BY SOME
SECONDARY SOURCES (Thousand b/d)

	June	PIW July	August	June	IEA July	August
Algeria	600	670	670	600	700	700
Ecuador	40	50	120	100	100	100
Gabon	150	160	160	200	200	200
Indonesia	1,170	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200	1,200
Iran	2,500	2,500	2,800	2,300	2,400	2,800
Iraq	2,000	2,000	2,100	2,000	2,100	2,200
Kuwait	1,130	1,610	1,715	1,150	1,300	1,600
Libya	950	1,100	1,100	1,000	1,000	1,100
Nigeria	1,350	1,350	1,350	1,300	1,400	1,400
Qatar	400	350	450	300	300	400
Saudi Arabia	4,180	4,510	4,715	4,250	4,500	4,700
UAE	1,335	1,335	1,505	1,400	1,400	1,700
Venezuela	1,640	1,640	1,590	1,600	1,700	1,700
Total Opec	17,445	18,475	19,475	17,300	18,200	19,700

	June	WPA July	August	June	Reuters July	August
Algeria	600	670	700	640	670	700
Ecuador	50	50	100	123	130	160
Gabon	150	200	200	160	160	160
Indonesia	1,200	1,200	1,220	1,180	1,200	1,300
Iran	2,300	2,400	2,620	2,300	2,400	2,600
Iraq	2,000	2,100	2,200	2,050	2,150	2,100

	June	WPA July	August	June	Reuters July	August
Kuwait	1,200	1,350	1,620	1,200	1,300	1,650
Libya	950	1,150	1,080	950	1,100	1,100
Nigeria	1,300	1,330	1,350	1,250	1,340	1,300
Qatar	400	400	400	300	350	400
Saudi Arabia	4,200	4,500	4,660	4,100	4,450	4,550
UAE	1,300	1,400	1,600	1,220	1,350	1,600
Venezuela	1,600	1,700	1,670	1,500	1,570	1,700
Total Opec	17,250	18,425	19,425	17,000	18,200	19,300

SOURCES: *PIW* (excluding condensates); *IEA*; *WPA* (excluding condensates); Reuters (for August 1987: Neutral Zone excluded).

TABLE 3: NETBACK VALUES FOR SELECTED CRUDES, JANUARY 1987
(Dollars per Barrel)

The following are the latest f.o.b. netback values, based on spot product prices in the Northwest Europe (Rotterdam) and US Gulf markets, as prepared by *International Crude oil and Product Prices*.

Northwest Europe (Rotterdam)								
1986								
Prices as of:	Arab Lt.	Arab Hy.	Iran Lt.	Murban	Kirkuk	Kuwait		
25 November	12.27	11.64	12.06	12.61	12.76	11.52		
1 December	12.33	11.76	12.13	12.65	12.81	11.62		
8 December	12.24	11.65	12.03	12.53	12.72	11.51		
12 December	12.31	11.71	12.09	12.61	12.78	11.56		
1987								
6 January	15.94	15.23	15.69	16.32	16.42	15.08		
1986								
Prices as of:	Sahara	Zueitina	Bonny Lt.	Brent	Oman			
25 November	13.43	13.59	13.93	13.68	12.48			
1 December	13.46	13.63	13.97	13.75	12.54			
8 December	13.33	13.48	13.85	13.58	12.43			
12 December	13.39	13.57	13.93	13.62	12.51			
1987								
6 January	17.15	17.43	17.79	17.44	16.22			
US Gulf								
1986								
Prices as of:	Arab Lt.	Arab Hy.	Sahara	Bonny Lt.	Brent	TJ Lt.	Isthmus	Maya
25 November	13.05	12.13	15.14	14.84	14.79	13.88	14.99	12.83
1 December	13.33	12.35	15.52	15.23	15.18	14.13	15.39	13.01
8 December	12.80	11.90	14.92	14.64	14.61	13.65	14.88	12.70
12 December	13.44	12.43	15.66	15.32	15.23	14.23	15.45	13.12
1987								
6 January	15.76	14.56	18.25	17.90	17.78	16.45	17.96	15.02

SOURCE: *MEES*, 12 January 1987.

TABLE 4: NETBACK VALUES FOR SELECTED CRUDES, DECEMBER 1987
(Dollars per Barrel)

Northwest Europe (Rotterdam)								
1987								
Prices as of:	Arab Lt.	Arab Hy.	Iran Lt.	Murban	Kirkuk	Kuwait		
25 September	16.21	15.44	15.95	16.57	16.69	15.30		
2 October	16.66	15.97	16.39	17.01	17.11	15.76		
12 October	16.98	16.34	16.72	17.27	17.43	16.12		
16 October	17.17	16.46	16.89	17.48	17.62	16.24		
23 October	17.26	16.54	16.98	17.60	17.71	16.32		
30 October	17.08	16.23	16.78	17.47	17.54	16.05		
9 November	16.48	15.59	16.19	16.88	16.95	15.44		
13 November	16.45	15.51	16.15	16.89	16.94	15.38		
20 November	15.82	14.68	15.50	15.36	16.33	14.63		
25 November	16.14	15.10	15.82	16.64	16.63	14.99		
4 December	16.06	14.88	15.73	16.65	16.57	14.81		
11 December	15.68	14.55	15.35	16.23	16.18	14.47		
1987								
Prices as of:	Sahara	Zueitina	Bonny Lt.	Brent	Oman			
25 September	17.31	17.59	18.05	17.54	16.48			
2 October	17.74	18.06	18.51	18.00	16.95			
12 October	17.86	18.27	18.73	18.18	17.26			
16 October	18.17	18.50	18.96	18.35	17.47			
23 October	18.31	18.64	19.13	18.51	17.56			
30 October	18.19	18.52	19.01	18.35	17.39			
9 November	17.62	17.91	18.41	17.78	16.77			
13 November	17.64	17.95	18.43	17.78	16.76			
20 November	17.16	17.45	17.95	17.27	16.13			
25 November	17.41	17.72	18.20	17.54	16.46			
4 December	17.46	17.78	18.26	17.56	16.41			
11 December	17.03	17.34	17.80	17.14	16.01			
US Gulf								
1987								
Prices as of:	Arab Lt.	Arab Hy.	Sahara	Bonny Lt.	Brent	TJ Lt.	Isthmus	Maya
25 September	16.75	15.73	18.95	18.58	18.45	17.53	18.70	16.44
2 October	17.18	16.14	19.33	18.91	18.72	17.96	18.95	16.87
12 October	17.50	16.47	19.63	19.21	19.03	18.28	19.24	17.20
16 October	18.25	17.09	20.51	20.04	19.80	18.96	19.97	17.67
23 October	17.94	16.74	20.31	19.84	19.61	18.63	19.79	17.30
30 October	17.82	16.65	20.17	19.71	19.49	18.53	19.68	17.22
9 November	17.28	16.19	19.49	19.05	18.85	18.03	19.03	16.81
13 November	17.24	16.09	19.52	19.03	18.80	17.96	19.00	16.71
20 November	16.31	15.10	18.80	18.33	18.12	17.00	18.36	15.68
4 December	15.82	14.49	18.46	17.96	17.71	16.44	17.97	15.04
11 December	14.96	13.46	17.93	17.41	17.17	15.50	17.43	13.84

SOURCE: *MEES*, 21-28 December 1987.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. About the "fair share" policy, the *PE*, observed, "The disastrous 'market share' strategy espoused by Opec fifteen months ago has been finally abandoned." *PE*, February 1987.

- MEES* remarked, "The policy of expanding market share at the expense of price, which was previously espoused by the Opec majority and Saudi Arabia and its Gulf allies in particular, has now been relegated to the back burner, for the time being at least." *MEES*, 22-29 December 1986.
2. It would appear, however, that netback deals prevailed throughout the year. For *MEES* carried in practically every issue during the year, from that of 12 January to the last one on 21-28 December, a table "Netback Values for Selected Crudes." For two tables, the first and the last, see Tables 3 and 4. For Ahmad Zaki al-Yamani's statement about netback, see *MECS* 1986, p. 230.
 3. At the end of March, Saudi Arabia was reported to have restarted oil barter deals. *MEES*, 30 March 1987.
 4. *NYT*, 13 March 1987.
 5. Saudi Arabia had compensated its long-term contract customers, especially the Aramco companies, and they continued to lift the full contract quantities.
 6. *MEES*, 23 May 1987.
 7. *MEES*, 2 February 1987.
 8. Reporting on Hisham Nazir's visit to Moscow, and his report that the Soviets had agreed to cut exports to the West by 7%, *Newsweek* noted that some observers suggested that this meant "de facto Soviet membership in Opec." The Soviets export 1m.b/d to the West; oil exports account for 60% of the Soviets' hard currency earnings. The weekly reported that "Washington viewed Moscow's 7% solution as little more than a one-shot deal, with minimal economic and geopolitical impact." *Newsweek*, 30 March 1987.
 9. *MEES*, 16 February 1987.
 10. *MEES*, 9 February 1987.
 11. *MEES*, 16 March 1987.
 12. On 22 May, President Reagan stated that the American naval presence was essential to guard "a crossroads for three continents and the starting place for the oil that is the lifeblood of much of the world economy." If a hostile nation ever dominated "this strategic region and its resources, it would become a choke point" threatening the freedom of Western nations. The Japanese and West European economies are heavily dependent on oil from the Gulf countries. *NYT*, 24 May 1987.
 13. *PE*, August 1987.
 14. Belkacem Nabi, the Algerian minister of energy and petrochemical industries, explained: "Although prices are reasonably firm at the moment and the market is being, to a certain extent, buoyed by buyers' fears over the Gulf situation which makes them more inclined to build up and maintain stocks, nevertheless there is no escaping the fundamental fact that both production and stock levels in the second quarter are too high for comfort. In these circumstances, it would be advisable for Opec to retain its current ceiling of 15.8m.b/d as provided for in the schedule laid down in the December 1986 agreement." *MEES*, 22 June 1987.
 15. After evaluating the agreement, *MEES* concluded, "Iraq emerges as a notable beneficiary, in economic terms, in view of its freedom to maximize output, to the extent of its newly expanded capacity, at firm price levels maintained by the rest of Opec." *MEES*, 6 July 1987.
 16. *Ibid.* The resolution provided no specific definition of what would constitute a "significant change in market price." The suggestion of *MEES* that a rise or fall of around 50 cents a barrel in market prices was belied by market movements during the balance of 1987.
 17. *Ibid.*
 18. See *MECS* 1983-84, p. 277; 1984-85, p. 274.
 19. In the December 1986 agreement Iran was given a quota of 2.25m.b/d, and Iraq was assigned a quota of 1.5m.b/d. *NYT*, 21 December 1986. The export capacity of Iraq in June 1987 was 2.2m.b/d, and was to be boosted by another 500,000 b/d to a total of 2.7m.b/d, when the new trans-Turkey pipeline expansion came on stream by the end of July. *MEES*, 6 July 1987.
 20. Considering the quick conclusion of the midyear conference, the *NYT* optimistically, prematurely perhaps, noted: "The group's minorities, who usually spend more time bickering and exchanging accusations than controlling prices, showed a remarkable sense

- of togetherness caused by the fear of uncontrolled production." *NYT*, 5 July 1987.
21. On 29 June, Nazir sent a telex to Lukman in which he asked the Nigerian president of Opec to take the necessary measures to deal with the reported overproduction, which, it said, would have a negative effect on the stability of the market and harm the interests of those member countries that were abiding by the Opec agreement. Nazir received no reply at the time. *MEES*, 17 August 1987.
 22. *Newsweek*, 14 September; *MEES*, 17 August 1987.
 23. *WSJ*, 10 July 1987.
 24. *NYT*, 17 July 1987.
 25. *NYT*, 11 August 1987.
 26. *MEES*, 24 August 1987. In a delayed reply to Saudi Arabia's complaint, Lukman asked for primary evidence of the overproduction by members. *Ibid*.
 27. *US News and World Report*, 31 August 1987.
 28. *DT*, 8 September 1987.
 29. *NYT*, 13 September 1987.
 30. *MEES*, 21 September 1987.
 31. *MEES*, 19 October 1987.
 32. *MEES*, 30 November 1987. On 23 November, US Secretary Herrington said in Washington that "the falling dollar is going to create a certain degree of chaos in the negotiations about what the world price should be. \$18 a barrel is going to be a very difficult figure for them to argue, for I still think they will be lucky to hold the price at \$18 a barrel among the different interests in Opec." *Ibid*.
 33. *MEES*, 7 December 1987.
 34. Out of a total contract volume of 260,000 b/d for the fourth quarter, actual Japanese lifting of Iranian crude averaged 164,000 b/d. *MEES*, 23 November 1987.
 35. *MEES*, 16 November 1987.
 36. *MEES*, 3 August 1987.
 37. *MEES*, 13 July 1987.
 38. *MEES*, 9 November 1987.
 39. According to OECD sources, the non-Communist industrial countries lifted during the first six months of 1986 3% more Soviet crude oil than in the corresponding period in 1986. The overall Soviet crude oil production in 1987 overshot the target of 12.4m.b/d. *PE*, February 1988.
 40. *MEES*, 7 December 1987.
 41. *NYT*, 13 December 1987.
 42. *MEES*, 14 December 1987.
 43. See above, decision of the midyear conference.
 44. *MECS* 1984-85, p. 261.
 45. *MEES*, 21-28 December; *Time*, 28 December 1987.

**Quotas for First Half of 1988
(Thousands b/d)**

Algeria	667	Libya	996	
Ecuador	221	Nigeria	1,308	
Gabon	159	Qatar	229	
Indonesia	1,190	Saudi Arabia	4,343	
Iran	2,369	UAE	948	
Kuwait	996	Venezuela	1,571	Total 15,060

46. *NYT*, 20 December 1987.
47. *MEES*, 21-28 December 1987.
48. See *MECS* 1987, pp. 236-40.
49. *NYT*, 17 March; *MEES*, 30 March 1987.
50. *NYT*, 19 November 1987.
51. *Time*, 16 March 1987.
52. *MEES*, 2 March 1987.
53. *US News and World Report*, 17 August 1987. See Herrington's statement about cooperating with Opec, quoted above.

54. At the end of April, a group of 12 congressmen from the oil-producing states introduced a bill in the House of Representatives proposing the imposition of an import fee on imported oil. Interior Secretary Hodel opposed the bill. The effort failed. *MEES*, 4 May 1987.
55. In 1940 it produced 289,000,000 barrels, in 1950 it reached 1,955,475,000 barrels and in 1970 it climbed to 5,158,748,000 barrels. Benjamin Shwadran, *The Middle East, Oil and the Great Powers* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1973), pp. 520, 525.
56. During 1987, references were made to high prices as the cause of the disaster. Early in June, Saudi Oil Minister Nazir said in an interview with the Saudi daily *al-Riyad*: "We do not want prices to fall below their present level, nor do we want any insane increase in prices which would force consumers to turn to alternative sources of energy or other producers." *MEES*, 15 June 1987. On 5 July, in an interview with *WP*, Lukman emphasized, "We want to prevent oil prices from rising too high to make it uncompetitive with other forms of energy." He said that the price of oil "should not be allowed to rise catastrophically as has been done in the past." For a discussion of the issue of prices by the deputy secretary-general of Opec, Fadhil al-Chalabi, see "What is the Optimal Price of Oil — Producers' Point of View," *MEES*, 28 September 1987.
57. Saudi Arabia did not totally give up the "fair share" of the market policy and determinedly resisted every effort to become again the swing producer.
58. *MEES*, 24 August 1987.
59. *Barron's*, 7 December 1987.
60. *PE*, August 1987.
61. *MECS* 1986, p. 240.
62. *WSJ*, 30 July 1987.
63. *WSJ*, 5 August; *WP*, 8 August 1987.
64. *PE*, December 1987. The executive editor of *MEES*, Walid Khadduri, analyzed the various possibilities of exporting oil through the inactive gas line from Iran to the USSR. He concluded that an agreement was unfeasible in the immediate future. "Iranian Plans for Gas and Oil Exports to USSR Unlikely to Materialize in Practice," *MEES*, 23 December 1987. Even if the present gas line to the USSR, IGAT I, could be converted to an oil line, how would the oil be disposed of? What would be the impact on Opec? What price would be asked for the oil?
67. *PE*, May 1987.
68. *MEES*, 3 August 1987.
69. *Ma'ariv*, 27 January 1987. The countries included were Bahrain, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE.
70. *MEES*, 14 December; *JP*, 13 December 1987.
71. *MEES*, 8 June 1987.
72. *MEES*, 18 May 1987.

Arab Labor Mobility in the Middle East in a Period of Economic Recession, 1982–87

GIL FEILER

INTRODUCTION

During the 1970s the Middle Eastern states — especially the rich oil producers — were huge importers of Western technology, such as engineering products and construction and technical services. The major suppliers were the US, Japan and West European countries. According to a report produced by the US Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) — in response to a request from the House Committee on Science and Technology and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs — the 15 Islamic countries in the Middle East imported \$5.5 bn. in 1970 from the industrial countries, and this amount rose to about \$100 bn. in 1982. Of this, \$42 bn. was spent on machinery, equipment, and technical services.¹

Technology is easier to trade with than to absorb, especially in the oil countries, where there is a gap between human and financial resources. Human resources are the most crucial variables in building modern nations, and are essential for economic and social development. The oil-producing countries needed to import technical and managerial personnel as well as semi- and unskilled workers. The labor mobilization to the Gulf countries demonstrated the need for technology transfers. The differences in the economic, physical, educational, and social condition of the Gulf states on the one hand, and other Arab countries — and in some cases Asian and African countries — on the other, created the need for huge waves of temporary migrant workers.

The migration process inevitably entails a brain drain, and has an economic, social and political impact on both the importing and exporting labor countries. There are the remittances of the migrants and their contribution toward the development of the labor-exporting countries; there is a change in the status of the womenfolk before and after the migration process; there are problems of return migration and illegal migration; and then there are the psychological problems of the foreign workers,² and so on.

The aim of this article is to examine trends in Arab labor mobility in the ME in the wake of the oil glut and the economic recession in the period 1982–87, and to analyze the effect of political events on the movement of labor. But before doing this, it is necessary to place the labor mobility phenomenon in its historical context.

Enormous migration waves to other territories and countries have occurred from ancient times. The differences between one wave and another were based on a variety of socioeconomic and external and internal political circumstances.³ In the modern ME, like other parts of the world, migration is a well-known demographic phenomenon. For example, Christians — and to a lesser extent Muslims and Druzes — from the Ottoman province of Syria had been emigrating to the Americas since the

last two decades of the 19th century for economic reasons,⁴ and Europeans began to settle in the ME. In the 18th century, Syrians began emigrating to Egypt in a fair number.⁵ The discovery of oil in Bahrain in the 1930s opened up employment opportunities for foreign workers, especially from Iran and India.⁶ Large numbers of Palestinians immigrated to Kuwait in 1948–49. And the migration of Egyptians to the West and to other Arab states was especially noticeable in the 1960s.⁷ In the last few years, South Lebanese civilians have sought work in the Israeli labor market.⁸

The labor mobilization of the last decade-and-a-half was characterized by a change in settlement patterns and by temporary sojourns — of between one and five years — in the Gulf states. Most men emigrated without their families to look for work. This saved on expenses and also conformed with the laws of the oil-producing countries. Only those with essential skills and high earning power were permitted to bring their families with them.

The migration process in search of work in the ME is different from the guestworker phenomenon in Western Europe: in the latter case we see migration from less advanced countries to more advanced ones. But in the ME this process is reversed in most cases: the migrants come from countries that are more advanced in such fields as education. Another difference is that guestworker systems inevitably lead to permanent migration in the long run.⁹ In the Gulf states, foreign workers rarely stay. Another significant difference is that, while the recruitment of foreign workers in Western Europe stopped or declined sharply after 1974, that is when it just began in huge numbers in the Gulf.

THE QUALITY OF THE DATA

Although literature dealing with migration in the ME is flourishing,¹⁰ exhaustive research has been rare, especially on the 1980s. Official data are published irregularly, if at all; the labor-importing oil countries refrain from publishing correct data, because of the sensitivity of the issue. They tend deliberately to underreport the number of foreigners in their countries, because they hope to prevent an internal crisis, especially since in some countries the native population constitutes a minority.

Agreements on the migration process are uncommon between countries importing and exporting workers, and accurate data cannot be secured at all. Even if there were regular agreements between the sending and receiving countries, it would be impossible to acquire accurate data, because the amount of migration within the formal system is very limited. Most of the emigration process is spontaneous, and the emigrants decide to go on their own. For example, of the 2 m. Egyptians who were working in other Arab countries in 1980, only 37,251 of them had emigrated according to the official agreements.¹¹

The unknown extent of illegal immigration adds to the confusion. The Gulf states, like many other countries which rely heavily on immigrants (temporarily or permanently), are bound to contend with illegal migration. The number of illegal migrants is very difficult if not or even impossible to obtain. Some of them entered the oil-producing countries on the pretext of coming on *hajj*, as tourists or on family visits. For example, more than 850,000 pilgrims have visited Saudi Arabia annually during the last decade.¹²

The problem of determining the number of foreign workers is made even more difficult when various authorities in the same country give conflicting figures. For

example, the Egyptian Foreign and Emigration Ministries report significantly higher figures than that country's Central Agency for Public Mobilization and Statistics (CAPMS).

SCOPE

The October 1973 war opened a "new era" and marked a dramatic shift in ME migration. In 1975 there were about 2m. foreign workers in the oil states; 68% of them were from the poor Arab countries, while the rest were from Asia.¹³ Tens of thousands of Europeans and Americans were also employed in the oil states.¹⁴ In 1980, there were 3m. foreign workers, 65% of which were Arabs. The number of foreign workers in the ME, which rose by about 50% from 1975–80, received an additional boost at the beginning of the 1980s. This time it was not only due to the development programs that the oil states had initiated, but to the Iraqi-Iranian War, which led to Egypt alone supplying 1.25m. workers to Iraq. In 1983, there were about 5m. foreign workers in the oil states: the number was even higher if their relatives were counted.¹⁵ In 1985, according to research published by the Arab League, there were 3m.–4m. foreign workers in the Gulf states, but these did not include the foreign workers in Iraq,¹⁶ where there were more than the 1.25m. from Egypt.

It should be noted that at the beginning of the 1970s, the number of foreign workers in the ME did not exceed a few hundred thousand. Another change was that, in the 1960s, many of the foreign workers were seconded by their governments; but, after the hike in oil prices, the labor mobilization phenomenon included millions who tried to secure greater benefits for themselves. Their governments in most cases encouraged this migration, and that, too, was a new phenomenon.

The principal labor-importing countries are Iraq — which was a net labor exporter before the war with Iran — and Saudi Arabia. Together they have imported about 65% of the total foreign work force in the region in 1983. The other countries importing workers are Kuwait, Libya, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Oman, and Jordan.¹⁷ The principal countries supplying workers are Egypt (which exports 60% of the foreign Arab labor force), Jordan, the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR), and Sudan.

The number of the Egyptian workers in the Arab oil countries rose from 200,000 at the beginning of 1973, to 500,000 in 1975, and 1.25m. in 1978. The outbreak of the Gulf War increased the stock to about 2.9m. Egyptians working in other Arab states.¹⁸

The extent of Jordan's exported labor force is also impressive: in 1974, about 150,000 Jordanians were employed by other Arab countries; by the early 1980s their number rose to 250,000, and in 1985 it was 325,000.¹⁹ This number is exceptionally large, in view of the fact that the entire Jordanian labor force in 1985 was 592,000.²⁰ Jordan is also a labor importer; in 1982, about 130,000 foreign workers, mostly Egyptians, were employed there.

Sudan supplied about 46,000 workers to other Arab states in 1975. By 1982, their number had risen to between 200,000 and 450,000.²¹ A study presented at a conference on the economy of Sudan revealed that there were 350,000 Sudanese in the Arab oil states in June 1987.²² The YAR exported 290,000 workers in 1975, about 500,000 in 1979, and 600,000–740,000 in 1982.²³

Information on Syrian migration to the Arab oil states is very limited. According to

data collected by Kanovsky, 70,000 Syrians were working in the oil states in 1975, and their number rose to 80,000–250,000 in 1982.²⁴ About 267,000 people emigrated from Lebanon in 1975–80, 47% of them to Arab states and 53% to the Americas. The civil war — not economic factors, in contrast to the other Arab labor-exporting countries — was the main reason for emigration.²⁵

CAUSES OF THE MASSIVE MIGRATION

In the decade after the 1973 war, Opec revenues totaled \$1,112 bn. Of this amount, \$323 bn. were directed to ambitious development projects,²⁶ which required professional and administrative staff, as well as semi-skilled and unskilled workers. Since the required labor force was not locally available, it was necessary to import foreigners.

The acute shortage in the labor force of the oil countries stemmed largely from demographic factors. They have small populations, and about 50% of the people are under the age of 15. Furthermore, the growing educational system in these countries further reduced the number of young people in the labor market. Fewer than 10% of the women are part of the modern work sector.²⁷ About 10% of the residents of these countries are nomads who are generally outside the modern economy.²⁸ All these factors combined to bring about an extremely low rate of about 20% active participation in the labor force.

Recruiting foreign workers did not require a special effort on the part of the oil states. The growing economic incentives that they offered were a drawing force of the first order. Moreover, the work-exporting countries encouraged this phenomenon, because they wanted to reduce the rates of unemployment and underemployment; to benefit from the foreign currency remittances; to enable their population to raise their standard of living; and to increase cooperation between the states in other fields.

In Egypt, for example, the laws and policies relating to emigration underwent a total turnaround: in the 1950s and 1960s most of the movement of workers was restricted by government order, and professionals were compelled to serve in Egypt for a number of years after they had completed their studies. But after 1970, the Egyptian Government began to encourage emigration by easing the process, offering financial incentives, concluding bilateral agreements for the exportation of workers, and passing laws to encourage emigration.²⁹

IMPACT OF THE RECESSION ON MIGRATION: GENERAL VIEW

To what extent is the economic recession in the oil-producing countries affecting the Arab foreign workers in the region, and how? Is there a tendency toward the massive return of Arabs to their countries? If so, how are the labor-exporting countries, as well as the labor-importing ones, coping with the process? After all, expelling hundreds of thousands of foreign workers is not an easy task, especially when it is a question of Arab workers in Arab countries. This issue is likely to have far-reaching social and political consequences.

The oil-producing countries seek to reduce their dependence on foreigners for economic and political reasons. However, it is not clear whether they can fulfill their development aspirations by themselves. The oil countries have a real problem: if the

foreigners leave, the countries face economic chaos; but if they stay, the countries face political chaos. In the 1970s, most of the oil-producing countries had liberal migration policies; toward the end of the decade the same governments began to expel illegal immigrants and to tighten immigration controls. Special steps were taken to restrict the size of immigrant families, and new labor laws were passed, which discriminated against foreign workers. Arab foreign workers were given preference over Asian and African foreign workers by the labor and nationality laws of the Gulf states. Foreigners working in the Gulf states could not become citizens or permanent residents of the country in which they worked, did not enjoy equal rights, and were socially isolated. They were prohibited from marrying locals and from owning land.³⁰

Many articles of a speculative nature were published in the last few years, noting that economic recession in the oil-producing countries had caused or would cause a huge deportation of foreign labor from the Gulf. However, there was no evidence that this ever went beyond mere rhetoric. The Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), for example, noted in its UAE issue of 1987–88 that “many expatriates have left since the recession set in during 1982–83,”³¹ but did not say exactly how many. Kanovsky cited an unofficial report claiming that 700,000 foreign workers had left the oil countries in 1984; he also referred to a report that between 50,000 and 60,000 foreign workers were leaving Saudi Arabia monthly in 1985.³² Kanovsky added that no breakdown had been given of the national origin of the returnees, and he assumed “that if it is proportionate it would imply that 200,000–300,000 Arab workers had been laid off in the Gulf countries in 1984 and again in 1985; presumably more than half of these were Egyptian.”³³ Kanovsky’s argument is reasonable, but we cannot be sure of the reliability of the data on which he based his assumption. It should also be noted that the oil countries prefer to deport first the Asian foreign laborers, then the Palestinians and Syrians, and only in the end the Egyptians. The deportation is never determined proportionately.

At the end of March 1986 there was talk of dismissing of about 1.5m. foreign workers from the Gulf by January 1987, but it did not happen. None of the reports were based on empirical data. They all appeared to be based on speculation or on erroneous facts or forecasts. During the month of Ramadan 1987, for example, Egyptian and other Arab and Western papers wrote about the massive remigration of hundreds of thousands of Egyptians from Iraq. What they did not mention was that these Egyptians had gone home to spend Ramadan with their families, and afterward returned to Iraq. Other reports that seemed to confirm a massive wave of remigration mentioned that flights from the Gulf states to Egypt were fully booked by workers returning home. These reports were correct as far as they went; but they did not mention that the return flights to the Gulf were also fully booked by Egyptians who were about to try their luck in the Gulf, or who had just spent a holiday with their families.

In 1987, it seemed that the concern of the Arab labor-exporting countries about a massive return of their workers had generally proved to be greater than warranted by reality, although the situation varied from country to country. While the economic recession and the reduction in oil income began at the end of 1981 for Saudi Arabia, and at the end of 1980 for the other oil exporting countries (see Table 3), the number of Arab foreign workers did not decrease significantly during the subsequent years. One of the main reasons for this was the Gulf War, which created an opening for a

large number of Egyptian workers. Egypt enjoyed a clear advantage in the Iraqi labor market, since it could provide the required personnel who were suitable in other respects as well. Compared with the Syrians and the Palestinians, for example, who were also able to provide highly trained manpower, the Egyptian workers were considered a passive political factor and therefore preferred in Iraq, as well in the conservative oil countries. The Iraqi Government therefore encouraged the importation of Egyptians, despite the fact that until the outbreak of the war with Iran, Iraq had been extremely hostile to Egypt on account of the Camp David accords. It should also be recalled that Egypt supplied Iraq with arms and also had agreed to give military training to Iraqi students.³⁴

All the above applied to the legal foreign workers. But the situation concerning the informal migrants was quite different. The issue of illegal immigration usually came to the fore during political or economic difficulties. The illegal foreigners were expelled and the rules relating to them were harsher. The economic recession gave the Gulf states an excuse to rid themselves of illegal migrant workers as well as potentially subversive elements, such as Palestinians and Shi'is from Lebanon and Iraq (see below).

REMITTANCES

One way — but by no means the only way — of determining the new trends in the foreign labor markets in the Gulf is to examine the amounts received and sent home by the workers. From Kuwait, for example, \$532m. were remitted in 1979. After the oil glut the level of remittances rose to \$865m. in 1983; \$963m. in 1984; and more than \$1.1 bn. in 1987. From Saudi Arabia, \$3.4 bn. were sent in 1979, and after the economic recession, \$5.2 bn. in 1985. Egypt received \$2.3 bn. from its workers abroad in 1979, and almost \$4 bn. in 1984. The amount received in Jordan more than doubled from 1979–84, from \$509m. to more than \$1 bn., and dropped to \$743m. in 1987. On the other hand, foreigners in Libya substantially reduced their remittances from \$2 bn. in 1983 to \$448m. in 1986, and Syria and Sudan suffered the most from reductions in remittances (see Table 2).

According to these data, the level of remittances did not fall dramatically after the oil glut. But it is not possible to determine accurately migration trends from remittances. While the amount of cash transferred through banks can be known accurately, money transferred through the free markets or invested or spent on consumer products is very difficult to estimate.³⁵

Political events in the labor-exporting countries also affected the official remittance level, as was seen after the assassination of President Sadat of Egypt in October 1981, when the amounts coming in from abroad dropped, although the number of Egyptians abroad grew. Only in 1982 did the remittance level reach, and even surpass, that of the assassination year.³⁶ There are also unofficial Egyptian and other money changers who travel in the Gulf states and collect the immigrants' money at a special exchange rate.³⁷

Another factor that makes it difficult to estimate the extent of emigration according to remittances is that in some countries — especially Iraq and Libya — the amounts the immigrants can send are limited by the host governments because of economic difficulties.³⁸ Also, after the sharp decrease in oil revenues, wages dropped in the Gulf states, so it was possible that the same number of workers sent less money. In Saudi

Arabia, for example, expatriate wages fell by about 30% in 1986, and the American Embassy in Riyadh estimated in September 1987 that wages would continue to fall, but at a slower rate. The report also noted that "private employers have generally chosen to reduce wages rather than send their employees home."³⁹ As for Jordan, a worker who used to earn JD120 in 1985 got only JD60 in April 1986.⁴⁰

IMPACT OF THE RECESSION ON MIGRATION: SPECIFIC VIEW

EGYPT

Egypt retained its major role and importance as a labor exporter, even after the signing of the peace treaty with Israel in March 1979 and the subsequent Arab political and economic boycott. The Arab states did not hurt Egypt where they could have hurt it most, i.e., by expelling the Egyptian workers within their borders.⁴¹

According to various sources, the number of Egyptian workers in the Arab world did not decrease significantly: there was a gradual return of Egyptian workers to Egypt, but not a massive one as some observers had forecast. Sa'd al-Din Ibrahim predicted in 1985 that half a million Egyptians would terminate their work in the Gulf by the end of the year;⁴² *The Economist* noted in August 1986 that "the trickle of Egyptians returning from Iraq and the Gulf... may soon turn into a flood."⁴³ But the number of returnees was even lower than that forecast by various Egyptian ministries: a study prepared in early 1985 by the Ministry of Manpower and Vocational Training stated that the number of Egyptians working abroad was stable, in spite of the oil recession. It was expected that 10% of the Egyptians in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would return to Egypt in 1985-86.⁴⁴ In August 1985, other research carried out by the Ministry of Labor revealed that an estimated 10%-15% of the Egyptian labor force in the Arab states (excluding Iraq) were expected to return to Egypt by the end of 1985.⁴⁵ However, various sources indicated that the number of Egyptian workers in the Arab oil states was stable at the time of writing this article.⁴⁶

Reports concerning the massive return of Egyptians from the Arab countries were wrong in most cases. The Egyptians simply came back to spend the summer or Ramadan with their families, and did not leave their jobs in the Gulf states. According to Mustafa Kamil Murad, head of Egypt's Liberal Party, about 1.7m. returned every year for vacation and then went back to work abroad.⁴⁷ In May 1987, for example, 480 extra flights were arranged to transport Egyptians returning home for the summer; and at the end of July, about 60,000 Egyptian teachers who were working in Saudi Arabia were supposed to take their vacation in Egypt.⁴⁸ And even if some did return to Egypt permanently, there were others who set out for the Gulf. According to an Egyptian Labor Ministry report that was discussed by the government in August 1987, there was a rise in the number of young Egyptians leaving to work abroad. It was estimated that every year 1m. ask permission to work abroad.⁴⁹

The governments of the Gulf states, as noted, accorded special treatment to the Egyptian workers who tended to be professionals and whose behavior was not a cause for concern.⁵⁰ Kuwait did not cancel the contracts of Egyptian workers, and at the end of 1986 Egyptians could still find additional employment in Kuwait.⁵¹

In the second half of 1987 the Gulf states, headed by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and the UAE, informed President Husni Mubarak that they would continue to employ

Egyptian workers and to give high priority to recruiting them. The Gulf states and Egypt reached this agreement as the result of Egypt's help in dealing with the spillover effects of the Iraqi-Iranian War. Also, the Gulf states wished to aid Egypt indirectly by increasing the amount of remittances, which constituted its main source of foreign exchange.⁵²

According to Moseli-Lesch, 3.5m. Egyptians lived in other Arab states in 1985.⁵³ Their number was stable in 1986-87. According to a study carried out by Egypt's Emigration Ministry, the number of workers abroad reached 4m. in March 1986.⁵⁴ In February 1987, *al-Akhbar* cited data suggesting that 5m. were working abroad.⁵⁵ One high-ranking official in the Foreign Ministry indicated in March 1987 that between 4m. and 4.5m. Egyptians were working abroad,⁵⁶ but the minister of labor said in September 1987 that there were only about 2.5m. Egyptians in other Arab states.⁵⁷ The preliminary results of the 1986 census indicated that 2.25m. were "working or living in other Arab countries."⁵⁸ This number did not take into account the number of illegal immigrants. It seems that the figure of 3m. is the most accurate, as was indicated by a study published by the International Labor Office (ILO) in October 1987.⁵⁹

Examining the number of Egyptians in separate states, we see that in some cases it was stable. In Kuwait, for example, the number did not change from the peak years; the Egyptian labor minister said there were 171,000 in Kuwait at the end of December 1986, among them 145,000 private-sector workers.⁶⁰ In the UAE, according to a report presented by the Ministry of Labor of Egypt, there were 83,859 Egyptians at the end of 1986. This number presented a very slight decrease of only 159 workers compared with 1985.⁶¹

In 1987, another source of employment was created when the Algerian Government decided to take Egyptian teachers in the natural sciences, mathematics, chemistry, and physics, instead of French teachers.⁶² The Egyptian labor minister said in January 1987 that some of his countrymen had gone to work in the YAR after they learned that there was no need to present entry visas. He put their number at 50,000.⁶³

The Egyptian Government was trying to cope with even the modest return of workers from the Gulf. One of the main tasks of the Ministry of Emigration was to let the migrants participate in soil-improvement projects, whereby 25% of the reclaimed land would be allocated to them.⁶⁴ The government also attempted to prepare alternative ways of coping with a possible massive return of migrant workers, and tried to find other labor markets in South America and in Africa for the returnees. But these efforts were not successful.⁶⁵

JORDAN

Jordan as a labor exporter was spared a mass return of its 325,000 citizens working abroad in 1987, but the Gulf countries were no longer creating new jobs for Jordanians. Up to 1984, the Jordanian labor market still needed foreign workers. The major reason was the emigration of about 40% of the work force to the Arab oil countries. A report issued by the Jordanian Bank for Development and Industry indicated that 93,000 work permits had been issued in 1981, and 150,000 in 1984.⁶⁶ But, from 1985, Jordan faced a modest return of its citizens from the Gulf and increasing unemployment. In 1985 and 1986, 35,000 Jordanians returned to Jordan as a result of the economic recession,⁶⁷ but this number did not mean that no further labor

emigration had taken place. It should be noted that remittances in 1986 increased to \$985m. from \$846m. in 1985 and dropped to \$743m. in 1987 (see Table 2).

Unemployment in Jordan increased as a growing number of well-educated youngsters found opportunities curbed by sluggish economic growth at home and a downturn in Gulf economies. The Jordanian Government tried to take measures against unemployment, which rose to more than 9% in 1987.⁶⁸ According to sources in the Jordanian trade union federation, the Ministry of Labor and Social Development deported 2,000 foreign workers and issued warnings to 1,750 establishments, companies, and shops in this regard in July 1987. Jordan also cracked down on illegal foreign workers. From 22 July to mid-October, it deported 4,000 foreigners who had been working in the country without permission. "We consider those here with no work permits, no work, and no money to be a serious security risk," said the police chief.⁶⁹ The labor minister confirmed that 4,000 foreigners had been deported in the period August-October 1987.⁷⁰ The government also decided to fine foreign workers who delayed renewing their work permits,⁷¹ and to stop issuing work permits to foreigners in 1988.⁷²

In 1986, Jordan issued 98,000 work permits, three quarters of them to Egyptians. From the beginning of 1987, the government issued permits only to agricultural laborers; allowances were made for Egyptian *fellahin* who came to work without permits after 1 January 1987. One hundred thousand permits were issued in 1987, according to Labor Minister Khaled Hajj Hasan.⁷³ The country's total labor force was estimated at 600,000, of which 100,000 were legally employed foreigners.⁷⁴ According to Hasan, at least 80,000 foreigners were working illegally in Jordan and faced deportation.⁷⁵

KUWAIT

Birks, Seccombe and Sinclair analyzed the effects of declining oil revenues on worker migration in the Gulf, and took Kuwait as a case study. According to their analysis, the collapse in world oil prices in 1980-85 was not associated with the large-scale reexport of foreign labor that was envisaged. However, the inflow of migrant workers did decline as government spending fell. According to their data, while the demand for construction workers fell, the demand for maintenance and operational staff continued to expand.⁷⁶

Kuwait was heavily dependent on foreign workers, who constituted nearly 80% of its labor force.⁷⁷ Oil production dropped from 2.5m. barrels per day (b/d) in 1979 to 825,000 b/d in 1983 and 1984; and the price per barrel for Kuwaiti crude dropped from \$35.5 in 1981 to \$27.3 by 1985. But in spite of this, the Kuwaiti Government increased its development spending in 1984 and 1985 in an attempt to counter the economy's recessionary trend.⁷⁸

The last census conducted in Kuwait, in 1985, when oil prices were dropping sharply revealed that the proportion of native Kuwaitis in relation to foreigners had continued to drop. In the 10 years up to 1985, the expatriate population had grown to slightly more than 1m. from 523,000. The 1975 census established that there were 472,000 who constituted 45% of the population; in 1980, their number was 566,000, and the ratio to foreigners had dropped to 42%; and, in 1985, the 680,000 Kuwaitis constituted only 40% of the total population of 1.7m. The number of foreigners grew from 792,000 in 1980 to more than 1m. in 1985.⁷⁹

Kuwait deported foreign workers but, not only because of the economic recession. In August 1985, Kuwait deported over 4,000 foreigners. The deportations followed bomb explosions in two restaurants on 11 July, which killed nine and injured many others. Iran reported that 100 Iranian workers were among the deportees.⁸⁰ It should be noted that in 1985 and 1986, before and after the bombing, Kuwait deported hundreds of Iranians.⁸¹ These deportations were not connected with the recession but with the fight against terrorism, and Kuwait continued to recruit new workers from abroad. During the first half of 1985, 19,379 work permits were issued and 12,631 were canceled. The net inflow was therefore 6,748.⁸²

The Statistical Department in the Ministry of Planning published data for 1986: 41,623 foreign workers entered Kuwait, of which 80% were Asians, 13.5% Arabs and 5.6% Europeans. The rest came from the US and other countries. Seventy per cent of the newcomers sought work in the construction sector, 10.1% in the commercial sector, 6.8% in services, 4.3% in industry, 4.1% in agriculture, and the rest in other sectors.⁸³ According to the labor minister in June 1986, the number of workers arriving in Kuwait annually was between 45,000 and 50,000, cf. 20,000–25,000 who stopped working there.⁸⁴

At the beginning of 1987, there were rumors that Kuwait intended to expel many foreign workers. Officials denied this in February.⁸⁵ At the end of March, the labor minister said: "The Kuwaiti gate will be open to anyone who wishes to leave and earn [money abroad]."⁸⁶ In April, the government again denied planning a large-scale reduction in the number of the foreign workers.⁸⁷ In fact, that very month it asked Egypt's minister of labor for 300 engineers and technicians.⁸⁸

But, at the same time, the authorities deported illegal immigrants: at the beginning of 1987, the Interior Ministry reported, for example, that 15–20 people were being deported each week after having entered the country illegally.⁸⁹ In August, the ministry announced a number of decisions concerning the residence of foreigners. The government feared terrorist acts, especially from Islamic circles; accordingly, many Lebanese and Iranians were deported.⁹⁰ According to the Lebanese *al-Masira*, Shi'i workers transferred some of their monies to the Amal organization.⁹¹ In 1987, a total of 10,068 foreigners were deported.⁹²

It should also be noted that many rich Kuwaitis decided to leave the country temporarily because they feared sabotage actions and Iranian missile attacks, especially after the Kuwaiti Government invited the US Navy to enter the Gulf in mid-1987. Ministerial sources said that many foreign workers might leave Kuwait for the same reasons.⁹³

SAUDI ARABIA

Saudi Arabia, according to a 1974 census, had a population of 7m.; the results of a 1976 census were never published. In order to disguise the high percentage of foreigners living in the kingdom and to minimize the importance of the indigenous Shi'i population (especially in the eastern province), officials overestimated the number of Saudis there were. According to the EIU, 2.66m. non-Saudis were employed in the civilian labor force in 1984, and the overall non-Saudi population was probably not less than 3.5m.⁹⁴ According to an estimate by the American Embassy in Riyadh, there were 3.9m. foreigners in Saudi Arabia in 1987, 3.3m. of them workers.⁹⁵ *MEED* stated in its cover story of 9 January 1988 that there were about 4m. foreign workers in Saudi Arabia.⁹⁶

An evaluation of overall civilian employment suggested increasing dependence on foreign workers up to 1984–85. Their share rose from an estimated 58% in 1979–80 to 64% in 1984–85, i.e., the rate of participation of Saudi nationals in the labor force compared with that of foreign workers declined after the oil glut,⁹⁷ and oil revenues fell from \$119 bn. in 1981 to less than \$22 bn. in 1987.⁹⁸ Saudi foreign assets totaled an estimated \$150 bn. in the early 1980s, and only \$80 bn. at the end of 1987.⁹⁹

At the end of March 1986, there were rumors that the Gulf states and Saudi Arabia intended to expel 1.5m. expatriate workers by the end of the year. However, a "responsible source" in Riyadh promptly denied that this was true.¹⁰⁰ Indeed, such a massive remigration had not occurred by the end of the year under review. According to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and other sources, 200,000 fewer visas were issued to foreign workers in 1984–85 than in previous years.¹⁰¹ This figure suggested that Saudi Arabia was still recruiting workers, but at a lower level.

The 1985–90 Saudi development plan called for a reduction in the foreign labor force from 2.7m. in 1984–85 to 2.1m. by 1989–90.¹⁰² The 1980–1985 development plan also called for a freeze in the number of foreign workers; it was hoped that Saudi nationals would come to replace the foreigners. But Saudi Arabia failed to accomplish these aims: between 1980 and 1985, the total work force grew annually at a rate of 8% or by 1.42m., far exceeding the target of 1.2%. Moreover, the Saudi component accounted for only 292,800 or about 21%. The Saudi labor force grew at an average annual rate of 3.7%, cf. non-Saudi growth rate of 11.7%.¹⁰³ The share of Saudis in the total labor force declined during 1980–85 from 49.4% to 40.2%.¹⁰⁴

Future projections did not leave much room for optimism. The Saudis, as Kanovsky noted, were reluctant to take blue-collar or technical jobs; when they got a higher education, they preferred fields of studies that did not meet with the Saudi employment-market need. "The youth want to do the least amount of work and get the maximum [income] possible."¹⁰⁵

The Saudi Government decided in late 1985 that private-sector companies would have to prove conclusively the absence of adequately trained indigenous workers before being permitted to hire foreigners.¹⁰⁶ It was also decided that the contracts of expatriates would be renewed only if a Saudi national could not be found to fill the vacancy.¹⁰⁷ But as 'Ali Ghamidi said in an article published in *al-Riyad* in April 1987: "Although in Saudi newspaper want-ads it is written that preference will be given to Saudi citizens," he wrote, "it is just a slogan."¹⁰⁸

Saudi Arabia, like Kuwait, tried to expel citizens from countries that "exported" terrorism. According to *al-Kifah al-'Arabi* in September 1987, Lebanese citizens in Saudi Arabia were harassed by security forces, especially after the Mecca incident.¹⁰⁹

THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES

The ratio of UAE nationals to immigrants was an extremely sensitive issue. In its 1980–85 development plan, the government indicated that the ratio of nationals to foreigners was 30:70, but there were sources who put the figure for nationals even lower. Comparing the 1980 and 1985 census figures produced these findings. In 1980, the total population was 1.04m., of whom 69% were males. The 1985 census put the total at 1.62m., of whom 65% were males.¹¹⁰ The 56% increase in the total population and the number of males indicated that there had not been a massive exodus of foreign workers as a result of the oil glut.

Between 1984 and 1985 some 40,000 foreigners, primarily Asians, left the UAE.¹¹¹ In November 1986, almost 6,000 foreign laborers left the UAE; 4,000 of them had been working in Abu Dhabi and Dubai. But this number was negligible; according to unofficial data, there were more than 900,000 foreigners in the UAE at the time, and most of them were Asians.¹¹²

BAHRAIN

Comprehensive data were not available regarding the number of foreign workers in Bahrain. Available data, related only to private sector employment in 1986, had highlighted an extensive dependency on foreign workers. From a total of 101,533 workers in the private sector, the number of Bahrainis was 21,581 or about 21%. In some sectors, dependence on foreign workers was complete. For example, in 1986 45,302 people were working in the construction sector; of these, 42,991 or 95% were non-Bahrainis.¹¹³ The number of foreigners might have been even higher because these figures covered only enterprises with 10 or more employees, and did not include illegal immigrants.¹¹⁴

LIBYA

The demand for foreign workers in Libya grew as a result of huge development projects and an expansion of the military, which occurred during the extension of the period of mobilization from the end of the 1970s. Libya was one of the countries that suffered most from the economic recession, and it expelled a fair number of foreigners. Reducing dependence on foreign labor was an urgent priority since the salaries of expatriate workers took 15% of oil revenues in 1983. In 1983, the government forbade the renewal of the contracts of foreign workers employed in administration, and restricted the export of foreign currency.¹¹⁵

In the summer of 1985, workers from Tunisia, Egypt, and various Asian countries were deported.¹¹⁶ However, there was a difference between these expulsions and those from the Gulf states: the latter were based on economic considerations and a fear of terrorism, Libya's were motivated by political calculations.¹¹⁷ The Libyan "Voice of the Great Arab Homeland" explained that workers from Arab countries who rejected the establishment of a united Arab state were foreigners, and the government was not responsible for finding jobs for them.¹¹⁸ Before the expulsion, an unnamed Libyan source noted that Egyptians were no longer allowed to work there; this was a withdrawal of support from an Egyptian regime that had recognized Israel.¹¹⁹ In November 1987, after long negotiations, the Libyan Government approved the payment of compensation to the Egyptians deported in 1985,¹²⁰ and in December, after the normalization between Tunisia and Libya, there were negotiations to recruit again Tunisian workers.¹²¹

In 1987, foreign companies and foreign workers were still responsible for most of the nation's infrastructure and almost all its manufactured goods. Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi stressed that Libya should become self-sufficient; but the activities of foreign companies showed that self-reliance was a long way off. The recession affected Libyan payments; the government was sometimes as much as six months behind in paying for projects.¹²²

THE REASONS FOR THE GRADUAL REMIGRATION

The remigration of Arab foreign workers was gradual, despite the huge fall in oil revenues in the last seven years. It should be remembered that foreigners were employed in all economic sectors in the Gulf countries, not only in the oil sector. In fact, the last sector employed a very limited number of foreigners. The oil-producing countries first sent back their Asian workers, and then the foreign Arabs. Also, while wages in the labor-importing countries were greatly reduced as a consequence of the recession, they were still higher than in the foreign workers' countries of origin.

Although the Arab oil-producing countries suffered greatly by the decline in oil revenues, they managed to find other capital sources to maintain their development plans. Kuwait, for example, had another major source of foreign currency — its income from investments abroad. In 1980–81, this reached \$6.4 bn., and in 1983–84 \$4.4 bn., which constituted more than one third of its budgetary outlays.¹²³ All the Gulf states still held a fair level of reserves, although the amounts were much lower than in 1982. In fact, Opec assets in Western banks increased by c. \$19 bn. 1987, cf. a decrease of \$22 bn. in 1986.¹²⁴ According to estimates of the National Bank of Kuwait, the aggregate reserves of the governments of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) at the end of 1986 totaled \$205 bn.: Kuwait had \$86 bn.; Saudi Arabia \$80 bn.; the UAE \$22 bn.; Qatar \$12 bn., Oman \$3.1 bn; and Bahrain \$1.6 bn. In July 1987, the reserves of the Kuwaiti Government totaled \$90 bn.¹²⁵

The reversal of the downward trend in oil prices since June 1986 might have been another reason why the return of expatriate workers from the oil-producing countries was gradual. Between the beginning of 1986 and April of that year, oil prices plummeted from \$30 to \$10 and even less per barrel, but by June the price had climbed to \$15, and between January and April 1987 spot prices in Europe remained at around \$18.

The oil-producing countries could not afford to dismiss essential workers in the fields of education, health, industry, quarries, and electricity, even in their reduced economic circumstances. These countries could forgo the construction of new buildings, but the buildings that had been started had to be completed, and those that had been completed had to be maintained.

Thus, the Bahraini minister of labor stated that the proportion of foreigners in his country would remain steady for at least another 10 years, because the local labor force could not replace them.¹²⁶

CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTIVE DEVELOPMENT

The labor markets in the ME have a role of their own. The economic factor, that is the decrease in the revenues of the oil-producing countries, was not the main one responsible for the number of foreign workers in the region. Despite the massive decreases in oil revenues experienced by all the GCC states, the number of Arab foreign workers did not decrease significantly. In fact, in a few cases, they even increased.

The situation was different in Libya, one of the countries most severely affected by the recession, where the government took steps to reduce the number of foreign workers following economic distress, at the same time exploiting the opportunity to

settle political accounts (for instance expelling Tunisian and Egyptian workers in September 1985). This was a new trend in Libya's treatment of foreign workers. During the "miniwar" between Egypt and Libya in July 1977, for example, hundreds of thousands of Egyptian remained in Libya; although some were expelled, and others left on their own, the overall trend was stable. Even after the Camp David accords and the subsequent Baghdad boycott of Egypt, Arab states did not act against the Egyptian workers in their midst.

The oil-producing countries preferred to tap their reserve funds and keep the foreign workers who were essential to the development of their economy. The future of foreign workers in the oil-producing countries did not depend solely on oil prices, which had not yet stabilized, but also on political factors, the Gulf War being the most outstanding example. While a sharp decrease in migrant labor had been predicted in 1980, the outbreak of war caused a sharp increase in this labor force.

The first to be sent back to their countries of origin were Asian and illegal workers, while Arab laborers were dismissed only at a later stage. Distinctions were also made among Arab foreign workers: the oil-producing countries first took advantage of the opportunity to dismiss elements they perceived as potentially subversive, such as Lebanese Shi'is and the Palestinians. The politicians in the oil countries denied, of course, that there was a tendency to deport some foreign workers and not others.¹²⁷

Yet, an explosive political situation could result from even modest remigration. A *fellah* in Egypt, for example, who sees his neighbors going to work in the Gulf states and returning loaded with luxury items, or starting to build or renovate their homes, will eagerly await his chance to work there too. He might place great hopes on improving his economic and social status. Seeing his neighbors coming home and not returning to their work in the Gulf might cause great disappointment in the *fellah*, who would feel that he has lost the chance of a lifetime. If many *fellahin* feel the same way, this could constitute an explosive social and political situation.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to predict the future trends of migration since economic reality does not play the major role. So it cannot be concluded that if the economic recession continues, the demand for labor will decline in the same proportion. By the same token, if economic growth is high, the demand for labor need not grow accordingly. Political events in the ME have shown that it is impossible to plan labor movement, even for a short term, and even if more than one scenario is considered. No plan can take into account unexpected occurrences, such as the Gulf War. Attempts to forecast the number of Egyptian migrant workers did not take into consideration political events, and accordingly bore little relation to reality.

At the end of the 1970s, Serageldin *et al.* predicted two possible developments: if there was rapid economic growth in the oil-producing countries, there would be 761,000 Egyptian emigrants in 1985; if there was slow economic growth, there would be only 619,000 Egyptian migrant workers in 1985.¹²⁸ Another erroneous estimate was made by Birks and Sinclair, who wrote in *The Middle East Journal* in 1979: "the period of market expansion of export of Egyptian manpower is over.... It is most unlikely that there will be one million Egyptians working abroad by 1985, despite a continuing increase in the demand for labor in the industrializing capital rich states".¹²⁹ As far as we know, two years after this article was published, there were more than 1.25m. Egyptians working in Iraq alone. It should be noted, however, that Sherbiny

of the World Bank predicted in autumn 1984 that there would be an increasing demand for foreign workers in the Gulf states in spite of the economic recession.¹³⁰

TABLE 1: TOTAL ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE POPULATION

Country	Year	Total Population	Active Population	Activity Rate %	Activity Rate Male	Activity Rate Female
Egypt	1983	44,038,000	13,842,200	31.4	49.8	12.5
Algeria	1983	20,192,000	3,632,594	18.0	33.8	2.4
Morocco	1982	20,449,551	5,999,260	29.3	47.1	11.6
Sudan	1973	11,810,388	3,473,278	29.4	46.7	11.9
Bahrain	1985	272,095	71,690	26.3	42.5	10.0
Iran	1982	23,232,659	6,417,963	27.6	47.1	7.2
Iraq	1977	12,000,497	3,133,939	26.1	41.9	9.4
Syria	1983	9,446,919	2,112,760	22.4	38.5	5.6
UAE	1980	1,042,099	559,960	53.7	73.9	8.8
Kuwait	1985	1,697,301	670,385	39.5	58.8	18.1

SOURCE: ILO, *Yearbook of Labor Statistics 1987* (Geneva: ILO, 1987).

NOTE: All data includes foreigners.

TABLE 2: REMITTANCES (in millions of dollars)

	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
(1) Labor-Exporting Countries							
Egypt	2,230.0	2,481.0	3,688.0	3,981.0	3,216.0	2,515.0	—
Syria	582.0	446.0	461.0	327.0	293.0	—	—
Turkey	2,559.0	2,198.0	1,549.0	1,885.0	1,762.0	1,703.0	2,070.0
Sudan	332.7	107.1	245.8	276.8	248.6	89.3	—
PDRY	404.5	469.9	486.4	499.4	425.6	292.4	302.6
YAR	777.4	911.4	1,084.3	995.5	763.2	527.4	—
Tunisia	331.0	361.0	346.0	304.0	259.0	354.0	—
Jordan	921.9	932.9	923.9	1,028.1	846.2	984.4	742.9
Sri Lanka	202.9	263.8	274.5	276.5	265.5	294.1	—
Pakistan	2,195.0	2,793.0	3,116.0	2,942.0	2,710.0	2,676.0	2,437.0
(2) Labor-Importing Countries							
Saudi Arabia	-5,438.0	-5,347.0	-5,236.0	-5,284.0	-5,199.0	-4,804.0	—
Oman	-459.0	-556.0	-695.0	-819.0	-906.0	-851.0	—
Libya	-1,570.0	-1,597.0	-2,045.0	-1,240.0	-767.0	-448.0	—
Kuwait	-689.0	-875.0	-865.0	-963.0	-1,044.0	-1,084.0	-1,102.0

SOURCES: IMF, *IFS Yearbook 1987*; *IFS*, August 1988.

**TABLE 3: GOVERNMENT OIL REVENUES OF OPEC MEMBER COUNTRIES*
(in millions of dollars)**

	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985	1986	1987
Iran	22,000	23,000	20,900	18,800	11,600	8,500	19,000	20,000	15,000	14,000	5,000	9,461
Saudi Arabia+	33,500	38,000	36,700	59,200	104,200	113,300	76,000	46,000	43,700	28,000	20,000	21,499
Kuwait+	8,500	8,500	9,500	16,300	18,300	14,800	10,000	9,900	10,800	9,000	6,000	8,140
Iraq	8,500	9,500	11,600	21,200	26,500	10,400	9,500	8,400	10,400	12,000	7,000	11,349
UAE	7,000	8,000	8,700	13,000	19,200	18,700	16,000	12,800	13,000	12,000	7,000	8,810
Qatar	2,000	1,900	2,200	3,100	5,200	5,300	4,200	3,000	4,400	3,000	1,000	1,187
Libya	7,500	9,400	9,300	15,200	23,200	15,700	14,000	11,200	10,400	10,000	5,000	—
Algeria	4,500	5,000	5,400	7,500	11,700	10,800	8,500	9,700	9,700	8,000	4,000	—

TABLE 4: GCC: CURRENT ACCOUNT ESTIMATES, 1986-87
(in millions of dollars)

	1986	1987*
Bahrain	+65	+250
Oman	-969	-250
Kuwait	+6,160	+8,000
Qatar	-200	+50
Saudi Arabia	-10,388	-9,000
UAE	+1,852	+4,600
GCC total	-3,480	+3,650

* Estimate.

SOURCE: MEED, 2 January 1988, p. 6.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Congress of the US, OTA, *Technology Transfer to the Middle East*, OTA-ISC-173, September 1984, pp. 3-5; on this issue, see also James J. Emery *et al.*, *Technology Trade with the Middle East* (New York: Westview Press, 1986), *passim*.
2. See in this context, D.E. El-Rufaie, "Acute Schizophrenic Episode: Is It a Culture-Related Syndrome," *Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica*, Vol. 73, No. 3, May 1986, pp. 263-65.
3. For recent research into the international labor migration, see W.R. Boehning, *Studies in International Labour Migration* (London: Macmillan, 1984); Mary M. Kritz *et al.* (eds.), *Global Trends in Migration* (New York: Center of Migration Studies, 1981).
4. For a study on the emigration to North America, see: Alixa Naff, *Becoming American: the Early Arab American Experience* (Carbondale: South Illinois University Press, 1985); and see also Kemal Karpat, "The Ottoman Emigration to America, 1860-1914," *IJMES*, Vol. 17, No. 2, May 1985, pp. 175-209.
5. Thomas Philip, *The Syrians in Egypt, 1725-1975* (Stuttgart: Steiner Verlag, 1985).
6. Ian J. Seccombe, "Labour Migration to the Arabian Gulf: Evolution and Characteristics 1920-1950," *British Society for Middle Eastern Studies Bulletin*, Vol. 10, No. 1, 1983, pp. 3-20.
7. Gil Feiler, *The Number of Egyptian Workers in the Arab Oil Countries, 1974-1983: A Critical Discussion* (Tel-Aviv: The Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Occasional Papers, October 1986), pp. 4-7.
8. *JP*, 6 June 1986.
9. See, for example, on Western Europe, Stephen Castles, "The Guestworker in Western Europe," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Winter 1986), pp. 761-87.
10. For the most extensive bibliographies of migration, see: Gilbert Beauge, and A. Bendiab, *Migrations Internationales au Moyen-Orient: 1975-1986* (Aix-en-Provence: Institut de Recherches et d'Études sur le Monde Arabe et Musulman, 1987); Ian J. Seccombe, *International Migration for Employment in the Middle East: An Introductory Bibliography* (Durham: Centre for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1984).
11. The data on the agreements were taken from, *MEN Economic Weekly*, Cairo, Vol. 22, No. 4, p. 13. For data on the overall number, see Feiler, *op. cit.*, p. 23.
12. See statistics in SAMA, *Statistical Summary 1407*, p. 99.
13. Especially Pakistan, India, the Philippines, Korea, Thailand, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. The Asians are paid less than the Arab foreign workers, and also their work conditions are worse. See for example: *Arabia, The Islamic World Review*, May 1985, pp. 72-73;

- Mostafa H. Nagi, "Migration of Asian Workers to the Arab Gulf: Policy Determinants and Consequences," *Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 9, No. 3, Spring 1986, pp. 19–34; M. Weiner, "International Migration and Development: Indians in the Persian Gulf," *Population and Development Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1, March 1982, pp. 1–36; F. Czichowski, "Migration pakistanischer Arbeitskräfte in die Arabischen Erdoelstaaten und ihre Sozioökonomischen Implikationen fuer Pakistan," *Internationales Asienforum*, Vol. 17, No. 1–2 (May 1986), pp. 7–28.
14. Regarding British emigration, for example, the ME became their second most important foreign destination in the 1970s — most of them were highly skilled workers on lucrative short-term contracts. See A. Findley and A. Stewart, "Migrations des Travailleurs Qualifiés Britanniques sous Contract au Moyen-Orient," *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, Vol. 2, No. 1 (September 1986), pp. 95–107.
 15. G. Feiler, "The Decrease in Oil Prices and Its Effect on the Foreign Labour Force in the Middle East," *Middle East Focus*, Vol. 9, No. 7 (Summer/Fall 1987), p. 13.
 16. *Al-Madina*, 28 June 1987, p. 8.
 17. Jordan, as we shall see later, is also a labor exporting country: see Ian. I. Seccombe, "Immigrant Workers in an Emigrant Economy: An Examination of Replacement Migration in the Middle East," *International Migration*, Vol. 24, No. 2 (June 1986), pp. 377–39.
 18. Feiler, Dayan Center, p. 20.
 19. See *MECS* 1986.
 20. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 24 July 1985.
 21. Eliyahu Kanovsky, *Migration from the Poor to the Rich Arab Countries* (Tel-Aviv: Dayan Center, Occasional Papers, June 1984), p. 63. Compare: 'Uthman Al-Hasan Muhammad Nur, "Hijrat al-Sudaniyyin lil-Aqtar al-Naftiyya," *al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, Vol. 9, No. 87, May 1987, pp. 132–51. See also: M.M Abdel-Salam, and E.P. Kraly, "The Impact of Emigration on Public Sector Activities," paper presented at the Population Association of America's meeting, Pittsburgh, PA, 15 April 1983.
 22. It was stated that more than 60% of them are technicians and skilled workers. See *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 30 January 1987.
 23. Kanovsky, op. cit., p. 61. Compare: B.R. Pridham (ed.), *The Impact of Emigration on Social Structure in the Yemen Arab Republic* (London: Croom Helm, 1985).
 24. Kanovsky, op. cit., p. 60.
 25. Hadi Zurayq, "The Process of Decision to Emigrate, Temporarily or Permanently, from Lebanon," (in Arabic), *al-mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, Vol. 9, No. 87 (May 1987), pp. 77–102.
 26. *AOG*, Vol. 13, No. 307, July 1984, p. 4.
 27. Even in Iraq, in spite of the secular regime, there was little pressure, before the war with Iraq, for women to participate in the labor force. After the war, female participation in the work force increased significantly.
 28. G. Feiler in *Middle East Focus*, p. 13 (see note 15 above); Feiler, "Peace and Egyptian Labor Migration to the Arab Oil Countries," *New Outlook*, November/December 1987, p. 22. In Iraq the mountain Kurds were largely outside the labor force.
 29. Ali Hillaal Dessouki, "The Shift in Egypt's Migration Policy, 1952–1978," *MES*, Vol. 18, No. 1, 1982.
 30. See for example, *al-Ahram al-Iktisadi*, 5 August 1985, pp. 18–19; Roger Owen, *Migrant Workers in the Gulf* (London: the Minority Right Group Report No. 68, 1985), pp. 11–13.
 31. EIU, *UAE, Country Profile 1987–88*, p. 8.
 32. E. Kanovsky, "Migration from the Poor to the Rich Arab Countries," *Middle East Review*, Vol. 18, No. 3, 1986, p. 35.
 33. Ibid.
 34. See, for example: *Defense and Foreign Affairs Weekly*, 1 June 1986; 27 April 1987; 22 February 1987, p. 3; *al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 15 April 1987; *Flight International*, 6 June 1987.
 35. See, for example: Paul Hallwood, "Labor Migration and Remittances between OPEC Members and Non-oil LDCs," *Middle East Review*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 1987, pp. 39–48; G. Feiler, "Remittances of Egyptians Working in the Arab Oil-Producing Countries 1973–1984," *AAS*, Haifa, Vol. 21, No. 3, 1987, pp. 305–25.

36. Feiler, *ibid.*
37. See, for example: *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 19 August 1987.
38. Feiler in *AAS* (see note 35); *al-Waatan al-'Arabi*, 28 August 1987.
39. See US Department of Commerce, *Saudi Arabia*. FET 87-78, Washington, September 1987, p. 5.
40. *Egyptian Gazette*, 24 April 1986.
41. Feiler in *New Outlook* (see note 28), pp. 22-23.
42. *IHT*, 7 October 1985.
43. *The Economist*, 2 August 1986.
44. *M E N Economic Weekly*, 22 February 1985; *al-Ahram*, 16 February 1985.
45. *Al-Ahram*, 7 August 1985.
46. In May 1987 the Egyptian Government estimated that, until 1989, 500,000 Egyptians would return. See *al-Ahram*, 6 May 1987.
47. *Al-Ahram*, 22 June 1987.
48. *Al-Akhbar*, 15 April, 30 July 1987; *Akhir Sa'a*, 29 April; see also *al-Musawwar*, 22 May 1987.
49. *Al-Qabas International*, 8-9 August 1987.
50. *Akhir Sa'a*, 28 January 1987.
51. MENA, 12 October — SWB, 21 October 1986.
52. At the same time the Gulf states asked Egypt to renew the work contracts of Egypt's military adviser in the Gulf. See: *al-Wafd*, 26 July; *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, Kuwait, 20 September 1987.
53. Ann Moseli-Lesch, *Egyptian Labor Migration: Economic Trends and Government Policies*, American Universities' Field Staff Reports No. 38, February 1986, pp. 1-12.
54. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 3 March 1986.
55. *Al-Akhbar*, 11 February 1987.
56. *Egyptian Gazette*, 11 March 1987.
57. *Akhir Sa'a*, 9 September 1987.
58. Arab Republic of Egypt, CAPMS, *Statistical Year Book 1952-1986*, Cairo, June 1987, p. 5.
59. *Sawt al-'Arab*, Cairo, 18 October 1987.
60. *Al-Ahram*, 24 January 1987; *Akhir Sa'a* wrote on 28 January 1987 that their number was 175,000; *al-Ahram* noted on 29 May 1986 that their number reached 177,268; see also, *October*, 18 January 1987.
61. *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 8 December 1986, p. 7.
62. *Al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 15 March 1987. On Egyptian teachers in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, see: *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 16 March 1987.
63. *Al-Ahram*, 19 January 1987.
64. *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 23 June 1986.
65. *Al-Ahram*, 16 August 1985.
66. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 24 July 1985.
67. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, Kuwait, 25 November 1986.
68. *MEED*, 21 November 1987.
69. *Al-Ra'y*, 17 September; *JP*, 27 October, 2 November 1987.
70. *Al-Ra'y*, 26 October 1987.
71. *Al-Ra'y*, 7 September; *al-Dustur*, Amman, 3 September 1987.
72. At the end of December 1987, there were rumors that some Egyptians were subjected to humiliation. See: *al-Wafd*, 31 December 1987.
73. *Al-Wafd*, 31 December 1987.
74. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 9 April; *JP*, 27 October, 2 November; *Jerusalem Star*, 26 February 1987.
75. *JP*, 2 November 1987. According to the economic editor of Jordan's *al-Ra'y*, 11 August 1987, 140,000 foreigners were working in Jordan. It should be remembered that Egyptians and Syrians needed no entry or residence permits, which made the flow of migrants hard to monitor.
76. J.S. Birks, I.J. Seccombe and C.A. Sinclair, "Migrant Workers in the Arab Gulf: The Impact of Declining Oil Revenues," *International Migration Review*, Vol. 20, Winter

- 1986, pp. 799–813; see also Nasra M. Shah, "Foreign Workers in Kuwait: Implication for the Kuwaiti Labor Force," *ibid*, pp. 815–32; I. J. Seccombe, "Economic Recession and International Labour Migration in the Arab Gulf," *Arab Gulf Journal*, Vol. 6, No. 1, April 1986, pp. 43–52.
77. US Department of Commerce, *Kuwait*, FET 85–72, Washington, August 1985, pp. 3, 9.
 78. *Ibid*, pp. 3, 13.
 79. National Bank of Kuwait, *Economic and Financial Bulletin*, various issues. See also AP, 29 April 1985. For extensive data on the last population census in Kuwait, see: *Al-Ta'dad al-'Amm lil-Sukkan wal-Masakin wal-Munsha'at* 1985, Kuwait, 1986, 3 Vols.
 80. *Middle East Newsletter*, 12 August 1985.
 81. See SWB, 14 April, 13 June, 2, 7, 22 July, 12, 15, 24 October, 30 November, 11 December 1985, 12 March, 10 June 1986.
 82. National Bank of Kuwait, *Economic and Financial Bulletin*, No. 9, 1986, p. 8.
 83. *Arab Times*, 18 January 1987.
 84. *Al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 13 June 1986.
 85. *Al-Anba'*, 28 February 1987.
 86. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 31 March 1987.
 87. *Al-Anba'*, 11 April 1987.
 88. *Al-Akhbar*, 26 April 1987.
 89. *MEED*, 2 May 1987.
 90. *Al-'Alim*, 3 October; see also, *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 6 October; *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 2 August — DR, 13 August; SWB, 14 August 1987; *October*, 3 January 1988.
 91. *Al-Masira*, 19 December 1987.
 92. *Al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 9 January 1988.
 93. *Al-Wafd*, 7 November; *al-'Alim*, 15 August 1987.
 94. EIU, *Saudi Arabia. Country Profile, 1986–87*, p. 6. Jallal al-Din wrote that in 1985 Saudi Arabia employed 3m. foreign workers. See: *al-Mustaqbal al-'Arabi*, April 1985, pp. 80–95.
 95. US Department of Commerce, *Saudi Arabia*, op. cit., p. 5.
 96. *MEED*, 9 January 1988, p. 6.
 97. IMF, *Saudi Arabia*, Washington, 1986.
 98. *The Economist*, 16 January 1988.
 99. *Ibid*.
 100. SWB, 4 April 1986.
 101. IMF, 1986; *Saudi Economic Survey*, 11 December 1985.
 102. E. Kanovsky, *Saudi Arabia's Dismal Economic Future: Regional and Global Implications* (Tel Aviv: Dayan Center, Occasional Papers, April 1986), Table No. 10, pp. 110–11; see also: *AOG*, 1 July 1986; *MEN Economic Weekly*, 19 April 1985; *Arabia. The Islamic World Review*, May 1985; *al-Dustur*, London, 27 October 1986; *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 19 June 1986; *al-Itihad al-'Usbu'i*, 16 July 1987.
 103. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Ministry of Planning, *Fourth Development Plan 1985–1990*, Riyadh, 1985, pp. 31, 36 and Table 2.8.
 104. EIU, *Saudi Arabia. Country Profile, 1987–88*, p. 11.
 105. Kanovsky, April 1986, pp. 40–41. Kanovsky believes, on the other hand, that the Saudi plan to reduce the number by 600,000 by 1989–90 is likely to be achieved or exceeded because of the economic recession.
 106. IMF, 1986; *MEED*, 11 January 1986.
 107. *MM*, 3 February 1986.
 108. *Al-Riyad*, 27 April 1987.
 109. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 28 September 1987.
 110. *CR: UAE*, No. 4, 1987, p. 8.
 111. *AOG*, Vol. 15, No. 355, 1 July 1986.
 112. *The Times of Oman*, 8 January 1987.
 113. IMF, *Bahrain*, Washington, January 1987, p. 58.
 114. *Ibid*.
 115. *Euromoney*, Special Supplement, April 1984, pp. 26–28; Frannois Burgat, "The Libyan Economy in Crisis," in Bichara Khader and Bashir El-Wifati (eds.), *The Economic Development of Libya* (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 217.

116. *Africa Report*, Vol. 30, November 1985, pp. 44-45; *ME*, October 1985, pp. 12-14; *al-Nahar Arab Report and Memo*, 13 September 1985, pp. 1-3; *Africasia*, October 1985, pp. 32-34.
117. See, in this context, George Henderson, *MEI*, No. 258, 13 September 1985, pp. 9-11; Gilbert Beauge and Frannois Burgat, "La Question des Migrations en Libye," *Maghreb-Machrek*, *Monde Arabe*, No. 112, April 1986, pp. 56-65.
118. R. Tripoli, VoGAH, 14 August — DR, 15 August 1985.
119. JANA, 8 July 1985 — DR, 8 July 1985.
120. *Al-Wafd*, 13 November 1988.
121. *Al-Sabah*, 18 December 1987.
122. *NYT*, 25 April 1987. See also: Qadhdhafi's speech on economy at a meeting with members of the General People's Committee of the People's Committees of the Municipalities, as cited by Tripoli Television Service, 26 March — DR, 27 March 1987.
123. Kanovsky, April 1986, p. 47.
124. *FT*, 13 May 1988.
125. *WSJ*, 16 September; *MEES*, 21 September 1987. The deposits which the Saudi Arabian Government held in Western banks amounted to \$46 bn. at the end of March 1987, according to the bank of international settlement. See: *MEES*, 10 August 1987. The US Embassy in Riyadh estimated in September 1987 that Saudi Arabia's liquid official foreign assets were about \$60 bn.—\$70 bn. See US Department of Commerce, *Saudi Arabia*, op. cit., p. 5.
126. *Al-Khalij*, 4 January 1986.
127. See, for example, the words of the Kuwaiti labor minister, *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 31 March 1987.
128. Ismail Serageldin *et. al.*, "Human Resources in the Arab World: the Impact of Migration", in I. Ibrahim (ed.), *Arab Resources: the Transformation of Society* (Washington, D.C.: Croom Helm, 1983), p. 24.
129. J. S. Birks and C. A. Sinclair, "Egypt: A Frustrated Labor Exporter?" *MEJ*, Vol. 33, 1979, p. 303.
130. Naiem A. Sherbiny, "Expatriate Labor Flows to the Arab Oil Countries in the 1980s," *MEJ*, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Autumn 1984), pp. 643-67.

**PART TWO:
COUNTRY-BY-COUNTRY
SURVEY**

Middle East Countries

Basic Data

<i>Country</i>	<i>Capital</i>	<i>Most Important Natural Resources</i>	<i>Area 1,000 sq. km.</i>	<i>Population in millions (mid-1986)</i>	<i>GNP per capita (\$US 1986)</i>
Bahrain	Manama	Crude Oil	0.6	0.431	8,510
Egypt	Cairo	Cotton, Crude Oil, Fruits, Vegetables, Iron	1,001	49.7	760
Iran	Tehran	Crude Oil, Natural Gas	1,648	45.6	NA
Iraq	Baghdad	Crude Oil, Dates, Cement	435	16.5	NA
Israel	Jerusalem	Fruits, Vegetables, Potash	21	4.3	6,210
Jordan	Amman	Phosphates, Vegetables, Fruits	98	3.6	1,540
Kuwait	Kuwait	Crude Oil	18	1.8	13,890
Lebanon	Beirut	Fruits, Citrus Fruits, Vegetables, Forests	10	NA	NA
Libya	Tripoli	Crude Oil, Vegetables, Fruits	1,760	3.9	NA
Oman	Muscat	Crude Oil	300	1.3	4,980
Qatar	Doha	Crude Oil	20	0.317	13,200
Saudi Arabia	Riyadh	Crude Oil	2,150	12.0	6,950
Sudan	Khartoum	Cotton, Gum, Cereals	2,506	22.6	320
Syria	Damascus	Cotton, Crude Oil, Vegetables, Fruits, Livestock, Phosphates	185	10.8	1,570
Turkey	Ankara	Cotton, Wool, Tobacco, Chrome, Copper	781	51.5	1,110
United Arab Emirates	Abu Dhabi	Crude Oil	84	1.4	14,680
Yemen (North)	San'a	Coffee, Cotton, Sorghum, Fish	195	8.2	550
Yemen (South)	Aden	Cotton, Fruits, Vegetables, Tobacco, Fish	333	2.2	470

SOURCE: *World Development Report 1988* (New York: Oxford University Press for the World Bank, 1988).
NA = not available.

Currencies

Country	Currency Unit	Approximate Equivalent in Other Currencies*				
		US Dollar	Pound Sterling	Deutsche Mark	Swiss Franc	French Franc
Bahrain	Bahraini Dinar = 1,000 Fils	2.65	1.62	4.83	3.97	16.06
Egypt	Egyptian Pounds = 1,000 Milliemes	(c) 0.74	0.45	1.35	1.11	4.48
Iran	Iranian Riyal = 100 Dinars	0.010	0.006	0.018	0.015	0.061
Iraq	Iraqi Dinar = 1,000 Fils	3.22	1.96	5.87	4.83	19.51
Israel	Israeli Shekel = 100 Agorot	0.63	0.38	1.15	0.94	3.82
Jordan	Jordanian Dinar = 1,000 Fils	2.99	1.82	5.45	4.48	18.12
Kuwaiti	Kuwaiti Dinar = 1,000 Fils	3.68	2.24	6.70	5.51	22.30
Lebanon	Lebanese Pound = 100 Piastres	0.01	0.0061	0.018	0.015	0.06
Libya	Libyan Dinar = 1,000 Dirhams	3.35	2.04	6.10	5.02	20.30
Oman	Omani Riyal = 1,000 Baiza	2.60	1.59	4.74	3.90	15.76
Qatar	Qatari Riyal = 100 Dirhams	0.27	0.16	0.49	0.40	1.64
Saudi Arabia	Saudi Riyals = 100 Halalas	0.27	0.16	0.49	0.40	1.64
Sudan	Sudanese Pound = 1,000 Milliemes	0.25	0.15	0.46	0.37	1.52
Syria	Syrian Pound = 100 Piastres	0.25	0.15	0.46	0.37	1.52
Turkey	Turkish Lira = 100 Kuruş	0.001	0.00061	0.0018	0.0015	0.0061
United Arab Emirates	UAE Dirham = 100 Fils	0.27	0.16	0.49	0.40	1.64
Yemen (North)	Yemeni Riyal = 100 Fils	0.11	0.067	0.20	0.16	0.67
Yemen (South)	Yemeni Dinar = 1,000 Fils	2.92	1.78	5.32	4.38	17.70
\$US rate \$1		—	0.61	1.8215	1.4985	6.06

* As quoted by the Bank of America in London on 22 April 1987.

(c) = Commercial rate.

The Arab Republic of Egypt

(Jumhuriyyat Misr al-‘Arabiyya)

AMI AYALON

Six years after Husni Mubarak's accession to the presidency, Egypt's political and socioeconomic realities were much the same as they had been upon his resumption of office. The country was still facing a severe economic crisis, which exacerbated old social tensions and sometimes created new ones. The regime's critics continued to seek an alternative order, resorting to a variety of means — verbal as well as violent — to attain their ends. In 1987, as before, amidst the normally peaceful but somewhat gloomy daily routine of a society overburdened with difficulties, there were student strikes and demonstrations, and clashes between Muslims and Copts. There was also a wave of political assassination attempts by Muslim radicals and Nasserites around the middle of the year.

Such events notwithstanding, the regime remained stable, handling these challenges from within with impressive skill while focusing most of its energy on economic development and the improvement of public services. One effective means of regulating domestic pressure was the multiparty system with its largely free press, through which much of the opposition bitterness and criticism were channeled. The process of political pluralization continued to make strides in Egypt; in 1987 it was enhanced by elections for the People's Assembly and the reelection of Mubarak as president.

On the foreign front, Cairo scored a great success towards the end of the year, when most Arab states moved to resume full diplomatic relations — the culmination of extensive political and diplomatic efforts over the years. In the background was growing Arab preoccupation with the Gulf War, which relegated the issue of Egypt's peace with Israel to secondary importance. The continuing "cold peace" between Cairo and Jerusalem and their growing mutual mistrust also made it easier for the Arabs to overlook Egypt's peace policy. In the global arena, Cairo, still on "special" terms with the US, continued to seek a more middle-of-the-road international position by gradually expanding its ties with Moscow. By the end of Mubarak's first term, in late 1987, Egypt's international status on both the regional and global fronts was considerably more balanced, and hence more comfortable, than it had been when he took power.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

MORE "DOSAGES" OF DEMOCRACY: PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS AND PRESIDENTIAL REELECTION

"We are providing dosages of democracy in proportion to our ability to absorb them," President Mubarak stated in early 1987. "We are forging ahead, but we need time for

our democracy to develop fully...an overdose can be harmful."¹ Two such "dosages" of democracy were offered to the Egyptians in 1987: the People's Assembly elections in April, following changes in the electoral law; and the reelection of Mubarak for a second term as president, in October. Both highlighted the strengths and weaknesses of Egypt's political pluralism.

THE PEOPLE'S ASSEMBLY ELECTIONS — THE BACKGROUND

Unlike the previous elections for the Egyptian legislature, in May 1984 (see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 353–62), the April 1987 elections took place prematurely. The assembly was not meant to be dissolved until mid-1989. But opposition pressure, along with the growing independence of the judiciary, forced the government to enter the contest against its political rivals ahead of time, or risk undermining the democratic image it had worked hard to foster.

The process that led to early elections had its roots in the aftermath of the last poll, in 1984, when opposition leaders, embittered by what they considered governmental "abuses" and "fraud," appealed to the Supreme Constitutional Court to annul the electoral law enacted in 1983 (see *MECS* 1982–83, p. 422) as unconstitutional. A ruling to this effect would delegitimize the assembly elected under that law. In late 1986 the case came up before the court, and a ruling was expected by early 1987.

Because this was a delicate period — Mubarak was to be nominated by the assembly for reelection later in the year — and because the court's decision was unpredictable, the government moved to preempt an adverse ruling by amending the electoral law on 30 December 1986. But the maneuver served only to intensify tension between the regime and its opponents, who now maintained that by amending the old law the government had in fact invalidated it, as well as the assembly elected when it was in effect. Mubarak resolved to remove all doubts: on 4 February, in a surprise move, he called for a referendum on the dissolution of the assembly and the election of another under the modified law.²

The referendum took place on 2 February. Reportedly, 85.6% of the voters were in favor of the president's decision.³ On 14 February Mubarak dissolved the assembly, and set 6 April as election day. On 16 May the court indeed ruled that the 1983 electoral law was incompatible with the constitution in some of its central articles.⁴

The sudden decision to dissolve the assembly and announce elections was proudly presented by Mubarak as a venture "to consolidate democracy"; it marked the fact that the country had "arrived at a common understanding of the role of democracy at this point in [its] national struggle."⁵ Yet, if it attested to the regime's commitment to political pluralism, the move also implied an indirect admission of certain deficiencies in the democratic process. As far as the opposition was concerned, the president deserved no special credit for making a decision that was "only natural" and "indeed long overdue."⁶ It seemed that by agreeing to play the democratic game according to rules that were more acceptable to its rivals, the government had given in to pressure and lost points. On the other hand, its reward, in the long run, would be a strengthening of its democratic image and credibility.

THE REVISED ELECTORAL LAW

The amendment approved by the People's Assembly on 30 December 1986 affected the electoral law in a number of ways. The most important changes were the following:

(1) While the old law provided for participation in the elections through party lists only, its revised version allowed independent candidates to compete on an individual basis, something that was long sought by the opposition. Forty-eight seats in the 458-member assembly were allocated to independents, who were to be elected in 48 constituencies. To win a seat in the assembly, an independent candidate was required to obtain the largest number of votes of all competing individuals, and no less than 20% of the votes in the constituency. Independent candidates were also granted the right, already enjoyed by parties, to be represented in election committees and to observe the counting of votes.

(2) Hitherto, unused votes of parties failing to win a certain minimum (see below) were all credited to the largest party — an obvious advantage to the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). The amended law stipulated that unused votes be distributed among all parties passing the minimum in proportion to their scores in the elections.

(3) The allocation of seats for women (31 in the 1984 assembly) was abolished.⁷

One important stipulation of the old law that was left unchanged was that a party had to poll at least 8% nationwide in order to be represented in the assembly. This was evidently a serious limitation on the small parties and a cause of bitter criticism, both before and after the amendment. The government continued to consider this rule as indispensable for checking its opponents, and justified it again as a “necessary safeguard against the pulverization of the system.”

THE CONTESTANTS

Six parties were legally registered in Egypt when the elections were announced:

(1) The NDP, headed by Mubarak and backed by the regime’s ruling establishment and the powerful administrative apparatus.

(2) The Wafd, headed by the veteran Fu’ad Siraj al-Din — the largest opposition party since its inception in early 1984 and the only one to be represented in the 1984 assembly. During the 1984 elections, and for a while thereafter, the party was allied with the Muslim Brothers, whose members entered the assembly on a Wafd ticket (see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 355, 362). But by late 1985 a rift occurred between the two and the Brothers left the Wafd, to join forces with the Liberal Party (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 269–70 and below).

(3) The Liberal Party, headed by Mustafa Kamil Murad — a small, centrist, conservative, and on the whole marginal party until its alliance with the Muslim Brothers in 1986. In this alliance the Brothers soon became dominant, drawing the party to adopt an aggressive Islamic-fundamentalist line.

(4) The Socialist Labor Party (SLP), headed by Ibrahim Shukri — until 1984 the largest opposition party which lost much of its popularity thereafter. It also lost its oppositional primacy to the Wafd. The SLP featured an ideology combining Egyptian nationalist and pan-Arab principles with a vague traditional-Islamic line.

(5) The National Progressive Unionist Grouping (NPUG), headed by Khalid Muhyi al-Din — the party of the left comprising Marxists and Nasserites, mostly from the intelligentsia. A small but vociferous group.

(6) The People’s (*Umma*) Party, headed by Ahmad al-Sabbahi — a tiny splinter group advocating a strong fundamentalist orientation.

The hastily announced elections left little time for other groups to organize as

licensed parties and enter the contest. One group, which had long sought entry into the multiparty game under the name of the Nasserite Party (*al-hizb al-Nasiri*; see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 356), announced its formal foundation in February 1987.⁸ Unable to organize its ranks in time to contest the elections, however, the party decided to let its candidates run on the NPUG ticket.⁹ Another group, headed by the president's brother, Sami Mubarak (formerly a member of the Wafd — cf. *MECS* 1983–84, p. 354), moved to form the Republican Party (*hizb al-jumhuriyya*). But, like the Nasserites, the group embarked on its initiative too late to qualify for the elections.¹⁰

With the 8% barrier still in effect, opposition parties at first sought to unite in a single bloc capable of passing the prohibitive hurdle.¹¹ The Wafd, however, refused to cooperate, ostensibly because such a move was illegal, but more practically because the party expected to do better if it ran separately.¹² (For a similar position of the Wafd in 1984, cf. *MECS* 1983–84, p. 357.) As these efforts failed, the other parties continued to seek tactical cooperation that would improve their chances. By late February a new coalition was emerging, composed of the SLP, the Liberal Party, and the Muslim Brothers. The three agreed to run jointly on the SLP ticket.

No sooner was the "Tripartite Coalition" (*al-tahaluf al-thulathi*) formed than it assumed the role of chief opposition grouping for the election. The coalition seemed to combine effectively the organizational apparatuses of the SLP and the Liberals with the popular, aggressively voiced Islamic ideology of the Brothers. Markedly more coherent and more clearly phrased than the often vague principles of their two partners, the Brothers' call soon dominated the line which the coalition took in the election campaign (see below). The coalition, as such, represented a fresh force in the political arena, and could thus disclaim the image of impotence which the older opposition groups shared in the public's eye. Instead, it seemed to be a potentially powerful element with a forceful message which could be seriously considered as a genuine alternative to the line advocated by the regime. (Three years earlier, the Wafd made an impressive return to the political arena under very similar circumstances — cf. *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 354–55.) The other three opposition parties, the Wafd, the NPUG, and the *Umma*, failed to reach an agreement on a common framework and were left to compete separately. Altogether 1,655 candidates contested the 400 assembly seats allocated to parties.¹³

Most of the candidates, however, did not run on party lists but as individuals. As many as 1,937 candidates stood for the 48 seats allocated to independents.¹⁴ Many of them were newcomers to politics; others were popular party leaders allowed to run as individuals because of their reputation and political appeal. Among these were the NDP's Sulayman Mutawalli, Hasballah al-Kafrawi, Jamal al-Sayyid, and 'Abd al-Hamid Radwan (all cabinet ministers), the coalition's Salah Abu Isma'il (of the Brothers) and al-Hamza Di'bis (of the Liberals), and NPUG leader Khalid Muhyi al-Din.

THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

From the beginning the NDP enjoyed a considerable edge over its opponents. The decision to hold elections, albeit at a time convenient to the regime, could be presented to the public as proof of the government's democratic intentions. It seemed to lend credibility to the solemn promise, by state leaders, that the contest would be free and fair, as between rivals competing on equal terms. At the same time, the regime

continued to benefit from its monopoly of the broadcasting media and control of the so-called "national" press. These offered extensive and favorable coverage of state leaders' activities, amplifying their achievements. President Mubarak, who was also the NDP chairman, toured the country in a thinly disguised promotion campaign for the party, inaugurating schools, factories and bridges in front of television cameras. So did cabinet ministers and other high officials. The opposition parties were allowed a token 80 minutes each of air time to present their platforms.¹⁵ Even more important was the government's control of polling mechanisms and the counting of votes. The government rejected an opposition demand, backed by a group of civil judges, that polling be supervised by neutral representatives of the judiciary,¹⁶ on the grounds that the idea was technically unfeasible.¹⁷ Having accepted the opposition's challenge for a test of power, the regime was careful to retain a foolproof shield against any real threat to its control.

The opposition, for its part, entered the race with much confidence. Its leaders justly claimed credit for having forced the government to admit the illegitimacy of its former acts and to put its public standing to the test. The modified electoral law improved, to some extent, the opposition's chances in the elections. And while the small parties reckoned that the government would not allow them to exceed the bounds of a controllable minority in the assembly, they did hope, realistically, to increase their presence substantially, provided that they ran an effective campaign.

There was little novelty in the themes around which the verbal confrontation between the regime and its opponents revolved. The opposition took the government, and individual state officials, to task for poor performance in various areas of the economy and public services; for the lack of a coherent vision of the country's future; for the growing dependence on the US; and for persisting in the policy of peace with Israel at the expense of Egypt's inter-Arab standing. Accusing state leaders of personal corruption formed, as usual, a central part of the forceful opposition offensive, as was criticism of Mubarak's insistence on retaining the post of NDP chairman — which made him "at once a contestant and a referee."¹⁸ Another major, and long-familiar, theme was doubting the sincerity of the government's intentions to conduct "truly free" elections. Opposition publications produced ample evidence that the regime was, "as always," scheming to resort to manipulation and forgery on election day. They also rejected the modified electoral law as still undemocratic, and pledged to challenge its constitutionality in court.¹⁹

The NDP chose to campaign under the slogan "patriotic unity, national sovereignty, building for the people." Its spokesmen emphasized the regime's achievements in securing stability, development and a respectable international standing for Egypt. They derided the "political impotence" and "petty intraparty strifes" that characterized the opposition. The small parties, NDP leaders argued, had no serious political, social and economic program; indeed, they could afford to dispense with one, since they were, and would surely remain, distant from positions of responsibility. "After years in which the opposition parties have offered no solutions [to the country's problems], the man in the street is realizing that all they seek is to denigrate [the government]," said the deputy prime minister and NDP secretary-general, Dr. Yusuf Wali. "Allegations of forgery will be of no avail in justifying the lack of public faith in those who make them."²⁰

If there was, nonetheless, a new element in the preelection encounter it was the

prominence of Islamic motifs, which the Tripartite Coalition tried to turn into the heart of the debate. Under the Brothers' inspiration, the coalition raised the telling slogan of "Islam is the solution." Although somewhat murky, this formula was presented as a relevant alternative to the regime's equally ambiguous message. The coalition posed as a mouthpiece of the popular moderate Islamic trend, whose primary goal was full implementation of the *Shari'a*. This, the party program indicated, was "not a subject for acceptance or rejection; rather it is the duty of every Muslim to respond to God's call and apply His Law."²¹ The other parties responded by similarly including the demand for the application of the *Shari'a* in their programs. Among them was the NDP, which pledged to "adhere to religious values and to the *Shari'a* as the chief source for legislation."²²

By and large, the campaign took place in an orderly atmosphere, although limited clashes did occur here and there, as was the case in previous elections. The sense that the competition this time was freer than before led government and opponents alike to invest more effort in trying to expand their constituencies. The result was an especially vivid propaganda campaign, with public rallies larger and more frequent, and street signs and wall posters more visible than in the past. The NDP, Wafd and NPUG weekly organs (*May*, *al-Wafd* and *al-Ahali*, respectively) increased their frequency of publication to several times a week on the eve of the elections; *al-Wafd* became a daily newspaper on 9 March. As polling day drew nearer, there were more opposition complaints of harassment, even violent assaults, by the NDP and the government, including reports of the disruption of party gatherings, the detention of party activists, and the threatening of potential voters for the opposition.²³ The government responded in kind²⁴ or, more often, disregarded the allegations altogether. A few days before the elections the police carried out what were described as "preventive arrests" on a large scale: the opposition estimated that some 2,000 men were detained, most of them Muslim Brothers or supporters.²⁵ State sources confirmed the arrest of 500, all "Muslim radicals" who had planned to "stir up trouble and disrupt the elections."²⁶

THE BALLOT, AND FORMATION OF THE NEW ASSEMBLY

The elections took place on 6 April. There were 21,235 polling stations and, for the most part, balloting proceeded peacefully. Order was maintained by large numbers of security forces. There were, nonetheless, a few clashes between NDP and opposition activists, and some 50 people were injured.²⁷ The opposition also reported the death of one man, but this was denied by spokesmen for the regime, as were opposition complaints of restrictions imposed on their representatives at polling stations.²⁸

The results were announced by Minister of the Interior Zaki Badr on 9 April. Of 14,324,162 eligible voters, 7,227,467 (50.4%) participated in the balloting. Of these, 6,824,908 were valid votes. The NDP obtained 4,751,758 votes (69.6% of the valid votes); the Tripartite Coalition 1,163,525 (17%); the Wafd, 746,024 (10.9%); the NPUG, 150,570 (2.2%) and the *Umma*, 13,031 (0.2%). Consequently, only the NDP, the Coalition and the Wafd, which scored more than the required 8% minimum, could be represented in the assembly. The NDP won 308 seats through party lists; the coalition, 56; and the Wafd, 36. In addition, 48 individual candidates were elected, 39 of them on 6 April and the rest in a second round of polling, on 13 April. Of those elected outside party lists, 39 were identified as NDP members; four as coalition members; and five as independents not affiliated with any party.²⁹

All cabinet ministers who ran on behalf of the NDP were elected, except for Jamal al-Sayyid, the minister of state for war production. Likewise, most participating opposition leaders were successful, the prominent exceptions being NPUG leader Khalid Muhyi al-Din and the Wafd's Mumtaz Nassar, a veteran assemblyman who was opposition leader in the previous assembly (he died a few days later).

The NDP won a total of 347 seats, forming 75.8% of the assembly membership. The opposition had a total of 96 seats (21%), of which 60 (13%) belonged to the coalition and 36 (8%) to the Wafd. Thirty-six of the coalition representatives were members of the Muslim Brothers.³⁰ Five seats were occupied by independents.

On 21 April, Mubarak, acting upon his constitutional prerogative, nominated 10 additional members. Among them were two ex-ministers, 'Abd al-Mun'im al-Nimr and William Najib Sayfyan, and four women.³¹ The total number of women in the assembly was now 18.

The new assembly convened for the first time on 22 April. Dr. Rif'at al-Mahjub, Speaker of the former assembly, was reelected to the post.³² The opposition, for its part, elected SLP chairman, Ibrahim Shukri, as its leader in the assembly.³³

REACTIONS AND ANALYSIS

While pleased to have strengthened its assembly representation, the opposition was critical of the "chaotic" manner in which the authorities had conducted the elections, and of the of "rigging" designed to preserve the ruling party's "artificial majority." Opposition spokesmen complained that their delegates had been "harassed," prevented from entering polling premises and even beaten by NDP members under the eyes of the police. And the final results had been "tampered with" and "falsified." "Had the NDP allowed the citizens true freedom," it was argued, "it would not have attained even five per cent of the seats."³⁴ Wafd leader Fu'ad Siraj al-Din described the elections as "a horrible and violent repetition of the 1984 farce";³⁵ while the party secretary-general, Ibrahim Faraj, called them "the worst in Egyptian political history." "This is fake democracy," Faraj asserted, "the government acted this way because it felt that the opposition parties have strengthened."³⁶ In like manner, the government accused opposition delegates of "blatantly calling [upon the people to] defy law and order," of acting violently at polling stations, and of attempting to forge the ballots there in favor of their own candidates.³⁷ Officials noted, however, that incidents of disorder were few and far between. "The violations occurred only in 10 out of a total of 21,235 subsidiary committees," Interior Minister Badr stated. "In their impartiality, honesty and fairness these elections are a shining beacon on the road of democratic progress in our homeland."³⁸ Other officials expressed satisfaction with what they described as the "huge turnout" of voters, which proved that "the Egyptian people are eager to participate in a practical way in strengthening the march of stability and democracy."³⁹

The regime attained the main goals it had set for itself in calling for elections. As expected, the ruling party retained its convenient majority in the assembly, despite an 11% decrease in its representation (from 390 to 347 seats). The elections, the Egyptian leadership felt, reinforced the democratic legitimacy of the regime and would remove the obstacles to Mubarak's reelection in October.

The opposition had its own reasons for satisfaction. Having forced the regime to accept its challenge, it came out stronger, with an assembly presence 65% greater than

previously (from 58 Wafd seats before to a total of 96). With a bloc forming one fifth of the assembly, the government's rivals were in a position to voice their demands — such as the implementation of the *Shari'a* and further changes in the electoral law — more aggressively, and to make it more difficult for the majority party to disregard them. The opposition viewed this achievement as a direct outcome of its effective political and legal pressure on the government, encouraging it to pursue the same line of political action. That the Wafd lost its lead to the coalition was a result of two things: first, the shift of the Muslim Brothers from the former to the latter; the Brothers, with their popular message, must have brought the coalition most of its electoral gains. Second, the novelty of the coalition as a political force in the multiparty arena. As experience during 11 years of political pluralism had shown, any force heading the opposition struggle against the mighty regime would be worn out after a while, its popularity seriously eroded. By 1987 this had happened to the Wafd, which lost its position to a fresh contender.

No doubt, the 1987 elections represented an important step on the road to greater democracy. Yet the Egyptian leadership, having committed itself to following such a course, was inclined to proceed as slowly and gradually as possible, both because of the natural desire of a government to retain its authority to the full, and the conviction that Egypt needed a long period of preparation and experiment before comprehensive democracy could be applied. It was also in the nature of the process, however, that increasing pressures on the government by its rivals would make it increasingly difficult for the former to curb the latter. The more the opposition consolidated its political position, the more able it would be to maneuver the regime into having to choose between expanding freedom and abandoning democracy; and the choice would be harder each time. The regime, forced to make such a choice in early 1987, opted for more freedom, thereby electing to move towards the next crossroads — where choice, again, would be still tougher and retreat potentially more risky than before.

MUBARAK'S REELECTION AS PRESIDENT

Mubarak's first six-year term as president expired on 13 October 1987. In 1981, he had been less than enthusiastic about accepting the post and — like quite a few others — had doubts about his ability to fulfill it successfully. By the time he was half way into his term, however, it had become clear that he would seek reelection. There was no precedent in post-revolutionary Egypt of a transfer of the presidency through elections, nor of a plurality of candidates in times of reelection. According to the constitution, it was for the People's Assembly to nominate a candidate — a two-thirds majority was required — whose appointment would be confirmed by popular referendum. In practice, referenda had always confirmed the assembly's choice by a majority of over 90%. There was no doubt that Mubarak too would be reelected by a similar majority.

Nevertheless a lively public debate preceded his reelection, reflecting the remarkable freedom of speech attained under him. This was an occasion for reviewing the achievements and failures of the regime, and it was seized upon by the opposition, which conducted, for the second time in 1987, an offensive against the government and the president. "In these six years...the public sense of resentment, distress and revulsion have increased, yet President Mubarak...is declaring that the same policy

that led to the crisis will continue," charged an editorial in *al-Ahali*.⁴⁰ A Wafd member of the assembly suggested that "under Mubarak, Egypt has witnessed no prosperity, prices have gone up sharply, agriculture deteriorated, oppression and persecution have reached a peak, and the plundering of national resources has persisted; yet the president and his party, rather than confronting corruption, have often protected the corrupt."⁴¹ The Wafd announced that it had examined "carefully, fairly and deeply" all the positive and negative aspects of Mubarak's era and that "it was clear right from the beginning that the negative points outweighed the positive ones."⁴² Accordingly, the party delegates in the assembly abstained from voting on the renomination of Mubarak (save for six members, who voted for Mubarak and then resigned from the party).⁴³ The NPUG, not represented in the assembly, published a "black book" entitled *That is Why We are Opposed to Mubarak*, in which it listed his government's "evils" and called upon the public to vote against his reelection.

To confront such negative voices, an intensive campaign of support for Mubarak was launched by the government-controlled media. The establishment press went to great lengths in commending the president's achievements, dwelling chiefly on stability and democracy. His style of leadership was lauded as efficient, honest and candid, just the kind of authority the country needed.⁴⁴ The SLP, Liberal and *Umma* parties also announced their support.⁴⁵ "There is no substitute for Mubarak," said Liberal Party leader Mustafa Kamil Murad:

While his first tenure...has been characterized by a horrible rising of prices, the increase of [national] debts and weak governments incapable of making decisions, it has also been typified by some positive aspects, such as the peaceful completion of the evacuation of Sinai, growing allocation of resources to public services such as housing, water, electricity, sewage and telephones, and greater investment in heavy industry, oil, agriculture...and education.⁴⁶

Other sectors followed suit in expressing their support, among them the Army,⁴⁷ the Coptic pope,⁴⁸ al-Azhar leaders,⁴⁹ the Supreme Council of the Judiciary,⁵⁰ and the Writers' Association.⁵¹

On 6 July the People's Assembly nominated Mubarak for a second term. In his acceptance speech, Mubarak readily concurred that his first term had been "one of action and fulfillment, progress and achievement. More has been accomplished in six years than had been done in decades." He then pledged to "complete traversing the road" by adhering to "democracy and the rule of law" and by using the "noble religious values as a basis and advanced knowledge as a lighthouse."⁵²

The referendum took place on 5 October in a peaceful atmosphere. On the next day it was announced that 88.47% of those eligible to vote had done so. Of these, 95.08% approved the reelection of President Mubarak; 2.82% were against it, and the rest of the votes were invalid.⁵³

Mubarak, and the semi-official press, hailed the event as a remarkable democratic achievement. The opposition, in particular the NPUG and the Wafd, thought otherwise. "We have been plagued with dictatorship ever since the renewal of the presidency by referendum," said an article in *al-Wafd*. It continued:

A referendum on the presidency is abhorrent and the people reject it. The referendum has had no appeal, neither during the Mubarak regime nor in the

Sadat and 'Abd al-Nasir eras, for the simple reason that people feel that it is pointless to cast ballots. It would have served a purpose had there been a choice between two or more candidates.⁵⁴

Mubarak took the presidential oath on 12 October before the People's Assembly. On the same day 'Atif Sidqi's Government submitted its resignation. It was replaced, on the following day, by another government headed by Sidqi, which featured a few minor changes (see Table 1).

Another change effected at the beginning of Mubarak's second term was in the armed forces: Lt. Gen. Ibrahim al-'Urabi, the chief of staff since 1983, was replaced by Lt. Gen. Sayf al-Din Abu Shinaf.⁵⁵

ECONOMIC PRESSURES AND SOCIOPOLITICAL TENSIONS

THE ECONOMY: SHORT- AND LONG-TERM AILMENTS

The trend toward deterioration, very much in evidence since the beginning of the decade, remained a visible characteristic of Egypt's economy in 1987. It was reflected, above all, in the discouraging data revealed by a population census published early in the year. On the other hand, there were also positive developments: Egypt persuaded her creditors to improve the terms of debt repayments; and the government embarked on a new five-year plan to ameliorate the economic situation in the long term.

The results of the census, conducted in November 1986, were published in April. The Egyptian population had reached 50.45m., including 2.25m. working or living abroad — an increase of 11.5m. in 10 years. This meant an average growth rate of 2.8% annually — up from 2.31% a decade earlier. One outcome of this rapid growth was a relative expansion of the younger age groups — 34.1% were in the 0–12 years group, compared with 31.7% in 1976. Concomitantly, there was a relative decrease of the labor force, from 30% of the population in 1976 to 28.4% in 1986. Another trend revealed by the census was the continued exodus from the countryside to the urban centers. Cairo's population grew in the preceding decade by nearly 2m., from 8m. to 9.75m; together with neighboring Giza, whose population reached 3.85m., the Cairo megalopolis had come to comprise about a quarter of the country's population. The deteriorating housing situation was placed in sharp focus by the census: Egyptians lived in an average density of 1.5 persons to a room; and 300,000 young couples had been waiting a year or more for their own apartment.⁵⁶

The data provided by the census reflected a disheartening reality. It could quite safely be anticipated that, should the population continue to grow at the same rate, it would reach c. 70m. by the year 2000. A parallel increase in the gross national product was scarcely a realistic vision. Moreover, the fact that the population was growing younger could serve only to guarantee an uninterrupted high birthrate in the future. Evidently the government's efforts regarding family planning had produced very limited results. The chairman of the National Population Council put the blame on scanty resources and the people's traditional attitudes. "Even if we succeeded in forcing every couple in Egypt to have no more than two children," he said, "it would take some 60 years before population growth came to a halt."⁵⁷

Alongside these indicators of long-term problems, there were also signs of more immediate trouble. Economists reported a continuing slowdown in economic activity.

A survey published by the US Embassy in Cairo, for example, noted that real gross domestic product (GDP) fell by 1.5%–2% in 1986–87, after having increased an average of only about 3% in each of the previous two years.⁵⁸ These rates were considerably lower than both those reported by the government and those projected in the five-year plan. One characteristic of this stagnation was a serious drop in investment, which, according to government estimates, fell from 31% of GDP in 1981–82 to a mere 20% in 1985–86, and probably less in the following fiscal year.⁵⁹ Behind this severe crisis was the continuing decline in revenues from oil sales, remittances by Egyptians working abroad, and tourism, a decline that had become particularly steep since 1985 (cf. *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 345–46; *MECS* 1986, pp. 263–64). By 1987 it had placed the Egyptian economy in dire straits.

While groping for solutions that would alleviate Egypt's more basic problems, the country's economic leadership also had to seek ways of bailing the economy out of the immediate acute crisis. For nearly two years Egyptian officials had been negotiating with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) an agreement under which the fund would extend the country substantial financial resources (cf. *MECS* 1986, pp. 265–66). During the drawn-out negotiations, the government resisted IMF demands for far-reaching structural changes in the economy, in particular a request for harsh austerity measures and stiff reductions of food subsidies. By early 1987 an agreement was finally reached, and it was signed on 15 May. Egypt was to receive a loan of \$325m. over 18 months. The government, for its part, undertook to reduce the budget deficit, by raising prices for agricultural products and energy, limiting credit and collecting more taxes; and to reform its foreign currency regulations, by instituting a partially free market for foreign exchange.⁶⁰

The main benefit for Egypt in the IMF agreement was that it prepared the ground for a deal with her chief Western creditors, grouped in what was known as "the Paris Club." Of its foreign debt which totalled c. \$40 bn., Egypt owed c. \$23 bn. to Western European countries and c. \$9 bn. to the US.⁶¹ Armed with the IMF accord, Egypt now approached the Paris Club and asked it to reschedule about \$10 bn. of its civilian and military debts under improved conditions. On 22 May, an agreement was concluded whereby Egypt's debts were spread over a period of 10 years, with a five-year grace period.⁶²

The two agreements caused much relief in Cairo. Delighted, Mubarak referred to the accord with the IMF as "a certificate proclaiming to the entire world that the Egyptian economy is on the correct course."⁶³ But that course, correct or not, could hardly be anything but long and treacherous, as Mubarak and his aides knew very well. In order to benefit from the IMF pact, the government was forced to introduce painful measures, increasing the burden on the lower classes. Indeed, as early as June the price of sugar went up 8% to be followed by a wave of more price rises.⁶⁴ It thus seemed that the bill for economic recovery was being submitted to the country for immediate payment; recovery itself remained a matter for the distant — and unforeseeable — future.

Mubarak has been a firm believer in systematic planning as the only remedy for the country's economic ills. The first five-year plan under his presidency was completed in 1987, offering the regime an occasion to take pride in its economic performance. Senior officials quoted impressive, if somewhat dubious, figures attesting to the first plan's achievements in increasing production and the GDP and in expanding

investment. Such gains, Prime Minister Sidqi stated, confirmed the soundness of careful planning, just as they reflected "the Egyptian people's determination to continue along the road of economic reform."⁶⁵

Upon the completion of the plan in July, a second, more ambitious five-year plan was launched. Its designers hoped it would "generate a process of development" which would place the country on sound socioeconomic foundations "by the 21st century." The plan was designed to increase production by c. £E22.6 bn., to reach £E96.8 bn. by the end of the period, at an annual average rate of 5.5%. Investment was to amount to £E46.5 bn. (as against £E36.4 bn. officially reported in the first plan). The plan also undertook to create 2.1m. job opportunities; to increase wages by 30.7% over the five years; and to reduce the rate of population growth from 2.8% to 2.6% annually by 1992.⁶⁶ These were, no doubt, very ambitious goals; perhaps too ambitious for a country like Egypt, with its limited capabilities.

In 1982, upon launching the first five-year plan, Mubarak announced his decision "to remove the burden of suffering from the Egyptian people's shoulders within ten years.... We should do it in two stages," he stated, "namely, through two five-year plans" (cf. *MECS* 1982-83, p. 418). By the end of the first plan, it still seemed a largely open question whether the creation of solutions outpaced the accumulation of problems. Against such a background, the hope that within another five years "the burden of suffering" would be "removed from the Egyptian people's shoulders" appeared to be overly optimistic.

SOCIAL UNREST AND THE RISING TIDE OF TERRORISM

While the connection between economic plight and sociopolitical agitation in Egypt has not always been direct and readily visible, there could be little doubt that the extensive disquiet the country experienced in 1987 was largely a result of its material distress. A harsh present and a seemingly bleak future continued to drive more people into the circles of the discontented who sought, often impatiently, a route to an alternative reality. Islamic fundamentalism was an increasingly popular route, and in 1987 there was a marked intensification of its assertiveness. A new torrent of Muslim-Coptic clashes; a persistent tide of unrest on university campuses, where fundamentalist students were the chief activists; a mighty wave of terrorist acts by Muslim radicals; and a newly established Iranian connection, were all clear symptoms of extensive vexation. Violence also erupted through non-fundamentalist — i.e., leftist — channels. Such cases, though basically motivated by political rather than socioeconomic factors, comprised further evidence of broad dissatisfaction.

Sectarian clashes had broken out periodically in recent years, usually reflecting the growing frustration of Muslim radicals. In 1987, after several years of relative quiet in Muslim-Coptic relations, the sectarian front flared up again. As had often been the case in the past, it was rumors — mostly false — that fed tensions and prompted outbursts. Early in the year, it was rumored that Copts were secretly spraying Muslim women's veils with a chemical that made cross-shaped marks to appear on them. In another story, Coptic manufacturers of various goods were accused of provocatively marking crosses on their products.⁶⁷ The ground proved ready for a conflagration. In January a series of anti-Coptic demonstrations took place in Minya (245 km. south of Cairo), but due to firm police intervention it ended without a clash.⁶⁸ The events that occurred in March, however, were far graver: riots broke out in Minya, Bani Suwayf

and Sawhaj (all in Upper Egypt), then again in Sawhaj and in a village in the central Delta. A mosque and a church were set on fire (the former apparently by accident, the latter as an act of revenge), as were a number of houses and cars. Muslims and Copts confronted each other violently; one woman was killed, 11 policemen were wounded in clashes with the rioters, and more than 200 people, mostly Muslim radicals, were arrested. The governor of Sawhaj imposed a curfew on the city on 23 March.⁶⁹ Anti-Coptic demonstrations, somewhat less violent, also took place in Fayyum.⁷⁰ Violence broke out again in Minya and Asyut in September and October, where the sectarian arena was reported to have remained unquiet to the end of the year, and beyond.⁷¹

The magnitude and intensity of these events alarmed many, not least Mubarak himself, who, in a speech on 17 March, called upon all Egyptians "to stand against those who are behind the strife...Fomenting sectarian conflicts [might]...destroy the whole community."⁷² Cabinet ministers, the rector of al-Azhar, and leading writers and journalists strongly condemned the riots and expressed deep concern about their impact on national unity.⁷³ Some of them tended to blame "foreign hands" — as a matter of routine, these were identified as "imperialism and Zionism" — for plotting this "vicious blow upon our people."⁷⁴ Others, more realistic, ascribed the events to domestic factors. An ex-minister of the economy, Sultan Abu 'Ali, one of the many public figures interviewed on the issue, offered a thorough list of these factors, mentioning the economic crisis, the continuing decline in the standard of living, the inadequacy of existing political institutions, the absence of a credible and uncorrupt leadership, and the "still tribal nature" of the Upper Egyptian society as reasons that combined to produce the *fina* (sedition).⁷⁵

In the universities, too, disquiet prevailed. Students were as restive in 1987 as they had been during the previous three years. They held strikes and demonstrated on campuses throughout the country to protest against aspects of their own situation and governmental policies on national issues. Fundamentalist students were particularly active, demanding stricter adherence to Islamic values in educational and cultural activities. Some of these acts of protest developed into violent confrontations between students and campus guards, and scores of students were often arrested.⁷⁶ The elections for student unions, held in November, offered as always a source of tension between the students and the authorities. A massive wave of demonstrations swept many universities, lasting several weeks and involving clashes and arrests. As had been the case in recent years, representatives of fundamentalist groups emerged victorious in the polling on most campuses.⁷⁷

When they expressed their views on political issues, the students mostly protested against the policies of Israel and the US in the region, and the government's policy of alliance with them. On 2 November, "large masses" of students at 'Ayn Shams reportedly demonstrated on the 70th anniversary of the Balfour Declaration, burning Israeli and US flags and condemning "the Zionist presence in Egypt and US interference in the Arab region." In December, campuses throughout the country became turbulent again as angry students gathered in anti-Israeli rallies to denounce "Israeli aggression" in the occupied territories and to express "solidarity with the oppressed Palestinians."⁷⁸

A wave of terrorist attacks swept the country around midyear. On the evening of 5 May, two gunmen seriously wounded former interior minister Hasan Abu Basha near

his Giza house. On 26 May, three US diplomats were slightly injured when shots were fired at their car as they were driving from their home to the embassy. On the evening of 3 June, an attempt was made on the life of Makram Muhammad Ahmad, editor-in-chief of *al-Musawwar*, as he was riding in a car in the heart of Cairo; Ahmad was slightly wounded. And on 13 August another former interior minister, Muhammad Nabawi Isma'il, was the target of an assassination attempt, from which he escaped unhurt. In all these cases the assailants opened fire from moving cars, hitting passersby.

The perpetrators in the first, third and fourth cases were believed to have come from radical Islamic groups, those involved in the second attack were thought to be members of a leftist terrorist organization calling itself the "Egyptian Revolution." Soon after the first attack the police launched a campaign of massive arrests among fundamentalists, especially members of the militant al-Jihad organization. About 500 men were detained, according to an official statement (the opposition spoke of up to 3,000 detainees).⁷⁹ By late August, the attackers of the two former ministers and Makram Muhammad Ahmad were discovered. They belonged to a newly founded fundamentalist organization calling itself the "Rescued from [Hell] Fire" (*al-najun min al-nar*), which, like many other similar groups, sought to replace the existing regime in Egypt by an "Islamic state" through terror and revolution.⁸⁰ Thirty-three members of this group were put on trial in November; the prosecutor demanded the death penalty for 15 of them and imprisonment with hard labor for the rest.⁸¹

The mystery surrounding the incidents prior to the unearthing of the group, and the details on its ideas and plans which came to light, captured public attention for a good many months. The general reaction, as articulated in published writings, was one of concern and indignation but hardly shock. The public had grown accustomed to, and had even come to expect, violent responses to the frustrations of Egyptian reality. By 1987, announcements concerning the exposure and arrest of militant fundamentalists had become matters of routine and could shock nobody. If there was a new twist to Islamic activities, it was in the Iranian connection of the movement, uncovered during the investigation. Beyond serving as a source of inspiration for some Egyptian radicals — several of those arrested admitted that they regarded Khomeyni's Islamic Republic as a model for emulation⁸² — Iran was actively engaged, through an official of its mission in Cairo, in supporting clandestine fundamentalist activities and in trying to establish an Iranian-controlled branch of Hizballah in Egypt.⁸³ When this was discovered, the government closed down the Iranian interests office in Cairo.⁸⁴

Nor was militant Islam the sole option available to the discontent. The "Egyptian Revolution" (which had claimed responsibility for the killing of two Israelis, in August 1985 and March 1986; see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 371, and *MECS* 1986, p. 283) acted in the name of "nationalist," "pan-Arab," and "Nasserite" principles, as it made known in leaflets left at the site of its attacks. It offered a different way, evidently to a different constituency. When the organization claimed responsibility for the May assault on the American diplomats,⁸⁵ there was a spate of reports and speculation in the Egyptian press on its identity, membership, and objectives. Rumors about extensive arrests of people known for their "Nasserite views" circulated abroad from early June;⁸⁶ and by late September, Arab newspapers outside Egypt began to carry reports on the exposure of the organization. It turned out to be very "Nasserite" indeed, for, as the reports indicated, one of its chief leaders was none other than 'Abd al-Nasir's own son, Khalid.⁸⁷ Puzzled, the authorities at first tried to deny the news. But the

reports persisted and spread. Eventually, it became known that the son of the late president had been allowed to leave the country quietly.⁸⁸ A dozen other members of the group were also exposed and arrested, and the authorities let it be believed that the organization had been dismantled. Other sources, however, hinted that the group, far from neutralized, was continuing to operate underground all over the country.⁸⁹

As the year drew to a close, the domestic front seemed to be returning to relative quiet — relative, that is, to the midyear turbulence. But few deluded themselves that the quiet was more than temporary. In many Upper Egyptian towns sectarian tension was palpable in the air. And frustrated university students, like many others, were paying more attention to the fundamentalist message. There was little doubt that, so long as the basic circumstances that encouraged these phenomena remained unchanged, further periods of internal friction and perhaps terror lay ahead for Egypt.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

EGYPT AND THE SUPERPOWERS

EGYPT AND THE UNITED STATES

Perhaps the most telling fact in Egyptian-US relations in 1987 was the repeated postponement of President Mubarak's planned visit to Washington. The visit, first scheduled for February, was eventually put off until the following year. This reflected the general atmosphere of disagreement, at times even tension, that dominated ties between the two states throughout the period. While Cairo continued to view its relations with the US as "special," and Washington's economic and military aid as indispensable, it gave ample expression to its growing discontent with the latter's policies and attitudes. Two central issues cast a heavy shadow on these relations in 1987: disagreement over repayment of Egypt's military debt to the US; and basic differences over the desirable strategy for the ME peace process.

Repayment of the military debt of c. \$4.5 bn. to Washington was becoming an unbearably heavy burden on the Egyptian budget, due to the high interest rates on the borrowed sums and to the country's continuing economic crisis. From mid-1986, Cairo had been negotiating with the American authorities possible changes in the repayment arrangements, the primary Egyptian demand being that Washington write off as much as one half of the interest on these debts (cf. *MECS* 1986, pp. 276–77). Reluctant to grant the demand, the US in January proposed instead that payment of half of the interest be suspended until after the expiry of the loan in the year 2009, when it would be paid at the same interest rate. Egyptian officials calculated that, by that time, interest on their loan would have added up to no less than \$18.5 bn.⁹⁰ This outraged the Egyptians: "It is unreasonable," said Ibrahim Nafi', editor-in-chief of *al-Ahram*, "that Egypt, a developing country that has to contend with such harsh circumstances, would be required to pay the US, the world's richest country...billions of dollars over and above what she owes her."⁹¹ Washington's attitude was all the more frustrating to Cairo since in mid-March the Soviet Union had agreed to meet most of Egypt's demands concerning the rescheduling of her debts to the USSR (see below). As one journalist bitterly noted, "At a time when our special friend [the US] has...chosen to give us the cold shoulder...those who are not bound to us by any

special ties [the Soviets] are extending helping hands to help us overcome the problem."⁹²

The Egyptian Government continued to pressure the Administration to show more flexibility and alleviate the burden. Cairo came forward with various suggestions, among them a proposed arrangement by which US and Arab commercial banks would loan Egypt money, at lower interest rates, to pay off some or all of its debts to Washington.⁹³ The US, however, remained disinclined to accept such proposals because, among other reasons, it feared that granting the Egyptian requests would open the door to a flood of similar demands from other foreign and domestic debtors. By the end of the year the problem had yet to be resolved, to the great dismay of the Egyptians.

The second bone of contention between Cairo and Washington was the question of an international conference as a part of the ME peace process. While Egypt firmly believed in the need to convene such a conference, and invested considerable diplomatic efforts to that end in the international and regional arenas (see below), the US was more skeptical about the practicability of the idea, and chose to proceed much more cautiously. While no longer insisting on direct negotiations between the potential partners to peace as the sole acceptable option, as it had done earlier, the Administration still held that an international conference would be a "futile venture" if it did not lead quickly to such negotiations (see essay on the ME peace process). Cairo was dismayed by what it saw as unnecessary and damaging procrastination on Washington's part. "The US could have a much more active role in convincing Israel of the need for the international conference," Mubarak complained.⁹⁴ Egypt, therefore, made it known "that setting a date for President Mubarak's visit to Washington [was] linked with a tangible change in US positions on the convocation of an international peace conference."⁹⁵

Beyond such differences, the governments of both countries continued to attach much importance to their basic friendship and mutual interests. "We do not turn our back on a friend who stands beside us," Mubarak stated in April, angrily refuting reports in the opposition press that Cairo was about to switch its global orientation from a pro-US stance to a pro-Soviet one. "Egypt does not see any benefit in such an alleged transformation, as it contradicts the stability that is the cornerstone of Egypt's efforts."⁹⁶ One area that was not affected by the disagreements was military cooperation. In May, it became known that Washington had agreed to allow Egypt to produce the main US battle tank, the M-1A1, in a move that would transfer sensitive technology to the Egyptians.⁹⁷ And in August, another round of joint military exercises in the series codenamed "Bright Star" took place in the Western Desert, involving about 9,000 US troops and an equal number of Egyptian soldiers.⁹⁸

EGYPT AND THE SOVIET UNION

In marked contrast to Egyptian-American relations, Cairo's relations with Moscow in 1987 were characterized by constant improvement and an ever-friendlier atmosphere. The USSR did not have a "special" position similar to that which the US enjoyed in Egypt's foreign strategy, secured through large amounts of aid. Yet in 1987, Soviet efforts to show understanding for Cairo's needs and to emphasize their community of views on central international and regional issues seemed to have earned the Soviet Union much credit in Egypt.

The pact to reschedule Egypt's debts to Moscow played a major part in setting the tone for cordial Egyptian-Soviet exchanges throughout the year. Estimated at "more than \$3 bn." (some sources put it as high as \$7.6 bn.),⁹⁹ the debt had been an obstacle to the promotion of bilateral relations. In March, an Egyptian delegation headed by Dr. Yusri Mustafa, the minister of economy and foreign trade, went to Moscow and signed an agreement according to which repayment of the debt would be spread over 25 years, with a six-year grace period. The Soviets also agreed to cancel the accumulated interest on that sum.¹⁰⁰ The accord was received with much satisfaction in Cairo: "The Soviet Union," ran an editorial in *al-Ahram*, "has furnished a practical proof of understanding Egypt's circumstances as well as Egypt's efforts to improve its people's standard of living."¹⁰¹ This spirit of "understanding" brought numerous Soviet missions and officials on frequent visits to Cairo. In February, the "Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Association," disbanded in 1981, resumed its activity with Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Butrus Butrus-Ghali as its new chairman.¹⁰² In April, Soviet Ambassador Gennady Zhuravlev announced that the two countries had decided to resume military cooperation, and that the USSR would supply spare parts for Soviet weapons in use in the Egyptian Army.¹⁰³ In October, two Soviet consulates that were closed down in 1981, in Alexandria and Port Said, were reopened.¹⁰⁴ And, in December, a Soviet economic delegation visited Cairo and the two countries signed a three-year trade protocol providing for a 100% rise in the volume of trade between them — from £E500m. in 1987 to £E1 bn. in 1990.¹⁰⁵ In the same month Egypt also announced its decision to increase the exchange rate of the accounting unit through which it conducted its trade transactions with the USSR,¹⁰⁶ thereby removing another obstacle to cooperation between them (cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 278).

The centrality of the international conference issue on the ME agenda in 1987 provided another area of Egyptian-Soviet understanding. Both countries shared the conviction that convening a conference under the auspices of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council was the most effective way of proceeding towards a solution of the conflict. The Soviet Union expressed support for "Egypt and President Husni Mubarak's efforts to hold the international peace conference, restore the Palestinian people's legitimate rights and assure their representation at this conference."¹⁰⁷ Egypt, for its part, was "eager to see the Soviets attend" the conference.¹⁰⁸ And Butrus Butrus-Ghali went so far as to define the Egyptian-Soviet community of views on this issue as "the most important positive factor which has caused the improvement of political relations between our two states."¹⁰⁹

Cairo, however, was still somewhat cautious about these relations. Its intensive exchanges with the Soviets were readily interpreted by observers worldwide — and, more important, by officials in Washington — as signalling an Egyptian readiness to translate its disenchantment with the US into a change in its global orientation. Yet Cairo was far from ready, at this point, to give up its "special" ties with the US, with all the benefits entailed. Thus, in a year in which Mubarak refrained from traveling to Washington, he was also careful to avoid acceptance of a Soviet invitation in March¹¹⁰ to visit Moscow. Mubarak was no more explicit than when he stated that Egypt did "not swing or oscillate in its policies," and was not considering shifting its international loyalties¹¹¹ (see above).

EGYPT AND THE ARAB WORLD

EGYPT "RETURNS TO THE FOLD"

The protracted process of Egypt's "return to the Arab fold" culminated, in late 1987, in a dramatic move by a large group of Arab states to resume formal relations with Cairo. It had been an arduous process, painful to all concerned, above all to Egypt. Egypt's ostracism from the regional system, imposed on it by the Arab consensus following the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli peace agreement in 1979, had begun to erode shortly afterwards: most members of the fragmented Arab system had come to realize that boycotting the largest Arab state was detrimental to the system as a whole and to each of them individually. Eager to see "fraternal Egypt" back in its "normal place within the fold," yet reluctant to accept an Egypt at peace with Israel, Arab states moved, slowly and hesitantly, to normalize informal ties with Cairo while still boycotting it formally.

Egypt, for its part, exerted great efforts to facilitate the process: although refusing to give up its peace strategy, it displayed faithfulness to the all-Arab cause and a passionate readiness to defend Arab interests. Cairo had been demonstratively active in supporting the "Arab case," represented by Iraq, in the Gulf War; in backing the Palestinians in the exigencies of the early 1980s and later; and in seeking a political settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict that would be beneficial to the Arab side. It had also done much to cut to a minimum its ties with Israel.

Such Egyptian efforts, combined with a genuine Arab interest in rectifying the the outset of 1987, Egypt had come to enjoy good working relations with most Arab governments on every level but the formal. Between 1979 and the beginning of 1987 only two Arab states resumed full diplomatic relations with Egypt: Sudan, in 1981, and Jordan, in 1984. Other countries developed extensive cooperation and a cordial dialogue with Cairo, but stopped short of breaching the still-valid Arab consensus. By the outset of 1987, Egypt had come to enjoy good working relations with most Arab states; the few exceptions were members of the "rejectionist" group of states, once known as "the steadfastness front," which had ardently objected to any exchanges with a pro-Israeli Egypt — Syria, Libya, Algeria, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDYR).

The convention of the Islamic Conference Organization (ICO) summit in Kuwait, in January (see essays on inter-Arab relations and Islamic affairs), offered an opportunity for ample expression of the improvement in Egypt's regional standing. Mubarak, who attended and spoke at the conference, noted in his address "the warmth expressed toward Egypt and its role" by Arab leaders, which, he suggested, represented "a constant tie that has never been severed and a giving that has never stopped."¹² The Egyptian delegation was particularly active in the summit debates as well as behind the scenes, its presence and activities capturing the attention of other missions and outside observers alike. When Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad protested against Egypt's participation and criticized its policies (see below), he found himself isolated in a strongly pro-Egyptian atmosphere.¹³ "It is as if the Kuwait summit was convened especially for Egypt," one commentator remarked,¹⁴ reflecting a profound Egyptian satisfaction. The sense that Egypt was about to regain its old senior position in the regional system was echoed by other Arab media: "It is possible to say that the crisis in Egyptian-Arab relations is closer than ever to a solution" a Saudi daily

suggested. This was due to Cairo's "positive stand toward the most crucial Arab problems in recent years."¹¹⁵

Voices praising Egypt's loyalty to the Arab cause and calling for the restoration of its former inter-Arab status were sounded repeatedly in different corners of the Arab world. They expressed readiness to belittle, or altogether ignore, Cairo's commitment to the Camp David agreements. "The hope [that Egypt abandons peace with Israel] is incompatible with reality...the question is not whether Egypt wants to get rid of these agreements but rather whether she can do so," said a Kuwaiti newspaper.¹¹⁶ There was much faith in Egypt's ability to bail the Arab system out of its serious troubles.¹¹⁷ Consequently, Egypt had come to enjoy extensive Arab sympathy and support. By mid-1987 there was a general feeling that her return to the fold was only a question of time and an appropriate opportunity.

The opportunity came in early November, at the Arab League emergency summit in Amman, convened to discuss developments in the Gulf War (details in essay on inter-Arab relations). On the eve of the summit, it was widely rumored that the conference would decide to readmit Egypt into the league, or permit Arab states to renew their formal ties with Cairo bilaterally. Several Arab leaders reportedly planned to initiate such a move and had contacts on the matter. The Egyptian media contributed their share to the initiative, by reminding the league member states that the dangers facing the Arab world were of such magnitude that "the Arab body would not be able to stand without Egypt, its backbone." Hence the conference had better take "practical and effective decisions."¹¹⁸ Indeed, Gulf Cooperation Council states, potentially the chief victims of Iranian aggression, reportedly decided at their Jidda conference in September (see chapter on Kuwait) to renew their ties with Egypt if the Arab consensus failed to agree on this.¹¹⁹ Egypt's demographic and strategic weight thus seemed to be assets that could, under the circumstances, open for her the door back to the Arab world.

The Amman summit, which convened from 8–11 November, did not decide to readmit Egypt to the Arab League, nor did it discuss such a possibility, in view of strong objections from Syria and Libya. It did, however, adopt a resolution allowing Arab states to decide individually on restoring full relations with Cairo — an unusual resolution, since it deviated from the hitherto observed convention that all Arab League decisions be taken in consensus. "Confident that Arab national security would be fully attained only through comprehensive Arab solidarity...Arab leaders have decided that the diplomatic ties between each Arab League member state and Egypt are a matter of sovereignty, for every state to decide according to its respective constitution and laws."¹²⁰

The first to take advantage of the resolution was the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which moved to renew full diplomatic relations with Egypt on 11 November. It was followed by Iraq (13 November), Kuwait and Morocco (14 November), the Yemeni Arab Republic and Bahrain (16 November), Saudi Arabia and Mauritania (17 November), and Qatar (18 November). Tunisia — with a new leadership still in the process of consolidating its rule — upgraded its diplomatic ties with Cairo on 22 November by according its chief official the rank of ambassador, but without formally restoring diplomatic relations. On 16 November, the Palestine National Council (PNC) Speaker, 'Abd al-Hamid al-Sa'ih, went to Cairo and added the PLO's voice to those commanding the reacceptance of Egypt as "a return to the normal state

of affairs."¹²¹ Two weeks later, on 29 November, the Egyptian Government permitted the organization to reopen its office in Cairo, which had been closed seven months earlier (see below). By that time there were only five Arab League members without ambassadors in the Egyptian capital: Syria, Libya, Algeria, the PDRY, and Lebanon. By the end of 1987 these states still had only partial diplomatic ties with Egypt or none at all.

Cairo reacted to the summit resolutions and subsequent developments with satisfaction, though not with as much joy as might have been expected. A guarded government statement on 15 November — the first official reaction — expressed contentment with what it termed the "important step on the road leading to concord and détente. Egypt welcomes this step just as it welcomes any step that results in unifying ranks and eliminating resentment."¹²² The Egyptian press was more enthusiastic, and spoke of the summit decision as a "triumph for reason and good judgment,"¹²³ and of Arab resumption of relations with Cairo as evidence that they had come to realize that "without Egypt restored to its leader's role...any talk of transcending the gap between dreams and their realization would be little more than make-believe."¹²⁴

Yet an undertone of displeasure was also discernible in some of the statements, due to the feeling that the Arabs were prepared to appreciate Egypt's "national role" only when they needed Egypt's manpower and military backing. Thus, an editorial in *al-Ahram* made it a point to indicate that "the repeated call for reestablishing Egypt's role in the Arab world was not made in the streets of Egypt, but in the hearts of those Arab capitals which felt the heat of danger and found nobody except Egypt and its people ready to place themselves in the service of steadfastness and confrontation."¹²⁵ A senior Egyptian official was quoted as saying that Egypt would carefully examine any future alliances with Arab states: "We are not mercenaries. No Egyptian troops will fight in return for financial aid or anything like that."¹²⁶

While Egypt's return to the fold was a gradual development enhanced above all by chronic Arab disunity, there was no doubt that the changes of November 1987 could be attributed to the more immediate Arab fears of Iran. This was implied in statements from the Arab capitals, which referred to the "machinations of evil and aggression menacing the very existence of the Arab world" and necessitating reintegration of Egypt in the system.¹²⁷ Under the circumstances, little importance was attached to the fact that an Israeli flag was flying in Cairo. It thus was a change in the order of priorities of the Arab world that facilitated Egypt's return in late 1987. Iran, rather than Israel, was now conceived as the chief threat to the Arabs; and on the country whose collaboration seemed indispensable, the "stain of Camp David" became all but invisible — at least for the time being. (See also essay on inter-Arab relations.)

BILATERAL RELATIONS

The country perhaps closest to Egypt both before and after the November developments was Jordan. Cairo and Amman held common views concerning the two main issues on the ME agenda: on the peace process they both agreed on the need to convene an international conference with PLO participation; they likewise shared the growing concern regarding the escalation of the Gulf War due to what they saw as persistent Iranian aggression against "fraternal Iraq" and her allies. This entailed frequent contacts to coordinate their positions. King Husayn visited Egypt in March,

May, September, October, and December, and Mubarak was in Amman in June and November. Husayn invested intensive diplomatic efforts in securing the Arab summit resolution readmitting Egypt, before and during the conference.¹²⁸ For that he won the praise of Mubarak, who hailed the king as "an Arab leader of very deep Arab belonging, capable of effective participation in closing up Arab ranks."¹²⁹

The two countries also shared many bilateral interests, which they coordinated through the Egyptian-Jordanian Higher Committee (cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 280). A large Egyptian delegation consisting of 10 ministers and headed by Prime Minister Sidqi went to Amman in May for the annual meeting of the committee, at which cooperation in trade, industry, agriculture, energy, transportation, and culture was discussed.¹³⁰ A Jordanian delegation, consisting of seven cabinet ministers and other senior officials and headed by Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifa'i, went to Cairo in December for another session of the Committee.¹³¹ (See essay on inter-Arab relations.)

Iraq was another close ally of Egypt. Their friendship, solidified by a massive Egyptian military aid from which they both benefited, if in different ways, was bound to grow closer as the Gulf War escalated and Iraq's needs grew more urgent. Cairo continued to deliver to Iraq large quantities of weapons and ammunition, including missiles, helicopters, tanks, and armored cars. Egyptian military experts were sent to the Iraqi battlefield, and to train Iraqi pilots and technicians.¹³² During the second half of 1987, as Egypt's return to the fold was palpably approaching, Cairo became more vocal about its support to Baghdad as a mark of its Arab loyalty. Out of this loyalty, said *al-Ahram*, Egypt was prepared to supply Iraq "even at the expense of Egypt's own strategic reserves."¹³³ Meanwhile, Cairo's relations with Iran, which had long been strained, were further exacerbated following the exposure of Iranian subversive acts in Egypt and the subsequent rupture of diplomatic ties (see above). This made it easier still for Cairo to express a loud and unequivocal pro-Iraqi stand. Egypt and Iraq also continued to develop bilateral cooperation in trade, economic, and educational projects. Not surprisingly, Iraq was among the countries that most eagerly sought a pro-Egyptian decision at the Amman Arab summit; within 48 hours of the summit's closing, Baghdad announced the official return of an Iraqi ambassador to Cairo.

Egypt's relations with Sudan, which since the April 1985 coup in Khartoum had been ambivalent, continued in 1987 to be characterized by cooperation coupled with declared fraternity, on the one hand, and disagreement, sometimes even tension, on the other. Basically, the leadership in both countries was most eager to preserve and develop their collaboration, designed to serve major common interests repeatedly acknowledged by spokesmen in Cairo and Khartoum. References to the "eternal bonds" and "blood ties" between "two twin sisters" appeared as a matter of course in public statements. Thus, Sudanese Prime Minister al-Sadiq al-Mahdi spoke of the feelings and interests which "have joined the...two fraternal countries since time immemorial and will last forever."¹³⁴ Mubarak reciprocated by stating that these relations were "free of any sensitivity and able to overcome anything."¹³⁵ As "Integration" between the two countries was running into difficulties (Khartoum was reluctant to adopt a major component of former President Numayri's policy; cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 282), al-Mahdi, who favored an institutionalized expression of mutual interests, proposed an alternative: a "Brotherhood Charter" (*mithaq al-ikha*), which "envisages cooperation between the two countries arising from the people,

rather than from the governments."¹³⁶ Al-Mahdi, heading a large delegation, traveled to Cairo in February for extensive talks on his proposal. During the visit, a joint Egyptian-Sudanese ministerial committee drafted a charter, and it was signed by the two prime ministers on 21 February.

The charter set out basic principles and common strategic interests. It defined various goals in the fields of economic relations, culture and education, information and youth, health services, communication and transport; and delineated the coordination of foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict, the Gulf War, the Lebanese crisis, and the problems of Chad and South Africa. It also provided for the formation of a joint higher committee, headed by the two prime ministers, which would work to realize these objectives.¹³⁷ In an address to the Sudanese Constituent Assembly upon returning from Cairo, al-Mahdi clarified the fact that the charter "should cancel previous agreements and institutions [i.e., those pertaining to the Integration plan] because of the new principles included in it."¹³⁸

In this "spirit of brotherhood," Cairo and Khartoum proceeded to expand their cooperation in various fields. High officials exchanged frequent visits, ending in mutual declarations of amity. Sudan was especially interested in obtaining Egyptian military support, in view of the deterioration in its southern provinces and Ethiopian assistance to the rebels (see chapter on Sudan). The Sudanese chief of staff, Fawzi Fadil, visited Cairo in April, where he was promised Egyptian support for the Sudanese Army "at Khartoum's request."¹³⁹ The two countries also sought to expand trade between them; in 1987 it reached a total of \$272m.¹⁴⁰

There were, however, areas of discord. The Sudanese Government continued to press for the extradition of the deposed president Numayri, who had found refuge in Cairo. This was a Sudanese "popular demand," according to al-Mahdi,¹⁴¹ a matter in which Cairo refused to cooperate. Al-Mahdi pledged to "strive to achieve this by all available means" and insisted that "the objective will eventually be achieved."¹⁴² A Sudanese attempt to secure the extradition through legal action failed in March, when a court in Cairo ruled that it had "no authority to hear the appeal" since "granting political asylum is an act of sovereignty."¹⁴³ The Sudanese Government, apparently in protest against this decision, made several ambiguous statements on its intention to abrogate its joint defense pact with Egypt, signed in 1976. Al-Mahdi's declaration, that "all agreements concluded with Egypt during the regime of the butcher Numayri are now null and void, following the conclusion of the Brotherhood charter," was interpreted by the official Sudanese News Agency as an actual revocation of the defense pact.¹⁴⁴ Cairo replied that it "will absolutely not object" to the retraction, as "Egypt did not impose this agreement" on Sudan. "If al-Sadiq al-Mahdi wishes to revoke this agreement, let him say so openly and officially. We will not hesitate to respond to such a demand."¹⁴⁵ Al-Mahdi, however, found it expedient not to dispel the ambiguity. Another uneasy point was Cairo's constantly improving relations with Ethiopia, the country which Khartoum accused of supporting the opposition in southern Sudan. Sudan may have preferred Egypt to openly join it in suppressing the revolt; but Cairo insisted that it was better to maintain good relations with Addis Ababa, so that it could mediate between Sudan and Ethiopia — an objective in which Egypt invested much effort and scored some success.¹⁴⁶ Yet another point of friction seems to have been Sudan's friendship with Libya (see chapter on Sudan) and the growing "Libyan, Iranian and Syrian presence in Khartoum" which, in the words of

one Egyptian journal, "might cause Egypt to think that this presence is, in whole or in part, directed against it."¹⁴⁷

Relations between Egypt and the Arab states of the Gulf were marked by considerable improvement in 1987. In the background were Egypt's pressing need for financial assistance and the Gulf states' growing fear of an increasingly aggressive Iran. Relations between these states (particularly Kuwait and the UAE) and Egypt had been amicable in recent years, even without formal diplomatic representation. During the ICO summit in January, Mubarak offered generous expressions of appreciation for the Kuwaiti leaders, who responded in kind. He also took advantage of his stay in the area to pay a visit to Abu Dhabi. Egypt let the Gulf states know they could count on it for support, militarily and otherwise. Before the Iranian missile attack on Kuwait in September (see essay on Iraqi-Iranian War), Mubarak reportedly notified leaders of the Gulf countries of Egypt's "readiness to intervene on their side" if necessary.¹⁴⁸

Following the Iranian assault, Cairo came out with a vocal pledge "to shoulder its pan-Arab responsibility towards its brothers in fraternal Kuwait." The escalation caused by the "aggression against a state which is not a party to the war and which has not committed any aggressive acts against other states," an Egyptian presidential statement read, had "reached a stage where it can no longer be tolerated or ignored."¹⁴⁹ The Egyptian media amplified the message, voicing strongly worded warnings to Iran.¹⁵⁰ It was broadly rumored that Egypt was considering sending weapons and even troops to Kuwait,¹⁵¹ or had already done so (this was denied by Mubarak).¹⁵² After the Amman summit and the renewal of formal ties between the Gulf states and Cairo, Egypt could openly lay the groundwork for a significant expansion of its military cooperation with these countries. There were intensive contacts between high-ranking Egyptian and Gulf military officials concerning the supply of Egyptian arms, including aircraft and missiles, and possible Egyptian participation in a contemplated "Arab deterrent force" in the area.¹⁵³ In mid-December, Egyptian Defense Minister 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala went to Kuwait, and the two countries signed an accord to "reinforce without limits the conditions of the military cooperation" between them. An Egyptian official was quoted as saying that there was "active military cooperation, and it is not only limited to Iraq and Kuwait."¹⁵⁴

There was another dimension to Cairo's efforts in this region. Egypt hoped to obtain massive financial support from the rich Gulf states, in the form of loans or as payment for military aid. Already in May it was rumored that three Gulf states had agreed to provide Egypt with a loan of \$750m.-\$1,000m., to help it pay its debts to Western countries.¹⁵⁵ In October, and again in December, there were reports of Kuwaiti and Saudi financial assistance to Egypt, and of a negotiated deal on troops-for-aid.¹⁵⁶ It was clear that the exigencies of the war, which were forcing Arab states to reassess regional relationships, also offered an opportunity for Egypt to benefit financially from the countries seeking to enlist its powerful military support.

Syria and Libya remained Egypt's unmistakable foes in the region, both because they headed the group of Arab "rejectionist" states firmly opposed to the Camp David strategy and because they openly supported Iran. For the latter, they were both strongly attacked by the Egyptian media, which depicted Syria's President Asad and Libya's Qadhafi as "the two avowed enemies of the Arab nation." It was "the Arab nation's foremost duty to turn against them and thus put an end to their crimes against

the Arab people," a Radio Cairo commentator said.¹⁵⁷ Mubarak, while noting that "the only feelings binding the Egyptian and Libyan peoples are those of cordiality and fraternal love," also complained of the Libyan regime's untrustworthiness: "Libya has frequently demanded that the radio campaigns between the two countries be stopped...However, the Libyan regime's radio only intensified its attacks against Egypt and resorted to uncivilized methods." On another occasion Mubarak put it in a more colorful way: "If the Libyan president extended his hand to me, I would do the same," he promised, "provided his hand is not full of explosives."¹⁵⁸ The Egyptian press used more explicit language: Qadhdhafi, stated one commentator, "represents a rejected phenomenon that has lost all justification for existence...Qadhdhafi's regime is a stigma to the Libyan people. It is a disgrace to the entire Arab homeland, and it is one's duty to wipe it out."¹⁵⁹ Tripoli, for its part, argued that it was not Libya alone but rather "the entire Arab nation, its rulers and its people, that loathed the Egyptians, because "the Zionist enemy continues to disgrace Egypt's territory and dignity within view and earshot of the capitulationist and submissive regime."¹⁶⁰ Cairo was also critical of Libya for its "voracious raids and campaigns" in Chad,¹⁶¹ with which Egypt had close relations. Egypt denounced Libya's "futile adventure" there, and called on the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to take action against Qadhdhafi.¹⁶² A specific source of contention was the defection of Libyan airmen flying three aircraft — a transport plane and two helicopters — to Egypt in early and late March and in July. The crews requested and were granted asylum in Egypt, whose government turned down Libyan demands for the return of the planes.¹⁶³

Relations with Syria were almost as strained. Syria tried, and failed, to prevent Egypt's participation in the ICO summit in Kuwait. In an apparently accidental meeting, Mubarak and Asad bumped into each other in a corridor of one of the conference halls, shook hands and exchanged a few polite words. Observers were quick to interpret this as a sign of a forthcoming thaw in Egyptian-Syrian relations. But then came a sharp attack on Egypt in Asad's address to the conference. Mubarak, in his speech, chose to ignore the assault, so as not to spoil the otherwise constructive atmosphere. Later the Egyptian media derided Asad's conduct, which led to Syria's isolation at the summit.¹⁶⁴ (See essay on inter-Arab relations.)

Unfriendly exchanges persisted in the following months. Damascus commended the organization that carried out the assault on American diplomats in Cairo in May (see above), describing the attackers as "heroes" and their act as "an extension of the Egyptian people's revolt against the capitulatory regime which opened Egypt's doors and land to everyone and mortgaged its destiny to world imperialism."¹⁶⁵ Cairo, for its part, condemned Syria's military "intervention" in Lebanon, and called on the Arab League, which had decided on the deployment of Syrian forces there 12 years earlier, to review its decision.¹⁶⁶ When Arab states moved to renew their relations with Egypt in November, Syria's reaction was precisely as expected: it insisted that there was no change in the circumstances that had dictated the all-Arab anti-Egyptian "national stand"; what had changed was "the stand of certain Arab rulers who had begun to unmask their true policies, and of others who were openly declaring their positions alongside the USA."¹⁶⁷

Egypt's relations with the PLO comprised in 1987 the vicissitudes typical of their dialogue in recent years. Tension and *rapprochement* alternated, above all due to the PLO's ambivalent attitude toward Cairo: while in need of Egyptian friendship and

support, the organization still found Cairo's commitment to the Camp David policy unforgivable. As for Egypt, it showed consistent loyalty to the Palestine cause. Cairo continued to invest efforts, diplomatic and otherwise, in trying to advance the political process to settle the Palestinian problem, making it a point, in every instance, to insist that the PLO be represented in future Arab-Israeli negotiations (see essay on the ME peace process). In March, during the siege of Palestinian camps in Lebanon (see chapter on Lebanon), Egypt responded to PLO requests for support with "quick, compelling and intensive" diplomatic activity, including a call for an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, in order to "bring an end to the ordeal of the Palestinians."¹⁶⁸

Cairo, however, was upset by "contradictory statements made by some of the Palestinian officials working with Yasir 'Arafat...that are not in line with Egypt's efforts on the Palestinian issue."¹⁶⁹ Such statements made Egyptian leaders concerned that the PNC, convening in Algiers in April, might adopt an anti-Egyptian resolution. Mubarak, therefore, warned the PNC that "any statement in its resolutions that damages Egypt or tries to come between the Egyptian people and their wishes will prompt Egypt to take the toughest conceivable measures" against the PLO.¹⁷⁰ Cairo's concern was not unfounded: on 26 April the PNC adopted a resolution revalidating a policy defined by the 16th PNC in 1983, limiting the organization's ties with Egypt to relations with the "popular and democratic forces" in the country (i.e., the opposition; see essay on the PLO, and cf. *MECS* 1982-83, p. 434). This provoked an extremely angry reaction among Egyptians, officials and others. Outraged, the Egyptian Government on 27 April announced the closure of all PLO offices and institutions in Egypt. For weeks afterward, the Egyptian press, both national and opposition, carried sharply worded attacks on the "ungrateful" PLO for its "disgraceful deal with the people's enemies" (referring to Syrian pressure on the organization to adopt the decision).

Yet — as was the case after the 1983 PNC — the two sides were careful not to let the crisis harm relations more than necessary. PLO officials kept visiting Cairo to meet with Egyptian leaders at regular intervals. As early as 8 May, Mubarak was prepared to assert that Cairo's "point of view on the PLO has not changed."¹⁷¹ This and other more friendly statements, were practically unavoidable as Egypt considered support for the PLO a major principle of its regional strategy. By July there were assessments that the PLO's offices in Cairo would be reopened "soon."¹⁷² That month, Mubarak and 'Arafat met in Addis Ababa during the OAU summit and held three working sessions, following which "Arafat described the PLO's differences with Cairo as a "family misunderstanding."¹⁷³ On 29 November, Egypt officially reversed its previous move and allowed the PLO to reopen its offices in the country.

EGYPT AND ISRAEL

Ten years after President Sadat's historic trip to Jerusalem, where he launched the Egyptian-Israeli peace process, peace was still uneasy and controversial — trapped, so to speak, in a minefield of difficulties and disappointments. On the formal level, it was meticulously preserved by both parties. But the atmosphere of their dialogue, mainly through the media, and the spirit of exchanges between Egyptian and Israeli officials, remained cool and often unpleasant. "Normalization," initially a central component of the peace, was limited to free passage between the two countries (used

almost exclusively by Israeli and foreign tourists) — and low-level agricultural and commercial cooperation. By and large, relations were dominated by mutual suspicion and disillusionment; expressions of estrangement were far more common than cordial words.

Egypt had its reasons for feeling bitter about its partner in peace. A decade after Sadat's initiative, and nine years after Camp David—where Egyptian-Israeli peace was explicitly linked to a broader regional political process and to progress on the Palestinian issue—Egypt was still isolated in its open dialogue with Israel, while the lot of the Palestinians was as bad as, if not worse than, before. Israel's attitude toward, and confrontation with, other Arab states and the Palestinians had on many occasions embarrassed Cairo and outraged the Egyptians. The return to power in Israel, in late 1986, of Yitzhak Shamir — a leader known for his "intransigence" — seemed to exacerbate matters. In addition, economic prosperity, which (perhaps unrealistically) had been expected to follow peace, was slow to materialize. Egypt was paying dearly for its ties with Israel, both in decline of its regional standing and, graver still, in a painful sense of disorientation, caused by the need to redefine a central part of the national belief-system. In exchange, many Egyptians felt, they were getting very little. Israel, too, had its grievances. The Israelis accused Egypt of being inattentive to their sensitivities, and of overlooking the fact that Israel was still on hostile terms with its other neighbors and the PLO, a fact that sometimes necessitated military action against them. Israel was also dismayed by what seemed to be Egyptian unreadiness to part with the old, distorted, thoroughly negative image of the Jewish State. To the overly cautious Israelis, every Egyptian critical reference to their country served to strengthen their mistrust; and in 1987 such references abounded.

Egyptian newspapers and periodicals were severely critical of Israel's policies and behavior. Egyptian writers and journalists resorted to language that was sometimes so hostile as to recall the darkest days of Egyptian anti-Israeli propaganda before the peace. Israel's basic traits as reflected in such Egyptian texts and cartoons were perfidy, guile, expansionism and aggressiveness. Israel was continuously assailed for its "uncooperative attitude" toward the peace process; for "brutal" treatment of the Palestinians; for "spying" and conducting "subversive activities" in Egypt; and for a variety of other evils, contemplated or committed, that were meant to harm Egypt, the Arabs, and Islam. Anti-Semitic motifs, implied as well as explicit, often appeared in these writings, although more so in the opposition press than in establishment publications. References favorable to Israel, which in the past had countered the critical voices to some degree, grew fewer and fewer, and by 1987 had all but disappeared.

Expressions of disenchantment with the peace were not limited to the press. On 13 January, in a closed forum of officials, Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Abu Ghazala reportedly described Israel as Egypt's "main and sole enemy, the peace agreement notwithstanding," and added that "if the Egyptian and Syrian military commands cooperate and coordinate their moves, they could together achieve a sweeping victory over Israel."¹⁷⁴ This stirred angry reactions in Israel, prompting Egyptian officials to deny the report.¹⁷⁵ On another, this time public, occasion, Abu Ghazala stated that "the [size of] the Egyptian force in Sinai is currently greater than its size during wartime, and [it] is capable of confronting any attack." This also elicited an Israeli protest.¹⁷⁶ Such utterances, even when disclaimed, reflected a loss of trust in the peace and the partner to peace.

The main bone of contention between Egypt and Israel in 1987 was the question of an international conference. While Cairo was firmly convinced that there was "no other alternative to the convocation of an international Middle East peace conference in the manner accepted by the entire international community,"¹⁷⁷ Israeli cooperation in this matter proved hard to enlist. The Israeli leadership was sharply divided between those strongly opposed to the idea, primarily Prime Minister Shamir and his Likud Party, and those in favor of it, chiefly Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres and the Labor Party (see chapter on Israel). In September 1986, when Peres was prime minister, he visited Egypt and committed himself (and the government) to work for the convocation of an international conference (see *MECS* 1986, p. 284). Peres remained an enthusiastic supporter of the idea. In February 1987 he went to Cairo, where he again agreed with his hosts on the need for joint efforts to convene the conference.¹⁷⁸ By then, however, Peres was no longer head of the government. And Prime Minister Shamir made it clear that he would disregard Peres's commitment, for he considered the idea too dangerous to Israel.

Throughout the period under review Israel presented a divided position, which was as anomalous as its National Unity Government. The premier and the vice premier worked separately to promote their respective, mutually exclusive, goals. Peres invested considerable efforts in advancing the conference idea, through negotiations with Egyptian officials and otherwise. He met with Mubarak in Geneva, in July, for a "frank and friendly" working session on the matter.¹⁷⁹ Two weeks later, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister 'Isma' Abd al-Majid came to Jerusalem and, in addition to meeting with Shamir, he also conferred with Peres, discussing ways of overcoming obstacles to the convocation of the conference.¹⁸⁰ Peres acknowledged that he had "no authority to agree to a conference" on the government's behalf, but insisted that he "could conduct negotiations on the matter." Shamir, he told an Egyptian interviewer, "is unable to prevent me from holding contacts and consultations."¹⁸¹ What Shamir could do, however, was to adhere doggedly to his opposition, and this was sufficient to invalidate the idea.

The phenomenon of a government talking with two voices was puzzling and frustrating to the Egyptians. "What is happening in Israel?" Mubarak asked in evident dismay. "In Alexandria last December [sic] I met with Israeli Foreign Minister Peres who told me he wanted the conference. Then Prime Minister Shamir blocked the idea. I cannot understand it!...[Shamir's] attitude is surprising and his position is totally wrong."¹⁸² Foreign Minister 'Abd al-Majid was similarly critical of Shamir: "Today there is a kind of international conviction that the solution is an international conference. It is not logical that the whole world is wrong and Shamir alone is right."¹⁸³

The Egyptian media were far more blatant in their criticism. An editorial in *al-Akhbar* suggested that "Shamir's obstinacy and solitary position to the widespread support for an international conference signifies his desire to perpetuate the grave situation in the Middle East....His concept...indicates that riots, tension and brutal acts of repression by Tel Aviv's forces will continue."¹⁸⁴ Another article, in *Akhbar al-Yawm*, tried to settle the confusion caused by the equivocal Israeli position: there is no difference between Shamir and Peres, the paper suggested, "they are two sides of the same useless coin." It appeared to the paper that "Prime Minister Shamir and Foreign Minister Peres have agreed to foil the convocation of the conference by

having the former reject it and the latter support it." This, the paper angrily remarked, "has become a bad joke."¹⁸⁵ Such views characterized Egyptian references to the matter until the end of 1987 and beyond.

Another point of tension between the two countries was the question of Egyptian compensation to the families of those killed in the October 1985 Ra's Burqa' incident (cf. *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 371–72). Egypt accepted responsibility for the death of the Israelis and acknowledged the principle of compensation, but insisted that the amount to be paid be decided by an Egyptian judicial tribunal — the standard mode of determining compensation in Egypt. The Israeli families involved rejected the tribunal formula, because they suspected that it would order the payment of a very low sum. They therefore demanded that the compensation be agreed upon in government-to-government negotiations. Cairo refused to budge; nor did a US appeal in this regard make it change its position.¹⁸⁶ The matter was not settled in 1987, remaining as a source of much Israeli indignation toward Egypt.

On 19 November, the 10th anniversary of Sadat's trip to Jerusalem, was broadly commemorated in Israel by political leaders, the media and various public institutions (most Israeli newspapers published special supplements to mark the event). Cairo, however, chose to play it down. Its ties with the Arab states were still fresh after the Amman summit. The government sent Dr. Mustafa Khalil, an ex-prime minister and a loyal supporter of peace with Israel, who was serving as NDP deputy chairman for foreign affairs (a relatively low position), to Israel to represent Egypt in ceremonies marking the anniversary. The Egyptian media, with the exception of the opposition press, made little reference to the event. The opposition publications used the occasion to carry out another forceful offensive against Israel and its "agents" in Egypt, above all Mustafa Khalil.¹⁸⁷ "The people in Egypt," explained Ahmad Baha al-Din, a leading Egyptian intellectual and journalist, "are not celebrating the 10th anniversary of President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem, for they feel that Sadat's initiative has lost its splendor." Israel was to blame for this, because of its slow withdrawal from Sinai, its invasion of Lebanon and its unacceptable conduct in the occupied territories. Consequently, "the Egyptian people remember Sadat's trip with mixed feelings: on the one hand they feel that Sadat took a courageous step which eventually led to the restoration of Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai. On the other, there is a sense that this is not the peace we had expected."¹⁸⁸

The outbreak of disturbances in the occupied territories in December, and the powerful encounter there between Palestinian residents and Israeli security forces (see essay on the occupied territories), once again pushed Egyptian-Israeli relations to a low ebb. The events of December, and subsequent months in 1988, highlighted the problematic aspects of Israel's peace with one Arab country while in a state of potential or actual confrontation with another Arab nation. The Egyptian reaction was just what one would have expected it to be: furious denunciation of Israel and unreserved solidarity with the rebelling Palestinians. During the first 10 days of unrest, Cairo issued four protests against Israel's handling of the situation. The fourth, on 19 December, was especially sharp. It stated that Mubarak and the Egyptian people were following the events "with the utmost concern and extreme indignation." In these events Israel was "practicing methods of suppression [and] ignoring the lives of women, children and the elderly." Such acts would not only "deepen hatred, aversion and vengeance," but would also "threaten the peace process

in the Middle East." Egypt, therefore, demanded that "this deteriorating situation be brought to an end immediately" and called for "immediate efforts to terminate the occupation."¹⁸⁹ A day later, the Israeli ambassador in Cairo, Moshe Sasson, was summoned to the Foreign Ministry, where he was told of Cairo's distress at what a fifth protest, which was read to him, termed "the brutal, oppressive measures taken by Israel." On that day the Egyptian minister of state for foreign affairs, Butrus Butrus-Ghali, said that Egyptian-Israeli relations were in a state "as delicate as during the Sabra and Shatila" episode¹⁹⁰ (referring to the Lebanese refugee camp massacre of September 1982; see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 464).

The reaction of the Egyptian media was, as always, markedly sharper. Writers resorted to emotional language in expressing their sympathy with the Palestinians and fury over Israel's tough measures in suppressing them. Israel was equated with the Nazis and its methods compared to those of the South African Government: it was barbaric, bloodthirsty, and murderous. Israel, it was argued, "hoped to solve the Palestinian problem by suppressing the Palestinian people," through "killing and blood massacres of schoolchildren and civilians." But it was destined to fail:

As for those who planned to consolidate the Zionist entity on the land by deluding themselves that the Palestinian national personality would disappear through deportation and extermination, oppression and collective massacre — all these methods, which are more horrible than those of the Nazis and Fascists — their hopes collapsed in the face of Palestinian determination to lead a legitimate national struggle....Many of the illusions which served Israel in imposing its control over the Gaza Strip and West Bank cities have drowned in a sea of blood of children and youngsters.¹⁹¹

The Egyptian reaction, both official and unofficial, was limited to the verbal sphere only. Egyptian-Israeli diplomatic relations remained unharmed, and there was no threat that they would be cut or limited. This was so apparently because of Mubarak's characteristic reluctance to adopt extreme or dramatic measures, and, more important, his conviction that peace with Israel, its painful shortcomings regardless, was vital to his country in face of the tremendous challenges lying ahead.

TABLE 1: 'ATIF SIDQI'S CABINET, 13 OCTOBER 1987¹⁹²

Prime Minister and Minister of International Cooperation	Dr. 'Atif Muhammad Najib Sidqi
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defense and War Production	Field Marshal Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister	Dr. Ahmad 'Ismat 'Abd al-Majid
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Planning	Dr. Kamal Ahmad al-Janzeni
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture and Land Reclamation	Dr. Yusuf Amin Wali
Minister of Insurance and Social Affairs	Dr. Amal 'Abd al-Rahim 'Uthman
Minister of Housing, Utilities and New Urban Communities	Hasballah Muhammad al-Kafrawi
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs	Dr. Butrus Butrus-Ghali
Minister of Transport, Communications and Maritime Transport	Sulayman Mutawali Sulayman
Minister of Electricity and Energy	Muhammad Mahir 'Uthman Abaza
Minister of State for War Production	Jamal al-Sayyid Ibrahim
Minister of State for People's Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs	Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid Radwan***
Minister of Information	Muhammad Safwat al-Sharif
Minister of Works and Water Resources	'Isam Radi 'Abd al-Hamid Radi**
Minister of Industry	Muhammad Mahmud 'Abd al-Wahhab
Minister of Oil and Mineral Resources	'Abd al-Hadi Muhammad Qandil
Minister of Cabinet Affairs and Minister of State for Administrative Development	Dr. 'Atif Muhammad 'Ubayd
Minister of Tourism and Civil Aviation	Fu'ad 'Abd al-Latif Sultan
Minister of Interior	Zaki Mustafa Badr
Minister of Supply and Internal Trade	Dr. Muhammad Jalal al-Din Abu al-Dhahab
Minister of State for Scientific Research	Dr. 'Adil 'Abd al-Hamid 'Izz
Minister of Health	Dr. Muhammad Raghib Duwaydar
Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade	Dr. Yusri 'Ali Mustafa
Minister for People's Assembly and Consultative Council Affairs	Dr. Ahmad Salama Muhammad**
Minister of Education	Dr. Ahmad Fathi Surur
Minister of Finance	Dr. Muhammad Ahmad al-Razzaz
Minister of <i>Awqaf</i> (Religious Trusts)	Dr. Muhammad 'Ali Mahjub
Minister of Manpower and Training	'Asim 'Abd al-Haqq Salih
Minister of Justice	Faruq Sayf al-Nasr*
Minister of State for International Cooperation	Dr. Maurice Makramallah*
Minister of State for Emigration and Egyptians Abroad	Dr. Fu'ad Iskandar*
Minister of Culture	Faruq Husni*

* New ministers.

** Reshuffled to another portfolio.

*** Died on 1 November 1987.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. R. Cairo, 12 February — SWB, 14 February; *JP*, 13 February 1987.
2. MENA, 4 February — DR, 5 February; *October*, 8 February 1987.
3. R. Cairo, 14 February — SWB, 16 February 1987.
4. *Al-Wafd*, 17, 24 May; *al-Ahali*, 20 May; *Sawt al-'Arab*, 21 May 1987.
5. Mubarak quoted by MENA, 15 February — DR, 17 February 1987.
6. NPUG leader Khalid Muhyi al-Din quoted by MENA, 4 February — DR, 5 February 1987.
7. *Al-Ahram*, 31 December 1986.
8. *Al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 24 February 1987.
9. KUNA, 24 February; *Sawt al-'Arab*, 29 March 1987.
10. MENA, 11 February — DR, 12 February; *al-Masa*, 18 March; *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, 4 May 1987.
11. *Al-Masa*, 8 February; MENA, 10, 11 February — DR, 13 February 1987.
12. *Al-Masa*, 9 February; MENA, 11, 13 February — DR, 13, 17 February 1987.
13. MENA, 6 April; R. Cairo, 9 April — DR, 10 April 1987.
14. Ibid.
15. *Al-Ahram*, 7 March 1987.
16. Muntaz Nassar, quoted by MENA, 5 February — DR, 6 February; Ibrahim Shukri's interview in *October*, 1 March; *al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 3 March 1987.
17. Zaki Badr's interview in *October*, 8 March 1987.
18. *Al-Ahram*, 23 February 1987.
19. *Al-Ahram*, 16 February 1987.
20. Yusuf Wali's interview in *Akhir Sa'a*, 11 March; see also Wali's interview in *al-Majalla*, 4–10 March 1987.
21. *Al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 17 March 1987.
22. *May*, 3 April; cf. also *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, 30 March 1987.
23. See e.g., *al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 24, 28 March, 6 April; *al-Wafd*, 10, 23 March, 5 April; *al-Ahali*, 1 April; *al-Ahram*, 6 April 1987.
24. E.g., *May*, 3 April; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 6 April 1987.
25. Quoted by AFP, 6 April — DR, 7 April 1987.
26. *Al-Ahram*, 6 April 1987.
27. *Al-Wafd*, 7, 8, 9 April 1987.
28. *Al-Ahali*, 8 April; R. Cairo, MENA, 6 April 1987.
29. R. Cairo, 9 April — DR, 10 April; AFP, 14 April — DR, 14 April 1987.
30. *Al-Masa*, 13 April 1987.
31. R. Cairo, 21 April — DR, 22 April 1987.
32. R. Cairo, 22 April 1987.
33. MENA, 10 April — DR, 13 April 1987.
34. *Al-Wafd*, 5 May 1987.
35. *Al-Wafd*, 7 April 1987.
36. Quoted by AFP, 6 April — DR, 7 April; see also *al-Masa*, 7 April 1987.
37. MENA, 6 April — DR, 7 April; Minister of Interior Badr, quoted by R. Cairo, 9 April — DR, 10 April 1987.
38. Quoted by R. Cairo, 9 April — DR, 10 April 1987.
39. R. Cairo, 7 April — DR, 8 April; see also *al-Ahram*, 10 April 1987.
40. *Al-Ahali*, 2 September 1987.
41. *Al-Ahali*, 29 July 1987.
42. *Al-Wafd*, 6 July 1987.
43. MENA, 6 July — DR, 7 July 1987.
44. E.g., *al-Akhbar*, 25 June; *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 27 June 1987.

45. MENA, 22 June — DR, 24 June; MENA, 5 October 1987.
46. Murad's interview in *al-Ahali*, 12 August 1987.
47. MENA, 29 June — DR, 29 June 1987.
48. Ibid.; MENA, 9 July 1987.
49. *Al-Akhbar*, 25 June 1987.
50. *Al-Ahram*, 26 June 1987.
51. Ibid.
52. R. Cairo, 6 July — DR, 7 July 1987.
53. R. Cairo, 6 October — DR, 7 October 1987.
54. *Al-Wafd*, 10 October 1987.
55. R. Cairo, 12 October — SWB, 14 October 1987.
56. *Al-Ahram*, 19 April; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 20 April 1987.
57. *Akhir Sa'a*, 27 May 1987.
58. Quoted by *FT*, 7 October 1987.
59. Quoted *ibid*.
60. *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 2 May; *al-Akhbar*, 3 May; R. Cairo, 11 May — SWB, 19 May; *FT*, 1HT, 12 May; MENA, 16 May, R. Cairo, 17 May — DR, 18 May; *WSJ*, 18 May 1987.
61. *Memo*, 24 April 1987.
62. *FT*, 23 May; a full text of the agreement in *al-Akhbar*, 24 May 1987.
63. R. Cairo, 17 May — DR, 18 May 1987.
64. *WSJ*, 3 June; *al-Wafd*, 21 June, 1 September; *Sawt al-'Arab*, 21 June 1987.
65. Deputy prime minister and minister of planning and cooperation, Kamal al-Janzuri, quoted in *al-Ahram*, 9 June; Prime Minister Sidqi, quoted in *al-Ahram*, 15 May 1987.
66. Janzuri's statement to the People's Assembly, 8 June, quoted in *al-Ahram*, 9 June 1987.
67. E.g., *al-Itihad*, 10 January; *al-Itisam*, March 1987. Cf. *al-Ahram*, 13 March 1987, where these rumors were disproved.
68. *Al-Itihad*, 10 January; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 14 January 1987.
69. *Al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 10 March; *al-Ahram*, 21 March; *NYT*, 22 March; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 24 March 1987.
70. *Al-Akhbar*, 10, 11 March; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 12 March 1987.
71. *Al-Ahram*, 26 October; *al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 27 October 1987.
72. Quoted by MENA, 17 March — DR, 18 March 1987.
73. *Al-Ahram*, 14, 15 March; *al-Watani*, 15, 22 March; *al-Akhbar*, 15, 30 March; al-Azhar Rector Jad al-Haqq's interview in *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 19 March 1987.
74. *Al-Ahali*, 4, 18 March; *al-Wafd*, 12 March; Jad al-Haqq's interview in *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 19 March 1987.
75. *Al-Akhbar*, 30 March 1987.
76. E.g., on 6 January in Zaqaq — MENA, 6 January — DR, 7 January; on 3 February in Hilwan — *al-Ahali*, 11 February; on 16 February in Sawhaj — *al-Musawwar*, 27 February; on 9 March in Fayyum — *al-Akhbar*, 11 March; on 4 April in Bani Suwayf — *al-Ahram*, 6 April; in late October and again in December in Alexandria — *al-Wafd*, 28 October, *al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 3 November; AFP, 10 December 1987.
77. *Al-Watan*, 10 November; *al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 25 November; *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 28 November; *al-Nur*, 2 December; AFP, 8 December 1987.
78. *Al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 3 November, 22, 26 December; *Sawt al-'Arab*, 27 December; *JP*, 31 December 1987.
79. MENA, quoting Zaki Badr, 7 June, 20 July — DR, 8 June, 21 July; *al-Wafd*, 8 May; *al-Sha'b*, Cairo, 19 May 1987.
80. For extensive surveys on the group, its structure and goals, see *al-Wafd*, 23 August; *al-Ahram*, 25, 30 August; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, *al-Akhbar*, 30 August; *Akhir Sa'a*, 2 September; *al-Siyasa*, 7 September 1987.
81. MENA, 15, 18 November — DR, 18, 19 November; for a detailed report see *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 16 November 1987.
82. E.g., *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 7 September 1987.
83. For details see *al-Wafd*, 6 April; *Akhir Sa'a*, 20 May; *al-Dustur*, London, 25 May, 7 September; *al-Tah'a al-'Arabiyya*, 1, 15 June; *al-Majalla*, 9 September 1987.
84. MENA, 13, 14 May — DR, 14, 15 May 1987.

85. VoL, 26 May — DR, 26 May 1987.
86. *Al-Khalij*, 1 June; *al-Ahali*, 2 June 1987.
87. *Al-Watan*, 22, 23 September; *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 24 September; *al-Dustur*, London, 26 October 1987.
88. *Al-Safir*, 28 November; *al-Shira'*, 30 November 1987.
89. According to *NAD*, 16 November 1987, some 2,000 organization members were still at large and active throughout the country.
90. Mubarak's interview in *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 19 January 1987.
91. *Al-Ahram*, 9 January; cf. also *al-Musawwar*, 27 February 1987.
92. *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 30 March 1987.
93. *WSJ*, 14 July; *al-Sayyad*, 28 August 1987.
94. Mubarak's interview in *La Repubblica*, 7 November — DR, 13 November 1987.
95. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 6 August 1987.
96. Mubarak's address to the People's Assembly, R. Cairo, 23 April — DR, 24 April 1987.
97. *FT*, 7 May; *IHT*, 30 June 1987.
98. *MENA*, 28 July; *The Guardian*, 14 August 1987.
99. *JP*, quoting AFP, 26 March; for other estimates see *MENA*, 23 March — DR, 24 March; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 30 March 1987.
100. *MENA*, 23 March — DR, 24 March; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 30 March 1987.
101. *Al-Ahram*, 31 March 1987.
102. R. Cairo, AFP, 5 February — DR, 6 February, SWB, 11 February; Tass, 13 February 1987.
103. *MENA*, 15 February; *al-Ahram*, 16 February 1987.
104. *MENA*, 25 October — SWB, 27 October; Tass, 28 October — DR, 30 October; *al-Ahram*.
105. *MENA*, 27, 29, 30 December — DR, 28, 30, 31 December; *FT*, 30 December 1987.
106. *MENA*, 5 December — DR, 7, 15 December 1987.
107. Deputy chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Arnold Ruutel, quoted by *MENA*, 15 June — SWB, 18 June 1987.
108. Assembly Speaker Rif'at al-Mahjub, quoted by *MENA*, 15 June — SWB, 18 June 1987.
109. Butrus-Ghali's interview in *al-Musawwar*, 18 February 1987.
110. *Al-Anba*, Kuwait, 1 April 1987.
111. Mubarak's address to the People's Assembly, R. Cairo, 23 April — DR, 24 April 1987.
112. Mubarak's speech, R. Cairo, 27 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
113. *Akhir Sa'a*, 28 January; *al-Musawwar*, 30 January; *October*, 1 February 1987.
114. *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 31 January 1987.
115. *Al-Jazira*, 1 February 1987.
116. *Al-Anba*, Kuwait, 30 March 1987.
117. E.g., *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 10 May 1987.
118. *Al-Ahram International*, 30 October 1987.
119. *'Uman*, quoted by R. Cairo, 14 September; *al-Yamama*, 14 October 1987.
120. R. Amman, 11 November 1987. For the full text of the summit resolutions, see appendix to essay on inter-Arab relations.
121. *MENA*, 16 November — DR, 16 November 1987.
122. *MENA*, 15 November — DR, 16 November 1987.
123. *Al-Akhbar*, 13 November 1987.
124. *Al-Ahram*, 11 November 1987.
125. *Al-Ahram*, 13 November 1987.
126. *NYT*, 15 November 1987.
127. Saudi Information Minister 'Ali Hasan Sha'ir, quoted by *The Times*, 18 November 1987.
128. *Al-Qabas*, 15 November 1987.
129. *MENA*, 17 November — DR, 17 November 1987.
130. *MENA*, R. Amman, 5 May; R. Cairo, 5 May — DR, 5 May 1987.
131. Rifa'i quoted by R. Amman, 3 December — DR, 4 December; *MENA*, 3 December 1987.
132. *Al-Majalla*, 28 January-3 February; *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 22 May, 11 June; *MENA*, 11 August 1987.
133. *Al-Ahram International*, 30 October 1987.

134. Quoted by MENA, 18 February — DR, 19 February 1987.
135. Quoted by R. Cairo, 19 February — DR, 20 February 1987.
136. Quoted by MENA, 18 February — DR, 19 February 1987.
137. Full text in MENA, 21 February — SWB, 23 February 1987.
138. SUNA, 24 February — SWB, 26 February 1987.
139. MENA, 20 April — DR, 21 April 1987.
140. *Al-Wafd*, 15 May 1987.
141. SUNA, 24 February — SWB, 26 February 1987.
142. Ibid.
143. MENA, 3 March — DR, 4 March 1987.
144. SUNA, 14 June — DR, 16 June; see also *al-Wafd*, 24 May, 13 August; *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 3 July; MENA, 5 July — DR, 6 July 1987.
145. MENA, 5, 9 July — DR, 6, 10 July 1987.
146. *Al-Musawwar*, 27 February, 3 April; MENA, 17 July, 1 December — DR, 17 July, 3 December 1987.
147. *Al-Musawwar*, 27 February 1987.
148. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 23 August 1987.
149. MENA, 22 October — SWB, 24 October 1987.
150. E.g., R. Cairo, VoA, 23, 24 October; *al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, *al-Akhbar*, 25 October 1987.
151. *Al-Ittihad*, 28 October; *al-Yawm al-Sabī*, 2 November 1987.
152. MENA, 3 November — DR, 3 November 1987.
153. MENA, 2, 3 December — DR, 3 December, SWB, 4 December; *al-Ittihad*, 10 December; *al-Mustaqbal*, 12 December; *al-Wafd*, 28 December 1987.
154. KUNA, 17 December — SWB, 18, 19 December; *IHT*, 26–27 December 1987.
155. *Al-Khalij*, 5 May 1987.
156. *Al-Ahali*, 28 October; *FT*, 29 October; *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 31 December 1987.
157. R. Cairo, 13 October; cf. *al-Wafd*, 22 January 1987.
158. Mubarak, quoted by MENA, 17 January, 8 September — SWB, 20 January, DR, 9 September 1987.
159. R. Cairo, 7 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
160. JANA, 1 August — DR, 3 August 1987.
161. *Al-Ahram*, 15 August; cf. also *ibid.*, 28 March; R. Cairo, 30 March — DR, 31 March 1987.
162. *Al-Akhbar*, 3 September 1987.
163. For details see R. Cairo, MENA, AFP, 3 March — DR, 3 March; MENA, 30 March, 16 July — DR, 31 March, 17 July; *al-Akhbar*, 6 April 1987.
164. For details see *Akhir Sa'a*, 28 January; *October*, 1 February 1987.
165. R. Damascus, 27 May — SWB, 29 May 1987.
166. *Al-Akhbar*, 25 February, 8 December; *al-Ahram*, 4 March 1987.
167. R. Damascus, 14 November — SWB, 16 November 1987.
168. MENA, 31 March, 2 April — DR, 1, 3 April 1987.
169. Information Minister Safwat al-Sharif, quoted by MENA, 1 April — DR, 2 April 1987.
170. *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 25 April 1987.
171. *Al-Musawwar*, 8 May 1987.
172. E.g., *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 20 July 1987.
173. MENA, 28 July — DR, 29 July 1987.
174. *Ha'aretz*, 29 January 1987. According to the paper's military commentator, excerpts from Abu Ghazala's speech were published by an Egyptian opposition newspaper, but the authorities hurried to confiscate some 40,000 copies of the issue.
175. *Al-Ahram*, 5 February; *Ha'aretz*, 6 February, quoting the Egyptian ambassador in Israel.
176. MENA, 17 August; *al-Wafd*, 20 August 1987.
177. Mubarak's address to the People's Assembly, *al-Akhbar*, 13 October 1987.
178. Vol. 27 February — SWB, 28 February 1987.
179. Interviews with Mubarak and Peres, R. Cairo, MENA, Vol. 9 July — SWB, 11 July 1987.
180. *Ma'ariv*, *Ha'aretz*, 21 July 1987.
181. Peres's interview in *al-Akhbar*, 30 June 1987.
182. Mubarak's interview in *La Repubblica*, 7 November — DR, 13 November 1987.
183. 'Abd al-Majid's interview in *al-Tadamun*, 10–16 October 1987.

184. *Al-Akhbar*, 25 November 1987.
185. *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 15 August 1987.
186. *JP*, 26, 28 October 1987.
187. E.g., *Sawt al-'Arab*, 22 November 1987.
188. Baha al-Din's interview in *Davar*, 20 November. Baha al-Din reproduced the parts of his interview that were critical of Israel in an article in *al-Ahram*, 26 November 1987.
189. MENA, 19 December — SWB, 21 December 1987.
190. *JP*, 21 December 1987.
191. *Al-Akhbar*, 16 December; *al-Ahram*, 20 December 1987.
192. MENA, 13 October — SWB, 15 October 1987.

The Gulf States

DORE GOLD

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

For the six states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), an even more threatening Iraqi-Iranian War in 1987 forced deep reconsideration of some of the most basic principles that had guided their collective foreign and defense policies since 1981. Certainly the most basic principle in the GCC's national security doctrine was "self-reliance." Because of the stress given to this doctrine, the GCC consensus rejected in the early 1980s Oman's advocacy of open military collaboration with the West (see *MECS* 1980–81, pp. 459–61, 463–64; 1981–82, pp. 481–82). Thus the Gulf states — with the exclusion of Oman and to a lesser extent Bahrain — resisted American efforts to establish a regional military infrastructure in the Arabian Peninsula in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Similarly, in a more regional context, the doctrine of self-reliance meant that the GCC officially did not seek to involve non-Gulf Arab powers in its subregional defense schemes; thus Jordanian readiness to assist in problems of Gulf security were not always well-received (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 390). When the Gulf states established their own rapid deployment force—which they came to call *dir' al-jazira* (Shield of the Peninsula)—no Western or non-Gulf Arab military contributions were involved (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 382–83).

But under the changing military conditions of the latter months of 1986 and especially 1987, "self-reliance" was shown to be a lofty ideological goal for a group of states most of which had enjoyed the formal external protection of Britain until the early 1970s. Even the "big brother" of the Gulf Six — Saudi Arabia — was hard put to stand alone against the Iranian threat. Despite the injection of American protection of 11 reflagged Kuwaiti tankers at sea and the growth of the Western naval presence in and around the Gulf in the course of 1987, the GCC states discovered that their new maritime umbrella did not deter Iranian provocations against Kuwait on land. As Iranian missiles from the occupied Faw peninsula pounded targets in and around Kuwaiti ports in September and October (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War), the GCC was also forced to take steps to protect Kuwaiti territory better as well. The need to reinforce the GCC deterrent posture led to closer security collaboration with non-Gulf Arab powers, specifically with Jordan and Egypt. The growing Gulf state reliance on the latter had direct implications for inter-Arab diplomacy; Egypt's post-Camp David isolation was put to an end after the Amman summit of Arab leaders (see essay on inter-Arab relations) as each of the GCC states resumed formal diplomatic ties with Cairo (with the exception of Oman that had never severed ties with Egypt).

THE GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL INSTITUTIONS

The GCC Ministerial Council, consisting of the foreign ministers of the Gulf states, met frequently in regular and extraordinary sessions. On 7 January, the Ministerial Council convened in an extraordinary session to prepare GCC positions in advance of the Islamic summit in Kuwait (see essay on Islamic affairs). The council, on that occasion, affirmed the importance of holding the conference in Kuwait as planned (for Iranian threats against Kuwait on holding the conference see chapter on Iran, section on Kuwait, and essay on Islamic affairs).¹ The Gulf ministers reportedly also discussed recent developments in the Gulf War and the "camps war" in Lebanon (see chapter on Lebanon and essay on the PLO). The ministers also heard a report on recent low-level United Arab Emirates' (UAE) contacts with the under secretary for political affairs in the Iranian Foreign Ministry.²

The Ministerial Council was back in session on 17 February. Again the Islamic summit and the war of the camps were high on the agenda. Some consideration was given to economic matters, such as GCC-European Economic Community relations.³ In the aftermath of the meeting, local analysts were quoted as saying that the GCC states were reassessing their security policies after the revelation of US arms sales to Iran. Some of the new lines of thought included reduced security dependence on the US, a broadening of GCC diplomatic contacts with the USSR, and a continuation of limited accommodation toward Iran.⁴

In June, the GCC council met again for a regular session on the background of the impending US reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers (see essays on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and the US and the ME, and section on Kuwait). The session was held on 6-8 June in Jidda. In their final announcement, the GCC foreign ministers appeared to have endorsed Kuwait's decision to reflag part of its threatened tanker fleet:

The council reaffirmed its support with the State of Kuwait. It favors the measures taken by Kuwait to safeguard its security and stability and to secure its commercial and economic interests....The council appreciated the interest shown by the international community in securing navigation in the international waters of the Gulf.⁵

However, Oman and the UAE were said to have reservations about the Kuwaiti initiative.⁶ Among the GCC states, these two retained the closest relations with Iran. About a month prior to the June meeting, Oman's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Yusuf al-'Alawi visited Tehran for talks (see section on Oman). The conclusions of his discussions with his Iranian counterparts were planned to be raised at the Ministerial Council meeting.⁷

The Ministerial Council met again on 12-13 September in Jidda for a regular session. At the top of the agenda were the July disturbances involving Iranian pilgrims in Mecca (see chapters on Saudi Arabia and Iran, and essay on Islamic affairs) and the more recent *Silkworm* missile strikes on Kuwait launched from the Iranian-occupied Faw peninsula (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and section on Kuwait). The council's final statement denounced "the acts of anarchy and sedition carried out by the Iranians during the pilgrimage session and their desecration of the sanctity of the Holy Places."⁸ The council also denounced the recent attacks on Kuwait, though in this case it did not denounce Iran directly; the council repeated the GCC's traditional policy statement that aggression against any member country was considered

aggression against the GCC as a whole. Notably, it called on the international community "to shoulder its responsibilities to prevent any repetition of such aggression," despite the fact that the GCC never viewed the defense of the GCC states or their territorial waters — as distinct from international waters — as an international responsibility.⁹ The council also expressed its support for the UN secretary-general's efforts to implement Security Council Resolution 598; noting Iraq's positive attitude to the resolution, it called on Iran to accept it as well. No suggestion was made in the council's statement of a follow-up enforcement resolution calling for sanctions on Iran. The GCC foreign ministers took an almost identical position on the missile attacks against Kuwait and Resolution 598 when they met in joint session with GCC finance ministers on 24–25 October.¹⁰ One Western source explained that the UAE, Qatar, and Oman were behind the less-than-wholehearted condemnation of Iran that the GCC was issuing.¹¹ Apparently, Saudi Arabia had been unable to push as strong an anti-Iranian stand in the GCC as it wished.¹²

The high point of the various GCC ministerial meetings during 1987 was the annual GCC Supreme Council meeting of the rulers. The eighth GCC summit was held on 26 through 29 December in Riyadh. Many of the main lines of GCC policy developed throughout the year received a final stamp of approval at the summit. The Supreme Council's final statement (see Appendix 1) did not call for tough actions against Iran, such as UN sanctions, but held out the option of a more cooperative relationship. In fact the summit reportedly authorized more intense contacts with Iran, to be pursued partly through Syria.¹³

With the Palestinian uprising under way since 9 December in the Israeli-held West Bank and Gaza Strip (see essay on the West Bank and Gaza and chapter on Israel), the GCC summit devoted some attention to the Palestinian issue. It praised the uprising and called for the "rapid convening of an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN with the participation of all the concerned parties, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on [an] equal footing, and the permanent member states of the UN Security Council."¹⁴

Some progress was made at the summit in the areas of security coordination. A gulf security pact — based on increased coordination in internal security affairs — had eluded the GCC states for years, largely because of Kuwaiti objections (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 392).

At the 1987 Riyadh summit, the Supreme Council approved a "comprehensive security strategy" based on the work of the GCC interior ministers.¹⁵ Reportedly, traditional Kuwaiti reservations — particularly concerning the right of hot pursuit from one GCC state to another — were overcome.¹⁶ Increased defense cooperation was also discussed in terms of external threats, but few details were available. One issue that was reportedly discussed was increasing Egyptian involvement in issues of Gulf security; an Egyptian role in a joint Gulf arms industry was said to be on the Gulf leaders' agenda.¹⁷ The discussions over Egypt's possible contributions to Gulf security came in the wake of reported Egyptian offers of up to 15,000 troops to a joint Arab force to defend the Gulf states.¹⁸

Earlier in the year, the GCC states held their "Shield of the Peninsula III" joint exercises in the Sultanate of Oman. The participating units arrived in Oman on 17 March for two weeks of maneuvers.¹⁹

In sum, the growth of the Iranian threat in 1987 led to a fundamental revision of

GCC security concepts *vis-à-vis* the US and the Arab states. Whether these changes would endure even after Iranian military pressure abated in the future was not yet at all clear.

APPENDIX 1: FINAL STATEMENT OF THE EIGHTH GULF COOPERATION COUNCIL SUMMIT HELD IN RIYADH²⁰

In response to an invitation by King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, custodian of the two holy mosques, the eighth session of the GCC Supreme Council was convened, with God's aid in Riyadh from 26–29 December 1987. The meeting was attended by their majesties and highnesses: His Highness Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nahayyan, president of the UAE; His Highness Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman al-Khalifa, emir of the State of Bahrain; King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al Sa'ud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, custodian of the two holy mosques; His Majesty Sultan Qabus Ibn Sa'id, sultan of Oman; His Highness Shaykh Khalifa Ibn Hamad al-Thani, emir of the State of Qatar; His Highness Shaykh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-Sabah, emir of the State of Kuwait.

The Supreme Council reviewed the progress of cooperation between member countries in the political, security, military, economic, and social spheres. It also reviewed developments in the Iraqi-Iranian War; developments of the situation in the Gulf; and the developments of the Arab situation, the Palestine issue, and the problem of Lebanon.

On cooperation and coordination among member countries, the Supreme Council voiced its satisfaction at the stages accomplished in this context for the benefit and comfort of the citizens, and as an embodiment of the spirit for which the council was set up.

With regard to the situation in the Gulf region, the council studied the developments in the Iraqi-Iranian War, the tragedy experienced by the peoples of the two countries it represents, and the negative effects it has brought about, which are threatening the region.

The Supreme Council voiced its deep regret at this destructive war, and its great concern over its persistence and attempts to extend its sphere. The council also reviewed the international efforts which have been made to end this war. In this context, it commended UN Security Council Resolution 598, which was passed unanimously by member states on 20 July 1987. This resolution represents the will of the international community and was welcomed by international public opinion in view of its objective to stop the bloodshed and destruction.

The council stressed the resolution of the extraordinary Arab summit, convened in Amman last November, which expresses the united Arab stand *vis-à-vis* the Iraqi-Iranian War, to which the GCC member countries are committed. In this context, it expressed its appreciation of Iraq's positive position regarding UN Security Council Resolution 598, to the implementation of which it has given its unreserved consent.

The council noted with great regret Iran's procrastination regarding accepting the resolution and urged the international community, led by the Security Council, to shoulder its responsibility to adopt the necessary steps to implement Resolution 598 as soon as possible. The council expressed its hope that Iran will take an attitude responding to the will of the international community and to answer the appeal of the Islamic nation by ending the war, establishing peace, halting the bloodshed of Muslims, and conserving its energies in order to confront the enemies of the Islamic nation.

The council also discussed the dangerous escalation which is threatening the regional security and safety of the member states and international navigation, a matter which subjects the region to the dangers of international conflicts.

The council discussed the events in holy Mecca and the sedition which the Iranians aroused at the House of God; what the State of Kuwait has encountered — shelling by missiles and Iranian aggression against Kuwait's security and stability; the Iranian aggressions against the Embassies of the State of Kuwait and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in Tehran; the striking at oil tankers and commercial ships sailing from and to the ports of the GCC member states in Gulf waters; and what such aggressions represent in terms of violating international law and the UN Charter.

Out of its conviction for the necessity of keeping this region and its peoples free from the threat of war and establishing amity among its states, and out of its desire to keep the Gulf region free from international conflicts, the Supreme Council calls on Iran to adhere to the principles of good-neighbourliness and mutual respect in a manner that guarantees the reestablishment of security and stability in the region.

The Supreme Council reviewed the Arab situation and praised the outcome of the extraordinary Arab summit which was held in Amman in the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan last November. It praised the bolstering of Arab solidarity and the adoption of the latter as the basic foundation of joint Arab action which aims at the embodiment of a unified Arab stance. The council reaffirmed its resolve to bolster the effective Arab solidarity, to work to avoid anything that may obstruct the Arab march, and to confront all the challenges which may be encountered by this march.

The council also stressed the necessity of settling all Arab differences within a framework of brotherhood and understanding by way of constructive dialogue in order to preserve the unity of rank and in an endeavor to mobilize the entire Arab energies and capabilities in the service of the main battle the Arab nation is waging at this critical stage of its history.

The Supreme Council discussed the development of the Palestinian question and the situation resulting from the continuation of the Israeli occupation of Arab territories in light of the resolutions of the Arab summit conferences. In this regard the council praised the Palestinian popular uprising in the occupied territories against the enemy, its settlement plans, and its continued violations of the sanctity of the holy places in Palestine. The council also denounced the oppressive and tyrannical measures the enemy practices against the Palestinian people inside the occupied territories. The council noted with admiration that the brave

resistance and firm steadfastness, which is being displayed by the Palestinian people who are under occupation, are categorical proof of the rejection by this struggling Arab people of the policy of *fait accompli* which the Zionist enemy is trying to impose, and of this people's firm and lawful commitment to their self-determination, preserving their pan-Arab personality, and exercising their national rights over their land and soil.

The council affirmed its support and backing to this uprising using all the resources available, and entrusted the chairmanship to send messages to the permanent member states in the Security Council with regard to this issue regarding the importance of these events, which constitute an important development and a change in character in the history of the Palestinian people's struggle. In this respect, the council praised the latest resolution of the Security Council on the issue and called on the international community to shoulder its responsibility in order to face this situation. The council considered that this uprising constitutes a new reality which necessitates the rapid convening of an international peace conference under the auspices of the UN and with the participation of all the concerned parties, including the PLO, the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, on equal footing, and the permanent member states of the UN Security Council. The council considers that this is the only appropriate means for a peaceful, urgent, and comprehensive solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict.

The Supreme Council attached particular importance to the situation in fraternal Lebanon and expressed its pain with regard to the sufferings of the fraternal Lebanese people as a result of this regrettable situation. The council called on the Lebanese leaders and people to place the interest of Lebanon and the supreme Arab interest above any other considerations and to make sincere efforts in order to emerge from this bloody ordeal and reach an urgent solution which would achieve for fraternal Lebanon its security, stability, the integrity of its territories, and its sovereignty. The council, while affirming its stance with Lebanon in its ordeal, called on the international community to supply quickly the necessary human aid the Lebanese people need.

Regarding spheres of cooperation, the Supreme Council approved the comprehensive security strategy submitted by the interior ministers. It voiced its satisfaction at the cooperation achieved in the security sphere, and stressed the need to adopt more advanced steps in order to protect the gains realized by its member states along the march of security cooperation.

The Supreme Council also approved the recommendations of the defense ministers with regard to military cooperation, stressing the importance of the member states' buildup in order to bolster defense capabilities within the framework of coordination and integration, in a way that would fulfill the requirements of security and stability.

The Supreme Council studied the progress in implementing a unified economic agreement in light of the plan approved by the Ministerial Council in conformity with the resolution of the Supreme Council's sixth session. It voiced its satisfaction at the steps accomplished to implement the unified economic agreement and stressed the need to continue implementing its remaining clauses. It approved the granting of permission to citizens of the council member countries to carry out a number of economic activities in new spheres in the member countries, in accordance with the constraints on the practice of economic activities approved by the Supreme Council at this session.

The council also ratified [the decision] allowing citizens of the council member states to practice additional private professions, in accordance with the codes of practice of citizens of the member states.

The Supreme Council also ratified the gasoline lending system among the member states.

With regard to negotiations with states and international economic groups, the Supreme Council delegated the Ministerial Council to begin official negotiations with the European Community, in accordance with the recommendations submitted to it from the Ministerial Council.

In order to deepen the bonds among the citizens of the council member states, the Supreme Council approved the cultural development plan and the equalization of students in the member states' higher educational establishments.

With regard to the spheres of coordination, the council looked into the oil situation and the latest development in the international markets. It stressed the necessity of maintaining market stability and the obligation of all Opec member states to abide by the agreed prices and to stop granting direct and indirect reductions. The council also reaffirmed its support for the efforts of Opec and the commitment of the member states to implement production quotas according to their latest agreements, which aim at fixing prices at \$18 per barrel with regard to benchmark oil.

The council urged all gasoline exporting states outside Opec to cooperate in order to achieve the desired stabilization of the world market by reducing surplus production which exceeds the actual demand in the market.

The Supreme Council examined the situation of trade exchange among the various countries of the world and expressed its concern over the protectionist policies, in particular those which Japan intends to apply with regard to the imposition of duties and taxes on its imports of crude oil and gasoline products. This policy impedes the freedom of international trade, hampers trade exchange, and reduces its volume among the various countries of the world, especially between the developing and industrial states.

The council urged the international community, especially the industrial states, to do away with protectionist measures and to adopt a more open commercial policy, particularly toward the developing states, including Opec states.

The Supreme Council decided to entrust Mr. 'Abdallah Bishara, the incumbent secretary-general, to continue his work until the council decides on this matter at its next session in accordance with the statute.

The Supreme Council expressed its profound appreciation and gratitude to King Fahd Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Sa'ud of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, custodian of the two holy mosques, and his government and people, for the generous hospitality and reception given to the leaders of the council member states and members of the participating delegations, and for the excellent organization, which played a noticeable role in the realization of the results which the Supreme Council reached.

The council looks forward to its next meeting, the ninth session, in the State of Bahrain in December 1988, at the kind invitation of His Highness Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman al-Khalifa, the emir of the State of Bahrain. Issued in Riyadh on 29 December 1987.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. KUNA, 6, 7 January — DR, 6, 8 January 1987.
2. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 12 January 1987.
3. KUNA, 17 February — DR, 18 February: SPA, 17 February — DR, 18 February 1987.
4. *CSM*, 27 February 1987.
5. SPA, 8 June — DR, 9 June 1987.
6. *IHT*, 16 June 1987.
7. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 22 May 1987.
8. R. Riyadh, 13 September — SWB, 15 September 1987.
9. *Ibid.*
10. SPA, 25 October — SWB, 27 October 1987.
11. *FT*, 27 October 1987.
12. *Ibid.*
13. *NYT*, 28 January 1988.
14. Riyadh TV, 29 December — DR, 30 December 1987.
15. *Ibid.*
16. *The Times*, 29 December 1987.
17. *The Guardian*, 29 December 1987.
18. *IHT*, 11 December 1987.
19. R. Muscat, 18 March — DR, 19 March 1987.
20. Riyadh TV (in Arabic), 29 December — DR, 30 December 1987.

Bahrain

UZI RABI

The way the Gulf War was impinging on regional nonbelligerent states exacerbated Bahraini fears, especially since its relations with Iran were deteriorating and it lacked adequate defenses. Bahrain accordingly sought to consolidate its ties with regional and international allies, and to improve its military capabilities. Under the circumstances, Bahrain welcomed the Saudi intermediary role through which its dispute with Qatar over Fasht al-Dibal island was apparently resolved.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

Concerns over Iranian-inspired subversive activity were revived by the attempted sabotage of an oil installation in December. Soon afterward, a cell comprising three Shi'i Muslims, two of them Bahraini citizens of Persian origin and the other an Iranian national, was uncovered by Bahrain's security forces.¹ The fact that one of the two Bahrainis was an employee of the state-owned Bahrain National Petroleum Company, served to underline the vulnerability of heavy industry on the island, where Shi'is constituted the majority of workers.² The arrests also pointed to the efficiency of the local intelligence service, manned by Jordanians and Pakistanis under the guidance of British experts.³ The cell was probably affiliated with Shi'i-oriented opposition groups, which posed the greatest danger to the regime. One of these was the Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain (IFLB), which was responsible for the December 1981 attempted coup initiated and financed by Iran (see *MECS* 1981-82, pp. 490-91). The IFLB was also known to have taken part in a conference of liberation movements held in Tehran in December 1987.⁴ Reports on behalf of this organization continued to be broadcast by Tehran radio, which emphasized Bahrain's links with the West by describing the violence used by Bahrain security forces in dispersing anti-American demonstrations.⁵

Other incidents, reported by opposition sources, were not mentioned by the Bahraini media; accordingly they could not be verified. Bahraini jails were reported to contain hundreds of political prisoners from various opposition groups. Eighteen Bahraini citizens were reportedly brought before the courts, and 15 were convicted for affiliation with the National Front for the Liberation of Bahrain.⁶

A security problem of a different kind was presented by the newly inaugurated causeway linking Bahrain with Saudi Arabia, which gave Shi'is free access to the island. Fearing repercussions after the Mecca incident in July (see essay on Islamic affairs), Bahraini security forces intensified precautions till after the Shi'i 'Ashura in September.⁷

THE ARMED FORCES

Motivated by a growing awareness of its own defense needs, Bahrain pursued a relatively high level of military development. A new air base, suitable for F-16 fighter jets, was built at Suman, in the southern part of the island.⁸ The F-16s, due to be delivered in 1990, were one of two major Bahraini-US arms deals; the other involved the purchase of shoulder-held *Stinger* missiles (see below). This apparently necessitated an expansion in the number of armed personnel and was probably connected with the reported Bahraini plan to form a local military reserve force in addition to its regular armed forces.⁹ Until that time, Bahrain, with a population of 420,000, had 2,800 men in its armed forces, mostly volunteers.¹⁰

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The repercussions of the previous year's recession, caused by the global drop in oil prices, continued to affect Bahraini economic activity. The damage caused by relying on crude oil as the prime source of revenue necessitated industrial diversification. Efforts were made to reduce the private sector's reliance on government expenditure and to boost investment. The minister of finance and national economy, Ibrahim 'Abd al-Karim Muhammad, announced the government's intention to allocate some \$2 bn. for capital projects in both the public and private sectors.¹¹

Effects of the recession were also discerned in the banking sector, considered to be a regional center for monetary activity. Apart from a general slowdown, which was only to be expected in times of financial difficulty, Bahraini banks faced an increasing number of loans that had to be written off, as well as bankruptcies. Borrowers attempted to evade rescheduling by appealing to Islamic Law, according to which interest is illegal.¹² The Bahraini Government also announced plans to attract foreign investment. For instance, in April, an agreement was signed with a company representing US investors.¹³ Moves to establish a stock exchange, which had begun the previous year, were pursued further with a decree in March that made it a legal entity, and another in November that announced the appointing of a board of directors.¹⁴

THE SAUDI-BAHRAINI CAUSEWAY

The economic consequences of the 25-km. causeway linking Bahrain and Saudi Arabia (see *MECS* 1986, section on Bahrain) were, on the whole, beneficial. Several segments of the Bahraini population profited from its existence. The tourism industry, for instance, was among the prime beneficiaries. With the opening of the causeway, a large number of Saudis, as well as Western expatriates working in Saudi Arabia, visited Bahrain.¹⁵ The cheaper and easier transportation enabled local companies to increase their exports to regional states. In the first half of 1987, Bahrain exported BD12m.-worth of commodities to other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states compared to BD15.5m. during the whole of 1986.¹⁶ However, Bahraini merchants suffered losses due to unfair competition with Saudi-subsidized retail goods, which were some 30% cheaper than their Bahraini equivalents.¹⁷

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REGIONAL POLITICS

Bahrain, like other Gulf states, felt threatened by the spillover effects of the Gulf War. Obstacles along the Gulf waterway seemed to have become a daily reality, severely damaging Bahrain's overseas commerce. Bahrain maintained a prudent stance toward the conflict, firmly advocating the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War).¹⁸ The superpowers' intervention probably allayed some of its concerns.

However, Bahrain's relatively subdued approach became more vocal in the second half of the year following several incidents initiated by Iran. Bahrain, with its majority Shi'i population, feared that the effects of the Mecca incident would harm its internal stability (see above). Moreover, the Iranian attacks on Kuwait in September and October (see section on Kuwait) further highlighted the danger that nonbelligerent states would be dragged into the Gulf War. These events served to push Bahrain into a more anti-Iranian stance, which was reflected in firm condemnations.¹⁹ Addressing the UN General Assembly in September, Bahrain's foreign minister, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Mubarak al-Khalifa, called for sanctions against Iran should the latter fail to comply with Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire.²⁰ Bahrain's attitude did not go unnoticed by Iran; it appeared that Bahrain was an overt supporter of Iran's foes. Commenting on the sale of *Stinger* missiles to Bahrain, Tehran Radio asserted ominously: "Regimes like Bahrain's are too small to remain optimistic about their future security under US support while they continue their policy of supporting US forces and helping the enemies of Islam."²¹

Iraq's cultural and information minister paid a visit to Bahrain in March and brought a message from President Saddam Husayn to the Bahraini ruler, Shaykh 'Isa Ibn Salman.²² An additional message was delivered by Iraq's first deputy premier, Taha Yasin Ramadan, during his October visit to Bahrain, presumably to coordinate positions before the Amman summit.²³

Bahrain maintained its close ties with other GCC states, mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, both known as pro-Iraqi. Throughout the year, high-level visits were exchanged between Bahraini officials and representatives of these two countries. Regional security problems were discussed during most visits. Bahraini-Saudi security ties were strengthened by the Saudi decision to finance a considerable part of the Bahraini purchase of US aircraft.²⁴ Bahrain expressed its total solidarity with Kuwait in light of the hostile Iranian activity against the latter. Bahrain also achieved reconciliation with Qatar regarding their dispute over Fasht al-Dibal island (for a full account of the dispute, see chapter on the Gulf states in *MECS* 1986; for details on the reconciliation, see section on Qatar).

Outside of the Gulf, Bahrain continued to maintain close ties with Arab moderate states, especially Egypt and Jordan. The renewal of full diplomatic relations with Egypt following the Amman summit was apparently a mere formality since close ties with both had been maintained all along. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak visited Bahrain in June on his way to Oman.²⁵ King Husayn headed a delegation to Bahrain in September as part of his regional tour before the November summit.²⁶ Bahraini support for the PLO was reaffirmed during visits by PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat to Bahrain in May and in October.²⁷

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Gulf war threats pushed Bahrain to further consolidate its ties with the US in terms of military coordination and arms procurement. Bahrain's anxiety about its lack of adequate defense equipment, and Washington's apparent wish to repair the damage done by the "Irangate" scandal (see essay on the US and the ME) led to the signing of two US-Bahraini arms deals.

In January, the US announced its intention to sell 12 F-16 fighter aircraft to Bahrain as part of a contract valued at \$400m. This was the first time that such sophisticated equipment had been offered to a Gulf state.²⁸ The deal was designed to come into effect in 1990. More controversial was the Bahraini request to be provided with 70 *Stinger* missiles. Approval was finally given after the Reagan Administration determined that the *Stinger* did not constitute a qualitative change in the military balance between Israel and the Arab states.²⁹ Bahrain, however, was compelled to accept US-dictated safeguards and store the missiles at separate sites.³⁰

Bahrain continued its substantial military and intelligence gathering coordination with the US, while attempting to keep these links as discreet as possible. The US Navy's Middle East Force headquarters continued to be based in Bahrain.³¹ Apart from providing logistical support, the base was used as a transit point for military personnel in the Gulf.³² Bahrain reportedly expanded harbor facilities to accommodate additional US warships, which were dispatched to the area to escort Kuwaiti vessels.³³ Several American officials visited Bahrain during the year. The most prominent visit was that of Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger in September, when the US reaffirmed its commitment to free navigation in the Gulf.³⁴

Britain was also considered a potential supplier of arms. The minister of state for defense procurement, Lord Trefgarne, paid a visit to Bahrain in March, reportedly to discuss the sale of *Tornado* aircraft in case the request for F-16s, then still under discussion in the US, was rejected.³⁵ The Bahraini heir apparent and minister of defense, Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Isa al-Khalifa, led a delegation to Britain in September and conferred with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and other high officials. They discussed bilateral relations and regional problems concerning the Gulf.³⁶

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *MM*, 25 January; *Khaleej Times*, 5 January 1988.
2. *MM*, 25 January; *Khaleej Times*, 7 January 1988.
3. *MM*, 5 January 1987.
4. *MM*, 25 January 1988.
5. R. Tehran, 14 August — DR, 14 August; R. Tehran, 13 October — SWB, 15 October 1987.
6. *Al-Nashra*, 11 May; *Iraq al-Ghad*, 8 December 1987.
7. *MM*, 31 August 1987.
8. *The Gulf States*, 30 June 1987.
9. *CR*: Bahrain, 2nd quarter, 1987; *The Gulf States*, 23 February 1987.
10. *The Gulf States*, 23 February 1987.
11. *CR*: Bahrain, 3rd quarter, 1987.

12. *FT*, 24 July 1987.
13. *CR*; Bahrain, 3rd quarter, 1987.
14. *JP*, 31 May; *FT*, 11 November 1987.
15. *CR*; Bahrain, 4th quarter; *Khaleej Times*, 27 November 1987.
16. *CR*; Bahrain, 1st quarter, 1988.
17. *MM*, 11 January 1988.
18. GNA, 21 October — DR, 21 October 1987.
19. GNA, 19 August, 6 September — DR, 20 August, 8 September; GNA, 21 October — SWB, 23 October 1987.
20. *CR*; Bahrain, 4th quarter, 1987.
21. R. Tehran, 14 December — SWB, 15 December 1987.
22. QNA, 24 March — DR, 25 March 1987.
23. INA, 28 October — DR, 30 October 1987.
24. *CR*; Bahrain, 2nd quarter, 1987.
25. MENA, 13 June 1987.
26. GNA, 1 October — DR, 1 October 1987.
27. GNA, 6 May, 20 October — DR, 7 May, 21 October 1987.
28. *WP*, 22 January 1987.
29. *WP*, 20 December; *MM*, 16 February 1988.
30. *IHT*, 19 December; *WP*, 20 December 1987.
31. USIS, 6 July 1987.
32. USIS, 6 September 1987.
33. USIS, 21 July 1987.
34. GNA, 27 September — DR, 28 September 1987.
35. *CR*; Bahrain, 2nd quarter, 1987.
36. *Khaleej Times*, 15 September 1987.

Kuwait

DORE GOLD

Since the outbreak of the Iraqi-Iranian War in September 1980, every succeeding year had proved to be more dangerous for the shaykhdom of Kuwait. On the internal front, domestic terrorism increased in frequency during 1987; it also now drew on support from Kuwaiti Shi'i citizens besides Iraqi and Lebanese Shi'is belonging to the foreign work force that had contributed to terrorism in previous years. Externally, there were no major changes on the southern front in the Gulf War since the Faw offensive of early 1986. Nevertheless, the introduction of a superpower umbrella at sea — in the form of the reflagging and convoying of Kuwaiti tankers by the US — directed Iranian pressures against Kuwait in other areas. Kuwait's oil terminals became subject to repeated Iranian missile attacks, bringing the shaykhdom even closer to being fully involved as a party in the war.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT AND CHANGING PATTERNS OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM

During the previous four years, Kuwait had found itself confronting a rising tide of domestic terrorist attacks that could usually be connected with the strategic goals of the Islamic Republic of Iran. In the year under review, the first occasion for such pro-Iranian violence was the Islamic summit in Kuwait on 26 January (for details see essay on Islamic affairs). Iran strongly objected to holding the conference in Kuwait; in a formal note to the conference secretary-general, Iran's foreign minister "expressed regret that stands adopted by Kuwait since it was selected as the venue of the fifth summit meet [*sic*] were indicative of that country's scheme to turn the meeting into a forum for Iraqi propaganda and political goals."¹ Ultimately, when the conference opened, only Iran and Afghanistan — whose membership in the Islamic Conference Organization had been suspended — did not attend.

Given the Iranian attitude, it was not surprising that a number of pro-Iranian organizations issued warnings against leaders attending the conference. On 12 January, the Islamic Revolutionary Organization (*al-haraka al-islamiyya al-thawriyya*) issued a threat in Beirut saying that it would turn Kuwait into a tomb because the conference sought to rehabilitate the leaders of Egypt, Morocco, and Jordan as well as support the Iraqi president's "crimes" (for details on the Islamic Revolutionary Organization, see *MECS* 1986, chapters on Iraq and Saudi Arabia, which deal with the hijacking of the Iraqi airliner that crashed in Saudi Arabia on 25 December 1986). Similarly, Islamic Jihad (*al-jihad al-islami*) issued a statement in Beirut on 16 January warning all Muslim leaders against attending the summit.²

Despite the extensive security measures taken by the Kuwaiti authorities during the month of January,³ terrorist attacks nonetheless occurred. First, on 19 January, explosions were reported at three Kuwaiti oil installations (for previous attacks on Kuwait's al-Ahmadi oil terminal see *MECS* 1986, pp. 303–4). One bomb caused substantial damage to the offshore oil loading platform at Sea Island; one of two berths was knocked out of service.⁴ None of the groups that had threatened Kuwait during January took responsibility; instead, an organization in Beirut calling itself “the Revolutionary Organization — Forces of the Prophet Muhammad in Kuwait” claimed credit for the attack. A far less significant explosion occurred on 24 January behind a police station; no damage or injuries were reported.

The most important development associated with the January terrorist attack on Kuwait's oil installations was the disclosure of the identities of the suspects arrested by the Kuwaiti authorities. Two of the eleven men initially arrested were from well-established Kuwaiti Shi'i families.⁵ Eventually a total of six Shi'i Kuwaitis came to be associated with the attacks, and they were sentenced to death in June.⁶ In past high-profile acts of subversion in Kuwait, foreign residents were usually involved. (After the 12 December 1983 car bomb attacks against the embassies of the US and France as well as other targets, mostly Iraqi and Lebanese Shi'is were arrested, although a few Kuwaiti Shi'is were also initially accused; see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 405, 406). Subsequent terrorist incidents usually involved foreign Shi'is or Jordanian nationals of Palestinian origin. The involvement in 1987 of Kuwaiti Shi'is whose ancestors had left Iran at the turn of the century raised the issue of the ultimate loyalty of Kuwait's substantial (25%) Shi'i citizenry. The potential danger of the terrorist cell that was captured in connection with the oil facility attacks was further underlined to the Kuwaiti populace when security authorities revealed on television the extensive arms caches that had also been seized.

Kuwaiti Shi'is came to be involved in other incidents. Twenty-five Shi'is were charged with violently impeding searchers for suspects connected with the January bomb attacks. On 22 May, there was another terrorist attack on Kuwait's oil installations. Police identified as their prime suspect Faysal Ahmad Karam Nayruz, a Kuwaiti Shi'i who worked for the Kuwait Oil Company.⁷ On 15 July, two Kuwaiti Shi'is were reported to have died when a car bomb they were setting up went off prematurely outside the Air France offices in the al-Salihiyya area.⁸ Attesting to the awkward position many Kuwaiti Shi'is felt themselves in, a relative of one of the deceased took out a front-page advertisement in several Kuwaiti newspapers reaffirming his support for the Kuwaiti people and the ruling al-Sabah family.⁹

The association of Kuwaiti Shi'i citizens with domestic violence tended to deepen the societal divisions between the Sunni and Shi'i communities. The distinction between Kuwaiti Shi'is and their coreligionists in the foreign worker community became blurred. The Kuwaiti authorities attempted to work against any tendency to brand the Shi'is as a pro-Iranian fifth column. In an interview with the editors of *al-Qabas*, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-Sabah, Kuwait's heir apparent and prime minister, stressed the need to maintain internal cohesion and simultaneously confront discrimination in Kuwaiti society: “We should not accuse an entire population if a small group is involved. We should not wrong the majority for the sins of a misguided minority.”¹⁰ Thus an increasing sensitivity to intercommunal tensions became evident during the period under review.

INCREASING INCIDENTS OF DISSENT AND SABOTAGE

At least a dozen acts of subversion or violent political dissent were reported in 1987. Some of the more notable incidents are listed below.

- * 19 January — Three explosions at Kuwait's offshore oil-loading platform.
- * 24 January — Explosion of a small bomb behind a police station.
- * 22 May — Explosion at natural gas storage tanks at the al-Ahmadi oil terminal.
- * 8 June — Eight Kuwaitis charged in the state security court with preparing, printing, and distributing leaflets calling for the violent overthrow of the Kuwaiti regime. All the suspects were Shi'is; one was an employee of the Education Ministry, while the rest were secondary school pupils.
- * 15 July — Two Kuwaiti Shi'is killed while preparing a car bomb near the Air France offices in the al-Salhiyya district.
- * 4 September — Sabotage suspected as cause of a fire that broke out at Kuwait University.
- * 24 October — Explosion at the seafront offices of Pan American Airways in downtown Kuwait. No casualties reported.
- * 3 November — Car bomb exploded in the Shamiyya area in downtown Kuwait near the Interior Ministry.
- * 5 December — Kuwait security court sentenced two Kuwaitis — at least one of them a Shi'i — to prison terms for distributing pamphlets calling for the overthrow of the Kuwaiti regime.¹¹

Several themes were repeated during the year by opposition elements that had associated themselves with the terrorist attacks. Some organizations called for the release of the 17 convicted for bomb attacks in December 1983, and protested against the death sentences handed down to those associated with the 1983 attacks, as well as the death sentences given to those involved in subsequent incidents. As of mid-1987, Shi'i terrorists who had been sentenced in 1983 and afterward had still not been executed.¹²

Another topic raised by opposition elements was the mass deportation of foreign workers in recent years. Security authorities reported that from January to November 1986, 26,898 foreigners had been deported.¹³ The Iraqi fundamentalist opposition movement, *al-Da'wa*, warned Kuwait against arresting Iraqi exiles in the shaykhdom.¹⁴ A third theme repeatedly discussed by subversive groups was Kuwait's increasing reliance on superpower protection, and particularly the reflagging of 11 Kuwaiti tankers by the US (see below). Radio Tehran reported a statement by an organization calling itself "Kuwaiti Hizballah" warning that Kuwait's request for a superpower presence in the Gulf and the "mounting wave of arrests in Kuwait" would lead to an "armed struggle waged by the country's Muslims against the ruling Kuwaiti regime."¹⁵

In sum, domestic instability in Kuwait grew in 1987 against a background of themes related to the Gulf War or to international Shi'i interests. No notable domestic violence was connected with the suspension of the Kuwaiti Parliament or the limitations placed at the same time on press freedom (see *MECS* 1986, p. 305). Kuwaiti Sunni fundamentalism was certainly not behind the upsurge in terrorism, though some extreme Sunni groups called for attacks on Kuwaiti Shi'i ideas.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

TOWARD INCREASING CONFRONTATION WITH IRAN: THE REFLAGGING OF KUWAITI TANKERS BY THE UNITED STATES

(For operational details of the US reflagging and escorting mission, see essays on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and the US and the ME; the following deals only with the Kuwaiti view of the operation and its immediate implications.)

At first glance, the very idea that Kuwait might seek American protection for a large part of its tanker fleet appeared to contradict fundamental principles of its foreign and defense policy. After all, since the mid-1960s Kuwait had carefully constructed a neutralist foreign policy. Moreover, within the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Kuwait had been a firm advocate of the principle that the defense of the Gulf was the responsibility of the littoral states alone. But a careful reconstruction of the decisions leading to the reflagging indicated that, at least initially, Kuwait had not abandoned its earlier policy orientation.

First, a central theme put forward by spokesmen during the period under review was that Kuwait did not seek to increase the military involvement of outside powers by leasing foreign tankers or reflagging Kuwaiti ones. In the words of Shaykh Sa'd, Kuwait was simply undertaking "a commercial action" with the external powers.¹⁶ Initially, in fact, the Kuwaiti Government did not turn to the US Government directly — instead, a low-key approach was made in December 1986 by the Kuwaiti Oil Tanker Company to the US Coast Guard requesting information about US reflagging procedures.¹⁷ The choice of this corporate channel to the US was consistent with the Kuwaiti view of the reflagging procedure as a chiefly commercial matter.

Second, Kuwait did not of course turn to the US alone, though Western observers frequently suggested that the Kuwaitis had approached the Soviet Union in order to get Washington involved. Shaykh Sa'd explained that his primary interest was getting the five permanent members of the UN Security Council involved in the protection of Kuwait's tanker traffic; the Security Council had condemned attacks on Gulf shipping through Resolution 553. Thus, by the early part of 1987, Kuwait had opened discussions not only with the US and the USSR, but also with Britain, France, and China on the subject of leasing or reflagging its tankers.¹⁸

Third, Kuwait did not initially appear to be interested in revising its balanced approach to the superpowers. In January, the US learned that out of a total fleet of 22 tankers, the Kuwaitis planned to reflag six ships with the US flag and five with the Soviet flag; thus an approximately even distribution between the superpowers was originally envisioned.¹⁹ Only after the US insisted on reflagging all the 11 ships in question, on 7 March, did the Kuwaiti approach begin to change. The Soviet Union had to be content with chartering three Russian tankers to the Kuwaiti fleet.²⁰

Fourth, Kuwait steadfastly opposed the granting of foreign bases or the assumption of responsibility for Gulf security by outside powers. As early as May 1984, when the tanker war got seriously under way, Kuwaiti officials, such as Foreign Minister Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir, were distinguishing between responsibility for the Gulf's international waters — which they viewed as an international matter — and the security of the Gulf itself (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 394). The involvement of outside powers in a specifically international dimension of gulf security — maritime shipping

rights — had started to become a legitimate proposition well before the reflagging proposals of early 1987.

Before the reflagging and convoy missions began, questions were raised about Kuwait's motives. One Western observer noted that of 93 ships hit in the tanker war from early 1984 until mid-1987, only eight were Kuwaiti. This became the basis of a theory that Kuwait did not so much seek the protection of its ships as the increased internationalization of the Iraqi-Iranian War to bring it to an early end.²¹ Kuwait's oil minister, Shaykh 'Ali Khalifa al-Sabah, vigorously disputed this view: "We did not go into reflagging because we wanted to internationalize the conflict, but because our oil production was cut by 40%–50% at one time. Before reflagging, 45 Kuwaiti tankers were attacked."²²

Much of the dispute over the extent to which Kuwait actually suffered from Iranian naval attacks hinged on the data examined by different observers. While the number of Kuwaiti-flag tankers struck by Iran since 1984 was indeed small, the number of merchant ships of all nationalities that served Kuwait's port and were struck was high. One source estimated that, of 52 vessels struck by Iran between September 1986 and July 1987, 34 were Kuwait-bound.²³ Thus Kuwait's maritime trade as a whole was greatly affected by Iranian attacks at sea. The Kuwaitis probably felt that, by acquiring American convoy protection for their 11 reflagged tankers, they might also deter attacks against non-US-flag shipping bound for Kuwait. But no public statements to this effect were reported during the year.

There were several significant implications of the reflagging and convoying mission that became apparent once it got under way. First, US military involvement in Kuwait itself increased, albeit incrementally. Shaykh Sa'd was firm about not granting the US bases in his country in mid-July, when the reflagging began: "I am sure the members of the US Government know our position, and they know that we are not ready to offer air or naval bases."²⁴ The Kuwaiti refusal to offer bases for US *Sea Stallion* mine-hunting helicopters delayed American mine-hunting activities until late July, when the amphibious assault ship, USS *Guadalcanal*, entered the Gulf to serve as a platform for the helicopters. But despite this sensitivity to foreign bases, Shaykh Sa'd did not rule out American access to Kuwait entirely: "If you want to know whether Kuwait will be able to offer certain facilities in other cases, this can be discussed later with Kuwaiti officials."²⁵

Initially, in June 1987, Kuwaiti cooperation with the US was confined to offering US naval units belonging to the Middle East Force (MIDEASTFOR; the token American naval group — normally numbering between three and five ships — that has been deployed in the Persian Gulf since 1949) in the Gulf, and the US carrier battle group — in the Arabian Sea — fuel on a commercial basis. Kuwait also offered to provide free fuel for those MIDEASTFOR vessels convoying reflagged tankers.²⁶ Later, in July, US military advisers were reportedly in Kuwait to assist in handling the mine threat posed by Iran in a deep-water channel leading to Kuwait's main oil terminal.²⁷ By December, however, Kuwait appeared to have relaxed some of its former reservations concerning an increased US military presence; its previous position, as noted, was not to object to a US presence in international waters but to insist that the defense of Kuwaiti territory and territorial waters was Kuwait's responsibility.²⁸ But as the year drew to an end, Kuwait appeared prepared to allow a US presence in its territorial waters in the form of a floating naval barge that

functioned as a base for US forces.²⁹ A slow but steady evolution had occurred in Kuwait's readiness to increase its security collaboration with the US.

A second implication of the US mission in the area was connected with its impact on the pattern of Iranian-Kuwaiti military confrontation in the Gulf War. Before the US became involved, Iranian pressure on Kuwait took the form of naval attacks against its shipping. With Kuwaiti tankers in the Gulf guarded by American naval units, Iran sought other means of applying pressure on Kuwait that would not necessarily entail a confrontation with the US. With the task of protecting tanker traffic divided in such a way as to give the US responsibility in international waters and Kuwait responsibility in Kuwaiti waters, it was no wonder that Iran began applying military pressure on Kuwait's port areas. This took the form, from September onward, of repeated *Silkworm* missile attacks close to Kuwait's oil terminals. On 22 October in the eighth such attack, an Iranian *Silkworm* struck the offshore Sea Island oil-loading platform that served the al-Ahmadi oil complex.³⁰ Estimates of damage varied, some claiming that Kuwait's petroleum export capability had been cut by one third.³¹ Repairs on the platform took weeks to complete. The Iranian attack came just after an American retaliatory strike against an Iranian oil platform for an earlier *Silkworm* attack on the US reflagged Kuwaiti tanker, *Sea Isle City*, within Kuwait's territorial waters (for details, see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Thus the net effect of having acquired a partial superpower umbrella at sea was to bring the Kuwaiti-Iranian confrontation far closer to land.

REGIONAL POLITICS

As Kuwait looked beyond the GCC framework to the superpowers to help deal with its security problems at sea, it also looked elsewhere in the region for allies to provide it with additional strategic backing against the threat on land. Its search for a regional strategic partner focused on Egypt; accordingly, Egypt's presence at the Islamic summit in Kuwait in January (for details, see essay on Islamic affairs) was hailed enthusiastically by Kuwaiti officials and newspapers. The prime minister, Shaykh Sa'd, expressed in January his appreciation of Egypt's role in regional political and military affairs, and said he looked forward anxiously to its return to the Arab community: "I hope it takes place today before tomorrow, or tomorrow before the day after; I even share your opinion that Egypt's return to the Arab ranks is now nearer than before."³² The Kuwaiti daily, *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, noted in an editorial the historically deep ties that bound Kuwait and Egypt: Egyptian leaders had founded the Kuwaiti educational system in the 1940s; its legal and technical specialists continued over the years to maintain a presence in Kuwait and throughout the Arab world despite the freeze in diplomatic relations.³³ However, the warmth expressed toward Egypt in various Kuwaiti circles did not imply an acceptance of the Camp David accords or the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. The daily *al-Qabas*, while praising the accomplishments of President Husni Mubarak's first Administration, called on him to make the eradication of the results of Camp David a goal of his second term in office.³⁴

In the aftermath of the Amman summit in November (see essay on inter-Arab relations), Kuwait and Egypt resumed full diplomatic relations on 14 November.³⁵ A high-level military delegation visited Kuwait shortly afterward.³⁶ Egyptian Defense Minister Muhammad 'Abd al-Halim Abu Ghazala arrived in Kuwait on 14 December.³⁷ Abu Ghazala's visit was accompanied by numerous reports of increasing

Egyptian involvement in Kuwait's air defense system as well as the arrival of Egyptian pilots to assist the Kuwaiti Air Force. (For further discussion of Kuwaiti-Egyptian relations, see chapter on Egypt.)

Kuwait pursued similarly close relations with Jordan, which had traditionally announced its readiness to help defend the Gulf states if asked to do so. King Husayn visited Kuwait in January, during the Islamic summit, and again on 30 September on the fourth leg of a tour of the Gulf states.³⁸ He paid another visit to Kuwait on 12 December.³⁹ Earlier in the year, Husayn reportedly requested that the Kuwaitis slow down their deportation of Palestinian workers back to Jordan.⁴⁰

Kuwait's relations with Syria had grown tense in previous years due to Syria's special relationship with Iran and Syrian actions against the Palestinians in Lebanon. Syria gave Kuwait support after the series of Iranian missile attacks against Kuwaiti ports in the fall; but the Syrians refused to condone the American military presence in the Gulf or American military action against Iran.⁴¹ There were reports that, prior to the Amman summit, Kuwait had threatened to cut all financial assistance to Damascus for the latter's support of Iran in the war.⁴²

GLOBAL POLITICS

(US-Kuwaiti relations are examined in the previous section. On the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers, see also essay on the US and the ME.)

Kuwaiti-Soviet relations at the beginning of the year appeared to be excellent. In the aftermath of the November 1986 revelations concerning the Iran-Contra affair (see essay on the US and the ME), US-Kuwaiti relations were weakened. Kuwait somewhat softened its position on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The English-language *Kuwait Times*, for example, supported the cease-fire call of pro-Soviet Afghan President Najibullah, but the cease-fire was rejected by the Afghan *Mujahidin*. The *Kuwait Times* was actually critical of the US for seeking to embroil the Soviets in a costly quagmire.⁴³ Kuwaiti-Soviet relations appeared to reach their high point on 14 April, when Soviet spokesman Gennady Gerasimov announced in Moscow that the USSR would rent Kuwait three tankers and that "the Soviet tankers can be escorted by warships if the Soviet side thinks it necessary."⁴⁴ Yet, by August, Soviet-Kuwaiti relations had deteriorated somewhat while the US had succeeded in placing itself as the predominant protecting power of Kuwaiti oil traffic. Moreover, after the passing of Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a halt in the Iraqi-Iranian War (see essay on the war), the Soviet Union appeared to be dragging its feet in supporting a follow-up enforcement resolution. Behind the Soviet reluctance to impose sanctions against Iran was the gradual improvement of Soviet-Iranian relations in response to the growth of the American naval presence in the Gulf (see chapter on Iran, and the essay on the Soviet Union and the ME). By mid-August, three Kuwaiti dailies were critical of the Soviet position. "The USSR," said *al-Anba*, "which has concluded important agreements with Iran and has appeased its regime at a time when its savageness has reached unbearable limits, is now placing itself in the position of being almost a friend of that aggressive state."⁴⁵ *Al-Siyasa* noted that "Moscow and China, as reported, do not wish to impose sanctions on Iran"; the paper warned that the attitude of the USSR would have its effect on Soviet-Arab friendship.⁴⁶ *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm* also noted reports of a new Soviet-Iranian oil pipeline and explained that with its establishment, Moscow would not support sanctions against Tehran.⁴⁷

Despite popular Kuwaiti suspicions concerning Moscow's Gulf policies, both sides nonetheless attempted to maintain a diplomatic dialogue. On 9 September the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, joined his Iraqi colleague in Moscow for talks on Soviet Gulf policy.⁴⁸ At the end of October, the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, Yuri Vorontsov, arrived in Kuwait to explain Soviet attitudes toward enforcement of Resolution 598. According to *al-Qabas*, the Soviet diplomat succeeded in calming Kuwaiti concerns about Soviet-Iranian relations.⁴⁹

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. SWB, 8 January 1987.
2. SWB, 14 January 1987.
3. *The Guardian*, 17 January 1987.
4. *NYT*, 1 February 1987.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *NYT*, 19 June 1987.
7. *Al-Qabas*, 10 June — DR, 11 June 1987.
8. KUNA, 15, 16 July — DR, 16, 17 July; *NYT*, 28 July 1987.
9. *NYT*, 28 July 1987.
10. *Al-Qabas*, 8 June — DR, 10 June 1987.
11. KUNA, 8 June, 25 July, 12 September — DR, 9 June, 27 July, 14 September; KUNA, 3 November, 5 December — SWB, 4 November; 8 December 1987.
12. *Al-Majalla*, 1-7 July — DR, 8 July; KUNA, 11 July — DR, 13 July 1987.
13. *NYT*, 21 March 1987.
14. AFP report from Beirut (undated) — DR, 20 November 1987.
15. R. Tehran, 29 April — SWB, 30 April 1987.
16. R. Kuwait, 20 July — DR, 21 July 1987.
17. Caspar W. Weinberger, *A Report to the Congress on Security Arrangements in the Persian Gulf*, 15 June 1987, p. 14.
18. R. Kuwait, 20 July — DR, 21 July 1987.
19. Weinberger, *op.cit.*, p. 14.
20. *Ibid.*
21. *NYT*, 4 June 1987.
22. *The Guardian*, 4 December 1987.
23. Aharon Levran, *The American Naval Involvement in the Persian Gulf* (Memorandum No. 21, January 1988) Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University, p. 4.
24. R. Kuwait, 20 July — DR, 21 July 1987.
25. *Ibid.*; *IHT*, 21 July 1987.
26. Weinberger, *op. cit.*, p. 20.
27. *Al-Majalla*, 8-14 July — DR, 13 July; *NYT*, 20 July 1987.
28. *Al-Majalla*, 8-14 July — DR, 15 July 1987.
29. *IHT*, 30 November; *FT*, 5 December 1987.
30. *The Times*, 4 December 1987.
31. *Ma'ariv*, 23 October 1987.
32. KUNA, 20 January — DR, 21 January 1987.
33. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 January — DR, 28 January 1987. For a review of the Egyptian role in the Arab League force that defended Kuwait from Iraqi encroachments immediately after its independence in 1961, see Y. Oron (ed.) *Middle East Record*, Volume Two (Jerusalem: Israel Universities Press, 1961) pp. 117-18.

34. *Al-Qabas International*, 21 March 1987.
35. R. Kuwait, 14 November — DR, 16 November 1987.
36. KUNA, 15 November — DR, 17 November 1987.
37. SWB, 15 December 1987.
38. R. Amman, 30 September — DR, 1 October 1987.
39. R. Amman, 12 December — DR, 14 December 1987.
40. *NYT*, 21 March 1987.
41. R. Damascus, 1 November 1987.
42. BBC, 3 November 1987.
43. KUNA, 4 January — DR, 5 January 1987.
44. *NYT*, 15 April 1987.
45. *Al-Anba*, Kuwait, 20 August — DR, 24 August 1987.
46. KUNA, 22 August — SWB, 25 August 1987.
47. Ibid.
48. *FT*, 9 September 1987.
49. *Al-Qabas*, 1 November 1987.

Oman

UZI RABI

During 1987, Oman concentrated on regional issues rather than domestic affairs. It succeeded in maintaining its neutral posture toward the Gulf War, steering a course between appeasement of Iran and conformity with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) policies. Following the establishment of full diplomatic relations with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), a similar development with Syria was expected. This was in line with the recent Omani policy to broaden its range of contacts in the Arab and international arenas.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITIES

There was a sharp decrease in subversive activity against Oman in 1987. Foreign sources and the opposition press, the prime sources of information for this kind of activity, carried very few reports. One such report, in June, noted that 39 members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman had been imprisoned by the Omani Government.¹ This relative calm could be largely attributed to the Omani *rapprochement* with the USSR and the PDRY, both former supporters of subversive operations against the sultanate.

CABINET CHANGES

A new defense portfolio — minister of state for defense — was established and given to Sayyid al-Mu'tasim Ibn Hamad al-Busa'id, who also served as the minister of municipalities.² The post seemed to reflect the challenges facing the sultanate as a result of the escalating war (see below).

THE ARMED FORCES

Oman continued to Arabize its defense forces in accordance with the GCC policy to replace all foreign soldiers in its members' armies. A greater appeal was made to Omanis to join the Army, and women were asked to join as nurses. "It is all part of the process of Omanization, training local staff, and getting rid of expatriates," an Omani official explained.³ The sultanate was due to inaugurate the Wuddam naval base toward the end of the year, thus considerably improving its naval capabilities. Until then it relied mainly on the base at Khor Muscat.⁴

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The recovery in oil prices has benefited Oman's economy by keeping its anticipated deficit below the original projections. Oman, a non-Opec member, continued its policy of maintaining stability in oil prices by setting a self-imposed quota, thus

curbing its oil production by 5% from 1 February.⁵ Oman was also known to have urged other non-Opec members to follow suit. Apart from cuts in its expenditure, the Omani Government made efforts to reduce dependence on oil by promoting small-scale industrial ventures in the private sector.⁶ Talks revolving around the expected opening of a stock exchange by the end of the year further reflected this policy.⁷

In an attempt to widen the country's economic base, the government made a considerable change in its policy toward tourism, which hitherto had been discouraged. Alongside acts to facilitate entry into the country, e.g., the abolition of visa requirements from GCC nationals, Oman took steps to consolidate its touristic infrastructure, mainly by allocating resources to restoring ancient sites and building new hotels.⁸

Fearing the repercussions of unfair competition, Oman firmly rejected offers to abolish intra-GCC customs duties which had been introduced to facilitate their export of surpluses. A 50% customs duty levied from 1 April on cement imports was regarded by outside observers as a countermeasure for the selling of United Arab Emirates' (UAE) cement at below market prices.⁹ Similar reservations were expressed by Oman in the course of GCC-European Economic Community talks regarding the implementation of a free trade agreement as part of a wide-ranging mutual trade pact.¹⁰ The departure of expatriate workers from Oman, another implication of the 1986 recession, continued. Moreover, the Omani Government also limited the range of occupations open to non-nationals. According to official sources, about 50,000 foreign workers were to leave Oman in 1987.¹¹

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REGIONAL POLITICS

Oman maintained its basically neutral posture towards the Gulf War. While reiterating the pledge to protect shipping in its territorial waters only, Oman entrusted the responsibility for the freedom of navigation in international waters to the world community. The ruler of Oman, Sultan Qabus, stated: "When we talk about the security of the strait in face of a direct threat, we sincerely believe that the responsibility is bigger than the sultanate's size."¹² Apart from supporting the implementation of Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War), Oman asserted its willingness to mediate between the belligerents. Its intermediary role was illustrated in September and October, when Iranians captured by US forces in military engagements in the Gulf were repatriated through Omani territory.¹³

The Omani Government's pragmatic approach was mainly seen in its efforts to appease Iran while trying, at the same time, to conform with regional and inter-Arab guidelines. Oman maintained its stable relations with Tehran through high-level contacts in various fields. The most prominent visit was that of Oman's minister of state for foreign affairs, Yusuf Ibn 'Alawi, to Tehran in May, when regional problems and bilateral relations were discussed.¹⁴ However, the US presence following the reflagging of Kuwaiti vessels, as well as the minesweeping operations by European fleets, appeared to have become a potential source of tension between Oman and Iran, especially in view of the special relations that existed between Oman and Britain, and the US military presence in the sultanate. Consequently, Oman was careful not to appear to be too closely connected with the intensified Western presence in the Gulf.

On several occasions, Omani officials were quoted by the Iran News Agency as supporting Iran's position on these initiatives, and emphasizing the danger of turning the region into a scene of international struggle.¹⁵

Oman was also known to have moderated some resolutions in the GCC and inter-Arab forums with regard to Iran. In his speech to the UN General Assembly in September, the Omani minister of state for foreign affairs stressed that his government resented the proposed anti-Iranian sanctions.¹⁶ This was in keeping with the decision taken at the August meeting of Arab foreign ministers, when a reported Kuwaiti initiative to force the implementation of 598 by collectively threatening to sever diplomatic relations with Iran was rejected by several states, which settled for a sharp condemnation.¹⁷ A similar attitude reportedly prevailed in Oman (and the UAE) during the 8 December GCC summit in Riyadh.¹⁸ The mollifying approach toward Iran clearly indicated the Omani perception that its security would be better protected by adopting a conciliatory tone toward Iran rather than through complete conformity with pro-Iraqi states such as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia.

At the same time Oman expressed views that were in line with GCC policy, asserting occasionally that an attack on any individual member state would be regarded as an attack on all of them.¹⁹ Along with other Arab states, Oman backed the Amman summit's harsh condemnation of Iran's aggression in the Gulf (see essay on inter-Arab relations). Oman continued to coordinate its policies within the GCC, chiefly in the military sphere. The GCC military maneuvers that took place in March on Oman's territory were considered by outside observers to be highly professional.²⁰ Oman, however, refused to view the GCC mainly in terms of military cooperation. The Omani minister of state for foreign affairs said that military cooperation was only one aspect of Omani policy that was aimed at achieving peace and stability.²¹ The depth of security links with Saudi Arabia were reflected in the approval given to Saudi AWACS to fly over Oman during reconnaissance missions.²² Oman, the only GCC state to require entry visas from the council's nationals, canceled this requirement in August as part of a tourist promotion scheme.²³ By doing so, Oman took another step toward assimilation within the GCC.

On Oman's southern front, normalization with the PDRY was completed, although there was a border clash. In January the PDRY foreign minister, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dali, announced during a visit to Oman that both countries were dealing with the issue of border demarcation through a joint technical committee,²⁴ but an agreement of that kind had not been reached by the end of the year. PDRY troops crossed the unmarked border and provoked a clash in October which caused the death of eight PDRY and two Omani soldiers.²⁵ Nonetheless, the incident, described by both Omani and PDRY sources as an accident, did not seem to overshadow relations. An agreement putting an end to the dispute arising from the incident was reportedly reached through UAE mediation.²⁶ This was preceded, in November, by the nomination of Muhammad Ibn Salim al-Hajirin as the first Omani ambassador to the PDRY.²⁷

OMAN AND INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

Egypt's reinstatement within the Arab world, immediately following the November summit in Amman, did not basically alter the relations between it and Oman, but only lent them additional legitimacy. Oman was one of three Arab League members that

refused to sever ties with Egypt after the 1978 Baghdad summit. Not surprisingly, Oman enthusiastically supported Egypt's return to the Arab fold, emphasizing its vital role within this framework. King Husayn's visit to Oman in September, and President Husni Mubarak's visits in January and September, suggested that Oman was active in initiating the return.

Oman maintained its traditional links with Jordan, mainly in terms of political coordination. King Husayn paid another visit to the sultanate in December to implement some of the summit's resolutions.²⁸ Both countries deepened their cooperation in the fields of culture, trade, and education.

Diplomatic relations between Oman and Syria were to be established following talks in Damascus in December between the Omani minister of state for foreign affairs and the Syrian foreign minister, Faruq al-Shar'.²⁹ The two countries had never had direct diplomatic ties. This initiative could have been connected with Oman's recent *rapprochement* with the USSR and other Soviet-oriented Arab states.

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Oman and Britain maintained their long-standing relationship, mainly through coordination on regional security problems. In the course of the mining of the Gulf of Oman, Qabus agreed to provide British minesweepers with limited base facilities, but he declined requests that the minesweepers themselves be based in Oman.³⁰ According to British sources, two Royal Air Force *Nimrod* maritime reconnaissance planes were dispatched to Oman for "routine exercises" of unknown duration; they also provided the Omani Navy with an airborne reconnaissance capability over its area of operation.³¹ The 1985 *Tornado* aircraft deal, which included the purchase of eight long-range interception planes and was expected to materialize in 1988, was postponed until 1991, mainly due to Oman's financial difficulties.³² Several British diplomats visited Oman; the most prominent was the British minister of state for the foreign and commonwealth office, Timothy Renton, in February, when support in all fields was discussed.³³ Another noteworthy West European visit to Oman was that of the French foreign minister in March, which dealt with the further strengthening of economic and trade relations between the two countries.³⁴

The Omani military link with the US became more problematic in light of the Kuwaiti reflagging, which exacerbated tension between the US and Iran. Oman attempted to blur its military cooperation with the US, reportedly canceling a joint military exercise due to be held in July.³⁵ Nonetheless, US access to three Omani bases — at Sib, Masira and Thamarit, dating from 1980 — was said to have been extended.³⁶ The US Air Force also reportedly built significant storage facilities in all three bases for fuel and water, and, in the case of Thamarit, ammunition.³⁷

Diplomatic relations between Oman and the USSR were finally established. The two countries' initial diplomatic ties dated from September 1985; since 1986 their respective ambassadors to Jordan had acted as non-resident envoys. In August 1987, delegates from both countries discussed the opening of embassies for the USSR and Oman in Muscat and Moscow.³⁸ Oman's resident ambassador to the USSR, Nizar Ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Ali al-Shaykh, presented his credentials in Moscow in December.³⁹ The possibility that similar developments would occur in other Eastern Bloc states was also raised, though nothing materialized. Oman, like other GCC states, was asked to support a Soviet-proposed conference on freedom of navigation

in the Gulf. This was presumably discussed during the April visit to Oman of Vladimir Petrovsky, the Soviet deputy foreign minister.⁴⁰

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *Al-Hurriyya*, 21 June 1987.
2. *CR*: Oman, 3rd quarter, 1987.
3. *Khaleej Times*, 17 July 1987.
4. *CR*: Oman, 4th quarter, 1987.
5. *Memo*, 30 January; *R. Muscat*, 15 January — *DR*, 20 January 1987.
6. *Al-Anba*, 16 September 1987.
7. *Khaleej Times*, 15 November; *IHT*, 25 May 1987.
8. *Al-Bayan*, 1 September; *Khaleej Times*, 23 August, 28 December 1987.
9. *CR*: Oman, 2nd quarter; *IHT*, 25 May 1987.
10. *FT*, 5 October 1987.
11. *CR*: Oman, 3rd quarter, 1987.
12. An interview of Qabus with *al-Musawwar*, 9 January 1987.
13. *Al-Ray' al-'Amm*, 26 September; *KUNA*, 17 October — *DR*, 19 October 1987.
14. *R. Muscat*, 19 May — *DR*, 20 May 1987.
15. *R. Tehran*, 16 August — *DR*, 17 August; *R. Tehran*, 13 July — *SWB*, 15 July 1987.
16. *Al-Qabas*, 19 November 1987.
17. *The Gulf States*, 2 November 1987.
18. *The Gulf States*, 11 January 1988.
19. *Ha'aretz*, 26 October; an interview given by 'Alawi to *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 26 January 1987.
20. *FT*, 24 July 1987.
21. An interview given by 'Alawi to *October*, 26 April 1987.
22. *Sunday Telegraph*, 16 August 1987.
23. *R. Muscat*, 19 August — *DR*, 20 August; *CR*: Oman, 4th quarter, 1987.
24. *R. Muscat*, 14 January — *SWB*, 17 January 1987.
25. *IHT*, 15 October 1987.
26. *Al-Ittihad al-Ushu'i*, 5 November 1987.
27. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 7 November 1987.
28. *GNA*, 26 September — *DR*, 28 September; *R. Amman*, 14 December — *SWB*, 16 December 1987.
29. *The Gulf States*, 11 January 1988; *Khaleej Times*, 20 December 1987.
30. *FT*, 19 August; *ST*, 20 December 1987.
31. *CR*: Oman, 3rd quarter; *Sunday Telegraph*, 16 August 1987.
32. *CR*: Oman, 2nd quarter, 1987.
33. *R. Muscat*, 28 February — *DR*, 3 March 1987.
34. *R. Muscat*, 22 March — *DR*, 23 March 1987.
35. *FT*, 19 August 1987.
36. *FT*, 6 August; *USIS*, 6, 21 July 1987.
37. *FT*, 6 August 1987.
38. *Al-Bayan*, 27 August 1987.
39. *MENA*, 13 December; *Khaleej Times*, 25 September 1987.
40. *KUNA*, 22 April — *DR*, 23 April 1987.

Qatar

UZI RABI

Unlike the other littoral states, Qatar did not seem to have to contend with any extraordinary event in its domestic or foreign affairs. However, there were signs of increasing tension over the escalating Gulf War, and the regime consistently advocated a cease-fire through the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598 (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Qatar's minuscule size and sense of vulnerability increased its reliance on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), pushing it to end its dispute with Bahrain over Fasht al-Dibal island for the sake of GCC cohesiveness.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

Qatar's recovery from the previous year's economic recession seemed to be slower than that of other Gulf states. Its location at the northern end of the Gulf, combined with the generally high insurance rates for shipping, made buyers more reluctant to lift oil there and severely damaged the Qatari market.¹ In March 1987 a proposed budget for 1987-88 was announced, envisaging a total expenditure of QR12, 217m. and projected revenues of QR6,754m.² The predicted deficit led Qatar to demand that its Opec oil quota be increased. Following the June Opec meeting in Vienna, Qatar's allocation was raised from 285,000 barrels per day (b/d) to 299,000 b/d, effective for the second half of the year.³ Despite economic difficulties, Qatar advanced its projected plan to develop substantial gas reserves as an alternative source of income.

THE NORTH FIELD GAS PROJECT

The most important economic development in Qatar was the initiation of the North Field offshore natural gas project, considered one of the largest reservoirs of natural gas in the world.⁴ The field, discovered in 1971, had not been given final approval for development until 1987, apparently because of the high cost of doing so and the worldwide glut of natural gas. In May, approval was given to develop the first phase of the scheme only, through a special arrangement with foreign contractors.⁵ The scheme was viewed as crucial to the diversification of the economy, which at the time was totally dependent on oil. In July, talks were held with Turkey about a plan to build a pipeline from the North Field to Western Europe via that country.⁶

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REGIONAL POLITICS

Qatar maintained its neutral policy towards the belligerents in the Gulf War. However, it was disturbed by the escalation of the conflict and the subsequent superpower

intervention. Though Qatar did not publicly accept the Western presence in the Gulf, it responded favorably to a US demand for storage facilities for medical supplies and jet fuel.⁷ The mining in the lower Gulf as well as the Iranian missile attack over Kuwaiti oil installations in September (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War) were preceded by Qatar's reiterated request for the UN to implement Resolution 598.⁸ Qatar's anxiety, derived from the increasing possibility of other states being dragged into the war, was demonstrated after the missile attack over Kuwait. Qatar's minister of state for foreign affairs, Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Sayf al-Thani, asserted that Kuwait was not a party to the war and that recurrent violations of its sovereignty in that manner would increase tension in the region and endanger its security.⁹

Qatar's urgent wish to see the war end also emanated from its extreme economic vulnerability to any disruption of traffic along the Gulf route, through which it exported its oil and imported vital commodities. Apart from the damage inflicted on Qatar's overseas commerce by the war, its vessels were sometimes directly involved. A Qatari freighter was attacked by an Iranian gunboat off the Bahraini coast on 22 May; it was badly damaged and three of its crew were wounded.¹⁰ This incident did not, however, seem to affect Qatari-Iranian relations. Iranian Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati arrived in Qatar in May during a regional tour, probably in an attempt to coordinate a unified stance *vis-à-vis* the reflagging of Kuwaiti vessels by the superpowers.¹¹

THE QATARI-BAHRAINI DISPUTE

The dispute between Qatar and Bahrain over the Bahraini-controlled island of Fasht al-Dibal (for a full account of the dispute, see chapter on the Gulf states in *MECS* 1986) seemed to be resolving itself, mainly due to continuous Saudi mediation efforts. High-level contacts, carried out by both countries throughout the year, indicated that a warming up was possible. Several days before the convocation of the eighth GCC summit in December, it was reported that both countries had agreed to submit the matter to the International Court of Justice for arbitration.¹² Qatari and Bahraini readiness to achieve reconciliation might be seen as an attempt to promote unity within the GCC in the face of the escalating war.

INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

Outside the Gulf region, Qatar maintained close ties with three inter-Arab actors. Despite the absence of full Qatari-Egyptian diplomatic relations, representatives of both countries continued to meet. Qatar advocated Egypt's return to the Arab framework, emphasizing its vital role in the Arab world.¹³ Full diplomatic relations were resumed in November, following the Amman summit.¹⁴

Qatar continued to maintain close ties with Jordan. King Husayn arrived in Qatar in October during his regional tour to prepare for the summit.¹⁵ Both countries' good relations were also reflected by the signing of a joint cultural and educational agreement in June.¹⁶

Qatari support for the PLO was further emphasized through its consistent call for the PLO's participation at an international peace conference. PLO Chairman Yasir 'Arafat, who visited Qatar in May and in October, expressed his thanks for Qatar's endeavors to aid the Palestinians.¹⁷

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Qatar newspapers continued to criticize US policy toward the Middle East. News of the US arms deal with Iran had the same effect as in other Gulf states, increasing doubts about American sincerity in resolving the Gulf conflict. A similar approach was adopted toward other American initiatives in the area: the US reflagging of Kuwaiti ships was regarded as the first sign of foreign intervention that might grow and threaten the region's stability.¹⁸ Commenting on the ME tour of Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, the Qatari media doubted the US capability to bring regional conflicts to an end.¹⁹

Qatari-French relations were marked by an agreement to increase military cooperation, signed in June during the visit of the Qatari heir apparent and defense minister, Shaykh Hamad Ibn Khalifa al-Thani, to France.²⁰ Qatar, whose military had been largely equipped with French arms, procured *Roland* surface-to-air missiles and armored personnel carriers, among other items.²¹

The Qatari minister of state for foreign affairs visited London in August and met with his British counterpart. Their talks focused on the rising tension in the Gulf and the forthcoming Arab League foreign ministers' meeting in Tunis.²²

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *CR*: Qatar, 2nd quarter, 1987.
2. *CR*: Qatar, 1st quarter, 1987.
3. *CR*: Qatar, 3rd quarter, 1987.
4. *FT*, 22 May; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 23 February 1987.
5. *MM*, 20 June; *FT*, 22 May 1987.
6. *Al-Anba*, 5 September 1987.
7. *NYT*, 10 October 1987.
8. QNA, 23 September — DR, 23 September 1987.
9. GNA, 23 October — DR, 23 October 1987.
10. QNA, 22 May — DR, 26 May 1987.
11. GNA, 1 June — DR, 1 June 1987.
12. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 28 December 1987.
13. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 6 November 1987.
14. GNA, 18 November — DR, 18 November 1987.
15. QNA, 1 October — DR, 1 October 1987.
16. *Al-Ra'y*, 26 June 1987.
17. GNA, 5 May — DR, 5 May; QNA, 20 October — DR, 21 October 1987.
18. QNA, 27 March — DR, 1 April 1987.
19. GNA, 8 May — DR, 14 May 1987.
20. *The Gulf States*, 30 June 1987.
21. *Le Monde*, 24 July 1987.
22. *Khaleej Times*, 15 August 1987.

The United Arab Emirates

UZI RABI

Two ominous developments, one internal the other external, seemed severely to affect the policies of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in 1987. The most serious event was the attempted coup in Sharja, which served to underline weaknesses within the federation and raise considerable doubts about its cohesiveness. A threat of a different kind was presented by the spillover effects of the Gulf War, with mines being laid off the UAE's shores, apparently by Iran. This escalation, which revived in a more acute manner fears dating back to the previous year's attack on its offshore oil rig (for details see *MECS* 1986, section on the UAE), brought home the fact that distance from the front would no longer insulate the UAE from the conflict. Nonetheless, considering the potential menace projected by Iran toward other Gulf states, the UAE cultivated its special ties with that country and chose the conciliatory path. Within the Arab arena, the UAE's intermediary role was highlighted in several regional disputes. Most notably, it was the first country to restore diplomatic relations with Egypt after the Amman summit.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

THE ATTEMPTED COUP IN SHARJA

On 17 June there was an attempted coup in Sharja, when Shaykh 'Abd al-'Aziz, a brother of the ruler Sultan, issued a statement while his brother was in London, announcing the latter's abdication on grounds of financial mismanagement. Though the Supreme Council (comprising the heads of each emirate) did not initially express an unequivocal position toward the abdication, it announced a day later that it considered the declaration null and void.¹ Their stand was rejected by 'Abd al-'Aziz, who claimed that the royal family had pledged allegiance to him. However, the coup ended with Sultan's reinstatement after a few days of enforced exile in Dubai, but not before a compromise was reached under the auspices of the council nominating 'Abd al-'Aziz as Sultan's heir apparent.²

On the face of it, Sultan's restoration to the throne was a victory for federal cohesion and conciliation attempts. Yet the episode highlighted persisting weaknesses within the UAE. The chronic rivalry between Abu-Dhabi and Dubai was reflected in each one's support for a contending brother of the Sharja royal family: while Abu Dhabi, the leading emirate, tacitly supported 'Abd al-'Aziz, Dubai called for an immediate reinstatement of Sultan.³ Problems deriving from the provisional constitution were also apparent. 'Abd al-'Aziz's refusal to step down and the consequent need for a compromise revealed the Supreme Council's inability to exercise its power. The council was not constitutionally empowered to appoint the leader of an emirate.⁴ Sharja's financial plight, apparently the major reason for the coup, was largely

attributed to difficulties with the UAE's budget and Abu Dhabi's reluctance to continue subsidizing other members of the federation. Sharja, the main supplier of methane gas to the federation, had not been paid.⁵

The attempted coup embarrassed not only the UAE but also the regional states. Most of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which were attempting to present a unified front regarding the Gulf War, expressed deep concern about the instability in the UAE and hoped that the crisis would be settled peacefully. It appeared that Saudi Arabia applied pressure on the UAE ruler, Zayid Ibn Sultan al-Nuhayan, to impose stability. Iran, with which both Sharja and Dubai had long-standing trade relations, was also alarmed: "The events in Sharja, taking note of Dubai's serious objection to the new situation, cannot be ignored by us,"⁶ Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati stated.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The prevailing feeling in the UAE was that the effects of the 1986 recession, caused by the drop in oil prices, were diminishing. This was mainly due to the more or less fixed price of \$18 per barrel. The recession had forced a serious reassessment of economic policy in the federation, leading to a more rational utilization of resources, which was reflected in lower levels of government expenditure. New loans were difficult to acquire due to the considerable losses incurred by the banks when their customers failed to repay their debts on time.⁷ In an attempt to restore the confidence of foreign banks in the UAE banking system, the Federal Central Bank exerted pressure to remove the Islamic laws forbidding interest on loans.⁸ A decree issued in August by the UAE's ruler stressed that an "agreement between a customer and a bank must be maintained."⁹ The UAE budget for fiscal 1987, which was not approved until December, reflected expenditure estimated at UAEDh14.421m. and revenues estimated at UAEDh11,066m.¹⁰

Though still dependent on oil for the bulk of its revenues, the UAE increased its efforts to diversify its economy, mainly in the construction and oil service industries. An effort was also made to develop markets outside the Gulf, in order to minimize dependency on Iran. As it happened, trade with Iran suffered a setback after the mining of the lower Gulf. The effects of this were to some extent offset by trade with India.¹¹

Despite continuous denials by UAE officials, steady production above Opec allocations was recorded throughout the year. This could be attributed to fear that oil shipments would be halted suddenly as a result of the war. Within the federation, the exceeded quotas were another contentious issue between Abu Dhabi and Dubai. Abu Dhabi, which had joined Opec in 1967, before the establishment of the federation, failed to prevent Dubai, which never considered itself an Opec member, from overproducing. Abu Dhabi's excessive production appeared also to have been due to its refusal to continue playing the role of "swing producer" within the UAE.¹²

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

REGIONAL POLITICS

The Kuwaiti request for superpower protection for its oil underlined the Gulf states' growing dependency on external powers. For the UAE, the most ominous

development was the mining of its shores. On 10 August, a Panamanian-registered supertanker struck a mine 12 km. off the Fujaira coast.¹³ On 15 August, a supply boat owned by a Gulf company hit a mine near Fujaira port, and six crew members were killed.¹⁴ UAE ports became danger zones, and the federation was compelled to reassess its defense policy. As a first move, it banned all commercial shipping from its territorial waters for almost a month. Air patrols and vessel inspections were also instituted.¹⁵ European minesweepers, mainly British, were given provisional approval to use port facilities.

The UAE's pragmatic links with both Iran and the GCC further complicated its behavior. Relations with Iran were motivated by the need to continue their long-standing trade, chiefly through Dubai, as well as by the fear of Iranian hostile activity. The UAE's position within the GCC became more problematic following the incident in Mecca in July (see essay on Islamic affairs), and the September missile attack over Kuwait (see section on Kuwait). Both events pushed Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the dominant GCC states, toward a more anti-Iranian stand. Against this background, the UAE seemed to have moderated GCC resolutions regarding Iran. Perhaps the prime example was the resolution passed at the December summit in Riyadh, which reflected a much milder tone than expected, calling on the UN Security Council to force Tehran to comply with a cease-fire resolution.¹⁶

INTER-ARAB RELATIONS

During the year there was a marked increase in the UAE's mediation efforts within the region. As regards the Gulf War, several mediation attempts were made through Syria. Following a visit by Zayid to Damascus in August, both countries agreed to send envoys to Tehran to soften its position toward the UN cease-fire resolution.¹⁷ Zayid further suggested, during the Amman summit, that three leaders be nominated to mediate between Iran and Iraq.¹⁸ It should be stressed that Zayid also used his visit to Damascus to attempt to achieve a reconciliation between Hafiz al-Asad and Iraq's Saddam Husayn. Following the visit, a UAE envoy was sent to Baghdad to brief Saddam on the efforts made.¹⁹ Asad and Saddam appeared publicly reconciled during the Amman summit in November. The UAE's intermediary role was also evident in other inter-Arab disputes. On the Arabian Peninsula, the UAE helped to settle differences between Oman and South Yemen after their border clash in October (see section on Oman).²⁰ In the Maghrib, the UAE attempted to promote better relations between Algiers and Morocco.²¹

Zayid's self-appointed role as a mediator in regional conflicts might have helped to promote his image as a leader who carried the banner of Arab solidarity. It seems safe to assume that he felt that a broad range of contacts within the Arab world would increase the UAE's security in a region of escalating conflict. The moderate Iranian approach toward the UAE might partially have resulted from its ability to use the federation to communicate with the Arab world. The question arises whether Saudi mediation ability, undermined by the Mecca incident, precipitated the UAE's efforts in this direction, albeit on a smaller scale.

The UAE maintained its traditionally close relations with Jordan and Egypt. King Husayn was known to have coordinated with Zayid in several conciliatory attempts within the Arab world, such as the one between Syria and Iraq.²² King Husayn also visited the federation in September as part of a regional tour to prepare for the

Amman summit.²³ The UAE was one of the countries that argued for Egypt's reinstatement within the Arab fold, and was the first of nine Arab states to resume diplomatic ties with Cairo in line with the decision taken in Amman.²⁴ Indeed, *rapprochement* between the two countries had already begun before the summit. Egyptian President Husni Mubarak visited the UAE in January, following the Islamic Conference Organization summit in Kuwait at which Gulf states reportedly exerted considerable pressure for Egypt's reinstatement.²⁵ Mubarak's visit was followed by developments that reflected an improvement in relations. In February, the UAE reportedly announced that it was raising the level of its diplomatic representation in Egypt.²⁶

INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

The UAE's relations with the USSR developed in most spheres. In April, an embassy was opened in Moscow, thus normalizing diplomatic relations between the two countries. Numerous visits were exchanged, among them that of the Soviet deputy minister for foreign affairs, Vladimir Petrovsky, in April. This was possibly connected with the Soviet attempt to persuade several Arab countries to include in the Amman summit agenda a proposal to replace Western fleets in the Gulf with a UN peace force.²⁷ The web of UAE-Soviet trade relations was expanded with the signing of numerous agreements involving loans to Soviet institutions and purchases of Soviet arms.

The UAE newspapers continued to treat the US with skepticism. This approach, which resulted from the exposure of the US arms deal with Iran, was clearly reflected during the May visit to the Middle East of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy. The US was accused of being the major arms supplier to the belligerent states, and thus one of the parties responsible for the perpetuation of the Gulf War.²⁸ Doubts were also raised over the purpose of the massive American presence in the region. Were they there to protect tankers and ensure the flow of oil, or to achieve their global strategic goals?

The UAE and France continued to consolidate their ties, chiefly in the economic sphere. The French foreign minister, Jean-Bernard Raimond, visited the UAE in March to revitalize mutual trade, which had shown signs of decline. In October, a joint agreement on trade, industrial, technical, and educational projects was signed between the two countries.²⁹

The UAE also attempted to expand ties with China, chiefly in the field of commerce. The UAE minister of state for foreign affairs, Rashid 'Abdallah, headed an official delegation to Beijing, the first such visit since diplomatic relations were established in November 1984. The delegates dealt with the further implementation of the economic agreement signed in November 1985.³⁰ A maritime trade route between the two countries, the first of its kind, was inaugurated in May.³¹

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. R. Abu Dhabi, 18 June — DR, 18 June 1987.
2. R. Abu Dhabi, 20 June — SWB, 22 June 1987.
3. *The Times*, 18, 19 June 1987.
4. *Al-Qabas*, 24 June; *The Times*, 22 June 1987.
5. *FT*, 19 June 1987.
6. R. Tehran, 18 June — SWB, 20 June 1987.
7. *WSJ*, 23 October 1987.
8. *CR*: UAE, 3rd quarter, 1987.
9. *WSJ*, 23 October 1987.
10. R. Abu Dhabi, 21 December — DR, 22 December 1987.
11. *FT*, 9 December 1987.
12. *CR*: UAE, 4th quarter, 1987.
13. *Khaleej Times*, 16 August; *FT*, 12 August 1987.
14. GNA, 15 August — DR, 17 August 1987.
15. QNA, 18 August — SWB, 20 August 1987.
16. *The Gulf States*, 11 January 1988.
17. R. Abu Dhabi, 17 August — DR, 18 August; *Khaleej Times*, 20 August 1987.
18. An interview of Zayid with *al-Hawadith*, 11 December 1987.
19. *Khaleej Times*, 19 August; R. Abu Dhabi, 17 August — SWB, 18 August 1987.
20. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 7 November 1987.
21. *Al-Ahram*, 25 December 1987.
22. *Al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 23 August 1987.
23. GNA, 29 September — DR, 30 September 1987.
24. GNA, 11 November — DR, 12 November 1987.
25. GNA, 14 January — DR, 15 January 1987.
26. *Al-Ahram*, 18 February 1987.
27. GNA, 3 November — DR, 3 November 1987.
28. ENA, 9 May — DR, 11 May 1987.
29. GNA, 27 October — SWB, 10 November 1987.
30. QNA, 19 April — DR, 20 April 1987.
31. GNA, 10 May — DR, 12 May 1987.

Iran

(Jumhuriyye Islamiyye Iran)

DAVID MENASHRI

Continuity and change characterized the Iranian political scene in 1987. The disciples of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni, exclusively in control, concentrated — as they had in the years since they seized power — on two major targets: first, the consolidation, institutionalization, and — as far as possible — perpetuation of clerical rule; second, the implementation of Khomeyni's revolutionary ideology, which, in turn, would further promote legitimization and consolidation.

To achieve this, the regime in 1987 set out to rally and preserve a united popular front behind the clerics; to keep the revolutionary zeal at a high pitch and encourage active mass support; to institutionalize the regime's power through effective governmental-revolutionary organizations, particularly for the accelerated implementation of Islamization; to monopolize power through the suppression of any active or potential political opposition; and to preserve unity within the revolutionary camp.

Compared with their first years in power, the clerics were undoubtedly more firmly entrenched in 1987. As in the last few years it was clearly not the opposition that posed the main challenge for the revolutionary regime, but elements in the situation that they had created themselves. At the top of the list were three problems: the mounting and unresolved social and economic issues (and the concomitant discontent they caused); the intensified internal power struggle among the disciples of the Ayatollah; and the lack of any significant breakthrough in the war with Iraq. The three problems were clearly interrelated: the war added to the economic burden and became an issue of internal controversy; the economic difficulties influenced the war strategy and were at the very center of the internal rifts; and the struggle for power evolved around the economy and the war as well as the most crucial question of the leadership of the country after the death of the octogenarian Ayatollah.

Social and economic problems placed greater pressure on the regime than in previous years. Although the ruling clerics tried to explain (or, rather, explain away) the problems, they only confirmed that such problems were pressing hard on the regime. For example, in a speech late in August, Khomeyni used the word "problems" again and again: "I am aware of the problems facing the government"; "we shall, God willing, solve the problems"; "the government and Iran are facing all the difficulties"; "criticism is easy; solving problems is difficult."¹ A month later he said: "Today we face a lot of difficulties, a mountain of difficulties."² In many of his statements during the year he pointed to increasing problems and difficulties, chief among them the power struggle and the economy. (Oddly, the war hardly appeared on his list.)

The intensification of the three sets of problems not only sharpened the internal struggle for power further, but also led to growing disillusionment and disaffection

within the ranks of the *mostaz'efin* (the "dispossessed") and thus added a new challenge, more serious than anything the regime had faced before. Such challenges, already discernible in the previous two to three years, were further aggravated in 1987. While none of them was yet powerful enough to produce a change of the declared policies (for instance, toward the war) they clearly posed a critical threat. Until 1986, these challenges led the leadership toward greater pragmatism; in 1987 their intensification led to greater radicalism. Oddly enough, the trend toward greater radicalism came at the same time as the internal struggle between the ultraradical and the more pragmatic groups strengthened the position of the pragmatists. Thus, the more pragmatic elements within the administration, who had hitherto preached moderation while tightening their grip on power, were left with no choice but to implement the radicals' policy.

This trend was noticeable mainly in foreign relations: the growing tension in Tehran's relations with France and Britain; the confrontation with the Americans in the Persian Gulf; the events of the *haji*; and the tension with Kuwait. In a way, the greater radicalism was reminiscent of the regime's first years in power. Iranians again felt that the entire world was against them. As Khomeyni put it, on the eve of the Persian New Year: "We know that all the powers are opposing us. Today those powers have joined hands to smash Islam, which has gained power here, and to prevent Islam [i.e., Iran] from raising its head."³ But while in the first years of revolutionary Iran the radical trend was the result of Tehran's own preferred policy, such a policy was pursued now because it was felt that there was no choice.

THE STRUGGLE FOR POWER

The political system in 1987 functioned under the shadow of a fierce power struggle among Khomeyni's disciples. It began as far back as 1981-82, when the clerics monopolized power and virtually eliminated any danger from the other movements that had participated in Khomeyni's coalition against the Shah. In their moment of triumph, an ideological and — no less important — personal struggle for power surfaced among the clerics themselves. While earlier contests for power had pitted the leadership against hostile ideologies or, as in the case of the *Hujjatiyyah*, against other clerics consistently in conflict with Khomeyni's "line," the struggle now was among his disciples themselves. The mostly latent struggle for power was conducted within the narrow limits of radical beliefs held by the clerics in power, all of them fundamentalists. Yet, while the differences were seemingly over marginal points, on closer examination it was evident that the post-Khomeyni polity and, no less important, leadership were at stake. Personal rivalries and ideological controversies were often interwoven.

The dearth of reliable information made it difficult for outsiders to assess accurately the particular ideologies of the various groupings, the personal affiliation of the contenders, or the support each of them had within the leadership or with the public at large. Shifting loyalties made it even more difficult. The fact that some of them appeared moderate on one point but extremely radical on another was another difficulty. The tendency of all contenders to support Khomeyni and deny that differences existed only made it more complicated to reach definite conclusions in this regard. (For a discussion of earlier contests for power, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 329-30.)

Differences of opinion within the leadership could not be hidden any longer. As in

previous years, it was Hujjat ul-Islam 'Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani (the *Majlis* Speaker) who came closest to admitting these new realities explicitly. He claimed that "whether in the international, economic, or political field, these two currents [moderate and extremist] do indeed exist within our society." Elsewhere he added: "In deciding any important issue we have differing views." But he claimed that the leadership itself remained "very united and work[ed] in a coordinated way along a single line." The president, the prime minister, the Speaker, the president of the Supreme Court and Khomeyni's designated successor (Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri) "all remain subordinate to Imam Khomeyni, whose directives are decisive for everyone." Whenever there are differences, he went on, the issue is brought to the imam "who has the final decision."⁴ Khomeyni himself maintained that those claiming that there was a struggle for power "do not understand Islam."⁵

But Khomeyni's repeated warnings to the leaders of the republic to unite left no doubt that differences had in fact increased to threatening proportions. Early in the year he urged the leadership to "try and eliminate their differences."⁶ On the eve of the Persian New Year he again urged them to preserve their fraternity.⁷ Later in the year, admitting that differences did exist, he told the rivals that they "must not quarrel over material matters."⁸

The internal battle for power was fought on three levels: the struggle around the sensitive question of Khomeyni's succession; the struggle between the government and the extragovernmental organizations; and the struggle within the revolutionary Administration.

KHOMEYNI'S SUCCESSION

Since the "leader," i.e., the *velayate faqih* (the rule of the jurisconsult) was the highest authority, it was crucial for the future stability and posture of Iran to guarantee a smooth transfer of power from Khomeyni to his successor. Initial steps in this regard were taken in 1983 when a Council of Experts was elected and empowered to choose the next leader. Khomeyni wrote his political testament (see *MECS* 1982–83, pp. 517–19). And in 1985 the council nominated Montazeri as Khomeyni's successor (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 433–35). But in 1987 his authority was not sufficiently accepted even within the narrow circle of Khomeyni's disciples (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 333–35). Well aware of the delicate nature of the question and the importance of settling ahead of time the disputes that had arisen, Khomeyni took two important steps in 1987: he revised his will, and, at the end of the year, he defined more clearly his vision of the authority of the *velayate faqih*.

According to the Shi'i tradition and the Iranian constitution the leader must be a "righteous *faqih*" (i.e., theologian) who, apart from being the most learned *faqih* must be "just, virtuous, aware of the [requirements of the] times and courageous," as well as capable of "managing the affairs [of the state] with good sense." If there was no single *faqih* who is recognized as such by the decisive majority of the people (such as Khomeyni had been recognized), the Council of Experts was empowered to select one of the leading contenders and introduce him to the people. Should the experts fail to agree on an accepted leader, they could select three or five theologians to form a Council of Leadership.

However, the revolutionary leader had much more authority than comparable religious figures had had in the past. According to Shi'i tradition (up to the Islamic

Revolution) the head of the religious establishment was only *primus inter pares* — he did not have more religious authority than any of the other Grand Ayatollahs. Under the Islamic republic, however, the leader's power was absolute: he concentrated all temporal and spiritual authority. This could explain the argument within the establishment over the succession. Ever since his nomination in November 1985, many Iranians had second thoughts about the wisdom of naming Montazeri as Khomeyni's sole successor. Opposition came from various sources: some followers of the other Grand Ayatollahs (mainly Reza Musavi Golpaygani and Seyyed Abul-Qasem Kho'i) had not supported the decision in the first place. Other prominent ayatollahs (though not possessing the rank of Ayatollah 'Uzma) had also challenged the nomination all along. Then there were less prominent clerics with political power who resented the nomination. Some argued against Montazeri personally; others preferred a collective leadership.

If the issue of Khomeyni's succession had been a major challenge for the regime since his nomination, the events of 1986 made it more visible and important. The execution of Mehdi Hashemi (his son-in-law's brother, who had leaked the information about the arms deal with the US; see below), made the issue even more delicate. It must be stressed, however, that though Khomeyni had made it known that Montazeri was his favorite candidate, he never showed any marked enthusiasm for him. Neither did he declare openly whether he preferred a sole successor or a Council of Leadership. In the 1986 volume of *MECS* (p. 334), this writer claimed that

...if Khomeyni wishes to spare Iran the upheavals of a contested succession, and if he remains convinced that the future of the Islamic republic is better served by a single successor than by a collective leadership that is bound to engage in infighting, he can still bolster Montazeri's chances. An unequivocal and outspoken endorsement of his candidacy by Khomeyni in his lifetime, or even in his testament, could well tip the scales....To ensure an uncontested succession, Khomeyni would have to throw his *full* weight behind Montazeri and back him unreservedly.

It was apparently in order to spare Iran a contested succession that Khomeyni revised his will in 1987. Although at the time of writing it was not clear what the new will — or, for that matter, the old one — said, it was safe to assume that Khomeyni wished to make his choice more explicit and to urge his disciples to unite behind the new leader (or leadership).

In the past there were numerous occasions when no *faqih* was accepted as the sole legitimate source of religious authority. There was often a kind of collective spiritual leadership. But then the actual power was in the hands of the Shah. Now the situation was entirely different — the leader also had temporal functions. With such authority vested in the leader, it was arguable whether a collective leadership could effectively run the country. If such a council were formed, many Iranians believed, the government would be paralyzed. Even now — with the personal authority that Khomeyni wielded — there were doctrinal as well as political disagreements which prevented the passage of certain legislation (for instance on land reform or private trade). "If there is a Leadership Council," a *Majlis* deputy, Fakhr al-Din Hijazi, claimed in 1985 when Montazeri was selected as successor, "Iran will be another Lebanon." Rejecting the idea of the formation of such a council, Ayatollah Ahmad

Azari Qomi then explained: "We need a focus for people's emotions.... How can the people shout [during their demonstrations] slogans like, 'We are your soldiers, O Council of Leadership' [as they shout, 'We are your soldiers, Khomeyni']?"⁹ All this suggested the selection of a single candidate; the fact that Montazeri was the only Grand Ayatollah who unequivocally supported Khomeyni, made him the most appropriate choice. Yet, it was still possible that Khomeyni, recognizing the difficulties that Montazeri will undoubtedly face in establishing his authority and in order to promote unity among his disciples had decided otherwise.

On 10 December, amid rumors about Khomeyni's deteriorating health,¹⁰ Khomeyni summoned about 10 senior officials (including Montazeri, Rafsanjani and Ayatollah 'Ali Meshkini, chairman of the Council of Experts) to inform them that he had revised his last will and testament. As in 1983, when the first will had been written, not a single word was disclosed about its contents. The live broadcast over Tehran Radio revealed disagreements over where the two copies would be kept and who would seal them. Khomeyni decided that one copy would be kept in Meshhed (in the holiest Shi'i shrine in Iran, the Mosque of Imam Reza) and the other in the *Majlis*, for future reference by the Council of Experts. There were rumors that the new will differed radically from that handed over to the Council of Experts in 1983. Most of them speculated that the imam had rejected the idea of a single theologian to succeed him and recommended the formation of a Council of Leadership.¹¹ Yet, the disadvantages of a collective leadership argued against the accuracy of such speculation. The authorities, however, played down the political significance of the changes in the will. Typical was the reaction of Meshkini who said that it was only natural "that when five years pass, a political will and testament be revised based on changes in the times, changes in the atmosphere, [and] changes in the politics of the times." That the revision had been made only after five years, he said, was in itself a sign "of the greatness of his spirit and his deep political insight." He prayed that "several other five-year periods will pass and he will make similar revisions every five years and the process continues until his holiness [the Hidden (12th) Imam] reappears."¹²

THE AUTHORITY OF THE LEADERSHIP

At the end of the same month Khomeyni again interfered to make it clear that the *velayate faqih* would retain the full authority envisaged for it in his mind: namely that, in the future, as during his own rule, the cleric in power would maintain spiritual and temporal power. In notes exchanged (in late December 1987 and early January 1988) between Khomeyni and President Muhammad 'Ali Khameneh'i on the one hand, and Khomeyni and the Council of Guardians on the other, one of the main questions in Shi'i theology was discussed: the boundaries of the government's power in the Islamic republic. That Khomeyni found it necessary to interfere indicated the importance he attached to defining the sphere of authority within the Islamic regime. He undoubtedly wished to strengthen the institution of the leadership for the challenges of the post-Khomeyni era.

Late in December, the secretary of the Council of Guardians, Ayatollah Lotfollah Safi, asked the imam about the limits of the state's power to enforce terms on employers in return for their use of public resources and services. (The question was asked with specific reference to the Labor Law then discussed in the *Majlis*.) Khomeyni's answer was unequivocal: "The state can, in all cases in which people

utilize national resources and services, according to Islamic terms, unconditionally collect the price of that which is being utilized by them."¹³ This meant that, in return for providing benefits such as electricity, water, paved roads, ports, and similar state services, the government could impose certain limitations on employers and get them to make concessions to their employees. Among other things they would have to pay special bonuses to workers. Some members in the Council of Guardians (in which Islamic conservatism — rather than radicalism — was always strong) thought that such an intervention infringed on the legal rights of the private sector as guaranteed by Muslim Law.

Yet the problem did not apply only to the Labor Law. Over the years the *Majlis* had passed several important laws which were later blocked by the council. Among the most important were those concerning land reform, nationalization of foreign trade, and taxation. Thus the question related to the basic disagreements between the radical and the more conservative clerics. Khomeyni came out clearly in support of the radicals. Consequently, the council's spokesman declared that the council would now hasten the approval of the laws concerned, and endorse the *Majlis's* approval of the Labor Law, as well.¹⁴

The question was not whether these laws would now be approved. Clearly, the council would have to approve some of them, to demonstrate its loyalty to the imam, although it appeared more likely that the important ones would not be immediately approved (the council could return them to the *Majlis*, demanding additional amendments or clarifications and thus postpone the process of legislation).

The underlying question was much broader and related to the separation of powers in the Islamic republic. Before discussing the significance of Khomeyni's decree in this context, his exchange of notes with the president, which was clearly related to the same question, should be mentioned.

In his sermon after Friday prayers on 1 January 1988 the president referred indirectly to limitations imposed on the government by the Islamic Law. He seemed to imply that the executive did not have sufficient authority. He also made several general remarks about the limits of power of the Islamic Government. More specifically, he "quoted" Khomeyni as saying that "government exercises power only within the bounds of the divine statutes." Khomeyni felt it necessary to respond. In an unprecedentedly harsh letter to Khameneh'i (7 January), Khomeyni said that it appeared from the president's remarks that he did not "recognize government as an institution ordained by the Almighty...with absolute power entrusted to the Prophet." He claimed that the president had misinterpreted and misquoted him. If government were to be defined as an institution exercising power only within the bounds of the statutory laws of divine origins, he maintained, then God's entrustment of absolute power to the Prophet would have been an entrustment devoid of sense. On the contrary, Khomeyni continued, the government had the right even to close down a mosque and destroy it if it proved harmful. The government was even entitled unilaterally to revoke any lawful agreements with people if the agreements contravened the interests of Islam and the country. The government, he went on, could even temporarily prevent the performance of the *hajj* ceremonies, when they contradicted the interests of the Islamic state.¹⁵

On 11 January, the president replied to Khomeyni, expressing his gratitude for the imam's "guidance, which as usual clarifies the bright path of Islam." Khomeyni

responded on the same day, this time giving him his backing. He called the president "one of the capable arms of the Islamic republic," and added: "I consider you a brother who is familiar with the issues of jurisprudence, committed to them, and [a] serious supporter of religious principles related to absolute rule by the jurisconsult."¹⁶

As mentioned above, both developments were interrelated and touched on the basic questions of the authority of an Islamic state and the division of powers within the Islamic republic; as such, their implications were significant for those involved in the power struggle.

The question of the government's authority is addressed in Islamic theology on different levels. (Who is the legitimate successor of the Prophet Muhammad? Who is to replace the Hidden Imam?) The issue discussed here related to narrower, but nevertheless important, questions. Although some of them may have had theoretical importance in the general development of Shi'i theology, they also had significant immediate implications. Most important were those concerning the authority of the *velayate faqih* against the power of the Council of Guardians. In his decrees Khomeyni claimed, above all, unlimited power for the *velayate faqih* and the state. Under the constitution, the Council of Guardians had the ultimate right to review laws passed by the *Majlis* and to determine whether they were in conformity with Islamic law and compatible with the constitution. If it found that they were not, the guardians had the authority to veto them. But Khomeyni now used his personal prestige to force the Council of Guardians to approve laws it had hitherto rejected. This was an important step to strip the council of its constitutional authority. Until then the council, half of whose members (the clerics) were nominated by Khomeyni himself, and half (the jurists) were nominated by the High Council of the Judiciary and approved by the *Majlis*, had demonstrated much independence and refused to approve certain radical laws. If Khomeyni succeeded in forcing them to approve these laws it could lead to: (a) much more radical legislation; (b) much more power to the *Majlis*; and (c) the decline of the power of the council.¹⁷ But, most important, it would result in (d) the granting of greater authority — in fact, unlimited power — to Khomeyni, and, no less important, to his successor as the next *velayate faqih*.

Khameneh'i, apparently trying to rationalize the executive's failure to remove some basic problems, attributed it to the government being restricted by Islamic Law. Khomeyni, who as a rule tried to avoid interfering in internal debates between the various branches of government, rushed in to make clear his views. Presumably, he did so to stop internal rifts assuming dangerous proportions. At the same time, he wanted to help the government by giving it a free hand to solve the problems.

The implications regarding the power struggle between Khameneh'i and Rafsanjani were not significant and anyway the issue was no longer very relevant in 1987. Rafsanjani already had a clear advantage over the president. Things could of course change, but Khameneh'i seemed during the year to be lagging behind Rafsanjani. The latter had gradually concentrated power and was firmly established. Khameneh'i's position, by contrast, seemed less powerful, mainly since his election for a second term as president (1985). He suffered several setbacks, the most painful of which was being forced to nominate Musavi as prime minister (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 429–32). Rafsanjani's position remained secure (even following the arms deal), and he had a clear advantage in the contest for power. According to most observers, he was the strongest man in Iran after Khomeyni.

RAFSANJANI'S POWER FURTHER STRENGTHENED

The events of 1986–87 further strengthened Rafsanjani. While all other contenders for power seemed to suffer setbacks, Rafsanjani skillfully managed to appear to be above controversy. His greatest success was in preventing the arms deal scandal from affecting his status; he was helped in this by the other contenders' declining power. Montazeri was hurt by his affiliation with Hashemi (see below) and the controversy over Khomeyni's succession (see above); Khameneh'i's influence had been significantly reduced even before he received the harsh note from the imam — he was hurt by the disbanding of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP; see below) and by the fact that he was approaching the end of his second — and, according to the constitution, last — term as president.

"Whatever happens, Rafsanjani will stay on top," one observer remarked. He was, the same source said, a "popular, confident man who combines a sardonic sense of humor with an instinctive feel for politics and pragmatism required to ensure that, whatever else happens...he will come out on top, or very near to it." Whatever he lacks in Qur'anic learning "he makes up for amply with a forceful and flexible personality."¹⁸ Rafsanjani, another source maintained, successfully cultivated the image of the statesman, trying to reassure the middle classes that the days when patrols of zealots raided their homes with impunity in search of emblems of counterrevolution were over.¹⁹ "While he sometimes seems in danger of losing influence, he always returns to prominence and, in [the] view of many observers, is [still] the single most powerful and tenacious politician in the nation today."²⁰ He was believed to have the support of the Revolutionary Guards (RG) and the attentive ear of Khomeyni (mainly through his association with his son, Ahmad).

As far as Rafsanjani's "ideology" was concerned, one could hardly identify anything coherently. Over the last decade of revolution and war Rafsanjani had expressed mainly moderate views with regard to the Islamization process and had also voiced less radical views regarding the US. Yet by Western standards he could hardly be termed a moderate (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 330–31). If one had to define him in one word, "opportunist" would be more correct than "moderate."

But while the more pragmatic leaders were establishing their supremacy, there were growing signs of radicalism during the year (mainly in Iran's foreign relations, see below). Two factors could have been behind this radicalization among the pragmatists led by Rafsanjani: first, the failure of negotiations with the US, which led to the pragmatists' disappointment with the West; they now had to prove (even more than in the past) their loyalty to the revolution and the imam's line. Second, the struggle for succession and the forthcoming *Majlis* elections (in spring 1988). Thus, even though there were occasional conciliatory statements and gestures toward the outside world (always excluding Iraq), the leading figures in the government continued to speak with a single voice against the superpowers, to rail against the Arab Gulf states, and to vow to continue the war against Iraq until victory. Thus, some of the most radical anti-American declarations were now voiced by Rafsanjani. Early in October, he predicted that Iran would soon be at war against the US in the Gulf. Rafsanjani went on to blame Washington for firing the first shot in a conflict which, he said, could last several years.²¹ His speech was in fact the most bellicose statement against the American naval force in the Gulf. (For more moderate views on the same question, see section on foreign affairs.)

The power of the RG also grew. Their c. 400,000 members gave them about as many men as, and perhaps even more influence, than the Army. The regular forces found themselves increasingly relegated to such operations as artillery bombardment, naval and air patrols and bombing attacks in Iraq. At the various fronts, the RG assumed the main responsibility, even in major operations. In the Gulf, the small boats of the RG were more active than the Iranian Navy. More important, they had greater control over war strategy. Also, in 1987 they demonstrated much more restraint. For example, they abandoned their "human wave" operating style, which had been proven too costly in lives and militarily ineffective.²²

Gradually, they developed a huge power base. In addition to military and internal security activities, they were also busy in various non-military fields. Among other things, they established factories (including some for the production of weapons), in an attempt to provide work for wounded fighters and the families of the victims of the war (and, of course, to contribute to the war effort and the economy). They also planned to establish their own university. In fact, they had turned into a government within the government.

But it was still not clear who controlled the RG. Officially, there were two men: Mohsen Rafiqdust, the minister of the RG (who was in charge of their administration), and Mohsen Reza'i (the military commander). The general policy was defined by the Supreme Defense Council (usually on the basis of Khomeyni's orders). They were considered likely to be an important factor in post-Khomeyni Iran, but much still depends on their success in the war. Rafsanjani worked hard to gain their support and, according to most sources, had their loyalty. One source went so far as to attribute "the important secret of Rafsanjani's power" to his "deep influence on the Revolutionary Guards."²³

While Rafsanjani's power was clearly on the rise, Khameneh'i's position in the hierarchy of power was clearly descending, and he "receded into the background."²⁴

The disbanding of the IRP was another blow for the president, who doubled as the secretary-general of the party. Given the almost total paralysis of the party and the power struggle within its ranks, it was only a matter of time before a pretext was found for such a decision.

Compared with the revolutionary bodies, the IRP was less successful in establishing deeper roots in society. It seemed that even the revolution was not powerful enough to overcome popular skepticism about political parties. Even some of the revolutionary leaders appeared ambivalent toward the party since their own theology declared that there was no room for a party, or for partisanship, within the Muslim community. After all, they had all been members of Hizbollah, the "Party of God." Following the 1984 *Majlis* elections, rifts within the IRP sharpened (and were even publicized) until the virtual crystallization of two opposing wings (see *MECS* 1983-84, pp. 430-33). Rather than being an instrument for unity, it turned into a stage to highlight internal rifts. It eventually suited Rafsanjani to disband the party before the 1988 *Majlis* elections — by doing so he also knew he would further weaken Khameneh'i.

On 1 June, Khomeyni gave his consent to disband the IRP. This was done after Khameneh'i and Rafsanjani had appealed to him to do so, arguing that since the "institutions of the Islamic republic have been consolidated" and "the level of political awareness of the people has made the revolution invulnerable," the existence of the "outdated" party "no longer has the benefits of its early days. On the contrary, party

polarization under the present conditions provides an excuse for discord and factionalism." Khomeyni approved their request and said he hoped that "at this sensitive time you will strive unitedly and unequivocally" to advance the revolutionary goals. He warned them that "sowing discord is one of the greatest sins."²⁵ A few days later Rafsanjani disclosed that since the party had been experiencing "certain difficulties" for "about a year," the imam was asked to approve such a decision. He added that Khomeyni had refused to close it down, but would consent to its "limited operation." Soon afterward, several offices and branches of the party were closed. Rafsanjani further disclosed that it was he who had pressured Khomeyni to disband the party and that the approaching *Majlis* election had been an important motivating factor.²⁶

While the disbanding of the IRP affected Khameneh's position the execution of Mehdi Hashemi was believed to have undermined Montazeri's position (for the association between the two, see *MECS* 1986, p. 332). It also marked a victory for the government over the semi-independent revolutionary organizations.

After being arrested and confessing to acting against the interests of the revolution and Islam in November 1986, Hashemi was brought to trial in 1987. Appearing on state television on 17 March, he confessed to kidnapping and murdering three people as well as illegally concealing arms. He described his conduct as "totally deviant and un-Islamic."²⁷ In August he was tried on eight charges, including murder, kidnapping, links with the previous regime's intelligence service (the SAVAK), purloining confidential government documents, attempting to sabotage the government's foreign policies, smuggling arms and ammunition from the RG, and establishing cells in order to "gain power and rule by introducing a new system in line with his own deviated way of thinking."²⁸ The court accused him of being a *mohareb* (one who wages war against God) and *mofsed fi al-arz* (corrupt on earth).²⁹ Having been found guilty, he was executed on 28 September. Not much attention was paid to the matter in the local media. Some of his colleagues were executed a few days later.

With regard to the internal power struggle, the paradoxical result was that, although the execution of Hashemi and his group constituted a blow for the ultraradicals (and a victory for the pragmatists, mainly for Rafsanjani), ultraradical policies gained strength in 1987. Thus, although the execution weakened Hashemi's group as such, it did not necessarily destroy its doctrine. Although Montazeri wished to distance himself from the entire affair, in the public mind Mehdi Hashemi's name was connected with his (this was inevitable since Mehdi's brother Hadi was Montazeri's son-in-law). The very fact that he had to ask the authorities not to be influenced by this attested to his discomfiture. Moreover, the day the verdict was passed, Ahmad Khomeyni went to see Montazeri (to inform him of the verdict personally); the day Hashemi was executed, Musavi paid Montazeri a visit (apparently for a similar reason). These meetings suggested that such a connection was in fact made by Iranians. There was no question that Montazeri's status was affected; the only question was to what degree.

No survey of the internal power struggle in 1987 would be complete without mention of the growing power and popularity of one of the leading radicals, Hujjat ul-Islam 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi (b. 1946, Tehran). Until 1985, Mohtashemi had been ambassador to Damascus, where he worked to improve ties with Syria and established special relations with the Shi'is of Lebanon. He personally facilitated terrorist operations against American and Israeli targets. In 1983, he was injured during an

attempt on his life. In 1985 he joined Musavi's government as the minister of the interior, with authority over the *Komitehs* and the internal security apparatus. He also acquired greater influence through the appointment of provincial governors — with the approach of the *Majlis* elections he appeared to be exploiting his position to gain power in the *Majlis*, preparing the ground and building an independent power base for himself. (Rafsanjani had also been interior minister before becoming Speaker.) Mohtashemi's services to the revolution, and the fact that he had escaped an attempt on his life, added to his popularity. His world view is that of an extremist, especially in foreign relations. He believes that the Islamic Revolution should be exported, and, although he is the minister of the interior, he often expresses views on foreign policy as well. Many believe that in the longer term he will present a challenge to Rafsanjani.

Concluding the survey of the power struggle, three points could be made with some certainty in 1987. First, in the conflicts between the government and the extragovernmental organizations, the government secured the upper hand. Second, in the struggle between the "politicians" (i.e., Rafsanjani or Khameneh'i) and Montazeri, the designated successor, the first two had the upper hand. Third, in the struggle between Rafsanjani and Khameneh'i, the Speaker enjoyed a clear advantage.

THE IMPACT OF WAR AND REVOLUTION: ECONOMY AND OPPOSITION

ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES

Since the advent of the revolution, there was a steady deterioration in the economy. Several factors contributed to this: the rapid growth of the population; the brain drain; the outflow of capital; and the virtual cessation of local and foreign investment. Exports fell off, and the government found itself unable to deal with specific problems, such as growing unemployment and rising inflation, let alone the underlying economic causes of the decline. Two factors exacerbated the situation: the war with Iraq, which consumed vast resources³⁰ and created additional stresses (such as the need to assist refugees and to rebuild the infrastructure in the war zones); and the fall in oil prices on the international market. Iraqi air raids on Iranian oil installations (which began in the summer of 1985, and had become more intense since 1986) brought down the volume of oil exports, so that Iran was selling smaller quantities and earning much less than it used to.

Long term economic goals, such as creating self-sufficiency, diminishing the country's dependence on oil income, and improving the situation of the *mostaz'efin* had to be almost completely neglected. Major plans to solve economic problems (such as land reform, nationalization of foreign trade and taxation) turned into theological-ideological controversies and were blocked by the Council of Guardians. Attempts to block the influx of people into the large cities, mainly to the capital, failed totally. Plans to improve basic services — such as housing, education and health care — were not conspicuously successful. In fact, in many areas a change for the worse was noticeable. Revolution and war had given rise to hoarding and profiteering, and soaring prices put many commodities beyond the reach of the *mostaz'efin*. (For similar problems in the first years of the revolution, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 545–49;

1982–83, pp. 527–31; 1983–84, pp. 450–53; 1984–85, pp. 442–45; and 1986, pp. 335–40.)

In 1987, public resentment became more noticeable than in previous years. This was felt not only among the upper and middle classes, but also among the *mostaz'efin*, whose disillusionment increased in 1987. For the Islamic regime, and for Khomeyni personally, this was both painful and frustrating, considering the pledges that had been made to improve the lot of the *mostaz'efin*. It was also becoming a potential threat to the regime. No less important was the fact that economic policy had become the main issue of theological-political controversy between conservative clerics and radicals in the regime (see *MECS* 1986, p. 337).

How delicate these problems were could be discerned from the official — often exaggerated — statistics quoted by the government. Some of the basic problems that had led to alienation from the *ancien régime* were again evident, sometimes to a greater extent than a decade before. Housing was no less a problem in 1987 than it had been in 1977.

According to government statistics, there was a shortage of 3.7m. housing units in the period of the first five-year plan (1983–88) — 2.3m. in urban areas (where the political implications could prove more acute). Since the beginning of the plan, housing costs had risen faster than the incomes of urban families. According to a survey carried out by the Prime Minister's Office, in 1983–84 up to 82% of family income in Tehran was spent on rent. Given the rapid growth of the population and the limited amount of housing, the prospects for the future were even more gloomy.³¹ Unemployment continued to be high, most critically among high-school graduates. The prime minister said there were 4m. unemployed in the country in 1987.³²

Education was another major field in which conditions steadily deteriorated. The rapid expansion of academic education led to a lowering of standards but even so growing numbers of high-school graduates failed to be admitted to university. The disproportionate increase in the number of those receiving a primary and secondary education had created a large population of aspirants for higher education with decreasing chances of being admitted to university, let alone a specific faculty. In each of the last three years of the Shah's rule, between 250,000 and 300,000 young people applied for university admission; the highest actual admission figure for 1977–78 was little short of 30,000. Thus, in the final years of the monarchy there were well over 200,000 young people each year who had their hopes dashed by cruel reality. This had caused much resentment and added fuel to the ferment of the late 1970s.³³ In the 1984–85 academic year, 581,000 candidates took entrance examinations but only 44,000 were admitted to the universities and other institutions of higher learning.³⁴ In 1987, some half a million youngsters were denied a higher education.

Similarly, health services — mainly for the “dispossessed” — remained as much a problem as they had been before the revolution.

Inflation remained high and the devaluation of the Iranian rial continued. The American dollar could buy IR75 at the official rate but almost twenty times that on the black market. Montazeri had to admit that “in spite of the fact that expenditure has gone up, salaries have remained the same.” But the solution he suggested — to give government subsidies to the lower strata only³⁵ — was impractical.

In every sphere, signs of economic strain were increasingly visible. And although daily life was “far from impossible,”³⁶ the economic effects of the war were undeniably

imposing hardships on the people. The continuation of the war made a concentrated government effort to improve the economic malaise highly unlikely.

Aware of the growing public resentment of the situation, Montazeri admitted in mid-July that "[economic] shortages and difficulties" did exist. He advised the government to see to it that "all plans and programs should be formulated so as to benefit the deprived; we should not always be chanting slogans in support of the deprived while they remain deprived." He warned that if the problems were not solved the opposition could "take away the youth from us."³⁷ Rafsanjani also warned that "if the prices continue to go up...things may reach [an] intolerable and explosive level. Our society [had] better avoid this."³⁸ A *Majlis* deputy, Sa'id Amami, in an open session of the House in May tackled the same issue even more bluntly. He asked his colleagues truthfully to admit "that we have many economic problems in various stages." If they remain unsolved, he predicted "their adverse effects will increase and will eventually affect the very people that the great imam talks about all the time — the downtrodden people and the real owners of the revolution."³⁹

The government continued to appeal for "revolutionary patience," presenting such problems and others as the temporary costs of the revolution and the "just war" against the enemies of Islam. It systematically appealed to people to avoid consumerism and blamed foreign conspiracies for the lowering of oil prices⁴⁰ and the "economic terrorism" of opposition groups (for hoarding, profiteering, and raising inflation).⁴¹ Its practical policies, however, proved inadequate.

Aware of the potentially devastating consequences of economic hardship, the government declared in mid-July an "all-embracing plan" to combat profiteering. Seminars were organized in which executive officials, governors, and judiciary authorities attempted to coordinate policies to tackle profiteering. Price controls were enforced for certain goods, and fruit and vegetable markets in Tehran, where merchants charged extortionate prices, were closed.⁴² On 19 July, the Public Prosecutor's Office in Tehran issued an order calling on all officials of the *Komitehs*, the *Basij*, the Police Department, and the Gendarmerie to combat profiteering. These officials were obliged by the order to carry out arrests, confiscate goods, and hand over violators to the Public Prosecutor's Office.⁴³ The prime minister advised the use of "religious punishment" in an effort "to deal decisively with the problem of rising prices."⁴⁴ The government declared that there was an "extraordinary" public response to such measures. In November, Musavi said that during the first months of the new year (which began in March) the price index had risen by 2.1%, 2.4%, 2.6%, 2.7% and 2.9% a month; whereas, in the first month following the implementation of the plan, prices fell to 0.5%.⁴⁵ However, such government declarations were regarded with much skepticism: after all, it was not the first time the government had imposed such measures and claimed a similar "success." On the other hand, the measures proved sufficient to cause resentment among those with vested interests. (For details of a similar campaign two years earlier, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 450–53.)

Due to the devaluation of the Iranian currency and inflation, the wages of many civil servants and of members in the various forces plunged considerably below the cost of living. Unable to raise salaries, the government submitted a bill to provide indirect aid to civil servants. How delicate the question was would be gauged from the statements of the former governor of the Central Bank, Mohsen Nurbakhsh (who had been replaced in November 1986). In an article in *Kayhan*, he took issue with the

proposed bill and claimed that it characterized the government's preoccupation with curing the effects of the problem rather than its causes: the bill sought to remedy inflation and the shrinking purchasing power of the salaried classes, while the problem was not inflation *per se* but the economic conditions that led to inflation. He warned that unless the root causes were addressed, the government would soon be faced with grave problems.

It was precisely these basic economic problems that the government failed to solve. Given these difficulties and its determination to continue the war, the government moved instead to ease the economic burden by means of "a financial *jihad*." According to the scheme announced in November, all those who were unable to participate actively in the war would undertake to cover the expenses of one or more combatants. It would cost IR200,000 to sponsor one combatant for three months; wealthier people were advised not to limit themselves to one but to even sponsor a battalion (i.e., 1,000 combatants).⁴⁶

Nor did the 1988–89 budget, presented to the *Majlis* in late December, contain new elements. The prime minister repeated the same "main goals": priority to defense, to agriculture, to restructuring industry, to supplying essential goods at fixed prices, and maintaining price controls.⁴⁷

Oil revenues still made it possible for the government to continue running the state while financing the war. Although the state of the economy did not constitute an immediate political threat, it certainly caused increased public resentment and greater opposition to the war, and gave new life to the opposition. The linkage between the war and the economic situation of the *mostaz'efin* was another threatening factor for the government.

THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR

In 1986–87 Tehran had repeatedly pledged that the Persian year ending on 20 March 1987 would be the year of victory. But it was not to be. Although some relatively successful operations were carried out (such as in Mehran in May 1986, and around Basra in January 1987), the year was not more successful than the previous one or, for that matter, the year before that. Minor operations were carried out in the Kurdish region where Iran occupied some strategic heights, and in the deep south, where it penetrated deeper into the Iraqi defenses east of Basra. But these were not the kind of operations that were likely to bring victory. Moreover, since the January offensive (code-named "Karbala Five"), Iran had repeatedly claimed that its troops were preparing the major and decisive offensive, but it failed to materialize. Thus, while in each of the previous years there had been two or three major Iranian offensives, there was an interval of an entire year up to the writing of this chapter, when no large-scale offensive took place. This was the longest interval between major operations since the war began.

The Iranians were in a dilemma: they felt obliged to initiate a major attack to maintain the military momentum, but at the same time hesitated to risk another attack that would not result in a clear-cut success. Because of growing sensitivity to the human losses and the economic costs, the government preferred not to launch a major attack. Since the summer, new elements were added: the presence of the superpowers, and the escalation of tension with the US and with the Arab littoral states. Under these circumstances, Tehran was careful not to open a new front, or to

force the foreign powers into a direct confrontation. (For the developments on the war fronts and the growing tension with the US, see essays on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and the US and the ME.) These considerations could, presumably, have persuaded Tehran to seek a negotiated peace, or at least a cease-fire. But although the Islamic republic was at times willing to appear more moderate, it did not substantially change its conditions for the termination of the war.

At that stage, some Iranian leaders may have sincerely wished to end the war, but Khomeyni's uncompromising stand made the very raising of such a view tantamount to treason and political suicide. In his speech on the anniversary of the Islamic republic (11 February), amid heavy Iraqi attacks on Iranian civilians, Khomeyni made it clear that the heavy burden of the war notwithstanding, the government should continue its holy crusade until victory. "Almost every day," he said, "Iran is hit and many children, youngsters, old men, and ordinary people see their homes fall in on them, but as soon as they clamber from the rubble they speak of the need for us to make war until victory."⁴⁸ His determination remained unchanged; without his consent others — even if they wanted to — could not speak up.

Thus, Tehran clung to its old, uncompromising positions. Above all, it insisted on the destruction of Ba'th rule in Iraq. Early in the year, Rafsanjani said that, in order for the war to end, "the Iraqi Ba'thists must be removed from the region.... We have no alternative but to remove the ominous presence of those criminals."⁴⁹ Only this, he believed, would "pave the way for the liberation of Iraq."⁵⁰ Khameneh'i's view was no different. "The objective," he said in January, "is to wipe out the war-mongering Iraqi regime."⁵¹ "Punishment of the aggressor," he claimed, was not "an empty slogan... The issue is one of principle — revolutionary and Islamic. ...The Ba'thist-Afraqi regime of Iraq must go."⁵² This "cancerous tumor," he added in July, "should be rooted out."⁵³ Musavi followed suit, declaring that the removal of Saddam's "mischievous regime" was the aim of his government.⁵⁴

These declarations were intensified in the summer and coupled with warnings against the US, its European allies, and the Arab littoral states. In September, Rafsanjani stated that it would be "a serious mistake" to believe that it was at all possible to save the Iraqi nation from the clutches of the "infidel 'Aflaqis through political means."⁵⁵ In his speech at the UN General Assembly (22 September), Khameneh'i said that more important than the return of occupied Iranian territories and the Iranian demand for war reparations was the insistence on "punishing the aggressor and rooting out the apparatus of aggression."⁵⁶ To the UN secretary-general, Javier Pérez de Cuellar (who visited Tehran earlier in September) he said, "The only formula that can be accepted by the Islamic nation is the one that foresees the punishment of the aggressor."⁵⁷ 'Ali Muhammad Besharati (the deputy foreign minister) made it clear that there was "no room for negotiated peace."⁵⁸ Rafsanjani said he was confident that all members of the Security Council in fact agree that "Iraq is [the] aggressor." If they made such a declaration, he said, Iran would "compromise" over the question whether "an Islamic or regional court should be set up to discuss what to do with the aggressor." He stressed that "condemnation alone will not serve the purpose," it will only serve as "grounds for a court to subsequently issue a verdict."⁵⁹ All other officials followed the same line.

Nor were their declarations of confidence much changed. As at the beginning of the previous Persian year, Rafsanjani claimed that "the course of the war will be

determined this year" (ending, this time, on 20 March 1988).⁶⁰ As in the previous year, he soon retreated to less optimistic declarations. Later that month he only spoke of "fatal blows" to be delivered against Iraq that year. The president expressed the hope that Iran would "celebrate victory" before the ninth anniversary of the republic (in February 1988). Kamal Kharazi, Iran's war spokesman, stated in April that Iran was now "much closer to the finish."⁶¹

The American naval presence in the Gulf certainly did not encourage the Iranians to moderate their terms for ending the war, at least not in 1987. Yet, upset and furious as they were, the Iranians again demonstrated self-restraint. Late in July Khameneh'i warned that his country would attack the American forces unless they pulled out of the "dangerous whirlpool" of the Gulf. "They had better leave," he said in a Friday sermon, "otherwise we shall strike them so hard they will regret what they have done."⁶² To demonstrate its seriousness, Tehran staged (early in August) a four-day naval exercise in the Gulf, code-named *Shehadat* ("Martyrdom"), "to demonstrate the readiness" to carry out suicide attacks against the US Navy. Muhammad Husayn Malekzadegan, the commander of Iran's Navy, said (after the Mecca massacre) that his force was ready "to confront plots by world arrogance." He added: "We will soon avenge our martyrs in the Gulf region." Rafsanjani also threatened to attack US forces in the Gulf to avenge the deaths of the pilgrims.⁶³ But, in fact, Tehran proved much more restrained (see below).

Not only did it wish to avoid escalation in the Gulf (mainly with the US), but it was also more willing to encourage peacemaking delegations (mainly the UN) to continue their work. At this stage Tehran took pains to make its declarations sound more moderate. Khameneh'i said in December that Washington's aim was to spread the war. "We don't want to spread the war to other countries," he stated. In an uncharacteristic speech he expressed the hope that the war "will be over soon," and did not exclude diplomatic attempts to reach such a goal. Even with regard to the US presence in the Gulf he was now more cautious, claiming that Tehran would not accept its presence in the Gulf for the *long term*.⁶⁴ Similarly, Rafsanjani claimed that Tehran "strongly opposed" the American presence, but added that "this does not mean that we will start a fight with the US if it maintains its presence here. We will express our opposition *politically* and will exert pressure with whatever levers we have."⁶⁵ Its actual policy was further proof that Tehran's rhetoric notwithstanding, it was behaving in a much more rational way. In fact, since the summer, Tehran had made an important distinction between the war with Iraq and the tension in the Persian Gulf — the former should continue until victory, the latter "can end."⁶⁶ It was similarly willing to welcome any negotiations to halt the attack on civilians, and the Iraqi use of chemical weapons.⁶⁷ But, in 1987, ending the war was still another question.

THE OPPOSITION

The various opposition groups failed to take advantage of the growing resentment and other rifts in Tehran to seriously challenge the revolutionary regime. Either because of the regime's countermeasures or their own failures, the lot of the opposing political movements was one of frustration. They continued to be divided and ineffective, and seemed to have despaired of their ability to destabilize the regime, at least as long as Khomeyni was alive.

The domestic opposition did not go much beyond verbal criticism; abroad they could only nurse their dream of one day returning home. Against those who persisted in opposition activities, the most repressive measures were applied by the Islamic republic (sometimes even in their places of exile).

As in the previous few years, the various opposition movements labored to convince their compatriots back home of the disasters brought about by clerical rule. In doing so, the movements concentrated their criticism on one major issue: the war. Other important items on their agenda were the economy, the lack of freedom, and the brutal repression of the opposition.

The Freedom Movement (*Nehzate Azadi*), led by former prime minister Mehdi Bazargan, was the only domestic movement to express criticism. In 1987 it did so even more vigorously than in previous years. In an open letter to Rafsanjani (widely distributed in Tehran) early in the year, Bazargan criticized the government's determination to continue the war despite the heavy casualties. "It is seven years," he claimed, "that you are searching for imaginary victory... During this time your directive 'War until Victory' has changed to 'war until annihilation'." He accused the regime of "leading the people to complete dissolution" by setting the replacement of Saddam Husayn by another dictator as its major aim. Bazargan went on to accuse the government of "shutting the people's and the nation's mouth" and preventing them from raising their voice against the war.⁶⁸ A few months later he sent an open letter to Khomeyni repeating similar charges and asking him: "What is the purpose of all these killings?"⁶⁹

The Tudeh Party had not yet recovered from the heavy blow suffered in the 1982–83 crackdown (see *MECS* 1982–83, pp. 532–34), and continued to "operate" mainly from Europe. However, according to most available sources, it was clandestinely regrouping inside the country as well. It declared its support for an unconditional cease-fire ahead of a political settlement, and made it clear that over the long term it wanted to see a "popular, democratic revolution" in Iran to consolidate the ideals of the 1979 revolution, which had been corrupted by the current leadership.⁷⁰ The organ of the party, *Namehe Mardom* (published in Stockholm), kept repeating that, in the view of the party, "the bloody and devastating...war is useless, futile and aimless" and benefits only "international imperialism and reaction." Among its other charges were: the oppression and killing of revolutionary and patriotic forces in Iran, "the slaughter" of the Kurdish people, and the suppression of workers' demonstrations and antiwar movements.⁷¹ A Tudeh statement in November predicted that the country was "on the [verge] of a huge wave of dissent and protest against the destructive war and the warmongering regime." The party called for the formation of a "powerful and united opposition" which would "organize the scattered efforts of the huge masses of the people."⁷²

The *Mujahidine Khalq* continued to be the most organized and active opposition group. After some of their leaders were forced out of France in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 345–46) and others were asked to leave in 1987 (see below), they moved to Iraq, where they were closer to Iranian territory and to their fighters inside the country. According to some sources they were increasingly active in attacking units of the RG and preparing cells for a future confrontation with the regime (presumably when Khomeyni dies). Mas'ud Rajavi, the leader of the *Mujahidin*, announced in June the formation of a rebel army with strong backing from Iraq. Baghdad reportedly

provided training, equipment and staging grounds for the unit's operations as well as headquarters in the Iraqi capital (similar support had long been given by Tehran to Iraqi dissidents; see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 566–67). Despite claims of successful raids against the RG, however, it remained unclear what impact or power the unit actually had.⁷³

Other opposition movements, which had their headquarters in Paris, were no less vocal, but ultimately hardly more active than the *Mujahidin*. Reza (Shah) II continued to send his messages to the Iranian people from exile. In a message on the occasion of the Persian New Year, he said that the “pseudo-clerical usurpers” offered the nation “nothing but war, fratricide, floggings, torture, terror, suppression, lies and hypocrisy.” He vowed to take steps to topple the regime.⁷⁴ In a press conference in Paris, in August, he said that the circumstances were “favorable” and that he hoped “to play a far more active role.” He claimed that there was considerable resistance to Khomeyni among Iranian civilians and troops who, he said, were “ready to act at the right moment.” He added that “the answer does not lie in Western capitals but in Iran — we have to go back to Iran.” But he also implied that [only] the death of the imam “will open up opportunities for us.” He claimed to have devoted the last few years to organizing “underground resistance networks” inside Iran, but he did not elaborate on this, and there was not yet any evidence of a substantial monarchist movement springing up in Iran.⁷⁵

Whether in response to the opposition attempts to dissuade Iranians from continuing with the war or not, there were signs that more and more people were tired of it and were willing to see it end. Open criticism was voiced in Tehran. Leaflets signed by a former general were distributed in the streets and bazaars of Tehran in mid-May. Addressing an open letter to Khomeyni, retired general ‘Azizollah Amir Rahimi (the former commander of Khomeyni’s paramilitary Gendarmerie) bitterly criticized the “human wave” tactics used in offensives and called on the government to accept international mediation to end “this stupid and painful war.” He argued:

It is a big, painful joke to think of defeating the Iraqi Army by this ridiculous tactic of human waves. The tactics our irregular forces [the RG] are using at the front resemble those used by the American Indians 200 years ago. They failed and ours are doomed, too. Even a hundred more such attacks would be futile. Our greatest gain would be to see an end to the war before it is too late.⁷⁶

There were also reports of antiwar demonstrations in Tehran. On one occasion, in Vali-‘Asr Square (in the heart of the Tehran shopping district) in May, several hundred demonstrators had reportedly urged “forgiveness” for Saddam Husayn and reconciliation with Iraq — which could only be considered heretical given the animosity between the two countries.⁷⁷

Some acts of terrorism, mainly attributed to the *Mujahidine Khalq*, were reported during the year in Tehran itself. But the main field of opposition activity remained far from home. Several operations were carried out against Iranian envoys or government agencies abroad (such as the attack on an Iranian envoy in Madrid, in July; the siege of the Iranian Embassy in Oslo; and the attack on Iran Air offices in Paris and Frankfurt — all in September). The Iranian authorities, on the other hand, were blamed for the attempt on the life of the late Shah’s minister, Amir Khosrow Amir Parviz (in July, in London), and the assassination of an anti-Khomeyni activist, ‘Ali Tavakoli Nabavi, and his son (in October, in London).

The growing opposition in the West did not seriously concern the regime; but the mounting resentment within the country did provide it with reason for concern. Tehran had never explicitly admitted that there were disagreements about, and possibly opposition to, the official war policy. However, there was now growing evidence of such disagreement. Although Tehran denied reports that it was finding it more difficult to conscript fighters, some of its official statements tended to support these rumors.⁷⁸

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The revolutionary drive and the war with Iraq molded Tehran's foreign relations in 1987, just as they had since 1980. There was also continuity in ideological terms: this meant, above all, adherence to the concept of "neither the East nor the West" (in Tehran's relations with the superpowers) and to "exporting" the revolution (in its regional policy). With regard to Iraq, the declared aim remained unchanged: "War, war until victory."

Yet, in practice, Tehran often deviated from its doctrinaire conceptions in favor of pragmatic considerations (for such tendencies in previous years, see *MECS* 1986, p. 347). This was not a sign of new-found moderation, but a practical response to the exigencies of the situation. Such difficulties had led Iran in the previous year or so to improve its relations with more foreign countries — both in the Muslim world and the West. Such an approach could be discerned in attempts to improve relations with France and Saudi Arabia, among others. Tehran dealt with the French Government to settle their dispute in a friendly way; it also discouraged Iranians from radicalism during the *hajj* to Mecca, and negotiated with the Saudi Government to settle their differences despite basic disagreements. Moreover, Iranian officials dealt with the US to purchase arms, and signaled to Washington that they were interested in better relations. In retrospect it was clear that foreign policy in 1986 had been guided by more pragmatic considerations: instead of rejecting both superpowers, Tehran had tried to reduce tensions; instead of being aggressive towards the Muslim states, it had tried to buy their cooperation.

In 1987 tension reemerged in relations with more and more countries: an open conflict with the US (over the reflagging of Kuwaiti vessels and its military presence in the Gulf); difficulties in relations with France and Britain; and disagreements even with its closest ally, Syria. In mid-February Iran expelled two German diplomats, in retaliation for a television program mocking Khomeyni; late in April two Australian diplomats were expelled, for a similar reason; already late in March Tunisia severed ties, accusing Iranian diplomats of engaging in subversive activities among Islamic movements. Tension also reemerged in Tehran's relations with Turkey (over its policy toward Iraqi Kurds). In May, Egypt closed the Iranian interest office in Cairo because of alleged Iranian support for terrorism (see chapter on Egypt).

Early in 1987, then, the Khomeyni regime seemed much closer to the radicalism of its first years in power than to its more moderate stance in 1985 and 1986. In a different vein, in October 1987, one of the anomalies of the war came to an end: after seven years of bitter fighting, diplomatic relations between Iran and Iraq were broken. Announcing this, the Iranian ambassador to Ankara said that relations had been long suspended and "only a few [Iranian] employees remained at the embassy who had

practically no activities to carry out." Now they were called back.⁷⁹ (For earlier Iranian confirmation that some kind of diplomatic "relations" did exist, see *MECS* (1984–85, p. 449).

Tehran again felt it had been rejected by the entire world—just as it sensed at the outset of the revolution that the entire world was against it. Following the revelations of the arms deals with the Americans (in November 1986), significant segments in the government still wished to avoid a confrontation with the US. The more pragmatic elements in Tehran (Rafsanjani at their head) had the upper hand in the struggle against the more radical (such as Mehdi Hashemi). Paradoxically, however, the pragmatists themselves subsequently turned to more radical positions. Whereas in the first years of the revolution, Iranian extremism was the result of chosen policy, arising out of a sense of power, Tehran now felt obliged to return to such a policy out of a feeling of being besieged and threatened. The upshot was that Tehran again felt isolated and forced to promote its political aims by more radical means. The growing tensions notwithstanding, Tehran proved powerful enough to control its emotions and act in accordance with its national interests. Above all, it prevented an open confrontation with the US (over the Gulf patrol) and with Saudi Arabia (following the *haji* killings).

RELATIONS WITH THE WEST AND THE EAST

Iranian "relations" with the US deteriorated to their lowest level since the 1979 hostage crisis. With the Soviet Union some improvement was noticed in economic relations, but the basic ideological-political differences still made Moscow almost as repugnant as Washington. In the view of revolutionary Iran—as Khomeyni often put it—"all infidels belong to the same camp." In his message to the pilgrims he made it clear (in July) that the concept of "neither the East nor the West" was "the fundamental slogan of the Islamic Revolution" and revealed the true concept of non-alignment: "This policy will not be deviated from, even by an iota."⁸⁰ *Jumhuriyye Islami* revealed the Iranian view that in fact "not the slightest change" had taken place in their policy; the only fresh development, it said, was the "removal of the masks" that had covered their faces.⁸¹

THE UNITED STATES

While all areas of disagreement between the two countries persisted, tension in 1987 revolved mainly around the American involvement in the Persian Gulf. Hostile declarations became more frequent and much more radical, and there was no doubt that the US was still the "Great Satan."

The leadership promised that in the event of a confrontation with America, Islam would win. The spokesman of the RG said that Iranian forces had turned the Gulf islands into "huge battleships that can easily hunt all of the enemy's ships and naval apparatus." Rafsanjani, following a meeting of the Supreme Council of Defense late in June, said that Iranians must prepare for a confrontation with America.⁸² He told his people that "we are on the edge of a military confrontation with the US in our Gulf." The commander of the Navy said that his units were capable of confronting the Americans and winning the war.⁸³ Khameneh'i also threatened to take decisive measures against the US, should it take action in the Gulf.⁸⁴ He said on 1 July that Iran had already deployed its missiles and was ready to strike at the Americans in such

a way that the American people would never forgive the Administration for its "stupid" policy.⁸⁵ Deputy Foreign Minister Husayn Shaykh ul-Islam said in Vienna: "if the Americans make the mistake of attacking us, we will definitely strike back. If they attack us inside our country, we will attack them inside their country. If they attack our ships, we will attack their ships."⁸⁶ Velayati warned the US that it will find it easier to sail its ships into the Gulf than to get them safely out.⁸⁷ Anti-American statements grew in number and became harsher in tone with the escalation in the Gulf; by the end of the year both sides appeared to be on the brink of a war, but at the same time eager to prevent a direct confrontation.

Once again, its militant rhetoric notwithstanding, Tehran showed self-restraint. It made a diplomatic effort to dissuade West European governments from joining the US in supplying military protection for shipping through the Gulf, and to explain the Iranian point of view. At the same time, it labored to convince the Arab littoral states to distance themselves from American policy. Even when attacked by the Americans (such as the assault on the *Iran Ajr* or the attack on its oil platforms in September), it reacted in a calculated way in order not to push the Americans into a direct confrontation.

From time to time low-keyed references to Washington were also voiced by Iranian officials — mainly before the tension in the Gulf escalated, but also afterwards. As in previous years such statements were mainly made by Rafsanjani (and, more often than not, to foreign audiences). To an Iranian correspondent, Rafsanjani said early in April, that Iran "has never rejected the principle" of having relations with all countries, with the sole exceptions of Israel and South Africa.⁸⁸ At a press conference later that month he said: "We do not think relations with the US should remain severed for ever....Once we are assured that the US intends to stop engaging in mischief against us...we will be prepared to establish relations."⁸⁹ Late in September he revealed that the two countries were still maintaining some kind of contact, but added he was not "in a position to specify who established those contacts." He said: "Contacts of this kind are continuing. If the US changes its [anti-Iranian] feelings, it can easily demonstrate this...All they need to do is unfreeze our assets...We will then [even] be prepared to take action in their favor."⁹⁰ On another occasion he admitted that Iran was still willing to buy arms from the US.⁹¹

Late in October, following intensification of the tension in the Gulf (see essays on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and the US and the ME), President Reagan imposed a broad trade embargo against Iran for attacks on US and other interests in the Gulf. The order included a ban on imports of oil and other goods from Iran, and an embargo on 14 categories of US products with potential military application.⁹² Musavi responded that the president's move was intended "for domestic consumption" and that, anyway, Iran neither buys American goods nor needs relations with the US at all. He added: "As far as our foreign trade is concerned, the US was erased from the list of countries from which we receive imports...[and] we did not sell oil directly to the US."⁹³ But at that time there were already growing indications of what a foreign observer termed "the irony of Iran's expanding trade with the US."⁹⁴ In any case, this was another threatening development for Iran.

FRANCE AND BRITAIN

Relations with France in the previous two years had had their ups and downs. Following apparent improvements in ties in the spring and summer of 1985,

tension returned in the autumn of 1986. The main points of friction were — as in previous years — the shipping of military supplies to Iraq, the harboring of the members of the Iranian opposition, and the outstanding debt to Iran. To these, other obstacles were added in 1987: the arrest of Iranian “diplomats” in Paris, and French support for America’s Gulf policy. Nonetheless both sides were eager to improve relations. But, although tension abated somewhat (and economic transactions prospered), political exchanges remained strained and none of the basic problems dividing the two countries was solved.

The Iranian view of French policy was characterized in a commentary in early April:

If we look carefully we can easily see that among the Western bloc countries France has played *the biggest role* in arming the Iraqi regime. At present the Iraqi Air Force, with its Russian complexion, is using [French-made] *Mirage* planes, and Iraqi pilots are being trained to fly these planes [in France]. We have not yet forgotten the delivery of the *Super-Etendard* planes to Iraq... When the French leaders could not sell a weapon to Iraq they were prepared to rent it to them, swallowing their pride in their effort to confront Islam.⁹⁵

Jumhuriyye Islami warned Paris that it was considered “to be a partner in the crimes of Baghdad” and that Iran would respond to its crimes “in an appropriate manner that can be understood by Mr. Mitterrand.”⁹⁶

Early in June, Paris informally advised its nationals who did not have pressing business there to leave Iran as soon as possible. The warning followed fears of Iranian retaliation after 57 Iranians and Arabs were held for questioning in a major police roundup in Paris, Lyons, Marseilles, and Toulouse. Nine Iranians suspected of terrorist activities were expelled from the country; and the French Government insisted that the second most senior man at the Iranian Embassy in Paris, Wahid Gorji, be handed over to the police for questioning about his suspected terrorist activities. This marked a definite end to the “charm offensive” conducted toward Iran by France, in the hope of securing, among other things, the release of French hostages held by pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon.

The Iranians retaliated by sealing off the French Embassy in Tehran, organizing anti-French demonstrations, and blaming Paris for supporting Iraq. They threatened to put the French diplomats on trial, accusing them of spying (28 French citizens remained confined to their embassy.) Musavi warned that “popular forces” in Iran would retaliate against any pressure on Iranian representatives abroad.⁹⁷ Finally, on 17 July, France announced that it was severing diplomatic links. (Tehran had expressed its intention to do so even earlier, but did not announce the break until Paris did so.) Tension was further heightened with the dispatch (in August) of French and British minesweepers to the Gulf (on 13 July an Iranian gunboat had fired on a French freighter, causing damage but not injuries). Tehran reacted with bitterness, accused them of collaborating with the US to destabilize the region, and warned that their ships might be attacked in the event of a resumption of strikes on shipping by Iraq. A Tehran Radio commentary said: “If England and France want to stand back-to-back with American forces to implement the aggressive policies of the Reagan Administration, we are ready to repeat the events of Lebanon [in 1983] which resulted in their flight.”⁹⁸

The "embassy war" was settled in November. Paris proved willing to make concessions to settle the dispute (and gain the release of its hostages). One such concession was the police raid (on 7 December) on a Paris suburb, where dozens of members of the *Mujahedine Khalk* were rounded up. According to sources in the French Interior Ministry they were involved in militant activities that posed a threat to public order. Further explaining the move, a French minister said that France "was not a sanctuary for terrorists." He blamed the *Mujahedine Khalk* for "violent activities." Some of the detainees were expelled.⁹⁹ Ten days earlier (on 27 November), two French journalists who had been kept hostage in Beirut were released. With this, and the settlement of the Gorji affair, Tehran made public its satisfaction with France's new policy. Khameneh'i said (on 2 December) that the French Government had at last given up its bullying and was now trying to normalize ties with Iran.¹⁰⁰ The deputy foreign minister for political affairs, Husayn Shayk ul-Islam, said (on 3 December) that the four-month crisis between the two countries "has come to an end" through "secret and direct negotiations." He predicted that future Iranian-French relations would be "very good."¹⁰¹ Musavi added, a few days later, that progress in mutual relations "has been very good," and expressed the hope that "this tendency will continue and expand."¹⁰²

But the basic differences remained and may result in tension once more. An indication of possible future difficulties could be found in a Radio Tehran commentary: although France's recent action "is considered positive" and "one can call it a step toward the improvement of relations," the French authorities should bear in mind the fact that:

the country's ungrudging arms support for the warmongering Iraqi regime, and the fact that this matter is intolerable for the Iranian nation, will have a decisive negative effect on the trend of improving relations... . On the other hand, any delay or procrastination in the repayment of Iran's \$1 bn. loan — which, adding up interest, comes to about \$2 bn. now — would cast doubt on the sincerity of the French Government.¹⁰³

This contested loan, made to France's Atomic Energy Commission in 1974 to help pay for the construction of a uranium-enrichment plant, had indeed been a permanently disruptive factor in Iranian-French relations since the revolution. After France paid back \$330m. in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 350–51), negotiations continued early in 1987 before being broken off as the result of the growing political tension. Late in February a financial delegation led by the deputy minister of economic affairs, Mehdi Navab, left for Paris to discuss the subject but did not reach an agreement. In May, the *Majlis* agreed to entrust the dispute to international arbitration. In December, it was disclosed that Paris had undertaken to turn over another \$330m. to Iran as part of their secret accord.¹⁰⁴

Relations with Britain, which had long been tense, further deteriorated in May after Edward Chaplin, a senior member of the British interests section in Tehran, was detained and beaten up (in an Iranian response to charges of shoplifting against a member of its Manchester consulate). Both sides proved unwilling to go so far as to break off relations altogether. Tehran wished to maintain its London-based arms procurement office, which organized many of its purchases from European sources. It tried to portray Chaplin's detention as "a marginal problem," which should not cause

a break in diplomatic relations. London, for its part, still wished to have its representatives in Tehran, partly to continue negotiations to release its hostages in the hands of pro-Iranian extremists, either in Iran or in Lebanon. Consequently, London ordered the closure of the Iranian consulate in Manchester and expelled a number of Iranian diplomats. Iran retaliated by expelling some British diplomats.

When the tit-for-tat expulsions continued, London recalled all but one of its diplomats from Tehran and, in accordance with the principle of reciprocity, told the Iranians that they would be required to do the same at their diplomatic mission in London. A Foreign Office spokesman said that the remaining British official (a third secretary in the visa section) would not perform diplomatic, commercial, or consular functions, but would only assist the Swedish protecting power in administering the considerable British estate in Tehran. However, since the dispute had been confined to diplomatic and consular representatives, the Iranian military procurement office was still allowed to continue operating, although its activities were kept under surveillance. Britain has also urged its citizens in Iran to leave the country.

The British foreign minister, Sir Geoffrey Howe, stated on 18 June: "Yes, we want relations, but it has to be substantive.... The door is ajar, but the ball is in the Iranian hand."¹⁰⁵ However, the Iranians were unwilling to take unilateral steps to improve relations; they wanted Britain to prove its good intentions first. Consequently, relations further deteriorated to what they had been early in 1980, when, following the seizure of the American Embassy, demonstrations were held in front of the British Embassy in Tehran and Britain recalled its diplomats. British support for US policy in the Gulf further added to the tension. Finally, when a British tanker was fired at in the Gulf, the British Government (23 September) closed down the Iranian arms purchasing office in London.¹⁰⁶

THE SOVIET UNION

As in the first eight years of the Islamic republic, Iran's anti-American stand in 1987 did not produce a corresponding pro-Soviet turn: ideological tenets and political considerations made Moscow almost as repugnant as Washington. The main issues that overshadowed ties were the Soviet presence in Afghanistan and arms shipments to Iraq. The fact that the Soviets had been the first to consent to escort Kuwaiti ships (after a previous offer to the Americans was declined), was now also held against them. Yet, as in previous years, Iran was cautious not to allow relations with the Soviets to become as strained as those with the US. There was a continuation of political tension and mistrust, accompanied by mutual accusations, but at the same time there was an attempt to improve relations, mainly in the economic sphere.

Tension manifested itself early in the year, with charges and countercharges revolving mainly around the war with Iraq and navigation in the Gulf (the Soviets presumably also resented the Iranian use of Chinese missiles). In February, Khomeini attacked the USSR (and France) for having "placed missiles, bombs, or aircraft at Iraq's disposal." He accused them of acting against Iran.¹⁰⁷ Early in April, Radio Tehran blamed Moscow for supplying Iraq with "long-range surface-to-surface missiles, modern tanks and ultramodern aircraft."¹⁰⁸ In mid-April, Tehran protested against the Soviets' undertaking to escort Kuwaiti ships. The spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs said that this Soviet policy was "tantamount to expressing readiness to place a number of tankers at Kuwait's disposal."¹⁰⁹ A few days later, when

the first deputy chairman of the Soviet presidium visited Baghdad, Tehran criticized the USSR for expanding its political, economic, and military ties with Iraq. This, Tehran warned, would not save Saddam but only incite tempers in the Muslim world against Moscow.¹¹⁰ Khameneh'i then warned Moscow that its policy in the the Gulf was "a grave error."¹¹¹ On 23 April, *Jumhuriyye Islami* wrote that if Moscow was really worried about the war, as it claimed, it should have refrained from sending modern weapons to Iraq and not signed a "treaty of friendship with war criminals." When the Soviet deputy foreign minister visited Iraq and Kuwait, there was a similar reaction in Tehran. Early in May, Iranian gunboats attacked a Soviet ship in the Gulf; and the Iranian president reiterated that the Soviet stance in the Gulf War was "not acceptable."¹¹²

In February, Foreign Minister Velayati left for Moscow to discuss the expansion of economic and political relations (among the main issues raised by Tehran were the arming of Iraq and the invasion of Afghanistan).¹¹³ According to Western sources, they also discussed arms purchases. The trip to Moscow (the first at such a level since the revolution) was in itself important; but all Velayati was willing to say at the end of his tour was: "We achieved pretty much what we set out to do."¹¹⁴

This visit was followed by an extensive exchange of visits between Moscow and Tehran. Following the visit to Moscow by Javad Larijani (the deputy foreign minister, in July) and to Tehran by Yuli Vorontsov (the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, in August), agreement in principle was reached on several major industrial projects, including oil pipelines, refineries and a railroad from the Soviet Union to the Gulf.¹¹⁵ The economic ties between the two countries were further discussed by Iranian delegations to Moscow headed by Larijani (September) and Aqazadeh (October), and Soviet delegations to Tehran headed by Vorontsov (late in October), and the deputy minister of railways and chief of railway traffic (in November).¹¹⁶ Western media pointed to the "close relationship" established between the "odd couple."¹¹⁷ Rafsanjani said that relations had undergone "great developments," and that the prospect for further bilateral cooperation was "bright."¹¹⁸ On 1 September the Soviet ambassador to Tehran officially invited Rafsanjani to visit the USSR, and the Speaker accepted the invitation, although the date for the visit was not set immediately.

But not even the visits, declarations and economic projects could close the gap dividing the two countries. The Western media, sensitive to a possible pro-Soviet shift in Tehran, often overestimated the scope of actual relations. As one observer wrote: "If Iran-Soviet relations had improved as often as reported, the two nations would be [by now] strong economic partners, working side-by-side in scores of joint ventures and development projects. As it is, there has been little improvement in relations at the practical level."¹¹⁹ Even Rafsanjani, eager to demonstrate the closeness of relations, could not hide the existing difficulties. Iran, he said, still resented the Soviet supply of arms to Iraq, and the Soviets protested against Iranian aid to the Afghan resistance: "These two problems remain, but they are much less important because we have stopped criticizing each other about them."¹²⁰

THE MUSLIM WORLD

In its relations with the Arab world, Iran continued to combine the pragmatic considerations of national interest with the ideological spirit of the Islamic Revolution. In 1987, in line with the overall trend toward greater radicalism, Iranian rhetoric

again began to resemble the revolutionary statements of the initial years of the Islamic republic, yet actual policy was much more pragmatic. This was evident after the American intervention and the Mecca massacre.

THE PERSIAN GULF

The war and the world oil glut remained the main issues in bilateral relations between Tehran and the Arab Gulf states. In 1987, tension in the Gulf — closely related to both issues — had gradually acquired primacy. In the summer, it was the events in Mecca and the American naval presence in the Gulf that became the main divisive issues.

In previous years, Tehran's main concern was to keep its Arab neighbors from actively supporting Iraq, and to prevent a further decline of oil prices. It accordingly intensified its diplomatic efforts and toned down its public declarations. In 1987, however, it seemed to lose faith in their good intentions and returned to its early radicalism. What tipped the scales was mainly the Kuwaiti request for foreign intervention in the Gulf. Iran's lack of success on the battlefields was also a contributory factor. The Amman summit in November and its unequivocal expressions of support for Iraq (see essay on inter-Arab relations) further inflamed Tehran at the end of the year, as did the events at Mecca.

The most severe crisis developed with Kuwait. Tehran again used the "stick" rather than the "carrot," accusing Kuwait of supporting the Iraqi war effort. This was best expressed in a Friday sermon by Khameneh'i in April, in which he "reminded" the Arab littoral states of Tehran's policy: that the security of the Gulf "should be either for all or for none." Referring to Kuwait's demand for superpower support to protect its shipments, the president warned: "I issue an ultimatum to the Kuwaiti Government that it is responsible for the outcome of its moves in the Persian Gulf." Calling on the Gulf states to solve the problem between themselves, he said that hiding behind the skirts of the US and the USSR did not serve the interests of Kuwait or any other Persian Gulf country, since "in this adventurism" Kuwait was likely to suffer most.¹²¹ *Jumhuriyye Islami* wrote on 30 March that Kuwait could obtain security only by "completely and absolutely turning her back on the warmongering regime of Iraq."

Tension between Iran and Kuwait reached a peak in the second part of the year. Early in September, following the firing of an Iranian *Silkworm* missile off the Kuwaiti coast (it exploded near the loading terminal of Al-Ahmadi; see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War), Kuwait ordered the expulsion of five Iranian diplomats.¹²² But the Iranians only promised to respond "in due course." Thus, although tension was building up, Tehran gave proof of much self-restraint. Nonetheless, it continued to threaten the Kuwaitis and warn them that they would regret their anti-Iranian policy.

Grave strains emerged in Iran's relations with Saudi Arabia, mainly following the events of the *hajj* (for a detailed description of these events see essay on Islamic affairs; for Saudi reactions, see chapter on Saudi Arabia). As always, the Iranian indictment of Riyadh related both to the very nature of the Saudi regime and to the policies it had adopted. Tehran branded both as "anti-Islamic." As in previous years, tension came to a head during, and following, the *hajj*. The general trend of Iran's foreign policy and its wrath over Saudi policy in the Gulf did not bode well for relations between the two. It was clear that the Iranians would use the *hajj* to convince their coreligionists of the rightness of their cause.

Faithful to its doctrine that the *hajj* was a "big religious-political congress," Iran

regarded it as a "golden opportunity" to discuss the principal problems facing the Muslim world. Since in Khomeyni's doctrine there was no separation between religion and state, the Iranians believed that they should take advantage of such a huge gathering of Muslims (some 2m.) from all over the world to explain their ideas of "true Islam." For them, this was an important way of spreading not only their exclusive ideology but also their political line all over the Muslim world. The Saudis, by contrast, wished to limit the pilgrimage to a purely religious-ritual event and to prevent all pilgrims — but mainly the Iranians — from engaging in political debate, not to mention demonstrations. What made them even more nervous were the Iranian references to their incompetence to serve as the guardians of the holy shrines; to the un-Islamic nature of their regime; to their anti-Islamic (i.e., anti-Iranian, or rather pro-Iraqi) policy; and to the assertion that Khomeyni was the only true Islamic leader¹²³ — all such charges were raised on the eve of the *hajj* and intensified after the pilgrimage.

Although tension had peaked every year during the *hajj*, since 1984 Iran had shown much more restraint than it did, for example, in 1982 or 1983. Again and again Tehran advised its people to refrain from independent initiatives and to follow strictly the instructions of the (Iranian) officials. Tehran called upon its pilgrims to exhibit self-restraint and it even replaced (in 1985) the more radical Hujjat ul-Islam Kho'iniha with Mehdi Karubi as the imam's representative for the *hajj*. During the year under review, official Iranian declarations, including Khomeyni's instructions, were more radical than those of the last two years, but certainly less so than at earlier times. Khomeyni still asked his followers to observe Islamic behavioral norms and obey the officials, but at the same time he used harsh terms to describe the Saudis and Kuwaitis and, even more so, the US and Iraq. In the end there was an unprecedented confrontation, which led to the massacre of between 400 and 600 people.

Following the massacre, Tehran was torn between its desire for revenge and its need to prevent a further deterioration in its relations with Saudi Arabia. The upshot was that it opted for self-restraint, but continued to criticize the Saudis and warn them of dire consequences. More than at any other time in the past, they questioned the legitimacy of the Al Sa'ud family to rule — let alone serve as the guardians of the holy places. Typical were the words of Rafsanjani who said that Iran must "uproot the Saudi rulers in the region [and] divest the control of the holy shrines from the contaminated existence of the Wahabis, those hooligans." He added: "The true revenge is to remove the colossal and precious wealth belonging to the Islamic world which lies under the soil of the Arabian peninsula...from the control of criminals." And he continued: "We, as the soldiers of *Allah* and as those responsible for implementing God's orders feel duty-bound to take revenge on both the US and the Saudi leaders."¹²⁴ Interior Minister 'Ali Akbar Mohtashemi said in a message to his Saudi counterpart: "Our courageous mobilized people in the Persian Gulf will take revenge on the US forces for the pure blood of the pilgrims to the House of God." He too pointed to the Saudis' lack of qualifications and ability to safeguard the shrines and vowed that "in the near future these holy sites will be supervised by the Muslims of the world [whom Iran represents best]."¹²⁵ Musavi declared that "those behind this grave crime will pay dearly for it."¹²⁶ Khomeyni said: "We hold America responsible for all these crimes...God willing, at an opportune time, we will deal with her."¹²⁷ Other Iranian leaders voiced similar threats.

Special efforts were made to explain to the Muslim world that the Saudis were in fact not competent to be the guardians of the holy shrines: this was at the same time central to Iran's Islamic ideology and most upsetting to the Saudis. Marchers commemorating the 40th day after the massacre issued a resolution in which they endorsed a demand by Montazeri to hand over the administration of the holy sites to "the representatives of the nations of the Islamic world."¹²⁸ Similar demands were raised again and again by Montazeri¹²⁹ and Mohtashemi,¹³⁰ among others.

On the invitation of the Foreign Ministry, an international conference convened in Tehran in November to "review the sanctity and security of the holy shrines." The demand concerning the administration of the holy sites was repeated in practically every speech. Rafsanjani went so far as to state Iran's readiness to "liberate" Mecca and set up an Islamic international government there: "If the world of Islam and its scholars decide so, we are ready to fight under any circumstances for [the] liberation of Mecca."¹³¹ The resolutions passed by the conference declared Iran to be "the only spiritual and legitimate representative" of the Muslims and added that only competent Muslim *'ulama* should administer the shrines.¹³²

Eager as it was for revenge, however, Iran faced difficulties in taking a practical step that would be harmful for the Saudis (and the US), while not endangering basic Iranian interests. So it concentrated on verbal criticism. During all this time it tried, as one journalist put it, to keep the issue of the Mecca massacre "warm but not hot."¹³³

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA

Syria and Libya were the only Arab countries with which Tehran had had relatively good relations over the last few years. However, while sharing some basic policies and certain values — such as hostility to the US, Israel, and Iraq — their intrinsic differences (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 353–54) increasingly manifested themselves. In 1987, as in 1986, Libya seemed less interested in the Persian Gulf, and its support for Iran was weaker than in previous years (see chapter on Libya). More important, signs of incipient differences with Syria, Iran's closest ally, also appeared in 1987. They revolved around two main issues: the war in the Gulf and the civil war in Lebanon. As far back as the recapture of Khorramshahr in May 1982, there were initial signs of disagreement regarding the continuation of the war. The civil war in Lebanon, in which groups supported by Tehran and Damascus often confronted each other, comprised another major area of disagreement.

The Syrian-Iraqi dialogue was the main cause of tension between Damascus and Tehran in 1987. After having impaired its relations with Jordan a year before Damascus was now strengthening its ties with the more moderate Arab states, and with their blessing — and mediation — also conducting negotiations with Iraq. Three important meetings were held between Syria and Iraqi officials between April and June: in April Saddam Husayn conferred with Hafiz al-Asad; in May there was a meeting between 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Tariq 'Aziz; and in June 'Aziz met Faruq al-Shar' (see further in essay on inter-Arab relations). The very fact of these meetings was enough to infuriate the Iranians.

Iranian resentment expressed itself mainly as criticism of clashes between Syria troops and the Hizballah in Lebanon. Early in March, Montazeri called on Lebanese religious leaders to "prosecute and punish the perpetrators" of such a "crime."¹³⁴ But in this area, too, Tehran tried to prevent tension with Damascus. Typical were the

words of the president, who blamed the "Syrian forces' reaction to [Lebanon's] pious and struggling forces" not on the government but on individual officers.¹³⁵ Rafsanjani also took pains to stress that "there is no chill" in relations between the two countries.

The rift between the two became even deeper in the summer. Following the massacre in Mecca, Syria's support for Iran (unlike that of Mu'ammar Qadhdhafi) was somewhat hesitant. Early in August, 'Umran Adham, the Syrian envoy to the European Economic Community and a close adviser of Asad, reportedly warned that his country was ready to act militarily to stop Tehran's expansionism and the export of Islamic fanaticism. He said: "If Iran launches a war against an Arab state, Syria will send its forces to repel the aggression." This was the strongest declaration by a Syrian official against Iran in some years. Alluding to their differences over the issue of Lebanon, he added: "We repeatedly warned Tehran that we would fight and never allow the creation of an Islamic republic there."¹³⁶ Such a statement may have been intended to satisfy public opinion in France (the statement was made during an interview with the French radio station, Europe 1). But it pointed to the two major areas of disagreement between the two countries: the Gulf War and Lebanon.

Asad's participation in the Amman summit and his meeting there with Saddam Husayn were other signs of the same difficulties. But in its subsequent public declarations Tehran continued to refer to Damascus as its close ally. Late in the year, Khameneh'i depicted relations between the two countries as "profound" and "brotherly."¹³⁷

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. R. Tehran, 23 August — SWB, 25 August 1987.
2. R. Tehran, 29 September — DR, 29 September 1987.
3. R. Tehran, 14 March — SWB, 16 March 1987. See similarly his speech broadcast over Radio Tehran, 29 September — DR, 29 September 1987.
4. *JA*, 23 September (English translation in DR, 29 September 1987); R. Tehran, 25 December — DR, 28 December 1987.
5. R. Tehran, 14 March — DR, 16 March 1987.
6. R. Tehran, 5 February — DR, 6 February 1987.
7. R. Tehran, 21 March — SWB, 23 March; *NYT*, 22 March 1987. See also his speech from 29 September in DR, 29 September 1987.
8. R. Tehran, 2 July — DR, 6 July 1987.
9. Both are quoted in *TT*, 29 November 1985.
10. Such rumors were intensified following the amendment of the will. See, for example, *The Times*, 15 December, and *JP*, 16 December 1987.
11. See, for example, *The Times*, 11 December 1987.
12. R. Tehran, 10 December — SWB, 11 December 1987.
13. R. Tehran, 23 December — SWB, 29 December 1988.
14. R. Tehran, 12 January — DR, 12 January 1988.
15. R. Tehran, 7 January — DR, 7 January 1988.
16. R. Tehran, 12 January — DR, 12 January 1988.
17. It should be mentioned that the formation of such a council was stipulated in the first (1907)

- constitution, but the Shahs had never formed one. Now Khomeyni was trying to limit its power.
18. *The Guardian*, 31 January 1987.
 19. *ME*, April 1987.
 20. *NYT*, 29 August 1987.
 21. *FT*, 3 October 1987.
 22. For the growing power of the RG in 1987, see articles in *MM*, 22 June; *FT*, 6 August; *IHT*, 31 August 1987.
 23. *Kayhan*, London, 12 February 1987. For a similar view on such an "alliance" between Mohsen Rafiqdust and Rafsanjani, see: *MM*, 22 June 1987.
 24. *ME*, April 1987.
 25. *Ji*, 2 June; R. Tehran, 2 June — SWB, 3 June; *The Guardian*, 3 June 1987.
 26. R. Tehran, 4 June — SWB, 6 June 1987.
 27. R. Tehran, 18 March — DR, 18 March 1987.
 28. R. Tehran, 15, 17 August — DR, 17 August, SWB, 19 August; *FT*, 17 August 1987.
 29. R. Tehran, 17 August — SWB, 19 August; *NYT*, 18 August 1987.
 30. In his budget speech, on 28 December 1987, Musavi said that 41% of the expenditure in the general budget and 52% of current total allocations for the government "have been earmarked for military and security affairs": R. Tehran, 28 December — SWB, 29 December 1987. Foreign observers estimated that the country was spending as much as \$5 bn. of its c. \$7 bn. annual budget on the war: *Time*, 25 May 1987.
 31. *IPD* (Economic Bulletin), 14 July 1987.
 32. *IPD* (Political Bulletin), 13 July 1987.
 33. David Menashri, *Education and the Development of Modern Iran* (forthcoming).
 34. J. Behrouz, *Iran Almanac, 1987* (Tehran: Echo of Iran, 1987), p. 135.
 35. R. Tehran, 15 July — SWB, 18 July 1987.
 36. See an article in *NYT*, 19 August 1987.
 37. R. Tehran, 15 July — SWB, 18 July 1987.
 38. *MM*, 17 August 1987.
 39. *Kayhan*, Tehran, 26 May — DR, 4 June 1987.
 40. See, for example, Musavi's budget speech in the *Majlis*, 28 December 1986; R. Tehran, 28 December — SWB, 13 January 1987.
 41. See, for example, a commentary broadcast over R. Tehran, 30 June — SWB, 3 July 1987.
 42. R. Tehran, 15 July — DR, 16 July, and SWB, 21 July 1987.
 43. R. Tehran, 19 July — SWB, 22 July 1987.
 44. R. Tehran, 23 July — DR, 24 July 1987.
 45. R. Tehran, 3 November — SWB, 17 November 1987. For somewhat different figures in Musavi's budget speech in the *Majlis*, a month later, see: R. Tehran, 28 December — DR, 29 December 1987.
 46. See Khameneh'i's speech upon presenting the scheme: R. Tehran, 16, 17, 20 November — SWB, 18, 19, 23 November. Also, Musavi's speech: R. Tehran, 26 November — DR, 27 November 1987. Until then donations for the war effort were raised mainly by the Friday imams. Such a move may have also been aimed at strengthening the government and weakening the extragovernmental agencies. The president, however, denied any such intention.
 47. R. Tehran, 28 December — SWB, 29 December 1987.
 48. R. Tehran, 11 February — SWB, 12 February; *NYT*, 11 February 1987.
 49. R. Tehran, 18 January — SWB, 20 January 1987.
 50. R. Tehran, 28 January — SWB, 30 January 1987.
 51. R. Tehran, 23 January — SWB, 26 January 1987.
 52. R. Tehran, 11 February — DR, 12 February 1987.
 53. R. Tehran, 4 July — DR, 6 July 1987.
 54. R. Tehran, 8 March — SWB, 11 March 1987.
 55. R. Tehran, 27 September — SWB, 29 September; *The Guardian*, 28 September 1987.
 56. R. Tehran, 22 September — DR, 24 September 1987.
 57. *The Guardian*, 14 September 1987.
 58. R. Tehran, 19 September — DR, 21 September 1987.

59. R. Tehran, 29 August — SWB, 31 August 1987.
60. R. Tehran, 3 April — SWB, 4 April 1987. Following another such statement he was asked by an AFP correspondent about his previous statements to inflict the fatal blow on Iraq before the current Persian New Year. He answered that what he meant was to inflict "a fateful blow," not to win the war until that date: R. Tehran, 21 April — SWB, 22 April 1987.
61. *Newsweek*, 13 April 1987.
62. *IHT*, 1 August 1987.
63. *JP*, 4 August 1987.
64. R. Tehran, 4 December — SWB, 7 December 1987.
65. R. Tehran, 15 December — SWB, 17 December 1987. Earlier, in September, he said: "We will maintain our tolerance, observe the limitations, adhere to our principles." But, "as for retaliation [on Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities], it is something that cannot be ignored." R. Tehran, 4 September — DR, 4 September 1987.
66. For such a definition of Iranian strategy, see words of Khameneh'i broadcast over R. Tehran and cited in SWB, 30 May 1987.
67. In a message to the UN secretary-general (following heavy Iraqi attacks on Iranian cities in February), Foreign Minister Velayati said his country welcomed "any verifiable international initiative" to halt the attacks on cities and undertook "to cooperate fully in support of *this* effort": R. Tehran, 28 February — DR, 2 March 1987. For the damage done by the Iraqi air raids and missile attacks, see: *The Guardian*, 15 March; *JP*, 13 May 1987.
68. *Kayhan*, London, 12 February 1987.
69. *JP*, 17 June 1987.
70. *JP*, 16 December 1987.
71. *Namehe Mardom*, 3, 10, 17 March — JPRS, 30 April, 19 May 1987.
72. Radio of the Toilers of Iran, 27, 29 November, 2 December — DR, 2 December 1987.
73. *IHT*, 22 October, 1987.
74. *Kayhan*, London, 19 March 1987.
75. *IHT*, 7 August; *The Times*, 10 August 1987. For declarations by 'Ali Amini and Shahpur Bakhtyar (both served as prime ministers under the Shah) against Khomeyni and his policies, see: *Kayhan*, London, 19 March 1987. A typical declaration by the *Fada'i-yane Khalq* (the majority faction) was broadcast over Radio of the Toilers of Iran, 19 March and cited in SWB, 21 March 1987.
76. *The Independent*, 15 May; *JP*, 20 May 1987.
77. *The Guardian*, 18 May; *JP*, 20 May 1987.
78. See statements by Col. Sohrabi, commander of the Gendarmerie and Col. Razmjû, head of the National Conscription Department, in: *Kayhan*, Tehran, 26 February, R. Tehran, 1 July — DR, 2 July 1987.
79. R. Ankara, 2 October — SWB, 5 October 1987.
80. R. Tehran, 28 July — SWB, 30 July 1987.
81. *Jl*, 23 April — SWB, 27 April 1987.
82. *The Guardian*, 28 June 1987.
83. *Ma'ariv*, 1 July 1987.
84. *The Times*, 13 June 1987.
85. *Ma'ariv*, 2 July 1987.
86. *FT*, 8 June 1987.
87. *Ma'ariv*, 14 June 1987.
88. IRNA, 6 April — DR, 7 April 1987.
89. R. Tehran, 21 April — SWB, 22 April 1987.
90. *JA*, 23 September 1987. Already in May, however, the US returned to Iran \$451m. in frozen assets in compliance with an order by a special tribunal at The Hague. The IRNA said that some assets would remain in US hands until the tribunal settled further minor claims. The money represented the residue of a \$3.66 bn.-account established with Iranian money in 1981 to pay syndicated bank loans: *WSJ*, 6 May; *IHT*, 15 May 1987.
91. R. Tehran, 28 January — SWB, 30 January 1987.
92. *IHT* and *The Guardian*, 27 October 1987.
93. Tehran TV, 27 October — DR, 29 October 1987.
94. *MM*, 28 September 1987.

95. R. Tehran, 8 April — SWB, 10 April 1987. For similar accusations by Musavi, see: IRNA, 7 July — DR, 8 July 1987.
96. R. Tehran, 5 April — SWB, 7 April 1987.
97. *The Guardian*, 2 July 1987.
98. *FT*, 13 August 1987.
99. R. Tehran, 7 December — SWB, 9 December; *The Guardian*, *NYT*, *IHT*, 8 December 1987. For a similar move in 1986 to satisfy the Iranians, see: *MECS* 1986, p. 351.
100. R. Tehran, 2 December — SWB, 4 December 1987.
101. R. Tehran, 3 December — SWB, 5 December 1987.
102. R. Tehran, 6 December — SWB, 8 December 1987.
103. R. Tehran, 30 November — SWB, 2 December 1987.
104. *IHT*, 1 December 1987.
105. *The Times*, 19 June 1987.
106. *NYT*, 24 September 1987.
107. *Ettela'at*, 5 February 1987.
108. R. Tehran, 8 April — SWB, 10 April 1987.
109. R. Tehran, 15 April — SWB, 17 April 1987.
110. R. Tehran, 18, 25 April — SWB, 21, 28 April 1987.
111. R. Tehran, 24 April — DR, 27 April 1987.
112. *DT*, 9 May 1987.
113. See words of Velayati to this effect cited in *TT*, 16 February 1987.
114. IRNA — DR, 19 February 1987.
115. *NYT*, 5 August; *FT*, 12–13 September 1987. Oil minister, Aqazadeh, specified plans to convert the old gas pipelines to the Soviet Union to oil pipelines: R. Tehran, 8 August — DR, 10 August 1987.
116. During this last visit a protocol on Tehran-Moscow railway cooperation was signed: IRNA, 19 November — DR, 20 November 1987.
117. See for example, *NYT*, 7 August 1987.
118. R. Tehran, 29 August — SWB, 31 August; *JP*, 30 August 1987.
119. *MM*, 31 August 1987.
120. *JA*, 23 September 1987.
121. R. Tehran, 24 April — SWB, 27 April 1987.
122. A month earlier, following the Mecca massacre, angry demonstrators in Tehran took over the Kuwaiti Embassy and set fire to most of its property and documents.
123. Thus, for example, in a leaflet (in Arabic) distributed among the pilgrims in 1987 — leaflets usually had radical overtones — Hujjat ul-Islam Mehdi Karubi presented Khomeyni as the "leader of the call" (*ra'id al-da'wa*) for the "unity of the Muslim world."
124. R. Tehran, 2 August — SWB, 3 August; *JP*, *IHT*, 3 August 1987.
125. R. Tehran, 2 August — SWB, 4 August; *JP*, *IHT*, 3 August 1987.
126. *JP*, 2 August 1987.
127. *JP*, 4 August 1987.
128. R. Tehran, 11 September — DR, 14 September 1987.
129. R. Tehran, 27 September — DR, 29 September 1987.
130. R. Tehran, 9 September — DR, 10 September 1987.
131. R. Tehran, 26 November — SWB, 28 November 1987; *FT*, 27 November 1987. A similar line was taken by the president addressing the conference (R. Tehran, 23 November — SWB, 25 November 1987) as well as by Montazeri (R. Tehran, 27 November — DR, 30 November 1987).
132. R. Tehran, 27 November — DR, 30 November 1987.
133. *NYT*, 16 August 1987.
134. R. Tehran, 1 March — SWB, 3 March 1987.
135. R. Tehran, 6 March — SWB, 9 March 1987.
136. *The Guardian*, *JP*, 7 August 1987.
137. IRNA — DR, 30 December 1987.

Iraq


(Al-Jumhuriyya al-'Iraqiyya)

OFRA BENGIO

One of the most salient features of President Saddam Husayn's rule has been his ability to locate foci of trouble and take swift, preemptive action to ensure the survival of his regime. Husayn took such steps in July 1979, upon ascending to power; in June 1982, following the Iraqi defeat at Khorramshar; and in June 1986, following the fall of Faw and Mehran to the Iranians (see chapters on Iraq in previous volumes of *MECS*). The Iranian offensive against Basra in January 1987, which was the fiercest and the most dangerous ever, coupled with Iraq's catastrophic economic situation, prompted Husayn to carry out another series of far-reaching and fundamental changes which he referred to as a revolution. This "revolution from above" was designed to reinvigorate the economy; purge the government and the Administration of inefficient bureaucrats and "disloyal" Ba'this; reduce wartime and military pressures; and, finally, help develop new constituencies for Husayn, either from the civilian middle class or from among the military, at the expense of the Ba'th Party. These changes and the impact of the war combined to weaken the party both politically and ideologically, while further strengthening the military as a power center and entrenching Husayn in power.

No sooner was the Basra offensive contained than the regime had to contend with the March offensive in the Kurdish north, which, in a way, was even more menacing because it united the enemy without with the "enemy within," namely Iran with the Kurdish national movement. The uprising of the Kurdish population and the ruthless measures taken by the regime against it, reflected badly on the unity of the country and cast serious doubts on the Kurds' willingness to become integrated in Iraq and the country's ability to integrate them. The regime was also on the offensive against Islamic fundamentalism and the Shi'i opposition, though these proved far less dangerous than the Kurdish opposition.

Iraq was greatly relieved when, in the summer, it succeeded in shifting the focus of the conflict from the ground war to the Gulf. This shift had many advantages for Iraq, as it involved other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states more deeply in the conflict, drew the Powers to the Gulf, thus "internationalizing" the conflict, and relieved severe pressure on the home front. Paradoxically, perhaps, Iraq's weakness brought it the strongest outside support in the seven years of its war against Iran. The GCC and Arab countries' fear of an Iraqi collapse and its repercussions in the region galvanized anti-Iranian feelings and prompted more collective and clear-cut support for Iraq. US fears of spillover effects on GCC countries and other considerations turned it into Iraq's strongest supporter in its endeavors to put an end to the war. This bore fruit in the UN Security Council Resolution 598 of July, which was considered to be another achievement for Iraq in the international arena, for it called for an end to



Area of the Iranian Offensive on Basra, January-March 1987

the war in terms favorable to it. Israel, too, began to reassess its stance in the Iraqi-Iranian conflict and its secret arms sales to Iran.

But these Iraqi achievements were offset by failures. The Soviet Union, Iraq's ally and her first arms supplier, began to hedge her bets in the conflict and helped to block a possible end to the war. The internationalization of the conflict, far from making it easier to end it, served only to emphasize the rivalry between the Powers in the Gulf. And the Arab countries proved too cautious to support Iraq in any move which was likely to turn Iran against them. Iraq clearly had to buy more time.

THE "MODERNIZATION OF THE STATE"

In mid-February, just as the Iraqi Army was struggling to contain the Iranian offensive on Basra, the regime embarked on sweeping reforms in the governmental, administrative, economic, and social spheres. The shake-up (*hazza*) or administrative revolution (*thawra idariyya*), as Husayn termed the reforms, went on throughout the year, and affected the fundamental structure of the Ba'thi regime. Socialism, or the socialist-etatist system, was dealt a blow, while the private sector and capitalist enterprises were allowed to flourish. The Ba'thi establishment was also dealt a blow through a series of changes in various institutions, including the Cabinet, which weakened the hold of the Ba'thi apparatus. Such a well-entrenched institution as the Trade Union, which had become part and parcel of the Ba'th, was disbanded. Commenting on the dimension of the changes, Husayn said: "This year we began a series of broad, radical measures that affected our national economy, agriculture, industry, public work services, and other fields."¹

The prime motivator of these changes was Husayn himself. In a series of speeches and articles he wrote on the subject, he explained that he had begun to make these changes in 1977 (when he was not yet president) but for "certain reasons" (probably obstructionism), had not succeeded. The outbreak of the war in 1980 proved to be another formidable obstacle. Nonetheless, Husayn said that "at the beginning of this year we came to realize that it is impossible for us to wait any longer because of the war and that we have to strengthen our determination in order to put into force in one stroke all the concepts we believe in."² Rebuking all those officials who used the war as a pretext to obstruct change, he said the war was in fact "the most difficult law of life," but one should take advantage of its more positive aspects to introduce changes "which the people [are] likely to accept at this stage but not when the war [is] over."³

In fact, the war was both the cause and the excuse for the radical reforms. Like previous military crises, the ominous offensive on Basra triggered a chain of reactions which were nevertheless well orchestrated by Husayn. The most obvious cause for the reforms was the critical economic situation (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 375-76) which was exacerbated further by the growing cost of the war and the accumulating foreign debt which amounted to \$50 bn.-\$60 bn.⁴ The public sector could no longer cope with all these pressures, as Minister of Information Latif Nusayyif al-Jasim explained: "The state cannot take care of the Army and eggs at one and the same time."⁵ To remedy the situation, it was deemed necessary to introduce changes in the very structure of the economy which would reduce state expenditures, encourage initiative, and attract new capital to the dwindling Treasury. However, behind this immediate cause there lay deeper and more complex ones. Ever since he became President in July 1979, Husayn

had been advocating *infitah*, an open-door policy, and the reduction of the public sector's involvement in the economy, genuinely believing that the socialist-etatist system constituted a severe impediment to economic development (see chapters on Iraq in previous volumes of *MECS*). However, the crux of the matter was not so much economic as ideological-political. The policy of *infitah* clashed with one of the three pillars of Ba'thi ideology, namely socialism, and was likely to antagonize both the more orthodox members of the party as well as those with vested interests in the system. It was, therefore, all the more puzzling that Husayn should have initiated such a controversial move in the middle of a fierce Iranian offensive. In attempting to unravel this enigma, one should recall that Husayn had never lacked in boldness and ingenuity; often in the past, when the situation was critical, he went onto the offensive in order to fend off attacks against himself. As his own popularity and that of the war were wearing thin, Husayn evidently considered it necessary to take preemptive measures which might divert public attention to other arenas and help forestall moves against him. Husayn's readiness to risk clashing with the Ba'th Party establishment may be attributed to three interrelated causes. Firstly, the move might have reflected his declining standing within the party, which, in a way, made it easier for him to initiate drastic changes. Secondly, such "planned upheavals" have always been a golden opportunity for eliminating potential ideological and political rivals. Most important of all, the war catapulted the military into a primary place of importance in the regime and the state, and it was only natural for Husayn to strive to turn it into his main power base, and to fulfill its urgent requirements even at the risk of severely weakening the standing of the civilian base, i.e., the Ba'th Party. It would appear that the military had directly or indirectly applied pressure to limit the Ba'th Party's hold on the Army (as was the case before the war), in addition to channeling the country's economic and financial resources for military purposes, including such long-term projects as the development of the arms industry.

These steps were as hazardous as they were bold. Husayn hinted at negative reactions from various sectors, such as the bureaucracy, the Trade Union, the security apparatus and, most importantly, the party. He intimated that "some were a little upset" or "did not wish such a decision had been issued," but he warned them not to make "the mistake of opposing these decisions or trying to be troublesome or show a lack of enthusiasm over the application of the decisions."⁶ In a more direct speech, Husayn castigated both the party and the security services for obstructing reforms: "We have received complaints from productive enterprises that there is interference from the security services and Ba'th Party in their central work and central tasks, which [has] led to preventing the central aim of increasing production and improving its quality."⁷ Defending the new line against critics who "considered that their ideological basis was destroyed,"⁸ he asserted that not deviation but the rejuvenation of the party was in question, that the Ba'th did not belong to one class or two but to the whole people, and that those who attempted to oppose the new line were themselves deviationists who should be punished: "If there are people who insist on pursuing the road of deviation, the laws of the revolution will be sufficiently decisive to protect the course and protect the people."⁹ Referring to the conflict between the Ba'th and the people over the new line, Husayn explained that the people argued with Ba'this and took his speeches as evidence because "I meant to let the people understand the true line of the Ba'th Party." Husayn admitted that he "wanted to get the help of the

people" against party members: "I wanted the people to make use of my words and my conduct so that nobody would come and tell them the opposite or act in a contradictory manner, claiming that that is the line adopted by the party. The people will then say: 'Either Saddam Husayn is not a Ba'thist or your behavior . . . is not Ba'thist'."¹⁰ Obviously, Husayn was seeking to reach the people directly and thus enlarge his own constituencies and bases of support. "Our power", he said, "does not lie in the revolver or the state apparatus, but in our ability to convince our people."¹¹

While the reforms caused some agitation within the Ba'thi establishment, it was not so easy to identify the people or groups that opposed them and to assess the impact these people made. It appears that Michel 'Aflaq, the founder-leader of the Ba'th and the secretary-general of its National Command was reluctant to give his blessing to the new line, though he was known to have endorsed in the past various changes in the party that were not to his liking. However, this time the change was so fundamental and far-reaching that he apparently found it too much to swallow. 'Aflaq's way of expressing his indignation without taking too great a personal risk was to remain silent. In his traditional speech on the eve of the Ba'th anniversary on the 7 April, he did not even mention the reform or its initiator, Husayn. And he continued to ignore the changes during the rest of the year. Another central figure who kept his silence was 'Izzat Ibrahim al-Duri, deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) and assistant secretary-general of the Ba'th Party Regional Command (RC), and constitutionally Husayn's heir. However, it is not known whether al-Duri opposed the move as such or clashed with Husayn on other questions. A third person who had a wavering stance on the reforms was RCC member and First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan (al-Jazrawi). Ramadan, believed to be a staunch supporter of the socialist line, was also considered the "strong man" after Husayn, and a kind of prime minister for economic affairs (a position which the opposition claimed he had used to amass riches). With the changes, he lost ground in all three spheres. Husayn divested him of his power in economic affairs, thereby also weakening him politically. Significantly, however, Ramadan continued to play a double game by both supporting the changes and applauding socialism.¹²

As Iraq was still in the middle of the process of change in 1987, it was difficult to assess its long-term implications. It appeared, however, that if the reform took root, the Ba'th would become a pure vehicle of power devoid of any of its original ideological principles. It also appeared possible that it might lose its role as the exclusive vehicle for governing. Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz hinted at this when he said: "When the war ends we will not stick to the one-party system. We don't believe in it."¹³ The great imponderable was of course whether the liberalization of the economic system would bring in its train the liberalization of the extremely autocratic political system. This had not occurred by the end of the year, and although a new middle or upper class emerged, it was doubtful if it would come out against Husayn in the short term. After all, it owed its prosperity to his revolutionary policies. Husayn must have borne this in mind when he introduced the reform.

CABINET RESHUFFLES

Unlike the shake-ups of 1982 and 1986, which had affected all three governing bodies — the RCC (the highest legislative and executive authority), the Ba'th Party RC, as well as the Cabinet (see *MECS* 1982–83, p. 564, *MECS* 1986, pp. 367–68), the shake-up

this time was confined to the Cabinet. Also, the changes were not introduced in one stroke but piecemeal. Two possible explanations may be suggested for this: first, Husayn was reluctant to introduce sweeping changes in all the governing bodies at one and the same time because he did not want to unite his opponents against him; second, the changes were so basic that the system needed more time to absorb them.

Within nine months, 11 ministries changed hands; the Ministry of Youth was abolished; the Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation were merged; and three others had their names and functions changed (see Table 1). There were many reasons for the changes, but the most important one was economic. Husayn himself said that "1987 is the year of concentrated and comprehensive government effort in all walks of civilian life, especially the national economy."¹⁴ So crucial had the problem become that Husayn called on all party and government officials "to show interest in economic issues as much as in political ones."¹⁵ The most urgent task was to cut government expenditures by reducing the bureaucracy, merging or abolishing ministries and infusing new blood into the more problematic ones, especially those concerned with the economy. There was also a political issue here: most of the incumbents were young technocrats with no party affiliation. This suggested that Husayn wanted to purge the Cabinet of the Ba'thi old guard, and to make professional competence rather than political affiliation the yardstick for high office. Moreover, by introducing technocrats with no political following or ideological commitments, Husayn felt he would have pliant tools for his revolutionary policies. The various administrative changes he introduced within the ministries were also designed to reduce the interference of party officials in the day-to-day ministerial business. This did not of course diminish Husayn's own deep and unprecedented involvement in the affairs of the ministries.

Of the 11 ministerial changes, four stood out as the most interesting. On 2 August, Sa'dun Shakir, the minister of the interior, and Hasan 'Ali (al-'Amiri), the minister of trade, were relieved of their posts. In a marked departure from past practice, the decision this time was not taken by Husayn but by the Ba'th Party RC, probably because the two were leading members of the RCC and of the RC. They were officially said to have been dismissed so that they could "devote their time to party and RCC affairs."¹⁶ Such elegant phrasing was usually a sign of a person's fall into disfavor. One could only guess what the real causes were. It was pointed out that both Shakir and 'Ali had been Husayn's close associates. The fact that both were also Shi'is, might have had something to do with it. Shakir had Husayn's support since the time they had been in prison together (after the fall of the first Ba'th in November 1963). He actually helped Husayn to escape from prison. From the time of the Ba'th comeback in 1968, Husayn had endeavored to promote Shakir, at times against the will of the leadership. Thus, "when some Ba'thists complained that [Shakir] had been appointed a member of the Baghdad Branch Command in 1971, Husayn told them, 'Comrade Shakir is the one who helped me escape from prison'. This bore no discussion."¹⁷ Shakir was chief of Intelligence in 1972-73 and in 1975, and had become an RCC and RC member in 1977. In 1979, upon Husayn's ascendance to power, Shakir became the interior minister. There were four possible explanations for Shakir's dismissal, which were not necessarily mutually exclusive. The fact that Shakir was Husayn's protégé (as late as May 1987, Husayn singled him out for special mention),¹⁸ did not protect him from criticism or sacking. It might even have been Husayn who initiated the move in order to divert criticism from himself. Second, in the first half of 1987 there were

internal problems and disturbances, including bomb attacks by Shi'i and Kurdish groups which Shakir as interior minister was probably unable to check (his successor, Samir Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Shaykhli, was known for his toughness). Furthermore, Shakir's post as supervisor of internal security and Intelligence might have brought him into conflict with 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, Husayn's cousin and director-general of security, and with Fadil Barrak, head of Intelligence. Finally, it is possible that Shakir opposed or was slack in implementing reforms in his ministry (he was also secretary of the Ba'th Party Vocational Bureau). It should be pointed out that the decision on his dismissal was taken while he was abroad.

Hasan 'Ali became a member of the Ba'th RC in 1974; in February 1977, he was part of a special tribunal that tried those involved in the Najaf disturbances in the same month.¹⁹ The firm stand he probably took against the culprits, and his emergence as a kind of mediator between the Shi'i population and the government gained him access to the higher echelons of the government. He became trade minister in March 1977, and a member of the RCC in October 1977. 'Ali further gained Husayn's confidence when he assisted in unearthing a "plot" against him on the eve of his coming to power in July 1979, in which high-ranking Shi'i members of the government were involved (for details of the plot, see *MECS* 1978-79, pp. 560-61, 564). Following the dismissal of Na'im Haddad, (another Shi'i) from all his public positions in June 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 367-68), 'Ali replaced him as secretary-general of the Progressive Patriotic and Nationalist Front. In early 1987, 'Ali made a strong public declaration of support for the reforms. Against this background, 'Ali's dismissal was quite puzzling. One could surmise that he had lost ground, either because he had ceased to contribute to the pacification of the Shi'is, or because he did not facilitate the introduction of the new reforms, in which his ministry had a vital role to play. No doubt one need not have been over-impressed by declarations of support, which more often than not disguised real attitudes. ('Ali's powers might already have been severely curtailed by the decision in April to abolish five institutes belonging to the Trade Ministry). Finally, Husayn never had any qualms about discarding his closest associates if that served his interests.

The abolition of the Youth Ministry on 28 September merited discussion. Ostensibly, the cause was economic: the need to reduce government expenditure. However, on closer analysis, it seemed that the main cause was political. In the first part of 1986, a power struggle developed between the then-minister of youth Nuri Faysal Shahir, and Husayn's son 'Uday, who headed the Olympic Committee; this led to the dismissal of the minister in June (see, *MECS* 1986, p. 370). The appointment of Muhammad 'Abd al-Fattah Amin (al-Yasin) to the post two months later apparently did not put an end to the conflict. Backed by his father, the ambitious 'Uday sought to use his post as a springboard to gain political influence and a following among the youth, while placing the minister of youth in his shadow. It is not known whether the minister, Amin, openly opposed this, but it was significant that he was a Ba'thi of long standing, having been a member of the RC in 1974-82, and of the RCC in 1977-82. In any case, as Amin's powers had declined since his dismissal from the RC and the RCC in 1982, President Husayn probably encountered no difficulty in delivering him the *coup de grâce*. Following the abolition of the ministry, Amin was appointed to the minor post of adviser in the RCC's popular organization office. On the other hand, 'Uday's powers were boosted with the RCC's decision that other ministries and sports

bodies would take over the defunct Youth Ministry's responsibilities.

The trend to accumulate power in family hands (see *MECS* 1986, p. 363) was manifest in the appointment earlier in the year of Hatim 'Abd al-Rashid to the Ministry of Light Industry. Rashid was not known to be a Ba'thi member, but he did have strong family ties with Husayn. He was the brother of the VII Army Corps commander, Mahir 'Abd al-Rashid, whose daughter was married to Husayn's son, Qusay; Hatim himself was married to Husayn's cousin and sister-in-law.

REASSESSMENT OF BA'THI SOCIALISM

The brunt of Husayn's reformist movement was directed at the socialist-etatist system. The cautious and haphazard steps of the previous few years were to receive full legitimization and become obligatory. *Infitah* was to be the watchword in all economic activity. Throughout the year, Husayn lost no opportunity to explain the new trend and to justify it. He had to address himself to two different groups: the Ba'thi establishment, which by instinct and "breeding" opposed changes in the socialist system, and the new group or class which was to be the carrier of this change and therefore had to be convinced that it was serious. Granting that socialism was necessary for Iraqi society, Husayn nonetheless warned that this system should not close itself to life or become a burden on society and a "shackle."²⁰ In his opinion, the "new Ba'thi course" made it imperative that the socialist system make room for "an energetic, conscious and prosperous private sector." Refuting criticism that private enterprise might undermine the very roots of socialism, since it would open the road to exploitation, Husayn said that this problem could be dealt with through discussions between the state and the private sector. Referring to socialism's guarantee of "jobs for all", he said that the state would make sure that all Iraqis were given the opportunity to work either in the public or the private sector. To remove any doubts, Husayn stressed time and again that the change was not tactical but strategic and that it was not just for the duration of the war but for "eternity." That was so because, in his opinion, socialism could not exist without the private sector; the private sector was indispensable to "a real and prosperous industry"; and the private sector was more effective than the public one.²¹ He said, "If the private sector in our country is not active in industry, agriculture and public services, and if the socialist sector does not show serious activity in the light of an integrated and profound economic outlet, our socialist buildup would be a burden on society rather than [a] help".²²

One of the targets of "privatization" was agriculture, which was referred to as "endless oil." Agrarian reform, for long considered a feather in the cap of the socialist Ba'th, was to be abandoned. In a symbolic and practical gesture, "agrarian reform" was dropped from the name of the Ministry of Agriculture in May. Immediately afterwards, the ministry announced its decision to stop the parcelation of land into small units, as such units were uneconomic. (It was revealed that, while in the past 70% of the population had earned a living from agriculture, after the revolution [probably of 1958], the number fell to 30%).²³ It was also decided to sell off several state farms and agricultural bodies as their output had been dismal compared with that of cooperatives and private farms. At the same time, various incentives were granted to the private sector, including allowing farmers to sell their produce directly to greengrocers.²⁴ This was to reduce bottlenecks, boost the farmer's profits, and ensure a steady flow of supplies to the markets.

Reforms were also geared at modernizing and developing industry with a view to decreasing Iraq's dependence on oil, increasing productivity and the manufacture of import substitutes to save hard currency and most important of all, developing an independent arms industry. One of the ways of going about this was to allow greater independence and flexibility in the functions of the various firms and to encourage the private sector to make a larger contribution to industry. Among the practical steps taken in this direction were the abolition of tax on private-sector imports of raw materials and other industrial inputs, and the allocation of state money to fund them, and the abolition of a ceiling on private sector investment. Private-sector industries were allowed to export goods, provided that 60% of the value of the goods was remitted, and Arab investors were exempted from foreign exchange restrictions applying to imports.²⁵

In no area were the reforms more keenly felt than in business; the selling of state projects and enterprises took the form of an avalanche. Iraqi papers were full of advertisements announcing the sale of certain state enterprises and inviting the public to attend auctions. Bidders were also required for new projects, both in the civilian and military sectors.²⁶ By the end of the year, state-owned supermarkets, and hundreds of petrol stations, garages, and transport companies were sold. Even Iraqi Airways was restructured to allow about 50% of its shares to be offered to the public.²⁷

But liberalization had its risks: the private sector could get out of control; corruption could increase. Aware of this, Husayn delivered a warning to members of the private sector and entrepreneurs when he consented to the execution in mid-February of five high-ranking officials and businessmen accused of corruption. Among those executed was the ex-mayor of Baghdad, 'Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Latif al-Mufti (see *MECS* 1986, p. 370). Yet, the group of capitalists continued to flourish. According to a Communist source, there were over 800 Iraqi millionaires in Iraq.²⁸

THE ASSAULT ON BUREAUCRACY

Another objective of the reforms was to modernize the state machinery and make it more efficient. This meant reducing red tape and bureaucratic bottlenecks, abolishing state organizations, merging departments, and minimizing administrative overlapping. Commenting on the reasons for this reorganization, Husayn complained that certain institutions "were without work," and that "some managements crush creative people." Above all, he said, laws issued by the RCC itself in the last 18 years were no longer compatible with the new realities. He therefore called for the revision of all laws and the shake-up of the "Iraqi Administration as a whole." He urged ministers and other administrators to become "leaders" and not a "heavy burden" or "absolute rulers" (*mutasallitun*); their objective should be to reduce to the minimum bureaucratic procedures that tended to destroy creativity, enterprise, and planning.²⁹ In his opinion "the best Iraqis are those who are patriots, honest, sincere, productive, and creative, and those who always progress".³⁰

The most important changes introduced during the year were the restructuring of ministries; the abolition of state organizations, including five that belonged to the Trade Ministry and three oil and gas organizations; the merging of bodies and companies, such as that of the Iraqi National Oil Company with the Ministry of Oil; changes in the governorates, which meant abolishing Baghdad governorate in June and transferring its administrative units to other governorates; the abolition of certain

subdistricts; the reshuffling (in June) of three governors (of Najaf, Karbala, and Misan), and the dismissal of 11 deputy governors following the scrapping of this post.³¹

But these reforms were apparently not accepted wholeheartedly by the state machinery. In the middle of July, Husayn ordered all state officials to study "within one week" his speeches of 11 February and 7 June, because they represented "the policy of the state." He further warned that failure to implement the new line implied either an inability on the part of the officials to comprehend it or "a premeditated action aimed at opposing the high policy of the state." In either case the conclusion was "that the official is not fit for his post."³² (Significantly, the minister of trade and the interior minister were dismissed shortly afterwards; see above). Earlier in July, Saddam Husayn ordered the Ba'th Party and the security apparatus to stop interfering with and obstructing production.³³ Husayn's readiness to clash with the security apparatus and the party over the new line indicated the extent of his commitment to it.

THE NEW POLICY *VIS-À-VIS* EMPLOYEES, WORKERS, AND TRADE UNIONS

One of the most peculiar changes, which nonetheless fell in line with the general trend, was the one regarding workers and employees (*muwazzafun*). On 19 March, the RCC issued a decree on the status of workers, the most important points of which were:

(1) "All workers of state departments and of the socialist sector are considered employees and are equal in duties and rights";

(2) "The workers' federation of trade unions shall be confined to the private, mixed, and cooperative sector."³⁴

It was not difficult to see the contradictory aspects of the decree. On the one hand it purported to improve the lot of public-sector workers by making them the equals of government employees, but on the other it negated their right to form trade unions, which had been their most important privilege under the Ba'th. Worse still, it allowed workers of the private, mixed, and cooperative sector to form such unions.

The causes and objectives of this policy were unfolded by President Husayn during the year. He explained that "concealed conflict" had existed between "workers" and "employees" due to "psychological differences, social differences of one sort or another, and administrative and financial differences."³⁵ These differences, which placed the worker in "an inferior human and psychological status *vis-à-vis* the employee. ... severely harmed production and common collective cohesion and action." Hence, he explained, rather than deprive employees of their rights, the government had decided to grant "the deprived the benefits they deserved."³⁶ Furthermore, because the term "worker" was held in lower esteem in society than "employee", it had been decided to call workers employees. Husayn declared that state officials, himself included, would be henceforth referred to as employees.³⁷ (Ridiculing this move, an opposition paper suggested that the workers' slogan should be changed into "employees of all the world unite.")³⁸ Trade Union head, Ahmad Muhsin 'Alwan, who was soon to lose his post, appeared enthusiastic about the decision, which, he said, had benefited about 1m. people. This was "a revolution in itself," and would cost the government a lot of money to implement. Beyond the material benefits, he said, the decision would have far-reaching social and psychological implications and would put an end to situations where "an employee is preferred to a worker [as a marriage

partner] even if the wages of the latter are double the salary of the former.”³⁹ A pro-Iraqi source reported that tens of thousands of male and female workers took to the streets of Baghdad and other governorates to demonstrate their gratitude.

It soon became evident that the decision had its less joyous aspects. For one thing, Husayn made it clear that it worked both ways and actually meant turning more and more white-collar workers into blue-collar ones: “Our new method is that we shall all go to the machine and not leave the machine and sit behind the worktable; our new method, then, [is intended to] move [as many people as we can] from behind the worktables to the machine, and not vice versa.”⁴⁰ On another occasion he said explicitly that dismissed employees could either change their profession and find work in more vital state projects or join the private sector. A non-Iraqi source claimed that thousands of civil servants had been given the option of resigning without penalty or accepting new posts, often as lower-status factory or workshop employees (under the old labor law, those who resigned were required to repay the cost of their education).⁴¹ According to Husayn, the measures to remove thousands of civil servants from the government payroll had saved the state millions of dollars by June.⁴²

But the workers, too, had to pay a price. The previous Ba’thi commitment to provide lifetime employment for all was regarded as one of the biggest obstacles to increasing efficiency and developing the private sector. Moreover, it was noted that between one third to one half of all staff in typical state enterprises were administrative and service personnel.⁴³ The changes were therefore aimed at thinning out administrative staff, shifting workers to private-sector enterprises to reduce government expenditure, and coping with the new problem of unemployment. According to the minister of heavy industry, Qasim Ahmad al-Uraybi, manpower in his ministry alone was reduced within a few months by 1,600 (mostly foreigners).⁴⁴ In June, the RCC issued a decree permitting directors to grant a two-year leave of absence to their employees if they judged it necessary.⁴⁵ In September, ministers and directors were directed to accept the resignation of female employees (except those holding medical jobs) without any preconditions.⁴⁶ Here the changed approach was very clear: whereas in the first years of the war, women had been encouraged to go to work, they were now told to stay at home, ostensibly to have more children but actually to provide jobs for unemployed males. The problem of unemployment combined with the lack of hard currency also prompted the government to decrease significantly the number of foreign workers.⁴⁷

Most intriguing of all was the decision to disband the public-sector trade union, which had developed into an arm of the Ba’th itself, and in which no groups or parties other than the Ba’th could act. Defending the move against its critics both in Iraq and among socialist countries (which he did not name), Husayn said that the Ba’th was not a party of one or two classes but of the entire Iraqi people. His point was that the working class should not enjoy a privileged position over other classes or groups. He further argued that, since “employees” did not have trade unions of their own, now that workers had become employees, too, they should not organize in trade unions either.⁴⁸ Husayn was extremely critical of members of trade unions, claiming that no fewer than 3,750 did not do anything in addition to their jobs in the union, and that many of them benefited from various privileges, including government cars.⁴⁹ However, it appeared that besides its economic benefits, the move had political motives as well. For one thing, Husayn’s relations with the Trade Union had not

always been amiable. Evidence of that was seen immediately after he assumed power in July 1979, when he put to death Union chief Muhammad 'Ayish and its secretary-general Badan Fadil (on a charge of plotting against him; see *MECS* 1978–79, p. 564). The Union had apparently concentrated too much power for Husayn's liking; at the very least, it had ceased to be an efficient tool of the regime. Second, Husayn might also have anticipated opposition from this well-entrenched organization, which had vested interests in the "old" system. He noted, however, that although members of the Trade Union might have wished that the changes had not taken place, they "did not reach the level of opposing them." Husayn ventured the opinion that if someone other than himself had initiated the move, "he would have fallen."⁵⁰ Third, he might have suspected the Union of being manipulated by his colleagues against him or to have been infiltrated by communists, since it was their traditional stronghold. Given that the Trade Union was an important arm of the party, the move constituted a blow to the party and its hold on the state machinery. And the formation of the private-sector Union in June was another departure from previous Ba'thi practices. Husayn probably felt that the owners of private-sector enterprises would not allow their workers to conduct union activities during working hours. Be this as it may, the move was another sign of the importance he now attached to the private sector.

THE WAR EFFORT

In the first three months of 1987, Iraq had to contend with the most difficult offensive in its seven years of war. The attack was all the more threatening as it took place around Basra, its second largest city (with originally c. 1 m. inhabitants) and its sole outlet to the sea. It is true that Basra's port had been paralyzed at the beginning of the war and that the city itself had already suffered greatly due to its proximity to the front. However, at no time had the city been the target of such a concentrated onslaught, and never before had its fall appeared so imminent. The very contemplation of this made the Iraqi political and military leadership extremely uncomfortable because of its far-reaching strategic, political, and psychological significance. The fall of the infinitely less significant Faw in February 1986 had made a serious impact on Iraq (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 364–68), and it was feared that the fall of Basra might trigger a Shi'i uprising in the south, and a military coup or the fall of the regime.

Initial Iranian success in the offensive, which began on 9 January (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War), called for urgent action. Husayn, who was also the commander in chief of the Armed Forces, hurried to the front in order to raise morale, but he soon had to abandon this attempt and follow developments from Baghdad. He empowered 'Adnan Khayrallah Talfah, the defense minister and deputy commander in chief of the Armed Forces (and Husayn's cousin and brother-in-law) to take personal command of the counterattack. As the III Army Corps responsible for the sector proved vulnerable, it had to be assisted by the VII Army Corps stationed nearby, and, more important, by elite units of the Republican Guard which were dispatched from Baghdad and commanded by Talfah. Thanks to this concentrated effort, to which the Air Force contributed greatly, the offensive was stemmed by the beginning of February. On 1 February, Talfah was recalled to Baghdad to be decorated with the *Rafidayn* medal first class and no less than five medals of valor. Husayn explained that Talfah deserved these honors because of his courage and patience; because "he

attended and directed all or most of the major battles that [were] fought in the battlefield or the front" and "because of what he did for our country." Talfah declared triumphantly: "We slaughtered them, Mr. President."⁵¹ In fact, this proved to be only a short respite in the ferocious and bloody fighting, which was to continue for two more months. It was only at the end of March that the danger of an Iranian breakthrough at Basra was removed. Iraq, which had held its breath for three months, celebrated on 22 March "the fall of Iran's slogan of the year of decision," turning it in Iraqi terminology to the year of steadfastness (*sumud*). Significantly, Iraq termed the offensive "the big harvest battles" to denote its success in turning the area into a "killing zone" for Iranians (cartoons in Iraqi papers showed Iraqi sickles harvesting Iranian heads).

The offensive had far-reaching consequences in Iraq. The first to be affected was the military. While the war was still raging, the chief of staff, 'Abd al-Jawad Dhanun, was removed from his post, to be replaced (temporarily) by Sa'd al-Din 'Aziz Mustafa. Later in the year Nizar 'Abd al-Karim al-Khazraji became the chief of staff. Another high commander who was removed from his post in the middle of the offensive was Tali' Khalil Arhim al-Duri, commander of the III Army Corps, who was replaced by Diya al-Din Jamal. Nine other changes took place in the following months (see Table 2), all of which were designed either to remove inefficient officers or check excessively ambitious ones. Among the officers who fell into disfavor was Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri, assistant chief of staff for operations. Mahir 'Abd al-Rashid, commander of the VII Army Corps, was among the very few who remained in a military post for two years. Husayn apparently considered him too strong to be removed or shifted to another post. Rashid's strength could also be gauged by the fact that three of his brothers held high-ranking posts, either in the government or in the Army.⁵²

Husayn continued to increase his hold on the Army with the objective of turning it into his main power base, thus shifting his priorities from the Ba'th Party to the Army. The pressures of war and his wish to appease the military made him strengthen the Army further. In 1987, Iraq reportedly became the world's principal arms importer.⁵³ Furthermore, as a result of the significant losses suffered by the Air Force during the winter offensive (it was estimated that it lost c. 50 aircraft, about 10% of the Air Force),⁵⁴ and in order to maintain its air superiority, Iraq reportedly mobilized scores of foreign pilots, including some from France.⁵⁵ However, by far the most important move in terms of strengthening the Army was the stress the regime placed on the development of heavy industry in general and arms production in particular. Husayn stressed Iraq's commitment to develop its arms industry: "We are continuing our efforts to develop the Armed Forces' weaponry and military hardware and to invent weapons and military equipment that will promote our combat abilities... Iraq has become a producer of many of its military needs."⁵⁶ By the beginning of August, Iraq's military industry could declare its success in developing a surface-to-surface missile with a range of more than 600 km.

The 1986-87 winter offensive again highlighted Iraq's demographic predicament and its difficulties in coping with the problem of casualties, which were estimated to be in the thousands in the aftermath of the Basra offensive.⁵⁷ Husayn asserted that when the choice was "between paying [with] rivers of blood" or "losing the homeland," it was natural that Iraq "would opt for offering sacrifices and blood."⁵⁸ However, when it came to counteroffensives, Iraq was reluctant to embark on them, mainly because of

the reluctance to sustain casualties. Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz stated clearly: "Strategically, we have no worries except over the loss of human life. We are always worried about the human cost."⁵⁹ The root of the problem as perceived by Iraq was Iran's demographic superiority. Explaining this point, the minister of defense, Talfah, said that "Iran with its vastly greater population, had an advantage in fighting a war of attrition."⁶⁰ In its attempt to deal with the problem, the government encouraged procreation by granting new incentives to women, such as extended maternity leave from six to 12 months with full pay for the first six months and half for the remaining six months. Similarly, it encouraged Arabs residing in the country to become Iraqi citizens (see chapters on Iraq in previous volumes of *MECS*).

In the short run, however, the government had to address itself to the urgent problem of mobilizing people for the war effort. Among the signs of the manpower crisis were the widespread call-up of civilian and military police for service at the front, the return to duty of retired officers and the conscription of men up to the age of 50.⁶¹ Probably due to the high number of deserters during the Basra offensive, the RCC decided to consider as a deserter any member of the Armed Forces, the security forces or the Popular Army who obeyed "an order that was likely to remove" him from his duties at the front. The punishment for the person who had issued the order was to be at least 15 years' imprisonment and the confiscation of all his property.⁶² As for the deserters, they faced the death sentence, under a law passed shortly after the beginning of the war (see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 594). Another project was the population census which was carried out under curfew on 17 October (the last was in 1977).⁶³ The official reason for the census was the need to improve economic planning, but it appeared that the main motive was to keep a close check on deserters and opponents of the regime, and extend mobilization to the Army.

Iraq suffered from another serious disadvantage, namely the closeness of its populated areas to the front, which made Basra and even the capital, Baghdad, extremely vulnerable. The virtual siege of Basra caused severe demoralization there and in the country at large. Many of Basra's residents⁶⁴ left the city at the height of the attacks, and even the authorities could not prevent the exodus. For three months, the Iraqi propaganda machine concentrated its efforts on Basra, "the city of cities," and when it was no longer in danger of falling into Iranian hands, Iraq described the battle as her greatest victory in seven years. Baghdad was also hit in the war of the cities, mainly in January and February and from September onwards. The attacks on Baghdad were far more dangerous for the regime, and hence the sporadic "cease-fires."

The economic war continued to be another very important aspect of the conflict. By the end of 1987, Iraq succeeded in significantly ameliorating the problems, even if it did not overcome its severe economic crisis. The reforms discussed above contributed their part. In addition, the new Iraqi pipeline to Turkey, which was inaugurated in July, increased oil exports via that country by 0.5m. barrels per day (b/d), bringing total Iraqi production to 2.2m. b/d. Iraq's revenue from oil in 1987 was estimated at \$12 bn.⁶⁵ Iraq's earnings are expected to make a further leap forward after the completion, in 1989, of the new pipeline to Saudi Arabia, which Iraq began to build in September and was to add another 1.1m. b/d to its oil exports. Iraq also succeeded in rescheduling most of its debts and was thus able to survive its most severe economic crisis in seven years.

THE OPPOSITION

On 4 November 1986, the RCC issued Resolution No. 840 which authorized the death penalty for anyone who publicly insulted the president of the republic or his deputy, the RCC, the Ba'th Party, the National Assembly, or the government.⁶⁶ While it indicated Husayn's determination to nip in the bud any form of opposition, this draconian rule also reflected his sense of insecurity and the erosion of his popularity.

Husayn faced potential opposition from both within the Ba'thi establishment and without. The far-reaching changes he introduced in 1987 harmed many people, groups, and sectors of the establishment. Yet, despite some signs of discontent, the grumbling was not allowed to develop into open defiance. Husayn's long experience in eliminating his opponents, the hidden rivalry between the different centers of power (such as between the party and the Army), and the war itself explained Husayn's ability to survive. Indeed, some analysts argued that Husayn had ably manipulated the war to entrench himself in power. In the absence of any form of free expression, it was difficult to gauge the popularity of the regime or of the war, but there were signs indicating that they were at a low ebb. One sign was the growing number of deserters, who began to organize in the marshland and to carry out various anti-regime and terrorist actions. There were reports that deserters had organized themselves into bands and created a crime problem in the capital.⁶⁷ The opposition groups escalated their activities. In April, there was a reported assassination attempt against Husayn (see below). There was a series of car bombings and terrorist acts in the spring and summer in Baghdad, including one on 12 August which resulted in the death of about 20 people. Another incident occurred in Ba'quba, about 60 km. north of Baghdad, on 7 September. In the incident that took place during a festival attended by foreign diplomats, an opposition group opened fire on the parade, causing the death of 50–100 people. Diplomats believed that the attack had been designed to undermine in the presence of foreigners, the omnipotent image projected by Husayn.⁶⁸

In addition, there were signs of coordination among opposition groups against the regime. Indeed, after the conference of the opposition in Tehran in December 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 378), relations between the Kurdish and Shi'i groups became more viable, though by no means free of mutual suspicion. Thus, the Shi'i *al-Da'wa* was reported to have been acting against the regime via the Kurdish north, and at times in coordination with Kurdish groups, while another group (the Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq [SAIRI]; see below), came out openly against the regime's campaign of repression against the Kurds. Yet this collaboration did not amount in any way to a genuine alliance. The ideological, political, and ethnic gulfs between the Kurdish and Shi'i opposition were too wide to be bridged. The Arab fundamentalist Shi'i groups were opposed to any form of autonomy for the Kurds, both on nationalist and political grounds, believing that, as Muslims, Kurds should be integrated in a future Islamic republic in Iraq. Thus one of the Shi'i opposition leaders stated: "Autonomy [to the Kurds], yes, but is it sufficient? We propose a better solution, the Islamic solution... absolute equality in rights and duties."⁶⁹ The idea of dividing Iraq into three entities, which was suggested by a Kurdish nationalist (see below), aroused vehement reactions among the Shi'i opposition. But nor were the Kurds more inclined to accept an Islamic republic in Iraq, where their national aspirations would be totally suppressed.

The regime could take some consolation in the further weakening of the Iraqi

Communist Party (ICP) — formerly its most formidable rival. Not only was the ICP excluded from the conference in Tehran, but it was also reported to have had serious problems with Kurdish parties in the north, where it had found asylum. Worse still, the party was said to be torn by internal ideological, political, and ethnic differences, which were expressed openly at its November 1985 conference and resulted in the expulsion of 28 of its leaders and of more than two thirds of its central committee members. According to a thesis put forward in a book on the Communist Party, the cause of the conflict was the stance on the war as well as the deep rivalry between Arab and Kurdish members of the party. It was claimed that the Arab members backed the regime in opposing the continuation of the war, while the latter sided with Iran. This conflict led to the ousting of a larger group of leading Arab members, and the consequent domination of the party by the Kurds.⁷⁰

THE SHI'Ī THREAT

Baghdad's fears of a possible Iranian breakthrough in the south increased its alertness *vis-à-vis* the Shi'is. More than at any time in the past, it showed willingness to placate religious sentiments; but at the same time it also ruthlessly suppressed any manifestations of opposition by Shi'ī Islamic groups.

The Iranian anti-Ba'thi and anti-Saddam propaganda attacks, which had intensified during the offensive, called for an Iraqi counterattack. Baghdad was out to discredit the Ayatollah Khomeyni and the very foundations of his Islamic republic. Husayn, who led this "offensive," asserted that "the religion whose ideas Khomeyni advocates is not an Islamic religion." However, in a more defensive vein, he asked: "Who is threatening Islam? Are the Iraqis atheists or are they carriers of the banner and glories of Islam in the past and present and the ones who had the credit of spreading Islam in Iran?"⁷¹ In an article entitled "Religious Political Movements and Movements Operating under the Cover of Religion," published in May in the Iraqi papers, Husayn stressed time and again the Arabs' "leading role in conveying religion and its meaning to all mankind," and the fact that religion was "the core of Arab concerns." At the same time, however, he warned against political-religious movements in the Arab homeland whose activities "could lead to the toppling of this or that regime" and to the establishment of "theocracies."⁷² Husayn was thus responding, as he had on many occasions in the past, to the theory of *wilayat al-faqih*, first developed by Khomeyni in 1970 in Najaf (where he had been in exile) and which called for the establishment of an Islamic republic led by the highest authority (*al-marja' al-a'la*) in Islam.⁷³

While the secular Ba'thi regime proved determined to separate religion from state, at the same time it continued to use religion for its own political purposes. In February, the Islamic Popular Conference Organization held its annual meeting in Baghdad with the participation of men of religion from all over the Muslim world. The conference, which was sponsored and attended by Husayn, ended by naming him "a man of peace" (*rajul al-salam*) in appreciation of his "tremendous efforts to achieve peace and halt the shedding of Muslim blood."⁷⁴ This gesture was especially significant since it took place at the height of the Iranian offensive on Basra. Husayn rewarded the organization in April by granting it a special building in Baghdad. Concurrently, men of religion in different parts of the country, especially in Najaf and Karbala, were mobilized to express their support for the war and the regime in the Friday *khutba* and other religious ceremonies. Shi'ī 'ulama, albeit of secondary importance, also

publicly condemned Khomeyni and expressed support for Husayn.⁷⁵ In another gesture aimed at demonstrating the supposedly deep links between Saddam Husayn and Shi'ism, the people of Najaf granted him "a tree made of pure gold," showing Husayn's lineage back to "his grandfather, the Imam 'Ali'"⁷⁶ (for Husayn's claim to such a lineage, see *MECS* 1981–82, p. 602). The regime's attempts to win over Shi'i and religious sentiment were reflected in various displays of religiosity, including government sponsorship of religious ceremonies, the demand for strict observance of the Ramadan fast, and the discussion of theological questions related to Ramadan, for the first time, in Iraqi papers. No doubt this was in response to growing signs of religiosity, especially among the military. However, there was another motive as well, namely to keep all religious issues under tight surveillance. One example worth noting was the "high institution for preachers and imams," which was to open in the 1987–88 academic year and in which only Iraqis of Iraqi parentage could apply to study. Obviously, the government, which had come to have total control of religious institutions, used its power to exclude Iranians altogether, thus "purging" the country of potential dissidents (in the past most Shi'i men of religion were of Iranian origin).

For all the manifestations of Shi'i allegiance, the government still had difficulties in this sector. The Iraqi Shi'i spiritual leader, Ayatollah Abu al-Qasim Kho'i, as an apolitical figure had refused to publicly condemn the Iranian offensive against Basra and the Iraqi Shi'i opposition activities. The authorities reportedly reacted by putting Kho'i under virtual house arrest and executing his son-in-law and his son-in-law's brother.⁷⁷ It also appears that the population of the two Shi'i governorates — Najaf and Karbala — were not as supportive of the regime as could be gathered from the Iraqi papers. An indication of restiveness was the dismissal of the governors of Najaf and Karbala (see above). The authorities also had to cope with the activities of the Shi'i opposition, which luckily for the Ba'th, was not strong enough to undermine the regime.

The most severe handicap of the Tehran-based Iraqi Shi'i opposition was its factionalism. In an attempt to forge some unity among Shi'i and other opposition groups, and in anticipation of the January offensive in which the Shi'i opposition was expected to play a part in instigating a Shi'i uprising inside Iraq, Iran convened in Tehran "a conference of solidarity with the Iraqi people" at the end of December 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 145, 380). The main Shi'i groups at the conference were *al-Da'wa*, and *Munazzamat al-'Amal al-Islami*, and the umbrella organization, SAIRI. But if the conference succeeded in creating a *modus operandi* between Shi'i and Kurdish groups, it failed to do so among the Shi'is themselves. Admitting a lack of coordination on the "military level" among the Islamic opposition groups, a member of *al-'Amal al-Islami* explained that it was due to the "savage methods used by the regime" against the *mujahidin*, which made any coordination extremely difficult, if not impossible.⁷⁸ It seems, however, that more deep-rooted problems were at play. For one thing *al-Da'wa* and *al-'Amal al-Islami* competed for the leadership of the Shi'i movement as a whole. They were further divided on the question of priorities, on whether the movement should concentrate its activities inside Iraq or on the battlefield, alongside the Iranian Army. A third difference, not unrelated to the first two, concerned the relationship with the host country. While *al-Da'wa* insisted on retaining a margin of autonomous power, *al-'Amal al-Islami* was more submissive or loyal to Tehran, demonstrating its readiness to fulfill any mission assigned to it, either

in Iraq or elsewhere. Apparently Iran was uneasy with *al-Da'wa's* posture and its secretive, Communist-like cell structure. At one point, Iran's Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali Montazeri even called for *al-Da'wa's* disbandment, but he had to backtrack within a week.⁷⁹

SAIRI was active in Iran but less so inside Iraq. Its activities included propaganda warfare against Iraq, by means of a radio station transmitting Arabic-language programmes into Iraq; reeducation of Iraqi prisoners of war (PoWs); and, most important, the organization of units comprising Iraqi refugees in Iran and Iraqi PoWs to fight in the war against Iraq. By far the most significant effort was made during the offensive on Basra, when expectations ran high among the Shi'i opposition that there would be an Iranian breakthrough followed by the establishment of a bridgehead on Iraqi territory. At the height of the fighting, SAIRI instigated Iraqi soldiers to lay down their arms, and called on the people of Basra and other parts of Iraq to rise against the Ba'thi regime. No less important than the propaganda warfare was the active participation in the fighting. SAIRI's president, Ayatollah Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, claimed that the Shi'i opposition had its own divisions fighting at the front. He further revealed that in the fighting that took place opposite Basra, Iraqi units had outnumbered SAIRI fighters three to one, with the result that "we lost many of our people." At the time, Hakim seemed to have lost hope of a quick success; and apologizing for his inactivity in Iraq, he said: "If more Iraqi territory is occupied, we will of course leave Iran. If there had not been so many members of the clergy shot in Iraq, then I would have never gone to Tehran."⁸⁰ No doubt, the failure of the Basra offensive caused frustration among SAIRI and other groups seeking to establish an Islamic republic in Iraq.

Al-'Amal al-Islami, headed by Muhammad Taqi al-Mudarrisi, tended to concentrate its activities inside Iraq believing that any Islamic movement should have a presence inside that country, as its aim should be "the blowing up of this regime from within." Accordingly, it attempted to mobilize the people against the regime through various clandestine activities, which included the distribution of booklets of Shi'i 'ulama, the group's clandestine monthly *al-'Amal al-Islami*, and video films making fun of Saddam Husayn. The group claimed to have distributed this material among the population, soldiers, and even ministries, emphasizing that these activities had the dimensions of a "revolution."⁸¹ In addition, the group claimed to have carried out acts of sabotage and assassination attempts against government officials, especially members of the security forces; but it was impossible to confirm these claims. The group attributed the lack of publicity to the ruthless manner adopted by the regime to prevent the leaking of such reports to the outside world.

To judge from its own announcements, *al-Da'wa*, too, escalated its activities inside Iraq in 1987. The most daring act claimed by this group was an assassination attempt against President Husayn in Mosul in April.⁸² It was difficult to confirm whether an attempt occurred at all. Other acts attributed to *al-Da'wa* were the incident at Ba'quba in September, and car bombings in Baghdad in the summer (see above). *Al-Da'wa*, alongside other Shi'i opposition groups, escalated its propaganda activities in the international and Arab arenas, including an appeal in August to the UN secretary-general to interfere on behalf of Iraqi prisoners, a condemnation of the Arab summit in Amman for "trying to save Saddam from his doomed fall,"⁸³ and warnings to various countries to stop aiding the Ba'th. In one of these, 'Abd al-'Aziz Hakim

(brother of Muhammad Baqir al-Hakim, an Iraqi *mujahidin* leader), warned France to stop helping Iraq, otherwise, as he said, "the only remedy is TNT and dynamite." Justifying this posture, he said: "We are described as terrorists on account of six or seven hostages being held in Lebanon, but Saddam Husayn has taken 60 members of my family hostage, so is he not a terrorist?"⁸⁴

KURDISTAN: THE WAR FROM WITHIN

The year under review witnessed a severe deterioration in Ba'thi-Kurdish relations. The Kurdish movement described the situation as an *intifada* (popular uprising), the authorities hardly mentioned any problems, while non-Iraqi sources spoke of an internal war on a scale equal to the 1974 war led by the late Mulla Mustafa Barazani.

Although Iraqi Kurdistan had always been a cause of concern for the authorities, in 1987 new factors came into play which made the situation extremely dangerous from the regime's point of view. While in the past it could count on rivalries within the Kurdish camp to weaken the Kurdish opposition and reduce the challenge to itself, in 1987, for the first time in many years, the two main Kurdish groups — the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) headed by Mas'ud Barazani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) headed by Jalal Talabani — dropped their historical rivalries and acted in concert against the regime. This new-found amity was hardened by the two groups' determination to exploit the war for the realization of their nationalist aspirations, including a meaningful autonomy. The futile negotiations that the PUK conducted with the regime between 1982 and 1985 served as the glue between the old rivals. But the main mover behind this reconciliation was Iran (see *MECS* 1986, p. 383), which sought to exploit the Iraqi Kurds in its war against Iraq. Thus, for the first time in the seven years of war, the two main Kurdish groups were simultaneously collaborating with Iran against Iraq. The offensive that Iran launched in March in the Kurdish north highlighted this new factor. Furthermore, the Kurdish population, and not just the organized Kurdish opposition, mounted resistance against the Ba'th by deserting from the Army or resisting the draft altogether. Indeed, opposition to the draft had become so strong that at a certain point the authorities were obliged to exempt Kurds from obligatory service, making their participation voluntary.⁸⁵

The regime acted quickly and ruthlessly to frustrate a Kurdish popular uprising, which, coupled with an Iranian breakthrough in the Kurdish north, might have sealed the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan. In the second half of January, the authorities reportedly executed about 70 Sulaymaniyya Kurdish youths from a group of 300 that had been under arrest since late 1985. At the time, they had been taken hostage to persuade members of their families to give themselves up to the authorities or divulge secrets of the Peshmerga — the Kurdish guerrillas.⁸⁶ The immediate cause for the executions was said to be Kurdish demonstrations in January against service in the Iraqi Army; at the same time they reflected the regime's nervousness *vis-à-vis* the offensive on Basra. Terrorizing the population was thus regarded as one of the tactics to prevent the opening of an internal front.⁸⁷ The most alarming development, however, was the Iranian offensive in the north, which began on 3 March and was designed to both bolster the Kurds who were operating with Iranian commandos behind Iraqi lines, as well as to occupy strategic heights in the area controlling the Hajj 'Umran-Rawanduz axis. Significantly, this was the same axis that had been held by Mustafa Barazani in the 1974 Kurdistan war with the assistance of the Shah of Iran. The opening of this

front was worrying as it took place at a time when the war on Basra was still raging and Iraq could not decide whether it was a diversion or not; whatever the case, the need to split its forces between two fronts was a severe burden on the Army. A further cause for concern was the new "tripartite" alliance between Iran, the KDP and the PUK; the latter two groups accounted for 20,000–25,000 guerrilla fighters.⁸⁸

Ba'th anxieties were exacerbated by the radicalization of the PUK, a former ally. The PUK deputy secretary-general, Amin Nushirwan, declared in the middle of the Iranian offensive: "We are preparing the Kurdish movement to accept independence at the appropriate time. We therefore want the partition of Iraq into several small states — Shi'i, Sunni, and Kurdish."⁸⁹ This position, which he said was unique for the PUK, departed from the declared long-standing goal of autonomy. Although the Kurds could not expect to realize such a goal, the declaration nevertheless touched a very sensitive nerve in the Ba'th, which had come to fear the partition of Iraq into three states.

But the Ba'th did not take any risks. It already had two of its eight Army corps deployed in the north: the I Army Corps and the V Army Corps. Significantly, the headquarters of the V Corps was in Irbil — the capital of the Kurdish autonomous area. The government also dispatched elite units of the Republican Guard to help stem the offensive. It was assisted by Kurdish irregular forces, the national defence regiments (*afwaj al-difa' al-watani*) comprising about 50,000 men.⁹⁰ Iraq also accepted help, albeit reluctantly, from Turkey, which had a common interest in curbing the Kurdish national movement and safeguarding the flow of oil through the Iraqi-Turkish pipeline. Even before the Iranian offensive started, Turkey carried out raids against Iraqi-Kurdish villages on the border; later, it took tight security measures to stop the Kurds fleeing into Turkey.⁹¹

By the beginning of April, Iraq could divert more attention to the north. On 1 April, the V Army Corps launched a sudden air and ground operation against Kurdish guerrilla forces in the north. The massive mopping-up operation, said to be the second of its kind since 1974, aimed at removing Kurdish forces from areas under their control near the Turkish and Iranian borders.⁹² But whatever success the Iraqi Army had in this operation, it was offset by the 14 April joint operation by the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and Kurdish guerrillas, which reportedly resulted in the death of 1,500 Iraqi soldiers and the capture of strategic heights close to Sulaymaniyya.⁹³ This was followed by the major offensive referred to as "Karbala Ten," which, according to Iranian sources, resulted in 4,000 Iraqi casualties and the capture of areas around Karahdagh. Alarmed by these developments, the Ba'th applied the most drastic measures in Kurdistan. A sign of the regime's anxiety was the three-day visit Husayn concluded to the area immediately after the joint Kurdish-Iranian operation. More important was the earlier appointment of 'Ali Hasan al-Majid, the head of security, to the post of secretary-general of the Ba'th Party's Northern Bureau, which in effect made him governor with wide powers in the north at the time of the military operations. Majid conducted the most ruthless campaign against the Kurdish population, with the aim of preventing it from supporting the Kurdish guerrillas. The multifaceted campaign included the sporadic gassing of Kurdish villages with chemical weapons, a measure initiated after the 14 April Iranian operation; the systematic destruction of hundreds of Kurdish villages — some said 500 — situated along strategic areas or where Kurdish guerrillas were operating; and, finally, a massive

resettlement campaign aimed at "de-Kurdizing" restive areas, and transferring the population either to the more controllable area of Irbil or to remote areas near the Jordanian or Saudi Arabian borders. This campaign, which was described by a Western diplomat as "a demographic revolution," involved 100,000–500,000 Kurds. In addition, the campaign reportedly triggered the flight of 8,000 Kurds to Iran. All these measures culminated in the execution of about 150 Kurds at the end of the year.⁹⁴

But the campaign soon boomeranged. Far from cowing the Kurdish people, it only increased their opposition to the regime and their determination to support the guerrillas. In May and June, a "popular uprising" was staged in different parts of Kurdistan. Baghdad never admitted that the uprising took place; it only cited telegrams of support from various Kurdish towns. An indication of the state of affairs in Kurdistan was provided by the ceremony at the end of the academic year in Irbil's Salah al-Din University, which was attended by the commander of the V Army Corps, Tali' Khalil Arhim al-Duri.⁹⁵ The drastic measures also prompted Kurds serving in the pro-government defence regiment to desert to the guerrilla forces. The Kurdish movement continued to carry out guerrilla activities with greater vigor. The anti-Kurdish measures even encouraged the spread of these activities beyond Kurdistan; various acts of sabotage in Baghdad in the summer were believed to have been carried out by Kurdish activists seeking to avenge the government's policy in Kurdistan.⁹⁶ The failing campaign in the north was also believed to have had repercussions in the government. 'Izzat Ibrahim was reported to have criticized the government's policy, advocating more "humane" methods for quelling the uprising. He was even said to have resigned for a while in protest. There were also unconfirmed reports on Majid's dismissal from his post in the north.⁹⁷

Looking at the picture from the point of view of the Kurdish movement, it appeared that it had scored points in various areas. In spite of the severe repressive measures, it had managed to mount guerrilla operations and to mobilize Kurds against the regime, thus posing a formidable threat to the Ba'th, in fact the only significant one. Second, in spite of the ideological and political gulf separating the KDP and the PUK from Iran, they managed to develop a *modus operandi* which enabled them to coordinate activities against the Ba'th. Third, the KDP and the PUK managed to act in cohesion, or at least without too much friction, for an entire year, which was an outstanding achievement. Furthermore, in July, all five Kurdish groups active in Iraq decided to establish a united Kurdish front. As for the KDP, it quickly overcame the death of one of its two leaders — Idris Barazani — in February. (The regime claimed that he was killed by Iraqi bombing, but Kurdish sources said he died of a heart attack.) After Idris Barazani's death, his brother Mas'ud — the "overall leader" in northern Iraq — was appointed to manage the KDP's military affairs, while his nephew, Idris's son Nejir, was made responsible for the political affairs of the party. It was significant that a Talabani representative attended the KDP meeting that took these decisions.⁹⁸

But as important as the movement's achievements were, they were also very fragile. The new-found amity between the KDP and the PUK had to prove itself in the longer run and in the face of the regime's manipulations. The Kurdish uprising was as menacing to the regime as it was costly to the population, which always paid the highest price for the revolts. The "marriage of convenience" between Iran, the KDP, and the PUK was cemented by the common enemy and the war. However, once the

war ends, the Kurds could be in a very tight situation because their patron Iran might abandon them if it suits her interests. Little wonder then, that the Kurdish movement hoped for an indefinite prolongation of the war. It still had vivid memories of the 1975 accord between the Shah and Saddam.

THE FOREIGN ARENA

AMERICAN TILT TOWARD IRAQ

Iraqi-American relations in 1987 contrasted sharply with the situation in the early 1970s when no diplomatic relations existed between the two, when the US was Iran's main ally, and Iraq was the most vociferous opponent of the American presence in the Gulf. By the middle of 1987, however, the US emerged as one of Iraq's main supporters in its war with Iran, while Iraq became the main supporter and beneficiary of the American presence in the Gulf. This stance was the culmination of a long and gradual process that gathered momentum with the developments of the first half of 1987. Paradoxically, the *rapprochement* took place in spite of, or perhaps because of, two very embarrassing affairs in which each of the two was involved in turn. The first was the "Irangate" affair concerning secret US arms sales to Iran, in breach of its declared neutrality in the war and arms embargo on Iran⁹⁹ (see essay on the US and the ME). The US was suspected and, in fact, publicly blamed by Iraq of providing it with faulty intelligence data as "part of a deliberate policy to prolong the war and increase US influence in the region." Deputy Premier Taha Yasin Ramadan, who accused the US of "conspiracy," "treachery" and "lack of morals," ascribed to this faulty information the fall of Faw a year earlier.¹⁰⁰ Although Central Intelligence Agency officials hastened to deny the allegations,¹⁰¹ the whole affair left its impact on the fragile relationship. The second affair was the Iraqi plane attack on the American frigate *Stark*, which took place on 17 May and resulted in the death of 37 Americans and serious damage to the frigate (see essays on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and on the US and the ME). Iraq declared that the attack had been inadvertent and offered condolences and indemnity to the bereaved families. Although the affair left many questions unanswered (it was speculated that Iraq had initiated the attack with a view to blaming it on Iran), the US sought to play it down and ended up by accepting the Iraqi version. Thus, far from causing a crisis, the attack seemed to have bolstered relations and to have deepened American commitment to enhance Gulf security and help bring about an end to the war.

The US was motivated by three main considerations in its tilt toward Iraq: restoring its credibility among Arab countries in the aftermath of the Irangate scandal; checking Soviet ambitions in Iran as well as in the Gulf; and preventing, as far as possible, the spillover of the war to the countries of the GCC, where the US had long-standing interests and commitments. As for Iraq, it had long been seeking to internationalize the war with a view to either diverting war pressures from itself or bringing an end to the war. The convergence of Iraqi and US interests was largely behind the relatively mild reactions of both countries to the above affairs, and their endeavors to improve relations in various spheres.

In an attempt to counteract the effects of the Irangate affair and to appease Iraq, President Ronald Reagan condemned in January Iran's seizure of Iraqi territory and called the war a threat to "American strategic interests."¹⁰² In another gesture Reagan

called in February for an end to the Iraqi-Iranian War,¹⁰³ which Iran had systematically continued to oppose. In May he again stated that the US wanted the "long, costly, destabilizing, and tragic" Gulf War ended as quickly as possible.¹⁰⁴ Indeed, growing fears of an Iranian victory prompted Washington to initiate moves to put an end to the war. Already in March, Washington had sent an emissary to Moscow in an attempt to coordinate activities in this field. Washington was also the moving spirit behind the 20 July Security Council Resolution 598, which called for an end to the war in terms that were more favorable to Iraq than to Iran (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Secretary of State George Shultz, who attended the UN session (thus reflecting the importance the US attached to the matter) declared openly: "We now have good relations with Iraq, [but] we have grave concerns about [the] politics and practices of the Iranian people."¹⁰⁵ Two days later, the US began reflagging Kuwaiti oil tankers (see essay on the US and the ME), and though on the face of it this move had no direct bearing on Iraq, it was actually extremely important for that country on three counts: the increased US presence in the Gulf was likely to divert Iranian attention to that area; growing involvement in the Gulf might deepen US commitment to end the war; and this backing might help boost the morale of the Iraqi people. Small wonder, then, that, departing from its traditional stance, Iraq actually welcomed the American presence. As Ramadan said: "The presence of the US navy ships in the Gulf waters is linked with ending the war."¹⁰⁶

The extent to which the US was ready to accommodate Iraqi policies could be gleaned from its reaction to the tanker war resumed by Iraq at the end of August (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Although such an Iraqi move also jeopardized the American fleet in the Gulf, Washington was reluctant to castigate Iraq publicly; this was in sharp contrast to Britain's forthright condemnation.¹⁰⁷ And although American officials did attempt to put pressure on Iraq to stop its actions, they on the whole showed more understanding towards it than towards Iran. The US said it would seek an arms embargo on Tehran unless she accepted a UN ordered cease-fire. On 22 September Reagan called on the UN to impose sanctions on Iran "rapidly" if she did not abide by the UN resolution on the cease-fire. He also called on the Soviets to endorse an arms embargo on Iran. Shultz even attempted to obtain a Security Council arms embargo, but failed.

Concurrently, US-Iraqi ties continued to develop on the diplomatic, political and economic spheres. The two nations coordinated moves and exchanged visits more frequently than in the past. By far the most important bilateral move was the five-year commercial, economic, and technical cooperation agreement signed on 26 August by Minister of Trade Muhammad Mahdi Salih. Meanwhile, it was revealed that Iraq had become the US's third largest export market in the Arab world, mostly for agricultural products.¹⁰⁸ In October, Washington ratified \$1 bn.-worth of aid for food supplies. However, from what is known, the US was reluctant to supply hardware and military technology, though it continued supplying intelligence data to Iraq.

Iraqi-American relations had some bearing on internal Iraqi politics. For example, there is no doubt that one objective of the liberalization policy was to facilitate the development of economic relations with the West in general and the US in particular. The dismissal of Hasan 'Ali as trade minister seemed to be connected with this trend. An American spokesman said that the economic cooperation agreement had been scheduled to be signed in 1985, but was postponed because of the minister's ('Ali's)

mother's death. The real cause was more likely 'Ali's lack of enthusiasm for *rapprochement* with the US. For no sooner was 'Ali dismissed, than the new minister went to the US and signed the agreement. On the other hand, the Irangate affair, and the failure to move the US to sell weapons to Iraq were most probably the reasons for calling back to Baghdad the first Iraqi ambassador to the US since 1967, Nizar Hamdun, who was otherwise considered very successful. The new ambassador, who assumed the post in October, was 'Abd al-Amin al-Anbari (the new American ambassador to Iraq was April Gillespie). On the whole, it appeared that the "opening" towards the US was still controversial in Iraq, including among the ruling elite. Ramadan was highly critical of US policies while Talfah and Husayn were much more conciliatory. After all, Husayn was the architect of the opening.

WEST EUROPE'S WAVERING STAND

France remained one of Iraq's staunchest supporters in the West. Baghdad's debts to Paris amounted to \$4 bn.–\$5 bn., according to different estimates.¹⁰⁹ This huge debt had mixed effects on relations. On the one hand, it deepened France's commitment to the survival of the Iraqi regime — as one observer put it, "bound by financial chains growing ever heavier, France had no [other] choice."¹¹⁰ Accordingly, France granted full backing to the Security Council resolution of 20 July calling for a cease-fire, and came out publicly for an end to the war. Following the attack on the *Stark* with French *Exocet* missiles, Foreign Minister Jean-Bernard Raymond declared: "This drama shows that it is imperative to try to put an end to the war between Iran and Iraq, which is an absurd war."¹¹¹

Iraqi debts constituted a formidable obstacle to new arms deals. In February, both the minister of state for military affairs, 'Abd al-Jabbar Shanshal, and the foreign minister, Tariq 'Aziz, flew to Paris to negotiate new deals; but apparently France declined any such deals unless it was paid in cash.¹¹² A further dilemma for France was created by growing Iranian pressure that it stop arms deliveries to Iraq. Indeed, relations between Paris and Tehran deteriorated to such an extent that Paris decided to break relations in July. Iraq predictably welcomed the move, terming it "firm, responsible, respectable, and internationally necessary."¹¹³ Shortly afterward a French paper "leaked" details of what it termed renewed negotiations between Paris and Baghdad to reconstruct Iraq's French-built nuclear reactor, which had been bombed by Israel in 1981. French officials hastened to deny the report as "grotesque and ridiculous." By the end of the year, France began to have second thoughts about its "one-sided" support to Iraq (at one point the French press referred to its arms deliveries to Iraq as "Iraqgate").¹¹⁴ Shifting to a more balanced stance, Paris decided to renew relations with Iran (see chapter on Iran) and to be more "selective" about arms deliveries to Iraq.¹¹⁵ Paris agreed, however, the sell 12 *Mirage* F-1 fighters to Baghdad and to construct a factory to repair planes.¹¹⁶ Nevertheless, Iraqi-French relations did not make a significant leap forward, and it appeared possible that Iraq was on the threshold of a new era, attempting to shift its centre of gravity toward the US.

Britain's support of Iraq was more equivocal than that of France or the US. Britain lent its support to the Security Council resolution calling for an end to hostilities and also participated in the reflagging efforts in the Gulf, yet it did not hesitate to reprimand Iraq for the renewal of the tanker war at the end of August, urging it "in the

strongest terms to refrain from military action which would serve only to escalate hostilities."¹¹⁷ Iraq's relatively mild reaction to the British move showed that she was being careful not to antagonize Britain too much, a stance that paid off when, shortly afterward, Britain granted Iraq almost \$287m. in credit to finance British imports.¹¹⁸ Nonetheless Britain came under fire from both Iraq and Iran, who accused her of selling arms to the other.

Iraqi-West German relations underwent a crisis after the German foreign minister, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, declared on 24 July that Iraq was responsible for starting the war and for using poison gas. The unexpected tilt towards Iran enraged Iraq: alluding to the declaration, Husayn called on Western countries "to possess" the courage to stand firm and not adopt "short-term mercenary attitudes," warning that "there is a high price to be paid for weakness and resignation."¹¹⁹ Bonn soon had to pay a price. Baghdad canceled a meeting of the West German-Iraqi economic commission scheduled for 4 August in Bonn; it broke off negotiations with West German firms over major projects including the construction of a major Iraqi pipeline to Saudi Arabia; and it suspended Genscher's visit to Baghdad. Iraq's harsh reaction and German vested interests in that country (Bonn was involved in 100 projects and 1,000 of its firms reportedly had trade relations with Iraq), prompted the Federal Republic to take immediate conciliatory measures.¹²⁰ The Iraqi ambassador to Bonn was summoned shortly after the announcement and told that Germany was neutral in the conflict; that Genscher had not made an objective evaluation of the war's causes; and that "Bonn had made no statement as to who was responsible for the conflict."¹²¹ The incident, however, was the cause or the pretext for not awarding a German firm a \$1.5 bn. oil-pipeline contract which it was believed to have been on the point of winning before Genscher's declaration. However, careful not to push Germany into Iranian arms, Baghdad too moved towards reconciliation. In November, Genscher visited the Iraqi capital and met with Husayn, who proved his goodwill by pardoning a German citizen who had been imprisoned since 1981 on charges of espionage. Meanwhile, Bonn began investigating 12 West German firms suspected of having sold equipment and know-how for the manufacture of toxic gas to Iraq.

THE SOVIET UNION'S DOUBLE GAME

Iraqi-Soviet relations during the year seemed paradoxical. Though an ally of Iraq since the 1972 friendship treaty, it was the USSR, of all the members of the UN Security Council, that came out in support of Iran regarding the Security Council resolution (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). This act stood in sharp contrast to the fact that the Soviets continued to be Iraq's main arms supplier. For its part, in an apparent breach of the spirit of the friendship treaty, Iraq did not publicly welcome the "entrance" of the Soviets to the Gulf (which began with the Soviet escort of three Kuwaiti tankers in April), while it did support the growing involvement of the US. Yet neither the USSR nor Iraq took any sanctions against the other. These contradictions could be explained by the fact that the Soviet Union had strategic interests in both Iran and Iraq, while it was also about the only power that had a viable relationship with both. Accordingly, it sought to use this position to mediate between the two belligerents; success might have brought it dividends in the two countries, and in the Gulf at large. The fact that the UN resolution was unanimously interpreted to be "in favor" of Iraq only encouraged Moscow to take advantage of Iran's isolation and

increase its overtures towards Tehran. It is quite probable that the growing American presence in the Gulf and the *rapprochement* between Baghdad and Washington encouraged the Soviets further in their stance. But the Soviets were not willing to win one ally by losing the other, so their arms supplies to Iraq served both to guarantee a continued alliance and to provide leverage to pressure Iraq to accept Soviet mediation in the war. On the other hand, Baghdad's maneuvers between East and West did not necessarily jeopardize its standing *vis-à-vis* the Soviet Union. Perhaps the contrary was true. Baghdad, too, was neither willing nor able to cause a rupture with the Soviets. After all, the USSR was not only its chief arms supplier, but also the party that provided arms on the easiest terms.

Until June, relations developed more or less along the same lines as the last few years. Concerned about the offensive on Basra and a possible Iranian breakthrough, the Soviets intensified their arms shipments to Iraq — including, reportedly between 20 and 40 MiG-29s, their most advanced fighter bombers.¹²² Tariq 'Aziz's successful visit to Moscow, in mid-February speeded up the shipment of tanks, aircraft, and spare parts. The Soviet Union further assured Iraq that it would not subject arms shipments to the usual procedures, but would open up its arsenal to meet Iraq's requests as quickly as possible. Another important result of 'Aziz's visit was the Soviet agreement to reschedule Iraq's debts on easy terms over a long period. The sophisticated weapons and all the other requirements were to be subjected to the same terms as long as the war continued.¹²³ The debt rescheduling was crucial as the Soviets had shipped as much as \$10 bn. worth of arms to Iraq between 1982 and 1987.¹²⁴ Moreover, the USSR spoke for the first time of the "Iranian aggression against Iraq."¹²⁵ What lay at the bottom of these developments was not only the two parties' concern about the Basra offensive, but also the fate of the friendship treaty that was to mark its 15th year in April 1987. One article of the treaty stipulated that after 15 years it would be renewed automatically for five years, unless one of the parties stated its objection in the interval. As both were interested in the renewal, they were careful not to antagonize each other during this delicate period. At the same time, however, both sought to maintain a low-key approach to the matter. While seeking to keep its influence over Baghdad, the Soviet Union did not want the treaty to become an obstacle to achieving a foothold in Iran; similarly, while Baghdad needed the treaty for military, political, and psychological reasons, she did not want it to be a stumbling block on the path to relations with the West, especially the US. Thus, although the treaty's 15th anniversary was celebrated, neither party so much as hinted that it had been renewed.

The situation began to change from May onward, after the treaty was secured and the danger of the Iranian offensive was over. The Soviets felt they could now explore new possibilities in Tehran, especially as the latter proved more receptive to their overtures. In June, the USSR intensified its efforts to mediate between the belligerents; but Baghdad was probably alarmed by this development, reflecting as it did a Russian tilt towards Iran. Accordingly, it dispatched the staunchly pro-Soviet Taha Yasin Ramadan to Moscow. The visit resulted in some very important economic agreements, including the participation of Soviet enterprises "in various strategic projects in Iraq."¹²⁶ But it did not succeed in reversing the tilt. Moreover, no sooner had the Soviets signed Security Council Resolution 598 than they began to drag their feet on it, declaring their opposition to any move by the council to impose sanctions against

Iran. In a first reaction, *al-Thawra* indirectly attacked Moscow for what it termed "the shortsighted superpower opposition to the imposition of sanctions against Iran." In another article, it criticized calls for the withdrawal of foreign fleets from the Gulf (in an allusion to Moscow's opposition to the American reflagging), saying that this would clear the way for Iranian "terror."¹²⁷ In a more direct attack, *al-Jumhuriyya* blamed Tass on 5 September for distributing a report to the effect that the US was encouraging Iraq to escalate activities against Iran. *Al-Jumhuriyya* urged Tass to "correct this illusion," saying that Iraq "will not allow such ties to turn into a master-servant relationship."¹²⁸ 'Aziz's visit to Moscow shortly afterward, which was an attempt to convince it to change its attitude, did not bear fruit. 'Aziz then proceeded to criticize Moscow openly. Asserting that Iraqi-Soviet relations had been sound "in all fields" until the adoption of the cease-fire resolution, 'Aziz said that "the Soviets have abandoned their objectivity [by] adopting a conciliatory tone toward Iran." But even at the height of this controversy, "business" went on as usual. Iraq reportedly received 25-40 Sukhoi-25 combat aircraft,¹²⁹ and signed an agreement for cooperation in the development of the West Qurna oil field. Political contacts also continued at the highest level, including talks between Husayn and the Soviet deputy foreign minister, Yuri Vorontsov.

By the end of the year, the Soviet efforts at mediation had failed. But Baghdad and Moscow continued to clash over the question of sanctions against Iran and the presence of the American fleet in the Gulf. Consequently, speculation ran high about the imminent abrogation of the treaty by Baghdad. But nothing of the kind occurred. In fact, together with criticism of Moscow there were conciliatory statements especially by Ramadan, who declared: "We do not cast doubts on Moscow's desire to stop the war or on the Soviet commitment to Resolution 598." He explained that the Soviet stance had become "part of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the US."¹³⁰ For its part, Moscow, too, was eager to clear the atmosphere. Mikhail Sytenko, a special envoy to Baghdad who met Husayn in December, dismissed reports by "mass media without conscience" about tension between the parties and the possible abrogation of the treaty. While reiterating his government's position against "unbalanced and hasty" resolutions to impose an arms embargo on Iran, he asserted that the Soviets were continuing to support Iraq in all fields, and boosting its defense capability to enable it to confront any future aggression by Iran.¹³¹ This, then, was the crux of the matter: the USSR did not make sufficient headway in Tehran to justify a break with Baghdad, nor could the latter afford the luxury of straining relations with Moscow, at least not as long as the war was still raging.

GROWING ARAB SOLIDARITY WITH THE IRAQI CAUSE

From the beginning of the war, Iraq hammered at the idea that the war was not one between Iraq and Iran or between Sunnis and Shi'is, but between Persians and Arabs, and that Iraq consequently deserved maximum support from all the Arab countries. It seems that various developments in 1987 helped to "prove" Iraq's argument and won her the greatest amount of Arab support in the seven years of the war, both on the collective and the individual levels.

The secret US deal with Iran had significant repercussions on Arab countries which considered it an affront to them all and not just to Iraq. Indeed, it was considered one of the most important causes of Libya's volte-face in 1987 (see below). The Iranian

offensive on Basra, which came shortly after the revelation of the secret deal, served to further highlight the Iranian threat — not just to Basra and Iraq, but also to all the Gulf countries, especially Kuwait, which was the closest to the front and the most vulnerable to spillover effects. The Islamic conference held in Kuwait concurrently with the offensive (see essay on Islamic affairs) was again the target of Iranian threats — but rather than deflecting support from Iraq, they increased the sense of emergency among the Arab participants at the conference. It is possible that these developments, as well as pressures from Arab countries that felt menaced by them, were the cause of the slight change in the Syrian stance towards the belligerents (see below). The Mecca riots in August (see essay on Islamic affairs) also increased Arab solidarity in the face of Iranian expansionist threats. Similarly, the escalation of the tanker war, the threat to Gulf oil shipping, and the direct threat on Kuwait, including the Iranian missile attack on that country in October, helped Iraq to present the conflict as an all-Arab affair.

Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, and Egypt, went on providing political, financial, and diplomatic support. King Husayn of Jordan visited Iraq no less than eight times; Tunisia moved closer to Iraq by severing relations with Iran, while Algeria began to modify its pro-Iranian stance, and Kuwait allowed Iraqi warplanes to fly through Kuwaiti airspace and refuel at Kuwaiti air bases.¹³²

By far the most successful Iraqi diplomatic venture in the Arab arena was the emergency Arab summit in Amman in November. (For details, see essay on inter-Arab relations.) Among the successes that Iraq scored at this summit were the following: the main topic of discussion was the war with Iran; the summit produced resolutions condemning Iran's occupation of Iraqi territory, its refusal to abide by the Security Council cease-fire call, and its attacks against Kuwait; and Syria, Iran's chief ally, had to acquiesce in these deliberations, and, what is more, bow to pressures for reconciliation with Iraq. Yet the summit did not fulfill all Iraqi expectations: it did not impose sanctions on Iran, nor did it call for a collective severance of diplomatic relations with Tehran, let alone the dispatch of military forces to help Iraq in any future offensive. Syria, which played the main role in blocking such decisions, appeared to be doing a service to the GCC countries and others faced with very difficult decisions: for although they felt the dangers of the war approaching them, they did not want to identify with Iraq to such an extent as to provoke Iran. Iraq, whose dependence on the diplomatic, political, logistical, and strategic support of these countries had increased even further, had to resign itself to its allies' considerations and sensitivities.

The Amman summit assisted Iraq in solving one of its most difficult political and ideological dilemmas by providing an "umbrella" for the resumption of its diplomatic relations with Egypt (which had been severed after the peace agreement with Israel). The anomalous state of Iraqi-Egyptian relations was such that while Cairo emerged as Iraq's staunchest supporter in the war, diplomatic relations remained severed. Egyptian support included more than 1m. Egyptians¹³³ working in Iraq, where they filled the jobs of Iraqi men serving at the front (see also essay on labor migration); and arms supplies, which included an airlift during the Basra offensive, as well as the supply of 12 *Toacano* training planes, 10 *Gazelle* helicopters, *'Ayn al-Saqr* surface-to-air missiles, T-55 tanks, armored vehicles, field guns, mortars, rocket launchers, ammunition, and large quantities of BM-21 missiles.¹³⁴ There was also the reported

dispatch of Egyptian military experts to help with the Iraqi missiles program¹³⁵ and at the front, as well as diplomatic and political support in various forums. (It should be noted that Egypt severed diplomatic relations with Iran in May; for details see chapter on Egypt.)¹³⁶ Mindful of this crucial support, Baghdad nonetheless had to consider other factors: the Baghdad summit resolutions that called for the ostracization of Egypt because of the peace treaty with Israel; the Ba'th's deep ideological commitment to the Palestine question; and the rivalry with Syria over commitment to the pan-Arab cause. However, hiding behind the collective Arab decision, Iraq was able to overcome her dilemmas and drop ideological considerations for political ones.

Another Iraqi "achievement," though not one of her making, was Libya's decision — for reasons of her own — to modify her support for Iran in the war and to move toward a more even-handed stance (see chapter on Libya). The change was gradual, starting with criticism against Iran, going on to various direct contacts, including the Libyan foreign minister's visit to Iraq in September, and ending up with the resumption of diplomatic ties (which were cut in 1985).¹³⁷

However, Iraq's road to reconciliation with Syria was much more tortuous and far less promising. The deep Iraqi-Syrian animosity accompanied by shrill propaganda warfare had a short respite at the end of April, when a secret meeting took place between Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad in Jordan, following intensive mediator efforts by King Husayn, with the help of Saudi Arabia and the USSR. But this meeting did not help to break the ice, and soon relations reverted to the level of acrimonious attacks, especially after the Syrian foreign minister's visit to Iran in July and the Iraqi downing of a Syrian plane which had violated Iraqi airspace in August. At the Amman summit, there was another attempt at reconciliation: the two leaders met in public; foreign officials, especially Ramadan, spoke more optimistically about the possibility of *rapprochement*; propaganda attacks were halted; and there were one or two meetings between low ranking officials. But relations did not take off. Political problems were still the main stumbling blocks. Syria would not relinquish her support of Iran, and the modifications that did take place were motivated by a wish to curry favor with third parties such as Saudi Arabia or Kuwait. Nor was Iraq satisfied with such half-hearted gestures; the minimum she expected was a neutral Syrian stance on the war. After all, in her alliance with Iran, Syria was the one Arab country that broke Arab solidarity with the Iraqi cause. (For a detailed discussion on Iraqi-Arab relations see essay on inter-Arab relations.)

ISRAEL AND "THE IRAQI OPTION"

In 1988 there was a tendency in Israel to reassess her stance on the Iraqi-Iranian War and its relationship, so to speak, with Iraq. This assessment was triggered by Irangate and the controversy it aroused among the Israeli public. Subsequently, the American tilt towards Iraq, the Amman summit, and the pressure brought to bear on the Israeli Government by Egypt and the US, contributed further to the process of soul-searching.

In the wake of Irangate, Israeli scholars advocated what they termed the "Iraqi option," namely cutting covert arms supply to Iran and moving to a more pro-Iraqi or at least neutral — position. These suggestions aroused public debate in which journalists as well as politicians participated. The pro-Iraqi arguments could be summarized as follows: the policy of "peripheral alliances" initiated by David Ben-Gurion in the 1950s, which advocated alliances with non-Arab countries, had become

anachronistic. Secondly, Iran was no less anti-Israeli than Iraq, something that was not going to change as long as the Islamic republic existed. Thirdly, a pro-Iraqi stance would fall in line with that of the US as well as of the Arab "moderates," and might become crucial for the enhancement of the Israeli peace process with Jordan, for which Iraq's tacit support would be necessary. The advocates of this approach argued that the war, and especially the Basra offensive, should be regarded as the best opportunity for initiating the change, since assisting Iraq in its "hour of despair" might encourage a reciprocal change in the Iraqi stance toward Israel. Indeed, it was suggested that due to the war and other developments, Iraq had long abandoned its radically anti-Israeli position and moved, albeit indirectly, to a more moderate one.¹³⁸ After the Amman summit in November, various high-ranking Israeli officials, including Vice Premier Shimon Peres, came out publicly in support of a change in Israel's political orientation in the Gulf War and a shift towards support for Iraq.¹³⁹ Another Israeli official revealed that "in recent months, senior Iraqi officials have indicated a willingness to examine the possibility of changing the policy toward Israel if the latter supports Iraq in the Gulf War."¹⁴⁰

Pouring cold water on Israel's new approach, the Iraqi ambassador to London described the "growing *rapprochement*" as "Mossad disinformation." Charging that the Gulf War had been sparked by Israel's desire "to cripple and divide Iraq," he emphasized that there was no prospect of *rapprochement* "as long as Israel continues to arm Iran to the teeth."¹⁴¹ Similarly, Iraq denied as "totally baseless" reports broadcast on Israeli Radio of "alleged meetings between Iraqi and Zionist officials."¹⁴² As for Iraqi officials, none of them even hinted to their own public that Iraq was reconsidering its approach to Israel or the Arab-Israeli conflict. Moreover, Iraqi papers escalated their anti-Israeli propaganda attacks. In one of these, *al-Thawra* wrote that Zionism was "a racist, reactionary, and Fascist" ideology and, as such, the conflict with it was mainly cultural rather than political or military. It was also stressed that "the Arab-Israeli conflict will never end but will go on as long as occupied Arab territory is being settled by foreigners who have proved themselves ready to become the dagger drawn against the Arab neck." The paper emphasized that Ba'thi ideology considered the conflict to be a life and death struggle, or, as it put it, a question of "to be or not to be." For, according to the Ba'th, "the continued existence of 'Israel' [sic] meant the impossibility of realizing to the full any of the Arabs' objectives." *Al-Thawra* further quoted Saddam Husayn expressing his conviction that the Arab-Israeli conflict "has always been and will always be the main motivating force for the Arab masses, and that this conflict will become stronger day after day."¹⁴³

In contrast to this radical line, one could also discern a more moderate one presented to the outside world especially the US, with a view to placating the Americans. Thus, Nizar Hamdun, the Iraqi ambassador to Washington, declared shortly before leaving his post: "We do not hope that there will be another Arab-Israeli war, especially since we have had the experience of our own bloody war for the past seven years." However, Hamdun stopped short of declaring that Iraq would recognize Israel, saying it was difficult for an Arab to address this question directly: "We cannot give away our bargaining chip before the bargaining begins."¹⁴⁴

What was one to make of the conflicting attitudes? The fact that the Iraqi Government, instead of preparing its public for a change of approach toward Israel,

chose to escalate its attacks, could only indicate that it was not heading toward a strategic change. This attitude, however, did not blind analysts to the indirect changes, the most important of which was the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt, whose ostracization Baghdad had orchestrated a few years before. The escalation of attacks on Israel might also have been the fig leaf for the move toward Egypt. But the attacks might have served other ends, such as leverage for conciliation with Syria, an attempt to show Ba'thi ideological purity, especially following the erosion in all other spheres, and finally a diversion for the Iraqi public which had become weary of the war.

TABLE 1: MINISTERIAL AND OTHER CHANGES

<i>Name of Ministry</i>	<i>Date</i>	<i>Outgoing Minister</i>	<i>Incumbent</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Light Industries	21 February 8 March	Tariq Hamad al-'Abdallah (died at the end of 1986)	Hatim 'Abd al-Rashid	'Abd al-Rashid held various economic posts. The name of the Ministry of Light Industries was changed to Industry and that of the Ministry of Industry and Minerals to Heavy Industries.
Heavy Industries	23 March	Subhi Yasin Khudayr	Qasim Ahmad Taqi al-'Uraybi	Khudayr was appointed an adviser to the president. 'Uraybi had held various economic posts, including minister of oil (since 1982).
Oil	23 March	Qasim Ahmad Taqi al-'Uraybi	'Isam 'Abd al-Jalabi	Al-Jalabi was a technocrat whose career was mainly in the Oil Ministry.
Transport and Communications	23 March 7 May	'Abd al-Jabbar 'Abd al-Rahim al-Asadi	Muhammad Hamza al-Zubaydi	Al-Zubaydi, a Shi'i (?), had been a member of the Ba'th Party RC since June 1982. The Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform became the Ministry of Agriculture.
Interior	2 August	Sa'dun Shakir	Samir Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab al-Shaykhli	Shaykhli had been a member of the Ba'th RC since June 1982. Previously mayor of Baghdad and adviser to the president. In 1985 he was appointed minister of higher education and scientific research, which he continued to hold together with the interior post.
Trade	2 August 2 August	Hasan 'Ali [Nassar]	Muhammad Mahdi Salih	Salih, a Shi'i (?) and a technocrat, was previously deputy chief of the President's Office. Merger of the Ministries of Agriculture and Irrigation.
Agriculture and Irrigation	19 September	'Aziz Salih al-Numan (Agriculture) 'Abd al-Wahhab Mahmud (Irrigation)	Karim Hasan Rida	Al-Numan was appointed adviser in the RCC Popular Organizations' Office. Rida had been a member of the Ba'th Party since 1958. Previously governor of Ninveh Governorate.
Finance	26 September	Hisham Hasan Tawfiq	Hikmat 'Umar Mukhaylif	Mukhaylif, a technocrat, was also chairman of the Central Audit Bureau.
Heavy Industries	26 September	Qasim Ahmad Taqi al-'Uraybi	'Abd al-Tawwab 'Abdallah al-Mulla Huwaysh	Huwaysh was a technocrat.
Youth	28 September			The ministry was abolished. The outgoing minister, 'Abd al-Fattah Muhammad Amin, was appointed adviser in the RCC's Popular Organizations' Office. He received a distinction medal at the end of the year.

TABLE 2: THE MILITARY HIGH COMMAND

<i>Post</i>	<i>Name</i>	<i>Remarks</i>
Commander in chief of the Armed Forces	Field-Marshal Saddam Husayn	President of the republic. RCC chairman. Secretary-general of the Ba'th RC. Deputy secretary-general of the Ba'th National Command.
Defense minister	Gen. 'Adnan Khayrallah Talfah*	Also deputy commander in chief of the Armed Forces. Member of the RCC and the Ba'th RC.
Minister of state for military affairs	Gen. 'Abd al-Jabbar Shanshal	
The chief of staff	Lt. Gen. Nizar 'Abd al-Karim al-Khazraji	His predecessor until August was Lt. Gen. Sa'd al-Din 'Aziz Mustafa ⁺ who had replaced Gen. 'Abd-al Jawad Dhanun at the end of January.
Armed Forces assistant chief of staff for training	Lt. Gen. Sa'di Tu'ma 'Abbas al-Jaburi	Shi'i.
Armed Forces assistant chief of staff for operations	Lt. Gen. Thabit Sultan al-Hajj Ahmad	His predecessor was Lt. Gen. Hisham Sabah al-Fakhri, who was pensioned off.
Armed Forces assistant chief of staff for administration and supplies	Lt. Gen. 'Abd al-Sattar (Ahmad) al-Ma'ini* ⁺	Shi'i.
Commander of the Presidential Guard Forces	Maj. Gen. Iyad Fatih Khalifa al-Rawi	His predecessor until July was Lt. Gen. Husayn Rashid Muhammad [al-Windawi] [al-Tikriti]
Head of political guidance in the Defense Ministry	Maj. Gen. 'Abd al-Jabbar Muhsin	
Supervisor of military industries	Col. Husayn Kamil al-Majid	Saddam Husayn's cousin and son-in-law.
Head of the president's bodyguard unit	Lt. Gen. Sabah Mirza	
Air Force and air defense commander	Lt. Gen. Hamid Sha'ban al-Tikriti [Khudayr]	
Commander of the Naval and Coastal Defense Forces	Maj. Gen. 'Abd Muhammad 'Abdallah*	
Commander of the I Special Army Corps ("Allah Akbar Forces")	Lt. Gen. Kamal Jamil 'Abbud	His predecessor, Lt. Gen. Isma'il Tayih al-Nu'aymi, was pensioned off in October.
Commander of the I Army Corps	Lt. Gen. Husayn Rashid Muhammad [al-Windawi] [al-Tikriti]*	Rashid is a Kurd. His predecessors were Lt. Gen. Shawkat 'Abdallah and Lt. Gen. Nizar 'Abd al-Karim al-Khazraji.
Commander of the II Army Corps	Lt. Gen. Shawkat Ahmad 'Ata* ⁺	His predecessor was Lt. Gen. 'Abd al-Sattar (Ahmad) al-Ma'ini.
Commander of the III Army Corps	Maj. Gen. Diya al-Din Jamal* ⁺	His predecessor was Maj. Gen. Tali' Khalil Arhim al-Duri.
Commander of the IV Army Corps	Maj. Gen. Muhammad 'Abd al-Qadir	His predecessor was Lt. Gen. Thabit Sultan Ahmad.
Commander of the V Army Corps	Maj. Gen. 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibrahim al-Hadithi	His predecessors were Lt. Gen. Diya al-Din Jamal and (until October) Maj. Gen. Tali' Khalil Arhim al-Duri. Al-Hadithi was killed in January 1988 during the fighting in the north.
Commander of the VI Army Corps	Maj. Gen. Sultan [Qasim] Hashim Ahmad	
Commander of the VII Corps	Lt. Gen. Mahir 'Abd al-Rashid	

* Was given a medal or medals of valor.

⁺ Assumed office in the aftermath of the Iranian offensive on Basra in January-February.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here. In the present chapter, however, all references to *al-Jumhuriyya* and *al-Thawra* are to the Baghdad papers of these names.

1. R. Baghdad, 16 July — DR, 20 July 1987.
2. *Al-Thawra*, 10 June 1987.
3. Ibid.
4. *WSJ*, 12 February; *NYT*, 3 March; *FT*, 2 September 1987.
5. *Le Monde*, 14 December 1987.
6. INA, 13 July — SWB, 16 July 1987.
7. *Al-Thawra*, 2 July 1987.
8. *Al-Jumhuriyya*, 12 March 1987.
9. *Al-Thawra*, 31 March — JPRS, 15 May; *al-Thawra*, 19 October 1987.
10. INA, 13 July — SWB, 16 July 1987.
11. *Al-Thawra*, 19 October 1987.
12. For his strong support for socialism see R. Baghdad, VoM, 1 November — DR, 3 November 1987.
13. *New Yorker*, 12 October 1987.
14. R. Baghdad, 16 July — DR, 20 July 1987.
15. *Al-Thawra*, 13 July 1987.
16. *Al-Thawra*, 3 August 1987.
17. Fuad Matar, *Saddam Hussein: The Man, the Cause and the Future* (London: Third World Centre, 1981), p. 222.
18. *Al-Thawra*, 3 May 1987.
19. Ofra Bengio, "Shi'is and Politics in Ba'thi Iraq," *MES*, Vol. 21, No. 1, January 1985.
20. *Al-Thawra*, 12 February, 10 June 1987.
21. Ibid.
22. INA, 13 July — SWB, 16 July 1987.
23. *Al-Thawra*, 18 May 1987.
24. *MM*, 3 August; *MEED*, 15 August; *al-Thawra*, 13 September 1987.
25. *MEED*, 15 August; *al-Ra'y*, 21 August 1987.
26. *Al-Thawra*, 3, 4, 9, 22 July 1987.
27. *Al-Thawra*, 11 August; *FT*, 1 October 1987. For the wide scope of privatization, see *al-Waqa'i' al-Iraqiyya*, 30 December 1987.
28. *Al-Thaqafa al-Jadida*, March 1987, No. 183.
29. *Al-Thawra*, 12 February, 25 March, 3 May, 10 June 1987.
30. R. Baghdad, 16 July — DR, 20 July 1987.
31. *Al-Thawra*, 20 April, 26 June; R. Baghdad, 11 May — SWB, 19 May; *MM*, 3 August; *MEED*, 15 August; *al-Jumhuriyya*, 15 September 1987.
32. *Al-Thawra*, 23 July 1987.
33. *Al-Thawra*, 2 July 1987.
34. R. Baghdad, VoM, 19 March — DR, 20 March 1987.
35. *Alif Ba*, 1 July 1987.
36. *Al-Thawra*, 31 March 1987.
37. *Al-Thawra*, 12 March, 10 June; *al-Dustur*, London, 23 March — JPRS, 30 April 1987.
38. *Al-Tayyar al-Jadid*, 20 April 1987.
39. *Al-Dustur*, London, 23 March — JPRS, 30 April 1987.
40. *Al-Thawra*, 12 March 1987.
41. *MEED*, 15 August 1987.
42. *Al-Thawra*, 20 June; *MM*, 3 August 1987.
43. *MEED*, 15 August 1987.
44. *Al-Qadisiyya*, 18 May 1987.
45. *Al-Jumhuriyya*, 30 June 1987.

46. *Al-Thawra*, 14 September 1987.
47. *Le Monde*, 14 December 1987.
48. *Al-Thawra*, 31 March; *Alif Ba*, 1 July 1987.
49. *Al-Thawra*, 3 May 1987.
50. Ibid.
51. *Al-Thawra*, 2 February — JPRS, 13 March 1987.
52. *FR*, 23 July 1987.
53. *NYT*, 20 June 1987.
54. *JA*, 18 March 1987.
55. *Der Spiegel*, as quoted by *Ha'aretz*, 13 July 1987.
56. R. Baghdad, 16 July — DR, 23 July 1987.
57. The casualties were estimated at between 10,000 and 20,000. *The Economist*, 24 January; *The Washington Times*, 19 February; *MM*, 30 March 1987.
58. R. Baghdad, 22 March — DR, 23 March 1987.
59. *JP*, 16 December 1987.
60. *New Yorker*, 19 October 1987.
61. *The Guardian*, 15 April 1987.
62. *Al-Thawra*, 16 February 1987.
63. According to the census, Iraq's population was 16,278,316. INA, 18 October — DR, 20 October 1987.
64. The number of refugees was estimated at between 200,000 and 850,000 persons, *NYT*, 25 January; *MM*, 30 March 1987.
65. *Le Monde*, 14 December 1987.
66. *IHT*, 1 June 1987; *Amnesty International Report 1987* (London: Amnesty International Publications, 1987), p. 347.
67. *Newsday*, 3 February; *NYT*, 24 September; *FT*, 29 September 1987.
68. *NYT*, 22 September; *IHT*, 23 September; *FT*, 29 September; *New Yorker*, 12 October 1987.
69. *JA*, 14 January 1987.
70. *IPD*, 6 January 1987; Muhammad 'Abd Naji, *al-Hizb al-Shuyu'i al-'Iraqi* (Nicosia: Manshurat Dar al-Ghurub lil-tiba'a wal-nashr, 1986), pp. 58–65, 175–77; *al-Masar*, 10 May 1987.
71. R. Baghdad, VoM, 21 January — DR, 22 January 1987.
72. INA, 12 May — DR, 14 May; *Alif Ba*, 13 May 1987.
73. For further details, see Pierre Martin, "Le Clergé chiite en Iraq — hier et aujourd'hui," in *Maghreb Machrek, Monde Arabe*, January-March 1987, No. 115.
74. R. Baghdad, VoM, 22 February — SWB, 24 February 1987.
75. E.g., *al-Thawra*, 22 January, 21 March 1987.
76. *Al-Thawra*, 20 February 1987.
77. *The Guardian*, 12 February 1987.
78. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, April 1987.
79. *The Guardian*, 12 February 1987.
80. *Profil*, Vienna, 9 March — DR, 12 March 1987.
81. *Al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, April 1987.
82. *Arab-Asian Affairs*, No. 1, Vol. 14, May-June 1987.
83. IRNA, 19 November — SWB, 11 November 1987.
84. *Le Matin*, 12 February — DR, 17 February 1987.
85. *Al-Majalla*, 11 March 1987.
86. AFP, 13 February — DR, 17 February; *The Observer*, 15 March; *JA*, 15 April 1987.
87. *The Observer*, 15 March 1987.
88. *De Volkskrant*, 11 November — JPRS, 30 December; *al-Majalla*, 21–26 December 1986; *The Independent*, 17 March as quoted by *al-Tayyar al-Jadid*, 27 March 1987.
89. *Le Monde*, 16 April 1987.
90. *Al-Majalla*, 31 December 1986; *The Observer* claimed they numbered 200,000 (15 March 1987).
91. *Al-Tayyar al-Jadid*, 27 March; *al-Majalla*, 1 April; *Hürriyet*, 3 April — DR, 9 April 1987.
92. *Hürriyet*, 3 April — DR, 9 April 1987.

93. *The Guardian*, 2 May 1987.
94. *The Guardian*, 2 May; *Milliyet*, 5 May — DR, 8 May; *IHT*, 12 May; *WSJ*, cited in WF, 13 July; *FT*, 4 September; *NYT*, 22 September; *Le Monde*, 23 October 1987; *JP*, 26 February 1988.
95. *Al-Thawra*, 5 July 1987.
96. *FT*, 29 September; *Le Monde*, 23 October 1987.
97. *Le Monde*, 23 October 1987.
98. *Milliyet*, 3 July — DR, 10 July 1987.
99. In that same period the US envoys to Iran offered to overthrow the Iraqi Government. Barry Rubin, "Drowning in the Gulf," in *Foreign Policy*, 69, Winter 1987–88.
100. *NYT*, 19 January 1987.
101. News on the faulty information appeared first in the US. *The Guardian*, 13 January 1987.
102. *NYT*, 25 January 1987.
103. INA, 26 February — DR, 27 February 1987.
104. *WF*, 19 May 1987.
105. *WF*, 20 July 1987.
106. ENA, 12 September — DR, 14 September 1987.
107. *The Guardian*, 6 September 1987.
108. *WF*, 26 August 1987.
109. *NYT*, 22 July; *Le Monde*, 29 July 1987.
110. *NYT*, 22 July 1987.
111. *IHT*, 20 May 1987.
112. *MM*, 30 March 1987.
113. INA, 19 July — DR, 20 July 1987.
114. *Le Monde*, 18 November 1987.
115. *Le Monde*, 25 December 1987.
116. *Le Monde*, 10 December 1987.
117. Press Association, London, 1 September — DR, 2 September 1987.
118. *Al-Qabas*, 26 September 1987.
119. *Le Matin*, 31 July — DR, 7 August 1987.
120. *Al-Khalij*, 30 July 1987.
121. *The Times*, 28 July 1987.
122. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 7 February — DR, 9 February; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 19 February 1987.
123. *Al-Qabas*, 2 March — DR, 4 May 1987.
124. *FT*, 1 December 1987.
125. *Al-Qabas*, 2 March — DR, 4 March 1987.
126. INA, 4 July — DR, 6 July 1987.
127. *Al-Thawra*, 18, 20 August 1987.
128. *Al-Jumhuriyya*, 5 September 1987.
129. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 3 October; *Ha'aretz*, 5 October 1987.
130. *JT*, 17 December — DR, 17 December 1987.
131. GNA, 16 December — DR, 17 December 1987.
132. *FR*, 6 August 1987.
133. *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 17 August 1987.
134. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 16 February; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 13 April — DR, 15 April; MENA, 11 August—SWB, 13 August 1987.
135. The report was denied by Iraq: *al-'Iraq*, 12 August — DR, 17 August; on Egyptian experts, see *al-Majalla*, 28 January 1987.
136. INA, 16 May — SWB, 19 May 1987.
137. GNA, 7 November — DR, 10 November 1987.
138. *JP*, 23 January; *Davar*, 13 February; *JP*, 27 August; *Ha'aretz*, 8 November; *Ma'ariv*, 13 December 1987.
139. *JP*, 20 November 1987.
140. *Hadashot*, 13 November 1987.
141. *JP*, 26 November 1987.
142. INA, 30 December — DR, 30 December 1987.

143. *Al-Thawra*, 21 May 1987. For other articles in the same vein, see *al-'Iraq*, 27 January; *al-Thawra*, 14, 15, 22 May, 9, 17 June, 2, 8 July; *al-Jumhuriyya*, 3, 10 September 1987.
144. *JP*, 26 August 1987.

Israel

(Medinat Yisrael)

Yael Yishai

Throughout 1987 the Israeli Government pursued a policy of brinkmanship, defined as the art of not stepping over the brink. Fundamental matters of state were pursued to the brink and then placed on "hold" without reaching any decision.

On the surface, Israelis had many reasons to be content: the economy was booming, in fact Israelis had not had it so good for many years; the National Unity Government maintained its stability despite recurring disputes and crises; and partisan activity went uninterrupted, with the parties already flexing their muscles in preparation for the November 1988 elections. While there were manifestations of social tension between Arabs and Jews as well as within the Jewish community, extremism was largely contained and a pragmatic *modus vivendi* was apparently achieved. Beneath the surface, however, there were undercurrents that threatened to undermine the comfortable status quo. Israel was skating smoothly, but on thin ice, and at the end of the year the ice cracked, forcing the state to take stock and to reconsider its policy of brinkmanship.

POLITICAL AFFAIRS

THE GOVERNMENT: DIVIDED THEY SIT

The rotation of power agreement that was implemented in October 1986 was conceivably an original Israeli contribution to the art of politics, since no other democratic — or, for that matter, non-democratic — state ever featured such a peculiar arrangement. In 1987, Israel added another novelty to the practice of politics since it was technically controlled by the government inaugurated after the elections (with the switch in the premiership), but, in effect, it was ruled by two subgovernments which could hardly find any common ground, let alone be "united" as its name implied.

At the heart of this particular political organ lay the symmetry between its major partners, i.e., Labor and the Likud, each of which contributed five members to the Inner Cabinet where major decisions were to be adopted. The core of the government was sustained by small satellite parties allied with either of the "big powers," usually following their master's voice and endorsing their positions.

Controversy between the two camps was evident in socioeconomic as well as ideological issues. The first serious intragovernmental clash took place in February, ostensibly over budgetary affairs. In effect, the dispute was over well-entrenched vested interests which could have been affected by the allocation of national funds. At the heart of the crisis lay the enormous debts of the agricultural enterprises affiliated

to the Labor movement — the kibbutzim and moshavim. The United Kibbutz Movement (Takam) was asking for immediate authorization of a NIS260m. rescue package for its farms from the Knesset Finance Committee. A similar amount was needed to bail out the moshavim. The aid to the settlements was made a condition of Labor's staying on in the government. The Likud, for its part, linked the requested aid to financial support for settlements in Judea and Samaria.¹ A deal was struck between the Labor faction and Finance Minister Moshe Nissim, of the Likud, whereby the debts of the settlements would be rescheduled in return for Labor voting for the budget and for any future aid proposals submitted by the government after the budget was approved.²

The major loser of this deal might have been the State of Israel whose budget could once again fall victim to inflationary forces. Tension mounted as Likud ministers, headed by Deputy Prime Minister David Levy, were adamantly opposed to the aid for the Labor settlements. At the same time, Labor did not drop its veto on assistance to the West Bank settlements. As the crisis deepened, serious questions were raised regarding the survival of the government. Political exigencies, however, produced conciliation: Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir's impending trip to the US made it necessary to end the dispute, vote on the budget, and reestablish the government's unity. Labor, for its part, was eager to have its share of the pie and provide the agricultural settlements, which had been its traditional ideological and organizational backbone, with adequate funding. Although it offered ideological reasons for its devotion to the settlements' cause,³ the stakes were clearly political. After several delays and loud mutual allegations, the aid to the farming settlements was finally approved. The agreed solution paved the way for the vote on the first reading of the budget, on 18 February.⁴

The major causes of intragovernmental crises were the ideological differences over the Arab-Israeli conflict. Admittedly, there was some common ground: both parties rejected any possibility of negotiating with the PLO, establishing a Palestinian state, or returning all the territories occupied in the Six Day War. All insisted that united Jerusalem would remain the capital of Israel. There were, however, genuine differences between the Likud and Labor. The Likud was unequivocally against territorial concessions, supporting the idea of a Greater Israel; for Labor, the lands (or rather those parts that were heavily populated by Arabs) were a negotiable asset to be returned in exchange for peace.

In 1987, the controversy did not flare up over principles (Greater Israel versus Jewish Israel) but ostensibly only on procedure — what means should be used to determine how peace could possibly be achieved. At the center of the controversy was the question of holding an international conference (see also essay on the ME peace process). The idea was not new. Labor claimed that it had been endorsed by the Knesset, which in October 1985 approved then-prime minister Shimon Peres's speech to the UN that included references to such a conference. (The Likud at the time had to swallow Peres's speech and wait for Shamir's turn as premier, according to the rotation agreement.) Two years later it adamantly rejected the idea of an international forum.

The major differences between the Likud and Labor regarding the international conference were as follows:

- (1) *Authority*. Labor claimed that the international conference was only a cosmetic

device to induce Jordan to hold direct negotiations. Such a conference would have no compelling authority and would not impose any solutions unacceptable to Israel. The Likud maintained that the conference might turn from a cosmetic accessory into a decision-making body. Israel would not be able to resist the whole world pressuring it to yield against its own best interests.

- (2) *Outcome.* Labor maintained that the international conference was the safest road to peace. It would entail Israeli territorial concessions in exchange for an end to perennial Arab belligerency. The Likud feared that the concessions that Israel would be forced to make would be detrimental to its security. The conference, it argued, would be a straitjacket which Israel should do everything to avoid.
- (3) *Alternatives.* Labor saw no alternative to the international backing of peace talks between Israel and its enemies, maintaining that this was the only feasible road to conciliation. The Likud insisted on direct talks with the Arab states (following the example of the Egyptian-Israeli negotiations).

Differences of opinion persisted throughout 1987. The Israeli Government spoke in what was termed a "forked tongue" on major national and international issues. A schizophrenic structure of government created a paralyzing deadlock.

The first visible clash on the issue of the international conference occurred in February 1987, when Peres returned from a tour of Europe where he had actively promoted the idea. There was little use in presenting the issue for discussion or a decision by the government. The parity between Labor and the Likud in the Cabinet prevented any meaningful vote. The arena of conflict was thus shifted to the Knesset. Responding to a question from the Citizens' Rights Movement (CRM), Shamir said: "The government is bound by its basic guidelines. These make no mention of an international conference; thus the government is not moving, and will not move towards the international conference."⁵

The statement caused a row in the Knesset but did not develop into a crisis. Both the Likud and Labor voted to refer the motion to a committee. Both parties were interested in reducing tension. Shamir, as noted, was scheduled to visit the US and was therefore eager to portray the image of a united government. A Likud spokesman was quoted as saying that the controversy over the convening of an international conference "contains the seeds of a potential government-toppling crisis, but only if these are watered by a solid formal Jordanian commitment to embark on direct negotiations with Israel."⁶ Such a commitment was, apparently, totally unlikely at the time the remark was made. Labor, for its part, was not ready to forfeit its governmental benefits, especially in view of the financial difficulties the agricultural settlements were in. A tactical compromise was thus adopted which enabled the Likud publicly to reject the idea of a conference while Labor continued to advocate it and attempted to persuade the parties concerned to convoke such a gathering. While several ministers from both parties called on the Cabinet to vote on the issue, the majority preferred to leave the matter undecided.⁷ The face-saving formula adopted was that it was customary for the foreign minister to be allowed leeway to maneuver to achieve peace. This was a perfectly contradictory solution, leaving intact Peres's freedom to propagate his idea while at the same time enabling Shamir (and the government) to fiercely oppose it.

Shamir's declarations in Washington concerning, among other things, his

willingness to call elections over the issue of the conference,⁸ deepened the intragovernmental rift. The two leaders exchanged bitter recriminations on Israel Television.⁹ Yet the government did not break up.

Upon Shamir's return from Washington and Peres's return from Cairo (in March 1987), tensions between the two increased considerably. They were no longer confined to differences of opinion but took on the form of personal animosity. Each of the two embarked on a program of background briefings for newsmen in an effort to explain his position and win support for it. The gap between the camps seemed unbridgeable. Shamir was understood to believe that there was no possibility of compromise between his absolute rejection of the conference idea and Peres's approach to it as the best avenue for progress towards peace. Shamir declared that the Likud as part of the National Unity Government, would never allow Israeli participation at such a conference. He reiterated his opinion that Peres's activities on behalf of a conference should cease forthwith. Yet he also reportedly believed that "the disagreement over the conference should not lead to a crisis or breakup of the unity government," for the simple reason that "the conference idea is contrary to the National Unity Government guidelines, which speak of the Camp David accords as the framework for prospective negotiations with Jordan and the Arabs of the Land of Israel."¹⁰

Despite the exchange of verbal insults, the government did not seem to be in danger at this stage. Peres was free to continue exploring the idea of the conference in talks with foreign leaders, noting that, for the time being, no operational decisions on this score were called for. A foreign minister, maintained the premier, needed no specific authorization by the Cabinet for his explorations, nor could he obtain such authorization.

By the same token, however, the "explorations" could theoretically be stopped by a specific Inner Cabinet resolution. But it was not possible to adopt such a resolution because of the "balance" in that body, which was weighted equally between Labor and the Likud. The stalemate hardly offered a "model of sound governance," noted the press.¹¹

In April, tension between Labor and the Likud escalated sharply and the stability of the government was seriously threatened. The direct cause for the tension was Peres's statement during a visit to Madrid that "whoever undermines the peace process, endangers the government's existence."¹² Shamir responded by condemning the very idea of an international conference as "monstrous and insane." The premier held that the foreign minister could have conceived it "only in a nightmare of despair."¹³ Only 24 hours later Shamir sought ways of stepping back from his harsh attack, professing that his major aim was to keep the National Unity Government intact.

Shamir insisted, however, that the only policy of the Israeli Government was the one advocated by its premier and the coalition guidelines, which made no mention of an international conference. Apparently Labor faced a critical choice — stop advocating a conference or bring the coalition to an end. But Labor was evidently not ready for new elections, and once again a *modus operandi* was worked out between Shamir and Peres which enabled Labor to continue working for a conference while the Likud continued to denounce it. Once again the two parties had stepped back from the brink. The pretext was the death of a woman in a terrorist attack in Alpehei Menashe (a Gush Emunim settlement in Samaria; for details see essay on armed operations). Shamir said that "Israel's security and political interests alike will suffer

if the enemies who seek to kill us also [see] division among us."¹⁴ Both Shamir and Peres prevented the tabling of the issue of an international conference on the government's agenda; both stepped back "until there is a specific peace initiative to discuss." The fact was that there were still no viable negotiating partners on the Jordanian-Palestinian side. The government thus continued to speak in two diametrically opposed voices, causing confusion abroad and disarray at home.

Yet the government seemed doomed to continue muddling along between two opposing poles. Another coalition crisis occurred in May, when the premier and his deputy finally agreed to have the Inner Cabinet discuss the problems of the international conference. Shamir attempted to counter Peres with a peace plan of his own, based on the principles of the Camp David accords, direct bilateral Israeli-Arab talks, and renewed autonomy talks that would not include the participation of the PLO and the great powers.¹⁵ Peres, for his part, submitted to the Inner Cabinet the original Israeli-Jordanian-American agreement elaborated by US special envoy Walter Cluverius. Additional documents were submitted to clarify the terms of reference of the prospective international conference. Not surprisingly, the lengthy meeting of the Inner Cabinet recessed without adopting any decision. There had been no movement toward compromise on either side. Peres was determined to wind up the debate before his scheduled departure for the US.¹⁶ The Likud argued that the conference would lead to a withdrawal to the 1967 borders. Another Inner Cabinet meeting ended inconclusively. Both Shamir and Peres refrained from submitting their proposals to the vote, knowing that five to five votes would be the outcome, amounting to rejections of the proposals. But Shamir regarded the stalemate as a Likud victory. He declared that "Peres had no mandate to act in the international arena on the subject of an international conference." Peres, for his part, rejected this interpretation, saying that "there is no decision to halt the negotiations for a conference."¹⁷ Crisis loomed large again, triggering different party reactions.

Shamir reportedly sought reconciliation. He was quoted as saying he hoped that within a few weeks the crisis would die down, and Labor and the Likud would be able to function amicably in a working National Unity Government.¹⁸ Labor, however, embarked on a public and political campaign to promote early elections in which the conference issue — presented as a struggle for peace — would be the central theme. An early general election was apparently the alternative favored by Labor's ministers.¹⁹ The press joined the call to advance the date of the election: "The National Unity Government has come to the end of its road. There is no turning back without either of the two major parties, or both of them, hopelessly compromising their utterly conflicting positions on the crucial issue of peace with the Arabs."²⁰

A three-man Labor team set out to mobilize a Knesset majority to vote for new elections, but in vain.²¹ The National Religious Party (NRP) and Agudat Israel opposed early elections; Shas vacillated, with the majority leaning toward the Likud. With its efforts to advance the elections crumbling, Labor could either let the Likud function as a minority government with the support of the religious parties and Tehiya, or it could remain in the coalition and be perceived as yielding to the Likud's whims. After all, it was Labor that had sought change, while the Likud was content with the status quo.

Labor was dealt another blow when Communications Minister Amnon Rubinstein (Shinui; affiliated with Labor) announced his resignation from the government

because the "two-headed monster had reached a dead end."²² The Likud scored additional points that day when Rabbi Yitzhak Peretz (Shas, affiliated with the Likud) rejoined the government as a minister without portfolio, after being promised support on religious issues.²³

Despite these blows, the Labor Party resigned itself to staying on in the government. Peres said that Labor's resignation would bring about "the establishment of a clerical extreme right-wing government."²⁴

In July, Labor and the Likud again retreated from the brink of a coalition split. This time the crisis was provoked by Shamir voting to pardon the members of the Jewish underground, sentenced for assaults against Arabs in the occupied territories, who were still in jail.²⁵ The question of financial aid to Labor-affiliated settlements also remained unsettled; and the gap regarding the peace process was as wide as ever. Yet, the two partners (or rather rivals) clung to each other. Shamir stated in the Knesset that the National Unity Government was still essential, especially for economic stability, and differences between Labor and the Likud should not be accentuated.²⁶ Labor ministers also decided to stay in the government "while continuing to pursue the goal of peace."²⁷

The cease-fire between Labor and the Likud broke down towards the end of the year as mutual recriminations were again exchanged by the leaders of the two parties.²⁸ Industry and Trade Minister Ariel Sharon's decision to acquire another home in the Muslim quarter of Jerusalem's Old City, and Peres's continuing efforts on behalf of the international conference, fanned the flames of dispute. But nothing was done to end the spurious unity. The public also demonstrated dissatisfaction through the national unity polls which showed that public confidence in the National Unity Government had sharply declined since rotation. In September 1986, 64% of the respondents in a national poll thought the government was "successful" or "mostly successful." In April 1987 this figure fell by half, to 32%. This drop in confidence was attributed to the decline in its performance in foreign affairs (from 59% to 41% respectively), and was related to the public's dissatisfaction with the handling of the Jonathan Pollard espionage affair, which was approved by only 13%. The wide negative vote on the government's handling of a foreign policy issue was unprecedented, with the disapproval cutting across party lines.²⁹

THE LAVI

The indecision concerning production of the *Lavi* fighter aircraft vividly demonstrated the policy of brinkmanship. The Israeli Government appeared unable to make up its mind whether to halt or continue production. Only after numerous delays was a resolution finally adopted.

The *Lavi* was designed to be Israel's most prestigious technological project. It was authoritatively presented as potentially the best plane in the world, and it was regarded as a truly Israeli creation, a source of pride to a small nation. The project was initiated in the early 1980s, and was successfully implemented for some six years until it was challenged by its objectors. In 1987, the controversy over the *Lavi* gained top priority on the national agenda. On 30 August 1987, only seven years after the project was initiated, the government decided to scrap it. The thousands of workers employed on the project at Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI) protested violently; but the *Lavi* was dead.

There were convincing arguments both for and against its construction. The arguments against the *Lavi* were:

- (1) The project would be at the expense of other military requirements. There would be no funds available for investments in more urgently needed instruments of warfare, some of which were also of original Israeli design and required by all the armed services.
- (2) Design and production of the plane had begun without any long-range planning, without any reasonable policy, and without going through a proper decision-making process.
- (3) Israel was too small a state to produce such a plane. With the state's small population, limited physical resources, and limited political power, the project could be described as a case of the tail wagging the dog.
- (4) There were better and less costly alternatives to the *Lavi*; the American F-16 was regarded as just as good as the *Lavi*, and it cost about half as much as the Israeli product.

Those in favor of the *Lavi* presented the following arguments:

- (1) While the *Lavi* was an expensive project, the scientific and technological infrastructure set up to develop and produce it, relying as it did on thousands of expert engineers and technicians, was a lever to raise Israel up to a higher technological stage. In that case, there could be no substitute for the *Lavi*.
- (2) Economic considerations had never determined the course of national development. From the strictly economic point of view, it would be more advisable to set up a Jewish ghetto in Brooklyn, argued one of the supporters.³⁰
- (3) Cancellation of the *Lavi* would mean the dismissal of thousands of workers from IAI, and this could be devastating. It might lead to large-scale emigration and mean lost votes for the party regarded as responsible for the decision.

Top Likud ministers were in favor of the fighter plane. The project was initiated in 1980, during Menachem Begin's premiership, and was sponsored mainly by Moshe Arens, a senior Likud leader. In fact Herut committed itself, at its 1987 convention, to the continuation of the *Lavi*. However, support of the project was not confined to the Likud. There were Labor ministers (Arye Nehamkin, agriculture, and Shoshana Arbely-Almoslino, health) who were in favor of producing the plane. The Knesset Finance Committee and Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee also voted to continue with the project.³¹

Not surprisingly, one of the greatest advocates of the *Lavi* was IAI, whose 20,000 workers pressed the government³² to continue with the project. Other electronic industries (especially those linked to IAI) joined the ranks of the supporters.

The list of objectors was much longer. First and foremost were the Israeli Defence Forces (IDF), especially the Air Force. Other important opponents were the defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and the finance minister, Moshe Nissim, who regarded the project as "a great threat to the budget." The Bank of Israel also objected on economic grounds.³³ Against the *Lavi* were the majority of the Labor ministers. It ought to be noted, however, that Peres joined the objectors late in the process of deliberation.³⁴ Public opinion was almost equally divided, with 49% of those polled favoring cancellation and 45% opposing it.³⁵

The road to decision was long and arduous. The government was typically divided over the issue. But it also realized that the decision of the project's future might

determine Israel's military capabilities, as well as influence the structure of its economy. The *Lavi* was first challenged by a Pentagon envoy, Dov Zackheim, who expressed (in May) his country's objection to its continuation. He was joined by Israel's State Comptroller Ya'acov Maltz, who revealed the horrendous process of decision making that set the plane on its course.

The *Lavi* issue was brought to the government on 16 August. Rabin and Nissim, the leading opponents, had tabled a joint motion to dismantle the project forthwith. But Shamir and Peres acted together to defer the final vote in the Cabinet by a fortnight. The issue was so important, it was claimed, that it was worth trying to attain a ministerial consensus.³⁶ The real reason for the delay was Shamir's and Peres's apprehension regarding the *Lavi*'s future. Both leaders attempted to avert a decision in favor of its cancellation. The postponement of decision was a last-minute attempt to rescue the project. However, the number of opponents grew in time because Rabin and Nissim, the ministers whose opinions weighed most heavily, uncompromisingly supported the *Lavi*'s cancellation.

The intragovernmental division of opinion largely represented the Likud-Labor confrontation. After Peres joined the opponents, pressure was exerted on recalcitrant ministers to veer in the "right" direction. Avraham Sharir (Likud) was persuaded by means of a transatlantic telephone call to reverse his already recorded anti-*Lavi* vote; Almoslino was made to abstain in the party's interest. The health minister gave in, although she stated that she still favored the project.

The decision to terminate production was narrowly adopted (12-11, with one abstention). It was the health minister's abstention that clinched the matter. An even split between supporters and opponents would have obstructed any change of the previous government decision regarding the production of the *Lavi*.

The cancellation was welcomed by many Israelis, especially in the IDF. But there were angry reactions within the government,³⁷ and IAI workers took extreme measures of staging violent demonstrations to force the government to revise its decision. Protest subsided as it became clear that the resolution was irreversible. The scrapping of the *Lavi* exacerbated the strained relations between the two major coalition parties, but the government remained intact.

Despite the loveless coalition and declining public confidence, the government survived. The Likud was anxious to prolong the government's life because it wished to benefit from the political investment it had made in letting Labor have the first turn under the rotation deal; it also wanted to resolve its internal battles and to demonstrate political achievements. The repeated challenge to Shamir's leadership from his rivals, Levy and Sharon, also discouraged a change in the status quo. Finally, the Likud averted early elections because it feared that the Israeli public would prefer a chance to make peace to the perpetuation of hostility.

Labor's clinging to the government was more puzzling. But there were also good reasons preventing it from leaving the coalition.

First, Labor's chances of setting up and leading a narrow coalition appeared less realistic than the Likud's. The religious parties seemed to have inclined toward the party that advocated a Greater Israel, and was also more willing to promote religious affairs. The Likud could offer them a binding pledge on the "Who is a Jew?" issue. If Labor abandoned the government, the Likud would have the advantage of incumbency in the scheduled elections.

Second, as noted above, the precarious financial situation of the Labor-affiliated organizations militated against early elections. Conceivably, aid for them would not have been forthcoming from a Likud-led transition government. Labor could not afford to leave the coalition. The prospects of a Likud-led minority government were extremely unattractive to Labor, owing to its socioeconomic and military implications.

Third, political advantage could be gained by not precipitating elections. It was hoped that a financial scandal in which Labor was involved would be forgotten,³⁸ that the peace process would gather momentum, that Jordan would establish itself more strongly on the West Bank, that a new Soviet-Jewish exodus would get under way, and that Russia's stand toward Israel would become less hostile. All these potential developments were expected to boost Labor's electoral prospects.

Fourth, a large number of Labor's Members of Knesset (MKs) were opposed to early elections. About 15 of them did not believe they would be given a realistic place on the next list of the Knesset candidates. Thus a majority for early elections could hardly be secured within the party itself.

Fifth, there was not a majority in the Knesset to support an early election. Shas relied more on the Likud than on Labor to promote its religious interests; the NRP was not ready for elections owing to its unsettled factional strife and poor image at the polls; Agudat Israel was also contending with deep internal conflicts and was not ready for elections; and Tehiya wavered, but finally decided against, also because of serious internal dissent which subsequently resulted in a split.

Finally, Labor was apprehensive it would lose votes even among its traditional supporters if it presented the international conference as a central issue. It was believed that the idea was heavily associated with massive territorial concessions, for which the Israeli electorate was not ready.³⁹ While the polls favored Labor, giving it a considerable lead over the Likud, the results of the 1984 elections proved that optimistic estimates could be misleading⁴⁰ (cf. *MECS* 1983–84, chapter on Israel).

The two parties were thus constantly at each other's throats, but did not put an end to the so-called "unity" government.

THE KNESSET: LINGERING WEAKNESS

The Knesset continued to come under severe public criticism. The prevalent absenteeism and the quality of the Knesset debates contributed to a further erosion of its image. However, steps were taken to improve its status and efficiency. One of the major problems that affected parliamentary functioning was the "moonlighting" of its members. Many MKs had lucrative work outside the Knesset, which interfered with their parliamentary duties. Years of public pressure, as well as a campaign waged by the smaller factions, triggered a resolution to deal with this. The House Committee decided, subject to plenum approval, that future MKs would not be permitted to engage in any gainful occupation other than their parliamentary work.

A public committee was set up to determine how this resolution could be implemented, while one of its provisions came into effect immediately. It required MKs to report all their economic interests, as well as their own and their families' sources of income. The press applauded this move: "Hardly an Israeli invention, this provision is so obvious a necessity that it is only strange it has taken over 38 years to get it on the books."⁴¹

During the year, there were several opportune moments for the Knesset to flex its muscles. One occasion arose in the aftermath of the Pollard affair (for details see essay on the US and the ME). After Pollard was sentenced to life imprisonment for spying for Israel, strong public pressure was exerted on the Israeli Government to carry out an investigation to determine who was politically responsible for the affair. This pressure was countered with wall-to-wall resistance from the leadership. The Pollard operation began when Arens was defense minister and Shamir was premier, but developed mainly in the period after 1984 when Peres led the government and Rabin headed the Defense Ministry. These four politicians, top leaders in their parties, were flatly opposed to an inquiry. Nevertheless, despite the broad Labor-Likud consensus within the Cabinet, the Knesset insisted on an investigation.

Senior MKs of both parties sought to empower the Knesset's closed-door Subcommittee on Intelligence to be the forum to look into the handling of the Pollard affair.⁴² While Shamir told the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that it should regard the issue as "closed," the committee's chairman, Abba Eban, countered that "while this might be the government's position, it was not the prevailing view in the Knesset." He added: "It is our right and our duty to investigate and to supervise the actions of the government."⁴³

The government had to yield; but it appointed its own two-man committee to probe the Pollard affair in tandem with the Knesset subcommittee.⁴⁴ It was believed that the Knesset's initiative regarding the investigation had prompted the setting-up of the government's committee.

The powers of the Knesset subcommittee (like those of the government committee) were limited. It did not have the authority to subpoena witnesses; nor would its recommendations be legally binding on the government. It operated mainly by asking questions and receiving answers, as it did routinely in other matters. But tough questions were nevertheless fired at senior government ministers.⁴⁵ Shamir continued to protest that the investigation was "an unauthorized wild-cat operation" and gave assurances that the affair was "now at the end." These assertions were unacceptable to the MKs. In total secrecy and seclusion, the legislators questioned the national leaders for many hours. Although they could not compel people to testify, and those who did so did not swear to tell the truth, nobody refused to appear before them.⁴⁶

In the end, the Knesset subcommittee did not fulfill the public's high expectations. Its report reflected the Likud-Labor rift among its members, with the notable exception of Eban himself who sided with the Likud. The Knesset report cleared the top ministers of responsibility for the misdeeds of Raphael Eitan and Aviem Sella, the senior officials involved in the affair. It suggested that Peres's responsibility was greater than that of either Shamir or Rabin, simply because he was premier at the time the affair broke out and because he chaired the forum of ex-premiers that handled the resulting dialogue with Washington.⁴⁷ The document barely had an impact on the structure of politics or on the ability of the legislative branch to control the executive. In fact, the Knesset report was dismissed by Peres and Rabin as unworthy of comment and not binding on the Knesset as a whole.

The Eban report thus vividly exposed the Knesset's inability to force conclusions on the government, let alone induce it to penalize its members.

The year saw little legislation of substance, with the exception of the minimum wage bill. On 31 March, the Knesset passed unanimously,⁴⁸ in a single day, the law

providing for a minimum wage, which was set at 45% of the average wage. Unanimity was not attributed to coalition discipline, but to opposition to the existence of "sweatshops" in Israel. The law was to be carried out in stages, and payments would be linked to the cost-of-living index only in November. It also had other defects — premiums, for example, were to be considered as part of regular wages for the purposes of the law, which would thus apply to far fewer workers than originally anticipated. The law was passed 20 years after the idea of a minimum wage bill was first mentioned by the Histadrut (the General Federation of Labor) in the Knesset. The major opponent of the bill was the Manufacturers' Association, whose members owned traditionally low-wage enterprises.

Brinkmanship was evident also in the Knesset, which continued its efforts to change the electoral system. By an 8–3 vote the Knesset Law Committee once again approved an electoral reform bill initiated by Gad Ya'acobi (Labor) for a first plenum reading.⁴⁹ The bill provided for the division of the country into 20 electoral districts, each of which would elect four MKs to make a total of 80. Another 40 MKs would be chosen from party lists on a national basis. The bill had been presented in the plenum in July 1986, when it was approved by only a 50–39 majority. Since it involved a change in a Basic Law, the bill required an absolute majority of all MKs and was therefore removed from the floor. In 1987, support for the bill was evident in both major parties.⁵⁰ A revision of the traditional system that released the elected representatives from direct accountability to their electors seemed to be in order.

The Bill of Rights (Basic Law: Human Rights) was another law that failed to be enacted.⁵¹ The Knesset Law Committee remained paralyzed by disagreements between the right-wing Orthodox alliance and a partnership between the left and the center over the two crucial provisions: the status of non-Jews, and the status of Orthodox Jews. The Likud-religious alliance wanted to ensure that non-Jews would be turned down by the courts if they pleaded discrimination, and that personal affairs be excluded from civil jurisdiction. These stumbling blocks could not be removed. The special security needs, the strong (though resented) hold of the rabbinical authorities (which was buttressed by the structure of the coalition), reduced the chances of approving a law that, in effect, had been delayed for 40 years.

As in previous years, in 1987 the Knesset did not excel as a check on the executive branch. It had no tools and even less will to do so. MKs were still dependent on the party leadership, and the National Unity Government strengthened partisan alliances. Partisan targeting of ministers from the other party had become a common practice. An automatic majority for the government was also assured, so ministers failed to show up in the plenum. The Knesset had become a forum for ritual, and as a result, its image was tarnished and its efficiency reduced.

POLITICAL PARTIES: PRECARIOUS UNITY

In early 1987 the two pillars of the coalition government, the Likud and Labor, continued to be preoccupied by internal problems. Herut was still agonizing over the succession to the traditional leadership. In Labor there were also signs of internal feuds, albeit on a smaller scale. Both parties, however, were apparently successful in coping with their internal problems in anticipation of the 1988 elections.

HERUT PARTY

Internal tensions in Herut were exposed early in the year. Since its convention in March 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 403–5), the party was organizationally in a vacuum, since its national posts had not been filled. Shamir, as the leader of the party, attempted to reconvene the convention, but not before an agreement was reached among the factions. His rivals, Sharon and Levy, while disputing each other's claims, challenged the premier's strategy. Levy had been seeking a convention decision to make him the party's number two man, i.e., a deputy party chairman. Arens and Sharon, as potential contenders for the party leadership in the post-Shamir era, opposed any arrangement that would give Levy an advantage over them.⁵² They demanded that the convention hold elections for all the top party positions, but Shamir was totally opposed to this. Both Sharon and Levy made considerable efforts to win support. Sharon invited all convention delegates to a "private meeting" and delivered a message of national renewal.⁵³ This triggered a reaction from Levy, who declared that he was "fed up" and threatened to renew his claim to the party leadership. Arens opposed the election of any party officials, except Shamir as a leader. Sharon was willing to have a contest for deputy leader only if all the other top jobs were filled and no one got more than one key position.⁵⁴ Shamir decried factionalism in Herut, describing the contest between the camps as "an idiotic, insane struggle which borders on suicide." He further admitted that the struggle had no ideological base; rather it was "like fighting a shadow, nothingness, a fog."⁵⁵ The premier was determined to summon a convention despite the widely publicized disagreements. But observers noted that, given the enmity between the camps, the disagreements over the technical and legal points might lead to a total disruption of the convention, as had been the case the previous year.⁵⁶

After lengthy negotiations, the Herut leadership concluded an agreement on the convention's agenda which allowed for an unrestricted contest for the party's top positions (including the chairman of the Central Committee, the chairman of the Secretariat, and the hitherto non-existent post of deputy chairman). The scheduled convention opened on 30 March. A last-minute hitch was removed when the chairman of the presidium, Moshe Katsav, announced that he would not compete against Levy for the deputy chairmanship. Another obstacle was Levy's demand that the first items on the agenda be approval of those changes in the party constitution that would make possible his election as deputy chairman. Elections to the leadership positions also took place, with two contenders for each job.⁵⁷

Shamir, whose leadership remained uncontested, was reelected party chairman by an almost unanimous vote. The other candidates were less successful. Arens and Sharon won with about 64% of the delegates' votes, i.e., a substantial majority. Levy, however, was supported by 56.9%. The deputy premier claimed that he had been a victim of an "unfair" coalition that had deprived him of a more impressive victory.⁵⁸ Levy increased his attacks on his three colleagues (Shamir, Arens and Sharon), accusing them of undermining his position. His rivals, however, did not strike back at him publicly, in order not to exacerbate tensions in the party. Herut's leadership took pains to demonstrate unity. Shamir told reporters that "no one had been victorious and no one had been defeated."⁵⁹ However, he reportedly refrained from congratulating Levy.

The convention had the following effects on Herut's internal division of power:

- (1) Shamir's leadership was clearly strengthened by the peacefulness of the convention; by the unanimous support he received; and by the fact that his call to elect the three ministerial candidates had been heeded. He emerged from the convention as the unchallenged party leader.
- (2) Levy was dealt a severe blow. While his supporters had cast their ballots for the leadership candidates (Shamir, Sharon and Arens) he was not given the same support by the members of the other factions. Apparently Levy was left with a ceremonial post that carried little weight in the party power struggle.
- (3) The chief winner was Sharon, who was elected with a sizable majority to the only working party apparatus — the Central Committee — with the power to decide about Herut's Knesset list. Moreover, Sharon, who had been said to command only 15% of the convention delegates, actually received four times as many votes, presumably owing to his control of the party machine.
- (4) Arens also enlisted impressive support; but in contrast to Sharon, he had to reconstitute the Secretariat and to confront Levy's supporters in that body.

The intraparty rivalries persisted, but only under the surface. On the face of it, Herut appeared to be united behind its leadership and its commitment to the Greater Israel cause. In fact, Herut hardened its ideological line and displayed growing intolerance toward dissent. Arye Naor (a former government secretary and a prominent member of the party) was one of the victims of this closing of ideological ranks. Naor was accused of joining a "peace policy forum" in the Foreign Ministry and endorsing the idea of an international conference. Herut had never shown much tolerance toward dissent, but intolerance was previously reserved almost entirely for those who challenged the primacy of the party's leaders. Naor's case was different since he had not repudiated the ideological foundations of Herut or threatened the leadership, but cooperated with another party on a specific political issue. Herut was unwilling to tolerate even a small breach of its unity. The party court's decision in May, to expel Naor, thus stressed and consolidated partisan ideological lines.⁶⁰

In 1987 Herut did its utmost to restrain factionalism. In an interview Shamir gave at the end of his first year as premier under the rotation agreement, he referred to the spirit of unity in his party in the following words: "There are no differences of opinion in Herut. People voice different opinions but make no demand for operative steps as a consequence of their opinion. The camp as a whole is united in the principle of the wholeness of the Land of Israel — no repartition, no withdrawal."⁶¹

THE LIBERAL PARTY

The Liberal Party, Herut's ally in the Likud, had long contended with a serious internal crisis. The image it conveyed was one of deep division which had deep roots in the past. The intraparty frictions were ridiculed by the public and the press. Even Yitzhak Moda'i, the chairman of the party's presidium and a former finance minister, admitted that the Liberals were "the butt of jokes."⁶² There were two major factions in the party — one headed by Moda'i and the other by the three ministers, Nissim (finance), Gideon Patt (science and development) and Avraham Sharir (justice; tourism). These factions were constantly at each other's throats, using various techniques, including appeals to party and national courts, in order to obstruct their rivals' activities.

On 6 February a party convention was summoned, which was marred by mutual

recriminations and repeated scuffles. This was not surprising in view of the incidents that preceded the event. First, Moda'i summoned the party's council to approve amendments to the party regulations which would allow him to nominate his supporters to the party's forums.⁶³ The rival faction scheduled its own session of the council three days earlier. Each side claimed its session to be the legitimate one. Before a third council was summoned, a magistrates' court decision dropped all agenda proposals, thus leaving the council with no issues to discuss. The council was thus concluded without reaching any decisions.

Having come so close to a split, it was hardly possible for the party to keep its united front. However, the Liberals did remain united, for one major reason: both factions realized that the merger with Herut (desired by both) would not take place unless the party was united. Herut was hardly willing to be caught in the middle of a heated Liberal feud, especially in view of the fact that the party's electoral appeal was extremely modest. Moda'i particularly sought a merger as a means of acquiring a national leadership position, which his fellow Liberal leaders denied him. By the end of 1987 the merger had not yet taken place, although the storms within the Liberal Party had subsided.

THE LABOR PARTY

The Labor leadership faced confrontations in two arenas. In the major external arena, it exhibited a united front advocating territorial concessions. But there were cracks at home regarding the party's ideological stands. On the dovish front, Ezer Weizman took the lead, stating, in March, that Israel must speak to PLO representatives who recognize UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.⁶⁴ This proclamation was a counterweight to mainstream centrist and right-wing Laborites.

There were, however, no challenges to the leadership. On 19 May, some 3,000 party activists convened for a show on unity. Both Peres and Rabin radiated harmony, claiming that Labor was "a shining example for all the nation."⁶⁵ The Labor Party was indeed united behind Peres, who had put his personal as well as his party's fate on the line with his peace initiative. According to political commentators, Peres had launched a game for the highest stakes, maneuvering his party to support the idea of an international conference and to be ready for territorial concessions.⁶⁶

Yet the Labor Party did not totally escape the friction of personal rivalries. One of the more publicized intraleadership clashes followed the report of the Knesset subcommittee on the Pollard affair. Its chairman, Eban, who had sided with the Likud MKs, was accused by Peres and Rabin in the party's Central Committee of harming Labor and doing them a personal injustice. He was also blamed for doing the bidding of the subcommittee's Likud faction.⁶⁷ However, in a subsequent meeting, conciliation was achieved and it was decided to "let bygones be bygones."⁶⁸ Soon afterwards the party launched a public campaign to drum up support for the peace process and consolidate its unity.⁶⁹

TEHIYA PARTY

Tehiya, the right-wing party, underwent a split in November, when Raphael Eitan (Rafal), a former chief of staff, withdrew after his list (Tzomet) was narrowly defeated in a vote taken by the party's council.⁷⁰ The direct cause of the split was Eitan's demand, put to vote in the council, to "democratize" the party and open it to mass

membership. The question, however, was not why Tehiya broke up, but why it had come together in the first place. The party factions were indeed strange bedfellows — religious zealots from Gush Emunim settlements, ardent Herut nationalists (Geula Cohen), and Labor devotees headed by Eitan, who had neither messianic religiosity nor revisionist affinity. During its eight-year existence, the party grew from a three-MK faction to a five-member one. The polls were also favorable to Tehiya, indicating prospects for increased support. Yet personal animosities and divisive social backgrounds overrode the common devotion to a Greater Israel.⁷¹ Eitan won full parliamentary recognition for his one-man faction. It remained an open question, however, whether the independent operation of Tzomet would hurt the right-wing forces or prove more attractive to a Labor constituency reluctant to support Tehiya in its present semireligious form.

THE NATIONAL RELIGIOUS PARTY

The NRP held its national convention on 25 December. The convention's resolutions clearly indicated that the party had veered towards the right-wing camp. Although it did not endorse the "transfer" of the Arab population or a unilateral annexation of the territories, it totally rejected the option of territorial concessions. The NRP continued to be situated in an uncomfortable position between the nationalistic Herut and Tehiya on the one side, and the Orthodox Agudat Israel and Shas on the other.

THE CENTER PARTY

The year set the stage for the birth of a new party when Shinui (without Mordechai Virshubski, who resigned and joined the CRM), the Independent Liberal Party, and the Liberal Center joined to form a centrist-Liberal bloc.⁷² The new Center Party presented a dovish plank — pursuit of territorial compromise, advocacy of individual freedoms, and the rule of law. It situated itself somewhere between the CRM and Labor. The new party had high ambitions — to wrest the balance of power in the Knesset from the religious parties.⁷³ It remained to be seen whether the Israeli public would be willing to support such a party.

THE RULE OF LAW

Failure on the part of the government and individual ministers to accept and exercise responsibility led to a lack of public confidence and a search for solutions outside the rule of law. The major manifestation of this trend was the transfer of controversial political issues to the judicial arena. In fact, Israel was described as being "in the throes of a retreat from politics."⁷⁴ Several major issues were submitted for judicial or quasi-judicial arbitration and adjudication.

The judicial commission of inquiry into the Pollard affair was one such move designed to satisfy the public's craving for "justice." The committee, which included a prominent jurist and a former chief of staff, was in the technical sense not judicial. But it was expected to promulgate the principles of the rule of law. Unfortunately, its findings were highly disappointing, and were described as only "little better than anodyne whitewash."⁷⁵ The government happily endorsed the report simply because it had found all ministers collectively at fault for the affair, had not placed responsibility on any particular individual, and therefore had no immediate political repercussions.

More successful was the commission headed by a former Supreme Court president, Moshe Landau,⁷⁶ which examined the interrogation methods of the General Security Services (GSS). The inquiry was instigated by the High Court of Justice ruling in the case of Izak Nafsu (an IDF officer accused of treason), which exposed the practices of the GSS.⁷⁷ The major findings of the commission were shocking. It revealed that, on numerous occasions, the GSS had lied to the courts about the methods used to extract confessions from suspects. The commission decided, however, to draw a veil over the past, and recommended that none of those involved be put on trial. The commission sanctioned the use of limited physical and psychological pressure during interrogation, and repeatedly praised the GSS's efforts and successes in fighting terrorism. The commission also opened the way for the victims of perjury to seek legal redress.

Reactions to the report were favorable across the political spectrum, with politicians on the right hoping that it would end public disparagement of the secret service, and those on the left underscoring the need to remove lawlessness from its ranks. The legal community also applauded the report, describing it as "an inspiring milestone for coexistence between the rule of law of an enlightened country on the one hand and the needs of security on the other."⁷⁸ The Landau report was thus regarded as an important contribution to the continued primacy of the rule of law.

Subsequent responses were less enthusiastic. There were two major criticisms: first, some people found it difficult to accept that the lengthy period of lawbreaking had been erased and no one was being punished. Second, it appeared that no one — not the courts, not the military, and not the political leadership — was directly accountable for the GSS. The political echelon was spared personal responsibility since it was still believed that, in the fight against terror, law and security needs were more often than not irreconcilable. Especially disturbing was the commission's recommendation that the use of a certain amount of pressure during interrogation be approved by the authorities. The Knesset opposition criticized the report for protecting the political leadership and demanded parliamentary control of the GSS.

The Cabinet overwhelmingly endorsed the report and instructed "the authorities involved" to act in accordance with its recommendations. The Cabinet also approved the setting up of a committee of ministers, as suggested by the Landau Commission. It comprised the premier, the vice premier, and the ministers of defense and justice, and it was to study special issues related to the GSS submitted to it by the premier, including methods of interrogation.⁷⁹ The attorney-general was conspicuously absent from the government's commission. His exclusion, noted the press, left the cat as the sole guardian of the milk.⁸⁰

There were further efforts to buttress the rule of law. The public mood encouraged a group of university professors to press for a proposed constitution for Israel, covering all aspects of public life. Their 17-chapter document defined the rights and responsibilities of the government, the Knesset, the judicial systems, the public Administration, the IDF, and the political parties. It also delineated the inalienable rights of private individuals. The proposed constitution contained two major innovations: a bill of rights, and a radical change in Israel's electoral and parliamentary system. These were the obstacles that had prevented any structural reforms in Israeli politics and impeded the adoption of a constitution. While the professors' proposals put the issue on the political agenda and triggered public debate, they did not mature into concrete policy in 1987. The scope of this debate indicated, however, that Israelis

were just about ready to institute a rule of law based on universal norms of freedom and equality.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS: DOUBLESPEAK

There have always been differences of opinion within the government in Israel regarding basic issues of foreign policy. For foreign consumption, however, the government always spoke in one voice. But foreign policy statements in 1987 were unprecedented. Not only were differences publicized, but the contending parties also sought to enlist the help of foreign governments to obstruct each other's moves. Peres, responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs, made arrangements for an international conference without fully informing the premier of the details because he feared obstruction. Shamir, for his part, dispatched his special envoys to Washington and lobbied in foreign countries (such as France) for non-cooperation with Peres (cf. also essay on the ME peace process).

Israeli leaders made frequent trips abroad, mainly to the US; but no pressure was exerted on the government by the Reagan Administration. On the contrary, Israel was designated a major non-Nato ally, which could result in an additional \$100m. in US defense-related contracts the following year.⁸¹ Apparently the US preferred not to take sides in the serious intragovernment debate. Before the differences were sorted out, the Administration saw no point in prodding Israel toward an international parley. Speaking in the Knesset, Shamir described the visit of Secretary of State George Shultz to Israel in October as "the latest example of the pressure-free relationship that exists between us and our great ally." He also noted that the US and Israeli opinions regarding peace "flow through the same channel even though there are certain differences on certain issues."⁸²

Israel also made an effort to improve its relations with the Soviet Union. During a visit to Italy, in April, Peres met with Soviet delegates. Although no dramatic developments were evident, the dialogue that had started in Helsinki in 1986 continued. The USSR was obviously interested in an "active role" for itself in any ME peace conference, and insisted on preconvention meetings to establish guidelines for the peace process. It was believed that the USSR would join the conference once the ground rules were agreed upon. A Soviet consular delegation, which arrived in Israel in June, was another sign of the improving relations between the two states.

Another breakthrough occurred in Israeli-Chinese relations. A meeting between the Chinese foreign minister and his Israeli counterpart took place on 30 September. Despite differences of opinion, it was decided to maintain regular contacts through the ambassadors of both countries at the UN. As a regular member in the Security Council, China could be involved in the future peace process. Strengthening the ties with this giant state was a major objective of Israel's foreign policy.

There were also some developments in Israel's relations with South Africa. On 16 September, the Cabinet decided to impose 10 specific EEC-type sanctions against South Africa, touching on economic, cultural, scientific, sports, and official ties. This was a follow-up of the Inner Cabinet's decision of 18 March, which included a ban on all new defense contracts with South Africa and the establishment of an inter-departmental committee to recommend further specific sanctions. Needless to say, the issue was also subject to interparty (Likud-Labor) friction.

The unusual aspects of the two-pronged foreign policy led to some unusual steps regarding the enlisting of outside support. In a speech to the Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations, Peres called on US Jewry to join with Israel in the fight for peace, which, he said, was a matter of life or death.⁸³ Shamir accused Peres of dragging American Jewry into Israel's partisan debate, while Peres denied any intention of asking the American-Jewish leaders to make decisions for Israel. Nonetheless, Peres's direct appeal to American Jewry to become involved in an internal Israeli argument was unprecedented.

SOCIAL AFFAIRS: AN ACCUMULATION OF TENSIONS

Social tensions continued to surface, with a diminishing of the Ashkenazi-Sephardi rift and an intensification of religious-secular differences. Labor relations were generally under control, except in the health sector. Temporary trade union unrest occurred when wage agreements were to be signed. Especially aggravating were the mounting Jewish-Arab tensions, which had clearly ominous implications.

LABOR RELATIONS

An ailing health system was plagued by lingering strikes and work stoppages in 1987. There was hardly an occupational sector in this branch that was not involved in a labor dispute, and physicians, nurses, and service employees took action.

The union of government hospital administrative and maintenance workers was the first to strike. While its members were not indispensable experts (like the doctors), its leaders adopted an extremely harsh unionist approach, exacerbating relations with the authorities to the point of breakdown.

The obvious reason for the workers' unrest was their pathetically low income. Physicians also staged strikes on grounds of professional efficiency. Their stated goal was to improve the level of health care by adding an extra work shift to the existing schedules, thus shortening the extremely long waiting lists for elective surgery. Undoubtedly, the doctors also had reason to complain about their salaries, which were far lower than those in Western countries.⁸⁴ The result of the recurrent strikes was the near collapse of public health services. Various committees were set up to study the situation and recommend solutions, but to no avail.

The reasons for the crisis in the health system were fourfold. First, cuts in the health budget put constraints on medical services. Second, responsibility for determining health policy was vested in the Health Ministry, but it was the Finance Ministry that determined the allocation of resources, sometimes without the consent (or even awareness) of the relevant ministry. Quite often the health minister allied herself with the strikers against her colleagues in the government. Third, in addition to the lack of administrative coordination, there was a genuine difference of opinion between Finance Minister Nissim and Health Minister Arbeli-Almoslino. The former, representing a liberal tradition, advocated the introduction of user fees in the health system, a move adamantly opposed by the socialist-oriented health minister. Finally, the division of labor between the major health fund (Kupat Holim, owned by the Histadrut) and the Health Ministry threw the system into disarray. The demand for "equalization" between the services provided by the state and those offered by Kupat

Holim was the major cause of labor disputes. However, coordination between the two institutions was not feasible.

The Health Ministry, operating as the direct provider of medical services, had been incompetent and inefficient, but was unwilling to cede its authority. Kupat Holim, for its part, had been the Histadrut's bastion of power and reservoir for jobs and funds. Any fundamental change in the infrastructure of Kupat Holim was simply ruled out by the Labor leaders. The major sufferers were the patients, who had to seek daily information regarding the closing of clinics and the abrupt cancellation of operations. Since they lacked clout, their agony could not be translated into political power.

Another arena of unrest was the Israeli Broadcasting Authority (IBA), which was also in complete disarray, beset as it was by repeated strikes and work stoppages. In February, Israel Television workers went on strike owing to the suspension of the chairman of the technicians' staff committee.⁸⁵ Broadcasts were resumed after nine days, but labor relations continued to deteriorate. In September, a strike was staged by television and radio journalists seeking to boost their eroded incomes. The direct cause was the journalists' demand to link their salaries to those of their colleagues in the print media. While the IBA is an independent, autonomous body (like the BBC), it depends for its budget on the Treasury, which determines annual license fees. The Treasury adamantly refused to increase the journalists' wages, fearing it would precipitate a chain reaction throughout the public sector and undermine the wage agreement signed with the Histadrut. As the strike continued (surprisingly without public protest), the Cabinet approved a bill for the possible closure of radio and television broadcasting for a 90-day period.⁸⁶ The threat to close the broadcasting services was not carried out, but television and radio remained off the air for nearly two months before the strike ended. The workers returned to their jobs after management agreed to postpone plans which should have led to large-scale dismissals and accepted arbitration over wage rises. The main reason for the return to work, however, was the astonishing lack of public concern over the shutting off of the broadcasting services.⁸⁷

The labor dispute affecting the greatest number of people flared up over wages in the public sector. The Treasury and the Histadrut could not see eye to eye over the new wage agreement which was to become the benchmark for wage accords throughout the economy. Nissim proved to be a stubborn fighter for budgetary constraints and would not breach the framework of the economic policy. The Histadrut, for its part, was under heavy pressure from constituent unions to change the status quo. Worth noting is the fact that the public sector (comprising almost half a million employees) is overstaffed with people who are, by and large, underpaid. Any significant increase in their salaries could have shattered the government's economic achievements, which included slashing inflation to manageable levels. On 7 July, a 24-hour general strike was declared as a warning to the Treasury. Despite claims of success, the collective action failed to hide divisions within the Histadrut following Nissim's call to resume stalled negotiations. Low-paid unions demanded an escalation of the struggle. But the Histadrut leadership, aware of the budgetary problems caused by an oversized public sector, was more willing to compromise.⁸⁸ After more than five months of haggling, an agreement was finally signed, which, in addition to some wage increases, included a few novelties. But signature was made possible only when the government yielded to the Histadrut's demand that it approve a five-day working week.⁸⁹ The government's

agreement on this was to be traded for a Histadrut consent to sign a two-year agreement. Such an arrangement could spare the government the need to negotiate a new wage agreement in 1988, an election year. The Histadrut, for its part, hinged the two-year agreement on the extension of the cost-of-living allowance accord and the price-control arrangement for the same period. In the end, no such deal was concluded. The wage agreement was to be in effect only until April 1988. And the implementation of the five-day working week was also postponed. It was the objection of the private employers (and the Bureau of Coordination, their umbrella group) to the short week demand which rendered impossible the two-year agreement. Nevertheless, the Histadrut stood firm on its other demands—improved pensions and an across-the-board pay rise with higher wages for those getting the lowest amounts.⁹⁰ The wage agreement was a clear victory for the Treasury. A mere NIS75 a month salary increase was approved; the promise that was given on a five-day working week was not to be implemented in the foreseeable future. There were still two unattained targets for the long term: to raise the efficiency of the public sector, and to reduce the number of its employees.

RELIGIOUS-SECULAR RELATIONS

Religious-secular relations largely deteriorated during 1987. Confrontations took place in the courts and on the streets between furious and frustrated demonstrators on both sides, and the authorities.

The hoary issue of conversion was once again brought to the High Court of Justice, which was asked to approve the legal rights of non-Orthodox converts. The judicial hearing followed a rabbinical threat to denounce the court should it decide "to register non-Jews as Jews."⁹¹ The former interior minister, Yitzhak Peretz (who resigned from his post in January 1987 because he refused to register a Reform convert as a Jew in her ID card) filed the court petition arguing that Reform converts were not Jews under the Law of Return. But the High Court nevertheless approved the conversion's validity.⁹²

A clash between the civil and rabbinical judicial authorities occurred also in the William Nakash case.⁹³ A rabbinical court challenged the High Court's decision regarding Nakash's extradition and issued a decree preventing him from leaving the country. The religious court displayed a total disregard of internationally accepted rules of justice, arguing that Jewish Law predominates. It was one of the rare head-on collisions between the secular and the religious judicial systems.⁹⁴

More disturbing to more Israelis was the conflict over the religious status quo in Jerusalem, which remained practically the only city in which cinemas were closed on Friday night. The Orthodox claimed that the holy character of the city required the strictest observance of religious rules. The secular residents, for their part, claimed that their civil liberties were being undermined by the denial of harmless cultural activities on the Sabbath.

The Friday night screening of films triggered widespread and violent demonstrations, with both religious and secular residents firmly adhering to their version of the Sabbath. An existing municipal bylaw banned the showing of movies in Jerusalem on the Sabbath; however, a municipal court judge ruled that issues concerning freedom of religion and conscience were the province of the Knesset, not the city councils. The judge further noted that banning Sabbath movies was

"unreasonable since it represents an unnecessary intervention in citizens' rights."⁹⁵

Another issue revolving around religious sensibilities concerned the use of agricultural products grown in Israel during the Sabbatical year. Questions were asked when Industry and Trade Minister Sharon approved the export of a large portion of the country's wheat crop on religious grounds,⁹⁶ while at the same time importing an equal amount of subsidized wheat from the US.

Then the prime minister, in his capacity as acting interior minister, delayed approving a plan for a new football stadium in Jerusalem because of religious objections.⁹⁷

The precarious balance of the coalition government was one of the main reasons for yielding to extreme religious demands, which, for their part, contributed to a marked escalation of tensions between Orthodox and secular Jews. A tenuous "cease-fire" was maintained, with the serious danger of a *Kulturkampf* hovering not only over Jerusalem but over the Jewish community at large.

JEWISH-ARAB RELATIONS

Jewish-Arab relations had already deteriorated considerably in the months before riots erupted in the occupied territories on 9 December. There was also friction with the Druzes and the Bedouins, who were traditional allies of the Jews.

The reason for the mounting tension was the conspicuous inequality between the Jewish and the minority sectors regarding housing facilities, job opportunities, education, and municipal services. Unprecedented violence occurred because of a land shortage in Druze villages in the Mount Carmel area and in upper Galilee, and in the Bedouin communities in the Negev. Although the government yielded to the villagers' demands in each case, the issue of inequality continued to surface.

The Arab sector as a whole (represented by the Committee of Arab Local Councils) pressed for equality and demanded a far greater share of the national pie. Several strikes were staged to pressure authorities and to keep the issue on the public agenda. In response, a draft plan was introduced to integrate the minorities more fully in the mainstream. But the plan also called for greater government influence over grassroots Arab organizations. The Arabs reacted with conspicuous coolness to the plan, regarding it as a means of dampening their demands for equality.⁹⁸

The assumption that the Arab minority would learn to accept the Jewish State in time was not sustained. There have been many indications that the process would be long and arduous. Extremism occurred on both sides and was not confined to street clashes. Gen. (res.) Rehavam Zeevi came out openly in favor of "transfer," that is, the deportation of Arabs from the Jewish State.⁹⁹ A militant mood also took hold among the Arab community, including its moderate leaders, who demanded more drastic measures to force the government to "sit up and take notice."¹⁰⁰ When violence flared up in the occupied territories, it added fuel to the flames. A "Peace Day" strike was staged on 27 December by the entire Arab population under the auspices of the Committee of Local Councils. Although the police minister asserted that "only a small fraction of the towns where Israeli Arabs live were hit by violence," a new stage in Arab-Jewish relations had been marked. It was clearly demonstrated that the Arabs were capable of united action, and that they were no longer prepared to accept their plight as an immutable law of nature. It also indicated that the process of Palestinization of the Israeli Arabs, which started in 1967, was well under way.

THE ECONOMY: GROWTH AND PROSPERITY

The recovery that had begun in the second half of 1986 in economic activity and in the labor market continued in 1987. The data were impressive: the business sector's gross domestic product (GDP) grew during 1987 by 6.2%, the fastest rate of growth since 1972.¹⁰¹ The GDP for the entire economy did not lag far behind, rising by 4.6% during the year in comparison to 2%–3% annually in the years 1983–86. Recovery in the period was reflected in rising industrial production indices, in higher building starts, in the indices of tourism and of imports of production inputs. The picture was especially bright during the first half of the year, but a considerable slowdown in the pace of growth took place in the last two quarters reminding Israelis that the economy's healthy appearance did not of necessity indicate a healthy body.

The relatively large increase in output during 1987 stemmed from a considerable rise in exports. In volume terms, sales of commodities to foreigners rose by 11.2%. Investment spending rose by 11.1%, after three years of falling levels. Despite this impressive rise, investment spending was still 17% below what it had been in 1983. The good news also included a decline in unemployment, which fell in 1987 to 6.2% of the civilian labor force, compared to 7.1% the previous year. Officials noted, though, that the fall in the rate of unemployment took place in the first half of the year, while in the last six months it was on the rise again. The stepped-up activity in the labor market was accompanied by a further rise in real wages which was even higher than in Aridor's heyday. Average real wages per employee rose by 10% in addition to the 6% rise of wages per hour in 1986. The rise was especially evident in the business sector — 11% in 1987 (7% in 1986). In comparison, the rise in wages in the public sectors rose by only 8% (4% in 1986). All in all, the net income percentage (including domestic and foreign resources, and government transfer payments with taxes deducted) rose in 1987 by 7%, after a decline of 4% in 1986 and 10% in 1985.

Indeed, during 1987 there was a noticeable 6% rise in the standard of living. Israelis were enthusiastically engaged in purchasing luxury goods and above all private cars — at a rate of 23% more than the previous year. A concomitant development was a jump in the number of traffic accidents, which troubled the public and the decision-makers alike.

Prices also came under control. In the period surveyed, the rate of inflation was stable — with seasonable fluctuations — at about 1.5% per month. The consumer price index rose during this period at an average monthly rate of 1.2%, slightly below the previous year's average. The taming of inflation was perceived as "one of the most remarkable developments during the period surveyed."¹⁰² This, despite the fact that the annual inflation rate was still about 10% higher than the rates Israel's principal trading partners were contending with (for a summary of economic indices see Table 1).

Curbing inflation was a result of positive policy measures taken by the government in cooperation with other social sectors in what became known as the "package deal."

In January 1987, Nissim held talks with the Histadrut and the Manufacturers' Association in order to reach an agreement on wages and prices, as well as on proposed reforms in the capital market and the tax system. The trilateral forum was to agree on the principles of a new economic program. In the initial stages of the deliberations, the Histadrut and the manufacturers criticized the prepared program.

The former attacked the proposed tax reform and demanded the appointment of a public committee of experts, including its own representatives, to formulate a less drastic reform which would increase net pay without canceling exemptions and tax discounts as proposed by Nissim. This demand was totally rejected by the finance minister. Furthermore, the Histadrut, which was willing to accept only a committee of officials that would make some changes to the original Treasury plan,¹⁰³ fiercely objected to the proposal to impose payment for visits to physicians. The Histadrut was specially adamant regarding the cancellation of tax exemptions for disabled IDF veterans, victims of work accidents, war widows, and other such handicapped groups.¹⁰⁴ It was willing, though, to negotiate the cost-of-living allowance in view of the moderate inflation. The manufacturers also opposed the plan, because it did not provide sufficient benefits for their own sector and did not encourage export profitability.¹⁰⁵

The Treasury's attempts to appease its partners to the deal proved productive. Nissim promised the employers that the new program would lower labor costs by reducing taxes and contributions to the National Insurance Institute. To the Histadrut, the finance minister offered price stability in return for a freeze on nominal wages. But Nissim also made some marked concessions. He waived his plan to make patients pay for visits to doctors in hospitals and clinics. He also announced that Histadrut representatives would hold talks with government representatives to ensure that the health system would be adequately funded and that the Health Ministry's budget would not be cut. All this added up to financial aid to the Histadrut's most cherished asset, Kupat Holim. Nissim also gave up his plan to cancel the long list of tax exemptions, which Yisrael Kessar, the Histadrut's secretary-general, described as the Labor movement's main achievement in the negotiations.

After compromise had been reached, the government approved the new economic program on 14 January. It included a 10% devaluation of the currency, the postponement of half of the cost-of-living allowance that was due to be paid with the March salaries, a 2.7% reduction in employers' national insurance contributions, and a further cut in subsidies to basic goods and services.¹⁰⁶ The agreement also stipulated that price controls would be maintained. In April, reductions of individual and corporate income tax rates came into force, as the initial part of the planned income tax reform. Several additional steps were taken to implement the capital market reform.¹⁰⁷ The public hailed the new program and especially the tax reform on the corporate and individual levels. It was hoped that reduction of taxation would encourage investment and productivity, giving firms and employees alike an incentive to work.

The program had economic and political ramifications. It was believed that its fate hinged on the ability of the government and the employers to resist wage demands. The collective wage agreements were to expire in April and the Histadrut was not expected to press for any wage increases. While price controls (which applied to about half the goods and services in the economy) were extended until April 1988, they were difficult to enforce without the voluntary consent of the parties involved. The Bank of Israel summed it up by saying that "in the short run these policy measures succeeded in correcting the relative price distortions and contributed to maintaining the economic recovery without an acceleration of inflation."¹⁰⁸

One economic target was not achieved. The governor of the Bank of Israel, Michael

Bruno, urged the government to make budget cuts alongside the tax reform.¹⁰⁹ Soon afterwards, the Economic Cabinet approved a \$320m. cut in the state budget, and there was talk of introducing fees for education and user charges for health services.¹¹⁰ But these did not materialize, at least not in 1987. The public-sector budget for real activity (i.e., excluding interest payments on the domestic debt) not only continued to run a surplus, but increased from 3% of GDP in the second half of 1986 to some 5% in 1987.

During the year there was increasing evidence of the beginning of a structural change in the economy, which was expected to lead to accelerated and stable growth. There was an increase in the size of the business sector relative to the public sector, and within the business sector greater profits were reported, which meant increased output and higher wages. There were also signs of "privatization," with a shift from government intervention to initiatives taken by banks and individuals. On the 10th anniversary of the economic upheaval ushered in by the Likud, some of its principles were taking hold.

The repercussions were evident in the political domain. Cooperation between the major groups in the economy was being shown to be both possible and desirable. It was possible because of the institutional arrangements that facilitated interaction, namely the government's willingness to come to terms with the representatives of the major economic sectors rather than impose its policy.¹¹¹ It was also possible owing to the peculiarities of the Israeli economic system. For instance, the Histadrut, which represents over 80% of the country's workers, is also one of the largest employers in the country, with enterprises that produce some 25% of the national income. The dual role of the Histadrut facilitated agreements on the national level.

That such agreements were also desirable, was self-evident. Instead of a bitter class struggle (which hardly ever occurred in Israel), the pact between the state and the representatives of the two major economic sectors brought about prosperity and stability.

So much for the good news. There were also dark spots which indicated that prosperity might be ephemeral.

To begin with, there was a marked rise in the national deficit. The gap between imports and exports of goods and services, excluding military exports, totaled \$3.4 bn., compared with \$2.8 bn. in 1986 (and \$2.2 bn. in 1985). Some 60% of the rise in the deficit, however, was attributed to import prices rising faster than export prices. Second, there was still a large gap between the rise in income and the rise of production. Productivity in the business sector rose by 3.1% in 1987; at the same time, hourly wages rose by 10.8% in real terms.¹¹² Low productivity was diagnosed by experts as one of the major ailments of the Israeli economy.

The vulnerability of the economy was further exposed by a scandal that forced almost the entire top echelon of a major bank, Leumi, to resign. It began with a report on the huge salaries (around \$1m. a year) and severance payments and pensions received by the bank's top directors. The focus of the attack was Ernest Jaffet, the chief executive of Bank Leumi, a public enterprise whose shares are owned by the Jewish Agency's Jewish Colonial Trust. Evidently neither the Trust nor the Agency exercised authority over the bank, mainly because it had become a national institution in its own right, a giant corporation with an international reputation. The holders of ordinary shares had no vote at the annual general meeting, and the Bank of Israel played only a modest supervisory role, as it did with all the other banks. Following a

public outcry the bank's board of directors resigned *en masse*, despite attempts by both the premier and his deputy to persuade the directors to remain in their posts.¹¹³ The new bank managers, Dr. Meir Heth and Bino Zadik, were chosen on the basis of their professional expertise.

The redemption of the bank shares on 31 October, four years after their prices collapsed on the Stock Exchange and the government undertook to compensate shareholders, posed another grave danger to the economic achievements of 1987. To make the redemption possible, the Treasury was ready to inject the amount needed (NIS2 bn.) into the economy. This move was necessary since the so-called "arrangement" promised all those who held bank shares on 5 October 1983 the full inflated worth of their investment. Some measures were taken to curb the possible damage: attractive savings schemes were offered, and monetary expansion was curtailed by means of high interest rates. Bank Leumi also raised its borrowing rates by 1.8%, a move which created a large gap between interest rates on lending and borrowing.¹¹⁴ The attempts to curb the flood proved successful as most of the shareholders refrained from redeeming them.

The economy also had its share of brinkmanship, mainly concerning attempts at reform. Energy Minister Moshe Shahal's intention to dismantle the cartel running the energy industry and introduce competition encountered stiff opposition from the three operating oil companies. The minister vowed to go ahead with his plan, but was not able to carry it out.¹¹⁵

By and large 1987 was indeed a good year, although there were pitfalls ahead. Prices were kept down, partly due to low wages in the public sector and high interest rates. Keeping the exchange rate below its real value was also important in controlling inflation. It remained to be seen whether the achievements of 1987 were durable or would collapse in the face of unfavorable political circumstances or even an election year such as 1988.

CONCLUSION

Israel persisted with its brinkmanship policy almost to the end of the year. Minister Weizman was quoted as saying: "The whole world stands on its head: Soviet Russia is undergoing a dramatic shift; there are purges in China, a drama is under way in the US [Irangate], an Arab summit is about to take place in Amman, and we are not bothered by anything."¹¹⁶

Nevertheless, the government did have a very impressive accomplishment. It had tamed three-digit inflation and put the economy on the path of expansion again. On the other hand, attempts to change the status quo failed in most other domains. While prices were curbed, the government failed to grapple with the deeper problems of the economy. None of the social issues plaguing the Israeli policy was resolved. The perennial attempt to change the Law of Return or, alternatively, to modify the arrangements of the status quo were also aborted. Ironically, although 1987 was declared (in Alexandria in September 1986) by Israel's Premier Peres and Egypt's President Mubarak to be the Year of Peace, the state found itself on the verge of war with rebellious Palestinians.

Serious questions were also raised again regarding the capability of a democratic society burdened with severe security problems to sustain the rule of law.

At the end of the year, many Israelis were pondering the future course of the state. Evidently the policy of brinkmanship, typical of the two-headed government, had proved inadequate in dealing with Israel's pressing problems. The state was evidently moving ahead, but the question was, where to?

TABLE 1: ECONOMIC INDICATORS 1986-87
PERCENTAGE OF CHANGE IN COMPARISON TO PREVIOUS YEAR

	1987	1986
Gross national product	4.6	
Export	11	5
Import ¹	10	15
Private consumption per capita	6	12
Private income	7	-4
Wages per hour	10	6
Productivity per hour:		
In the business sector	3	3
In the agricultural sector	15	-3
In public services	1	-3
Unemployment ²	6	7
Prices ³	19	47
Investments	11	
Balance of payments ⁴	3.4	2.8
Exchange rates ⁵ (NIS to \$)	1.55	1.48
Foreign currency reserves ⁶	5.32	4.26

1 Defense import in 1987 \$2.6m., in 1986 -- \$1.1 bn.

2 Percentage of labor force.

3 Percentage of increase.

4 In billions.

5 As of 24 December.

6 In billions.

SOURCES: *JP*, 29 December; *Ha'aretz*, 31 December 1987.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *JP*, 2 April 1987.
2. There was also a threat from the chairman of the Knesset Finance Committee (Avraham Shapira, Agudat Yisrael) not to approve the budget unless the government earmarked funds for religious institutions. *Ibid.*, 5 February 1987.
3. Peres said: "Agriculture is not just a branch of the economy, but the very foundation of the state. Without agriculture we would lose the land and without the land our sovereignty would only be on paper." *Ha'aretz*, 3 February 1987.
4. As in previous cases there were a few Laborites who defied party discipline and voted against various aspects of the budget. *Ma'ariv*, 19 February 1987.
5. *Ha'aretz*, 11 February 1987.
6. *JP*, 13 February 1987.
7. *Ibid.*, 3 February 1987.
8. *Ibid.*, 19 February 1987.
9. Peres: "Anyone who is opposed to the international conference is murdering the peace process." Shamir: "This remark is bordering on scandal." *Ibid.*

10. Ibid., 5 March 1987.
11. Ibid., 2 March 1987.
12. *Ha'aretz*, 8 April 1987.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 13 April 1987.
15. Ibid., 10 May 1987.
16. Another source of pressure on Shamir was a letter from Shultz, in which Washington's support for Peres's initiative was clearly reiterated. *Ha'aretz*, 12 May 1987.
17. *JP*, 14 May 1987.
18. Ibid.
19. Some MKs, including the party's secretary-general, Uzi Bar'am, urged Labor to leave the coalition if it failed to enlist a majority to dissolve the Knesset. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. The parties supporting early elections were Labor (20), Mapam (6), CRM (4), Hadash (4), and Shinui (2 — excluding Druze MK, Zaidan 'Atshi).
22. *JP*, 25 May 1987.
23. The Likud undertook to legislate within 60 days an amendment to the 1927 Religious Conversion Ordinance, stating that all conversions must be approved by the Chief Rabbinate.
24. Ibid., 22 May 1987.
25. Ibid., 9 July 1987. See also Y. Yishai "The Jewish Terror Organization: Past or Future Danger" *Conflict*, No. 6, 1986, pp. 307-31.
26. *Ha'aretz*, 15 July 1987.
27. *JP*, 7 August 1987.
28. Ibid., 29 November 1987.
29. Smith Poll, *ibid.*, 3, 8 August 1987.
30. Science and Development Minister Gideon Patt, *ibid.*, 29 June 1987.
31. Ibid., 10 August 1987.
32. A pro-*Lavi* rally was held by thousands of workers in front of the Prime Minister's Office on 29 June 1987.
33. *Ha'aretz*, 13 August 1987.
34. At the initial stages of the government quandary, Peres stated that "The *Lavi* is better for security than holding on to the Gaza Strip." *JP*, 13 May 1987.
35. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 4 September 1987.
36. *JP*, 17 August 1987.
37. After the vote, Minister without Portfolio Moshe Arens announced his intention to resign rather than accept responsibility for the "tragic decision." Ibid., 31 August 1987. Within the next few days Arens withdrew from the government.
38. Peres was accused of receiving an expensive watch as a gift from David Balas, on trial for fraud.
39. A straw poll conducted by the *JP*, revealed a hardening of attitudes among the Israeli public; *JP*, 14 May; see also *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 25 April 1987.
40. In April 1987, Labor enjoyed the support of 41% in the polls in comparison to 24% of Likud. *JP*, 20 April 1987.
41. Ibid., 12 February 1987.
42. Ibid., 10 March 1987.
43. *Ha'aretz*, 10 March 1987.
44. The members were former Supreme Court president, Moshe Landau, and former chief of staff, Zvi Tzur.
45. "Knesset Panel Grills Rabin," was how the press put it. Ibid., 13 March 1987.
46. The committee had internal problems since four of its seven members were absent while it operated and returned only toward the end of deliberations. Ibid., 8 April 1987.
47. For the full version of the report, see *JP*, 28 May 1987.
48. The law was approved by 80 MKs, an unusually large number. *Ha'aretz*, 1 April 1987.
49. *JP*, 18 March 1987.
50. Ibid., 8 January 1987.
51. Ibid., 9 July 1987.

52. Ibid., 9 January 1987.
53. The event was described as "an unsurpassed public relations move." *Ha'aretz*, 12 January 1987.
54. Ibid., 15 January 1987.
55. *JP*, 4 February 1987.
56. Ibid., 10 March 1987.
57. Levy was challenged by MK Meir Cohen-Aridor of the Sharon camp; Sharon by MK Ovadia Ali of the Levy Camp; and Arens by Yoram Aridor of the Levy camp. Ibid., 29 March 1987.
58. Ibid., 31 March 1987.
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid., 17 May 1987. Another recalcitrant Herut member was Moshe Amirav, whose secret meetings with pro-PLO Palestinians were made public. Ibid., 7 October 1987.
61. Ibid., 14 October 1987.
62. Ibid., 6 February 1987.
63. Ibid., 6 January 1987.
64. Ibid., 2 March 1987.
65. Ibid., 20 March 1987.
66. Ibid., 30 April 1987.
67. Ibid., 29 May 1987.
68. Ibid., 7 June 1987.
69. Stalls were set up to solicit 75,000 signatures for a petition calling on the government not to reject the "chance for peace." Ibid., 21 June 1987.
70. Of the 241 votes cast, the party secretariat list won 133 votes; Eitan's counter list received 118 votes. *Ha'aretz*, 16 November 1987.
71. Ibid., 1 February 1987.
72. Ibid., 30 July 1987.
73. Moshe Kol during the signature of the merger agreements, *JP*, 3 August 1987.
74. Ibid., 27 March 1987.
75. Ibid., 28 May 1987.
76. The other members were former Mossad chief, Yitzhak Hofi, and State Comptroller Ya'acov Maltz.
77. The High Court of Justice cleared Nafsu of charges of treason and espionage after it found that his GSS investigators had committed perjury. For excerpts see *JP*, 1 November 1987. Apparently perjury had been committed as a matter of policy for over 16 years, according to ex-GSS executive Yossi Ginosar.
78. Ibid., Attorney-General Yosef Harish.
79. Ibid., 9 November 1987.
80. Ibid., 10 November 1987.
81. Ibid., 20 February 1987.
82. Ibid., 20 October 1987.
83. Ibid., 2 October 1987.
84. A doctor's average income in Israel is \$12,000 p.a.
85. The chairman was accused by management of cutting off a live transmission from overseas. *JP*, 13 February 1987.
86. Ibid., 26 October 1987.
87. Ibid., 27 October 1987. Three local alternatives were available to the Israeli audience: IDF Radio, the Voice of Peace, and the fledgling Second Channel.
88. The Histadrut suggested that at least half the number of the annual retirees should not be replaced. *Ha'aretz*, 13 July 1987. But the public sector has kept growing.
89. *JP*, 28 September 1987.
90. Ibid., 11 August 1987.
91. Ibid., 4 March 1987.
92. Ibid., 22 April 1987.
93. Nakash was accused of killing an Arab in Besançon. After he fled to Israel, France requested his extradition so that he could stand trial for murder.
94. *JP*, 7 October 1987.

95. Ibid., 23 November 1987. This ruling prompted a legislative initiative to empower local authorities to ban Sabbath entertainment.
96. Ibid., 12 June 1987. There is a biblical commandment to leave lands fallow during a sabbatical year; 1987 coincided with such a year in the Jewish calendar.
97. Ibid., 15 December 1987.
98. Ibid., 28 October 1987.
99. Ibid., 6 July 1987. The plan was supported by Yosef Shapira, a minister without portfolio (NRP). There was also a series of arson attacks by Jews against Arabs living in a Jewish neighborhood. Ibid., 26 June 1987.
100. Ibid., 3 July 1987.
101. Information on the economic indicators is excerpted from *Ha'aretz*, 31 December 1987.
102. *Recent Economic Developments*, No. 41 (Jerusalem: Israel Research Department, 1 September 1987).
103. *JP*, 6 January 1987.
104. The Histadrut's position was supported by the association of the disabled who held a protest demonstration in Tel Aviv, making their way slowly in wheelchairs and on crutches. *Ha'aretz*, 12 January 1987.
105. Nissim claimed that export profitability was reduced because the manufacturers raised their employees' wages and could not expect the government to reimburse the expenses. *JP*, 2 January 1987.
106. This was on top of the 4.5% reduction approved in the previous year. Ibid., 14 January 1987.
107. See Chapter VI in *Recent Economic Developments*, op. cit.
108. Ibid., p. vii.
109. *JP*, 7 January 1987.
110. Ibid., 12 January 1987.
111. This arrangement, prevalent in most European states, is termed "corporatism." See for example, I. Scholten (ed.), *Political Stability and Neo Corporatism* (London: Sage, 1987).
112. *Ha'aretz*, 28 December 1987.
113. Ibid., 13 January 1987.
114. Ibid., 2 October 1987.
115. *JP*, 5 January, 3 July 1987.
116. Y. Marcus, "Who Cares?" *Ha'aretz*, 6 November 1987.

Jordan

(Al-Mamlaka al-Urdunniyya al-Hashimiyya)

ASHER SUSSER

The year 1987 was mostly uneventful in Jordan. The Middle East peace process was almost stalled, and Jordan-PLO cooperation remained elusive. King Husayn tried to make the most of this period of indecision to bolster Jordan's inter-Arab position and to strengthen Jordanian influence in the West Bank and Gaza at the PLO's expense.

Since Jordan enjoyed the unique fortune of good relations with Syria, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt, Husayn strove to play a central role in forging an Arab consensus on the two most pressing regional issues — the Gulf War and the Palestine question. Husayn's efforts in the Arab arena culminated in the convening of the Arab summit conference in Amman in November. The very convening of the summit was an important boost for Jordanian prestige and an indication of Husayn's much improved status in the Arab world. Jordan's actual gains at the summit were, however, limited. Husayn did not succeed in achieving a genuine reconciliation between Iraq and Syria, which would have led to a united Arab front against Iran and a stronger bargaining position for the countries on Israel's eastern front.

While Jordan maintained some room to maneuver on the Palestine issue, Husayn was unable to seriously erode the PLO's recognized representative status. Jordan did seem to be making certain inroads in the West Bank and Gaza. These, however, did not have a lasting effect and were swept away by the Palestinian uprising that broke out in December. The uprising did not bode well for Jordan's Palestinian aspirations and Husayn was forced back onto the defensive in his competition with the PLO for supremacy in the Palestinian arena.

On the domestic front, Jordan was still suffering the effects of economic recession. The impact of the recession, together with the substantial fundamentalist influence in the country, were cause for concern, though they were not yet to pose a serious challenge to the regime's prolonged stability. These factors, however, might very well have inspired Husayn's decision to postpone the scheduled elections for Jordan's Parliament.

DOMESTIC POLITICAL AFFAIRS

PARLIAMENT AND THE QUESTION OF GENERAL ELECTIONS

As in the past the government was not seriously challenged by the opposition in the two houses of Parliament — the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. For the most part, parliamentary activity focused on legislation in the economic and administrative fields. These did not usually lead to confrontation between the government and the legislature.

There was, however, one interesting exception. A constitutional tussle developed in January when deputies questioned the government's right to obtain retroactive approval for supplementary expenditure made in previous years. A number of deputies, including Layth Shubaylat and Riyad al-Nuwayisa, the champions of the opposition (see *MECS* 1983-84, pp. 512-13; 1984-85, pp. 505-6), charged that this government practice was unconstitutional. They maintained that it denied the legislature its fundamental prerogative of supervising government spending, and urged the government to obtain prior parliamentary approval for any supplements to the budget. The prime minister, Zayd al-Rifa'i, initially contended that the constitution did not specify whether parliamentary approval should precede or follow the supplementary expenditure, and in February both houses of Parliament approved the supplementary budgets for fiscal 1984 and 1985.¹

The regular session of Parliament came to a close at the end of February, but during an extraordinary session from the end of June until the end of August the same issue was raised again. In obtaining approval for the 1986 supplementary budget, Rifa'i disarmed his critics in both houses by pledging that the government would refrain in future from supplementary expenditure until it had secured prior parliamentary approval. And, indeed, in early December, the government obtained such approval for the 1987 supplementary budget. However, this was only achieved after extensive debate, during which a number of deputies urged the government to reduce public spending and government borrowing.² The 1988 budget was approved unanimously by both the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies after Rifa'i stressed his government's intention to cover all Jordan's current expenditure as well as a higher proportion of its capital expenditure from domestic revenues, by controlling government spending and improving the revenue collecting process. This, he said, would minimize borrowing. Until this objective was achieved, Rifa'i assured Parliament, the government would continue to work to reduce borrowing and to keep the service of the public debt within internationally accepted safe limits.³

During the year, preparations began for general elections, which were to be the first since 1967 and the first to be held in accordance with the new election law passed in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 425-27). The term of the incumbent Chamber of Deputies was to expire in January 1988. Elections were therefore required by late 1987, unless the king exercised his constitutional prerogative to extend the chamber's term for one to two years.

Voter registration took place in May. Some 912,000 people registered. Estimates of the total of eligible voters (citizens aged 19 and over) varied from 1,115,000 to 1,176,000 (in the East Bank), which meant that between 77.5% and 81.8% of eligible voters had registered. This was said to be very high in comparison with previous figures.⁴ However, tens of thousands of names were subsequently removed from the voters' lists. For the most part, those removed had not registered in their designated constituencies. Others were people with criminal records who had been sentenced to prison terms of more than one year since 1976.⁵ The number of registered voters consequently dropped to just over 820,000.⁶ The number of eligible voters was expected to drop further because of the bureaucracy involved in the additional requirement that each voter also obtain a special voter identity card.⁷

On 10 October, in his speech from the throne inaugurating a new session of Parliament, Husayn announced his decision to postpone the general elections and to

extend the term of the incumbent chamber for a period of not more than two years. The king explained that more time was needed to complete the process of registration and preparation.⁸ Considering the relatively short period required for the initial round of registration this did not appear to be a very convincing explanation. Among the political reasons for the move, one could have been related to the upcoming summit in Amman. Since the election of a Parliament that would represent Palestinians on the East and West Banks was a controversial issue impinging upon the PLO's representative status, Husayn may have been unwilling to have the elections turned into an issue at the summit. Another possible explanation for the postponement was the strong showing of Muslim fundamentalist candidates in by-elections in recent years (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 513). In a by-election in Irbid in June 1986, there was evidence that the government had had to intervene to ensure the defeat of a fundamentalist and the success of its own candidate (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 427–28). The defeated fundamentalist candidate, Dr. 'Abd al-Majid Nusayr, filed a complaint to the Chamber of Deputies against government meddling in the election. Not surprisingly, his complaint was rejected as groundless by most deputies, aside from those with fundamentalist inclinations.⁹ But Husayn may well have been concerned about the possible necessity for wide-scale government interference in the election process to ensure the desired outcome.

By-elections in 1987 did not give rise to contests involving fundamentalists. This, however, was not an indication of waning fundamentalist potential, but a result of the fact that the by-elections did not involve urban Muslim constituencies where the fundamentalist current was prevalent. The one vacated seat was reserved for a Christian deputy from Bethlehem. Since by-elections could not be held in the West Bank, Carlos Di'mis was selected by the Chamber of Deputies¹⁰ to replace Hanna Banura, who had passed away. The other vacated seat was that of the representative of the northern Badia constituency of the East Bank. The by-election was a purely Bedouin tribal affair. Nawwaf Sa'ud al-Qadi was elected to succeed his father Shaykh Sa'ud al-Qadi.¹¹

Against the background of recession and rising unemployment (see below), the regime was most concerned about the potentially destabilizing effect of the appeal of Islamic fundamentalism, particularly among the country's younger generation. Crown Prince Hasan observed that fundamentalism in the ME was an "issue involving young people," and 50% of Jordan's population was below the age of 15.¹² A large percentage of the unemployed were community college and university graduates in their twenties,¹³ and Hasan expressed "grave concern" about the future. He contended that the fundamentalist message was invariably about social disparities, and that the country's youngsters were "extremely susceptible" to an Islamic fundamentalist momentum "nurtured by poverty, social imbalances, [and] political frustration."¹⁴

While making every effort to keep Jordan's economy on an even keel (see below), the regime's policy towards the fundamentalists was a combination of conciliation, control, and repression (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 431–35). The regime maintained its uneasy *modus vivendi* with the Muslim Brethren, which remained the only legal political organization in Jordan. There were, however, a variety of other fundamentalist groups that were more radical and revolutionary, such as the Islamic Liberation Party (ILP) which did not enjoy similar tolerance. Layth Shubaylat, the most outspoken and influential of the fundamentalist deputies, was not affiliated with

the Brethren or the ILP. But, like the Brethren, he also advocated evolutionary change towards the Islamization of the state rather than revolution, which, he argued, was against the principles of Islam.¹⁵

Before Husayn's announcement on the postponement of elections, there were reportedly many in Jordan who believed that the elections might provide an opportunity for an Islamist *tour de force*, partly due to the regime's own measured tolerance of the fundamentalist current. An indication of the existing influence of the fundamentalists in the Chamber of Deputies was given at the end of September, when 20 deputies sent a cable to the Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, appealing to him to pardon Tunisian fundamentalists who had received heavy sentences.¹⁶ Whether or not the regime was primarily motivated by the specter of fundamentalism, the postponement of the elections at least had the effect of deferring an undesirable manifestation of fundamentalist political effervescence.

THE LEFTIST OPPOSITION

Though the leftist opposition enjoyed less popular support and posed less of an immediate threat to the regime, the threshold of tolerance that the regime displayed towards the left was, as always, very low. Whereas the regime could find common ground with the Muslim Brethren, at least on the need for the cultural and social role of religion in the Hashemite state, it had no common ground with radical left-wing groups. For parties such as the Ba'th and the Communists, or for the supporters of radical factions of the PLO, the very existence of the Hashemite regime was ideologically repugnant. Leftist groups were, therefore, systematically hounded by the authorities. The organs of the Democratic and Popular Fronts for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP and PFLP), and the Palestinian Communist Workers' Party (*hizb al-'ummal al-shuyu'i al-filasini*), frequently reported the arrest and imprisonment of their supporters. They also accused the government of constant intervention in the affairs of professional and labor unions to counter leftist influence.¹⁷

On 17 June, the government dissolved the Jordanian Writers' Association. The Ministry of Information and Culture explained that the measure was necessary since the association had been transformed into a "place for anarchy (*sawda*) and activity wholly unrelated to culture and literature."¹⁸ The fact that the measure was immediately condemned by the PFLP and the DFLP¹⁹ was a clear indication of the political coloring of the association. The government action came only days before the association's annual elections and after the association had refused to cooperate with the Ministry of Information and Culture in hosting a conference of Arab writers, scheduled to take place in Amman in early 1988.²⁰ The association's relationship with the authorities had been troublesome since its foundation in 1974. Many members of the association had encountered difficulties in having their work published or distributed in Jordan, and some had even been arrested for various political offenses.²¹

Shortly after the publication of the dissolution order, a new Writers' Union was formed with government approval. The membership rules of the union disqualified anyone who had been sentenced for any felony or misdemeanor. The rules also required candidates for membership to submit proof of their literary activity.²² These rules were presumably intended to keep out undesirable political activists who were not actually writers, as well as writers who had engaged in illegal political activity.

In August, when the question of imminent general elections was still on the

domestic political agenda, some 200 people affiliated with various PLO factions and leftist parties, such as the Ba'th and the Communists, issued a statement criticizing the election law and the election process in Jordan. The statement, published by the DFLP organ, *al-Hurriyya*, criticized the new election law (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 425–27) for infringing upon the PLO's status as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinians and for not providing for the free participation of all political parties and organizations in the elections. The statement also urged the government to refrain from interfering in the elections in any manner, and to abolish the state of emergency which gave it almost unlimited authority to intervene in the democratic process in the name of national security.²³

These manifestations of leftist activism may also have had some influence on Husayn's decision to postpone the elections.

THE IMPACT OF THE ECONOMIC RECESSION

During 1987 Jordan continued to contend with recession, which had been induced mainly by the economic slump in the Arab oil-producing countries and the subsequent sharp decline in Arab aid (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 497–502; 1986, pp. 438–42). Economic growth rates had dropped sharply in the early 1980s. Jordan was forced to borrow more in order to revitalize its economy and to implement its ambitious five-year plan for 1986–90. According to the World Bank, sustaining the 4%–5% annual growth rate (projected in the five-year plan) would require substantial external borrowing. In late 1986, the World Bank calculated that Jordan's debt service ratio could rise to as much as 23% by 1993.²⁴ It had already risen from 9.9% in 1985²⁵ to 14.9% in 1987.

Nonetheless, there was reportedly a general mood of optimism regarding Jordan's ability to continue to withstand the recession in the region. The government's deliberately reflationary budget for 1987 (just over JD1 bn.), which was aimed at expanding local production, promoting exports, and creating new jobs, was said to have encouraged optimism about economic prospects. Confidence was also boosted by the fact that the country had managed to maintain a marginal rate of growth in the past four years.²⁶ The Jordanian Central Bank reported that gross domestic product had increased by 2.6% in 1986.²⁷ This, however, fell short of the growth rate projected in the five-year plan, and also failed to keep abreast of the high annual rate of population increase of about 3.8%.

On the positive side the Jordanians could point to the fact that their trade deficit had been reduced in 1986 to JD591.8m., as against JD761.6m. in 1985.²⁸ This came as a result of the lower oil prices, the weaker dollar, and the tighter import controls introduced by the government to protect local industry and reduce consumption. Another positive feature was the fact that remittances from Jordanian expatriate workers, the country's main source of foreign currency, had increased from JD403m. in 1985 to JD415m. in 1986. But the increase was partly due to the fact that a greater proportion of these funds was being transferred through the official banking system after the financial collapse of some leading money changers in 1986.²⁹ Nonetheless, the level of remittances reflected the fact that the number of Jordanian expatriate workers had remained more or less stable, at about 330,000. This in itself was cause for relief. The number of workers returning to Jordan had been "a trickle rather than a deluge,"³⁰ and this had allayed initial fears that, as a result of the Gulf recession,

Jordan might have to face both a severe reduction in remittances and widespread unemployment. Preliminary figures on remittances for 1987 were, however, less encouraging. According to the deputy governor of the Central Bank, there was a drop of some 8% during the first half of the year.³¹

Maintaining the country's economic equilibrium with much reduced levels of Arab aid led not only to increased borrowing but also to diminishing reserves of foreign currency. In 1985 reserves had dropped to JD147m., and in April 1987 these were down to JD51.8m, or just enough to cover two weeks of imports. Reserves were said to have risen to more than JD70m. in July, but this did not herald a change in the pattern of recent years which was one of diminishing reserves. This negative trend was offset by Jordan's gold reserves, worth about \$500m. (in August 1987), and credit to Iraq of some \$600m., which could be used to cover some categories of imports such as oil.³²

The government was forced to take a variety of austerity measures, including new controls on spending by ministries, additional customs duties on some imported luxury goods, and increased travel taxes.³³

The most disturbing feature of the recession for Jordan's policymakers was the problem of unemployment. The fact that the number of expatriate workers had more or less leveled off meant that a much smaller ratio of the 30,000–35,000 new job seekers entering the market every year could find employment abroad. Official figures for unemployment in 1987 were given as 7%–8% (or some 40,000), but the real figures were higher. Jobs would have to be found for some 200,000 people between 1986 and 1990, provided that the number of workers returning from abroad did not exceed the official estimate of 25,000. The five-year plan aimed to create nearly 100,000 new jobs. Also anticipated was the repatriation of 50,000 of the 150,000 foreigners working in Jordan, and their replacement by Jordanians. But even on the basis of these optimistic assumptions, and after making allowances for natural wastage and emigration, a net increase in unemployment was still expected.³⁴ A study published in Jordan at the end of 1987 estimated that the unemployment rate would rise to 10% in 1990. This projection, however, was based on the official figures for unemployment, which only included those who had registered at government agencies. Unregistered job seekers were estimated by the Royal Scientific Society and the Department of Statistics to comprise about 30% of the total unemployed. This meant that unemployment was already in the vicinity of 10% and would be higher in 1990, especially if the job-creating objectives of the five-year plan were not achieved.³⁵

Jordan's high population growth was becoming a burden on the economy. The population (2.8 m.) was overwhelmingly young: as noted, over 50% were under 15;³⁶ and in the 1987–88 school year there were nearly 950,000 children at school.³⁷ More than two thirds of Jordan's unemployed were under the age of 30, and 40% were community college and university graduates.³⁸

The policymakers were well aware of the fact that long-term solutions to the unemployment problem required greater emphasis on family planning³⁹ and a reorientation of the country's education policy. In the past, the education system had been geared to produce a highly qualified labor force for export. Now it was producing too many qualified people for the country's needs. Unemployment among professionals was said to be double the national average.⁴⁰ According to the minister of labor and social development, Khalid al-Hajj Hasan, Jordan faced "structural

unemployment." There was an excess of supply in certain professions and university specializations in the social sciences, management, medicine, and engineering. At the same time there were manpower shortages in agriculture, construction, industry, and services.⁴¹

In early September, the king opened a national conference on education in which he emphasized the need to maintain an equilibrium between Jordan's resources and population, and to rectify the imbalance between the products of the education system and the real needs of society.⁴² The conference followed the establishment of a committee of experts to reassess education policy, under the supervision of the crown prince, and a series of visits by Hasan to all parts of the country to discuss reform with educators and officials from education departments in the various governorates. The main objective of the educational reform was to ensure that the system would meet the present and future requirements of the labor market. The Jordanians now placed greater emphasis on vocational training and attempted to change social attitudes that accorded low prestige to manual labor.⁴³

The government took measures to reduce the numbers of university graduates, particularly in medicine and engineering. Rifa'i referred explicitly to the need "to limit as much as possible academic studies that exacerbate the problem of unemployment."⁴⁴ In August, the Ministry of Higher Education announced that it would limit its recognition of foreign university degrees as part of the effort to curb the surplus of graduates in certain fields. The ministry further announced that it would no longer be committed to recognize the foreign diplomas of students who had not originally achieved the matriculation averages required for entry to the various faculties of Jordanian universities. (These were a minimum of 85% to study medicine; 80% for engineering; and 65% for all other fields of specialization.)⁴⁵

Various short-term measures were also introduced to alleviate unemployment. The government required public institutions such as schools, colleges, ministries, and municipalities to employ more doctors and engineers; more job categories were added to a list reserved for Jordanians only; and tougher measures were taken against the employers of foreign workers who did not have the necessary work permits. Over 4,000 foreign workers were deported between July and October, mostly for labor law violations.⁴⁶ While the Jordanians sought to reduce the number of foreign workers in the country, they made a concerted effort to maintain the number of their compatriots employed abroad. Jordan conducted negotiations with the Gulf states to ensure the continued employment of its expatriate labor force. According to Rifa'i, the Jordanian Government had received assurances from these countries that its nationals would not be dismissed. There were also attempts to provide Arab states with Jordanian expertise as part of bilateral technical cooperation programs, and to penetrate new job markets in countries like the Yemeni Arab Republic and Sudan. Because of the low salaries paid in those countries, the Jordanian Government was even thinking of subsidizing Jordanian labor there, to alleviate its own problem of unemployment.⁴⁷

JORDAN, THE PALESTINIANS, AND THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

JORDAN'S CONCEPT OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE AND POLITICAL SETTLEMENT

As in recent years, the Jordanians continued to stress the urgent need for progress in the ME peace process (cf. *MECS* 1981–82, p. 679; 1982–83, pp. 631–32; 1983–84, p. 517; 1986, pp. 451–52). According to Crown Prince Hasan, the “urgency for a solution [was] enormous and the latent dangers [inherent in the status quo were] frightening...The centrist approach [had] to be fostered and protected before fanaticism overwhelm[ed] the whole area.”⁴⁸

Jordan remained committed to the idea of an international conference as the only practical vehicle for peace negotiations. Jordanian spokesmen emphatically rejected direct negotiations with Israel as a viable alternative to an international conference. Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri noted that Jordan would not deviate from this position “even if Shamir’s government continued to call for direct negotiations for [the next] ten years.”⁴⁹ Husayn had previously accepted direct negotiations with Israel within the framework of an international conference, but not as a substitute for the international forum (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 515).

Jordan’s commitment to an international conference derived from a number of factors:

(1) Disappointment with the US position, which the Jordanians argued was biased in Israel’s favor. In view of Israel’s military supremacy, without a prior US commitment to pressure Israel to accept withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza, the Jordanians did not believe that direct negotiations could achieve any positive outcome.⁵⁰

(2) The belief that an international conference that would include the USSR and the other permanent members of the UN Security Council would provide a counterweight to what Jordan regarded as the pro-Israeli stand of the US. European involvement in the conference was deemed important by the Jordanians,⁵¹ as a means of influencing the US position and of preventing possible failure due to polarization between the two superpowers and their respective local clients.

(3) The realization that the conference, which would be attended by all the major local protagonists, including the PLO, would provide the essential Arab backing that Jordan required for any kind of settlement with Israel. This was particularly important for Husayn, who contended repeatedly that only such a conference could reach a solution that would also enjoy the support of future generations.⁵²

The Jordanians remained convinced that any effort on their part to negotiate a settlement independently with Israel would not only be doomed to failure but would also force them to contend with severe Palestinian and general Arab condemnation, and perhaps even a military threat from Syria. Jordanian spokesmen denied all reports of secret meetings between Husayn and Israeli leaders,⁵³ though there could be little doubt that such occasional meetings did in fact take place. These meetings, however, were not intended by the Jordanians to serve as a substitute for the international conference, but rather as part of the preparations for it. In April, at a meeting in London between Husayn and Israel’s Vice Premier and Foreign Minister Shimon Peres, an understanding was reached on the nature of the proposed

international conference. The agreement was subject to the approval of the governments of Jordan and Israel, and those parts of it that were to be made public were to be accepted by Jordan and Israel as a response to proposals made by the US.

The first part of the agreement stipulated that the secretary-general of the UN would extend invitations to the five permanent members of the Security Council and to the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict to peacefully negotiate a settlement based on Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. The objective of the negotiations would be to achieve a comprehensive settlement that would ensure the security of the states in the region and the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. The second part specified that the objective of the negotiations would be to solve the Palestinian problem in all its aspects, and that the conference would invite the parties to form regional bilateral committees to negotiate common issues. The third and final part of the accord dealt with the controversial issues of the authority and powers of the international conference and the nature of Palestinian representation. Jordan's extreme caution in dealing directly with Israel was reflected in the reference to this part of the accord in the preamble, which stated that it was to be treated with "great confidentiality." Moreover, it was to be regarded as a set of commitments made by Jordan to the US, to be transmitted to Israel, i.e., not commitments made directly to Israel. According to this clause, the international conference would not impose a settlement or veto any agreement reached by the parties; there would be direct negotiations in the bilateral committees; the Palestinian issue would be discussed in a committee composed of the Israeli delegation and a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation; and the participation of Palestinians in the conference would be dependent on their acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338 and their renunciation of violence and terrorism.⁵⁴ (For more details, and the text of the London agreement, see essay on the peace process).

The accord was not ratified by the divided Israeli Government. For their part, the Jordanians denied Israeli reports that such an agreement had in fact been reached. The phase originally envisaged, in which the US would offer the agreement to Jordan and Israel as American proposals, did not materialize. Husayn said that, contrary to reports in the Israeli press, he had never met privately with Peres or agreed to any direct negotiations, as Peres had claimed.⁵⁵ Other Jordanian sources were more emphatic. Prime Minister Rifa'i and other members of his Cabinet denied that Jordan had come to any agreement at all with Israel about the international conference.⁵⁶

In fact, the London agreement did not differ substantially from publicly stated Jordanian positions. The Jordanians were, however, obviously embarrassed by Israeli revelations about an agreement concluded in secret. Moreover, the Jordanians did not accept the interpretations given to the various parts of the agreement by Peres and his supporters in Israel. These diverged very markedly from Jordan's own understanding of the international conference. Thus, while Jordan agreed that there was "no question" of the conference having the right to veto an agreement reached by the parties or imposing a settlement (cf. *MECS* 1986, p. 449),⁵⁷ it did not accept the Israeli interpretation that the Powers would essentially have no active role in the negotiations. According to Hasan, it was expected that the five permanent members of the Security Council, collectively and individually, would "play a positive role in proposing and providing alternative methods or channels for the negotiations to continue," whenever the negotiations got bogged down.⁵⁸

Jordanian sources repeatedly rejected the notion of a "bogus international conference" whose purpose would be limited to that of a "cover for direct negotiations." The conference was not supposed to be a brief "photo opportunity." It was to be an ongoing conference of substance that would remain active until a decisive outcome was attained, and the "moral weight" of the Powers would be brought to bear on the proceedings.⁵⁹

A report in May on the London agreement, stating that Jordan had made a commitment to the US and Israel to minimize the Soviet role in the conference,⁶⁰ was flatly denied by the Jordanians.⁶¹ An American proposal conveyed by Secretary of State George Shultz to Husayn in October, that a Jordanian-Palestinian delegation enter direct talks with Israel under the cosponsorship of the US and the USSR, was turned down by Jordan. Shultz had suggested that these talks begin during the US-Soviet summit in Washington in December. The two superpowers would sponsor the opening session and then, in effect, fade into the background as Jordan and Israel negotiated directly.⁶² The Jordanians explained that this was not their idea of an international conference.⁶³

Whereas Israeli advocates of an international conference tended to emphasize the conference's role in promoting direct negotiations, the Jordanians stressed that the essential purpose of the conference was to achieve Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and Gaza. Jordanian spokesmen accepted publicly that there was no alternative to the formation of bilateral regional committees, and that direct negotiations would in fact take place there.⁶⁴ However, the objective was not direct negotiations but the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. These resolutions, the Jordanians noted, spoke of the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and called for Israeli withdrawal from the Arab territories occupied in 1967. According to Masri, Jordan was willing to work through the international conference until a total Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories was achieved. The conference, Masri said, was to discuss Israel's withdrawal and the arrangements for it.⁶⁵

For Jordan, the Israeli-Egyptian settlement was the accepted precedent to follow in implementing the principle of territory in exchange for peace, as outlined in Resolution 242.⁶⁶ The Jordanians therefore rarely departed from the notion of total Israeli withdrawal. According to the *Boston Globe*, Husayn had indicated in an interview that "it was not realistic to expect to regain all the territory Israel captured" in 1967.⁶⁷ However, when the interview was reproduced in the *Jordan Times*, this sentence was omitted.⁶⁸ There was no indication that Husayn had intended anything more than his previous references to the possibility of minor border rectifications on a basis of reciprocity (cf. *MECS* 1984-85, p. 512). Indeed, in the *Boston Globe* interview, Husayn restated his long-standing rejection of the Israeli Labor Party's ideas of territorial compromise that envisaged substantial border changes in Israel's favor.⁶⁹

Though unwilling to make territorial compromises, the Jordanians continued to give various indications of their readiness to recognize Israel within the 1967 boundaries. In an article in *The Washington Post*, Jordan's ambassador to the US, Muhammad Kamal, wrote that "every country in the region, including Israel, must be guaranteed the security of its sovereign existence."⁷⁰ The commander in chief of Jordan's Armed Forces, Zayd Ibn Shakir, suggested that one of the possible scenarios for peace would be the demilitarization of the West Bank, which "could ensure Israel's security."⁷¹

However, when addressing the issue of peace before Arab audiences, Jordanian spokesmen were less forthcoming and occasionally accompanied their statements with harsh remarks about Israel. In a speech at Jordan's Royal War College, Husayn spoke in favor of a settlement based on the "equation of territory in exchange for peace," in accordance with Resolution 242. But he then went on to accuse Israel of ignoring Palestinian rights and tilting toward "the Nazi concept of racial differences among peoples."⁷² The minister for the occupied territories, Marwan Dudin, himself a Palestinian, questioned both Israel's right and its ability to exist when he contended that Israel was a state "founded on injustice" that would eventually disintegrate from within.⁷³ Israelis, Dudin maintained, had to realize that in the last analysis they were just "a drop in the lake" of the Arab world. If they wanted to be a part of this lake, they had to recognize the rights of the Palestinian people. Israel could not be a safe haven for oppressed Jews unless its leaders realized that this could not be achieved by force. Any entity established in the Arab midst, Dudin concluded, had to "behave like a minority," seek coexistence, and not "inflict injustice on others."⁷⁴ Dudin's views, not repeated by more senior spokesmen, seemed to correspond more with the traditional Islamic perception of the Jews as a tolerated minority within the Islamic state than with the acceptance of Jewish statehood. The latter option, however, did not seem to have been completely ruled out provided that Israel met certain conditions.

THE QUESTION OF PALESTINIAN RIGHTS AND REPRESENTATION

As in the past, Jordan continued to regard Resolution 242 as the "best framework" for the ME peace process.⁷⁵ Even though this resolution remained unacceptable to the PLO, Jordan did not support the idea of modifying it to include an explicit reference to Palestinian national rights. According to Husayn, questioning Resolutions 242 and 338, "even if only in one aspect, would mean destroying them." As they stood, these resolutions were the only feasible starting point for any future negotiations.⁷⁶ Since the Jordanians had serious reservations of their own about Palestinian self-determination (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 516-17), they were prepared to give no more than partial satisfaction to the PLO in this respect. The Jordanians only maintained that any settlement based on 242 and 338 would also have to solve the Palestinian question in "all its aspects."⁷⁷ But, as opposed to the PLO, they deliberately stopped short of raising the recognition of the Palestinians' right to self-determination by the US as an essential precondition for any peace process based on 242 and 338. In an effort to preserve as much influence as possible over the ultimate fulfillment of the Palestinian right to self-determination, the Jordanians still argued that self-determination was a purely Jordanian-Palestinian issue. It was "not a subject for international negotiations."⁷⁸

Despite the abrogation of the Amman accord of February 1985 (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 195-200, 523) by the Palestine National Council in Algiers in April (see essay on the PLO), Jordan continued to regard the accord as the basis for future Jordanian-PLO relations.⁷⁹ Immediately after the PLO's abrogation of the accord, a Jordanian official spokesman announced that the principles of the accord, which reflected the "distinguished relationship between the Jordanian and Palestinian Arab peoples," would "continue to be the beacon guiding" Jordan's Palestinian policy. Jordan, the spokesman added, had originally entered the agreement with the PLO

because of Jordan's "sense of special responsibility toward our kinfolk, the Palestinian people."⁸⁰ The Jordanian press similarly emphasized Jordan's essential centrality to, and "leadership role" in, the Palestinian question, because of the large Palestinian population on the East Bank and Jordan's "direct link" with the population under occupation.⁸¹ Indeed, Jordan's special relationship to Palestine would "not be canceled by a decision or affected by personal or organizational interests," because this relationship was rooted in constant historic, geographic, and demographic facts as well as a common destiny.⁸² There was no power that could make "one people into two peoples." Moreover, the PLO's emphasis on its "independent decision making" would not alter the organization's predicament since its expulsion from Lebanon in 1982, which made its decisions "subject to Arab political equations."⁸³ Masri contended that a Jordanian-Palestinian *rapprochement* was inevitable. It remained the basis for any progress in the peace process.⁸⁴ Jordan, Husayn subsequently explained, regarded the Palestinian question as a pan-Arab issue that did not only concern the Palestinians themselves. It was in that framework that Jordan was exerting its efforts "to have the Palestinians regain their rights on their soil."⁸⁵

For Jordan it was always important to appear to be operating out of a sense of pan-Arab duty, rather than to be usurping Palestinian rights. Jordan therefore strove for partnership with the PLO and the Palestinians and not for their displacement in any future peace process. In practical terms this meant continued adherence to the idea of a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to future negotiations, and to the ultimate conclusion of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation, as outlined in the Amman accord.

The Jordanians agreed that the PLO would have to be invited to the international conference, and that it ought to participate "on an equal footing" with the other parties. However, "equal footing" in the Jordanian view did not preclude a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. On the contrary, Husayn contended that a joint delegation was the "only acceptable formula."⁸⁶ Jordan's adherence to this notion was an integral facet of its overall perception of future Jordanian-Palestinian relations, which were to be governed by an especially close association. According to Hasan, the question of Palestinian self-determination had been resolved in the Amman accord, which called for a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation.⁸⁷ Jordanian spokesmen generally avoided committing themselves to a fully independent, PLO-controlled Palestinian state. Husayn preferred more ambiguous references to Palestinian rights. He thus supported the return of the occupied land "to its owners," recognizing the right of the Palestinian people to "exercise freedom on their territory."⁸⁸

The Jordanians, however, repeatedly emphasized that they were not trying to find an alternative Palestinian representation to replace the PLO.⁸⁹ Nor did Jordan itself "wish to replace the PLO in representing the Palestinian people" or serve as "a substitute for the Palestinian Arab people who must have their say and participate in the achievement of peace."⁹⁰ Husayn conceded that the PLO remained the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. But while paying his dues to the Rabat resolutions, Husayn also expressed the hope that the PLO would "truly reflect and represent the aspirations of its people and allow the people to express their views about their fate."⁹¹ Husayn was obviously trying to create the impression that the PLO did not fully reflect Palestinian aspirations, and that other Palestinians, particularly those under Israeli occupation, should therefore also have a say. This

corresponded with Jordan's long-standing position that Palestinian representation was essentially divided among the PLO, Jordan, and the Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 513–14). As Masri put it, each party had “to realize that it [was] not the only party in the equation.”⁹² When the PLO abrogated the Amman accord, the Jordanian Government and the government-controlled press noted that “regardless of the opinion and decision of a narrow segment of the sons of the Palestinian people, the final word is for the great majority of the sons of Palestine who suffered under occupation or who are scattered in the diaspora.”⁹³ Jordan supported greater involvement of the people in the occupied territories in the determination of their fate, even if representatives from these territories to future negotiations would have to obtain PLO approval. This seemed to rest on the assumption that some such prospective candidates, though generally supportive of the PLO, were nevertheless critical of certain of its positions.⁹⁴ They could, therefore, possibly have a moderating influence on the organization, both in respect to relations with Jordan and in positions toward Israel. The Jordanians hoped to see the Palestinians in the occupied territories exerting pressure on the PLO rather than the other way round. They were consequently critical of the subservient stand of Palestinian leaders in the West Bank and Gaza who, at the behest of the PLO, refused to meet with Secretary Shultz when he toured the area in October.⁹⁵

The Jordanians did not appear to believe that non-PLO Palestinian participation in the peace process could serve as a realistic alternative, rather than as an addition, to the PLO. However, the PLO's own participation was made conditional on the organization's unequivocal acceptance of Resolutions 242 and 338. Invitations to the international conference, the Jordanians contended, ought to be extended on the basis of these two resolutions, and all parties participating in the conference would have to accept them.⁹⁶

Jordan's adherence to 242 and to the idea of a joint delegation served its fundamental interest in forestalling the eventual establishment of a fully independent Palestinian state. However, Jordanian spokesmen could not possibly explain their policy in such terms. They chose an apologetic line, explaining that their position was not due to the fact that Jordan itself imposed conditions on the PLO or had any reservations about Palestinian independence. Rather, it was because the US and Israel had positions on these matters which the Arabs could not realistically ignore.⁹⁷

The Jordanians similarly argued in the name of pragmatism to defend their ongoing constitutional link with the West Bank, which was maintained by the representation of the West Bank in the Jordanian Parliament. Masri explained that this was not designed as a means of competing with the PLO, but only to prevent the creation of a “legal or constitutional vacuum” in the West Bank that could be exploited by Israel.⁹⁸ But this argument did not hold much water. Whether Israel annexed the West Bank or not would depend on Israeli calculations that were not connected with the existence of a “constitutional vacuum.” For instance, Israel had not annexed the Gaza Strip, to which Egypt laid no claim and in which Jordan had no legal standing. What was really at stake for the Jordanians was their own centrality in the Palestinian question and their capacity to influence effectively any future negotiation over the West Bank and Gaza.

TENSE RELATIONS WITH THE PLO

Relations between Jordan and the PLO remained tense since Husayn's suspension of political cooperation with its leadership in February 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 442–49). In August, Masri noted that relations with the PLO were “neutral.” Though there still were contacts with the PLO, there was no political coordination with the organization.⁹⁹ Husayn and other senior Jordanian spokesmen repeatedly declared that political coordination with the PLO could only be resumed from the point where it had been suspended.¹⁰⁰ Husayn was not prepared to “return to square one” and begin the arduous process of negotiations all over again.¹⁰¹ In practical terms this meant that coordination would only be resumed if and when the PLO accepted Resolutions 242 and 338 unconditionally.¹⁰²

In the meantime, Jordanian-PLO contacts were limited to occasional meetings of the Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee to Support the Steadfastness of the Occupied Territories. The committee had been inoperative for some time both because of a lack of funds and the state of Jordanian-PLO relations. Since the launching of Jordan's West Bank development plan in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 455–57), Jordan had been dealing with support for the West Bank and Gaza independently of the PLO. The Jordanians had no intention of sharing responsibility with the PLO in the execution of the plan. Husayn made it clear that the dialogue with the PLO would not be resumed simply to give the PLO a role in the distribution of aid to the occupied territories. That was Jordan's duty, which it was carrying out on its own, Husayn explained.¹⁰³ However, Jordan encountered difficulties in raising money for its development plan from countries that did not want to appear to be taking sides in the Jordanian-PLO competition. Saudi Arabia was one such example. In January, the Saudis transferred \$9.5m. to the dormant joint committee rather than to the Jordanians directly, thereby prodding Jordan and the PLO to reactivate the committee. In February, the committee met for the first time in more than a year. Its discussions focused mainly on the distribution of the Saudi contribution in the territories.¹⁰⁴ But Jordanian sources were quick to point out that the meeting did not indicate a resumption of political coordination with the PLO or a Jordanian retreat from its independently executed development plan.¹⁰⁵ According to a Western diplomat, Husayn was still “dead set against reconciliation.”¹⁰⁶

Hani al-Hasan, one of 'Arafat's political advisers, held talks with Rifa'i in early July, but these were of no consequence.

At the Arab summit in Amman in November (for details, see essay on inter-Arab relations), the Jordanians made a deliberate effort to slight the PLO. Husayn did not welcome Yasir 'Arafat upon his arrival, as he had done with the other heads of delegations, and Jordanian Television coverage of the PLO chairman was minimal. When asked about the lack of coverage, Crown Prince Hasan explained that so much was going on at the summit that one had no choice but “to set a list of priorities.”¹⁰⁷ 'Arafat was obviously very low on this list. Husayn and 'Arafat met during the summit and 'Arafat contended that they had achieved more than reconciliation.¹⁰⁸ Husayn, however, was considerably more reserved, reiterating that political coordination could only be resumed once the PLO had accepted Jordan's conditions.¹⁰⁹

The Jordanians also succeeded in seriously annoying 'Arafat when they distributed an English text of the summit resolutions that omitted the standard reference to the

PLO as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people," which did appear in the Arabic text. 'Arafat suspected that this was a deliberate Jordanian effort to score points off the PLO with the foreign press. "They are trying to cover up internationally what they failed to do in the conference," 'Arafat charged.¹¹⁰

The Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee met again in mid-December, to discuss the disbursement of additional Saudi funds received, but there was still no progress on the more fundamental issues. The gulf of suspicion and mistrust that divided Jordan and the PLO in respect to the peace process and the future of the occupied territories remained as wide as ever.

JORDAN AND THE WEST BANK

Since Husayn's suspension of coordination with the PLO leadership, Jordan conducted a sustained campaign to enhance its own influence in the West Bank and Gaza at the expense of the PLO. The main vehicle of this campaign was to be Jordan's five-year development plan for the territories (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 455-57).

The Jordanians, however, repeatedly denied that their plan was conceived as a form of competition with the PLO for supremacy in the Palestinian arena. The minister for the occupied territories, Dudin, claimed that there was "no contradiction whatever" between Jordan's acceptance of the Arab consensus on the PLO's representative status and Jordan's own "responsibilities to our people in the West Bank."¹¹¹ Moreover, Husayn explained, Jordan was required by Arab summit resolutions to support the steadfastness of "our kinfolk" in the occupied territories.¹¹² And Dudin pointed out that the West Bank was "still officially an integral part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan."¹¹³

Jordanian protestations of innocence were in fact only further evidence of the Jordanian perception of the continued "unionist relations"¹¹⁴ that existed between Jordan and the West Bank, irrespective of the PLO's status. Despite the regular lip service paid by Jordan to the PLO's exclusive representative status, Jordan was still striving energetically towards the ultimate creation of a Jordanian-Palestinian partnership in which Jordan would have the upper hand.

Senior Jordanian spokesmen often contended that the principal objective of the development plan was to forestall future efforts by Israel to solve its demographic problems by encouraging the emigration of the Arab population to Jordan. By promoting the economic well-being of the population under occupation, Jordan strove to "keep the Palestinians on their land" and prevent their emigration.¹¹⁵ Considering the dangers inherent in the status quo, Jordan could not resign itself to stagnation. Jordan could only hope that the members of the Arab League, the PLO and all those who were "politically mature" would realize that Jordan's policy was the only pragmatic approach that could preserve the Arab, Muslim, and Palestinian identity of any part of Palestine.¹¹⁶ The Jordanians did seem to be genuinely motivated by such calculations, but the political objective of creating a network of West Bank and Gazan dependence on Jordan was no less important.

To facilitate the implementation of the development plan, the West Bank and Gaza were divided into nine "development areas." These were Jerusalem, Janin, Nablus, Tulkarm-Qalqiliya, Ramalla, Jericho, Bethlehem, Hebron, and Gaza. In each of the areas development committees were formed. These were composed of local government officials, who had served the Jordanian Administration before 1967, and

representatives of the private sector. Their task was to supervise the execution of projects in their respective areas.¹¹⁷ Projects in the Gaza Strip were to be implemented through a charitable society led by the former mayor of Gaza, Rashad al-Shawa,¹¹⁸ who had previously been given Jordanian citizenship (see *MECS* 1986, p. 454). The work of all these committees was to be considered an "extension of the official functions of the Jordanian Government."¹¹⁹

Jordan's main problem in executing the development plan was money. Available funds fell far short of the planned \$150m. a year. Rifa'i told Parliament in February that the government was reconsidering some of the West Bank and Gaza Strip development projects because of its difficulties in raising funds for them.¹²⁰ Arab states as well as some European countries were reluctant to contribute funds to the Jordanian Government for a plan which was designed to undermine the PLO, and which had been openly criticized by the organization. The Saudis, for example, preferred to give money to the Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee (see above). Even the French were said to be particularly concerned that their contribution should go directly to the West Bank "for fear of appearing to undercut the PLO."¹²¹

The Jordanians themselves earmarked JD10m. in their budgets for 1987 and 1988 for the West Bank-Gaza development plan. In 1987, JD3.4m. were allocated to development projects in the West Bank and JD1.5m. to projects in the Gaza Strip. Another JD3.9m. were allocated for salaries to teachers in government schools in the occupied territories (who also received salaries from the Israeli authorities). This sum covered 50% of the basic salaries of some 7,000 teachers and staff in the West Bank, as well as a monthly supplement of JD25–35 for 2,400 teachers and staff in the Gaza Strip.¹²²

In the US allocations for fiscal 1986–87, Jordan was to receive \$11.5m. for its development plan in the occupied territories; this would be increased to \$30m. during the following fiscal year.¹²³ The British promised £5m., the French a similar amount and the West Germans undertook to provide DM12m. in 1987¹²⁴ (most of which was to be channeled directly to the West Bank).

However, according to Israeli and American officials, only a small part of the sums promised for development projects by Jordan was actually transferred to the West Bank and Gaza. US officials were reportedly concerned that American funds given to Jordan for the occupied territories had not made their way there.¹²⁵

The Jordanians were nevertheless creating the impression of intensive involvement, which was reinforced by action in other spheres. They took various measures to strengthen their control of the West Bank Muslim religious establishment (which functioned under the supervision of the Jordanian Ministry for *Awqaf* and Religious Affairs) by removing PLO supporters and appointing instead other functionaries more acceptable to Jordan. One of them was a preacher at the al-Aqsa Mosque, who was reportedly pensioned off after having attended a preachers' conference in Morocco as a representative of Palestine. He had taken his seat there at a table bedecked with the Palestinian flag, an act to which the Jordanians had apparently taken offense.¹²⁶ Punitive measures were also taken against other known PLO supporters who were prevented from crossing the bridges into Jordan, a measure that complicated their travel to other Arab states as well.¹²⁷

The pro-Jordanian newspaper, *al-Nahar*, which started off as a weekly in 1986, became a daily in 1987 and was recognized as Jordan's mouthpiece in the West Bank

and Gaza. Shortly before the Arab summit in November, *al-Nahar* published a petition signed by hundreds of residents of the occupied territories in support of Jordan's concept of confederation between the two Banks¹²⁸ (see essay on the West Bank and Gaza).

Jordan was still very far from turning the tables against the PLO in the territories, where the organization continued to enjoy overwhelming popular support. Even so, the pro-PLO camp in the territories was reportedly worried about the inroads made by Jordan. Jordan, according to one such PLO supporter, was "becoming a real competitor."¹²⁹ PLO concern may well have been exacerbated by Israel's apparent support for the strengthening of Jordanian influence in the West Bank. In early December, a meeting between the Israeli defense minister, Yitzhak Rabin, and West Bank members of the Jordanian Parliament was disclosed to the Israeli press. The meeting, attended by seven deputies, was designed to bolster the pro-Jordanian camp in the West Bank.¹³⁰ It was also an indication of Israeli approval of Jordan's intensified involvement in West Bank affairs.

However, whatever gains the Jordanians may have made in the West Bank seemed to be washed away by the Palestinian uprising or *intifada* that began in early December. If the Jordanians had counted on the emergence of a West Bank constituency that would pressure the PLO toward moderation and coordination with Jordan, the *intifada*, at least initially, had quite the opposite effect. Jordan and its supporters in the West Bank were pushed back onto the defensive in the face of Palestinian nationalist militancy. The uprising tended to serve the PLO and its inter-Arab and international standing, and therefore proved to be a severe setback for Jordan's West Bank policy.

The Jordanian response was one of damage control. On the one hand, the Jordanians publicly supported and encouraged the uprising. The Jordanian press carried numerous articles that heaped praise on the population under occupation. The uprising, it was argued, was proving to the Israelis that time was against them and that the Zionist presence on Palestinian land was no more than a transitory phenomenon. It proved that Arab-Israeli coexistence was impossible. The will of the people under occupation was stronger than any means of oppression, and the continued uprising, together with outside Arab support, would surely pave the way for Israel's ultimate collapse.¹³¹ This view was reinforced by the solidarity shown by the Palestinians in Israel for their brethren in the West Bank and Gaza. Israel's own Arab population constituted a "time bomb" and a strategic weapon that would challenge Israel's existence.¹³²

On the other hand, the Jordanians sought to dilute the specifically Palestinian nationalist nature of the uprising, to undercut the gains made by the PLO, and to emphasize Jordan's special link to the population under occupation. Jordanian sources thus repeatedly referred to the uprising of "our kinfolk" in the occupied territories.¹³³ This was part of an attempt to portray the uprising as more a rejection of Israeli rule than an expression of Palestinian nationalism and Palestinian demands for self-determination and political independence. In late December, Husayn instructed the Ministry of *Awqaf* and Religious Affairs to allocate monthly stipends to the families of "the martyrs of the blessed uprising." This gesture was described as part of Jordan's policy to "consolidate the close ties of brotherhood binding the people of this steadfast country with its East and West Banks and to entrench our

struggling kinfolk in Holy Jerusalem."¹³⁴ At the same time, explicit and implicit criticism was leveled against the PLO in some of the Jordanian media. According to an article in *al-Dustur*, the Palestinians in all of occupied Palestine, "from the sea to the river," were leading the struggle against occupation and it was they who were really the "sole representative of the Arab people in Palestine."¹³⁵ The PLO was accused of exploiting the uprising simply as a means of bolstering its own prestige, instead of taking the necessary action to reap tangible political gains from the new situation. Israel, it was argued in *al-Dustur*, was bound to take action to put down the uprising. Unless the Jordanian-Palestinian house was put in order, the Arabs would soon find themselves back at square one with nothing to show for their effort.¹³⁶

The Jordanians were not only concerned about the impact of the uprising on their position in the occupied territories. There was evidence to suggest that they were equally worried about the possibility of unrest breaking out among Palestinians in Jordan itself. The government did not permit demonstrations in support of the uprising by Palestinians in Jordan.¹³⁷ Special security measures were also taken in refugee camps in Jordan to ensure tranquillity on the East Bank.¹³⁸

JORDAN AND THE ARAB WORLD

Jordan's standing in the Arab world had improved markedly in recent years. Husayn had succeeded in maintaining favorable ties with Syria, Egypt, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia at the same time, a noteworthy achievement for any Arab regime. In the early 1980s, when Jordan was still at loggerheads with Syria and in the process of establishing political coordination with the PLO, the Jordanians had strongly advocated the abandonment of the paralyzing attempt to achieve Arab consensus. Husayn suggested that Arab summits take majority decisions in order to neutralize the veto power of the radical minority, i.e., Syria (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 518). Husayn's efforts were unsuccessful; and following Jordan's rupture with the PLO and its *rapprochement* with Syria, Jordan reverted to the old strategy of Arab consensus. Since Husayn's suspension of coordination with the PLO in early 1986, Jordan made repeated calls for an Arab summit (see *MECS* 1986, p. 457). These efforts gathered momentum after the PLO's abrogation of the Amman accord in April 1987. Jordan sought to exploit its advantageous inter-Arab position to further inter-Arab reconciliation and consensus on a basis that could serve its regional interests.

The choice of Amman as the venue for the Arab summit in November (for further details, see essay on inter-Arab relations) was, therefore, not only a boost for Jordanian prestige and Hashemite legitimacy, but also an opportunity for Husayn to register political gains concerning the Palestinian question and the Arab stand in the Gulf War — Jordan's most pressing regional preoccupations. The fact that all members of the Arab League attended the summit in Amman was in itself a triumph for Husayn. Jordan's actual political gains, however, were moderate and generally reflected its limited regional power and the need to make concessions to Syria.

The most urgent issue on the summit agenda was the escalating war in the Gulf. Jordan strove to achieve broad Arab support for the Iraqis; the summit resolutions sharply condemned Iran for the prolongation of the war, but stopped short of imposing any collective sanctions. The summit approved the restoration of diplomatic relations with Egypt, something Jordan had already done in 1984. But Jordan's desire

to have Egypt's suspension from the Arab League lifted remained unfulfilled. As for the Palestinian question, the summit was slightly more productive from the Jordanian perspective. The PLO's role at the summit was deliberately downplayed by the Jordanians (see also above). Though the resolutions reaffirmed the PLO's representative status, they made no reference to the right of the Palestinians to independent statehood. The summit endorsed the concept of an international peace conference and supported PLO participation in the conference on an equal footing with the other parties. This, however, did not preclude Jordan's preference for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation. While the Jordanians had good cause for satisfaction with the resolutions on the Palestinian question this gain was short-lived. The Palestinian uprising in the West Bank and Gaza, which began just after the summit ended, tended to restore the PLO's role at the center of the stage of inter-Arab relations.

Shortly after Jordan's *rapprochement* with Syria, Husayn launched a concerted effort to bring about a reconciliation between Syria and Iraq (see *MECS* 1986, p. 457). In April 1987, the presidents of Syria and Iraq met secretly on Jordanian territory, and both attended the Amman summit. But Jordan's good relations with Syria and Iraq were insufficient to effect a real breakthrough in the longstanding conflict between these two competitors for regional supremacy.

Jordan and Syria remained on different sides in the Gulf War and Husayn did not have much to show for his effort to wean Syria from its support for Iran. This, however, did not affect other aspects of the Jordanian-Syrian relationship. Jordan generally gave its blessing to Syrian action in Lebanon, and Syria and Jordan also came to an important agreement on the exploitation of the Yarmuk waters. In September, Syria and Jordan signed an agreement for the construction of a dam at al-Maqarin on the Yarmuk. The dam was to irrigate land and provide electricity for both countries. (For details, see chapter on Syria.)

Jordan's good relations with Egypt were reinforced by Husayn's leading role in preparing the groundwork for Egypt's return to the Arab fold. Jordan had led the Arab field in restoring diplomatic relations with Egypt, and thus set the stage for the Amman summit resolution permitting other Arab states to follow its example. Egypt's return to the Arab fold was a central facet of Jordan's regional policy. It was deemed essential for the bolstering of Iraq in its war against Iran, and for the reinforcement of those Arab states that supported a peaceful settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Jordan resumed diplomatic relations with Libya in September. These had been severed in 1984 (see *MECS* 1983-84, p. 527). The reestablishment of ties was part of Husayn's preparations for a fully attended Arab summit in Amman, and did not signify any reorientation of Jordan's regional policies.

JORDAN AND THE GREAT POWERS

JORDAN AND THE UNITED STATES

Jordan's relations with the US revolved around three main issues: (a) the US and the ME peace process; (b) US military and economic assistance; and (c) the US role in the Gulf War. In all three spheres, the Jordanians had cause for dissatisfaction with US policy. There was never any question, however, of Jordan shifting its basically pro-US orientation.

In recent years, Jordanian spokesmen had often complained about what they saw as a consistent pro-Israeli bias in Washington's ME policy (see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 527–28). Indeed, Jordan's support for an international conference that would include the Soviet Union and the other permanent members of the Security Council was largely motivated by this appraisal of US policy. The US, the Jordanians contended, lacked the required credibility to fulfill the role of honest broker between Israel and the Arabs.¹³⁹ Jordanian complaints about US credibility were particularly bitter in the wake of the revelations about American arms sales to Iran.¹⁴⁰ From the Jordanian perspective, this was yet another example of the US backing the wrong side. Husayn said that he had been "more than shocked" by these revelations. The sales to Iran were "diametrically opposed to every assurance" he had received from the US.¹⁴¹

Husayn registered his dissatisfaction with US policy by declining an invitation to visit Washington in April. The Jordanians explained that the king saw no point in visiting the US unless such a visit would produce new American proposals in favor of an international peace conference along the lines suggested by Jordan (see above).¹⁴² According to one Jordanian official, Husayn was "not interested in visiting Washington simply so that the Americans [could] point to a strong, moderate Arab leader's visit to prove that US credibility with the Arabs [had] not been damaged by the Iran arms sales."¹⁴³

In early April, Prime Minister Rifa'i and Foreign Minister Masri visited Washington, where they held talks with senior US officials including Vice President George Bush and Secretary Shultz. Rifa'i noted that there had been a favorable evolution of the US stand on the international conference. The US had accepted the principle of convening such a conference, but Jordan and the US still differed on the role, the modalities, and the terms of reference of the conference.¹⁴⁴ Jordan did not accept the US position that the conference should serve simply as an umbrella for direct negotiations¹⁴⁵ without any input by the Powers in the negotiating process (see above). Moreover, the Jordanians were critical of American reluctance to apply pressure on those in Israel who continued to reject the idea of an international conference. According to Minister of Court 'Adnan Abu 'Awda, instead of supporting the moderate elements in Israel led by Peres, the US Administration chose to be neutral in the domestic Israeli debate. This, he argued, was an example of a "misguided US policy which one week supports moderation and the next undermines it."¹⁴⁶

Another Jordanian grievance stemmed from congressional opposition to arms sales to the kingdom (see *MECS* 1986, p. 458). Husayn said that Jordan would no longer seek arms deals with the US.¹⁴⁷ Jordan's request for greater US financial aid was also turned down. Following congressional reductions of foreign aid, US financial assistance to Jordan was cut from \$100 m. in fiscal 1986–87 to \$71.8m. in 1987–88.¹⁴⁸

Even though Husayn described Jordan-US relations as having reached "an unprecedented low,"¹⁴⁹ the two countries still shared fundamental regional strategic interests that outweighed the strains in their relationship. In July, joint US-Jordanian maneuvers were held in Jordan with the participation of some 2,300 American soldiers. F-16 aircraft were also used. Jordan gave no publicity to these maneuvers, but, according to a US source, they were the most extensive ever held with Jordan.¹⁵⁰

The reinforced US naval presence in the Gulf following the American decision to reflag Kuwaiti ships (see essay on the US and the ME) was a demonstration of US resolve that, at least in some respects, must have heartened the Jordanians. As

opposed to the arms sale to Iran, this was American intervention in the Gulf War in favor of the right side as far as Jordanians were concerned. But the Jordanian position on the US role in the Gulf was a complex one. For some time, the Jordanians had been generally opposed to superpower interference in the Gulf (see *MECS*, 1980–81, p. 653). In principle, they remained opposed, and would have preferred a joint effort by the superpowers to end the Gulf War altogether and thus remove the need for the special US naval presence.¹⁵¹ But in the prevailing circumstances, the Jordanians explained that the US action was justified to protect oil tankers from Iranian attacks.¹⁵²

Jordan's original position against superpower intervention in the Gulf stemmed from its apprehension that such involvement could draw the local parties into an undesirable superpower confrontation in the area. The Jordanians were therefore eager to clarify that they did not support the US naval presence as anything more than a stopgap measure¹⁵³ and not as a permanent facet of US power projection against the USSR.¹⁵⁴ Once the Iranian threat was overcome, the Jordanians expected all foreign naval forces to leave the Gulf.¹⁵⁵ Crown Prince Hasan even voiced a measure of criticism against the US for having "gone too far in requesting [base] facilities from the countries of the area." He also suggested that it would have been preferable to have Gulf shipping protected by a naval force under the UN flag rather than by "a single state."¹⁵⁶

JORDAN AND THE SOVIET UNION

Jordan was a regional ally of the US and not of the USSR. But the Jordanians were noticeably unwilling to antagonize the Soviet Union and its local allies. This was true of Jordan's positions on the US military presence in the area and the ME peace process. Indeed, Jordan's support for Soviet involvement in the peace process was motivated in part by just such considerations. Husayn and the Jordanian press regularly praised the USSR for its stand in favor of an international conference and for the backing it gave to the Arab stand in the ME conflict.¹⁵⁷

As in the recent past, senior Soviet officials paid regular visits to Jordan to discuss regional issues. The Soviet ambassador at large, Mikhail Sytenko, held talks with Husayn in Amman in March; and Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet first deputy foreign minister, also met with Husayn in Amman and had another meeting with him in London in October.

Husayn was in the Soviet Union on an official visit on 21–23 December. This was his first visit to the USSR since 1982 (see *MECS* 1982–83, p. 648). He held talks with General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, with the president of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, Andrei Gromyko, and with other senior officials. No joint communiqué was issued at the end of the visit, presumably due to differences that were not ironed out in the talks. At a dinner hosted by Gromyko, Husayn delivered a speech in which he focused on the ME peace process and the Gulf War. He reiterated Jordan's support for an international peace conference that would be based on Resolutions 242 and 338 and attended by the five permanent members of the Security Council and all the local parties to the conflict, including the PLO. As for the situation in the Gulf, Husayn implicitly called for support for sanctions against Iran when he urged the Soviet Union to "use its effective international influence and weight" to pressure Iran to accept and implement Security Council Resolution 598 and thus end the war.¹⁵⁸

Gromyko's reply to Husayn restated Soviet support for an international conference,

but made no reference to Resolutions 242 and 338, which, for the Jordanians, were the cornerstone of the peace process. Moreover, Gromyko criticized "those quarters" that were "trying to surround the convening of the conference with fabricated preliminary conditions and various stipulations," i.e., the US demand that the PLO accept Resolutions 242 and 338 and recognize Israel. Gromyko also expressed the USSR's support for "the right of any people to choose *independently* [author's emphasis] its path of development in conditions of security." This did not coincide with Jordan's preference for a joint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to the proposed international conference, or with the notion of a Jordanian-Palestinian confederation instead of a fully independent Palestinian state.

The Soviet Union was not very forthcoming on the Gulf issue either. Gromyko said that the world community expected Iran to take practical steps to end the war, but he did not express any Soviet commitment to pressure Iran. Gromyko also insisted on the withdrawal of the US fleet from the Gulf. Freedom of navigation, Gromyko contended, could be ensured by UN naval forces.¹⁵⁹ Jordan had certain misgivings about the US naval presence (see above). Husayn, however, would not join the Soviets in insisting on the withdrawal of the US force, which Jordan actually supported in the existing circumstances. A Tass statement on the conclusion of the Soviet-Jordanian talks noted that Husayn had understood the Soviet approach on this matter, but did not claim that he had agreed with it.¹⁶⁰

Since 1981 Jordan had concluded two arms deals with the USSR (see *MECS* 1981-82, p. 693; 1984-85, p. 522). In early 1987, it was reported that Jordan had taken delivery of new consignments of SAM-8, SAM-13, and SAM-14 missiles.¹⁶¹ But reports that Jordan sought to enter a new deal with the USSR for MiG-29 fighter aircraft were denied by the Jordanians.¹⁶²

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *JT*, 7 January, 4 February; *al-Ra'y*, *JT*, 4, 23 February 1987.
2. *JT*, 29 July; R. Amman, 20 August — DR, 24 August; *JT*, 8 December 1987.
3. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 20 December 1987; R. Amman, 29 December 1987 — DR, 4 January 1988. Rifa'i had already explained elsewhere that the red line in this respect was reached when debt repayment equaled 20% or more of the country's income from exports. In Jordan, Rifa'i said, this ratio was 14.9% (R. Amman, 14 March — DR, 16 March 1987).
4. *Al-Ra'y*, *JT*, 19 May 1987.
5. *JT*, 1, 15 June 1987.
6. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 26 September 1987.
7. *JT*, 15 June 1987.
8. R. Amman, 10 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
9. *JT*, 7 January 1987.
10. *Al-Ra'y*, 8 July 1987.
11. *JT*, 17 August 1987.
12. Hasan to *Newsweek*, 2 February 1987.
13. *JT*, 15 December 1987.
14. Hasan, *ibid*.

15. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 31 July 1987.
16. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 1 October 1987.
17. E.g., *al-Hurriyya*, 25 January, 3 May 1987.
18. *Al-Ra'y*, 18 June 1987.
19. R. Monte Carlo, 18 June — DR, 19 June 1987.
20. *JT*, 20 June 1987.
21. *Al-Hadaf*, Damascus, 29 June 1987.
22. *Al-Ra'y*, 6 July 1987.
23. *Al-Hurriyya*, 6 September 1987.
24. *FT*, 22 May 1987.
25. *FT*, 27 August 1987.
26. *FT*, 22 May 1987.
27. *JT*, 13 July 1987.
28. *JT*, 31 May 1987.
29. *FT*, 22 May 1987.
30. *Ibid.*
31. *FT*, 27 August 1987.
32. *Ibid.*
33. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 8 February; *JT*, 17 February 1987.
34. *FT*, 22 May 1987.
35. *JT*, 15 December 1987.
36. *MM*, 2 February 1987.
37. *JT*, 9 September 1987.
38. *JT*, 15 December 1987.
39. AP quoted in *JP*, 2 December 1987.
40. *FT*, 22 May 1987.
41. *JT*, 26 October 1987.
42. *JT*, 7 September 1987.
43. Rifa'i on Jordan TV, 14 March — DR, 16 March; speeches by Husayn at an education conference and in Parliament, *JT*, 7 September; R. Amman, 10 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
44. Jordan TV, 14 March — DR, 16 March 1987.
45. *JT*, 18 August 1987.
46. *JT*, 26 October 1987.
47. Rifa'i on Jordan TV, 14 March — DR, 16 March, and in *al-Ra'y*, 16 July; budget speech by minister of finance, Hanna 'Awda, R. Amman, 7 December — DR, 9 December 1987.
48. Address by Hasan to Council of Europe, 29 January, *JT*, 31 January 1987.
49. *Al-Majalla*, 31 December 1986-6 January 1987.
50. See e.g., speech by Hasan at Royal College of Defence Studies, London, *JT*, 1 July 1987.
51. E.g., Husayn quoted in *al-Dustur*, Amman, 5 March 1987.
52. E.g., Jordan TV, 17 September — DR, 18 September 1987.
53. Rifa'i to *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, reproduced in *al-Dustur*, Amman, 5 March 1987.
54. What was said to be the "full text" of the agreement was published in Hebrew translation in the Israeli daily *Ma'ariv* on 1 January 1988.
55. *Boston Globe*, 5 May 1987.
56. R. Monte Carlo, 2 May; JNA, 3 May — DR, 4 May; *al-Ra'y*, 3 May 1987.
57. Hasan in *JT*, 1 July; similarly Husayn in *Profil*, 6 July — DR, 8 July 1987.
58. *Ibid.*
59. Masri in *al-Dustur*, Amman, and *JT*, 24 March; Rifa'i in *JT*, 9-10 April; *al-Ra'y*, 19 May; Husayn to *Neue Kronen-Zeitung*, 1 July — DR, 2 July 1987.
60. *NYT*, 12 May 1987.
61. R. Amman, 12 May — DR, 13 May 1987.
62. *NYT*, 7 November 1987.
63. R. Monte Carlo, 18 November — DR, 18 November 1987.
64. Masri in *al-Ra'y*, 16 June; Husayn in *Profil*, 6 July — DR, 8 July 1987.
65. Masri quoted by MENA, 3 April — DR, 3 April, in *al-Tadamun*, 2 May, and in *al-Ra'y*, 16 June 1987.

66. Hasan in address at opening of Euro-Arab Dialogue in Amman, 29 November, *JT*, 30 November 1987.
67. *Boston Globe*, 5 May 1987.
68. *JT*, 6 May 1987.
69. *Boston Globe*, 5 May 1987.
70. The article was reprinted in *JP*, 19 April 1987.
71. *CSM*, 8 April 1987.
72. R. Amman, 9 June — DR, 10 June 1987.
73. *Al-Ittihad al-Ushu'i*, 21 May 1987.
74. *Ibid*.
75. Hasan in *JT*, 1 July 1987.
76. Husayn in *L'Espresso*, 18 January — DR, 22 January 1987.
77. Hasan in *JT*, 31 January 1987.
78. Rifa'i to JNA, 3 May — DR, 4 May; Husayn quoted in *al-Dustur*, Amman, 22 July, and on R. Amman, 13 December — DR, 15 December 1987.
79. Husayn quoted on R. Amman, 13 December — DR, 15 December 1987.
80. R. Amman, 21 April — DR, 21 April 1987.
81. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 21 April 1987.
82. *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 22 April 1987.
83. *Al-Ra'y*, 21 April 1987.
84. *Al-Tadamun*, 2 May 1987.
85. Husayn to *al-Ahram*, 11 December 1987.
86. *Ibid*.
87. *JT*, 31 January 1987.
88. R. Amman, 9 June, 13 December — DR, 10 June, 15 December 1987.
89. Masri quoted by MENA, 3 April — DR, 3 April 1987.
90. Husayn quoted on R. Amman, 15 January — SWB, 17 January; Hasan in *JT*, 31 January 1987.
91. *JT*, 17 January 1987.
92. *Al-Ra'y*, 16 June 1987.
93. R. Amman, 21 April — DR, 21 April; *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 22 April 1987.
94. Masri quoted in *al-Ra'y*, 16 June 1987.
95. *Akhbar al-Ushu'*, 22 October; Dudin to *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 31 October 1987.
96. Rifa'i in *JT*, 9–10 April; Husayn in *al-Ahram*, 11 December 1987.
97. Masri to *al-Tadamun*, 2 May, 31 October; Husayn to *Profil*, 6 July — DR, 8 July 1987.
98. *Al-Ra'y*, 16 June 1987.
99. *Al-Ra'y*, 11 August 1987.
100. Husayn on R. Monte Carlo, 13 January — DR, 14 January, and on Jordan TV, 11 November — SWB, 13 November 1987.
101. R. Amman, 13 December — DR, 15 December 1987.
102. Masri in *JT*, 24 March 1987.
103. R. Amman, 15 January — SWB, 17 January 1987.
104. R. Amman, 17 February 1987.
105. R. Monte Carlo, 2 February — DR, 3 February; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 12 February 1987.
106. *IHT*, 16 February 1987.
107. Jordan TV, 9 November — SWB, 11 November 1987.
108. *Al-Ra'y*, 11 November 1987.
109. Jordan TV, 11 November — SWB, 13 November 1987.
110. *NYT*, 12 November 1987.
111. *Jerusalem Star*, 19–25 February 1987.
112. R. Amman, 15 January — SWB, 17 January 1987.
113. *Jerusalem Star*, *ibid*.
114. Masri to *al-Majalla*, 31 December 1986–6 January 1987.
115. Masri, *ibid*.; Hasan in *JT*, 31 January; Raja'i al-Dajani to *al-Hawadith*, 6 November 1987.
116. Dudin in *Jerusalem Star*, 19–25 February 1987.
117. *JT*, 26 January; R. Amman, 27 January — DR, 2 February 1987.
118. *JT*, 10 March 1987.

119. *JT*, 3 March 1987.
120. *JT*, 14 February 1987.
121. *FT*, 7 February 1987.
122. *JT*, 26 January 1987.
123. *Jerusalem Star*, 19–25 February; *FT*, 22 May 1987.
124. *FT*, 7 February; *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 24 March 1987.
125. *JP*, 23 October 1987.
126. *Filastin al-Thawra*, 1 August 1987.
127. *Ha'aretz*, 14 January 1987.
128. *Ma'ariv*, 11 November 1987.
129. *The Observer*, 20 September 1987.
130. *JP*, 4 December 1987.
131. E.g., *al-Ra'y*, *al-Dustur*, Amman, 24 December; *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 31 December 1987.
132. *Al-Ra'y*, 31 December 1987.
133. E.g., statement by Chamber of Deputies, JNA, 19 December — DR, 21 December; statement by Rifa'i in Parliament, R. Amman, 29 December 1987 — DR, 4 January 1988.
134. R. Amman, 24 December — DR, 31 December 1987.
135. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 28 December 1987.
136. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 24 December 1987, 2 January 1988.
137. *Sabah al-Khayr*, Beirut, 26 December 1987.
138. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 28 December 1987.
139. Husayn to *Boston Globe*, 5 May 1987.
140. Masri to *al-Majalla*, 31 December 1986–6 January 1987.
141. *FT*, 18 February 1987.
142. *CSM*, *WSJ*, 21 March; Masri in *al-Ahram*, 3 April 1987.
143. *IHT*, 30 March 1987.
144. Rifa'i to *JT*, 9–10 April 1987.
145. Masri to *al-Ahram*, 3 April 1987.
146. Address delivered by 'Adnan Abu 'Awda at Middle East Consultation of the Carter Center, Atlanta, Georgia, 17 November 1987. Text in Moshe Dayan Center Archives.
147. *Profil*, 6 July — DR, 8 July 1987.
148. *JT*, 12–13 February; *al-Bayan*, Dubai, 21 April 1987.
149. Husayn quoted in *al-Dustur*, Amman, 22 July 1987.
150. *CSM*, 31 July; *ENA*, 10 August — DR, 12 August 1987.
151. Husayn on Jordan TV, 11 November — SWB, 13 November 1987.
152. Masri in *al-Ra'y*, 11 August, and *JT*, 1 September 1987.
153. Husayn to *Sunday Telegraph*, 6 September 1987.
154. Hasan in *JT*, 30 November 1987.
155. Masri to *al-Tadamun*, 31 October 1987.
156. Jordan TV, 9 November — SWB, 11 November 1987.
157. *Al-Dustur*, Amman, 22 July, 22 October 1987.
158. R. Amman, 21 December — DR:SU, 22 December 1987.
159. Speech by Gromyko, *Pravda*, 22 December — DR:SU, 22 December 1987.
160. Tass, 23 December — DR:SU, 24 December 1987.
161. *Al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 18 February 1987.
162. *JP*, 6, 10 August 1987.

Lebanon

(Al-Jumhuriyya al-Lubnaniyya)

YOSEF OLMERT

The year in Lebanon was marked by the continuity of the political stalemate, the raging violence and the terrorism that had characterized previous years. The country also faced serious food shortages and unprecedented economic deprivation. The only novel element was the Syrian decision to invade West Beirut in February 1987 (see chapter on Syria) in order to restore law and order there.

The failure of the Lebanese factions and Syria to forge a viable political settlement was doubly significant in a year when much attention was devoted to the question of electing a new president in September 1988, when the term of Amin Jumayyil was due to expire. The very fact that the presidency was a focal point of discussion and political maneuvering in a state which had long been considered a "non-state" indicated that many Lebanese politicians still clung to the notion that some form of political unity, symbolized by a president, was a desirable goal.

Reality, however, proved otherwise. Jumayyil's authority was constantly challenged by most of his ministers, who refused to have anything to do with him. The government remained virtually paralyzed, and the president found himself under pressure also from within his own community. The power struggle in the Maronite community weakened considerably the Phalangist Party, once the most powerful political party in the community. The Maronites were further demoralized by the death of the former president and veteran politician, Camille Chamoun. Chamoun's death highlighted the leadership crisis in the largest Christian community in the country. The vacuum it created was only partly filled by various contenders for the leadership, such as Jumayyil himself, Samir Ja'ja', the commander of the Lebanese Forces (LF), and the Maronite patriarch, Nasrallah Sfeir (for details of his election, see *MECS* 1986, p. 480). The largest single community in Lebanon, the Shi'is, were also fragmented from within and subjected to external pressures. The mainstream Shi'i organization, al-Amal, was torn by endemic internal rifts, challenged by the rival fundamentalist organization, Hizballah, and locked in a bitter and costly struggle with the PLO. While al-Amal was far from being a spent force, its claim to represent the Shi'i community seemed less convincing than ever before, and that state of affairs played into the hands of Hizballah and its Iranian backers.

The political destruction of the Sunnis, once the most powerful non-Christian community, continued unabated. The success of the largely Sunni PLO in its fighting with al-Amal did not reverse this trend. Of all the traditional Sunni strongholds, only Sidon was still to some extent controlled by a local Sunni militia. The assassination of the Sunni prime minister, Rashid Karami, was another blow to the community. There was no major change in the position of the Druzes, which continued to be the one

community whose unchallenged leader, Walid Junblat, was in control of most of his people in a territory that constituted their unofficial canton.

In general, the politics of Lebanon in 1987 indicated that partition along communal lines had become an almost irreversible fact of life. This remained true even after Syria's interference in West Beirut in February. That massive action, coming as it did after 18 months of relative Syrian passivity in Lebanon, did not lead to a full-scale effort to overpower the various anti-Syrian factions in that country. But it did give notice of Syria's determination to remain a dominant force there. One region where Syria maintained a low-profile role was South Lebanon, where in 1987 as in previous years, Israel, the South Lebanese Army (SLA), al-Amal, Hizballah, the PLO, Unifil, and various Lebanese factions had a stake.

Syrian interference also did nothing to solve the economic crisis in the country in 1987, the year that the Lebanese currency became absolutely worthless (at any rate cheaper than wallpaper, as rioters maintained in the streets); unemployment rose; and starvation loomed as an imminent possibility. The Lebanese polity was unable to respond to the challenge, which posed a danger to almost all Lebanese, regardless of communal affiliation. What fueled the situation was the fact that the only elements that could rely on relatively generous financial assistance were Hizballah and the PLO, two organizations that militated against stability in the battered country.

FUNCTIONING OF THE STATE INSTITUTIONS

THE GOVERNMENT AND CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES

The Lebanese Government remained a nominal body during 1987. The ministers did not meet, most of them were not even on speaking terms, and the majority refused to deal with Jumayyil. The situation, then, was much the same as it had been the previous year (see *MECS* 1986, p. 466).

On 4 May 1987, Karami resigned from the premiership in order to demonstrate his displeasure with the political situation.¹ Karami resumed his responsibilities toward the end of May, only to be assassinated on 1 June (see below). Lebanon lost its nominal prime minister; immediately afterward, Jumayyil issued a decree naming the Sunni minister of labor, national education, and fine arts, Salim al-Huss, as "acting prime minister."² The Sunni leader retained this title until the end of the year.

On 7 August, Camille Chamoun, minister of finance, housing, and cooperatives, died (see below). Jumayyil nominated another minister, Joseph al-Hashim, to take over the deceased's ministries.³ On 26 November, the Greek Catholic minister of information, Josef Skaf, resigned.⁴ The Chamber of Deputies (CD) was more active than the government. On 17 March, Albert Muhaybir was elected Deputy Speaker, defeating Michel Sassin.⁵ On 5 June, the Speaker, Husayn al-Husayni, tendered his resignation.⁶ It was rumored that Husayni's resignation was connected with Syrian pressure on him following Karami's assassination.⁷ Nabih Barri, the leader of al-Amal, justified Husayni's resignation.⁸ However, the Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council (SISC), headed by Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, called upon Husayni to retract his resignation.⁹ Husayni resumed his activities following a visit to Damascus, when the Syrians urged him to do so.¹⁰ On 20 October, Husayni's reelection as Speaker was uncontested after a Shi'i rival, Joe Hammud, withdrew his nomination.¹¹ On 1 December, the CD approved a bill extending its term of office until 1990. The CD was

originally elected in 1972, and repeatedly extended its term in view of the inability of the authorities to hold parliamentary elections.¹²

Parliamentary wheeling and dealing assumed particular significance in 1987, in view of the forthcoming presidential contest. Since the president would be elected by the CD, the personality and political leanings of the Speaker and his deputy were important. Death and exile reduced the number of deputies to 79, from the 99 the CD was supposed to have.¹³ Prominent politicians like Raymond Eddé, Sa'ib Salam and Kamil al-As'ad were in exile.

On 21 May the CD abrogated the Cairo agreement of 30 November 1968 which legitimized an armed PLO presence in parts of South Lebanon. The abrogation was part of a package in which the 17 May 1983 agreement with Israel was also abrogated¹⁴ (for details this agreement, see *MECS* 1982–83, pp. 664–68). This was mainly a symbolic act, without much bearing on events on the ground, but nonetheless it was an act that demonstrated the importance of the CD as an official, functioning institution, in contrast to the complete inaction of the government (for more on the Palestinian presence in Lebanon, see below).

THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AND THE LEBANESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

The approaching presidential election caused a great stir in local political circles. Under normal circumstances such excitement might have indicated the viability of the political system. But conditions had been normal since 1975, and yet the Lebanese were greatly preoccupied with the issue of the presidency. There were several reasons for this:

(1) The president, though largely incapacitated since the outbreak of the civil war, was the nominal and legitimate head of state, the main source of authority in the fragmented country. This point was stressed by Jumayyil, particularly following the collapse of the "Damascus agreement" in January 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 466–68 and below).

(2) The president was the supreme commander of the Armed Forces. While the Lebanese Army was far from being a very effective force, it was still one of the largest military organizations in the country.

(3) The desire to elect a new president demonstrated that Lebanese of all political and religious factions (with the exception of Hizballah) still adhered to the notion that some form of political unity, symbolized by a president, was necessary.

(4) There was a prevailing notion, which was not completely unfounded, that the presidential issue would spark another round of foreign interference, mainly Syrian, perhaps also Israeli.

(5) The year of a presidential election was always fraught with tensions, which further exacerbated conflicts. The events of 1952 (the tacit coup against then-president Bishara al-Khuri), of 1958 (the civil war), 1970 (clashes between the Lebanese Army and Christian militias and the PLO), of 1976 (civil war), and of 1982 (the Israeli invasion and the Lebanese domestic turmoil) seemed to lend credibility to this theory.

Be that as it may, the political atmosphere was dominated largely by the presidential race. On 17 April, Danny Chamoun, son and political heir of former president Camille Chamoun, declared his candidacy.¹⁵ Danny Chamoun admitted that he was in touch with Israeli officials.¹⁶ Early in October, two months after his father died,

Chamoun was in Cairo, where he met with senior Egyptian politicians.¹⁷ He was also in close touch with Junblat (see below) and Husayni¹⁸ (for details of Chamoun's previous contacts with Junblat, see *MECS* 1986, p. 480). A Maronite deputy claimed that Junblat had expressed support for Chamoun's candidacy.¹⁹ Chamoun's contacts, especially with Junblat, were significant, because they enabled him to portray himself as a candidate with broad appeal. However, there was no sign in 1987 that Syria, the final arbiter of Lebanese politics, regarded his candidacy positively. And Chamoun was further handicapped by the opposition of Ja'ja' and the LF.²⁰ Ja'ja' did not declare his own candidacy, but clearly wanted to keep this option open and took pains to deter other Maronite politicians from declaring their candidacies. His deputy in the LF, Karim Bakraduni, was particularly active in attempts to assess his (Ja'ja's) prospects. He visited Europe twice during the year, but failed to mobilize any external support.²¹ It was also reported that the LF put pressure on Minister Hashim (see above), a prominent Phalangist, not to run²² (relations between the LF and the Phalangist Party are described below).

Three other Maronites were mentioned as likely candidates. First, the army commander, Gen. Michel 'Awn, who, according to sources in Beirut, was favored by the Americans.²³ However, his candidacy was strongly resented by the LF and caused much friction in East Beirut (see below). The Maronite patriarch, Sfeir, was particularly active during the year. The climax of his activities was an unprecedented visit by the head of the Maronite Church in the USSR, which was preceded by visits to Algeria, France, and the Vatican.²⁴ Sfeir demonstrated his ability to conduct diplomatic talks, thus preparing the ground for a presidential candidacy. The maverick veteran politician, Raymond Eddé issued a statement that it was "dangerous" to speak of nominations for the presidency. Nonetheless, he made it clear that he was interested in the nomination.²⁵

Intense interest in the contest was also shown by non-Maronites. According to Lebanese political tradition (though not the constitution), the president is a Maronite. Yet in the chaotic circumstances that prevailed in 1987, the presidency seemed to be up for grabs. The Greek Orthodox politician, Fu'ad Butrus (for his past activities, see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 713–14, 716, 718) expressed interest in running.²⁶ According to some reports, Barri told Sfeir that it was no longer in the interest of the Maronites to cling to a sectarian regime because the presidency would finally revert to the Muslims. Barri also hinted that he might run.²⁷ A group called the "Islamic Movement" issued a statement naming four Muslim clergymen — Shaykh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah, Shaykh Muhammad Mahdi Shams al-Din, Shaykh 'Abbas Musavi (all Shi'is) and Shaykh Sa'id Sha'ban (Sunni) — as possible candidates.²⁸

Fadlallah and Shams al-Din were quick to reject this call.²⁹

There was another possible candidate, who, though not officially running, was very prominent — that is, the incumbent, President Amin Jumayyil.

PRESIDENT AMIN JUMAYYIL

According to the constitution, the president is not eligible for two successive terms of six years. Previous attempts by serving presidents to change the constitution to extend their term had failed and caused much dissent (see the case of Chamoun in 1958, and of Shihab in 1964). However, the political circumstances now made a stalemate in the presidential elections seem likely, and highlighted Jumayyil's position as the legal

authority in the country. Moreover, the president did not behave like a politician who was about to retire. He was just as active as he had been in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 466–68). He concentrated on mending his fences with Syria and its leader, President Hafiz al-Asad; on dealing with Arab and international diplomatic activity; and on maneuvering within the Maronite community (see below).

Since the collapse of the Damascus agreement, Jumayyil lost favor with the Syrians (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 533–38). This was damaging to his position, because the Syrians encouraged their political allies and subordinates in Lebanon to boycott the president. Beyond that, the rupture with Syria neutralized Jumayyil's ability to play a meaningful role in any attempt to solve the Lebanese crisis. Under these circumstances, Jumayyil sought to resume his dialogue with Asad in 1987, but had only limited success. During the Islamic conference in Kuwait in January, Jumayyil conferred unofficially with the Syrian president (see essay on Islamic affairs). In his speech to the conference, Jumayyil praised Syrian help to Lebanon.³⁰ It was reported also that Jumayyil was ready to amend the constitution in order to appease the Muslim leaders of his country and the Syrian regime. Sources close to Jumayyil subsequently denied this report.³¹ During the Arab summit in Amman in November (see essay on inter-Arab relations), there was another unofficial meeting between the two presidents.³² No breakthrough was achieved at that meeting, since Jumayyil could not agree to major amendments in the constitution, and the Syrians insisted precisely on such changes as a precondition of any meaningful *rapprochement* between Asad and Jumayyil. Behind the Syrian position was the assumption that Jumayyil was a spent force and could not deliver what they wanted, even if he were to agree to some of their demands.

Jumayyil engaged in expensive diplomatic activity precisely in order to dispel the impression that he was merely a titular president. He participated in the Islamic conference in Kuwait and the summit in Amman (see above). He also attended the summit conference of Francophone states, early in September, in Canada.³³ On 24 September, he addressed the UN General Assembly.³⁴ During the year Jumayyil visited Jordan (in February), where he asked that troops be sent to East Beirut, a request turned down by King Husayn;³⁵ Belgium, where he requested emergency economic support from the European Economic Community;³⁶ Britain;³⁷ France;³⁸ Switzerland;³⁹ Abu Dhabi;⁴⁰ Bahrain;⁴¹ Egypt;⁴² and the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).⁴³ While in New York to address the UN, Jumayyil met with US Secretary of State George Shultz and Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky.⁴⁴ He also met with Faruq Qaddumi, head of the PLO's Political Department.⁴⁵ The meetings and visits might have added prestige to Jumayyil's tarnished image had they not been merely a diplomatic merry-go-round. Arab and non-Arab states did not involve themselves in Lebanese affairs, and Syria was not moved towards a *rapprochement* with Jumayyil. Reality in Lebanon continued to be dictated by military developments on the ground, the economic crisis, and political developments within the various communities and factions that constituted the national mosaic.

CHAOS, TERRORISM, AND VIOLENCE IN LEBANON

Attempts on the lives of senior politicians, the actual killing of prominent politicians and other personalities, and the kidnappings of foreign citizens continued unabated

during the year. On 7 January, Camille was injured in an attempt on his life, and three of his bodyguards were killed. An unknown organization, called "The Lebanese Forces — the Free Bashirites — the Forces of Vengeance," claimed responsibility.⁴⁶ It was reported that the attempt was linked to the LF.⁴⁷ There were assassination attempts against other prominent Christian leaders. The chief target was the supreme commander of the LF, Ja'ja', who had escaped 26 attempts on his life since his ascendancy to power in January 1986.⁴⁸ (On his rise to power in January 1986, see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 537.) There were unsuccessful attempts to kill him on 20 February,⁴⁹ 14 March, and 4 October.⁵⁰

Ja'ja's rival, Elie Hubayka, also escaped assassination attempts in September and December.⁵¹ Early in December there was an attempt to kill the commander of the Lebanese Army, Michel 'Awn.⁵² In May, there was an explosion in Zgharta, the residence of former president Sulayman Faranjiyya, when President Jumayyil was there. It was not clear whether Jumayyil was the target of the explosion.⁵³ Others who contended with assassination attempts were Danny Chamoun⁵⁴ (twice), Deputy Sassin,⁵⁵ and the commander of the SLA, Gen. Antoine Lahad (twice).⁵⁶

Muslim politicians and public figures were also subjected to terrorism. On 18 May, Dr. Hasan Hamdan, a Shi'i member of the Central Committee of the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), was assassinated in West Beirut.⁵⁷ On 14 August, a senior official in the pro-Syrian Ba'th Party, 'Ali al-Abdallah, was murdered, apparently by Hizballah.⁵⁸ The leader of the Ba'th Party, and one of Syria's chief agents in Lebanon, 'Asim Qansur, escaped an assassination attempt on 5 February.⁵⁹ Other prominent politicians who escaped assassination attempts were Mustafa Sa'd, the secretary-general of the popular Nasserite organization in Sidon⁶⁰ (twice); the Sunni deputy from Sidon, Dr. Nazih al-Bizri;⁶¹ Malik Salam, head of the Council of Development and Construction;⁶² Druze leader Junblat (twice);⁶³ the Greek Orthodox deputy from West Beirut, Najah Wakin, who killed his would-be assassin;⁶⁴ and the Sunni deputy from Tripoli, Hashim Husayn.⁶⁵

Some terror attacks were directed against Shi'i leaders: Shams al-Din narrowly escaped death on 2 February.⁶⁶ Hamid Sadiqi, head of Iran's Intelligence in Beirut, Shaykh 'Ali Yasin, a religious leader from Tyre, and Amal leader Barri were subjected to assassination attempts.⁶⁷ Other victims of terrorism were Muhammad Shuqayr, an adviser of Jumayyil, who was assassinated on 2 August,⁶⁸ and Yitzhak Sasson, a Jewish hostage held by the Shi'i organization "Oppressed of the Earth" (a shadowy group believed to be affiliated with Hizballah), who was murdered on 20 June.⁶⁹ On 15 September an attempt was made to kill Hasan Sabra, the editor of *al-Shira'*, whose weekly was the first publication to break the news of the Iranian-American arms deal subsequently known as "Irangate." It was rumored that Sabra was shot by gunmen loyal to 'Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani, the Speaker of the Iranian *Majlis*. By far the most striking terror act of the year was the assassination of the premier, Karami. Karami was born in 1921 into one of Tripoli's most important families. His father, 'Abd al-Hamid Karami (1895–1950), served as mufti and was the political and religious leader of the Sunnis of Tripoli and their chief representative in the CD; he also served briefly, in 1945, as prime minister. Rashid Karami succeeded his father as the leader of the Sunnis of Tripoli, and was elected to every CD since 1951. He first joined the government in 1951, as minister of justice, and first became prime minister in 1955. In 1958, his Nasserite tendencies came to the fore, when he was one of the leaders of the

opposition to then-president Chamoun. In the 1960s, Karami was prime minister in most of the Lebanese governments of the time. In June 1975, after the outbreak of the civil war, he was made prime minister again, until December 1976. In April 1984, he formed a "Government of National Unity." In his last years, he was completely associated with Syrian policy in Lebanon, and considered "Damascus's man."⁷⁰ Consequently, his assassination was a major blow to Syria's prestige. Karami was killed by an explosive device that had been placed under his seat in a military helicopter.⁷¹ Investigations revealed that three men were involved in the assassination, and they were from Army Intelligence and the Air Force.⁷² The soldier who actually planted the bomb, Private Elie Louis Salibi, was traced to Sweden, where he was detained on 1 August.⁷³ But by the end of the year he had not been extradited to Lebanon. The motive was not fully established. However, if the aim was to further destabilize the country and place difficulties on the path to a political settlement of the crisis, it achieved exactly that.

Kidnappings, mainly of foreign nationals, and other acts of terrorism continued to dominate daily life in Lebanon, so much so that a noted Lebanese writer described his country, or what was left of it, as the "killing field" of the ME.⁷⁴ This was hardly an exaggeration, considering official statistics which showed that 130,000 people had been killed there between April 1975 (when the civil war began) and July 1987. About 150,000 others had been crippled; and 14,000 had been kidnapped by the various militias, of whom 10,000 were murdered.⁷⁵

Foreign nationals were a favorite terrorist target, especially for Hizballah. Although it was known to be a dangerous country for foreigners, 8,000 of them were still living there in 1987.⁷⁶ What added fuel to the fire was the fact that some Western countries, such as France and the FRG were ready to negotiate with the terrorists, to pay large sums of money, and make other concessions to get their hostages back. Other Western countries, such as the US and Britain, were adamant in their refusal to negotiate with terrorists. Among the hostages released were an Italian national of Lebanese extraction, Joseph Khuri;⁷⁷ a West German engineer, Alfred Schmidt;⁷⁸ a South Korean diplomat, To Chae-Song, for whom a \$1m. ransom was paid;⁷⁹ and two Frenchmen, Roger Auque and Jean-Louis Normandin.⁸⁰ By the end of the year, 23 foreigners — British, American, French, West German, Indian, Iranian, Irish, and Italian nationals — were still being held by Lebanese terrorists.⁸¹ The most famous hostages were the Americans and Terry Waite, the personal envoy of the archbishop of Canterbury who had been involved for years in negotiations to free hostages, and was abducted in Beirut on 20 January by Hizballah men (see *MECS* 1986, p. 473). During the year, there were many conflicting reports on what had happened to Waite. On 5 July, it was reported that he had "died of natural causes," but this was immediately denied.⁸² According to another report, Waite was taken hostage after a microtransmitter was found concealed in his hair.⁸³ On 2 September, a shadowy group called "Right Against Falsehood" published its demands for Waite's release; it wanted a \$10m. ransom and the release of prisoners held in Kuwait and in Israel.⁸⁴ Junblat was particularly active in attempts to release Waite; he was in touch with Libya and Iran,⁸⁵ but to no avail. By the end of the year, there were eight American hostages in Lebanon; four of them, teachers at Beirut University College in the Muslim-dominated Western part of the city, were kidnapped on 24 January.⁸⁶ The Oppressed of the Earth claimed responsibility.⁸⁷ A few days later, American citizens

residing in West Beirut were evacuated to the Christian-dominated eastern sector.⁸⁸ During the following days the US conducted what was called "gunboat diplomacy."⁸⁹ American aircraft flew over Beirut, and ships of the Sixth Fleet were seen near the port.⁹⁰ This activity caused a stir in Lebanon, and provoked sharp Soviet denunciations.⁹¹ No major crisis occurred, although one such crisis almost erupted after the kidnapping of another American, the journalist Charles Glass, by Hizballah on 18 June.⁹² Two Lebanese, including the son of the defense minister, were also kidnapped, but released on 24 June.⁹³ The Glass affair was potentially a major source of tension, because it was seen by the Syrians as an affront to their declared policy of pacification following the entry of their troops into West Beirut in February 1987. After two months of hectic Syrian-Iranian negotiations, Glass was released⁹⁴ and the much-discussed Syrian-Iranian confrontation was averted, at least for the time being. However, the Hizballah stronghold in the South Beirut suburb of Bir 'Abd remained the center of a kingdom of terror.

But terrorism was not confined to Hizballah and to kidnappings and political assassinations. Car bombs continued to be favored by Lebanese terror organizations. On 8 January, a car bomb exploded in Zahlah, killing one person.⁹⁵ On 30 January, eight people were killed in another explosion in East Beirut.⁹⁶ On 9 February, 15 people were killed in South Beirut, and al-Amal blamed Yasir 'Arafat's men for the explosion.⁹⁷ On 15 July, a powerful explosion rocked Tripoli, when a car bomb exploded near a Syrian army checkpoint and caused over 100 casualties.⁹⁸ On 24 July, five people were killed in an explosion at Hubayka's headquarters in Zahlah.⁹⁹ On 29 August, Tripoli was hit again, and two were killed and 22 wounded by a bomb in a bus.¹⁰⁰ Another explosion in Tripoli, on 10 October, claimed two more lives.¹⁰¹ On 11 November, five were killed in an explosion at Beirut Airport, which was under Syrian control.¹⁰² A particularly atrocious attack occurred at the hospital of the American University in West Beirut, killing seven.¹⁰³ Both the airport and hospital attacks were carried out by women terrorists,¹⁰⁴ and the identities of the organizations behind the attacks were not established. But they were, apparently, anti-Syrian elements, since the attacks took place in Syrian-controlled West Beirut. Other terror attacks included the murder of two teachers at St. Joseph's University on 16 July,¹⁰⁵ and the wave of anti-Saudi attacks committed by Hizballah following the Mecca massacre in late July.¹⁰⁶

Although terrorism claimed many lives in the period reviewed, large-scale fighting claimed even more lives and also had a more profound effect on daily life.

LARGE-SCALE MILITARY CONFRONTATIONS IN LEBANON

THE AMAL-PLO CLASH

The "camps war," a constant feature on the political agenda since 1985, remained so during 1987 (for details of the fighting in 1985 and 1986, see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 543-44, and 1986, pp. 482-84 respectively). The basic parameters of the fighting were much the same as in previous years: al-Amal besieged Palestinian refugee camps in South Lebanon and in West Beirut, but proved unable to defeat the superior organization and motivation of the PLO. Al-Amal's position was further shaken because of internal rifts and its precarious military situation in West Beirut (see

below). Also, al-Amal failed to turn this struggle into a full-scale Shi'i war against the Palestinians, while the latter showed much more internal solidarity and cohesion, despite their internal rifts.

In January, al-Amal claimed that 300 Libyan soldiers had arrived in Sidon to reinforce the PLO presence there.¹⁰⁷ Soon afterward, there were reports that al-Amal had prevented the passage of food convoys to the Palestinian camps in West Beirut. The reason was the delay of the PLO withdrawal from the strategic village of Maghdusha, east of Sidon. Palestinians in the West Beirut camps faced starvation and began to eat cats and dogs.¹⁰⁸ According to an unverified report, Morocco's King Hasan II proposed an air drop of food and medical supplies to the West Beirut camps.¹⁰⁹ This assistance did not materialize, and the situation in the camps deteriorated. According to Palestinian sources, 90% of the dwellings in the Shatila camp, and 60% of them in Burj al-Barajina, were destroyed, mainly by indiscriminate shelling from al-Amal's artillery and tanks.¹¹⁰ The Palestinian Red Crescent reported about half a dozen cases of typhus in Shatila.¹¹¹ Western press reports from the camps emphasized the terrible conditions there.¹¹² What made the situation even worse was the occasional fighting inside the camps between various Palestinian factions. On 4 March, seven Palestinian fighters were killed and others wounded in clashes between rival factions of al-Fath. The rocket and machine-gun exchanges, in the Sidon area, pitted partisans of al-Fath secretary-general and treasurer, Zayd Wahbi, against those of fellow al-Fath officer, Abu Husayn al-Haybi. The latter, a rival of 'Arafat, was killed in the fighting.¹¹³ In August, there was further fighting within al-Fath. Rasam al-Ghul, brother of Jihad al-Ghul (the commander of al-Fath's elite unit, Force 17), was killed.¹¹⁴ The retaliation was immediate: on 25 August, pro-'Arafat loyalists assassinated Abu 'Ali Shahin, who was considered responsible for al-Ghul's assassination.¹¹⁵

Despite the terrible conditions in the camps and internal fighting, the PLO withstood al-Amal's pressure. On 27 June, the Shi'is started to besiege the Palestinian camp of Burj al-Shimali, near Tyre,¹¹⁶ and soon afterwards fighting erupted also in the Sidon area,¹¹⁷ while the siege of the camps in West Beirut was still continuing. However, the siege of the camps proved futile. Al-Amal lost ground politically and suffered heavy casualties. A cease-fire agreement on 11 September was greeted enthusiastically by the suffering Palestinian population in the camps.¹¹⁸ The initiative to terminate the fighting was al-Amal's; Barri had started the move toward agreement in late August. Considering the close relationship between al-Amal and Syria, it was obvious that Barri would not have dared to make his proposals without the prior consent, if not active encouragement, of Syria. For the PLO, the agreement was a major achievement. Under its terms, the numerous al-Amal checkpoints were to be replaced with observer posts manned by representatives of the Palestinian popular committees which ran the camps, as well as by al-Amal, the Lebanese Army, and the Syrians. In return, the PLO was to pull back its fighters from the strategic hilltop positions east of Sidon, which it had captured at the height of the war. The PLO's command of the coastal highway to Beirut had been a thorn in al-Amal's flesh, effectively cutting direct links between the Shi'i community in the south and Beirut. A withdrawal from these positions seemed a small price for the PLO to pay for the lifting of the siege and other benefits. These included free passage to and from the Rashidiyya refugee camp near Tyre, and the reconstruction of buildings destroyed in the camps

war. It was also agreed to allow the return of all displaced persons, mainly Palestinians, to their homes, and to carry out a phased exchange of prisoners.¹¹⁹ The PLO's gains from the agreement were obvious. What, then, motivated Syria and al-Amal? Syria found that the camps war and continuing siege had created a bad impression in the Arab world. Sympathies lay with the Palestinians, the women and children as well as the PLO fighters. The suffering of the refugees also created a problem of divided loyalty among pro-Syrian Palestinian groups. At the same time, Syria did not want to see another of its proxies, al-Amal, exhaust its military strength on maintaining a siege that had failed to produce decisive results. Under the terms of the cease-fire, al-Amal would have its lifeline to Beirut reopened. It seemed that all sides in the camps war gained something from the agreement. The question was whether the newly achieved peace would last. But then the history of the civil war was one of unholy alliance forged for expediency.

THE BATTLE FOR WEST BEIRUT

For some years, there was one such alliance between al-Amal and the Druzes. Their political and military cooperation was remarkably solid for Lebanon. Nonetheless, problems arose after al-Amal and the Druzes took over West Beirut in February 1984 (see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 551–52). Tension was caused by petty incidents, such as the tearing down of political posters, and by disputes over the control of areas and streets where roadblocks were a source of income. Intermittent fighting between the two sides started in the second half of 1985 (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 545) and continued during 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 484–85). During 1987, these clashes were part of a wider confrontation between al-Amal and leftist forces in West Beirut. While both al-Amal and the leftists allied themselves with Syria, the former resented the growing power of al-Amal and wanted to cut it down to size in West Beirut, before it became too formidable to deal with. In February, all these tensions erupted when al-Amal was confronted by a leftist coalition led by the Druzes, the LCP, the Syrian Social Nationalist Party (SSNP) and other leftist groups. By 19 February, the fierce fighting had claimed the lives of 150 people; hundreds more were injured. Al-Amal was dealt severe blows although the Shi'i-dominated 63rd Battalion of the Sixth Brigade of Lebanon's Army fought on its side.¹²⁰

Once again, the Druzes gave proof of their traditional military skills and superior motivation. As the fighting continued, the greatest losers were clearly the Syrians, because all the militias involved were its allies. Al-Amal, Syria's main backer in Lebanon, was defeated, and the continued fighting suggested that Damascus was unable to pacify Lebanon. After Syria lost face, it decided to intervene in the fighting, reportedly in an attempt to improve relations with the US and West European countries by working to release foreign nationals held hostage in West and South Beirut¹²¹ (see above). On 21 February, Lebanese Muslim and Druze leaders met with Asad in Damascus and issued a joint statement calling on "fraternal Syria" to intervene in West Beirut.¹²² A day later, a large Syrian force (see chapter on Syria) moved into West Beirut. The immediate effect was to rescue al-Amal. The big question was whether Syria would succeed in restoring law and order. During the rest of the year, it became clear that its success was not complete, although a large measure of peace and quiet was preserved in the shattered city (the problems between the Syrians, the Druzes, and Hizballah in West Beirut are described below).

THE FIGHTING IN SOUTH LEBANON

The situation in South Lebanon in 1987 was as volatile as in 1986. Unifil, Israel, the SLA, the rival Shi'i organizations, and other Lebanese and Palestinian factions were all directly involved in the struggle over that territory. This struggle was closely monitored by other actors in Lebanon, mainly Syria. The war was fought on the ground, in the air, and at sea. The SLA was under particular pressure. On 5 January, four SLA soldiers were killed by a roadside bomb.¹²³ During the rest of January and early February, 40 Hizballah men were killed in futile attempts to attack SLA positions.¹²⁴ On 27 February, the SLA killed three fighters of the the Sunni militia in Sidon.¹²⁵ On 31 May, 150 Hizballah fighters attacked three SLA positions near Jizzin. The SLA lost five men and Hizballah eight.¹²⁶ On 4 July, the SLA killed two terrorists, members of the Syrian-dominated al-Sa'iqa organization. The slain terrorists were on their way to northern Israel. Leaflets they carried indicated that they had been ordered to conduct a hostage-taking operation.¹²⁷ Another terrorist who belonged to this group was caught by al-Amal.¹²⁸ On 28 October, five terrorists were killed by SLA troops operating outside the perimeter of the security zone in South Lebanon.¹²⁹ On 4 November, the SLA suffered a major blow, when one of its positions was occupied by Hizballah men, who were subsequently expelled by Israeli troops.¹³⁰ Following this defeat, the SLA's commander, Gen. Lahad, dismissed some of the officers and soldiers who had participated in the battle.¹³¹ On 5 December, the SLA suffered another blow when it lost three fighters in a battle with Hizballah in the Jizzin area. The latter lost seven men.¹³² The SLA was also involved in clashes with Unifil. On 4 October, a Nepalese soldier was killed by SLA men.¹³³ On 14 October, the SLA and the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) evacuated one of their positions near the Shi'i villages of Ya'atar and Kafra, in an area held by the Irish battalion of Unifil, following many clashes between the SLA and the Irish.¹³⁴

The overall performance of Lahad's SLA was not considered totally ineffective by the Israelis, who calculated they would have to increase their own involvement in the security zone if the SLA collapsed. The training period of SLA troops was extended from four to eight months.¹³⁵ A new port was opened in al-Naqura, and with it came an improved economic situation in the security zone,¹³⁶ in clear contrast to the depressing economic reality in the rest of Lebanon (see below). Old Soviet tanks were supplied by Israel to the SLA.¹³⁷ There was an intensive effort to draft non-Christians into the SLA and 300 Druzes and Shi'is were recruited.¹³⁸ According to unconfirmed reports, the SLA was also reinforced by 200 soldiers from the LF¹³⁹ and fighters from the militia of the National Liberal Party (NLP), which was dominated by the Chamoun family.¹⁴⁰ Toward the end of the year, Lahad was in East Beirut, where he met Ja'ja', Chamoun,¹⁴¹ Jumayyil,¹⁴² and Sfeir.¹⁴³ According to one report, Lahad declared that he would not hesitate to run for the presidency.¹⁴⁴

Clashes in the south were not confined to the SLA. The IDF was directly involved in fighting on numerous occasions against Hizballah, the PLO, and al-Amal. On 12 February, Israeli war planes attacked the Palestinian camp of al-Miyah wa Miyah near Sidon, killing one person.¹⁴⁵ On 10 April, two IDF troops were killed in an ambush in South Lebanon. The attackers belonged to Hizballah.¹⁴⁶ Following this attack, a wave of violence erupted. Fortified SLA positions were raided, Katyusha rockets were fired at the Galilee panhandle and the security zone, and an attempt was made to seize hostages in Israel and trade them for Palestinian prisoners. Some of

these attacks were conducted by PLO elements and were aimed at Israeli territory itself, not the security zone. Hizballah, which was also active, aimed primarily at the security zone.¹⁴⁷ According to some reports in the Israeli press, the PLO, mainly al-Fath, and Hizballah coordinated their activities.¹⁴⁸ The Israelis retaliated vigorously. On 17 April, the IDF drove back a Hizballah attack on a South Lebanese outpost and killed 18.¹⁴⁹ On 12 May, Israeli warplanes attacked Palestinian positions east of Sidon and killed 13.¹⁵⁰ Ten more Palestinians were killed in another air raid on the Sidon area,¹⁵¹ and 13 died on 4 July in an air raid on 'Amik, a village in the Bika'.¹⁵² On 10 August, Katyusha rockets were fired at Galilee. One salvo was shot by members of the SSNP and another by al-Amal,¹⁵³ which denied any involvement in the incident.¹⁵⁴ The tension between Israel and al-Amal arose from the latter's involvement in attacks on the security zone and its refusal to release an Israeli navigator it was holding. On various occasions, Barri publicly stated that he would be ready to swap the Israeli soldier for Palestinian and Lebanese prisoners held by Israel, but no deal had been struck by the end of the year.¹⁵⁵

On 30 July, Hizballah made reference to two Israeli soldiers held in its prison since February 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 492), but categorically refused to swap them for Lebanese prisoners in an SLA prison in South Lebanon.¹⁵⁶ Early in August it was reported that Israel had taken steps, including the blocking of the al-Amal-held port in Ouzai, to force the Shi'i organization to release the Israeli prisoners,¹⁵⁷ but to no avail. However, al-Amal was not Israel's chief target in South Lebanon. This was amply and painfully demonstrated on 5 September, when PLO positions near Sidon were bombarded. Forty-six people were killed, the highest toll in one air raid since August 1982, and 67 were injured.¹⁵⁸ According to an unverified report, four senior pro-'Arafat commanders were killed in the raid.¹⁵⁹ Another air raid, the 22nd in 1987, took place on 10 October. According to reports, the attack missed a large parade attended by 200 Palestinian and Lebanese fighters.¹⁶⁰ On 13 November, three Palestinians were killed by the IDF in a skirmish in the eastern sector of South Lebanon.¹⁶¹

The Israelis also had their failures. On 16 September, three IDF soldiers were killed and four wounded in what was termed the "fiercest clash in South Lebanon since the Israeli withdrawal in 1985."¹⁶² On 25 November, Israel suffered a devastating blow when a Palestinian terrorist in a hang glider crossed the security zone, landed in Israel, and single-handedly killed six soldiers near Kiryat Shmona¹⁶³ (see also chapter on Syria). This was a grim reminder to the Israelis that their enemies were engaged in a persistent, relentless effort to find new techniques with which to pursue the battle against them. Another reminder came on 12 December, when an Israeli officer was killed in a clash at sea with Hizballah men believed to have been trained by Iran. Four Hizballah men were also killed.¹⁶⁴

THE ECONOMIC DISASTER AND ITS RAMIFICATIONS

A well-known Western journalist covering Lebanon described its deteriorating economy as a "decline into [the] Third World."¹⁶⁵ The days of the "great festivities" in what was once called the "Switzerland of the Middle East" were over.

A UN survey team that visited Lebanon published a report containing some startling figures: the living expenses of a Lebanese family in July 1987 were four times

higher than in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 473–75). The minimum monthly salary in 1986 was \$28; in October 1987, it was \$14. A Lebanese family of four needed \$56 a month in order to survive,¹⁶⁶ but most families did not earn that. The consequences were very visible in Beirut, where the signs of collapse were everywhere. Shops were filthy, office carpets uncleaned, bank telexes unmaintained. The residents looked shabby and the streets were crowded with beggars.¹⁶⁷ The electricity supply in West Beirut was constantly interrupted, and in East Beirut there was electricity for only six hours a day.¹⁶⁸ Nature began to reclaim the ruined streets, which became carpeted with grass.¹⁶⁹ Hygienic conditions deteriorated sharply and diseases increased.¹⁷⁰ Floods caused major damage in the Bīqā' and Beirut regions.¹⁷¹ The economy needed a strong central government, which did not exist in 1987. Most of the air and sea ports were centers of illegal activity, beyond the control of the government. Consequently, there was no customs income from the huge volume of smuggled goods.¹⁷² However, the government still controlled the Beirut International Airport, which reopened on 10 May after being closed for 98 days; but higher insurance premiums, which added \$200 to the cost of a ticket, made the cost of air travel prohibitive to many Lebanese. Besides, criminals extorted money from departing passengers.¹⁷³ The vacuum created by the absence of a viable government was filled by the militias and by foreign interference. The militias operated the ports to provide a source of income, which they used to provide social services to the needy;¹⁷⁴ to acquire modern weapons, such as helicopters (in the case of al-Amal) and military vessels (in the case of the Druzes and the LF);¹⁷⁵ and to organize themselves into regular armies (in the case of al-Amal, the Druzes, and the LF).¹⁷⁶

Foreign money continued to pour in, but not from such a large number of sources as had been the case in previous years. Most of the money was from Iran, designed to strengthen Hizballah, the main protagonist of the status quo in Lebanon. Iran invested about \$5m. a month in Lebanon,¹⁷⁷ which was used to pay relatively high salaries to Hizballah members (\$100 a month),¹⁷⁸ and to establish health and education facilities and social services.¹⁷⁹ The Druze militia under Junblat decided to send hundreds of its members to Libya, in return for financial support from Mu'ammār Qadhafi's regime. Such was the severity of the economic situation (see also below on the Druze community).

There was also support from outside that was not intended to further destabilize the country. Unicef launched a vaccination campaign in Beirut on 21–24 September during which 350,000 children were inoculated, 70,000 more than the organizers had originally hoped. They were vaccinated against diphtheria, whooping cough, tetanus, measles, and polio. Unicef officials complained that the general chaos in the country hampered their relief efforts.¹⁸⁰ On 11 December, the US Senate recommended supplying 150,000 tons of wheat, worth \$30m., to Lebanon. However, difficulties arose when the American Agency for International Development proved reluctant to supply the wheat. The agency claimed that some of the wheat shipped to Lebanon was smuggled out immediately upon arrival.¹⁸¹

Against this background, the government also tried to do something. On 12 July, the Lebanese pound suffered a one-day record fall of 7.7%. Official trading in the pound was halted, and the value of the currency hit a record low of £L184 to the dollar.¹⁸² This collapse triggered a rare meeting of Christian and Muslim ministers, after which the following emergency measures were agreed:

(1) Treasury revenues would be enhanced; efforts would be made to enable the state to regain control over the ports and utilities, and close down illegal ports.

(2) The austerity policy would be stringently applied where public spending was concerned.

(3) Efforts would be made to reopen the crossing points to facilitate the movement of people and goods between the various areas.

(4) Social, housing, educational, health, and food services would be bolstered.¹⁸³

This was an unrealistic plan, mainly because it depended on cooperation between the government and the various militias. This required a political understanding that was out of the question, even in the almost desperate circumstances that prevailed during 1987. The government took action to cancel the subsidies for petrol. But it still had one amazing asset: its reserves of 9.2m. ounces of gold, worth about \$4 bn. at the end of the year. On top of that, it had currency reserves of \$500m., enough to cover the official value of imports for 25 months.¹⁸⁴ On 10 August, Acting Prime Minister Huss put forward a plan to support the currency (at perhaps £L50–£L60 to the dollar) by selling 20% of the gold reserves.¹⁸⁵ Acting Finance Minister Hashim opposed the plan. He argued that the currency would drop still further if any of the gold were sold, since what was lacking was not reserves but confidence.¹⁸⁶ It followed, therefore, that not even gold could buy confidence and force a political settlement.

The Lebanese masses, however, were desperate for any solution that would provide jobs, food, and proper housing. During the year, there were numerous occasions when Lebanese of all communities closed ranks and protested against the deteriorating economic situation. On 23 April, West and East Beirut were paralyzed by a general strike.¹⁸⁷ A nationwide strike took place on 23 July.¹⁸⁸ On 20 August, hundreds of Muslims and Christians demonstrated along the "green line" separating the two parts of Beirut.¹⁸⁹ Another food protest occurred on 27 August. This time, Lebanese troops fired into the air to stop protesters from storming into the Central Bank.¹⁹⁰ The demonstration spread to Sidon and Tripoli.¹⁹¹ There were further, huge demonstrations, strikes, and peace marches on 5 September,¹⁹² 22 September,¹⁹³ 15 October,¹⁹⁴ and 5–10 November.¹⁹⁵ The driving force behind the protests was a consociational institution, the General Confederation of Lebanese Trade Unions, which had assumed its present form in 1970. Membership of the confederation grew from 14,000 in 1950 to 55,000 in 1980, when it comprised 24% of the country's work force.¹⁹⁶ The chairman of the confederation in 1987 was Antoine Bishara.

THE SITUATION WITHIN THE POLITICAL COALITIONS AND THE MAIN COMMUNITIES

THE LEFTIST AND NATIONALIST PARTIES

Since the demise of the main coalition of leftist and nationalist parties, the Lebanese National Movement (LNM),¹⁹⁷ following the Israeli invasion in summer 1982 (see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 702–5, 706–7, 709–11), there were attempts to create a new such coalition. In 1987, another such attempt was made. On 23 July, nationalist, progressive parties announced the establishment of the Unification and Liberation Front "to cope with the demands of the coming phase in Lebanon." The following parties and organizations formed the new front: al-Amal; the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP);

the pro-Syrian Ba'th Party; the LCP; the popular Nasserite organization from Sidon; the Arab Democratic Party from Tripoli; and the SSNP. The program of the front focused on the following points: (a) unification of the nationalist areas as the first step in a greater plan to liberate and unify Lebanon; (b) absolute resistance to Israel's plans; and (c) support for the anti-'Arafat factions of the PLO.¹⁹⁸ The composition of the new front and its program indicated that it was another Syrian-led attempt to mold its allies in Lebanon into a solid and unified political and military front. However, friction between the LCP, the PSP, and al-Amal (see above), as well as within the SSNP (see below), caused splits in the new front.¹⁹⁹

Al-Amal leader, Barri, accused members of the front of assisting the PLO.²⁰⁰ Shaykh Hasan Khalid, the Sunni grand mufti, expressed concern that the new front would further weaken the position of the Sunnis in West Beirut.²⁰¹ 'Umar Karami, Rashid Karami's brother and political heir apparent, also had reservations about the new front²⁰² (on his activities in Tripoli, see below).

Huss, the acting premier and perhaps the senior Sunni leader in the country, refused to head the new front.²⁰³ Early in September, it was reported that Libya was behind an attempt to revive the old LNM and include in it factions hostile to Syria, such as the Independent Nasserites under Ibrahim Qulaylat, and the Communist Labor Organization under Muhsin Ibrahim.²⁰⁴ The Unification and Liberation Front had virtually ceased to exist by the end of the year, when 'Asim Qansuh, the general secretary of the pro-Syrian Ba'th Party, withdrew from the front.²⁰⁵ This meant that Syria had lost interest in it.

One of the most militantly leftist, pro-Syrian parties, the SSNP, was engaged in bitter fratricidal fighting during the year. On 25 January, some leaders of the party — Jubran Juraysh, Dawud Baz, and Marwan Faris — established a new leadership that was considered independent, i.e., less pro-Ba'thi. The pro-Syrian wing was led by Isam Mahayri.²⁰⁶

The driving force behind the anti-Syrian move was 'In'am R'ad, and the split occurred after a long series of violent clashes between the two wings in 1986, during which 10 were killed.²⁰⁷ Violent clashes continued in 1987. Three party officials had been murdered by early September.²⁰⁸ Then large-scale fighting between the two wings erupted in the Kurah region, traditionally the main stronghold of the SSNP.

The Mahayri wing received indirect Syrian support; altogether, eight were killed and 22 were wounded.²⁰⁹ Another four SSNP members had been killed by the end of the year.²¹⁰ The ongoing fighting in the SSNP, as well as the failure of the Unification and Liberation Front, highlighted Syria's inability to forge a coherent leftist and nationalist movement in Lebanon.

POLITICS IN THE SHI'I COMMUNITY — AL-AMAL AND ITS PROBLEMS

Towards the beginning of the year, al-Amal's internal position was shaky. Barri was in Damascus, in self-imposed exile. Dawud Dawud, Mahmud Faqi, Hasan Hashim, 'Aql Hamiyya, and Mustafa Dirani were all in control of their own factions in the various Shi'i regions. In the background was the SISC and the official Shi'i religious establishment (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 481–82). Things became worse in al-Amal, as a result of its inability to defeat the PLO in the camps war, its defeat in West Beirut, its heavy reliance on Syria (see above), and the growing challenge of Hizballah (see below).

Early in March, tensions came to a head when Hasan Hashim and his followers staged a coup against Barri's leadership. Hashim was formerly chairman of al-Amal's Executive Committee. On 1 March, his loyalists captured al-Amal's positions in Tyre and Zifta in South Lebanon. Al-Amal centers in the Nabatiyya region were still under the control of Mahmud Faqi. Hashim issued a statement in which he argued that his home village of Marwaniyya had been attacked by al-Amal's faithful. Later in the day, Hashim declared the establishment of a "corrective movement" in al-Amal, whose Beirut leadership charged that Hashim was trying to "spread chaos."²¹¹ According to an unverified report, Dawud left the Tyre area 24 hours before the uprising started, for talks in Damascus.²¹² Dawud's associate in the south, Faqi, publicly criticized the uprising.²¹³ Barri himself hurried back to Beirut on 2 March.²¹⁴ Within a few days, the uprising was over.

On 5 March, Hashim issued a statement explaining the motives behind the uprising. He denied accusations that foreign incitement had prompted the actions he and his supporters had taken. He accused al-Amal's leadership of corruption.²¹⁵ On 6 March al-Amal's Central Organizational Bureau announced the expulsion of Hashim and his supporters from the movement.²¹⁶ Hashim failed because he did not manage to mobilize the support of Barri's other rivals, including Dawud, Husayni (the Speaker of the CD), Din (the deputy chairman of the SISC), and the Shi'i chief mufti, 'Abd al-Amir Kabalan. The Syrians resented his movement, and the Shi'is in the south were not forthcoming either. Following the failure of the Hashim uprising, al-Amal dispatched 20 tanks to the south, to reinforce its presence there,²¹⁷ and a new provisional command for South Lebanon was established, chaired by al-Hajj 'Atif 'Awn. Both Faqi and Dawud retained their membership in al-Amal's Central Political Bureau.²¹⁸ However, the two continued to be a thorn in Barri's flesh. On 7 March, Faqi announced his resignation from al-Amal and criticized Barri's handling of the camps war with the PLO and the situation in the south.²¹⁹ Dawud Dawud, for his part, made it clear that he supported reforms in al-Amal but objected to an armed rebellion like Hashim's; and, contrary to rumors in Lebanon regarding his connections with Israel (he is nicknamed "David-David"), maintained that he was not against armed incursions into Israeli territory.²²⁰ The next internal rift in al-Amal involved 'Aql Hamiyya, its chief military officer. He objected to new appointments in the movement in Beirut, which meant that Barri's position was being consolidated at his expense. Hamiyya was held responsible by other factions in the organization for its military failures. Besides, the fact that he was from the Biqu'a' alienated the southern wing in al-Amal.²²¹ In June, Hamiyya's conflict with al-Amal became violent, and its regional character was underlined in clashes between Hamiyya's men and the big clan from the Biqu'a', the Miqdadis, on the one hand, and remaining al-Amal factions, mainly southerners, on the other.²²²

Late in November, Hamiyya tendered his resignation from al-Amal, a step which sparked another round of clashes between Biqu'a'wis and southerners.²²³ Soon afterwards, al-Amal formally expelled 'Aql Hamiyya from the movement.²²⁴ But before that, Barri nominated Dawud to be the chairman of the Executive Committee, and made Faqi, who retracted his resignation, chairman of the Organizational Bureau.²²⁵ This was an apparent bid to win the support of the southern wing of the movement, which was being challenged by Hamiyya and Hashim.

While grappling with internal rifts, Barri also needed the support of the southerners

in his struggle against Hizballah's influence in South Lebanon. The Amal-Hizballah struggle was political and ideological; above all, it focused on control over the Shi'i community. Late in July, al-Amal successfully prevented a penetration by Hizballah's men into Tyre. Over 2,500 Hizballah supporters, who intended to march in Tyre, were turned back at roadblocks by over 3,000 al-Amal men, who were mobilized in a show of force.²²⁶ Soon afterward, al-Amal organized huge rallies in the south. On 31 August, over 400,000 Shi'is jammed the streets of Tyre in a massive show of support for al-Amal.²²⁷

During the demonstrations in the south, Barri implicitly attacked Iran and Hizballah's leadership. He said it was not enough "to put on a turban, like a religious man, so as to become a theologian." Barri also charged that Iran was maintaining diplomatic relations with Libya despite the latter's involvement in the disappearance of Imam Musa al-Sadr in August 1978. Some Hizballah clergymen, such as Fadlallah and Shaykh Subhi Tufayli, responded sharply to Barri's contentions.²²⁸ Late in December, al-Amal men besieged Fadlallah's house for three days, but no violence was reported.²²⁹ Nevertheless, a confrontation between al-Amal and Hizballah was on the cards. It became evident during 1987 that Hizballah was gearing itself for a showdown with al-Amal and had the full backing of Iran.

HIZBALLAH AND THE DRIVE FOR AN ISLAMIC STATE

Hizballah, well financed and politically and militarily backed by Iran, continued its relentless drive to hegemonize the Shi'i community before doing the same with the Lebanese Republic. This drive was not without its built-in constraints. Hizballah had to grapple with difficulties deriving from al-Amal's determination to dominate the Shi'is (see above). Beside the entry of Syrian forces into West Beirut in February and its results, the "Basta incident" highlighted Syria's resolve not to allow al-Amal to disintegrate, as well as Damascus's growing concern over Hizballah, and Iran's increasing influence in Lebanon. Indeed, Hizballah's inroads among the Shi'is of Lebanon were attributable, first and foremost, to strong Iranian backing. Much of Hizballah's military training was carried out in two Iranian-run camps near Ba'albak, 80 km. northeast of Beirut. There, and in other parts of the country, Hizballah's men had their well disciplined parades, which recalled Iran's goose-stepping troops. Parades were held on 22 May, in memory of "Jerusalem Day" and the 39th anniversary of the establishment of Israel, in South Beirut, Sidon, Tyre, and Ba'albak. The Ba'albak march was particularly significant because Hizballah's military units participated. Cannons, mortars, armored vehicles, and anti-tank and antiaircraft missiles were on display.²³⁰ The marches demonstrated Hizballah's anti-Israel stand, which was not merely rhetorical, enacted against the Israeli-held security zone (see above). Its operations revealed a level of planning and proficiency that ultimately could prove more threatening to Israel than the suicide car-bomb attempts and mass frontal assaults on strongholds that had characterized Hizballah's activities in the past. An analysis of the attacks on the security zone made it clear that Hizballah had revamped its military arm and improved its strike capabilities. Its tactics in some attacks seemed to indicate a new overall strategy, combining guerrilla-style warfare with classic military precepts. This was undoubtedly largely due to Iranian assistance and advice. However, the adoption of these new methods was not without its risks to Hizballah's existence. By adopting rational methods instead of the volatile surprises

of the past, Hizballah became more established, and this could have made it easier for Israel to anticipate its actions. Nonetheless, Hizballah continued to consolidate its military power and formed a naval unit,²³¹ while maintaining its policy of high-profile terrorism, of kidnapping Westerners, and setting out to assassinate prominent Lebanese public figures (see above).

All this could not have developed without massive Iranian financial support. The hilltop Biqa' Valley town of Mashgara provided a perfect illustration of this. Land and buildings there were purchased by Hizballah and the Iranians, and only a few Christian families were left in what was once a town of 14,000 with a Christian majority. The Iranians also established a "martyrs' foundation" with branches in most Muslim areas of Lebanon. It spent about \$12,000 a month on education and financing visits to holy cities in Iran.²³² Tehran also gave funds to 70,000 Muslim Lebanese students who abided by the tenets of Islam, and to women who wore the veil.²³³ Backed by Iranian money, Hizballah established a small television station in the Biqa' region.²³⁴ Hizballah also profited from the flourishing drug trade in Lebanon in general and in the Biqa' in particular.²³⁵ During the year, Hizballah organized delegations of Lebanese Muslim clergy clerics, both Sunni and Shi'i, to visit Tehran.²³⁶ Late in June, the Iranians convened the second congress on the *haji*, entitled "*Haji* and Muslim issues."²³⁷ One Muslim issue was the death sentence passed in Tunisia against Islamic fundamentalists there. Hizballah held mass demonstrations against the Tunisian regime and threatened to bring it down.²³⁸ On various occasions, Hizballah demonstrated its concept of "Islamic justice" in Lebanon. Eleven "spies" were executed for their alleged collaboration in the killing of innocent Muslims in South Beirut. On 15 October, Hizballah announced that it had "executed" a Lebanese teenager whom it accused of murdering a money changer in a village in the Biqa' Valley.²³⁹ The theological justification for Hizballah's actions in 1987 was provided by a group of senior Shi'i clergy, much the same as it had been in previous years. Prominent among these clergymen was Fadlallah.²⁴⁰ However, toward the end of the year, there was an unconfirmed report that Fadlallah had lost favor with the Iranians who made Tufayli Hizballah's chief spiritual leader.²⁴¹ (For more on Tufayli, see *MECS* 1986, p. 486).

THE SUNNI COMMUNITY

In 1987, as in 1986, the Sunnis were not in control of their traditional strongholds — Sidon, West Beirut, and Tripoli (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 489–91). But the community's situation was worse in 1987, mainly because of the repercussions of the murder of Rashid Karami, the Sunni prime minister and Tripoli's chief notable (see above). Karami's brother, 'Umar, was elected by the powerful Karami clan to replace the deceased as leader of the family.²⁴² 'Umar Karami refused to become prime minister.²⁴³ He was said to have made preparations to establish a Karami-led militia in Tripoli,²⁴⁴ but he was not considered a suitable substitute for his brother, mainly because he lacked leadership qualities. Ahmad Karami, the director of Tripoli's port, was also a contender for the leadership of the family and the city.²⁴⁵ Another power broker in Tripoli was Sa'id Sha'ban, the leader of the Islamic *Tawahid* Movement (on his past activities, see chapters on Lebanon in previous volumes of *MECS*). Sha'ban's organization was believed to have become the strongest faction in Tripoli after Karami's assassination.²⁴⁶ For that reason, Syria monitored Sha'ban's activities very closely, especially since he continued to pursue his close ties with Iran, which he

visited towards the end of the year.²⁴⁷ Kan'an Naji, a former military official of Sha'ban's organization, was believed to be the leader of the Liberation Battalion that carried out operations against the Syrians in West Beirut and Tripoli.²⁴⁸ In West Beirut, the Murabitun (Independent Nasserites) under Ibrahim Qulaylat, also resumed their anti-Syrian and anti-Amal activities. The Murabitun declared their decisions to unify with Egypt's Nasserite Revolution under the leadership of Khalid Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir.²⁴⁹ (For details of his activities, see chapter on Egypt.) A prominent West Beirut leader, Sa'ib Salam, remained in self-imposed exile in Switzerland.²⁵⁰ Another senior Sunni leader, Sulayman al-'Ali, a five-time deputy from 'Akkar and the chief Sunni leader there, died of natural causes on 28 September.²⁵¹ Sidon's politics continued to be dominated by the Shi'i-Palestinian struggle and the proximity of the city to the Israeli-held security zone (see above).

THE DRUZE COMMUNITY

As in previous years the Druze community at large, and Junblat in particular, had to deal with the problem of maintaining control over the Druze canton in the region southeast of Beirut. They had limited human and economic resources, and had to contend with opposition from Syria and the Shi'is (on the Druze community during 1986, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 487–88). Tension between the Druzes and al-Amal erupted in February in the battle over West Beirut, which was decided in favor of the Druzes.

As a result, Syria intervened in West Beirut (see above). From the Druze point of view, the significance of this intervention was that Syria could threaten the Druze areas in the Shuf from the east, south, and west. Junblat was forced, therefore, to make a supreme effort not to get into a confrontation with Syria, while maintaining a large measure of his autonomy in the Shuf. As in the previous year, there was no direct armed confrontation between Junblat's militia and the Syrians. But there were repeated clashes between the Druzes and the pro-Syrian wing of the SSNP²⁵² (the Mahayri wing, see above). Following Syria's entry into West Beirut, there were bomb attacks against Syrian targets there which were attributed to Abu Haytham (Jamal Karrara), a senior official in Junblat's militia. The latter claimed to have no knowledge of the men's activities and handed him over to the Syrians, along with 10 others. It was also reported that the Druzes executed some of Abu Haytham's accomplices.²⁵³ According to unofficial reports, Junblat suspected that Abu Haytham had connections with the LF, the Lebanese Army's Intelligence, the Israeli Mossad, 'Arafat's PLO, and Islamic groups. Though these elements were hostile to each other, Junblat believed they all had an interest in causing trouble between him and Syria.²⁵⁴ Toward the end of the year there was an unconfirmed report that Abu Haytham had managed to escape from a Syrian prison.²⁵⁵ While Junblat's relations with Syria remained tense during 1987, he made efforts to consolidate his relations with the USSR and the LCP. He did this because he was reluctant to depend solely on Syria for arms and because he believed that good relations with the USSR would prevent a Syrian onslaught against him. Early in February, Junblat allowed the LCP to hold its fifth congress in the Druze town of Ba'qlin in the heart of the Shuf. Junblat also addressed the congress.²⁵⁶ Afterward it was reported that the LCP had been allowed by Junblat to establish training camps in Druze-controlled areas.²⁵⁷ Junblat visited Moscow in April, where his hosts told him they were ready to extend financial aid to the Druzes,²⁵⁸ and to give them more arms, notably 60 T-54 tanks.²⁵⁹ According to an unverified report, Junblat

rewarded his Soviet friends by allowing them to install a radar station on top of Jabal Baruk, a mountain in the eastern sector of the Shuf.²⁶⁰ Junblat's international diplomacy took him also to England,²⁶¹ France, Switzerland,²⁶² and Italy where he met with the pope.²⁶³ In June Junblat was in Algeria, where he discussed possible Algerian mediation between himself and Syria.²⁶⁴ In September, the Druze leader made a significant move when he organized the dispatch of about 900 fighters to Libya in return for financial and military aid from Qadhdhafi's regime. Junblat's official explanation was that he did it "in the name of Arabism and Islam," to support Libya in its struggle against Chad. Members of the LCP were included in the delegation.²⁶⁵ According to an unconfirmed report, every Druze fighter was promised a monthly salary of \$600–\$800, and generous financial support was to be given to the PSP.²⁶⁶ A source close to al-Amal said most of the fighters sent by Junblat were Sunnis and not Druzes,²⁶⁷ who were known to be reluctant to leave their home turf.

At the end of October, it was reported that the PSP decided to recall most of the fighters who had been sent to Libya, in preparation for a possible military confrontation in Lebanon itself.²⁶⁸

During the year, Junblat continued to pursue his political dialogue with the Maronite Chamoun family (for details of the dialogue in 1986, see *MECS* 1986, p. 488). On 9 August, Junblat delivered a eulogy at Camille Chamoun's funeral at Dayr al-Qamar.²⁶⁹ Junblat met regularly with Danny Chamoun during the year,²⁷⁰ but did not declare his support for Chamoun as a presidential candidate. Amid all this diplomatic activity, Junblat found time, too, to make changes in his party, the PSP. On 15 August, he convened an emergency general congress of the PSP, which was preceded by the resignation of the number two man in the party, Anwar Fatayri. The congress strengthened Junblat's hold over the party, mainly through the election of his devoted supporters to its Central Committee, Advisory Council, and Politburo.²⁷¹

THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY — THE TURMOIL CONTINUES

Amid the general chaos, economic collapse, and disintegration of the country, Christian enclaves east and north of Beirut retained some measure of internal organization, law and order. Even the economic situation in these enclaves, covering one fifth of Lebanon's territory, was better than in other parts of the country. Stylish shops, cafes, restaurants, and cinemas still existed in the Christian areas, where the roads were also in relatively good condition. In sharp contrast to this was the situation in the Muslim areas, where anarchy, poverty, and a rigid religious atmosphere prevailed. Nonetheless, it was not true to say that peace and prosperity reigned in the Christian area. Far from it. But life in the Christian areas in 1987 was still tolerable, although a brutal power struggle for control of these areas continued to rage. The main participants in this power struggle were the LF; President Jumayyil; the forces loyal to Hubayka and Fu'ad Abu Nadir, two former commanders of the LF; the Phalangist Party; the supporters of former presidents Chamoun and Faranjiyya; and the Maronite Church.

THE LEBANESE FORCES AND THEIR ADVERSARIES

Ja'ja' and the LF under his command continued to play a focal part in the struggle and engaged also in diplomatic activity. During the year there were repeated reports of an improvement in relations between the LF and Israel. According to an unconfirmed report, Ja'ja' visited Israel in February.²⁷² He himself confirmed that relations between

Israel and the LF had improved, and that he encouraged Christian youngsters from his native area of Bishari to join the SLA.²⁷³ Toward the end of the year, there was an unconfirmed report that Ja'ja' had received emergency medical treatment in Israel and returned to Beirut after three days.²⁷⁴

During the year, there were also reports of LF contacts with the US. American arms arrived in East Beirut,²⁷⁵ and a personal envoy of Ja'ja's, Emille Rahmah, visited the US and met with senior officials dealing with Lebanese affairs.²⁷⁶ There was also an unconfirmed report that the LF was pursuing its contacts with the PLO (on these contacts in 1986, see *MECS* 1986, p. 466), and that Bakraduni, Ja'ja's deputy in the LF, had met 'Arafat in Baghdad.²⁷⁷ The purpose of all these contacts was to establish Ja'ja' as a possible presidential candidate. However, before being able to stake a claim to the national leadership, he had to assert his leadership of the LF and the Maronite community. The LF was known for its widespread lack of discipline and its armed clashes between rival factions,²⁷⁸ which necessitated frequent personnel changes in its top echelons. The LF took steps to prevent the emigration of Christian youths from East Beirut,²⁷⁹ and to improve the economic situation in its areas. For that purpose it established the "Institution of Social Solidarity," in order to help the needy.²⁸⁰ The LF also encouraged the adoption of poor Christian families in Lebanon by rich Lebanese abroad.²⁸¹ When the LF increased tuition fees in East Beirut, the move triggered violent student demonstrations in the Christian areas.²⁸² Ja'ja's main problem, though, was the military challenge presented by some of the LF's adversaries.

Hubayka's wing of the LF remained a bitter enemy of Ja'ja's. In 1987 there was no large-scale confrontation as there had been the previous year between the two wings, which confined themselves to terrorism (see above; on the 1986 fighting, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 475-77). However, a constant atmosphere of tension prevailed in East Beirut, because of repeated reports of a possible attack by Hubayka's men.²⁸³ The nervousness was intensified by reports of the close relationship between Hubayka and another avowed enemy of the LF, former president Faranjiyya, and of the mass drafting of Maronites from North Lebanon into Hubayka's militia.²⁸⁴

Unlike the tension between Ja'ja' and Hubayka, that between the commander of the LF and Jumayyil erupted into frequent violent clashes. The combatants were the LF and the north Matn militia, known as "Force 75," which was loyal to Jumayyil and secretly helped by elements in the Lebanese Army. Late in January, three members of the Presidential Guard were murdered by the LF, following an incident involving the president's daughter.²⁸⁵ Another clash occurred late in March, when Ja'ja's men tried to take over a government installation in the Christian suburb of Dikuwana in East Beirut, an area known to be a Jumayyil stronghold. The president placed large parts of the Army on alert, and the LF was forced to evacuate the installation.²⁸⁶ Other clashes took place in June,²⁸⁷ August,²⁸⁸ and late September, when the 96th Battalion of the Army was involved in a clash with the LF.²⁸⁹ The role of the Army was particularly significant in light of the fact that Gen. 'Awn was a possible presidential candidate (see above). On 11 July, 'Awn dismissed the commander of the 5th Brigade, which was stationed in East Beirut and considered pro-Ja'ja'.²⁹⁰ Toward the end of the year it was reported that Jumayyil's own Matn forces had received a shipment of tanks, apparently from the official Lebanese Army.²⁹¹ During the year there were also clashes between the LF and forces loyal to Abu Nadir, a former commander of the LF and a nephew of Jumayyil's whose stronghold was in Brumanna; while he was

pro-Jumayyil, Abu Nadir tried to retain his own power base (for details of his past activities, *MECS* 1986, pp. 475–76). Clashes between his forces and Ja'ja's took place on 15 February.²⁹² There were later occasions when a collision between the two forces appeared imminent but did not materialize. Abu Nadir continued to retain control over 300 men.²⁹³ Ja'ja' also had to grapple with the increasing political role of the Maronite patriarch, Sfeir, especially in light of the impending presidential elections (see above). In March, the patriarch received a letter from the pope, who demanded the dismantling of the Maronite militias and urged the beginning of a political dialogue.²⁹⁴ Sfeir prepared his own plan for a Lebanese solution in which he emphasized the need for comprehensive social and political reforms, as well as the importance of preserving the country's unity.²⁹⁵ This was not exactly Ja'ja's way of addressing the Lebanese crisis. Overall, though, Ja'ja' remained the most powerful figure in the Maronite community. This did not mean that he could dictate his terms to the other Maronite power brokers, but did mean that the other factions were weaker than the LF. The crisis that beset the Phalangist Party, and the death of Camille Chamoun, clearly underlined this point.

SPLIT IN THE PHALANGIST PARTY

Late in November 1986 the Phalangist Party held its 18th conference, commemorating its silver jubilee. This was supposed to be a big celebration, a rallying point for the party that claimed to be the Lebanese Christians' hope for a better future. But the Christian population reacted with stark indifference (see *MECS* 1986, p. 479). The party was clearly at a low ebb, beset by internal rifts between supporters of its nominal leader (George Sa'ada) and of Jumayyil (who aspired to be the actual, though informal, leader), and challenged from the outside by the LF. The turmoil came into the open during 1987. On 16 February, the supreme institutions of the party, the Politburo and the Central Council, approved internal organizational reforms; as a result some of Jumayyil's supporters lost their posts. Two of them, the editor of the party organ (*al-'Aman*), Joseph Abu Khalil, and Minister Joseph al-Hashim (see above), protested, and Sa'ada made it clear that he was ready for a showdown.²⁹⁶ According to one report, Jumayyil's supporters had a majority in the Politburo.²⁹⁷ A committee composed of eight senior Phalangists, including Ja'ja' and Bakraduni, was formed to monitor party affairs until a final settlement was achieved. This was seen as another erosion of Sa'ada's authority as chairman of the party.²⁹⁸ The crisis sharpened when Jumayyil's men threatened that the Lebanese Army would be deployed in East Beirut, thus ensuring Jumayyil's supreme position among the Christians. There were also reports of LF plans to establish alternative organizations to some of the Phalangists' own organizations.²⁹⁹ Late in September, the crisis came to a head when two close allies of Jumayyil resigned. The move was an apparent protest against the growing influence of the LF in the party. The two were Charles Dahdah, the party's general secretary, and Joseph Abu Khalil.³⁰⁰ Sa'ada acted swiftly and nominated a new general secretary, Munir al-Hajj.³⁰¹ But Jumayyil's supporters also acted quickly. Six more of them resigned their party posts and the party chapter of north Matn withdrew its recognition of Sa'ada as party leader.³⁰² Sa'ada did not lose his nerve; he made new appointments in the party, and that triggered new resignations — among them those of Abu Nadir (see above), and George 'Umayrah the deputy leader.³⁰³ Jumayyil's supporters all but made the split formal when they formed a new body, the

"Phalangist Salvation Authority." Their communiqué blamed Sa'ada for running the party along dictatorial lines and severely criticized the role of the LF.³⁰⁴

THE DEATH OF CAMILLE CHAMOUN

Not every Lebanese politician of the stature of Camille Chamoun had the privilege of dying of natural causes at the age of 87. The fact that a politician of Chamoun's caliber died that way was another remarkable element in an altogether remarkable and dramatic career. Chamoun died of a heart attack at al-Rum Hospital on 7 August.³⁰⁵ He had been born on 3 April 1900 in the Shuf, into a distinguished Maronite family. He received a French education at the law school of the Jesuit University of St. Joseph. However, since he was first elected to the CD in 1934, Chamoun was anti-French and affiliated himself with the Maronite faction led by Shaykh Bishara al-Khuri. He was made interior minister in the first independent Lebanese Government in 1943, then Lebanon's minister to London, and, in 1946, Lebanon's delegate to the UN. In 1952 he was elected president, and his term was marked by swift and important sociopolitical changes in the country, coupled with the advance of Nasserite pan-Arabism, which had a profound impact on the Lebanese polity. In 1958, the first Lebanese civil war of the century broke out; it ended only when Chamoun promised not to run again for the presidency and the US sent in its Marines.

In the ensuing years, Camille Chamoun built his power base through a network of political alliances with notables from different communities and through his own party, the NLP. After the beginning of the civil war in 1975, Chamoun regained much of his popularity among the Christians, and remained a living reminder of the Maronite ethos of a unified, Christian-dominated, and pro-Western Lebanon. Although his party and militia suffered setbacks, mainly at the hands of the Phalangist Party and the LF under Bashir Jumayyil, Chamoun remained the chairman of the Lebanese Front (the umbrella organization of the main Christian parties). He was also the undisputed leader of the NLP and its finance minister.³⁰⁶ Chamoun's death left a vacuum in the Maronite community at large, and in the NLP in particular. Danny Chamoun was his father's nominal successor in the NLP. But could he really succeed the great man? Could any of the other contenders to the leadership of the Christian camp ever match Chamoun?

Clearly, Chamoun's death was a symbolic and painful reminder of the decline of the Christians of Lebanon.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here. The source designation "Turkish press" refers to items carried by all major Turkish newspapers of the date(s) given.

1. VoL, 4 May — DR, 5 May 1987.
2. VoL, 1 June — DR, 2 June 1987.
3. R. Beirut, 8 August — DR, 10 August 1987.
4. R. Beirut, 26 November — DR, 27 November 1987.

5. R. Beirut, 17 March 1987.
6. R. Beirut, 5 June — DR, 8 June 1987.
7. VoL, 5 June 1987.
8. Voice of National Resistance, 5 June — DR, 8 June 1987.
9. *Al-Nahar*, 7 June 1987.
10. VoL, 16 June 1987.
11. On Hammud's withdrawal, VoL, 18 October — DR, 19 October 1987; on Husayni's reelection, R. Beirut, 20 October — DR, 22 October 1987.
12. R. Beirut, 1 December — DR, 2 December 1987.
13. *Al-Nahar*, 5 October 1987.
14. Voice of Free Lebanon, 21 May — DR, 15 May 1987. On the Cairo agreement, see I. Rabinovich and H. Zamir, *War and Crisis in Lebanon 1975–1981* (Tel Aviv: Shiloah Institute for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University, 1982), pp. 19–21, 187–89.
15. VoL, 17 April 1987.
16. Danny Chamoun's interview in *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, quoted in *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 6 October 1987.
17. *Al-Nahar*, 2 October 1987.
18. *Al-Anwar*, 8 December 1987.
19. Michel Sassin's statement, *al-Safir*, 29 November 1987.
20. *Al-Shira'*, 7 September, 12 October 1987.
21. *Al-Shira'*, 21 September 1987.
22. *Al-Shira'*, 31 August 1987.
23. See *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 15 June 1987; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 6 October 1987 (respectively).
24. *Al-Anwar*, 16 March 1987 (on the Algiers visit); *Kull al-'Arab*, 14 October 1987 (on the other visits).
25. R. Monte Carlo, 18 December — DR, 22 December 1987.
26. *Al-Shira'*, 2 November 1987.
27. Voice of Free Lebanon, 29 October, 30 November — DR, 29 October, 2 December 1987; VoL, 20 December — DR, 22 December 1987.
28. *Al-Nahar*, 3 November; *al-Qabas International*, 5 November 1987.
29. VoL, 5 November — DR, 5 November 1987.
30. VoL, 28 January 1987.
31. Voice of National Resistance, 2 March — DR, 3 March 1987; Voice of the Mountain, 2 March — DR, 3 March 1987 (respectively).
32. VoL, 15 November 1987.
33. R. Beirut, 3 September 1987.
34. For the text of his speech, see R. Beirut, 24 September — DR, 24 September 1987.
35. Voice of the People, 8 February — DR, 10 February 1987; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 8 February 1987.
36. *Al-Nahar*, 14 February 1987.
37. *Al-Nahar*, 16 February 1987.
38. *Al-Qabas International*, 20 February 1987.
39. VoL, 2 October — DR, 5 October 1987.
40. R. Beirut, 26 October 1987.
41. R. Beirut, 26 October 1987.
42. VoL, 26 October — DR, 27 October 1987.
43. *Al-Nahar*, 26 November 1987.
44. R. Beirut, 30 September — DR, 30 September 1987.
45. VoL, 30 September — DR, 1 October 1987.
46. Voice of Free Lebanon, 7 January — DR, 7 January 1987; Voice of National Resistance, 8 January 1987 (respectively).
47. Voice of the Homeland, 14 January 1987.
48. *Al-Liwa'*, Beirut, 12 February 1987.
49. VoL, Voice of National Resistance, *al-Nahar*, 14, 15, 18 March 1987 (respectively).
50. Voice of National Resistance, 16 October — DR, 16 October 1987; *al-Shira'*, 2 November 1987.

51. *Al-Masira*, 26 September; *al-Shira'*, 7 December 1987 (respectively).
52. MENA, 16 December — DR, 16 December 1987.
53. R. Beirut, Voice of the Homeland, Voice of the People, 9 May 1987.
54. R. Beirut, 5 September — DR, 8 September; *al-Safir*, 28 September 1987.
55. VoL, 2 December — DR, 2 December 1987.
56. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 19 April; *al-Shira'*, 15 August 1987.
57. VoL, 18 May — DR, 18 May 1987.
58. VoL, 15 August — DR, 17 August 1987.
59. Voice of Free Lebanon, 6 February 1987.
60. VoL, 18 January — DR, 21 January 1987; *al-Nahar*, 28 December 1987.
61. Voice of the Mountain, 15 September — DR, 15 September 1987.
62. Voice of the Homeland, 6 May 1987.
63. Voice of Free Lebanon, 17 April (quoting *al-Masira*); *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 17 June 1987.
64. R. Beirut, 1 October — DR, 2 October 1987.
65. *Al-Nahar*, 11 October 1987.
66. R. Beirut, 2 February 1987.
67. *Al-Dustur*, London, 1 June; *al-Nahar*, 6 June; *NAD*, 10 August 1987 (respectively).
68. VoL, 2 August — DR, 3 August 1987.
69. *Al-Dustur*, London, 21 September 1987.
70. Biographical notes on Karami, I. Shimoni, *Political Dictionary of the Arab World* (New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1987), pp. 271–72. On his father, see Y. Olmert, *British Policy towards the Levant States, 1940–1945*, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1983, p. 301.
71. AFP, 1 June — DR, 1 June 1987.
72. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 15 June 1987.
73. *JP*, *Ma'ariv*, 2 August 1987.
74. Farid al-Khazin, *IHT*, 4 June 1987.
75. *Ma'ariv*, 11 August 1987.
76. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 27 January 1987.
77. R. Beirut, 5 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
78. *JP*, *The Times*, 8 September 1987.
79. Voice of Free Lebanon, 27 October — DR, 28 October 1987.
80. AFP, 27 November 1987.
81. *The Times*, 19 August 1987.
82. *Al-Anba*, Kuwait, 5 July 1987; R. Beirut, 6 July — DR, 6 July 1987.
83. *Al-Shira'*, 10 July 1987.
84. R. Ihdin of Free and Unified Lebanon, 2 September — DR, 2 September 1987.
85. VoL, 23 August — DR, 24 August; *al-Qabas International*, 9 September 1987.
86. AFP, 24 January — DR, 27 January 1987.
87. VoL, 25 January — DR, 27 January 1987.
88. Voice of Free Lebanon, 31 January 1987.
89. *Time*, 16 February 1987.
90. Tanjug, 17 February; *al-Qabas International*, 16 February 1987 (respectively).
91. See comments of Karen Brutents, deputy chairman of the International Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and the Soviet ambassador in Beirut, 6 February; Voice of the People, 12 February — DR, 13 February 1987 (respectively).
92. VoL, 18 June 1987.
93. *JP*, 25 June 1987.
94. On the Syrian-Iranian deliberations over Glass's fate, see Y. Olmert, "Iranian-Syrian Relationships: Between Islam and *Realpolitik*," unpublished paper presented to the International Conference on the "Iranian Revolution and the Muslim World," the Moshe Dayan Center, Tel Aviv University, January 1988, p. 28.
95. VoL, 8 January — DR, 9 January 1987.
96. R. Beirut, 30 January 1987.
97. R. Beirut, 9 February — DR, 10 February 1987.
98. VoL, 15 July — DR, 15 July 1987.

99. Voice of Free Lebanon, 24 July — DR, 27 July 1987.
100. VoL, 29 August — DR, 31 August 1987.
101. VoL, 10 October — DR, 13 October 1987.
102. *Ha'aretz*, 12 November 1987.
103. *NYT*, 15 November 1987.
104. *JP*, 25 November 1987.
105. Voice of the People, 16 July — DR, 17 July 1987.
106. On attacks against Saudi installations in Beirut, see R. Beirut, 2 August — DR, 3 August; Voice of Free Lebanon, 3 August — DR, 4 August 1987.
107. *Al-Nahar*, 21 January 1987.
108. *Ha'aretz*, 12 February 1987.
109. Voice of Free Lebanon, 10 February — DR, 10 February 1987.
110. *Al-Watan*, 28 January 1987.
111. *Al-Nahar*, 13 June 1987.
112. *The Guardian*, 9 April, 13 September; *WP*, 12 April 1987.
113. AFP, 4 March — DR, 5 March 1987.
114. R. Monte Carlo, 22 August 1987.
115. Voice of National Resistance, 26 August — DR, 26 August 1987.
116. *Al-Bilad*, 1 September 1987.
117. *Ha'aretz*, 16 August 1987.
118. R. Beirut, 11 September — DR, 14 September; *Ha'aretz*, *Ma'ariv*, 13 September 1987.
119. Terms of the agreement, *JP*, 23 September 1987.
120. VoL, 19 February — DR, 19 February 1987.
121. *Al-Ussbu' al-'Arabi*, 2 March 1987.
122. R. Beirut, 21 February — SWB, 23 February 1987.
123. *NYT*, 6 January 1987.
124. *Ha'aretz*, 8 February 1987.
125. Voice of the People, 27 February 1987.
126. *Ha'aretz*, 1 June 1987.
127. *Ma'ariv*, 5 July 1987.
128. *Ibid.*
129. *JP*, 29 October 1987.
130. *Ha'aretz*, 5 November 1987.
131. *Ma'ariv*, 10 November 1987.
132. Voice of Free Lebanon, VoL, 5 December — DR, 7 December 1987.
133. *Ha'aretz*, 5 October 1987.
134. *Al-Nahar*, 27 October 1987.
135. *Ma'ariv*, 21 January 1987.
136. Voice of Hope, 18 June — DR, 19 June 1987.
137. *The Guardian*, 3 August 1987.
138. VoL, 10 August — DR, 10 August 1987.
139. R. Beirut, 2 October 1987.
140. R. Beirut, 22 October — DR, 22 October 1987.
141. *Al-Masira*, 19 December 1987.
142. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 21 December 1987.
143. *Al-Safir*, 23 December 1987.
144. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, *ibid.*
145. R. Beirut, 12 February — DR, 12 February 1987.
146. *Ha'aretz*, 12 April 1987.
147. *JP*, 26 April 1987.
148. *Ha'aretz*, 15 May; *JP*, 24, 29 May 1987.
149. *NYT*, 19 April 1987.
150. *Al-Nahar*, 3 May 1987.
151. *Ma'ariv*, 7 May 1987.
152. *Ma'ariv*, 5 July 1987.
153. VoL, 10 August — DR, 11 August 1987.

154. *Ma'ariv*, 14 August 1987.
155. Voice of Free Lebanon, 21 February; Voice of National Resistance, 9 March, 31 August — DR, 1 September 1987.
156. *Ma'ariv*, *Ha'aretz*, 30 July 1987.
157. *The Guardian*, 1 August; *Ma'ariv*, 6 August 1987.
158. *VoL*, 6 September 1987.
159. *Ma'ariv*, 14 September 1987.
160. *Ma'ariv*, 11 October 1987.
161. *Ha'aretz*, 15 November 1987.
162. *JP*, 17 September 1987.
163. *Ha'aretz*, 26 November 1987.
164. *JP*, 13 December 1987.
165. Robert Fisk, *The Times*, 12 November 1987.
166. On the UN report, *al-Nahar*, 18 October 1987.
167. *The Times*, *ibid*.
168. *Ha'aretz*, 4 December 1987 (quoting *Der Spiegel*).
169. *The Times*, 24 December 1987.
170. *Al-Nahar*, 26 January; R. Beirut, 30 January; *al-Sharq*, 4 July; *al-Safir*, 25 October 1987.
171. *Al-Nahar*, 17 October; *al-Anwar*, 19 October; *VoL*, 8 December; *al-Anwar*, 9 December 1987 (respectively).
172. For a detailed survey of the illegal ports, see *al-Anba*, 29 September 1987.
173. *NYT*, 11 May; *al-Nidaa'*, 27 August 1987 (respectively).
174. *NYT*, 18 October 1987.
175. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 13 April 1987.
176. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 17 November 1987.
177. *Al-Musawwar*, 25 September 1987.
178. *Ha'aretz*, 17 August 1987 (quoting *Newsweek*).
179. *Al-Qabas International*, 20 October; *Ha'aretz*, 3 December; *MEI*, 19 December 1987.
180. *NYT*, 25 October 1987.
181. *Al-Safir*, 13 December 1987.
182. *NYT*, 13 July 1987.
183. Voice of the Mountain, 31 July — DR, 3 August 1987.
184. *The Economist*, 12 September 1987.
185. *JP*, 11 August 1987.
186. *The Economist*, *ibid*.
187. *Ha'aretz*, 24 April 1987.
188. *Ha'aretz*, 24 July 1987.
189. *Ma'ariv*, 21 August 1987.
190. *JP*, 28 August 1987.
191. Voice of the Mountain, 29 August 1987.
192. *JP*, 6 September 1987.
193. R. Beirut, 22 September — DR, 22 September 1987.
194. *Davar*, Voice of the People, 16 October 1987.
195. R. Beirut, 9 November; Voice of Free Lebanon — DR, 10 November; *Ha'aretz*, 10 November 1987.
196. T. Hanf S. Nasr, *Syndicalisme Consociatif et Société Segmentée: Une Approche Empirique du Cas Libanais* (Munich Mainz: Kaiser & Grunewald, 1984), Appendix XIII.
197. On the LNM in its initial stages, see A. al-Azmeh, "The Progressive Forces," in R. Owen (ed.), *Essays on the Crisis in Lebanon* (London: Ithaca Press, 1976), pp. 59–73; S. Zaban, *al-Haraka al-Wataniyya al-Lubnaniyya* (Beirut: Dar al-Masira, 1977).
198. Syrian TV, 23 July — DR, 27 July 1987.
199. *Al-Shira'*, 24 August 1987.
200. *VoL*, 3 August — DR, 4 August 1987.
201. *NAD*, 3 August 1987.
202. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 7 August 1987.
203. *Ibid*.
204. *VoL*, 4 September — DR, 8 September 1987.

205. Voice of Free Lebanon, 16 November — DR, 17 November 1987.
206. Voice of Free Lebanon, 25 January 1987.
207. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 26 January 1987.
208. R. Monte Carlo, 30 January; Voice of the Mountain, 25 February — DR, 27 February; VoL, 14 April — DR, 15 April 1987.
209. R. Monte Carlo, 23 October 1987.
210. Ibid.; *al-Nahar*, 21 October 1987.
211. VoL, R. Beirut, Voice of the People, Voice of the Mountain, 1 March — DR, 3 March 1987.
212. Voice of Free Lebanon, 2 March 1987.
213. Voice of National Resistance, 2 March 1987.
214. R. Beirut, 2 March 1987.
215. Voice of the People, 5 March — DR, 6 March 1987.
216. Voice of National Resistance, 6 March — DR, 6 March 1987.
217. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 9 March 1987.
218. R. Beirut, 12 March — DR, 13 March 1987.
219. *Al-Safir*, 8 March 1987.
220. *Al-Shira'*, *NAD*, 27 April 1987 (respectively).
221. *Al-Masira*, 30 May 1987.
222. VoL, 22 June; *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 6 July 1987.
223. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 20 November 1987.
224. *Al-Liwa'*, Beirut, 29 November 1987.
225. Voice of National Resistance, Voice of Free Lebanon, 18 September — DR, 18 September 1987.
226. *JP*, 31 July 1987.
227. *JP*, 1 September 1987.
228. AFP, Voice of Free Lebanon, 3 September; Voice of Free Lebanon, 4 September — DR, 4 September 1987 (respectively).
229. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 28 December 1987.
230. On the Ba'albak march, *al-'Ahd*, 31 May; on preparation for the parades, *al-Nahar*, 17 May 1987.
231. *Ma'ariv*, 13 December 1987.
232. *JP*, 29 July 1987 (quoting Diana 'Abdallah's report in Reuters).
233. VoL, 29 October — DR, 30 October 1987.
234. R. Monte Carlo, 30 October — DR, 3 November 1987.
235. *Ma'ariv*, 26 June 1987.
236. *Al-Nahar*, 27 January; *al-Dustur*, London, 30 November 1987.
237. IRNA, 28 June — DR, 29 June 1987.
238. *Ma'ariv*, *al-Nahar*, 29 September 1987.
239. AFP, Voice of Islam, 15 October — DR, 16 October 1987.
240. See some of Fadlallah's important interviews during the year: *La Revue du Liban et de l'Orient Arabe*, 14 March; *al-Anwar*, 30 June 1987.
241. *Al-Qabas International*, 3 November 1987.
242. R. Beirut, 8 June 1987.
243. *Al-Hawadith*, 23 October 1987.
244. KUNA, 16 June 1987.
245. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 21 September 1987.
246. *Nouveau Magazine*, 29 June 1987.
247. *Al-Nahar*, 29 November 1987.
248. *NAD*, 25 December 1987.
249. *Al-Nahar*, 18 February; *al-Safir*, 5 December 1987 (respectively).
250. *Al-Anba*, 13 August 1987.
251. *Al-Haqiqa*, 28 September 1987.
252. *Al-Shira'*, 1 June; *al-Nahar*, 8 June; Voice of National Resistance, 23 August; *NAD*, 19 October 1987.
253. R. Damascus, 12 June 1987.
254. *Al-Shira'*, 6 July 1987.

255. Voice of Free Lebanon, 2 December — DR, 3 December 1987.
256. Voice of the Mountain, 3 February — DR, 4 February 1987.
257. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 24 April, 21 August 1987.
258. *Al-Dustur*, London, 30 March; *al-Mustaqbal*, 2 May 1987.
259. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 12 May; on other Soviet supplies to the Druzes, *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 12 June 1987.
260. *Al-Mustaqbal*, 24 October 1987.
261. *Al-Mustaqbal*, 4 April 1987.
262. R. Monte Carlo, 30 May 1987.
263. Voice of the People, 10 October 1987 (respectively).
264. *Al-Tadamun*, 30 May 1987.
265. R. Paris, 21 September — DR, 22 September 1987.
266. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 28 September 1987.
267. *NAD*, 5 October 1987.
268. *Al-Ittihad al-'Usbu'i*, 29 October 1987.
269. Voice of the Mountain, 9 August — DR, 10 August 1987.
270. *Al-Afkar*, 15 April; *al-Nahar*, 27 November 1987.
271. On the congress and the composition of the new institutions of the party, see Voice of the Mountain, 15 August — SWB, 18 August; *al-Anwar*, 15 August; *al-Nahar*, 16 August 1987 (respectively).
272. Tanjug, 14 March 1987 (quoting *al-Shira'*).
273. *Al-Sharq*, 16 April 1987.
274. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 18 October 1987.
275. *Al-Qabas*, 26 February 1987.
276. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 13 November 1987.
277. R. Beirut, 22 September — DR, 23 September 1987 (citing *Ila al-Amam*).
278. See a report on one of the more serious clashes, *al-Haqiqa*, 10 June 1987.
279. *Al-Majalla*, 18 November 1987.
280. Voice of Free Lebanon, 11 March 1987.
281. *Al-Nahar*, 15 December 1987.
282. *Al-Shira'*, 9 March 1987.
283. See *al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 29 December 1986, 16 March 1987; *al-Shira'*, 23 March 1987; *al-Sharq*, 5 May 1987; *al-Anba*, 12 June 1987.
284. *Al-Hawadith*, 15 May; *al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 17 August 1987.
285. *Al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 6 February 1987.
286. *Al-Haqiqa*, 17 April 1987.
287. *Al-Sharq*, 15 June 1987.
288. Voice of the People, 20 August 1987.
289. Voice of the People, 27 September 1987; *al-'Amal*, Beirut, 2 October 1987.
290. Voice of National Resistance, 12 July — DR, 13 July 1987.
291. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 21 December 1987.
292. *Al-Safir*, 15 February 1987.
293. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 9 March 1987.
294. *Al-Qabas*, 15 March 1987.
295. *Al-Safir*, 30 September 1987.
296. *Al-Safir*, 6 March 1987.
297. *Al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 16 March 1987.
298. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 17 March 1987.
299. *Al-Sharq*, 13 May 1987.
300. AFP, 28 September — DR, 29 September 1987.
301. *Al-Liwa'*, Beirut, 30 September 1987.
302. R. Monte Carlo, KUNA, 1 October 1987 (respectively).
303. *Al-Haqiqa*, 3 October 1987.
304. *Al-Anwar*, 7 October 1987.
305. Voice of Free Lebanon, 7 August — DR, 7 August 1987.
306. This biographical survey is based on numerous sources, including Chamoun's own accounts in press interviews. His last big interview was in *La Revue du Liban et de l'Orient Arabe*, 11 April 1987.

Libya

(Al-Jamahiriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Libiyya al-Sha'biyya al-Ishtirakiyya al-'Uzma)¹

YEHUDIT RONEN


Mu'ammār al-Qadhafi's regime entered its 18th year in power in 1987. Apart from further securing his hold on the country, Qadhafi's major preoccupation was the Chadian arena, where Libya's troops suffered a series of successive dramatic defeats.

At the same time, however, Qadhafi did not neglect the handling of internal affairs, though he did it in a relatively low-key way, concentrating mainly on pressing issues. On 1 January, he announced the cancellation of Tripoli's status as the capital of the *Jamahiriyya*. Whatever his motives were, the officially declared process of transferring the central institutions of the government from Tripoli and dispersing them throughout the vast country was not very successful. Nevertheless, since serious problems had unexpectedly developed during the year, primarily the debacle in Chad and the near breakdown of the country's retail system, Qadhafi was forced to change his priorities, shelving what appeared to be a process of administrative decentralization.

A major source of concern to the regime was the state of the economy, beset by a further decline in oil revenues and the subsequent near collapse of the country's system of distributing food and other essential commodities. That this exacerbated public discontent was clearly attested to by the topics at the top of the agenda of the annual General People's Congress (GPC), which convened in Sebha in February-March. Even the comprehensive reshuffle of the General People's Committee (GPCom, the equivalent of a Cabinet), which took place on that occasion and reinforced the position of the hard-line revolutionaries, reflected Qadhafi's concern about the threat inherent in the further deterioration of economic conditions. The effects on the daily life of the citizens could determine the further conduct of his revolution as well as his political position.

The struggle for power that had reportedly evolved between Qadhafi and 'Abd al-Salam Jallud, known for years as his right-hand man and the second most powerful member of the regime, seemed to be another source of apprehension for the Libyan leader. Nevertheless, Jallud's return home at the beginning of 1987 after more than three months of voluntary or enforced exile abroad, suggested that he and Qadhafi had reached some sort of *modus vivendi*.

At any rate, Qadhafi had more reason to be concerned about the opposition allegedly headed by Muslim fundamentalists, and dissent in the Army, though its scope and essence remained unclear. It could be assumed that Qadhafi was especially afraid that Islamic fundamentalism would take root in the Army and

Libya — Chad

----- The informal line of interdiction between the Chadian government controlled south and the "rebel" — held north under the control of Libya's Army and the forces of its Chadian ally.

constitute a real threat to his leadership. This would explain the public, televised executions of fundamentalists, including soldiers, in the first public executions to be reported in three years.

These strong warnings seemed to be effective, though undoubtedly much more significant in curtailing domestic opposition was the close supervision exercised by the Revolutionary Committees, the devoted "watchdogs" of the regime who were empowered to impose punishment. In the end, Qadhdhafi's grip on the country was not seriously threatened during the year under review. Even the expatriate opposition did not have any impact on domestic affairs. The regime, however, did not take any risks and continued to liquidate its opponents abroad.

Nor were foreign affairs a source of satisfaction for the regime. Libya's intervention in the war in Chad, where its Army had been actively involved since late 1980, became in 1987 the most divisive issue in Tripoli's foreign policy. After suffering in the first months of the year a series of dramatic reversals in its military position, Libya was forced early in the spring to evacuate its troops from northern Chad, with the exception of the Aouzou Strip where Qadhdhafi claimed sovereignty and which he had been occupying since 1973. An additional, dramatic turn for the worse occurred later in the summer when Chadian forces entered the Aouzou Strip and captured its administrative center. This was a serious military, political, and psychological blow for the Libyan Army and regime, forcing them to send reinforcements to the town of Aouzou several weeks later. But it was not long before the Libyans suffered a new, severe blow, when Chadian forces launched a surprise attack on a military base within Libya's internationally recognized borders. This was the first time that Chadian forces had crossed into Libyan territory, and it marked a turning point in the escalating war. Ndjamena's growing confidence in its military strength, encouraged at this stage mainly by the US, and to a lesser degree, by France, was probably the main reason why Tripoli accepted a cease-fire in Chad in the fall and adhered to the agreement until the end of the year.

Libya's frustration and humiliation in Chad made it seek comfort and encouragement, as well as military support, in other foreign arenas. Special attempts were made to improve its political position in the Maghrib. The breakup of the Moroccan-Libyan Federation Agreement in summer 1986 ended the two countries' anomalous alliance and thus the division of the Maghrib into two distinct groups. Libya exploited the newly created circumstances to move closer to Algeria, offering it in mid-1987 a framework of formal union. Though Algeria appeared unenthusiastic about Qadhdhafi's plan, relations underwent a significant *rapprochement*. Simultaneously, relations with Tunisia enjoyed a noteworthy amelioration, culminating at the end of the year in the resumption of diplomatic ties.

Another important area of interest for Tripoli was the Iraqi-Iranian War. Tripoli's changing attitude toward the sides, distancing itself from Tehran while moving closer to Baghdad, was the major significant development within that context. The process was gradual but steady, reaching a new climax in the fall with the restoration of diplomatic relations with Iraq.

Although Libya spared no efforts during the year to expand its influence in Sudan (see chapter on Sudan), its involvement in the Arab and African worlds was at a low level.

Its relationship with the superpowers remained basically the same as in previous

years — strong animosity toward, and fear of, the US; cooperation with the USSR, but a relationship that was not free of tension.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CANCELLATION OF TRIPOLI'S STATUS AS CAPITAL; THE TRANSFER OF CENTRAL INSTITUTIONS FROM THE CITY

On 1 January 1987, Qadhdhafi announced that Tripoli had from that day ceased to be the capital city of the *Jamahiriyya*. Accordingly, the Libyan leader added, all central government institutions were to be moved out of the city.² The state-controlled media did not give details on the relocation of the institutions and confusion prevailed regarding their transfer. However, information disseminated by foreign sources claimed that the Army headquarters had been transferred to al-Jufra Oasis, 350 km. south of Sirte,³ though the General Staff continued to operate out of Tarhuna, near Tripoli.⁴ The Foreign Liaison Bureau (i.e., Foreign Ministry) was also reportedly moved to al-Jufra Oasis. The Ministry of Economy was to be moved to Ajdabiyya, the Education and Health Ministries to Benghazi, and the Treasury to Sebha. The Industry Ministry had already been transferred several years earlier to Misurata, and there was also "talk" of moving the Central Bank to Sebha and the international airport from Tripoli to Benghazi.⁵ Whatever the precise relocation of the various institutions, it seemed clear that Qadhdhafi had not replaced Tripoli with another capital, but had taken a new course of decentralization.

Qadhdhafi provided his people with a list of reasons which allegedly shaped his decision. Among them was the need to ameliorate the lot of the residents of Tripoli, who, according to the Libyan leader, suffered various hardships, or "nightmares," because of the massive presence of government personnel. There was also a need to evaluate the potential arable land of Tripoli for "agriculture and husbandry" — an essential national goal, according to Qadhdhafi, especially in light of the further decline of the country's oil revenues and the near breakdown of the distribution system based mainly on imports. (See below, and *MECS* 1986, p. 509. For Qadhdhafi's earlier calls on the people to turn to productive work in agriculture in the north in general, and in the Tripoli area in particular, see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 579, and 1984–85, pp. 560–61.) Qadhdhafi's plan to construct "the great artificial river" to transfer water from aquifers under the Sahara in southern Libya to the country's coastal areas should also be viewed within the above-mentioned context. (For details on that project, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 579–80.) Another explanation given by Qadhdhafi was the importance of a more equitable population dispersion throughout the country. With over one third of Libya's 3.6m. people living in the capital,⁶ this explanation indeed made sense. Still driven by his dream of expansion toward Chad, Qadhdhafi even mentioned the possibility of "a union between Libya and Chad" as an additional argument to convince the people of the need "to fill this space" between the two countries.⁷ (Interestingly, however, this argument was dropped from the text of Qadhdhafi's speech in Arabic which appeared five days later in the Libyan publication *al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, just after Libya had faced a dramatic reversal in its military position in northern Chad.)

Though there was no reason to doubt Qadhdhafi's declared motives, it could be assumed that the Libyan leader was motivated by other reasons, which he preferred

not to elaborate on in public. Topmost, apparently, were security considerations: the American air attack in April 1986 had proved the vulnerability of Qadhdhafi's residence and headquarters in Bab-al-'Aziziyya in Tripoli. If launched more effectively, an air attack could even paralyze Libya's nerve center. Since the danger of an American attack was still perceived in 1987, at least in Qadhdhafi's mind (see below), the Libyan leader had a clear interest in dispersing the central institutions throughout the country, thereby reducing possibility of being critically hurt by an air strike while at the same time removing the "heart" of the country from the reach of the Sixth Fleet's guns. Also within the security context, it could be argued that Qadhdhafi felt potentially threatened by the concentration of political and military power in Tripoli. It was even possible to explain the decentralization move in terms of Qadhdhafi's wish to do away with the "bourgeois" state and break up the bureaucratic centers in Tripoli that could challenge his authority. It should be added that the decentralization move coincided with a new wave of attacks in the official media against the faults of bureaucrats and technocrats who "were obstructing [the] smooth course of the revolution,"⁸ or in other words, Qadhdhafi's political position.

Qadhdhafi's true motives and the real extent of his planned changes remained unknown. As it happened, the process was soon shelved. From the few sporadic notes of criticism published by one of the regime's mouthpieces, one learned that the secretaries (ministers) had remained in Tripoli, and "only their emissaries, some furniture, and some seals" were transferred from the city. The same source added that only the military had fully carried out Qadhdhafi's orders.⁹ In any case, it appeared that, despite Qadhdhafi's decision, Tripoli continued to serve as the center of the country, though without the formal title of capital.

THE ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS; THE RESHUFFLE OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

The GPC, ostensibly the country's sole independent political decision-making body, convened from 25 February-2 March in the town of Sharara al-Ula ("first spark"), known also as Sebha, where the system of "people's power" was first established in March 1977 (see *MECS* 1976-77, pp. 531-33). The six-day deliberations resulted in a long list of resolutions dealing with a broad cluster of internal and external issues. The state of the economy occupied a central place among the internal topics discussed and special attention was devoted to the collapsing retail system, clearly attested to by the acute and recurrent shortages of basic food and other essential goods in the state-sponsored supermarkets that in 1980-81 replaced private retail businesses (see *MECS* 1980-81, pp. 692-93). The enormous amounts of time required to find goods on the black market led to hoarding, profiteering and chronic absenteeism from work. According to a foreign source there was a new rush hour in Tripoli, in the mid-morning, when workers left their offices to go shopping.¹⁰ Absurdly, the system designed to protect the consumers from high prices, from "exploitation" as Qadhdhafi repeatedly put it, was having the opposite effect. Not surprisingly, the GPC directed strong criticism at the General Company for Marketing and Agricultural Production, the state-owned distributor of agricultural produce and other consumer goods to the state-controlled supermarkets. A decision to purge the company of "merchants and middlemen" and transform it with "revolutionary and technical elements" soon followed, making this authority the major scapegoat for the intolerable conditions.

During the GPC discussions, participants also expressed their dismay at falling living standards and called for prompt payment of salaries. The GPC also called for financial stringency and changes in the banking system in a bid to mobilize domestic savings. In addition, some details of the 1987 budget were discussed by the GPC; predictably, funds allocated for imports, management, and development showed a significant reduction from 1986.¹¹

Qadhdhafi's dissatisfaction with the poor economic performance¹² was further reflected in the comprehensive reshuffle of the GPCom that was announced on 1 March during the GPC conference. The changes, which dealt only with personnel, removed six secretaries, most of them holding portfolios connected with the economy. Of the remaining five secretaries, only two retained their former positions, while the other three changed posts (see Table 1). To the post of secretary of the GPCom (the equivalent of prime minister), the GPC "elected" 'Umar Mustafa al-Muntasir, 47, who had a reputation "for getting things done" and for excellent contacts with Western businessmen in Europe and the US. Muntasir had been secretary of heavy industry in the 1985-86 GPCom. It could be assumed that this choice reflected the regime's hope that Western businessmen would be encouraged to return to Libya by the prospect of dealing with a man they could talk to. Muntasir, it should be added, had been responsible for promoting many large-scale projects, such as the \$6 bn. iron and steel works at Misurata.¹³

The new GPCom was reinforced by hard-line revolutionaries. The new secretary of health, Mustafa Muhammad al-Zaydi, had been deported from West Germany in 1983, after being accused of oppressing dissident elements. The deputy information secretary, 'Ali Abu Jaziyya, had been a member of the four-man revolutionary committee that controlled the Libyan People's Bureau (i.e., embassy) in London at the time of the 1984 shooting of a British policewoman (see *MECS* 1983-84, p. 592). The new information secretary, Rajab Muftah Abu Dabbus, was also a noted ideologue. The new planning secretary, Muhammad Lutfi Farhat, came straight from the "World Center for Research and Study of the Green Book," one of the principal institutions for the export of Qadhdhafi's ideology.¹⁴

The list of dismissals from the GPCom was also interesting. The most noteworthy case was that of Kamal Hasan al-Mansur (known in 1985, and again after his removal in 1986, as al-Maqhur),¹⁵ who was dismissed from the post of secretary of the Foreign Liaison Bureau to which he had been appointed exactly a year earlier. The GPC accused Mansur (an experienced veteran), of a long list of shortcomings, among them the failure to "confront" the visit of "the president of the Zionist entity" to Australia (and other countries) in late 1986, and "the lack of any political initiative" with regard to the events in Chad. Mansur's portfolio was manned by Zaydallah 'Azuz al-Talhi, who had served in top positions of the people's power system since its inception in 1977 and who was known as a close aide of Qadhdhafi.

Another conspicuous dismissal was that of Muhammad al-Fayturi, hitherto the secretary for information and culture. Fayturi, also a veteran figure, was also accused by the GPC of a series of failures and inefficiencies.¹⁶

After concluding the almost week-long deliberations and the reshuffle of the GPCom, the GPC turned to the ceremonious and more glorious part of the conference. This was orchestrated by Qadhdhafi, who arrived in Sebha only at the conclusion of the GPC, deliberately refraining from taking part in its sessions in order to emphasize

their ostensibly independent character, despite the fact that they served to endorse decisions and praise policies taken by him (see references to GPC conferences in chapters on Libya in previous volumes of *MECS*). Marking the 10th anniversary of the "birth of the first *Jamahiriyya* in history,"¹⁷ Qadhdhafi delivered a long speech, highly praising the people's power system, which, as he reiterated, was "the only way [of] assuring the people's freedom."¹⁸

REPORTED UNREST

LEADERSHIP FRICTION: JALLUD'S ABSENCE AND RETURN

From late November 1986 until early March 1987, 'Abd al-Salam Jallud was in Damascus, officially to mediate between the two warring factions in the Lebanese "camps war," between the Shi'i Amal militia and the PLO. (For details on the camps war, see the essay on the PLO and the chapter on Lebanon.) Jallud, it should be emphasized, was known for years as Qadhdhafi's right-hand man and as the second most powerful member of the regime. It was not surprising, therefore, that his long absence, allegedly on a mission in Lebanon where Libyan influence was relatively negligible, and the fact that his family was with him all the time, created speculation that he was in voluntary or enforced exile.¹⁹ One theory even had it that Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad, who was on familiar terms with Jallud (both were closely aligned with Moscow), was keeping him in Damascus to protect him from Qadhdhafi.²⁰ There had been rumors concerning disagreement and even a power struggle between Qadhdhafi and Jallud though no mention of this was made by the state-controlled media. Jallud had even allegedly escaped an assassination attempt at his home in Tripoli in May 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 508). Various sources claimed that differences between the two leaders revolved around a broad set of issues, among them Qadhdhafi's decision to transfer the capital from Tripoli and to make a number of changes in the banking and oil sectors. Jallud was also thought to be less enthusiastic about Libya's involvement in Chad,²¹ and according to another foreign source, Qadhdhafi even held Jallud responsible for the serious military reversal in Chad at the turn of 1986-87. The same source added that Qadhdhafi also blamed Jallud for the disorganization among the Revolutionary Committees.²² Another theory had it that Qadhdhafi had been annoyed by Jallud's presuming to appear to take the initiative after the American air raids in 1986.²³ Whatever the real substance and scope of their differences, it was only in early February that Qadhdhafi and Jallud referred in public to their alleged dispute. The Libyan leader denied that there were any differences between them, noting that Jallud was staying on in Damascus "to take part in efforts to end the Palestinian camps war."²⁴ Jallud, for his part, held a news conference in Damascus, to confirm Qadhdhafi's statement.²⁵

In early March, after the conclusion of the GPC conference, Jallud returned to Libya and met with Qadhdhafi away from the limelight. Jallud's return was made possible, according to Tripoli Television, by the conclusion of his "pan-Arab mission [to] which he was commissioned by the brother leader of the revolution."²⁶ Jallud did not make a public statement and maintained a low-key presence at that stage.

Later in the year, after the summer, Jallud appeared at various public rallies and was reportedly busy keeping an eye on the oil industry and exercising considerable influence in economic matters, especially in negotiations with foreign companies. In

addition, Jallud was assigned the task of organizing the Pan-Arab Command for Leading the Revolutionary Forces in the Arab Homeland, which was created by Qadhdhafi in 1985.²⁷ All these activities, however, did not indicate his real status in the Libyan political system. According to one foreign source, Jallud's position was largely eclipsed by 'Ummar al-Mabruk al-Ta'if, one of Qadhdhafi's closest associates, who allegedly emerged in 1987 as Libya's second most powerful man.²⁸

THE REGIME AND THE FUNDAMENTALIST CHALLENGE

On 17 February, six men were hanged and three soldiers shot by firing squad in Benghazi in the first reported public executions in three years. The executions were shown on television.

The nine had been accused of treason and various acts of sabotage, including plotting, bombings, and assassinations of Libyan figures and the attempted assassination of Soviet experts. The broadcast said the nine belonged to the Islamic Jihad fundamentalist organization, which as Tripoli stated, "is hostile to the people's authority." The executions, attended by hundreds of slogan-chanting supporters of Qadhdhafi, were used by the authorities to teach the people a lesson, warning them not to be disloyal to the revolution — in other words, to Qadhdhafi's regime: "This is the fate of those who followed the path of darkness.... This is the punishment of the unjust heretic... of the clique of enemies of God, the allies of Satan and the hirelings of imperialism and Zionism, and the tools of the collapsing reactionary society...." Tripoli Television stated.²⁹

Exiled opposition sources claimed, however, that the three soldiers had been executed for taking part in an army mutiny against further military action in Chad³⁰ (see below). According to one opposition source, all the executed men did not belong to the Jihad organization. The same source added that, at the end of 1986, 35 people had been rounded up in Benghazi and tried by the Revolutionary Courts for killing members of the Revolutionary Committees.³¹ (For the political power of the latter in the *jamahiri* society, strengthened by their status as prosecutors in the Revolutionary Courts, see e.g., *MECS* 1979-80, p. 635; 1980-81, pp. 689, 691-92.)

Whether they belonged to the Jihad organization or not, the fact that they were presented as such indicated the growing impact of the fundamentalists and the hardening of the regime's line towards them. The authorities were clearly concerned about the negative implications of such a development. As reported by a foreign source, it was in October 1986 that the regime unhesitatingly closed down the country's 48 Islamic institutes without Qadhdhafi publicly advocating such a step. In addition, at the beginning of 1987 the Revolutionary Committees were reportedly taking an ever closer interest in the activities of the mosques and those who spent too much time in them. The same source referred to the tardiness in replacing Grand Mufti Muhammad Zawi, who died in August 1986, as further evidence of the regime's fears that the Qur'an was beginning to threaten the influence of Qadhdhafi's *Green Book*.³²

One could learn much about Qadhdhafi's concept of Islam, as well as his fears of the fundamentalist "front" — especially since the latter allegedly enjoyed support in the military³³ — from his repeated references to these issues. For example, in one of his many speeches, he stressed that:

Religion is the Qur'an and nothing else. Anything other than the Qur'an is heresy...Anything new is heresy...Yes, religious practices are well defined. Nobody can dispute the *hajj* or its principles...However, these calls by the atonement, ecstasy, and *al-Tabligh* group [fundamentalist organization offering its own version of the true words of Islam] are heresy because you are advocating new things.... All the parties, the so-called Muslim brothers—they are actually Muslim traitors because they destroy Islam and they are under the wing of Zionism.... These calls which you hear about are manufactured by the American, Zionist, and British intelligence agencies. The American intelligence agency...adopts the Muslim brothers. It adopts the '*ulama*, the so-called Muslim '*ulama*. It builds mosques. The American intelligence agency is now...telling the so-called Muslims to pray, [to] do such and such a thing, attack this regime... say that such-and-such a person should be killed: kill 'Abd al-Nasir, kill al-Qadhdhafi...''³⁴

REPORTED DISSENT IN THE ARMY

During 1987, there was the impression that the leadership had become increasingly concerned about dissent in the Army. The long war in Chad and especially the series of humiliating defeats the military suffered in 1987 served as a significant source of resentment against and even opposition to, the regime. The Army was reportedly demoralized, having to contend not only with defections but also with draft dodgers. According to one (hostile) source, the problem assumed such serious proportions that the authorities had to carry out large-scale searches in the cities to hunt down soldiers who had defected.³⁵ Other information (also from a foreign source) put the number of soldiers and reservists failing to report for duty in 1987 at 4,000.³⁶ Other foreign sources, mostly hostile, gave additional details of unrest and alleged attempts on Qadhdhafi's life by army officers.³⁷

The regime reportedly took a number of preventive measures such as frequent reshuffles in the higher echelons of the military, raising salaries of the Army by 25% as of February,³⁸ and keeping a check on dissident officers by using other military men in competition with them, such as the Deterrent Battalion, designed to prevent a coup, and Qadhdhafi's Presidential Guard, staffed by his fellow tribesmen.³⁹ In addition, the Revolutionary Committees played a very important role in overseeing the officers' movements and their arsenal. (For the effectiveness of their supervisory activities, see, e.g., *MECS* 1984–85, p. 562).

The defections to Egypt of five military personnel in a Libyan C-130 transport plane on 6 March, of three men in a helicopter two weeks later, and of another three men in a helicopter on 16 July (see chapter on Egypt), could be interpreted as clear signs of significant dissatisfaction in the Army.⁴⁰ All the defectors asked for political asylum.

In early October, waves of arrests were reported from Tripoli, and there were rumors of further executions. Some sources spoke of an attempt to forestall a coup planned by middle-ranking army officers, disgusted by the failures in Chad and apprehensive of a new offensive there.⁴¹ It remained unknown if the reported incident was somehow connected to the plot reportedly made against Qadhdhafi in August in Benghazi,⁴² or an entirely separate event.

THE RESUMPTION OF LIQUIDATION CAMPAIGNS AGAINST THE EXPATRIATE OPPOSITION

During 1987, the Libyan opposition abroad continued to launch virulent propaganda attacks against the Qadhdhafi regime, using mainly the Egyptian media for this purpose.⁴³ However, this kind of activity remained at the nuisance level and did not pose a real threat to Qadhdhafi. Nevertheless, the latter resumed with even greater vigor his campaign to physically eliminate those he called the "stray dogs," the "enemies of the revolution" — in other words, those opposed to his leadership. The first victim was a Libyan exile who was murdered on 7 January in Athens, allegedly by Qadhdhafi's men.⁴⁴ On 20 May, a former close aide of Qadhdhafi, who fell out with him in 1980, was seriously wounded in Vienna in an attack allegedly carried out by Qadhdhafi's men.⁴⁵ The injured man, 'Izz al-Din al-Ghadamsi, a former ambassador to Austria, survived a similar assassination attempt in Vienna in 1985 (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 563). On 26 June, another Libyan exile, known as a senior member of the National Front for the Salvation of Libya, the most important grouping among the expatriate opposition movements, was assassinated in Rome, reportedly by Qadhdhafi's hit team.⁴⁶ On 12 November, Switzerland deported three Libyans who were "connected with a plot to assassinate Libyan dissidents."⁴⁷

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

DRAMATIC DEBACLE IN CHAD

On 2 January, Libya suffered a serious military blow in Chad. Fada, a strategic Libyan-held garrison oasis since 1983, was recaptured by the forces of Hissène Habré, the Chadian president. Fada, it should be emphasized, was located 192 km. north of the 16th parallel—the informal line of interdiction between the Chadian government-controlled south and the "rebel"—held north under the control of Libya's Army and the forces of its Chadian ally, al-Shaykh Ibn 'Umar. (For more details on the change of inter-Chadian political alliances in the fall of 1986 and Libya's replacement of its traditional ally, Goukkouni Wuedeï with the new "puppet" leader, Ibn 'Umar, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 519–20).

The sudden collapse of Fada, protected by several thousand Libyan soldiers equipped with huge amounts of sophisticated weaponry⁴⁸ seriously undermined the Libyan forces. According to Ndjamena, 800 Libyan soldiers fell in battle, 81 were taken prisoner, and about 1,000 were routed from the area.⁴⁹ The effects on morale were predictable; but Libya officials ignored the Fada affair, adhering to its persistent denials of any military involvement in Chad. "The Libyans have nothing whatsoever to do with what happened and what is happening" in the fighting, Tripoli repeatedly stated.⁵⁰ This denial was contradicted by Ndjamena's display, during the first half of January, of more than 100 Libyan prisoners, among them officers and a Sukhoi fighter-bomber pilot.⁵¹ In an attempt to repair Libya's eroded credibility, Qadhdhafi "revealed" in the course of an interview with a French publication that "a Libyan military unit" of "a few hundred persons" entered northern Chad in autumn 1986 in order "to locate the whereabouts of 20 Libyan technicians" allegedly kidnapped by Goukkouni's men who thought that their leader was imprisoned in Tripoli⁵² (on the tension between Qadhdhafi and Goukkouni see *MECS* 1986, p. 519).

Notwithstanding Qadhdhafi's version, there was no doubt about Libya's deep,

direct involvement in the Chadian war. Furthermore, Habré's stand over Fada marked a clear turning point in his battle against Libya — the opening of a second military front in the northeast of Chad while continuing the fight against Libyan troops in northwest Chad, mainly around Zouar in the Tibesti mountains (see map).

The fighting rapidly escalated and on 4 January Libyan MiG-23s bombed Arada.⁵³ This Libyan action constituted a new development, since Arada was located 120 km. south of the 16th parallel — the line both sides tried not to breach. This time, however, Libya acknowledged that it had crossed the 16th parallel, but it did not admit that it had bombed targets there. Tripoli referred to its action as an "exceptional reprisal" which would not be repeated unless there was "renewed aggression."⁵⁴ In other words, the bombing seemed to be a deliberately demonstrative action aimed at the French, warning them that if they did not curb, or at least significantly decrease, the extent of their intervention in the Chadian war, the rules of the game would be changed to their detriment and Libya might draw them into large-scale hostilities. (The French reaction was rapid and clear: on 7 January, French aircraft destroyed half-a-dozen radar installations at the military airstrip built by the Libyans two years previously at Wadi Doum.)⁵⁵

Meanwhile, fierce fighting reportedly took place in late January between the Habré forces and the Libyans, mainly around Zouar and Fada.⁵⁶ On 21 January, Ndjama announced the "full control" of Zouar,⁵⁷ hitherto held by Libya's troops. Tripoli, however, denied this.⁵⁸ Furthermore, Qadhdhafi found it important at this stage to reiterate that there was no Libyan military presence in Chad at all, except the "small unit" he had mentioned earlier⁵⁹ (see above). Tripoli claimed that Ndjama's allegations concerning Libya's involvement in the war were merely aimed at justifying the "intensive intervention by France and the US in Chad."⁶⁰ It should be noted that Qadhdhafi was seriously worried about the French and the American involvement alongside Habré's forces, since it had a tangible impact on Libya's military position in Chad. Not surprisingly, Tripoli issued, in January-February, a barrage of warnings ostensibly against Chad, but directed mainly at Paris and Washington — that "the Great *Jamahiriyya* would not accept, whatever the justification, the installation of a hostile regime in Chad which would be used by imperialism to destabilize the security and stability of the Libyan Arab people inside their borders."⁶¹ Tripoli further emphasized that Chad was "a geographically and demographically natural extension of Libya" and, therefore, the US-French intervention there was "basically [aimed against the] *Jamahiriyya*..."⁶²

Qadhdhafi realized that if he was to avenge January's defeats and recover his grip on Fada and Zouar, he would have to send in more ground forces. That same month, he called up army reservists⁶³ and probably sent them immediately to Chad. Libya reportedly also concentrated troops (many of them said to be members of the "Islamic Legion" — foreigners press-ganged into military service after they arrived in Libya in search of work), in Sudan and Niger.⁶⁴ These countries were adjacent to Chad, and the troops Qadhdhafi sent there were apparently preparing to launch a counterattack against the locals in northern Chad. It was estimated that Libya had at least 15,000 troops in that area in February, up from 8,000 in early January.⁶⁵ Sources in Ndjama claimed that month that 20,000 Libyan soldiers had been placed in northern Chad.⁶⁶ (Libya's reinforcement occurred at the same time as the reinforcement of French troops in Chad.)⁶⁷

In early March, Libya still lacked confidence in its military position. A clear indication of this was the announcement of "a three-day unilateral cease-fire," ostensibly made by Libya's ally, Ibn 'Umar, the head of the *Gouvernement d'Union Nationale de Transition* (GUNT), while on a visit to Tripoli,⁶⁸ but actually made by Qadhdhafi. Habré, however, rejected the Libyan proposal of a cease-fire "unless Libya...totally" withdrew from Chad.⁶⁹

Meanwhile, battles continued to rage between Libya and Chad, and Ndjamena claimed an important military victory around Gouro, on the road north of Fada,⁷⁰ south of the Aouzou Strip (see map). On 18 and 19 March, the Libyan forces suffered further severe blows. Two Libyan columns, sent from their Wadi Doum military base in a bid to recapture Fada, were intercepted and destroyed, along with most of their military equipment. The Wadi Doum garrison was thus significantly weakened. According to Ndjamena, more than 800 Libyan soldiers were killed and more than 100 were taken prisoner.⁷¹ (During the fighting, as in the earlier clashes, the reports on the course and results of the battles came almost exclusively from Chadian sources, while Tripoli maintained total silence. This asymmetry made the presentation of an accurate picture of the events very difficult, and this had to be taken into account while dealing with this issue.)

Enjoying greater confidence in their military strength, Habré's troops initiated on 22 March an all-out assault on Wadi Doum, the main Libyan airstrip in northern Chad. During the battle, Ndjamena reported that more than 1,200 Libyans had been killed and nearly 450 taken prisoner.⁷² Whatever the precise figures, Western sources estimated that, during the first three months of 1987, Libya lost a major part of the territory it had held in Chad, between \$500m. and \$1 bn. in weapons, and one third of its c.15,000 troops.⁷³

In any case, the fall of Wadi Doum marked the biggest defeat for Qadhdhafi since the beginning of Habré's drive — at the end of 1986 and the start of 1987 — to reconquer the north of Chad. The loss of Wadi Doum, Libya's only hard-runway base, meant that Faya Largeau — an oasis town commanding access to the south and located on an exposed plain between the Tibesti and Ennedi mountains (see map) — was deprived of vital air cover, as well as food and military supplies, and was in danger of being encircled. That same week, three Libyan armored columns allegedly tried to cross the Sudanese frontier into Chad in order to reinforce their fellow soldiers there but were repulsed.⁷⁴ Libya predictably denied the report.⁷⁵ Libya's failure to reinforce its troops led it to withdraw, on 25 March, from Faya Largeau northward to the Aouzou Strip.⁷⁶ Toward the end of March, the evacuation of this base by Libyan soldiers was completed.⁷⁷ This paved the way for the further advance northward of Habré's troops. On 29–30 March, Ndjamena announced its "total control" of Ounianga-Kebir (see map) after an encounter with the Libyans.⁷⁸ On 3 April, Ndjamena announced that its forces had captured Gouro, and that the entire Borkou and Ennedi regions were "free of Libyan troops."⁷⁹

The presence of Habré's forces near the Aouzou Strip, for the first time since Qadhdhafi began his military encroachment into northern Chad in late 1980, constituted a severe threat to Libya's hold of the Strip, which it had annexed in 1973. Tripoli found it important to emphasize that "Aouzou is an indivisible part of the Libyan Arab land, and ... was not in the past, is not in the present, and will not be in the future an object of bargaining, international arbitration, or concession."⁸⁰

Furthermore, Tripoli sternly warned that any "aggression" by Chadian forces (and their allies) against the Aouzou Strip would be met with reprisals.⁸¹ Ndjamená's response was clear, stating its commitment to the continuity of the war until the "liberation of the last inch of Chadian territory [is] achieved."⁸² It was entirely clear that Ndjamená meant the Aouzou Strip, which remained in summer 1987 the last part of northern Chad still controlled by the Libyans. Unlike earlier occasions, when similar threats from Ndjamená did not elicit any serious Libyan response, this time Tripoli did reply in strong terms. "First," Tripoli stated officially, "there are no Libyan forces in Chad..." and "second... the Libyan forces are present at the international borders of the *Jamahiriyya*." Tripoli emphasized again that Aouzou "is an integral part of the Libyan territory like... Tripoli and Benghazi," and therefore it would consider "any military action against Aouzou as a declaration of war against it."⁸³ This strongly worded warning, directed at Ndjamená, Paris, and Washington, apparently reflected Libyan fears that Habré really intended to drive into the Aouzou region.

It was not long before it became clear that Libya's apprehension was justified. On 8 August, Habré's forces, in a surprise move, entered the Aouzou Strip and "liberated" the oasis town of Aouzou, the administrative center of the Strip.⁸⁴ Ndjamená claimed that its action was in response to a Libyan offensive against Bardai, about 80km. further south in the Tibesti region, during which Habré's forces drove the Libyans off and chased them into the Strip.⁸⁵ It could not be determined whether this was the real course of events or Habré's excuse for deepening his encroachment of the Strip, over which Ndjamená claimed sovereignty. Either way, the Qadhdhafi regime had suffered another severe military and political setback. Ndjamená announced that 650 Libyans had been killed and 147 captured in the operation.⁸⁶

Libya reacted rapidly and strongly. While playing its diplomatic card, calling on the UN Security Council and the Organization of African Unity (OAU) to shoulder their full responsibilities in light of "the Chadian aggression launched against Libyan territory," Tripoli retaliated with a series of air raids. According to Habré's sources, the Libyans daily bombed the town of Aouzou and other locations in the Tibesti mountains, as well as Kouba-Olanga, south of the 16th parallel; napalm was said to have been used in the bombing attacks.⁸⁷

On 28 August, a significant development took place when Libyan troops retook the town of Aouzou "after a two-hour battle."⁸⁸ The Libyans reported, in their first announcement of this kind, that while "liberating" Aouzou they had lost 10 of their soldiers and killed 600 of the "enemy."⁸⁹

On 1 September, the anniversary of Qadhdhafi's advent to power, Libya announced a halt of its air raids on Chadian posts, thus marking the festive day.⁹⁰ Qadhdhafi delivered his traditional speech to the nation, stating that he "would have liked to see Libyan aircraft carrying food and medicine, not tons of destructive bombs for the Chadians." Qadhdhafi added that "the war between Libya and Chad is a filthy one.... I am not happy to strike the Chadians, but today we are exercising only self-defense.... We are repelling aggression against our international borders. The Libyans are now in a situation of legitimate self-defense.... We have no colonialist ambitions in Chad at all. We would like to put an end to this game..., [and] to be an ally of the people in Chad."⁹¹

Despite Qadhdhafi's ostensible peace gestures, the conflict soon took a dramatic

turn for the worse. On 5 September, Habré's forces launched a raid against the military base at Ma'ten al-Sarra, 100 km. inside Libya and a key take-off point for its bombing raids. This was the first time that Chad crossed into Libyan territory, and it marked a sharp escalation of the conflict. Ndjamená's declared aim was to destroy the base and prevent further bombing raids from there against its forces.⁹² After the "mission [had been] accomplished," as Ndjamená noted, the base was "totally destroyed" and its forces departed as fast as they had come, performing "a classic *ghazw*" (the Arabic term for the hit-and-run attack of nomad bands).⁹³ According to a Chadian military communiqué, the Libyans lost 1,713 men and 312 were taken prisoner (two Soviet advisers were reportedly also killed). Libya's material losses were said to have been very heavy and to have included the destruction in the air of four aircraft and the destruction on the ground of 22 others.⁹⁴ The Libyans admitted the attack on the base, which they described as a civilian one. They claimed that the attack had been repulsed, but did not give details about casualties or damage. Tripoli affirmed, however, "its principled and declared stand that...the aggressions [of 8 August and 5 September] are aggressions against Libyan territories."⁹⁵ Though it tried to create the impression that it was completely in control of the security situation, Tripoli was duly alarmed by the new Chadian venture. The general mobilization of military forces reportedly announced in Libya immediately after the attack,⁹⁶ could be seen as an indication of Tripoli's fears.

The Libyan retaliation came on 7 September and took the form of a series of two waves of bombing against Chad's capital, Ndjamená, and against Abeche, 700 km. east of capital (see map). During these raids, a Libyan Tupolev-22 was shot down by a surface-to-air *Hawk* missile fired by the French from the ground batteries defending the Ndjamená airport.⁹⁷ Libya admitted the downing of its aircraft.⁹⁸

On 11 September, Libya announced its decision to halt its punitive air raids inside Chadian territory, accepting a cease-fire proposal by the OAU chairman, President Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia.⁹⁹ (Chad also accepted the OAU proposal.) The conditions for the cease-fire were that Libya would stop its bombing in exchange for Chad's pledge to abstain from incursions into the Aouzou Strip.¹⁰⁰ As part of the agreement, an OAU committee dealing with the Chad-Libya conflict met in Lusaka, Zambia, in late September. Habré was present but Qadhdhafi refused to attend, dispatching his foreign secretary instead. The committee merely agreed to hand the evidence on Aouzou's status to a group of jurists and cartographers.¹⁰¹ But Libya's stand with regard to the Strip was firm: "Aouzou is indisputably a Libyan Arab region... So we have no fear of [the decision of] international courts, but we do not see any justification for subjecting a portion of our national territory and sovereignty to international arbitration."¹⁰²

In addition to reaffirming again and again its rights in the Aouzou Strip, Libya adopted new tactics in the second half of September, declaring that "the war between the Great *Jamahiriyya* and Chad has ended following the repulsion of the mercenaries from Aouzou and their annihilation in Ma'ten al-Sarra, and the fact that the Great *Jamahiriyya* now stands within its international borders. The Great *Jamahiriyya* has completely closed its border with Chad, thus leaving Chad to the Chadians."¹⁰³ Ndjamená responded by stating that "the war can only end when Libya evacuates occupied Chadian territory."¹⁰⁴

But, despite the truce, military tension continued to grow. Both sides were reportedly

busy rearming and reinforcing their troops. While Tripoli allegedly launched a major recruitment campaign for Lebanese and Palestinian mercenaries willing to fight in Chad,¹⁰⁵ and allegedly "absorbed" 40 Syrian pilots in its Air Force,¹⁰⁶ Ndjamenā was receiving new shipments of sophisticated American weapons and military aid.¹⁰⁷ Against such a background, it was easy to understand Libya's "almost daily" surveillance flights over Chad, which Ndjamenā kept reporting.¹⁰⁸

In late November, tension between the two countries reached a new flash point, with Ndjamenā announcing that "a large column of Libya's 'Islamic Legion'" had entered Chadian territory from western Sudan. According to the same source, the Chadian Army chased them back to Sudan.¹⁰⁹ Tripoli repeatedly denied the Chadian allegation.¹¹⁰ (For further details on this development in the Libyan-Chadian-Sudanese triangle, see chapter on Sudan). Apart from this alleged event, the cease-fire held until the end of 1987, with the major point of dispute — the status of the Aouzou Strip — unresolved.

NORTH AFRICA (MAGHRIB)

ALGERIA

The normalization in relations between Libya and Algeria, which began in the latter part of 1985 and accelerated significantly in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 516–17), reached a new high point in summer 1987. On 14–18 June, Jallud arrived on an official visit to Algiers, during which he submitted a proposal of union with Tripoli.¹¹¹ In an apparent attempt to give the union proposal a dramatic impetus, Qadhdhafi arrived in Algiers 10 days later, on 28 June. Before leaving on 1 July, he urged the Algerians to set up the union framework, which he planned to establish on 1 November 1987.¹¹²

Although Algeria had a clear interest in strengthening ties with Libya (see essay on inter-Arab relations), its relatively cool references to the proposal during — and at the end of — Qadhdhafi's visit suggested that it was not too enthusiastic about a formal union. Qadhdhafi, presumably, was keenly disappointed. But he refrained from open criticism, exploiting the union efforts in general and the visit in particular to enhance his personal prestige and political position. This was especially important to him after his humiliating military defeats in Chad.

During the fall and winter, it became clear that Algeria was unwilling to enter into a formal union with Libya, though political and economic links at that stage enjoyed a significant momentum. Libya, which was preoccupied with the escalating conflict with Chad, temporarily froze its attempts to effect the union. However, the numerous visits to their respective capitals by important Algerian and Libyan political figures compensated to a large extent for the shelved union proposal. 'Abdallah Belhoucnet, the Algerian chief of staff and member of the National Liberation Front (FLN) Political Bureau, arrived in Tripoli on 9 August. His deputy followed at the end of the month.¹¹³ Though no details were released by either side on the aims of the visits, it was assumed that military topics — including cooperation, perhaps even the supply of Algerian arms and personnel — were discussed. A short while later, Chad claimed that 100 Algerian "aviation technicians" were in Libya to reinforce its troops.¹¹⁴ (Algeria, however, categorically denied the allegation.)¹¹⁵

Qadhdhafi did not relinquish his union plan. He used the convention of the two

countries' "unionist meeting" in Tripoli in mid-December as an additional step forward to establishing his goal. "Algeria did not consider the aim of the union a mirage, but made it a reality to which we are getting nearer every day. God willing, it will materialize in the forthcoming period," Qadhdhafi stated.¹¹⁶ (For further details on Libyan-Algerian relations, see essay on inter-Arab relations.)

TUNISIA

Libya's relations with Tunisia, strongly strained since the summer-autumn of 1985, underwent a significant improvement in 1987 (for Libya's relationship with Tunisia since the 1985 crisis, see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 564-65; 1986, p. 518). Tripoli's reconciliatory mood toward Tunis was motivated by Qadhdhafi's near-pariah status in the Arab world; his problematic and marred relations in North Africa and in Chad; and, not least, by pressure from Algeria.¹¹⁷ The first sign of Libya's reconciliation was its reported payment in early 1987 of its entire debt to Tunis Air,¹¹⁸ evaluated at nearly \$10m., which it had frozen since the 1985 dispute. A Tunisian source claimed, however, that Tripoli paid only two thirds of its debt.¹¹⁹ Whatever the case, the process of *rapprochement* was set further in motion with the official visit of a high-ranking Libyan delegation — led by Khuwaylidi al-Humaydi, a member of the hard-line revolutionary leadership — to Tunis on 10-12 March 1987. This was the first official visit since 1985, and Humaydi was quoted as saying that "the two countries have agreed to turn over a new leaf in bilateral relations."¹²⁰

Though the Libyan media did not emphasize the contacts toward *rapprochement*, quiet diplomacy was pursued and resulted in Tripoli reportedly agreeing to compensate the expelled Tunisian workers it expelled in 1985, who claimed a total of \$150m.,¹²¹ to give priority to recruiting Tunisian manpower in accordance with its needs,¹²² and to prevent subversive activities against Tunisia from Libyan territory.¹²³ A foreign source claimed that it was not long before Libya put its commitment into effect, supplying Tunis (in spring 1987) with information about members of a subversive group opposed to the Tunisian authorities.¹²⁴

The process of *rapprochement* moved into higher gear on 6 July, when the Libyans implemented a settlement dating to March of that year concerning the payment of social security benefits, old-age pensions, and workmen's compensation to Tunisian workers expelled in 1985.¹²⁵ On 23 July, Libya announced the resumption of air links between the two countries.¹²⁶

The growing ties were further attested to by a series of visits to Tripoli during the summer and fall by high-ranking officials. The most important visit was that of Hedi Baccouche, the Tunisian minister of social affairs, on 20-24 September. During the visit, the first at such a high level since 1985, the two countries signed the minutes of an agreement "on joint cooperation in the fields of social affairs, labor, banking...and numerous other aspects of cooperation."¹²⁷ On 28 September, Baccouche returned to Tripoli for further discussions on bilateral issues. His visit resulted in a Libyan commitment to make an advance payment of \$10m. to the Tunisian workers forced to leave Libya in 1985.¹²⁸ Tunisia reciprocated on 14 October by reopening its consulate in Tripoli,¹²⁹ and on 30 October reopened its border with Libya at Ras Agedir.¹³⁰

The ousting on 7 November of the Tunisian president, Habib Bourguiba, by a new government under Zayn al-'Abidin Ben 'Ali, was "warmly" welcomed by Qadhdhafi.¹³¹ The exchange in November-December of visits by high-ranking officials between

Tripoli and Tunis was followed by the Tunisian official announcement, on 28 December, of its decision "to resume diplomatic relations" with Tripoli.¹³²

MOROCCO

The cancellation of the Libyan-Moroccan "Arab-African Federation Agreement" in the late summer of 1986, reintroduced open tension between the two countries (for the agreement's signing and annulment, (see *MECS* 1983–84, p. 587; 1984–85, p. 566, and 1986, p. 518).

In spring 1987, Rabat reportedly accused Qadhafi of resuming his military support of the Polisario movement.¹³³ A foreign (hostile) source gave further details, noting that Libya supplied the Polisario fighters with modern and sophisticated weapons, including SAM-7s.¹³⁴ Tripoli's media, however, did not refer at all to these allegations.

Further tension crept into the two countries' relations in November, following Morocco's decision to restore diplomatic ties with Egypt (see essay on inter-Arab relations).

CHANGING ATTITUDE TOWARD THE CONFLICTING SIDES IN THE GULF WAR

The exposure in early November 1986 of arms sales to Iran by the US and Israel¹³⁵ — "the worst enemies of the Arab nation," as Libya persistently called them — caused Qadhafi a great amount of shame and embarrassment. This revelation put the Libyans in "the same boat" as "Zionism and [American] imperialism" aiding Persian Iran against Iraq, an Arab "sister" country.

But despite its discomfort, Tripoli did not make any official reference to the affair, not even an implied denunciation of Iran's involvement. Libya's silence, at least at the turn of 1986–87, might be attributed to Tripoli's state of shock, and the fact that it did not know how to "digest" the disgraceful revelation. But Tripoli's continued refusal to mention the affair seemed to justify the assumption that it was a calculated tactic to prevent negative repercussions in its relations with Tehran, at a time of increasing difficulties in its foreign affairs. Libya was not only still recovering from the trauma of the American air raids of April 1986, but it was also facing a military debacle in Chad. This seriously eroded Libya's military power and no doubt increased the urgency of its need for political support and military aid from Iran (mainly in the form of personnel and chemical weapons). There was, however, no available information to confirm Libya's request for such aid. Nevertheless, it was possible to make inferences from a foreign hostile report which claimed, in the late spring, that Iran had refused to allow Libyan military personnel serving in Iran — apparently manning *Scud* missile batteries — to return home, because they "are now at the front and possess military secrets."¹³⁶ In any case, Tripoli's rapidly mounting anger against Tehran in early 1987 provided ample grounds for assuming that the Iranians did not support Libya in any significant way.

At the close of 1986, after Iran fired ground-to-ground missiles at Baghdad and Basra, and after Iran occupied a small but useful Iraqi area only a short distance from the perimeter defenses of Basra, Libya (as well as Syria and other Arab countries) seemed to be highly concerned about the further possibility of occupation of Arab territories by a non-Arab country.

Qadhdhafi, wishing to find an outlet for his increasing discomfort concerning Iran, and hoping to gain further bonuses at home and in the Arab world, declared in mid-January a new "peace initiative" to end the the Gulf War. "The only victims in that 'crazy' war," the Libyan leader stated, are "the sons of the Iraqi and the Iranian people. Reason must intervene to stop this madness, to make wisdom replace hysteria."¹³⁷ Qadhdhafi noted in many subsequent references, that the "Zionist enemy and US imperialism alone [are] reaping the fruits of the war."¹³⁸

Later in January, Qadhdhafi added a proposal to form "an Islamic force of Algerian, Indonesian, and Nigerian [troops] to act immediately at Shatt al-'Arab and on the borders between Iraq and Iran... and separate these warring forces as a means of ending the problem." While making his proposal, Qadhdhafi thought it important to emphasize that he had "not taken any new stand toward the war differing from Libya's attitude of support for Iran against Iraq."¹³⁹ Examining the timing of his proposal, and the mouthpiece, the Kuwaiti *al-Watan*, he chose to announce it, one could not ignore the chronological proximity to the Islamic Conference Organization's fifth summit on 26–29 January, in Kuwait (see essay on inter-Arab relations). Referring during an interview with an Arab publication to his "peace plan," Qadhdhafi stated that the war "had no clear purpose and lacked strategic goals. The Arabs do not want to annex Iran, and the Persians do not seek to annex the Arabs.... Thus, the only declared war [aim] is for each side to try to topple the other." In addition to giving his interpretation of the goals of the two conflicting sides, Qadhdhafi allowed himself to rebuke them, saying the war had damaged "Islamic ethics...and the Arab image." Qadhdhafi continued his long reference to the war by saying that, "on this basis," and since the war "cannot be terminated militarily because of the equal strength of both sides," Libya should work for "reason and logic to control the fighting." He concluded by stating that the Arab nations and Persia must be linked by brotherhood and good neighborliness.¹⁴⁰

Qadhdhafi's changing position *vis-à-vis* the warring parties was clearly reflected in his terminology: the belligerents were no longer referred to in simple terms of black and white, or "bad" Iraq versus "good" Iran. The distinction made by the Libyan leader between "Arabs" and "Persians" was a clear indication of this change. In the past, while vehemently siding with "the revolution in Iran," Libya had deliberately played down the (highly embarrassing) fact that it was backing non-Arab Iran against Arab Iraq, and emphasized that "only the US was portraying it as such."¹⁴¹ Nevertheless, when Libya cooled its support of Iran, simultaneously with its *rapprochement* with Iraq, that hitherto improper distinction served it well and became, therefore, legitimate.

IRAN

Unfortunately for Qadhdhafi, Iran flatly rejected his "peace initiative." The Iranian blow, at the beginning of February, together with Tripoli's weakening military hold in Chad and Qadhdhafi's various internal difficulties increased the Libyan leader's bitterness.

Not surprisingly against this background, Tripoli's reaction to Tehran's rejection of its peace proposal was strongly hostile. On 2 February, Libya circulated an official statement to all embassies in Tripoli in which it referred to the Iranian reaction as "illogical and devoid of revolutionary spirit... contradict[ing] even the most basic

diplomatic and political rules." It "was almost like a declaration of war" against Libya, the statement added.¹⁴² Qadhdhafi attempted to diminish the intensity of his attack by saying that his fury was not directed against the "genuine Iranian revolutionary forces" but at the "fifth column" which "had infiltrated the ranks of Iran's revolution" and "had been completely exposed by the American arms deal through the Zionist enemy." Tripoli angrily added that these "fifth column" forces had "denied the Great *Jamahiriyya* its historical rule, [which] sought to transform the Gulf War into a revolutionary war." Tripoli further accused the Iranian "fifth column" of turning the war into "a national one between the Persians and the Arabs, a sectarian war between the Shi'is and Sunnis."¹⁴³ This was a sharp accusation since Qadhdhafi's strong rejection of "sectarianism" was repeatedly professed in public.¹⁴⁴

Iran's Foreign Minister 'Ali Akbar Velayati paid an official visit to Tripoli on 17 February, in order to reassure the Libyans that Iran still valued their support. But tension between the two countries continued unabated. In his speech in March on the 10th anniversary of the establishment of the *Jamahiriyya* (see above), Qadhdhafi stated: "We are with Iran's revolution. We were inciting the revolution with our speeches at the time the Iranians were [doing that] themselves. Today's Iranian leaders were in prison. They are our allies... However, when the question is about shelling Baghdad with missiles, this is a shame and we cannot accept it, nor can we consider it an act necessitated by the revolution." Trying, however, not to appear one-sided, Qadhdhafi balanced this by saying that he was also "against the shelling of Iranian houses."¹⁴⁵ Qadhdhafi's endeavor to create the impression of a balanced position *vis-à-vis* the warring countries came across clearly in his repeated statements that Tripoli's position toward Iran's revolution was "a principled constant [which had] not changed... Likewise our position toward Iraq... is also firm and unchanged."¹⁴⁶ In another typical reference to the subject he said: "When we declare our indubitable alliance with the revolution in Iran, we affirm at the same time that we are not standing with it against the Iraqi people...and against the brave Iraqi Army...At the same time, when we say that we are with the people of Iraq and the Iraqi Army, this does not mean that we are against the revolution in Iran."¹⁴⁷

Other statements by the Libyan leader during that period reflected his apparently increasing concern about the escalation of the war and the danger it posed for Iran and the Arab world. The continuation of the war might "bring down the Iranian leadership...and America would replace it with what it calls a moderate leadership."¹⁴⁸ Without saying so explicitly, Qadhdhafi virtually accused Tehran of shortsightedness and of responsibility for inflicting heavy damage on Arab interests. In a further attempt to persuade Tehran to end the war, and possibly sincerely fearing the acquisition of Iraqi land by Iran, Qadhdhafi kept emphasizing that "Iraq is a very important country in the Arab nation and is an integral part of the Arab homeland. Iran cannot dream of annexing this part so that it would be under its control as this would be imperialism, colonialism, and expansionism." Iran, Iraq, and Libya, added Qadhdhafi, had the same enemies — America, Zionism, racism, and reactionism. Therefore, Qadhdhafi further noted, "we need Iran and we need Iraq in our historical battle against America and against Zionism."¹⁴⁹

Other signs of Tripoli's political reservations were its "cool" reactions in June 1987 to Iran's crises with the UK and France (see chapter on Iran). Tripoli at the time was engaged in a strong dispute with both Paris and London, which had seriously

damaged its interests (see chapters on Libya in earlier volumes of *MECS*). But it offered only "lip service" in Iran's crisis with France,¹⁵⁰ while entirely ignoring Tehran's crisis with London.

Even in the case of the massacre of Iranian pilgrims in Mecca on 31 July (see essay on Islamic affairs, and chapter on Saudi Arabia), Libya's reactions reflected mainly its anger over the Saudi "profanation of Allah's House" rather than full sympathy with the Iranians.¹⁵¹

Additional signs of Tripoli's political alienation from Iran were Qadhdhafi's "reaffirmation" of Kuwait's right "to take whatever measures it deems appropriate to protect its interests," and Libya's repeated protests about Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti targets.¹⁵² Qadhdhafi's support of the Kuwaitis at a time of strong propaganda attacks against the Kuwaiti regime by Tehran, and especially when Kuwaiti tanker traffic was being placed under US protection in the Gulf, said much about the Libyan stand.

If further clarification regarding Libya's increasing alienation from Tehran were needed, it could be found in Qadhdhafi's statement in early autumn 1987:

We fought with Iran's revolution when it was in danger.... We [saw] that the revolution in Iran was very important for the Arab nation.... We defended Iran's revolution until the danger was removed. But now Iran — Iran's revolution — is not in danger. Hence we do not assist it to strike against Iraq. But we are with it against the US. We ally ourselves with it now to face up to America in the Gulf, this... insolent threat to... Iran and the Arab Gulf and to the Arab homeland.¹⁵³

Thus, not only did Qadhdhafi strongly attack the Iranian leadership, but he even used the term "Arab Gulf," which Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeyni totally rejected.

On 8–12 October, the Iranian acting foreign minister, 'Ali Muhammad Besharati, paid a visit to Libya, perhaps in order to counter the growing ties between Tripoli and Baghdad (see below). It could be assumed that the issue of the Gulf War was at the center of the talks he held with senior Libyan officials led by Qadhdhafi. Foreign sources reported that the question of sending Iranian volunteers to fight alongside the Libyans in Chad, even as a merely symbolic gesture, was also discussed.¹⁵⁴ US officials said that, in the fall-winter of 1987, Libya appeared to have provided Soviet-made antiship mines to Iran in exchange for chemical weapons.¹⁵⁵ This claim was neither confirmed nor denied by either side.

Whatever the real state of Libya's relations with Iran at the end of the year, Tripoli did not join the resolution agreed upon during the Amman summit (9–11 November) on the implementation of a joint Arab defense agreement against Iran.¹⁵⁶ (For further details on the summit and its resolutions, as well as Libya's participation and position, see essay on inter-Arab relations.)

On 28–30 December, Iran's foreign minister, 'Ali Akbar Velayati, paid his second official visit in 1987 to Tripoli. However, no tangible change in bilateral relations ensued.

IRAQ

Libya's aloofness toward Iran coincided with a gradual, but steady, *rapprochement* with Iraq. Ties between Tripoli and Baghdad, it should be recalled, were severed in late 1980 at the latter's initiative after citing Libyan military aid to Tehran (see *MECS* 1980–81, pp. 703–4).

Reduced hostility toward Iraq was already noticed in the first months of 1987 (see above) and was underlined by Tripoli's references to Baghdad that were free of vilifying adjectives, such as "fascist" and "reactionary," which it had persistently used in earlier years.¹⁵⁷

The process of *rapprochement* was consummated in the fall. On 6–8 September, Libya's Foreign Secretary Jadallah 'Azuz al-Talhi visited Iraq (and Kuwait). In a joint statement, the sides affirmed "their joint anxiousness to build fraternal relations." The sides also stressed their "firm stand against any foreign attempt aimed at detracting from the land, security, and interests of any Arab country," an apparent reference to Iran.¹⁵⁸ They also emphasized "the need to end war by peaceful means." As was further claimed (by a foreign source), it was during this visit that the two countries decided to resume diplomatic ties.¹⁵⁹ But it was only in late October that Libya reported reopening its embassy in Baghdad, and a similar move by Iraq a short while earlier in Tripoli.¹⁶⁰

Whether the significant amelioration was motivated by Libya's rage against Tehran or by the wish to force the latter to reconsider its attitude toward Libya in general and its peace initiative in particular, or whether the improvement was motivated by Libya's concern for an Arab "sister" country and its wish to be connected with the broader Arab camp, remained unclear. All these factors together could have played a part. It was also alleged that Algeria had applied pressure on Libya to effect a reconciliation with Iraq.

Whatever the case, observers did not fail to draw parallels between the Libya-Chad and Iraq-Iran conflicts, with both Tripoli and Baghdad fighting a Muslim, but non-Arab, enemy.

THE SUPERPOWERS

THE UNITED STATES

The "Black House" in Washington,¹⁶¹ a term frequently used by Libya when referring to the Reagan Administration — continued to be a major source of rage and apprehension for the Qadhafi regime. Apart from the after-effects of the American air raids in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 512–13), Tripoli became increasingly worried from the turn of 1986–87 onward about the significant increase of US aid to the Chadian Government. Libya's fears of being attacked by the US, this time from the south, "using Chad as the starting point," clouded the atmosphere in Tripoli during the first months of 1987.¹⁶² Newspapers, radio commentaries, Friday sermons, official statements, and interviews were full of abuse for the US, with Qadhafi's setting the dominant, vitriolic tone: "The Yankees have no morals; they have no conscience. They should not be treated as humans. They constitute a threat to the future of mankind."¹⁶³

American assistance to Ndjamenia indeed signified a most negative development for Libya, as was proved by the series of severe military setbacks suffered by Libya's troops in the first quarter of 1987. Hence it was not surprising that Libya accused the US of "pushing Habré's gangs" to attack Aouzou in early August.¹⁶⁴ Qadhafi's feeling of being persecuted by the Reagan Administration was significantly reinforced in the fall. The transfer to Chad at that time of \$32m. of American aid and weapons, including *Redeye* antiaircraft missiles,¹⁶⁵ and the American decision, announced in

early November, to supply *Stinger* missiles to Ndjamenā,¹⁶⁶ duly alarmed Tripoli, which perceived it all as a "direct threat" to its security.¹⁶⁷ It should be noted that the *Stinger* — a sophisticated, shoulder-fired missile — was expected to enhance significantly Chad's military strength, at a time when France appeared reluctant to provide more weapons to Ndjamenā. Had America not stepped up its military aid, Libya could theoretically at least have improved its military footing in northern Chad. Libya's venomous verbal assaults on the US, the "modern-day Dracula,"¹⁶⁸ provoked primarily by developments in Chad, focused in late 1987 on what Tripoli called American "aggression" and interference in the Arab Gulf area. Libya strongly demanded the "immediate withdrawal" of the US from the Arab Gulf (and from Chad). The US "is not the world's policeman,"¹⁶⁹ Tripoli stated repeatedly during the final months of the year.

THE SOVIET UNION

Libya's relations with the USSR continued to be governed in 1987 by the same major factors as in the previous year (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 515–16). While Moscow repeatedly offered Tripoli moral support in its conflict with the US,¹⁷⁰ Qadhafi for his part reiterated his willingness to join a military alliance with the Soviet Union.¹⁷¹

Meanwhile, the loss of enormous quantities of military hardware in Chad during the first months of 1987 prompted Libya to turn to the Soviet Union — its sole source of heavy arms — to equip itself. In early May, Libya's foreign secretary arrived in Moscow "for talks on further cooperation."¹⁷² Though the Libyan media did not dwell on the visit's aims or results, it could be assumed that an urgent Libyan request for arms was high on the agenda. A foreign source quoted a May 1986 agreement (apparently signed during Jallud's visit in Moscow) whereby Libya would offset the cost of Soviet arms with oil shipments. The Libyans began shipping 100,000 barrels a day to the USSR in August 1986, but suspended shipments in January 1987. As a result, the same source added, the Soviets refused to renew their arms shipments.¹⁷³ It might also be assumed that Libya's loss of huge amounts of first-line Soviet weaponry and military equipment did not contribute to Moscow's willingness to respond positively to Qadhafi's request. Whatever the real state of affairs between Tripoli and Moscow, a significant number of high-level Soviet political and military figures arrived in Tripoli during the summer-fall of 1987. Perhaps the visits, or part of them, were connected with the alleged death of two high-ranking Soviet military experts in early September during Chad's attack of the Ma'ten al-Sarra base.¹⁷⁴

In early November, Abu Bakr Yunis Jabir, commander in chief of the Libyan forces, spent several days in Moscow. No details were given of the aims or results of the visit.

TABLE 1: COMPOSITION OF THE GENERAL PEOPLE'S COMMITTEE

Portfolio	Incumbent, March 1986	Incumbent, March 1987
Secretary of the GPCom	Zaydallah 'Azuz al-Talhi	'Umar Mustafa al-Muntasir
Health	'Abdallah Husayn Khaddura	Mustafa Muhammad al-Zaydi*
Industry	Hasan 'Abd al-'Ati al-Barghati	Fathi Hamad Ibn Shatwan*
Treasury	Muhammad Qasim Sharlallah	Muhammad al-Madani al-Bukhari*
Economy and Foreign Trade*	Ibrahim Muhammad al-Bishari	Farhat Sharnana*
Planning	Fawzi al-Shakshuki	Muhammad Lutfi Farhat*
Public Services	Muhammad 'Abdallah al-Mabruk	Fawzi al-Shakshuki
Foreign Liaison Bureau	Kamal Hasan al-Mansur (al-Maqhur)	Zaydallah 'Azuz al-Talhi
Communications and Maritime	Mubarak al-Samikh	unchanged
Education and Scientific	Ahmad Ibrahim	unchanged
Research		
Information, Culture, and Revolutionary Guidance	Muhammad al-Fayturi	Rajab Muftah Abu Dabbus*

+ Earlier known as Economic Planning.

* New secretaries.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *Al-'Uzma* — the great — was added to Libya's official name in the aftermath of the American air raids on Libya in April 1986. By this, Qadhdhafi wished to mark the Libyans' victory, as he claimed, over the US.
2. R. Tripoli, 2 January — SWB, 5 January 1987.
3. *Al-Inqadh*, March; *al-Musawwar*, 20 February; *Guardian Weekly*, 12 April 1987.
4. *MM*, 2 February 1987.
5. *Guardian Weekly*, 12 April 1987.
6. *Country Profile*, Libya, 1987–88, (1985 estimate).
7. Qadhdhafi's speech, R. Tripoli, 1 January — SWB, 5 January 1987.
8. E.g., *al-Jamahiriyya*, 2, 23 January, 6, 20 February; *al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, 5, 12, 16, 19 January 1987.
9. Tanjug, quoting *al-Jamahiriyya*, 23 July — DR, 24 July. See also *al-Jamahiriyya*, 3 April 1987.
10. *South*, May 1987, a report from Tripoli; *CR*, Libya, Nos. 2, 3, 1987.
11. For the GPC discussions and list of final resolutions, see JANA, 26, 27, 28 February — DR, 27 February, 3, 4 March; *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 27, 28 July; Tripoli TV, 2 March — SWB, 5, 6 March 1987.
12. For Qadhdhafi's concern, see e.g., Tripoli TV, 26 March — SWB, 31 March; *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 27 March, 24 May; interview with *NYT* and *ST*, quoted by JANA, 14 April — SWB, 16 April 1987.
13. For further details on that appointment, see *MM*, 16 March 1987.
14. *South*, May; *CR*, Libya, No. 3, 1987.
15. The literal meaning of al-Maqhur is "the vanquished." Qadhdhafi had reportedly asked al-Maqhur in early 1986 to change his name to al-Mansur — "the victorious," since, the Libyan leader argued, "in the Libyan Revolution there is nobody who is vanquished; all are victorious." *Al-Hawadith*, 21 March 1986.
16. For the list of accusations of both secretaries, al-Mansur and al-Fayturi, see Tripoli TV, 1 March — SWB, 3 March 1987.
17. R. Tripoli, 28 February — DR, 2 March 1987.
18. For the full text of the speech, see *al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, 9 March 1987.

19. E.g., *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 12 January; *al-Dustur*, London, 12, 19 January, 2 February; *al-Nashra*, 26 January; and *JA*, 28 January 1987.
20. *CR*, Libya, No. 2, 1987.
21. *MM*, 16 February; *CR*, Libya, No. 2, 1987.
22. *FR*, 5 February 1987.
23. *MM*, 16 February; *South*, May 1987.
24. Qadhdhafi's announcement to AFP, quoted by *Le Monde*, 4 February. See also R. Beirut, 5 February — *DR*, 6 February 1987.
25. R. Monte Carlo, a report from the news conference, 9 February 1987.
26. Tripoli TV, 3 March — *SWB*, 4 March 1987.
27. *CR*, Libya, No. 3; see also *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 12, 22 April; R. Tripoli, 22 July — *SWB*, 24 July; *JANA*, 7 November — *DR*, 9 November 1987.
28. *CR*, Libya, No. 3, 1987.
29. Tripoli TV, 17 February — *SWB*, 19 February 1987.
30. *Time*, 2 March 1987.
31. *The Times*, 19 February 1987, quoting 'Abd al-Hamid Bakush, who had held several ministerial positions as well as the premiership under the monarchy.
32. *Guardian Weekly*, 1 February 1987.
33. *USIS* quoting *The Washington Times*, 26 February 1987.
34. Tripoli TV, 28 April — *DR*, 30 April 1987.
35. *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 23 April 1987.
36. *AC*, 23 September 1987.
37. *Al-Ahram*, 30 January, 12 March; *al-Dustur*, London, 16, 26 February; *al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 9 March, 23 April; *Le Monde*, 8–9 March; *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 9 October, reported a coup attempt in March; *NAD*, 2–8 November 1987, reported a coup attempt in August.
38. *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 10 April 1987.
39. *AC*, 18 February 1987.
40. E.g., *FT*, 4 March; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 30 March; *al-Majalla*, 8–14 April 1987.
41. *AC*, 4 November 1987.
42. *NAD*, 2–8 November 1987.
43. *Al-Musawwar*, 6 February; *al-Ahram*, 17 February, 3, 29 March; *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 27 April, 4 May; *MENA*, 22 July, R. Cairo, 15 October — *DR*, 23 July, 19 October 1987, respectively.
44. For more details, see *MENA*, 8 January — *DR*, 9 January; *al-Dustur*, London, 19 January; *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 26 January 1987.
45. *IHT*, 21 May 1987.
46. *AC*, 5 August; *Le Monde*, 1 July 1987. For more details on the groupings of the expatriate opposition, see *MECS* 1983–84, pp. 581–84.
47. *The Times*, 13 November 1987.
48. *WP*, 3 April 1987.
49. R. Ndjamen, 2, 3, 4 January — *DR*, 5 January 1987.
50. *JANA*, 2, 3, 4 January — *SWB*, 5, 6 January 1987.
51. AFP, 6, 14 January — *DR*, 6 January, *SWB*, 15 January; R. Ndjamen, 20 January — *SWB*, 20 January, referred to 200 prisoners. See also *JA*, 11 February 1987.
52. Qadhdhafi in an interview with *Libération*, 5 January — *DR*, 9 January 1987.
53. R. Ndjamen, 5 January — *DR*, 5 January 1987.
54. AFP, 6 January, quoting a communiqué issued by the Libyan People's Bureau (Embassy) in Paris — *DR*, 6 January 1987.
55. *IHT*, 8 January, quoting the French Defense Minister, André Giraud. Wadi Doum was bombarded by the French Air Force in February 1986 since it served as a staging point for the Libyan offensive against Habré's posts south of the 16th parallel. A Libyan bomber, it should be recalled, had attacked Ndjamen airport shortly after in retaliation. See *MECS* 1986, p. 519.
56. R. Ndjamen, 9, 16, 21, 28 January — *DR*, 9, 29 January 1987.
57. R. Ndjamen, 21 January — *DR*, 22 January 1987.
58. R. Bardai, Voice of the Chadian GUNT, 25 January — *DR*, 29 January 1987.
59. Qadhdhafi interview with *Le Monde*, 6 February 1987.

60. E.g., JANA, 8, 12 January — DR, 8, 13 January 1987.
61. Qadhdhafi's interview with the French *Politique Internationale*, quoted by Tripoli TV, 14 February — SWB, 17 February 1987.
62. *Al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, 5–19 January; see also JANA, 29 January — SWB, 31 January 1987.
63. R. Tripoli, 4, 5 January; *al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, 14 January; *al-Dustur*, London, 19 January 1987.
64. AC, 18 February 1987.
65. JP, 10 February 1987, data given by the spokesman of the French Defense Ministry.
66. Habré's interview with JA, 18 February 1987.
67. WP, 9 February; IHT, 21–22 February 1987, quoting an official source in Paris, naming their number as between 1,400 and 2,400.
68. R. Tripoli, 2 March — SWB, 4 March 1987.
69. *Al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 13 March 1987, quoting Chad's foreign minister.
70. R. Ndjamena, 14 March — SWB, 16 March 1987.
71. R. Ndjamena, 20 March — DR, 23 March 1987.
72. R. Ndjamena, 25 March — DR, 25 March 1987.
73. IHT, 3 April; NYT, 5 April; WSJ, 15 April; *The Times*, 13 May 1987.
74. USIS, 25 March 1987, quoting Charles Redman, the State Department spokesman.
75. R. Tripoli, 12 April — DR, 13 April 1987.
76. FT, 27 March 1987.
77. *Le Monde*, 1 April 1987.
78. *Le Monde*, 2 April 1987, quoting a statement of Chad's Embassy in Paris.
79. R. Ndjamena, 3 April — DR, 3 April 1987.
80. JANA, 12 April — DR, 13 April 1987, quoting a statement of Libya's Foreign Affairs Ministry.
81. *Al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 6 June 1987.
82. ARB, 15 July 1987, quoting Habré's statement from 6 June, after concluding a visit to Washington and on the verge of a visit to Paris.
83. JANA, 12 July — DR, 13 July 1987, a statement released by Libya's Foreign Affairs Ministry. This stand was repeatedly emphasized later, in the fall.
84. R. Ndjamena, 8 August — DR, 10 August 1987.
85. *The Times*, 10 August 1987, quoting the Chadian ambassador in Paris.
86. AFP, 12 August, quoting the Chadian ambassador in Paris — DR, 12 August 1987.
87. During August and early September, R. Ndjamena released almost daily reports on such air bombardments. e.g., R. Ndjamena, 12, 13, 25 August — DR, 13, 14, 25 August 1987.
88. JANA, 28 August — SWB, 31 August 1987.
89. Tripoli TV, 29 August — SWB, 31 August 1987.
90. R. Tripoli, 1 September — DR, 1 September 1987.
91. Tripoli TV, 1 September — SWB, 3 September 1987.
92. R. Ndjamena, 5 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
93. AFP, 6 September, quoting R. Ndjamena — DR, 8 September 1987.
94. R. Ndjamena, 8 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
95. R. Tripoli, 6 September — SWB, 7 September 1987.
96. R. Cairo, 7 September 1987.
97. R. Ndjamena, 7 September — SWB, 9 September 1987.
98. JANA, 8 September — DR, 9 September 1987.
99. JANA, 11 September — DR, 11 September 1987.
100. CR, Libya, No. 4, 1987.
101. IHT, 12–13 September 1987. For more details, see CR, Libya, No. 4, 1987.
102. *Al-Majalla*, 16–22 September 1987, an interview with a Libyan senior diplomat.
103. JANA, 17 September — DR, 17 September 1987.
104. FT, 19 September 1987, quoting R. Ndjamena.
105. R. Ndjamena, 21 September — DR, 22 September. For further details, see VoL, 20 September — DR, 21 September; FR, 5 November 1987.
106. MENA, 30 September — DR, 30 September 1987.
107. NYT, 9 October 1987.
108. E.g., R. Ndjamena, 11, 13, 16, 18, 28 September — DR, 13, 14, 17, 21, 29, September; R.

- Ndjamena, 2, 12, 20 October — DR, 5, 14, 22 October; R. Ndjamena, 19 November — DR, 21 November 1987.
109. R. Ndjamena, 24 November — DR, 25 November 1987.
 110. R. Tripoli, 25 November — DR, 27 November 1987. Tripoli repeated its denial later in November and December.
 111. R. Tripoli, 17 June — DR, 18 June 1987.
 112. Qadhdhafi's interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 June 1987.
 113. See R. Tripoli, 9 August — DR, 25 August, and JANA, 25 August — SWB, 26 August 1987, respectively.
 114. AFP, 20 November, quoting a Chadian senior source — DR, 23 November 1987.
 115. R. Algiers, 22 November — DR, 23 November 1987.
 116. Qadhdhafi's speech at the opening session of the Libyan-Algerian meeting, R. Tripoli, 19 December — DR, 21 December 1987.
 117. See e.g., *al-Sabah*, 25 January; *al-Majalla*, 18–24 March 1987.
 118. *JA*, 25 February; *al-Fursan*, 2 March 1987.
 119. *Al-'Amal*, 13 March 1987.
 120. KUNA, report from Tunis, 13 March — DR, 18 March 1987.
 121. *Al-Fursan*, 23 March; *CR*, Libya, No. 3, 1987.
 122. *Al-'Amal*, 19 March 1987.
 123. *Al-Ahram*, 18 March 1987.
 124. *Al-Dustur*, London, 4 May 1987.
 125. R. Tunis, 6 July — SWB, 8 July 1987.
 126. JANA, 23 July — DR, 27 July 1987.
 127. R. Tripoli, 24 September — DR, 25 September 1987.
 128. *Al-Sabah*, 28 September 1987.
 129. R. Tunis, 14 October — DR, 15 October 1987.
 130. R. Tunis, 30 October — SWB, 2 November 1987.
 131. JANA, 13 November — DR, 13 November 1987.
 132. R. Tunis, 28 December — SWB, 30 December 1987.
 133. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 20 April; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 4 May 1987.
 134. *Akhbar al-Yawm*, 18 April 1987.
 135. First published in *al-Shira'*, Beirut, 3 November 1986.
 136. MENA, 7 May — DR, 8 May 1987.
 137. Qadhdhafi in a statement to JANA on 12 January and quoted by *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 13 January 1987.
 138. E.g., *al-Zahf al-Akhdar*, 19 January, quoted by JANA, 19 January — DR, 20 January 1987.
 139. In an interview with *al-Watan*, Kuwait, 25 January 1987.
 140. In an interview with *al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 26 January; see also Tripoli TV, January — DR, 27 January 1987.
 141. E.g., Jallud was quoted by IRNA, 24 November — DR, 25 November 1986.
 142. *Al-Dustur*, London, 9 February 1987.
 143. JANA, 2 February — DR, 3 February 1987.
 144. See, for example, his interview with *al-Kifah al-'Arabi*, 26 January 1987.
 145. Tripoli TV, 2 March — SWB, 4 March 1987.
 146. JANA, 31 March — DR, 1 April 1987.
 147. Tripoli TV, 7 April — SWB, 9 April 1987.
 148. *Al-Hurriyya*, 16 March 1987.
 149. Tripoli TV, 7 April — SWB, 9 April; for additional references of the same kind, see Qadhdhafi's speech, quoted by Tripoli TV, 22 April — SWB, 24 April 1987.
 150. See JANA, 20 July — DR, 20 July 1987.
 151. Qadhdhafi as quoted by IRNA, 2 August — DR, 4 August; see also Tripoli TV, 7 August — DR, 10 August 1987.
 152. Qadhdhafi in an interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 June 1987.
 153. JANA, 11 October — DR, 13 October 1987.
 154. See *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 30 October 1987.
 155. *NYT*, 6 November; 24 December 1987.

156. See Jallud's statement, Tripoli TV, 11 November — SWB, 13 November 1987.
157. E.g., *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 19 November; 4, 11 December 1986.
158. R. Tripoli, 10 September — DR, 11 September 1987.
159. *Al-Qabas*, 13 September 1987.
160. GNA, 7 November — SWB, 11 November 1987, citing a statement by the Libyan acting head of the embassy in Baghdad, 'Abbas Ahmad al-Mustafa.
161. E.g., *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 3, 6, 16 January; 4, 14, 16, 22 February 1987.
162. E.g., JANA, 12 January, 2 February, 25 March — DR, 14 January, 3 February, 25 March 1987.
163. Tripoli TV, 2 March — SWB, 4 March 1987.
164. R. Tripoli, 28 August — DR, 31 August 1987.
165. *The Guardian*, a report from Washington, 11 September 1987.
166. *NYT*, 6 November 1987.
167. JANA, 8 November — DR, 9 November 1987.
168. JANA, 24 October — DR, 26 October 1987.
169. JANA, 9, 14 October, 4 November — SWB, 12, 15 October, 5 November 1987.
170. E.g., JANA, 8 April — DR, 10 April; *al-Fajr al-Jadid*, 16 April; Tripoli TV, 15 April — SWB, 17 April 1986, quoting high-level Soviet officials while visiting Libya.
171. E.g., Qadhdhafi's interview with NBC TV, 23 March 1987.
172. R. Moscow, 5 May — DR, 5 May 1987.
173. *The Guardian*, 4 May 1987.
174. Tanjug, 22 September — DR, 22 September 1987.

The People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

(Jumhuriyyat al-Yaman al-Sha'biyya al-Dimuqratiyya)

JOSEPH KOSTINER

In 1987, the leaders of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) concentrated on dealing with the problems and damage inflicted on their country by the January 1986 civil war. The two-week war had resulted in over 10,000 deaths; the destruction of large parts of the city of Aden and of major government institutions and army units; and the decimation of the political elite. The wider, yet immediate implications of the civil strife included escalated conflicts among the various PDRY tribal segments; the rise of an inexperienced and divided new leadership; and tense relations with the PDRY's skeptical neighbors, who were suspicious of the new leaders' intentions. The burgeoning difficulties made these leaders embark on a vigorous rehabilitation policy in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 532-33), which they reinforced in 1987, in all spheres of the republic's public life. In the words of 'Ali Salim al-Bayd, the secretary-general of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), 1987 was to be "a year of overcoming the harmful effects of the past."

Domestically, the regime focused on two main spheres: (1) The need to achieve political stability, notably among the supreme leaders of the elite and the tribal segments. In this respect Aden's leaders' efforts were relatively effective, as no major political disputes were reported in the country. However, the open conflict with the former president 'Ali Nasir Muhammad's opposition, who resided in exile in the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) but whose supporters probably acted clandestinely in the PDRY, was not mended, and kept overshadowing Aden's politics. (2) Economic rehabilitation. Serious attention was given to new development projects and future planning, and this was accompanied by self-criticism in reviews of past conduct. These efforts notwithstanding, by the end of the period under review the PDRY had yet to overcome the economic crisis that had plagued the state for two decades.

In foreign relations, the PDRY sought to produce regional conditions that would boost Aden's rehabilitation scheme. Practically, its leaders sought regional stability, articulated in friendly relations with all of its foreign interlocutors. It was, in fact, a continuation of the policies 'Ali Nasir had pursued since the early 1980s (see *MECS* 1986, p. 535). Aden's leaders apparently succeeded in devising policies that mostly generated the required regional conditions. However, these policies encountered difficulties in relations with the YAR and the Gulf states, over both residual and newly generated problems, which the PDRY found difficult to surmount.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

CONSOLIDATION OF THE NEW REGIME

The elite who emerged victorious from the 1986 civil war and ruled the PDRY was determined to consolidate its grip over South Yemeni society. In the view of the new leaders, consolidation had specific aims, which they voiced over the year. First, they wanted to bring in line the regions that had been centers of support for 'Ali Nasir and where — in the words of Salih Salim, the deputy secretary-general of the YSP — party authority had to be rebuilt.² Second, in al-Bayd's words, they sought to "close the gap between the vanguard and the masses," namely, to acquire widespread support for the new leaders. Third, they set out to terminate what they called "deviations" from the YSP line,³ which in practical terms meant surmounting 'Ali Nasir's opposition, both in the YAR and in the PDRY. A fourth goal, motivated by the unadmitted divisions among the top leaders, was to maintain good working relations and cooperation among themselves, in order to avoid internal upheavals in the future. By attempting to achieve these aims, the new leaders conveyed the impression that they were generating new cohesion, control, and rehabilitation, which would attest to their credibility and ability to lead the PDRY.

Aden's leaders embarked on a twofold policy, geared to reinforce the YSP, on the one hand, and to improve the economy, on the other. These are discussed below.

THE REINFORCEMENT OF THE YEMENI SOCIALIST PARTY

The reinforcement of the YSP was not only a legitimate and traditionally acceptable method in the Marxist PDRY, but was also a framework to disseminate the new leaders' message throughout the state. Under this banner, the leaders sought to reach the various geographical regions and sectors of South Yemeni society and to strengthen their position. Adhering to practices of the previous year, al-Bayd, Salih Salim, the PDRY's president, Haydar al-'Attas, and other senior officials frequently visited units of the military and praised their revolutionary role in defending society, under the YSP's leadership. Similar visits were paid to various regional governorates, notably at Shabwa and Abyan, 'Ali Nasir's former power bases, where the focus was on meetings with local leaders and activists. These people also frequently visited Aden to meet the new leaders.⁴

Interestingly, Aden's Marxist rulers also attempted to enlist imams to spread their word. They denounced attempts to instill "ideological sabotage" coined in Islamic terms, which were opposed to "progress" and only helped to entrench "superstition."⁵ While this denunciation was probably directed against the propaganda spread from the YAR by 'Ali Nasir's people, it was also one of the few blunt attacks voiced by Aden against the growing trend of Islamic revivalism.

Following internal YSP regional elections in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 532–35), the campaign of YSP reinforcement peaked on 20–21 June 1987, when a general party conference convened. Attended by some 23,000 participants, described as 75% of the entire YSP membership, the conference focused on the expulsion of 26 members of the YSP Central Committee who were 'Ali Nasir's supporters; elections for the main YSP committees, which served to install the new leaders in key positions; and generating a forum for discussions and acquaintanceship with the new leaders. The conference gave the new leadership an opportunity to redeclare their aims, which were

to reinforce cooperativism, win the support of the workers, strengthen the YSP's organization and leading role in society, and develop the PDRY's power and socialist posture.⁶

The fact that no major insubordination to party rules was reported in 1987 marked a success for the leaders' search for stability. Moreover, intra-elite problems were also calmed. There were reports of regional-factional tension among the leaders, notably of tension between Chief of Staff Haytham Ahmad Tahir, whose support came from Radfan (the mountains north of Aden), and a group headed by Salih Salim and Minister of Defense Salih 'Ubayd Ahmad, who commanded support from the Hadramawt and Yafi'i areas.⁷ But this tension did not produce an eruption and the new rulers did not engage in civil strife as the precedent of 1986 might have led one to expect (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 532–35).

RELATIONS WITH 'ALI NASIR'S OPPOSITION

'Ali Nasir's party presented a variety of problems to the PDRY ruling elite. Based in the city of Ta'izz in the YAR, 'Ali Nasir's activities were troublesome in several respects: first, his headquarters attracted dissatisfied elements in the PDRY, and c. 12,000 had fled there by the end of 1986. Second, though he did not openly admit anything of the sort, 'Ali Nasir was regarded in Aden as if he had irredentist ambitions to recapture control of the government. The evidence of 2,000 armed men who surrounded him, and several sabotage squads from the YAR which Aden intercepted (see below), magnified this problem in the eyes of the new leaders. Third, in January 1987, the PDRY authorities still held c. 400 detainees,⁸ suspected of participation in the January 1986 events on 'Ali Nasir's side; some were still being held for interrogation, and others were awaiting trial. 'Ali Nasir and 47 of his aides were also to be tried *in absentia* (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 532–35). The pressure put on the PDRY by humanitarian organizations and especially by various Arab governments to pardon all of 'Ali Nasir's people and mend fences with him (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 535–40) was another cause for embarrassment to Aden.

The PDRY's position over these issues was to portray a conciliatory and humane image, coupled with a demonstration of determination to "punish" 'Ali Nasir. The government granted amnesty to the majority of detainees and fugitives, and, in July, announced that only 144 people, including 'Ali Nasir's group, would be tried.⁹ This position, of course, failed to appease 'Ali Nasir. PDRY delegates met with the YAR's prime minister, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Ghani, during the Islamic conference in Kuwait in January, to discuss these issues, and again in February in Ta'izz, where Kuwait's minister of state for foreign affairs, Muhammad al-'Usaymi, mediated. 'Ali Nasir's demand, as voiced by the YAR, that all political renegades be granted total amnesty, and be permitted to return in freedom to the PDRY, where they would be reinstated in their former positions, was unacceptable to Aden and resulted in a deadlock in negotiations.¹⁰ An Egyptian paper reported that al-'Attas and 'Ali Nasir met twice in September 1987 in San'a, with the help of YAR's President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih, and that the second meeting was also attended by other friendly parties, such as the PLO chairman, Yasir 'Arafat, and by Ethiopia's president, Mengistu Haile Mariam. However, both sides were intransigent in their positions, which rendered the meeting fruitless.¹¹

The failure to neutralize 'Ali Nasir's group in itself led to conflicting reports

concerning his readiness to return to the PDRY and preparations to force him to return.¹² While a full-fledged attempt to do so was not made, Aden reported the interception of sabotage groups that had allegedly penetrated from the YAR to attack public institutions in the PDRY. Such reports, if true, may have attested to 'Ali Nasir's intentions.¹³

Aden was more successful in tackling other aspects of 'Ali Nasir's opposition. According to Aden's own account, the last eight detainees were released in June 1987 and only the above-mentioned members of 'Ali Nasir's group were left in prison.¹⁴ Moreover, although the Aden authorities did not give total numbers, they occasionally reported that "deluded brothers," namely fugitives to the YAR, had returned to the PDRY, where they were admitted in peace and freedom.¹⁵

On 13 December, the trial of 'Ali Nasir's group ended. Thirty-five of them were sentenced to death, including 19 *in absentia*, among them 'Ali Nasir and some of his top aides. President Salih of the YAR expressed his disappointment and called for clemency; 'Ali Nasir predicted that his followers in the PDRY would engage in hostilities against the government.¹⁶ This indicated that, even after the trial, serious difficulties still beset the PDRY, as far as its relations with 'Ali Nasir's opposition were concerned.

ATTEMPTING ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

The heavy destruction caused by the civil war forced the new leaders to give high priority to economic rehabilitation. They carefully examined and criticized past and present economic developments, and launched a campaign of denigration against 'Ali Nasir's previous policies. Thus, 'Attas al-Bayd and the PDRY's prime minister, Yasin Sa'id Nu'man, stressed in interviews to the Arab press and in speeches delivered to YSP forums that the PDRY's economy had been overly reliant on services (notably on the Port of Aden) as a source of employment; that only 1% of the country's 300,000 sq. km. had been cultivated; and that cooperative production had been "distorted," with producers seeking to become "individualistic," in other words, capitalist.¹⁶ This Marxist rhetoric was used to explain the recession in the PDRY after January 1986: foreign exchange transfers decreased from SYD130m. to SYD90,000, and it became very difficult to import foreign products. Imports consequently decreased from SYD280m. in 1985 to SYD200m. in 1986. The amount spent by the people for market commodities decreased from SYD190m. in 1985 to SYD114m. in 1986. The dependence on foreign aid contributed to the local budget growth, from 50% during the second five-year plan (1980-85), to 70% in the current five-year plan. Remittances from South Yemeni workers kept on dropping due to the oil recession in the Gulf states. Consequently, the investment budget in the third five-year plan had declined to SYD583m., compared with SYD680m. in the previous plan (which equaled \$1.5 bn.).¹⁷

South Yemeni officials stressed that the rectification of cooperative activity, the encouragement of agriculture and the fisheries industry, and a strong impetus to export would comprise the major strategy to improve the economy. Accordingly, they planned to increase exports to SYD20.9m. in 1987, an increase of SYD1m. over the previous year's amount.¹⁸ However, given both the residual difficulties of the PDRY economy and the crisis prompted by the 1986 events, the increase of local production was not likely to create a decisive improvement.

Hence there was a constant search for new mineral resources, mainly oil. Both Soviet drillers, who worked for the PDRY Government, and the French company Total, were engaged in the search for oil. In April, oil was found in Jawf al-Batin in Shabwa, in relatively abundant quantities of 200,000 barrels per year.¹⁹ However, not wishing to diminish Aden's prospects of economic aid from foreign sources, the leaders preferred to play down the possible positive effects of this oil on the local economy, and warned against "euphoria."²⁰ Thus, 1987 brought prospects for improvement in the economy, which still remained in crisis.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

As had been observed in the previous year, in spite of the new elite's rejection of 'Ali Nasir its members preferred to continue with the main strategies of his foreign policy: namely, the maintenance of regional stability, characterized by friendly relations with the various Arab parties, alongside a tight client-patron relationship with the Soviet Union (see *MECS* 1986, p. 535). During 1987, this policy was pursued for two main reasons: Aden's focus on internal rehabilitation, which obliged its leaders to avoid any superfluous entanglements in foreign issues; and the hope of befriending Gulf states to obtain their support in financial matters and in mediating problems Aden had with its immediate neighbors. At the same time, the PDRY's cooperation with the Soviet Union was aimed at maintaining ultimate strategic and economic protection during the turbulent times it was going through.

Three main principles guided the new elite in implementing this policy. First, it attempted to present the PDRY as a state friendly to all its Arab neighbors, which had given up its erstwhile goal of "exporting" the revolution to other Arab states (see chapters on the PDRY in previous volumes of *MECS*). Second, government spokesmen went out of their way to stress that they were hoping to remove the Arabian Peninsula from any international disputes. This policy was mainly aimed at persuading the Gulf states to refrain from aligning themselves with the US, in return for which the PDRY would not grant any permanent bases to the Soviet Union. (In practice, however, this equation meant that Aden would rely on Soviet help against any unwanted reinforcement of the US in the Gulf.) Third, the new elite still attempted to portray a revolutionary image mainly by cooperating with the member states of the "steadfastness front" and by mediating their internal disputes.²¹

REGIONAL RELATIONS

RELATIONS WITH THE YEMENI ARAB REPUBLIC

The tension between the two Yemens that followed the 1986 civil war gradually abated during 1987, as it became clear that the PDRY would not resume its insurgency against the YAR, and that the YAR would not intervene against the new government in Aden. By the end of 1986 the two governments had even resumed unity talks (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 535–37). One major problem that continuously weighed on inter-Yemeni relations was 'Ali Nasir's residence in Ta'izz. In Aden's view, his presence in the southern area of the YAR constituted an irresistible attraction for PDRY renegades, a potential military threat against Aden, and a source of pressure on the YAR regime to turn against Aden and away from unity. On the other hand, in San'a's

perception, 'Ali Nasir had legitimate claims against Aden. Moreover, as the PDRY's "fraternal" state, the YAR could rightfully press Aden to mend fences with 'Ali Nasir and reinstate him and his men in leading positions there. Beyond such considerations, however, it also seemed that the YAR was using 'Ali Nasir's presence on its territory as a bargaining chip, to pressure Aden on other issues important to San'a (see chapter on the YAR).

The attempts to resolve the status of 'Ali Nasir and his followers did not bear any fruit. Yet both sides tried to avoid an open conflict over this issue and refrained from overtly accusing or condemning each other. Thus, Aden's minister for Yemeni unity, Rashid Muhammad Thabit, simply pointed out that the assistance San'a afforded to 'Ali Nasir "was in conflict with the agreements between the two states,"²² but did not openly call upon San'a to completely abandon 'Ali Nasir. Likewise, the death sentence passed against 'Ali Nasir and his group in December prompted only a mild YAR request for clemency²³ but not direct criticism of the PDRY Government.

As had happened during the 1970s and early 1980s, the two Yemens often resorted to unity talks as a means of containing tensions and resuming positive relations. The disagreement over 'Ali Nasir's future presumably once more prompted the two sides to reengage in unity discussions, but cautiously and gradually. Through various communications, the two presidents were reported to have decided to present the 30 December 1981 draft constitution for ratification by their respective People's Councils "under suitable conditions."²⁴ In discussions between al-Bayd and Salih, who met in San'a in July, the YAR president reportedly suggested that the unification should take place in September 1987 (the anniversary of the YAR's revolution). But al-Bayd was apparently more careful, suggesting that the draft constitution for the united Yemeni state should be reexamined by a technical committee of the two Interior Ministries — which would lead to its redrafting and then to its submission to a popular referendum — prior to its examination by the legislative bodies of both states. Only then, al-Bayd maintained, should the draft be referred to the Supreme Yemeni Council, the forum of the two presidents, for endorsement.²⁵ In order to bring the parties closer together, particularly in view of their common interest in coordinating their positions in the wake of the forthcoming Arab summit in Amman, al-'Attas visited San'a in late September and held talks with President Salih. His approach in these discussions was depicted as pragmatic and positive,²⁶ but whether this produced any positive results was still not known at the end of the period under review.

RELATIONS WITH THE GULF STATES

The tense situation in the Gulf region, arising from the war between Iraq and Iran, the "tanker war," and the subsequent US intervention there (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War) encouraged the PDRY authorities to try to implement their general, earlier mentioned principles of foreign policy vigorously in this arena. Aden's position over the war was formulated to maintain good relations with both sides. It supported an end to the war in order to unite Iraqi and Iranian forces against Israel. In voicing this position, PDRY spokesmen did not indicate which party they wanted to see victorious or which one they blamed for starting the conflict. They only lamented Iran's absence from the Islamic conference in Kuwait in January, which could have led to a cease-fire. Prior to the Arab summit in Amman in November, Aden advocated the

implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 (calling for an end to the war) in full, followed by peace talks between the belligerents.²⁷ By adhering to such a position, the PDRY maintained good relations with Iran, mainly evident in quantities of Iranian crude oil sent for refining in Aden, and also with the Gulf states, which appreciated Aden's positive stand and support for Kuwait's initiatives to end the war. However, no major economic assistance was reported from the Gulf states to the PDRY in 1987 apart from Kuwait's loan of KD2.25m. for a water project in January.²⁸

The relative calm in the PDRY relations with the Gulf states underwent a crisis in the summer as a result of the US reflagging operations in the Gulf (see chapter on the Gulf states, and essay on the US and the ME). In Aden's view, this was nothing but a blunt imperialist intervention, which threatened to create an international conflict in the area and endangered the independence of local states.²⁹ The PDRY must have feared that the US intervention would seriously tilt the local balance of power in favor of the Western states in the region, and constitute a long-term, strategic threat to South Yemen. Aden reacted to this challenge by enhancing its military cooperation with the Soviet Union (see below) to counter the US intervention on the strategic level, and by reportedly renewing its support for the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and other radical groups in the Gulf (which it had discontinued in 1982). This was supposedly in order to subvert local pro-Western governments, but the report had no follow-up. In denouncing the US operation,³⁰ Aden seemed to get closer to Iran during this period. On the other hand, PDRY leaders also maintained direct contacts with Gulf states and expressed their concern over US activities directly to Gulf leaders.³¹ Unwilling to enhance regional tension, the latter were also reluctant to have a conflict with Aden. In the summer of 1987, Aden received messages from both King Fahd of Saudi Arabia and the emir of Kuwait, Jabir al-Ahmad al-Sabbah. Several Kuwaiti officials visited Aden, and the PDRY minister of foreign affairs, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dali, visited Kuwait.³²

It was not clear to what extent Aden's fears were allayed; but the Gulf states' clarifications did restore the PDRY's moderate line in regional affairs. Hence, in September, PDRY Minister of Information Muhammad Ahmad Jirghum declared that his state appreciated "all the steps [taken] by Kuwait to preserve its security and stability and defend its interests."³³ According to one report, the renewed improved relations led Saudi Arabia to commit financial aid of between \$300m. and \$450m. to the PDRY.³⁴

Under the circumstances, bilateral relations between Aden and Oman, which in recent years had reflected the PDRY's *rapprochement* with the Gulf states (see previous volumes of *MECS*), remained stable, but did not progress. Parts of the undemarcated frontier between the two states remained a cause of friction. The technical committee appointed by both states to solve this problem met in Aden in late February, but achieved no results. Al-'Attas declared in April that an *ad hoc* agreement on the demarcation had been reached,³⁵ but tensions along the frontier were again reported in November.³⁶ In March, a positive development had been reported: the two states were said to be considering upgrading their resident envoys to official diplomatic level, thus strengthening their relationship.³⁷

RELATIONS WITH OTHER REGIONAL PARTIES

South Yemen's new elite sought to project a revolutionary aura in their relations with more distant parties in the region, where they had no vital interests that might compromise such a policy. Aden, therefore, tried vigorously to reinforce its contacts with the radical parties in the region so as to strengthen the revolutionary camp. South Yemeni leaders were particularly anxious to improve contacts with Syria, a central state of the Steadfastness Front. During the Islamic conference in Kuwait, when latent criticism of Syria's cooperation with Iran was in the offing, al-'Attas openly praised Damascus for fulfilling its inter-Arab duties.³⁸ Later, a major YSP leader, Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah Muhsin, declared during a visit to the Syrian capital that the Steadfastness Front should be revitalized by aligning its members in a united Soviet-backed organization.³⁹ To achieve this, the PDRY was ready to ignore Syria's objections to 'Arafat's PLO faction and promote PLO unity as a means of reuniting the Steadfastness Front. Aden also welcomed the PLO's steps toward reunification, during the convention of the Palestine National Council in Algiers in April, as a development that would ultimately lead to overall Arab unity.⁴⁰ However, no tangible results emerged from the PDRY's policy of reinforcing the radical front.

During 1987, improved relations were also reported between Aden and Ethiopia. There were numerous mutual visits and economic agreements, and the crisis between the two states dating back to the 1986 civil war seemed to have abated. Nonetheless, Ethiopia's continuing relations with 'Ali Nasir constituted an obstacle in Aden's eyes.⁴¹

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

In 1987, the Soviet Union remained Aden's main strategic and economic supporter. Several technical agreements outlining Soviet aid to the PDRY in planning, fisheries, and energy development were signed.⁴² Paramount among these was an agreement to continue searching for natural resources in the PDRY.⁴³ There were also some important state visits: al-Bayd went to Moscow in February; and Gen. Yevgeniy Filippovich Ivanovskiy, the Soviet deputy minister of defense, and Nikolai Talyzin, the first deputy prime minister, were in Aden in April. The potential danger of a war against the YAR and 'Ali Nasir's forces, and of the eventual escalation of the tanker war leading to US intervention, facilitated growing military cooperation between the parties. According to an Egyptian expert, Gen. Farid Mutanalli (editor of *al-Difa*), the Soviets had at their disposal air and naval bases in Socotra, Perim, al-'Anad, Aden, and possibly Ghayr 'Ubayd.⁴⁴ The Soviet reluctance to mediate or decide on the 'Ali Nasir question cast a slight shadow over these relations;⁴⁵ but this was not sufficient to prevent the conclusion of the above-mentioned agreements.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Al-Bayd, quoted by R. Aden, 1 January — SWB, 3 January 1987.
2. Salih Salim's interview with *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 12 April 1987.

3. *Al-Thawri*, 30 June 1987.
4. R. Aden, 11 May — DR, 12 May 1987.
5. R. Aden, 4 February — SWB, 6 February 1987.
6. R. Aden, 20, 22 June — SWB, 22, 24 June; *Nidal al-Sha'b*, 11 July 1987.
7. *FR*, 8 January; *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 2 March 1987.
8. Al-'Attas's interview, *al-Watan*, 17 January 1987.
9. R. Aden, 12 July — SWB, 14 July 1987.
10. Al-'Attas's interview with *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 21 March 1987.
11. *Al-Musawwar*, 9 October 1987.
12. *Al-Qabas*, 20 February; 'Ali Nasir's interview with *al-Musawwar*, 13 March 1987.
13. R. Aden, 4 February — SWB, 6 February; R. Aden, 17 February — DR, 18 February 1987.
14. R. Aden, 29 June — DR, 30 June 1987.
15. R. Aden, 10 July — SWB 13 July 1987.
16. Al-'Attas's interview with *al-Watan*, 17 January; R. Aden, 3 May — DR, 8 May 1987.
17. *Ibid.*; *The Guardian*, 14 January; *FT*, 14 January 1987.
18. R. Aden, 12 January — DR, 16 January 1987.
19. R. Aden, 22 April — SWB, 5 May; also SWB's announcement, 5 May 1987.
20. *Le Monde*, 17 April; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 10 July 1987.
21. E.g., al-'Attas's interview with *al-Hadaf*, Beirut, 19 January 1987.
22. *Al-Musawwar*, 23 January; also al-'Attas's interview with *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 24 March 1987.
23. *The Guardian*, 14 January 1987.
24. Thabit's interview with *al-Majalla*, 12 May — DR, 13 May 1987.
25. *Al-Ittihad al-Ushu'i*, 13 August 1987.
26. *Al-Fursan*, 23 November 1987.
27. Al-'Attas's interviews with *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 28 January, and *al-Dustur*, 11 November; 'Abd al-'Aziz al-Dali's interview with *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 9 January; *al-Majalla*, 21 October 1987.
28. *Al-Thawri*, 24 January 1987.
29. *Al-Nashra*, 7 August 1987.
30. Al-'Attas was quoted by R. Tehran, 23 August — DR, 24 August 1987.
31. *Fourteenth October*, 9 August; R. Aden, 13 August — DR, 14 August 1987.
32. R. Aden, 10 August — DR, 11 August 1987.
33. ANA, 11 September — SWB, 15 September 1987.
34. R. Aden, 2 March — DR, 3 March 1987.
35. *Al-Anba*, Kuwait, 1 April 1987.
36. *Al-Fursan*, 23 November 1987.
37. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 21 March 1987.
38. R. Aden, 28 January — DR, 4 February 1987.
39. Muhsin's interview with *al-Ba'th*, Damascus, 22 February 1987.
40. Al-Bayd's interview with *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 11 May 1987.
41. E.g., al-Dali's interview with *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 12 April — DR, 15 April; *al-Fursan*, 23 February 1987.
42. R. Aden, 20 March — DR, 25 March 1987.
43. R. Aden, 18 April — DR, 19 April 1987.
44. R. Cairo, 10 May — DR, 12 May 1987.
45. *Al-Fursan*, 23 February 1987.

The Saudi Arabian Kingdom

(Al-Mamlaka al-'Arabiyya al-Sa'udiyya)

JACOB GOLDBERG

Following the stabilization of oil prices in late 1986, the primary goal of the Saudi leadership throughout 1987 was to stabilize the economy, which had suffered severe shocks since 1983. However, the royal family soon realized that, due to persistent market conditions, Saudi Arabia again faced the undesirable reality of being the "swing producer." But this time the Saudis decided to reject that role and to accord precedence to retaining their share in the oil market, even at the risk of decreasing oil prices. Such new priorities could very likely affect the kingdom's oil revenues, and make it all the more difficult to devise a coherent economic strategy.

With the overall revenues of Saudi Arabia constantly declining, budgetary expenditures continued to fall by staggering amounts: from close to \$90 bn. in 1984-85, to a projected \$37.65 bn. in 1988. The deficit the Saudis incurred in 1987 was \$14 bn., i.e., over 30% of the total budget, and the projected deficit for 1988 was over \$10 bn. The Saudis seemed to have second thoughts about their traditional policy of drawing on their financial reserves to fund the deficits. Instead, they adopted the unusual mechanism, which was also unconventional by the kingdom's Islamic standards, of borrowing money to fund up to 80% of the 1988 deficit. In addition, the government felt compelled to resort to another means it had consistently avoided in the past: cutting into the generous subsidy system in order to curb expenditures. It remained to be seen whether such measures would have an impact on the social cohesion of the kingdom and the stability of the royal family.

It was against this background of belt-tightening and economic contraction that Saudi Arabia's new massive arms deals emerged as conspicuous exceptions. The large-scale expenditures ran counter to the general trend of curbing outlays, cutting subsidies, and minimizing deficits. The conventional answer to such an obvious discrepancy was the growing military threat posed by Iran. But, as many analysts noted, the Iranian hostility was insufficient to explain arms deals of such proportions.

In foreign affairs, Saudi Arabia's main effort focused on mobilizing an all-Arab front against Iran, isolating Ayatollah Khomeyni and forcing him to end the war. Though the Amman summit of November seemed to have united the Arab world around such a policy, in practical terms the Syrian veto prevented any joint Arab action against Tehran. The Saudi goal was made even more elusive by the failure to enforce the implementation of Security Council Resolution 598, which called for a cease-fire, and the abortive attempts to impose an arms embargo on Iran. Moreover, there was heightened anxiety in Riyadh in the second half of 1987 as a result of the riots in Mecca which had left 400 people dead, the growing number of Iranian attacks on Saudi and Kuwaiti targets, the US naval presence in the Gulf, and a general sense

of an all-out confrontation with Iran. Indeed, the Mecca incident seemed to have marked the most significant milestone in Saudi-Iranian relations since the 1979 revolution.

But as their diplomatic and political offensive against Iran had led nowhere, the Saudi leaders had to reassess their military and defense strategy in order to provide an appropriate counterbalance to the Iranian challenge. On the regional level, the resumption of diplomatic relations with Egypt alleviated some of their concerns, though the Saudis could not see Egypt as providing such a counterbalance. Therefore, as a last resort, the royal family had to turn to the ultimate source of security — the US — for a defense umbrella *vis-à-vis* Iran. This explains why the Saudis were ready, as of August 1987, to enter into such military arrangements, involving cooperation and coordination with the US, which they had consistently rejected in the past. It appeared that there was a direct relationship between their perception of the degree of the Iranian threat and the level of their military cooperation with the US. The net result was that their dependence on the US was greater than ever.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

AMBIGUITIES OF SAUDI OIL POLICY

In the aftermath of the turbulence in world oil markets throughout 1986, the principal goal of the Saudi decision makers was to restore stability to oil production and pricing. Such a policy was anchored in Opec's decision in December 1986 to adopt a fixed price of \$18 a barrel and in the publication of the Saudi budget for 1987 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 545, 549). King Fahd repeatedly stated that the stabilization of the oil market was of the utmost importance to Saudi Arabia, and in May he declared that "oil prices must be stabilized at a specific level for at least two years."¹ Elaborating on this theme, Oil Minister Hisham Nazir said that a stabilized oil market benefited not only the consumer but also the producer [i.e., Saudi Arabia]: "It will enable him to base his plans and projects upon a known income or at least an estimate."²

But their willingness to keep oil prices stable immediately forced on the Saudis an undesirable reality: given the glut in the oil market, they had to decrease their production in order to defend prices. Thus, their oil production in the first quarter of 1987 fell far short of their Opec quota of 4,133,000 barrels a day (b/d): from 3.7m. b/d in January, it declined to 3.1m.b/d in March. Once again Saudi Arabia was left with the primary burden of cutting Opec output and again becoming the so-called swing producer. This was precisely the situation in 1986 that Saudi leaders had resented to the point of reversing their course, flooding the market with oil, and causing oil prices to plunge to their lowest level since 1974, to \$8 a barrel. Were the Saudis going to play the swing-producer role again?

A controversy apparently ensued in Riyadh over this issue. Some officials argued that the kingdom had to cut its production to defend prices when demand for Opec oil fell, even if it implied reassuming the swing-producer role. They reasoned that such a cut would be short-lived and could be made up later when demand rose seasonably. Opposing this view were senior princes, including Crown Prince 'Abdallah and Defense Minister Sultan, who expressed resentment at the idea of the kingdom's coming to the rescue of Opec once more. Two factors made the return to the swing-producer role the most practicable option. First, the kingdom seemed satisfied

that other Opec and non-Opec oil producers were sharing its sacrifice by decreasing production. Second, the other two options — keeping production at high levels or lowering the price of Saudi oil — were a guarantee for turmoil in the market and raised the prospect of a price war similar to the 1986 one. Given that the kingdom's top consideration was to avoid price chaos, slipping back to the position of swing producer was the least of all evils.³

This Saudi disposition tended to change during the year when it was realized that other Opec members were failing to do their share, leaving Saudi Arabia to bear the brunt of the decline in demand for Opec oil. This time it was even such Saudi neighbors as Iraq, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) — the latter two were also members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) — that engaged in “cheating” and produced way above their Opec quotas. Consequently, despite an official quota of 16.6m. b/d, Opec members produced 18.2m. b/d in July, 19.3m. b/d in August, and over 18m. b/d in September. The Saudis urged other Opec members “to cooperate with us in order to stabilize the market,” and even warned that they might use their muscle to reimpose order within the group. It was clear by then that the Saudis were anxious to continue a fine balancing act between their role as swing producer and their desire to hold on to their market share.⁴

In the second half of 1987 there were increasing signs that Saudi leaders were beginning to stress the kingdom's oil market share and gradually abandon the role of swing producer. Nazir said in an interview that “Saudi Arabia is not the sole custodian of oil stability. We will not be pushed into a role of swing producer, cutting back our oil production alone to help the world. We cannot do it alone. Other oil producers must pitch in.”⁵ As much as Fahd refused to see oil prices declining, he was determined to avoid the repetition of the 1984–85 syndrome when Saudi Arabia constantly lowered its production while other Opec members raised their output. Since then there were numerous reports that the Saudis had begun to offer discounts, to conclude barter deals, and to look for other avenues that would secure them a stable share of the oil market. Among the various projects reported to have been financed by barter deals were the *Tornado* aircraft arrangement concluded with Britain, construction and expansion plans in Mecca and Medina, the Rabigh export refinery, etc.⁶

In addition to occasional barter deals and discounts, the royal family realized that it needed a permanent mechanism to secure a large portion of its oil income beyond the vicissitudes of Opec policies. Saudi leaders concluded that their position within Opec was compromised by the fact that a very high percentage of Saudi oil had to be sold at official prices. At the same time, other Opec members were able to dispose of a much larger share of their output without Opec scrutiny in the form of equity crude, refined products, etc. The Saudis were particularly envious of Kuwait's ability to guarantee a high baseload of exports because it possessed a large downstream network overseas.

The royal family, then, decided to give itself more marketing flexibility and a chance to hold on to what it perceived as its rightful share of the oil market by making its own pricing less transparent. This could be achieved by emulating Kuwait's example, i.e., purchase downstream mechanisms overseas and sell as much oil as possible as refined products which are sold at market-related prices rather than as officially priced crude. Such a goal converged with another long-term Saudi strategy, designed to capture a large share of the growing US oil import market. Most news reports on this issue indicated that the Saudis were negotiating with three leading US

oil companies — Exxon, Texaco, and Mobil — for the purchase of substantial equity in their oil-refining and marketing operations in Western Europe.⁷

When the Saudis were confronted with “rumors” of discounts and barter sales, they retorted that they were committed “in letter and spirit to all Opec agreements” and that “the kingdom will not abandon its commitments as long as others are committed to them.” Referring specifically to discounts, Saudi spokesmen stated that Saudi Arabia would not offer discounts unless overproduction by other Opec members seriously threatened its market share. But as price cuts by Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, and the UAE were reported to have put increasing pressure on Saudi Arabia’s customers to look elsewhere for their supplies, the clear implication of the Saudi statement was that the kingdom would offer discounts. Indeed, Saudi statements expressing adherence to Opec agreements emphasized that this would only be binding “provided all other Opec members honor them.”⁸

It was against this backdrop that the Opec meeting of December 1987 convened, precisely a year after the organization had managed to contain the chaos and anarchy in the oil market and restore remarkable stability. Two principles were of the utmost importance on the Saudi agenda, and Nazir was successful in pushing the Saudi view on both. First, he managed to withstand persistent Iranian demands for a price increase, and Opec reaffirmed its official price of \$18 a barrel. Second, he made it clear that Saudi Arabia would not act as swing producer in the face of what promised to be an oil glut in 1988: “We are only one of 13 members; if others feel they can cut prices to sell more oil, we will not give up our share. Never again will we sacrifice our share of Opec’s production to support the price. The ball is in everyone’s court, not just ours.”⁹ It became clear that the official Saudi policy had hardened around the concept of all Opec members sharing the burden of shoring up oil prices by pro rata production cuts.

The aftermath of Opec’s meeting presented Saudi Arabia in late 1987 with a bleak outlook. Political infighting and adverse market conditions seemed to have squandered the political cohesion and pricing discipline that Opec had imposed in December 1986. Opec’s inability to curb overproduction resulted in a total output which came close to 18m. b/d (an official ceiling of 15.06m. b/d combined with Iraq’s actual production of 2.8m. b/d), and was far above the demand for Opec oil.

Such a situation could easily lead to cheating and discount offering on a large scale and slowly slide into a price war. With demand declining after the winter, prices could plunge to as low as \$12 a barrel by the spring of 1988. For Saudi Arabia this would signify the end of a period of relative stability in the realm of oil which could, once again, wreak havoc with its economy in general, and budgetary planning in particular. This crisis would intensify if the royal family remained determined to hang on to its market share even at the risk of falling prices. Indeed, in early 1988 there were strong signs that this was the case: Saudi Arabia was reported to have offered its customers substantial discounts, up to \$2 per barrel.¹⁰

In addition to this last principle, three conspicuous features characterized Saudi oil policy throughout 1987. First, there was absolute opposition to any price increase “whether as a result of the decline of the dollar or any other reason.” Fahd stated he did not wish to see “an increase in oil prices until the end of 1988, and even then only on condition that there was a real increase in demand.” He further observed that “lower oil prices curtailed the development of alternative energy and allowed investors to invest in energy-intensive industries.”¹¹

Second, Fahd took a much firmer grip on Saudi oil policy, and the whole decision-making process became much more centralized. This process, which began in the last quarter of 1986, and resulted, *inter alia*, in the dismissal of Ahmad Zaki Yamani (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 546–48), accelerated throughout 1987.

Third, in determining Saudi oil policy, the royal family had to concentrate on political considerations — both foreign and domestic — and not only on economic factors. The chief foreign policy issue, undoubtedly, was the need to maneuver between the opposing positions of Iraq and Iran. Domestically, the decision-making process came under increasing pressure from various groups: the major spending ministries, rival regional groups, financially squeezed princes, etc. In order to keep all these forces in check, the king had to concentrate decision-making on oil policy in fewer hands and to take many of the major decisions himself. Such political considerations could only add to the complexities of the Saudi oil market.

ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

CONTINUING RECESSION

Economic recession continued throughout 1987, though there were intervals when it appeared that the economy might have begun to stabilize. On the whole, the basic components of the economic and financial deterioration that had started in 1982 continued to exist and exacerbated the periodic crises that occurred in various sectors. The only positive element in the Saudi budget in 1987 was that oil revenues reached \$21.15 bn., almost \$4 bn. more than the projected \$17.4 bn. But the increase did not alleviate the \$14 bn. deficit: non-oil revenues, projected at \$13.9 bn. amounted to no more than \$10.15 bn.¹² The fact that non-oil income failed to reach the expected levels was symptomatic of the recession.

Such non-oil revenues were to be derived from a variety of investments overseas and from the operations of petrochemical plants. However, all such sources suffered severe setbacks. First, as interest rates fell in the West, Saudi earnings from foreign investments declined sharply. Second, since a large portion of Saudi foreign income was derived from dollar investments, the continuing slide in the value of the dollar — especially in the last quarter of 1987 — significantly eroded those earnings. Third, the ongoing depletion of Saudi foreign reserves (as a means of funding the large-scale deficits), had resulted in their being cut by half in five years. This resulted automatically in a steep decline in the income that these reserves yielded. Fourth, the European Economic Community dealt Saudi exports a blow when it imposed customs duties on various Saudi petrochemical products. The new tariffs were bound to make Saudi products less competitive and to prompt a decline in the kingdom's earnings from this source. In addition, the real value of Saudi oil income shrank as a result of the fall of the dollar. Though Japan and Western Europe were the major buyers of Saudi oil, its sales were denominated in US dollars. Thus, not only had oil revenues declined dramatically in recent years, but their value was even further eroded. At the same time, Saudi expenditures rose for the same reason. Given that Japan and Western Europe accounted for more than two thirds of Saudi imports, the rise in the value of their currencies further eroded Saudi Arabia's purchasing power and worsened its trade balance.

The regime continued to confront the same dilemma that had plagued the kingdom

since 1982. It had to choose between two evils — slash expenditures so they conformed to dwindling revenues, even at the expense of public dissatisfaction, or run the risk of considerable budgetary deficits, even at the expense of depleting the kingdom's reserves. As in previous years, the Saudi leadership opted for a combination of both. They did slash budget outlays considerably, but still maintained a high level of spending in areas they deemed "vital." Thus, the 1987 budget showed clearly that the government was making no attempt to increase its tax base or decrease the level of subsidies, thus displaying a desire not to increase living costs for ordinary Saudis. Moreover, a series of fiscal regulations indicated a continuing commitment to lowering operating costs for the private sector wherever possible, even if this entailed larger government subsidies for public services.¹³

At the same time, the government continued to cancel numerous projects, particularly in the construction sector. The large-scale Jubayl-Yanbu' scheme was a case in point. This project, when launched in the late 1970s, was based on the assumption that oil prices in the 1980s would stay well above \$30 a barrel. When that did not happen, the economic feasibility of expanding the cities of Jubayl and Yanbu' was called into question. Of the plants that already existed some were marginally profitable and many were not. The plunge in oil prices was a major factor in stalling the next stage of expansion. It also accounted for stalling the kingdom's industrialization as a whole — the development of secondary and light industries.

The government's cutbacks and efforts to slow spending produced a near-crisis in its relations with contractors, both Saudi and foreign. In stretching out the completion schedules of many projects, the regime forced up contract and operation costs. At the same time, it haggled over the contractors' appeals for higher fees. Some ministries put off substantial payments because of disputes over minor details. "The government can withhold 100% of the payment over a 1% issue; they are using their maximum leverage," complained one foreign contractor. American companies revealed that they had more than \$1 bn. tied up in such disputes. And a foreign diplomat put the total Saudi payments backlog at a staggering \$16 bn.¹⁴ The complaints and accusations prompted Saudi ministers to declare time and again that contractors were being paid on time, and that all delays were due to contractors failing to fulfill their obligations.

Also badly hit by the recession was the banking industry. Lending for real estate, construction, and oil projects — the source of the banking boom in previous years — had nearly dried up. All banks suffered sharp drops in profits: from 1982 through 1985 their combined profits plunged from \$709m. to \$221m. Others were actually taking losses. Provisions for bad debts tripled in three years to \$1.6 bn., and at least two of the kingdom's banks were being sustained by \$1 bn. in interest-free government deposits. In addition, the banks received unsympathetic hearings in court when their delinquent clients mentioned their interest charges, which were forbidden by Islamic Law. As a result of the leniency of the courts, many borrowers reportedly had little fear of blacklisting. At any rate, many debtors were members of the extended royal family or had close ties to it, and their names were not listed. Consequently, bankers argued that borrowers "simply walk away from debts with impunity."¹⁵ Chastened by their experiences with the courts, the banks felt they had no choice but to try to renegotiate loans and play on their clients' fears that they would deny them loans once the economy strengthened. But such a measure suffered a setback when a pioneering SR700m. (\$186m.) loan rescheduling arrangement for the Jidda-based

Arabian Auto Agency collapsed eight months after it was signed, with the company SR95m. in arrears on its rescheduled payments. Bankers stated that this cast a further shadow over their attempts to collect debts in the kingdom. No wonder, then, that there was a consensus among bankers that "there is a dysfunction in the banking system of Saudi Arabia right now."¹⁶

The best indicator of the extent to which the Saudi economy had shrunk in the 1980s was the volume of the gross domestic product (GDP). In 1985 it fell 8.6%; in 1986 it dropped 10%; and estimates for 1987 put the decline at 3%. The GDP totaled only \$70 bn. in 1986, less than half the 1981 figure.¹⁷ To compensate for the sharp drop in government spending, the leadership continued to call for more "private sector participation and investment in the Saudi economy." The theme of the third Saudi Businessmen's Conference, which met in Abha in March (for details of the previous conferences, see *MECS* 1982-83, pp. 748-49, and 1984-85, pp. 592-93), was "activation of the private sector for a better contribution to the national economy." In the absence of Fahd, who was abroad, the governor of 'Asir, Prince Khaled (the late King Faysal's son), opened the conference with a confrontational address, accusing Saudi businessmen who invested abroad of ingratitude for the development efforts of the government. Other official spokesmen were less direct in their criticism, but they all insisted that the time had come for the private sector to fend for itself rather than depend on government projects. There were also signs of reconciliation, however, with the formation of joint government-private sector committees to look into late government payments and to settle loan disputes between banks and the private sector.¹⁸

NEW POLICIES TOWARD 1988

The deficits in the Saudi budget could be conceivably covered by imposing more taxes, fees, duties, etc., or by slashing the generous subsidy system; or by obtaining loans. Since the kingdom had started to incur deficits in 1983, all three options were rejected by the royal family, which dipped into the financial reserves of the kingdom to close the gaps. But, in late 1987, the first signs of a change affecting all three options began to surface. In November, the government announced its decision to raise the price of super petrol — the standard premium gasoline used by cars — by more than 50%, from 35.3 cents to 53.8 cents per gallon. Thus, a gallon which cost only 27.3 cents in 1984, cost almost 100% more. Diesel, which cost 3.5 cents a gallon in 1984, soared 250% to 12 cents a gallon.¹⁹ It turned out that this was not the only subsidy cut. Formerly, the government subsidized flour, sugar, rice, edible oils, and powdered and condensed milk. With the exception of flour, all these lost their subsidies without any public announcement being made by the government. Barley had the only remaining import subsidy, and even that was cut from SR300 to SR100 per ton. The wheat cultivation subsidy was also cut, from SR3,500 to SR2,000 per ton. Postal rates went up by almost 350%, and fees for visas, driving licenses, and other government services also increased. Only water remained still heavily subsidized.²⁰ The government was clearly determined to cut its huge subsidy bill, both to save money and to encourage more efficient use of resources. No less important was the psychological dimension — the desire to wean the people from subsidies.

Another departure from previous policy was the decision to tax the income of expatriate workers. Those who earned over SR6,000 (\$1,600) a year would be taxed

between 5% and 30% of their salaries, expenses, and social benefits. The new tax was expected to fetch some \$470m. annually. The measure was announced on 3 January 1988, without any previous warning, and was to become effective the same month. It immediately created considerable resentment and led to an outcry, especially among American and European workers. The message they wished to convey to the government was that the net effect of the new regulation could very well be an exodus of highly trained Westerners — doctors, lawyers, engineers, and other professionals. Within hours, the regime changed course and canceled the tax.²¹ The very fact that the royal family was ready to enact a regulation which would raise only a relatively small amount of money and was bound to generate antagonism and anger, was indicative of the financially troubled situation it was in.

The third and the most conspicuous departure from established policy concerned the deficit issue. In previous years the regime had turned to its financial reserves as the only means of covering deficits. When he announced the 1988 budget, however, Fahd declared that the government was going to raise SR30 bn. (\$8 bn.) through the sale of Treasury bonds to balance the budget. It was the first time that the kingdom — with its deep-rooted religious aversion to the concept of interest — resorted to borrowing for fiscal reasons. The king did not say whether the bonds would be offered to the international market as well as domestically; nor did he elaborate on the form the debt instruments would take. Moreover, publication of details of the bonds was forbidden by the government, which must have feared a backlash from religious circles. Bankers expected the royal family to get around the interest problem by offering bonds on a discount basis modeled on the deposit accounts that had been offered by the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency since 1984. In explaining the need to borrow, Fahd said that the kingdom's revenues had sunk to only one fifth of their level at the beginning of the decade. He added that this required that the government borrow money and that the citizens cooperate in cutting costs.²²

The new approach to the problem of deficits in 1988 was further highlighted when contrasted with the government's policy toward the 1987 deficit. The previous approach explicitly recognized that the entire \$14 bn. gap would be covered by dipping into the kingdom's reserves, while borrowing was completely ruled out. In the 1988 budget, almost 80%, (\$8 bn.) of the deficit was to be raised by borrowing, while only 20% (\$2.13 bn.) was to be drawn from the reserves. This shift reflected a growing awareness in the kingdom that drawing on and depleting foreign reserves amounted to fiscal recklessness in the longer term, and that it could not be pursued indefinitely. By the end of fiscal 1987 — the fifth consecutive budget deficit — the cumulative deficit incurred since 1983–84 reached \$65 bn., an amount covered entirely from reserves. While the total value of the kingdom's reserves is a matter of speculation (see *MECS* 1986, p. 550), most estimates put it at around \$80 bn., while liquid reserves are probably half that amount. This would give Saudi Arabia cover for only three to four years before the liquid reserves were completely depleted. Hence the royal family felt that it had reached a red line and that other methods had to be adopted.

The 1988 budget reflected a continuation of the process of shrinking expenditures and declining revenues. Total projected spending was \$37.65 bn., down from \$45.3 bn. in 1987, and overall estimated revenues were put at \$27.52 bn., down from \$31.3 bn. in 1987. There was no indication of what proportion of the anticipated revenues would come from oil, and how much from non-oil sources. But given the disappointing

performance of the latter in 1987 (see above), it seemed that the decline in revenues represented mainly an anticipated decline from non-oil sources. The deficit built into the budget, \$10.13 bn., constituted 27% of total outlays and was still second only to that of the US.²³

DEFENSE AND MILITARY PRIORITIES

The economic recession also affected the largest single item in the Saudi budget — defense. But though there were cutbacks in defense outlays, there was a distinct bias in favor of military expenditures. Budgetary allocations for defense were cut from \$19 bn. in 1984–85 to \$17.7 bn. in 1985–86 and \$16.2 bn. in 1987. In percentage terms, however, military expenditures actually increased from 27% of total outlays in 1984–85 to 32% in 1985–86, to an all-time record of 35.7% in 1987 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 554). While the defense budget in 1987 was down only 8% over 1985–86 allocations, the budget as a whole dropped by more than 15%. There was also evidence that the Defense Ministry had been benefiting from extrabudgetary sources of finance; in fact, actual military outlays had always been shrouded in mystery.

It was precisely because of the sharp decline in expenditures in all other sectors that high defense and security allocations emerged as conspicuous exceptions which called for an explanation. Moreover, a review of the main military contracts awarded in 1987 revealed a high level of expenditures even in an area given considerably less priority in recent years — military infrastructure.²⁴ The scope, quantity, and quality of Saudi arms deals in 1986 and 1987 — both concluded and in the process of negotiation — were of a magnitude similar to the major deals of the late 1970s and early 1980s when Saudi annual oil revenues reached, and surpassed, the \$100 bn. level. With one fifth of those revenues earned in 1986 or 1987, it was surprising that the Saudis should embark on such a major drive of arms purchases and military expenditures. Following is a cursory glance at these outlays.

The “arms deal of the century” with Britain, signed in 1986, began to be implemented in 1987. It involved the sale of 132 aircraft worth \$7 bn.; but with the additional training programs, construction and improvement of bases, replenishment of spares and future modifications to the aircraft, the deal would probably be worth some \$12 bn. In addition, the Saudis were still implementing the \$4 bn. long-term contract with several US firms known as the “Peace Shield” program. Scheduled to be completed in 1992, it aimed at building a most sophisticated air defense system for the kingdom (for details, see chapters on Saudi Arabia in previous volumes of *MECS*).

New items in what one publication described as “Saudi Arabia’s seemingly endless chain of prestige military hardware purchases” were submarines.²⁵ Fahd stated that the kingdom was determined “to have both a visible and invisible deterrent naval force.”²⁶ In late 1986 Saudi Arabia invited bids from seven European consortia for the supply of six to eight advanced diesel-powered submarines and the construction of two ports, as well as bases and training facilities, worth between \$3 bn. and \$5 bn. The seven bidders were firms from France, Italy, Holland, Britain, Sweden, and two firms from West Germany, with the French and the British being the top contenders.²⁷ In addition, Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states were seeking to buy up to 20 maritime patrol aircraft, with the French *Atlantique*, the Dutch *Fokker*, and the American *Orion* being the three main choices. The total cost of the 10 aircraft for the Saudis was expected to exceed \$500m. Statements by Saudi leaders, especially

Defense Minister Sultan, suggested that they were determined to acquire deep-water capable submarines that were equipped with advanced conventional missiles and could be used both for surveillance and against surface ships. The Saudis had already acquired a stock of advanced *Harpoon* missiles and were expected to equip the submarines with those systems.²⁸ Finally, following the growing mine menace in the Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia invited bids for the supply of eight mine-hunting ships worth between \$450m. and \$550m.²⁹

In addition to building up their naval forces, the Saudis sought to strengthen their armored brigades. During the hot months of August and September, the Saudi Government tested four tanks for their fire power, adaptability to desert conditions, and mobility on sand dunes. The tested tanks were the French AMX-40, the British *Challenger*, the American Abrams M-1, and the Brazilian *Osorio*, all equipped with a 120-mm. cannon.³⁰

In March and April, the US approved three arms packages for the kingdom. The first was a \$400m. package consisting of 28 helicopters, rockets, and *TOW* antitank systems, and a C-12 aircraft. The second was a \$325m. deal involving electronic countermeasure systems for F-5 and F-15 aircraft. The third was a \$320m. contract extending the US Army Corps of Engineers' management contract with the Saudi Army for two years. From Brazil, the Saudis reportedly purchased advanced antiaircraft systems to protect air fields, in addition to rocket launchers and sophisticated ground-to-air missiles worth some \$500m.

The Ministry of Interior, prompted by fears of internal upheavals, was reported to have negotiated with the French the sale of advanced equipment for the security forces, the Frontier Corps and the Coast Guard. In November, Sultan announced the construction of a new air base in the Kharj area, 80 km. south of Riyadh. Scheduled to be operational by 1991, its total cost would be \$2.7 bn. Finally, Sultan announced that the kingdom was in the process of setting up four new weapons factories to manufacture machine-guns, armored personnel carriers, spare parts, light weapons, and ammunition. According to Sultan, the factories would be "big and costly" and had already provided the kingdom with 60% of its required ammunition and light arms.³¹

The purchase of submarines and marine aircraft, and the construction of two submarine ports at Jubayl and Yanbu', was bound to introduce a new strategic dimension into the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. With the last of the four French frigates delivered, the new purchases would mean that the Saudi Navy had made a tremendous leap forward since the late 1970s. Israeli sources said that they regarded "the presence of Saudi submarines in the Red Sea with concern."³² This view was accentuated by the fact that, given the shallow waters of the Persian Gulf, the submarines were likely to be employed only in the Red Sea area. Such a major development of the kingdom's naval and air forces would indicate that in 1987 Saudi Arabia leaped into the category of major regional forces, joining the ranks of Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Syria, Iran, and Iraq. This led an American newspaper to reason that the massive arms purchases were "far beyond" what the kingdom needed to confront Iran and protect its Gulf shipping. It concluded that, underlying this drive, was the desire of Fahd and Sultan to "build up a military force equal to that of Israel," which would enable the Saudis "to confront Israel's military superiority."³³

But in order to strengthen national security, armaments were not enough; the Saudi

military had to be substantially broadened. Yet the perennial problem of lack of volunteers, on the one hand, and the unwillingness of the regime to impose a draft, on the other, hampered any such prospect. All that was left for Fahd was to appeal "to all citizens to join the armed forces, the National Guard, or the internal security forces," and to suggest that all secondary-school graduates carry out at least two years' military training. He explained that if "the 50,000–100,000 secondary-school graduates serve their country for two years and then are replaced by others, this means that within a few years there will be no less than 400,000 or 500,000 people who can easily serve the country any moment they are needed."³⁴ However, in the absence of formal conscription, Fahd's call was unlikely to be heeded.

THE MECCA RIOTS — THE SAUDI ASSESSMENT

Examinations of Saudi statements and behavior prior to the pilgrimage season underlined the fact that the government was bracing itself for trouble. It was impossible to ascertain whether these Saudi expectations were based on concrete information or merely on their analysis and assessment of Iranian statements. But numerous indications pointed to the Saudis expecting the 150,000-strong Iranian contingent to behave in a highly provocative manner, in marked contrast to Iranian behavior during the 1985 and 1986 pilgrimages (for details, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 161–63, 598, and *MECS* 1986, chapter on Saudi Arabia and essay on Islamic affairs). Thus, a month before the *hajj*, in an unusually harshly worded speech clearly directed against Iran, King Fahd attacked "hypocrites and pretenders who are using Islam to undermine and destabilize other Islamic countries." He warned that "if their real intention is to stage demonstrations and angry marches and to chant well-known slogans which spread an atmosphere of chaos and upset the peace — then this cannot be approved or tolerated." The government issued an official warning banning "demonstrations and clamorous processions" during the *hajj*, a warning that was much sterner and more specific than in previous years.³⁵ It was against this backdrop that Jordan dispatched a crack battalion of special forces to Mecca at Fahd's request. The 300-man elite battalion was reportedly deployed outside the Grand Mosque in Mecca ahead of the Iranian demonstrations, and it played a major role in suppressing the riots on 31 July.³⁶ (For a detailed analysis of the riots and the conflicting versions of both sides, see essay on Islamic affairs, and chapter on Iran in this volume.)

Saudi anxieties were heightened on the eve of the *hajj* by Khomeyni's speeches and messages to the Iranian pilgrims, which the Saudis viewed as entirely different from his relatively "moderate" speeches in previous years. Of particular concern was his call to the pilgrims "to go from holy *hajj* to holy *jihad* by bathing yourselves in blood and martyrdom," and his description of the *hajj* not only as worship but also as "a battlefield." Finally, his instruction "to disavow the pagans with as much ceremony as possible in the form of demonstrations and marches" was interpreted by the Saudis as an inflammatory message inciting the Iranian pilgrims to riot. Consequently, following the clashes, Saudi officials suggested that the Iranian Government had advance warning of the riots. They noted that almost immediately after the incident, a mob mounted a "spontaneous" demonstration in Tehran, which led to the sacking of the Saudi Embassy and the Kuwaiti Embassy. Corroborating such an interpretation, American officials confirmed that the Iranians had rehearsed the overrunning of the embassies prior to the riots.³⁷

Furthermore, the Saudis strove to prove that the Iranian authorities not only had advance knowledge of the attack, but had actually planned it carefully. Citing "confessions" by Iranian pilgrims arrested and interrogated in the aftermath of the disturbances, Saudi officials claimed that the Iranian plan consisted of the following stages: first, shutting off all the worshippers who were inside the Grand Mosque; second, killing the imam of the mosque and anyone trying to prevent the Iranians from carrying out their plan; third, proclaiming Khomeyni "Holy Imam and Prophet of all Muslims," and forcing all the pilgrims in the mosque to pay allegiance to him as such; fourth, declaring the Iranian city of Qom a holy place which Muslims should visit as pilgrims; fifth, burning parts of the holy *Ka'ba* and blaming the Saudi authorities for the arson, in order to further humiliate the Saudi Government. Once all these stages had been implemented, the Iranians were to leave the area of the mosque and lead hundreds of thousands of pilgrims in an attack against royal palaces and other centers of Saudi power.

The "confessions" also revealed that the Iranian contingent had been specially formed to carry out the plan. Of the 150,000 pilgrims, 25% were Revolutionary Guards, 40% suicidal volunteers, 13% members of "the generation of the revolution," and only 22% were real pilgrims. Their overall goal was to destabilize Saudi Arabia and make the kingdom appear unfit to rule over Islam's holy shrines. Concluded the interior minister, Prince Na'if: "The real conspiracy hatched by the leaders of Iran was to make Saudi Arabia appear unable to provide adequate security." Reacting to the Iranian scheme, the Saudi media attributed these "abortive designs" to "psychological pressures and a growing sense of frustration and failure prevailing in Tehran, resulting from a complete state of isolation in which the Iranian leaders find themselves."³⁸ (For more on the Saudi reaction, see below.)

There was ample evidence that Riyadh's failure to control the Iranian pilgrims and the inability to keep peace at the sacred heart of Islam profoundly embarrassed the Saudi Government. The Iranian challenge to the Saudi fitness, indeed right, to be the custodian of Mecca seemed to have touched a raw nerve. On this issue, said a Saudi official, "we can never compromise."³⁹ Thus, in addition to a diplomatic offensive (see foreign affairs, below), the royal family launched what was described as "a public relations blitz," in an unusual display of concern for world public opinion by a kingdom that had traditionally made discretion a trademark. Normally reclusive Saudi Arabia summoned more than 100 Western and Arab reporters to Jidda for an unusual press conference by Interior Minister, Prince Na'if, his first since 1979. Giving the most detailed public account of the Saudi version of the riots, Na'if laid the blame for the "plot" squarely on the shoulders of Khomeyni and his government.⁴⁰

Next, the royal family put the military on alert. Security was especially tight in the Eastern Province, heart of the oil industry and home of the entire Shi'i minority in the kingdom. "The Province would be the first target," said its governor, Prince Muhammad (Fahd's son), citing the oil fields as his main concern.⁴¹ Such fears were substantiated on 15 August when a blast rocked a liquid petroleum processing plant at Ra's al-Juwayma, a showcase oil installation built in 1981. The official Saudi announcement attributed the explosion to an "electrical fault"; but an organization called "Hizballah of the Hijaz" claimed that its "brave youth[s] set fire" to the installation, as a result of which "dozens of mercenaries were killed." It was only one week later that the Egyptian newspaper, *al-Ahram*, reported that Egyptian officers and

soldiers from the central security units, specially trained in combating terrorism, had arrived in Saudi Arabia.⁴²

Finally, Fahd ordered all royal family members vacationing abroad to return to the kingdom immediately. This reportedly led to a mass exodus of Saudis from the Italian, French, and Spanish Rivas, where many of these princes had holiday homes. No official reason was given, but it was assumed that Fahd wanted his immediate family around him at a time of mounting Iranian threats and anti-Saudi propaganda. Security for vacationing Saudis had already been stepped up in Europe, where the police forces feared Iranian terrorist attacks. Fahd apparently refused to take any chances, and ordered his people back home.⁴³

ROYAL FAMILY POLITICS

Many challenges surfaced during the year that could have disrupted the unity of the royal family, but the family made a special effort to retain its cohesion. Declining oil revenues, growing deficits, depleted financial reserves, the Gulf War, the violent clashes with Iranian pilgrims, the US naval presence in the Gulf — all could have produced sharp differences within the royal family over the kingdom's policies. Instead, it appeared that the family was seeking to display and maintain unity despite obvious disagreements as well as power struggles among its ranks.

For the first time since Fahd's accession to the throne in 1982, there were reports, admittedly from anti-regime sources in Europe, of the emergence of a strong coalition against him. Surprisingly, the two main figures opposing the king were reportedly the crown prince, 'Abdallah, and the defense minister, Sultan, who had been known as arch rivals; the latter was a full brother of Fahd. The two were said to have blamed the king for the decline in Saudi Arabia's stature in the Arab, Islamic, and international arenas, and for the ongoing economic crisis and recession. In addition, both were reported to have been impatient with Fahd's management of the kingdom, and unwilling to wait for the normal succession process to take its course.⁴⁴

In addition to these reports, there were recurring "rumors" that 'Abdallah might try to ease Fahd off the throne.⁴⁵ But the chances of this taking place appeared to be very remote. As crown prince, 'Abdallah could expect to succeed Fahd in any case; moreover, Fahd was already in poor health, suffering from diabetes and heart disease, as well as being considerably overweight. It was therefore unlikely that 'Abdallah would jeopardize a peaceful and legitimate succession endorsed by all the senior princes by attempting to acquire power prematurely. Moreover, even if he were successful in such a course, he would undoubtedly forfeit the dynastic legitimacy of having all the senior princes publicly acknowledge his accession, as was the common practice. If the natural succession from Fahd to 'Abdallah was expected to be smooth, so was the appointment of Sultan as crown prince, making any precipitous action on his part also less likely.

The real uncertainty in any succession was more likely to concern the identity of Sultan's heir apparent. The candidate most frequently mentioned was Na'if, a man of considerable administrative experience who had formerly been the governor of Riyadh and had headed the Interior Ministry since 1975. One of the "Sudayri Seven," Na'if was a full brother of Fahd and Sultan, but in contrast to them had the reputation of being modest in his private life. However, a line of succession passing through Sultan to Na'if, and then possibly to Prince Salman, the long-time governor of

Riyadh, was bound to generate opposition among various branches of the royal family. For this meant that, starting with Fahd, four of the five Saudi kings would all be full brothers — Fahd, Sultan, Na'if and Salman—and members of the powerful Sudayri clan which would monopolize the position of monarch for some decades. This would probably be viewed by the other branches of the royal family as undermining the delicate balance among them. Consequently, there had been a question mark over whether 'Abdallah would try to disrupt the Sudayri line of succession.

However, in view of the many challenges facing the royal family, 'Abdallah could ill afford to alienate the Sudayris. The best he could strive for was to consolidate the strength of those power centers in the kingdom that were not controlled by the Sudayris — the foremost of which was the National Guard, which had been under his command for over two decades. This was considered relatively easy, as the National Guard was personally loyal to 'Abdallah, and because his son, Khaled, had the western command of the guard and was well placed for eventual promotion to its head. Another line 'Abdallah could adopt was to look for potential allies who shared his desire to curb the power of the Sudayris. Such allies could be the eight sons of the late King Faysal; indeed, there were indications that 'Abdallah had been courting them.⁴⁶

With such speculation surrounding 'Abdallah, his visit to Washington in October 1987 — the first since 1976 — came as an anticlimax.⁴⁷ If the visit had not coincided with the US naval strike against Iranian targets (see essay on the US and the ME), the collapse of the stock market on Wall Street, and the Indian prime minister's visit to Washington, it might well have been inferred that some mysterious hand was intentionally trying to keep 'Abdallah from being noticed. There was speculation in Riyadh about the arrangements that had been made by the Saudi ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan. Arab journalists covering 'Abdallah's visit were instructed not to dispatch anything unless they had cleared it first with Bandar. As he made himself unavailable during the visit, this was tantamount to a press blackout by the ambassador. Other Saudi sources observed that on their official visits to Washington, Fahd, Sultan, and other high officials had all pursued a higher profile itinerary. No senior member of the royal family — let alone a crown prince — had ever been accorded such public anonymity as 'Abdallah on that visit. And questions were asked about this in Riyadh and Washington.

Various answers were offered by both Saudi and US officials. One was that because 'Abdallah had a speech impediment (a bad stammer), no meetings had been scheduled for either the US or Arab press corps, and there were no formal briefings or statements from the US side. A second answer suggested that Saudi press coverage had been limited in keeping with 'Abdallah's own desire to observe royal protocol and not appear to be supplanting the role of the king. But if that was the case, why had 'Abdallah embarked on his trip in the first place?

One theory suggested that the visit was a major concession by the crown prince to Fahd's demands for consensus after the Mecca riots. Since 'Abdallah was identified as a critic of the close US-Saudi relationship, his visit to Washington could have been intended to scotch rumors of sibling rivalry. A second theory circulating in Riyadh was that 'Abdallah had decided on the Washington visit as an initiative of his own, to establish direct contacts with the Reagan Administration for himself at a time of great

sensitivity and possible tension within the Saudi leadership. In this context, his meetings with President Ronald Reagan, Vice President George Bush, Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, and various congressional leaders were cited. One Saudi observer suggested that 'Abdallah might have been trying "to show his own flag" in Washington; and precisely because this could have threatened the position of the Sudayris, Bandar might have tried to downplay the visit. The third theory was that 'Abdallah's visit had been an American idea, intended to win over the crown prince who was reputed to be among top Saudis the least sympathetic to US policy. This would explain the Administration's decision, 10 days before 'Abdallah's arrival, to avoid the controversy his visit might trigger in Congress by compromising on the proposed arms package for the kingdom (see below).

The unity of the royal family was severely tested by the publication, in the US, of Bob Woodward's book *Veil: The Secret Wars of the CIA, 1981-1987*. Woodward disclosed that Ambassador Bandar had arranged in early 1985 with CIA Director William Casey to finance the assassination of Sheikh Muhammad Husayn Fadlallah — a prominent leader of the Shi'i Hizballah in Lebanon. According to the book, Bandar provided \$3m. in a Swiss bank account, which paid for the hiring of agents and the purchase of explosives for the 8 March 1985 bombing of the sheikh's residence. When Fadlallah survived the explosion — 80 of his neighbors were not so lucky — Bandar reportedly helped to arrange a \$2m. bribe for food, medicine, and education for the sheikh and his followers. Bandar was quoted as saying: "It was easier to bribe him than to kill him."⁴⁸

The willingness of Fahd, prodded by Sultan and Bandar, to participate in covert American operations (in Lebanon, Angola, and Nicaragua), had long been a subject of internal Saudi debate. But the disclosure of Bandar's involvement in Lebanon caused a sharper controversy, because in the delicate division of responsibility in the Saudi court, Lebanon had not been Sultan's or Bandar's but rather 'Abdallah's area of concern. The disclosure thus exposed Bandar in an act of disloyalty to his uncle, in an abortive plot that caused 'Abdallah considerable loss of face, quite apart from the damage it did to Bandar's personal reputation. Prior to the disclosure, it had been planned that Bandar would assume a new position in Riyadh as Fahd's national security adviser. Though this plan was shelved, Bandar could not be withdrawn from his Washington post without the royal family appearing to be punishing him and contradicting its denial of Woodward's version. For the time being, therefore, Bandar was obliged to remain in Washington, but in limbo as it were.⁴⁹

Despite all the challenges and tests, the royal family did demonstrate its ability to pull together in times of crisis. Bandar had not been made a scapegoat for adverse publicity about covert payments abroad; Na'if received full support for his explanation of the confrontation with the Iranian pilgrims; and the king and the crown prince made consistent efforts to display unity within family ranks despite obvious policy differences. This feeling of consensus was also demonstrated when Fahd summoned royal family members back from abroad in the aftermath of the Mecca riots.⁵⁰ Highly significant also was the decision to appoint one of the sons of the late King Sa'ud, Prince Muhammad, to be governor of Baha. Defense and aviation minister under his father, Muhammad was the first member of Sa'ud's branch of the family to be rehabilitated politically. The desire to close ranks was paramount.

A GROWING DRUG PROBLEM

The problem of drug smuggling became a prominent issue in the public life of Saudi Arabia in 1987. For the first time, the government devoted a great deal of attention and resources to combating the problem and curbing its expansion. The sheer number of speeches, interviews, articles, committees, and symposia dealing with this subject was unprecedented, and reflected the seriousness with which the authorities perceived it. It also attested to the fact that the problem had increased in magnitude and that large-scale efforts were needed to confront it.

The government formed 35 units which were stationed in the main cities and at border checkpoints in order to combat drug smuggling and pushing. In addition, 150 cells were spread around the smaller cities and villages in the kingdom to gather information about drug smugglers and pushers. The military also joined the campaign: 15 units were formed in the Army and three in the National Guard, whose goal was to "instill a better understanding of the dangers and damage involved in using drugs and narcotics." The government also established a National Committee for Combating Drugs, and appointed Prince Faysal, Fahd's son, as its chairman.⁵¹ Editorials in the Saudi press frequently repeated the same theme: "We ought to recognize that we face a problem. We should mobilize all our influence at home, in schools, and on the streets to combat this problem. Each citizen, be he a parent, a teacher, a soldier, or a clerk, must do his utmost to check this problem from spreading; otherwise, we are bound to find ourselves descending into an abyss like other countries which had failed to combat the disease."⁵² In January 1987, the newspaper *al-Sharq al-Awsat* sponsored an extensive symposium on the subject of "Drugs in the Arab and Islamic Homeland," in which doctors, religious scholars, and government officials participated. The message that emerged from the symposium was that drug dealers were "devoid of any religious or moral values, [and their] sole [motivation] was greed." The problem should, therefore, be confronted as the "worst form of organized crime."⁵³

A major step in combating the problem was taken in March when the Higher Council of 'Ulama decided to impose severe penalties on drug offenders. First-time offenders charged with pushing or using narcotics would "receive a mild penalty — public flogging with fifty strokes of the whip." Repetition of the offense would carry a sentence of public beheading in the city's main square. The ruling was based on drug offenders being regarded in the category of people the Qur'an describes as "polluters of the Holy Land and the purity of living, who must be punished for their crimes by decapitation."⁵⁴ Saudi officials expressed the hope that such penalties would "limit the dimensions of the problem" and serve as "a reminder, warning, and deterrent to those involved in these crimes." In a televised speech following the beheading of a person convicted of "drug marketing," Na'if vowed to "strike with an iron fist anyone tempted to smuggle or market narcotics." He declared that there would be "no complacency or hesitation in implementing these penalties against those who corrupt our society." He admitted that there were numerous cases that were still being investigated and "whose culprits will meet the same fate soon."⁵⁵

Toward the end of the year there were indications that the government was satisfied with its efforts to curb the problem. The director-general of the national committee for combating drugs announced in November that drug trafficking in the kingdom had declined by 40%. He explained that as drug abuse had not yet become "a deep-rooted phenomenon," and as the problem had grown "only because there was a

lack of awareness of its dangers," it could be dealt with effectively and, indeed, "it decreased as fast as it had first expanded."⁵⁶

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SAUDI POSITION IN THE ARAB ARENA

Saudi activities in and expectations from the inter-Arab framework in 1987 fluctuated from pessimism and passivity to frantic activism and expectations of a breakthrough. The issue at stake was still the convening of the all-Arab summit conference that had been delayed since 1983 and should have met in Riyadh. The fact that such a summit had not convened reflected the splits and rivalries that had plagued the Arab world since the early 1980s, and belied any semblance of Arab solidarity, which the Saudis considered very important. Saudi Arabia could not get the major Arab states to agree even on a common agenda for a summit, let alone on substantive issues. Furthermore, the fact that the Iraqi-Iranian War, and Persian Gulf politics in general, had become intertwined with Arab, and hence summit, politics, further exacerbated the rivalries within the Arab camp and made a summit all the more elusive. In 1986 the Saudis concentrated on a multistage strategy aimed at: (a) effecting a reconciliation between Syria and Iraq; (b) attempting, through small-scale summits, to terminate the Iraqi-Iranian War; (c) convening the all-Arab summit conference. Having failed to attain any of these goals, the Saudis retreated to a backstage role until the spring of 1987.

Increasing Iranian attacks on tankers sailing to or from Saudi Arabia, and Khomeyni's much more belligerent posture toward the Gulf states, particularly Kuwait, seemed to change the Saudi attitude and to push the royal family back into high-profile activity. Saudi mediation efforts between Iraq and Syria were stepped up and, though never confirmed by either side, a meeting between Saddam Husayn and Hafiz al-Asad apparently took place in mid-May in Jordan. According to one version, it was attended by 'Abdallah. The expected Iraqi-Syrian reconciliation led 'Abdallah to give a remarkably upbeat assessment of the prospects of an imminent breakthrough in the Iraqi-Iranian War.⁵⁷ Such optimism must have been reinforced by Fahd's success in achieving what had hitherto been considered impossible — bringing King Hassan of Morocco and President Chedli Benjedid of Algeria together. That no substantive progress was made on the Western Sahara issue became less important; the very holding of the meeting was seen as a great Saudi achievement.⁵⁸

No wonder, then, that the Saudi leadership doubled its mediation efforts on the Iraqi-Syrian-Iranian scene, and the Saudi media displayed optimism as to the prospects of a breakthrough. Moreover, the Saudis could discern an overall pattern of reconciliation gradually crystallizing: Syria-Iraq, Algeria-Morocco, PLO-Morocco, Libya-Iraq, Egypt-PLO, and even Egypt-Libya. All this, according to one Saudi newspaper, could amount to "a new dawn in inter-Arab relations and a new era which would realize the Arab nation's hopes for solidarity and unity."⁵⁹ This also meant that the Saudis could now move to the second phase in their multistage strategy — the convening of a minisummit in Riyadh in preparation for the comprehensive summit. The minisummit would reportedly bring together the Saudi hosts, Syria, Iraq, Jordan, and the PLO, and devise an agenda on the major issues to be discussed by the larger summit. So confident were the Saudis of their success that they were reported to

have already scheduled the overall summit for September 1987.⁶⁰ As all the attempts at reconciliation failed to produce results, the Saudi plan faded and the momentum toward the summit collapsed in June.

It was only in August, as a result of the Mecca riots of 31 July, that the Saudis renewed their inter-Arab efforts, but with a much more limited goal in mind: the formation of an all-Arab front which would sever all ties with Iran. Shaken by the ever-increasing challenge from Khomeyni, the royal family sought to impress upon the rest of the Arab world the need to devise a clear, uncompromising policy against Iranian aggression. But two emergency meetings of the Arab League, in August and September, were unable to reach consensus on any multilateral break with Iran following its refusal to accept Security Council Resolution 598 for a cease-fire.⁶¹ The only practical consequence of the meetings was the decision to hold an emergency Arab summit in Amman in November. (For an account and analysis of the Arab League sessions, see essay on inter-Arab relations.) That the Saudis endorsed the plan — despite their long-time desire to hold the summit in Riyadh — attested not only to their obsession with the Iranian threat but also to their perception of the Amman summit as devoted merely to a single issue — Iran.

In preparation for the Amman summit, the Saudis let it be known that they were trying to forge a united Arab front against Iran and rally the other Arab states behind a resolution that would condemn Tehran for refusing to accept the Security Council's cease-fire resolution. It came, therefore, as a major surprise when Fahd announced, only four days before the opening of the summit, that he would not participate in the conference and that the kingdom would be represented by 'Abdallah.

A number of factors could explain his decision. First, as Syria was expected to resist efforts to condemn Iran, Fahd did not wish to have a public confrontation with Asad. Second, as Syria insisted that the Arab-Israeli problem be discussed as well, Fahd wanted to protest, by being absent, the fact that the summit was not dealing only with the "challenge to the Arab world posed by Iran." Third, as a number of countries, including Saudi Arabia, were to demand that Egypt be readmitted to the Arab fold as a counterbalance to the Iranian threat, and as the Syrians were expected to resist this, Fahd again wished to avoid a public confrontation with Asad. Fourth, the royal family expected to be pressed for increasing financial assistance, especially by Syria, and Fahd was reluctant to be put on the spot by such pressure. The common denominator in all these explanations was the unwillingness to have a public confrontation with the Syrian president. Furthermore, since 'Abdallah had personally been supervising Saudi-Syrian relations for a long time, the king considered him more adept at dealing with Asad.

Despite all their initial misgivings and apprehensions as to the summit's effectiveness — in view of the Syrian position — the Saudis seemed to have been taken by surprise by the show of a firm Arab consensus against Iran. (For an analysis of the summit, see essay on inter-Arab relations.) Moreover, the Saudi media immediately began to advance the argument that it was largely due to the Saudi performance in Amman that the summit finally adopted such a strong anti-Iranian stand. The mood was apparently euphoric in Riyadh, where the summit was referred to as "a pioneering step," "an historical turning point," and "the inauguration of a new era." The meetings and apparent reconciliation between, *inter alia*, Asad and Saddam Husayn, 'Arafat and King Husayn, and Asad and Amin Jumayyil, aroused new hopes in Riyadh that

an overall Arab reconciliation was within reach. In addition, the summit's resolution that each Arab country was entitled to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt, though not a full-fledged return of Cairo to Arab ranks, amounted nevertheless to a breakthrough since the overwhelming majority of Arab countries were expected to, and actually did, do so. Also, the net result of the latter, coupled with an Iraqi-Syrian reconciliation, could very well diminish the threats and dangers posed by Iran and perhaps even signal the beginning of the end of the Iraqi-Iranian War.⁶²

The royal family was determined to cash in on the success of the summit. Soon afterward, 'Abdallah resumed his mediation efforts, shuttling between various Arab capitals. He was concentrating on two issues: enhancing the Iraqi-Syrian *rapprochement* that supposedly began in Amman with the Asad-Saddam meeting; and attempting to heal the rift between Egypt and Syria by arriving at some acceptable formula concerning the next stage in the Arab-Israeli political process.⁶³ By the end of the year, however, it appeared that both efforts had collapsed. The various Arab parties were entrenched in their positions, and the Amman summit had no real follow-up in the sense that its declarations and resolutions (except for those concerning relations with Egypt) remained basically nonstarters. The Saudis were back to square one.

RELATIONS WITH EGYPT

The process of *rapprochement* between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, which had gathered increasing momentum since 1985 (see *MECS* 1984-85, p. 604, and 1986, pp. 558-60), reached its peak in late 1987 with the restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two countries. In fact, Saudi-Egyptian relations warmed up considerably throughout 1987. But had it not been for the Amman resolutions, the kingdom would not have resumed relations with Egypt unilaterally. It was expected that with the "normalization" of relations, the range of contacts, cooperation, and coordination between the two countries would further widen. It was also assumed that the areas of cooperation, hitherto limited to economics and finance, would expand considerably and include strategic, military, and political issues, which had suffered from the absence of open relations since 1979.

Two Saudi ministers visited Egypt at the beginning of the year—the oil minister in January and the minister for religious endowments in February. Both met President Husni Mubarak and emphasized the need for closer cooperation between the two countries which "are inseparable."⁶⁴ In February, Fahd presented 50,000 copies of the Qur'an as a personal gift to Mubarak. And in the same month, Saudi Arabia released—as a gesture of goodwill—25 Egyptians who had been arrested after the attack on the Mecca Grand Mosque in November 1979.⁶⁵ Economic cooperation had also expanded following an Egyptian-Saudi investment conference convened in Cairo in October 1986. At that time, both sides decided to take advantage of a growing Saudi readiness to invest in Egypt, and Cairo's need for foreign capital to implement its five-year plan. Following a visit of top Saudi businessmen to Egypt in November 1986, an Egyptian delegation representing various chambers of commerce visited Saudi Arabia in April 1987. Its members presented their counterparts in the chambers of Riyadh, Jidda, and Mecca with 48 plans for investment in Egypt. A special liaison bureau was established to advise potential Saudi investors and facilitate the implementation of their projects.⁶⁶

These growing contacts peaked in June when the traveling exhibition "Riyadh — Yesterday and Today" opened in Cairo. Egypt was the first Arab country to host the exhibition after it had been shown in a number of European capitals. At the opening ceremony, Mubarak and Prince Salman, the governor of Riyadh and Fahd's full brother, pointed to the event as "reflecting the profound brotherly relations binding the two peoples and countries." The hospitality and warmth which the Egyptians showed toward their Saudi guests prompted the Saudi media to conclude that the real value of the fair lay in the fact that it provided the two peoples with the opportunity to "reestablish the brotherhood and friendship which had once existed." While in Cairo, Salman sponsored a meeting with Egyptian journalists, authors, and intellectuals, aimed at "cementing relations with the people, not merely with the government."⁶⁷

But the most significant changes occurred on the political level, and began before the resumption of diplomatic relations in November. In Saudi references to Egypt and to its commitments to the Camp David accords, there was a clear tendency to understand the Egyptian position and give it some credit. Thus, in an interview with an Egyptian newspaper, Prince Turki (Fahd's full brother and a former deputy defense minister) stated that it was "easier to talk about abrogating Camp David than to retrieve the occupied land." In an obvious reference to, and implicit criticism of, the Syrian position, he said that "we wish that occupied territories of other Arab states be liberated as Sinai was; there is a need for action, not just talking. Our goal is not to make war but to retrieve our rights. Have all Arab states regained their rights?" Finally he argued that the code words "Camp David" were merely a pretext used against Egypt: "To the extent that the term refers to occupied land — then Sinai is liberated; as far as the Palestinian issue is concerned, President Mubarak made it abundantly clear that he was not speaking for the Palestinians but rather leaving it for them to determine their position."⁶⁸

The Saudi media also launched a campaign to pave the way for "Egypt's return to Arab ranks." The recurring theme was that Egypt's participation in the Arab struggle was indispensable, and the following reasons were cited: (a) Egypt was the main confrontation state; (b) Egypt continued to adhere to the two principles of a comprehensive settlement and the restoration of Palestinian rights; (c) Egypt had excellent relations with the US and good relations with the USSR, which could be expected to be the two main actors at an international conference; and (d) Egypt was the only Arab country to have relations with Israel, and as such could serve as "the political buffer state" between the Arabs and Israel.⁶⁹ Underlying such reasoning, however, was the clear Saudi realization that, due to internal, regional, and international constraints, there was no way that Egypt could withdraw from its peace treaty with Israel.

But at the same time there was an even more powerful consideration shaping the Saudi attitude toward Egypt. In view of the escalation in the Iraqi-Iranian War, the rising tensions in the Gulf during the summer, and Khomeyni's increasing belligerency toward Saudi Arabia, Riyadh felt it was necessary to reformulate Saudi-Egyptian relations, and "to base them on new, solid foundations." There was a distinct awareness that "the new military threats facing the kingdom require cooperation with Egypt so we can employ her expertise and experience."⁷⁰ Such a conviction was dramatically reinforced by the riots of the Iranian pilgrims in Mecca, which led to the death of 400 people, and by the subsequent Iranian threats "to avenge the killing of the martyrs."

The Saudis were encouraged by Egyptian statements in support of the Saudi position and in condemnation of the "Iranian leaders who perpetrated the crime of invading the *Ka'ba* and seeking to destroy it, and who are guilty of killing numerous Muslims — men, women, and children." It was in this context that there were reports that Egyptian units trained in counterterrorism arrived in Saudi Arabia. A British publication even claimed Fahd had formally turned to Mubarak to secure Egyptian military support in case he was threatened by Iran.⁷¹

The close relations between the two countries also had a personal element centered on Mubarak. Many of the Saudi references to Egypt implied that, beyond the political differences, the rift was very much the product of the late Anwar al-Sadat's personality. Once he disappeared from the scene, the insurmountable psychological obstacle was removed and the road was open for change. This became all the more feasible in view of the orientation and personality of Mubarak, who "is deeply committed to Arab solidarity and cooperation." No wonder, then, that on the eve of the presidential elections in Egypt (see chapter on Egypt) Saudi officials and the media went out of their way to praise Mubarak, and Fahd himself described him as "the most qualified person to continue his leadership of Egypt in these most critical circumstances." The Saudis emphasized his "rising above the particular interests of Egypt," his readiness "to defend all-Arab causes," and his determination "to continue being an integral part of the Arab world."⁷²

Nonetheless, such a clear-cut reconciliation with Egypt was not extended to a resumption of diplomatic relations before the November summit. But even after the summit, the royal family did not rush to reestablish diplomatic relations with Cairo, but waited five days for other Arab states to do so before its Cabinet officially made the announcement.⁷³ Saudi Arabia thus became only the seventh country to resume diplomatic relations with Egypt (cf. chapter on Egypt). From a Saudi perspective, the move marked the rectification of an anomaly in its foreign policy which had existed since 1979. But due to its own perception of vulnerability, the royal family considered itself unable to rectify this anomaly without an all-Arab endorsement. Paradoxically, then, both Saudi decisions—to sever relations in 1979 (see *MECS* 1978–79, pp. 745–48), and to resume them in 1987 — were indications of weakness. In both cases, Saudi Arabia followed a course paved by other Arab states.

RELATIONS WITH SYRIA

There were a number of indications in 1987 that Saudi Arabia was more willing than in previous years to pursue policies that were incompatible with Syrian positions. Such a Saudi disposition could probably be attributed to the perception of a Syrian decline caused by economic and financial crises and by growing isolation in the Arab world. It also appeared that there was a direct relationship between the growing Iranian threat to the kingdom and the latter's readiness to stand up to Syria. The fact that the Iranian challenge reached its peak in 1987 could explain why that was the year the Saudis showed themselves willing to deviate from the previous pattern of their relations with Syria.

The two countries continued to differ on almost every major policy issue in the region: the Iraqi-Iranian War, Syrian-Iraqi relations, the split within the PLO, the Jordanian-PLO dialogue, and the Lebanese crisis. But such differences had remained for the most part under the surface. They emerged into a kind of a test of strength

between the two countries only in the aftermath of the Iranian riots in Mecca on 31 July. The demands that Saudi Arabia then made, that the entire Arab world impose a boycott on Iran and sever all ties with Khomeyni, coupled with Riyadh's efforts to have Egypt restored to Arab ranks, were anathema to Asad. Even before the Amman summit, unnamed Saudi officials expressed "disappointment with Syria." They suggested in interviews that "Syria's inconclusive confrontation with Israel, its divisive policies with regard to Palestinian groups, and its alliance with Khomeyni in the Gulf War, all emboldened many previously coy Arab countries to take a stand in favor of Egypt."⁷⁴ And during the summit itself the Saudis helped pass the resolution that opened the way for all Arab states to resume diplomatic ties with Cairo.

All these challenges notwithstanding, the royal family seemed to realize that there was a line that could only be crossed at the risk of dangerously alienating Syria. This is why the Saudis stopped short of irreversibly antagonizing Damascus, and why the challenges continued to be accompanied by generous financial subsidies. In addition, there was a practical consideration: despite Saudi anger at the Syrian alliance with Iran, the royal family was always aware that precisely because of this alliance, Syria was the only Arab country to have leverage on Tehran. That leverage could be useful even from the point of view of Saudi interests. Thus, the Saudi readiness to stand up to Syria was tempered by considerations of *realpolitik* as well as by the traditional fear of alienating Damascus.

ATTITUDE TOWARD JORDAN AND THE PLO

Saudi Arabia and Jordan had similar perceptions about most regional issues and, moreover, sought the same three major goals: to effect a Syrian-Iraqi reconciliation; to terminate the Iraqi-Iranian War; and to convene an Arab summit conference. King Husayn and 'Abdallah continued to coordinate their mediation efforts between Asad and Saddam Husayn. Thus both were credited with arranging and chairing the meeting between the two in Jordan in the spring of 1987.⁷⁵ In addition, King Husayn and Fahd coordinated efforts towards convening the Arab League meetings in Tunis in the summer and the Amman summit in November.

The one issue on which the two countries differed in previous years was the Jordanian-PLO dialogue. Though endorsing in principle the idea of a joint Jordanian-PLO stand, the Saudis traditionally felt they could not lend public support to a process so adamantly rejected by Syria. In 1987, however, it appeared that the Saudi leadership was more willing to express such public support, and indeed it called on Jordan and the PLO "to devise a common political strategy based on cooperation and coordination, which will reflect their special relations and shared fate."⁷⁶ What probably led to such Saudi "boldness" in the face of Syrian opposition was the fact that in the absence of any Jordanian-PLO dialogue since February 1986, the Saudis felt that their endorsement of a process in the abstract, without immediate practical implications, was less likely to generate antagonism in Damascus.

But, in the Saudi view, no change could come about as long as the PLO continued to be fundamentally split. Riyadh demonstrated particular anxiety about the rift within al-Fath and the challenge to 'Arafat's leadership. Its repeated calls on PLO leaders to close ranks intensified on the eve of the Palestine National Council (PNC) meeting in Algiers in April. The recurring theme was that the splits weakened the Palestinians and enabled Israel to perpetuate its occupation of Arab lands. The

conclusion of the PNC with the seeming "achievement of national Palestinian unity" (see essay on the PLO) was therefore heralded by the Saudi media as "a major step toward the restoration of Palestinian rights and the establishment of an independent Palestinian state."⁷⁷

SAUDI ARABIA AND IRAN

The Saudi attitude toward Iran in 1985 and 1986 had been characterized by growing ambiguity. To counter Iranian threats emanating from the Gulf War, the Saudi leadership adopted a two-pronged strategy. On the one hand, Saudi officials pledged to defend their territorial integrity and come to the support of any Gulf state attacked by Iran, even if this meant war. On the other hand, the royal family strove — at times publicly, but mostly secretly — to establish channels of communication with various groups in Tehran in order to improve relations and change their negative perceptions of the kingdom. The net result of such a dual attitude was a very confusing state of relations between the two countries. A certain *rapprochement* evolved, reflected in the continuation of relatively peaceful pilgrimage seasons (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 605–6, and *MECS* 1986, p. 563). There was also an increasing number of visits by Saudi and Iranian officials. On the other hand, Saudi fear of Iran and anxiety that the war was gradually spilling over to include the Arab states of the Gulf became greater than ever. The overriding Saudi goal, however, remained unchanged: to avoid any entanglement in the war and to abstain from any action likely to provoke Iran. With its political and military leverage *vis-à-vis* Tehran extremely limited, all the Saudis could do was to press their mediation efforts; to dissuade Syria from its continuing support of Iran; to point to the absence of any "rational reason" to pursue the war; to instill the message that only "the enemies of Islam and Arabism" benefited from the war; and to impress upon Iran the notion that the war could not ever end in a complete Iranian victory.

Events in the first part of 1987 appeared to have reinforced the impression of a *rapprochement* between the two countries, certainly when viewed from the Saudi vantage point. In January, Fahd received a personal letter from President 'Ali Khameneh'i, delivered by an Iranian delegation headed by the deputy foreign minister. In March, Oil Minister Gholam-Reza Aqazadeh visited Riyadh for talks with his Saudi counterpart, which the Iranian minister described as "constructive and good." From another angle, 'Abdallah intensified his mediation efforts between Iraq and Syria as head of the Arab Commission for Reconciliation, and expressed confidence that his endeavors would be crowned with success. Consequently, in March, he gave a remarkably upbeat assessment of the prospects of an imminent breakthrough in the Iraqi-Iranian War.⁷⁸

Iranian attacks in the first half of April on tankers serving Saudi Arabia seemed to have ended the *rapprochement* and presented Riyadh with further dilemmas over how to respond to the Iranian challenge. But the royal family was still determined to keep some channels of communication to Tehran open. However, the confrontation with the Iranian pilgrims seemed to have marked the most significant turning point in Saudi-Iranian relations since the 1979 revolution. The Saudi leaders declared that the rioters' goal had been to seize the Grand Mosque and to declare Khomeyni the imam of all Muslims. Beyond this immediate goal, they said, Tehran's aim was to destabilize the kingdom and make it appear unfit to be entrusted with the two holy shrines (see

above). The crisis was further intensified when protesters in Tehran, reacting to the death of 275 Iranian pilgrims, attacked the Saudi Embassy, ransacked it, and took it over after having defiled portraits of the royal family. One Saudi diplomat died from injuries sustained in the attack.⁷⁹

The Iranian challenge prompted a large-scale and unprecedented Saudi propaganda attack. The Saudis described the Iranian regime as a "monster" and "a criminal gang" consisting of conspirators and *agents provocateurs*. In response to Khomeyni's reference to them as infidels, the Saudis retorted that the ayatollah was Satan himself. The Iranian leaders were compared to the Nazis and Khomeyni was equated with Hitler, and "all of them showed that their behavior is dominated by ruthless, bloody insanity." Iran was not exporting Islamic ideals but "terrorism and imperialism," using "inhuman methods and having no sense of guilt whatsoever."⁸⁰ One Saudi newspaper expressed surprise that the UN secretary-general managed to leave Tehran "unharmful and safe." It called on the Security Council to "retain...psychiatrists [to] analyze...Khomeyni and his puppets; they would undoubtedly...[conclude] that the Iranian leaders were insane." But, said another paper, "the psychiatrists would have great difficulty in determining what type of insanity it is."⁸¹ Finally, the Saudi media called on the Iranian people "to throw the ayatollahs out of the country and leave politics to the politicians who realize the interests of Iran and its Muslim people."⁸²

In their anti-Iranian propaganda, the Saudis placed special emphasis on refuting Khomeyni's claim to represent Islam. "How does Khomeyni," asked the Saudis, "then justify the terms of polytheism and atheism on the red banners carried by his pilgrims which said: 'God is Great, Khomeyni is Great; We obey Khomeyni' and the other terms of depravity, obscenity, and debauchery written on these banners?" The Saudis made much of a wristwatch worn by Khomeyni's devotees, inscribed with "the call of Khomeyni," which they regarded as sacrilegious wordplay on "the call of Allah." Finally, the Saudis quoted the Qur'an verses instructing that there be "no obscenity, nor wickedness, nor wrangling in the *haji*." "How does Khomeyni," they asked, "justify the savage demagoguery, the flags and idols, the distasteful slogans, the carrying of arms, and the calls to storm the holy shrine?"⁸³

Saudi propaganda also made frequent references to the reported relations between Iran and Israel. The Israeli arms sales to Iran, exposed in what became known as Irangate (for details, see essay on the US and the ME), provided the Saudis with a major weapon against Tehran. But it was remarkable that even though the episode had surfaced in November 1986, the Saudis did not use it extensively in their propaganda until after the Mecca riots in July 1987. It was clear that as long as there was some hope in Riyadh for a dialogue with Iran, the royal family wished to minimize friction with Tehran. After the riots, however, the Saudis used all the cards at their disposal.

The Saudis now sought to expose "the duplicity of Iranian leaders who falsely claim that their goal is to liberate Palestine and Jerusalem, while at the same time are supported by Israeli experts and arms in their war against an Islamic state, thereby helping Israel to perpetrate its crimes against the Arabs." They asserted that:

The military and terroristic alliance between the Iranian regime and the Zionist enemy goes back to the first day of the Iranian Revolution. Since then, Iran concluded 20 agreements to buy arms from Israel, worth over \$1 bn. Israel

found in the Iranian regime an instrument with which it could carry out its conspiracy against the Arab world on the basis of strategies devised in Tel Aviv and Tehran.

The Saudis claimed that top Israeli and Iranian leaders met frequently to discuss the question of Iranian Jews. In one such meeting in the summer of 1987 an agreement was reportedly concluded "to allow Iranian Jews to emigrate to Israel in return for Israeli arms for Tehran's rulers."⁸⁴

But the most frequently advanced theme in the anti-Iranian propaganda was the accusation that by pursuing the war against Iraq for over seven years, the Iranian regime had caused "the greatest damage ever inflicted on the Palestinian cause and struggle," by breaking the united Arab front against Israel; by "depriving the Arab struggle of the crucial eastern strategic front; by diverting Muslim and Arab resources from the common war against Israel to a war fought against another Islamic state; and by serving the strategic Zionist goals."⁸⁵

Saudi anxiety increased when, in the aftermath of the riots and the deployment of the US Navy in the Persian Gulf, there was a considerable buildup of military tension between the kingdom and Iran. Saudi officials claimed that they had obtained a copy of an Iranian document listing Saudi military and strategic targets which the Iranians planned to attack, such as Aramco oil installations, military airfields, especially those used by the AWACS, railroads, etc. In August there was a major explosion at an Aramco installation which the Iranians attributed to "invisible hands." In September, the Saudi tanker *Petroship* was attacked by Iranian boats in the Gulf. In October, another Saudi tanker, *Ra'd al-Baqr*, was attacked by an Iranian speedboat near Dubai. In the same month, Iran launched a formation of about 60 speedboats which got within 32 kilometers of an offshore Saudi oil terminal at Khafji, near the Saudi border with Kuwait. The Saudis reacted by sending US-made fighter jets and at least two frigates to warn off the Iranian formation. A more significant reaction, however, came in the form of a full military mobilization, including land troops, and an urgent warning to Iran that "Saudi Arabia is ready to make a stand and repel any attack."⁸⁶ Iran's increasingly bellicose attitude, and its continuing attacks on Kuwaiti targets, posed a severe challenge to Saudi Arabia to live up to its role as the "big brother" of the other Gulf states.

Beyond the immediate military encounters, there seemed to be a new political and diplomatic strategy that marked a turning point in Saudi policy towards Iran. The Saudis realized that their cautious effort to accommodate Tehran, to reduce differences, and to avoid provoking the hostility of the regime had failed. Saudi officials known for their tact suddenly became aggressively outspoken, stating that their goal was "to demolish the Iranian monster politically and Islamically." One official stated that "our main objective now is to get the Iranians on the run, to put them on the defensive." And Ambassador Bandar claimed: "We tried very hard to accommodate them, but they lied to us through mediators, through other parties; these people are and act very crazy." The impression that clearly emerged was that Saudi Arabia had ceased trying to appease Iran and had launched a diplomatic offensive to isolate it. The terms frequently used by analysts to describe the shift in the Saudi attitude were "sea change," "new activism" and a "thorough transformation."⁸⁷

The change was one of substance and style. Moreover, it appeared that the

kingdom was now likely to retaliate militarily if Iran attacked Saudi targets, even at the risk of being drawn into the Gulf War. Yet the political, diplomatic, and economic options that the Saudis could realistically pursue against Iran were circumscribed; and by the end of the year it had become clear that the assessments made in September and October were somewhat exaggerated. Saudi Arabia strove to forge an all-Arab front which would isolate Tehran, cut ties with the Iranian regime, and force it to stop the war. Indicative of the Saudis' frustration with this approach was, paradoxically, their success — not failure — to forge such an all-Arab coalition at the Amman summit in November. For they quickly realized that it was one thing to issue joint Arab statements to which even Syria assented, but quite another matter to get Iran to comply. By the beginning of 1988 it was apparent that the Saudi strategy of mobilizing a joint Arab front to end the war had failed.

Second, the Saudis sought to generate international pressure on Tehran to implement Resolution 598 which called for a cease-fire. The thrust of Saudi statements pointed to the "essential need of the Security Council to enforce the resolution on Iran and give Tehran a very short extension to implement it."⁸⁸ But given global constraints — mainly the Soviet position — the Security Council failed to follow up on Resolution 598; hence the Saudi diplomatic effort collapsed. (For details, see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War.) Third, the military option was inherently limited. Though the Saudis enjoyed air superiority, it was extremely unlikely that they would contemplate a military action against Iran unless it was in self-defense. Also, although they could make some use of the Arab League's Supreme Defense Council and draw on its Joint Security Pact (signed in 1950), they must have doubted the extent to which other Arab states, even Egypt, would rush to their support in a crisis.

Fourth, Saudi Arabia could potentially apply economic and financial pressure on Iran by flooding the market with Saudi oil and driving prices down, thereby cutting into the already dwindling oil revenues that Tehran depended on to finance its costly war effort. But such a scenario was described by a Saudi source as "shooting ourselves in the foot," because it would also cut down Saudi oil revenues, destroy the fragile unity of Opec, and generally run counter to the very Saudi interest of maintaining price stability in the oil market. That did not mean that Saudi Arabia and Iran had not confronted each other over oil policies. They had, when Iran accused Saudi Arabia and Kuwait of deliberately depressing oil prices to hurt its war effort against Iraq. Such accusations became more numerous when the Saudis and Kuwaitis backed Iraq's request to increase its official production quota. But the Saudi leadership was determined to forge a strong bloc within Opec that would isolate Iran and hold her responsible for any collapse of Opec's price structure. What made it easier for the Saudis to isolate Iran was its unrealistic attempts to increase by \$2.70 the official Opec price of \$18 a barrel; to limit Iraq's oil production; and to get all Opec members to lower production. The generally hostile mood towards Tehran enabled the Saudi delegation at the Opec conference in Geneva (see above) to effectively maneuver and isolate the Iranians, who lost even the support of their two traditional allies, Libya and Algeria.⁸⁹ But it was precisely the same Saudi desire to maintain price stability that ruled out the possibility of the kingdom flooding the market to hurt Iran. Thus, in the final analysis, the only option the Saudis could exercise in times of crisis was the American connection.⁹⁰ This realization seemed to transform the Saudi position toward a number of issues involving relations with the US (see below).

Having realized that the range of their options was inherently limited, the Saudis began to shift course at the turn of the year. It seemed that the "new Saudi activism" had come to an end and was replaced by some of the old patterns. The Saudis did not cut diplomatic relations with Iran, and again sought to avoid provoking it. Thus, they denied that Iraqi planes were refueling at Saudi bases when attacking Iranian targets in the Gulf; and they described as "fabrications" reports that they had urged the US to repel any Iranian aggression. Foreign Minister Sa'ud al-Faysal went so far as to say that he failed to understand Tehran's lumping of the kingdom with Iraq and Israel as "Iranian targets," given that "since the 1979 revolution, Saudi Arabia has never threatened Iran or damaged its interests."⁹¹ But in view of Riyadh's extremely limited leverage on Iran, the Saudis could do no more than continue to condemn Iran for its refusal to accept the Security Council cease-fire resolution.

THE GLOBAL ARENA

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

The exposure of the American-Iranian-Israeli arms deals or Irangate scandal created considerable embarrassment in Riyadh, particularly after it was revealed that the Saudi billionaire, Adnan Khashoggi, had played a major role in financing the deals. The royal family let it be known that it regarded the US sale of arms to Iran as a breach of faith which seriously undermined America's credibility and standing in the entire Arab world. However, evidence published in the Tower Commission's report (see essay on the US and the ME) suggested that the Saudi leadership had been aware of an arms link between the US and Iran. Furthermore, the Saudis were also reported to have realized that such arms sales had been part of a wider reconciliation attempt to establish an "opening" to Tehran, start a dialogue with various Iranian leaders, and have some influence on their policies—all based on common hostility toward the USSR. The Saudis reportedly understood the significance of this and agreed that it was desirable to establish a dialogue with the Iranian regime.

Such an assessment, all Saudi denials notwithstanding, was reinforced by a number of considerations. First, the major role played by Khashoggi over a long period made it highly unlikely that the royal family had not been kept abreast of the deals, especially given the close ties between Khashoggi and Fahd and Sultan. Second, whereas in the past the Saudi leaders had not balked at criticizing Khashoggi publicly, in this case they made no major attempt — beyond some ritual statements — to distance themselves from him. Third, when it was suggested in late 1986 that a joint delegation of Arab ambassadors be sent to the State Department to formally protest against the arms deals, Bandar argued successfully against the plan. Fourth, the fact that the Saudis did not voice their disquiet at the arms deals as forcefully as Jordan or Egypt suggested that they must have had prior knowledge of — and perhaps even condoned — the deals. At any rate, due to the need of the Saudis to publicly dissociate themselves from the deal, the US felt compelled to assure the royal family that it would remain strictly neutral in the war and that no more arms were being shipped to Iran.⁹²

Another issue that surfaced in 1987 and affected Saudi-American relations was the reported Saudi financial assistance to a number of "US causes" overseas. In March, Robert McFarlane, the former head of the National Security Council, revealed that

the royal family, through Bandar, had provided \$25m. for the Contras in Nicaragua in 1984 and 1985, thereby identifying the "foreign official" to which the Tower Commission report referred. In May, McFarlane testified that after Fahd's visit to Washington in February 1985 (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 607–8) Saudi Arabia agreed to sharply increase its contributions by giving \$24m. more to the Contras.⁹³ Then, in June, *The New York Times* revealed that Saudi Arabia had committed itself in 1981 — in exchange for the Administration's sale of the AWACS (see *MECS* 1981–82, p. 800) — to provide substantial financial assistance to anti-Communist movements and countries around the world. The most prominent cases mentioned in this context were the *Mujahidin* in Afghanistan, the Unita forces in Angola, and the governments of North Yemen, Morocco, Somalia, and Sudan. What was not mentioned in the story was the fact that in most of these cases the Saudi interest was predominant; in other words, the Saudis would have pursued the same course on their own regardless of US interests. It was also significant that the Saudi Government denied the report that Fahd had discussed aid to the Contras with Reagan, but refrained from denying *The New York Times* story, one of whose conclusions was that "Saudi Arabia funded parts of US foreign policy."⁹⁴ The explanation for this was rooted in the motive behind the publication of the story — which was most probably leaked by Administration officials or by the Saudi Embassy itself — and its timing.

The immediate reaction of State Department officials exposed the motivation: "Had Congress known the extent of Saudi contributions to US policies, it would not have opposed arms sales to Saudi Arabia."⁹⁵ Arms sales had been a major bone of contention between the two countries for several years. The problem was further exacerbated in 1987. On 16 May, the White House announced its intention to sell the Saudis 12 F-15 jets worth \$502m. The aircraft were to be stored in the US and delivered to the Saudis only to replace those of the 62 sold in 1978 that were lost in accidents. But only five days later, a major crisis erupted as a result of the Iraqi attack on the US frigate *Stark* (see essay on the US and the ME). Administration officials announced that two Saudi F-15 pilots did not comply with a US request to intercept the Iraqi jet that had attacked the *Stark*, because they did not have time to clear the request with their ground commanders. The story provoked criticism and anger in Congress where resolutions were cosponsored by 52 senators to block the pending sale of the F-15s. Though the Administration later argued that the Saudi pilots had acted appropriately, it decided to delay notifying Congress of the deal.⁹⁶

The crisis in US-Saudi relations reached its peak three weeks later. On 29 May, the White House notified Congress of its intention to sell the Saudis 1,600 air-to-ground *Maverick* missiles of a type more advanced than previously approved. Four days later, Secretary of Defense Weinberger met his Saudi counterpart Sultan in Nice to discuss "the final details of the deal and other Saudi requests." But with 67 senators and 200 House members sponsoring resolutions against the sale, the Administration was forced on 12 June to withdraw the proposal "temporarily until a more propitious moment." Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy described opposition to the sale as "a slap across the face of Saudi Arabia." The Saudis expressed "shock and dismay," arguing that it was "a disservice to American interests in the region," and accusing Congress of "yielding to the Israeli lobby and to Zionist pressures."⁹⁷

The US decision came at a very delicate point in US-Saudi negotiations over Washington's request for Saudi military cooperation in the Persian Gulf. American

officials consequently argued privately that the withdrawal of the sale would further "shake Saudi faith in the US" and "erode their willingness to carry their share of the load in Gulf defense and to work with us." It came, therefore, as a major surprise when a few days later Fahd sent a personal letter to Reagan accepting the American request. Accordingly, the Saudis were to permit US AWACS surveillance planes operating from Saudi bases to expand their patrol zones over the Gulf, and to have Saudi F-15 fighters continue to protect the AWACS in the expanded flight area.⁹⁸

What prompted Fahd to assent to the US request, despite the recent snub, was a reassessment of the prospects for future arms sales to the kingdom. Fahd must have realized that resentment in Congress over the extent of Saudi military cooperation with the US, made even worse by the *Stark* fiasco, was going to block future proposals by the Administration. It therefore became necessary for the Saudi leadership to demonstrate cooperation with the US over security and defense issues in a way that would significantly contribute to US interests. Was it a coincidence, then, that the story in *The New York Times* detailing Saudi financial assistance to "US causes all over the world" appeared only one day after Fahd's letter was made public? Clearly, the Saudi and Administration goal was to provide ample evidence of the usefulness of the Saudis to US interests as a means of preparing for the next attempt to "sell" the arms deal.

But it took the White House two months to announce its intention to resubmit the arms sale proposal. This time an entire package was proposed, worth \$1.4 bn., and it included the following items: the 12 F-15 jets, whose sale was first proposed on 16 May, worth \$502m.; the 1,600 *Maverick* missiles, whose sale was withdrawn on 12 June, worth \$360m.; electronic upgrading equipment and computers for the F-15s worth \$300m.; and improvements for M-60 tanks, artillery, and amphibious landing equipment worth \$242m.⁹⁹ The two-month delay was probably due to the Administration's assessment that Congress would continue to oppose the sales. However, in August — following the riots in Mecca, the reflagging of the Kuwaiti ships, and the deteriorating situation in the Gulf — the White House thought there would be considerably less opposition in Congress.

But Congress was still not ready. On 25 September, 64 senators signed a letter to the president urging him "to abandon the unwarranted arms sales" which they promised to "vigorously oppose." It was followed by a similar letter signed by 251 members of the House. The Administration regarded the deal as such a high priority that the Secretaries of Defense (Caspar Weinberger) and of State (George Shultz), as well as National Security Adviser Frank Carlucci, personally lobbied congressmen who had opposed the sales. They emphasized that the Saudis, in a clear departure from their traditional stand, "were now providing critical support to US naval operations in the Gulf in ways which many in Congress have long urged." They also provided members of Congress with classified reports that elaborated on "the new Saudi assistance." The only developments made public were "the providing of radar surveillance, expanded landing rights, and refueling support for US aircraft."¹⁰⁰ Finally, as a compromise, the White House removed the *Maverick* missiles from the proposal, and on 29 October formally submitted the rest of the package to Congress. The Administration did so only after it had obtained the reluctant agreement of Saudi Arabia to the elimination of the *Mavericks*. Such Saudi acceptance came in exchange for a personal assurance by Reagan that "in the event of an emergency, the US would provide *Mavericks* from American stocks."¹⁰¹

It seemed that the Saudis, though they publicly denied it,¹⁰² did consent in August to provide further landing rights, refueling facilities, and other logistical aid for carrier-based US aircraft in the Gulf. The arrangement was described as an "understanding" rather than a concrete agreement anchored in a document.¹⁰³ The new Saudi position was in marked contrast to Riyadh's refusal, just three weeks earlier, to provide the US with landing and refueling rights for mine-clearing operations in the Gulf. What accounted for the change in Saudi policies was the Mecca incident. It seemed to have brought an end to the Saudi desire to appease Iran by, *inter alia*, rejecting US requests for military cooperation (see above). The new, belligerent Saudi attitude toward Iran eased Riyadh's traditional reluctance to be seen as part of American strategy. Also, previous Saudi unwillingness to cooperate with the US was partly rooted in the fear that Washington might tire of its military obligations in the region and withdraw, or "cut and run." This, too, changed in August, when the remarkable growth of the US naval and aerial presence in and around the Gulf clearly strengthened Saudi resolve. With their increasing confidence in the magnitude and duration of the US commitment to the Gulf, the Saudis were ready to embark on more overt military cooperation with the US. This led Shultz to announce that Saudi Arabia had done "much more to help the US than could be publicized."¹⁰⁴

The transformation in the Saudi position was, in the final analysis, a function of their assessment of their own vulnerability and weakness. Having failed to appease Iran, and having realized the inherent uncertainties of any Arab — even Egyptian — military support, the Saudis had to resort to the last option — the US defense umbrella. Not only was this option the only one at their disposal, but it was also the sole effective deterrent *vis-à-vis* Iran, at a time when the Saudis were described as "more nervous than ever."¹⁰⁵ This also explained why, unlike in previous years, the opposition in Washington to arms deals with the kingdom did not trigger sharply worded Saudi condemnations. Riyadh must have realized that, though it could purchase weapons from other sources, there was no substitute for US protection and defense.

RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION

The previous pattern, of Soviet overtures and ambiguous Saudi responses, continued in 1987, especially in the first half of the year. The exposure of these overtures suggested that at least some of them took place during meetings between officials of the two countries. In late 1986, the Saudi and Soviet ambassadors in London met and reportedly discussed "Middle East affairs." In January, the Soviet ambassador in Kuwait stated that Moscow wanted "to cement relations with Gulf countries, primarily Saudi Arabia." He added that "it is no secret that we have made contacts through diplomatic channels," and expressed the hope that "trade and economic links between the two countries" would be developed.¹⁰⁶

Saudi-Soviet relations seemed to have warmed up considerably after Oil Minister Nazir's visit to Moscow in mid-January. The visit arose from the Opec meeting of December 1986, and was primarily aimed at obtaining Soviet agreement to impose production limits in order to secure stable oil prices. But it was immediately treated and analyzed as a major event in the context of Saudi-Soviet relations. Nazir met not only with his Soviet counterpart but also with the prime minister, Nikolai Ryzhkov,

and Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze. The premier noted the Soviet desire for "normal relations" with the kingdom and for the development of "mutually advantageous ties in trade, science and culture." Other Soviet officials stated that Moscow was ready to upgrade bilateral relations and to discuss the issue of diplomatic relations between the two countries. After the visit, a Soviet deputy foreign minister expressed confidence that it would lead to a "great outcome in...the two countries' diplomatic relations." And two weeks later the Soviet ambassador in the UAE declared that he did not "rule out the establishment of diplomatic relations in the near future."¹⁰⁷

However, relations seemed to have cooled considerably in the second half of 1987 as a result of a divergence of interests over three cardinal issues: Afghanistan; the Arab-Israeli political process and Jewish emigration; and the Iraqi-Iranian War and Soviet-Iranian relations. As far as Afghanistan was concerned, the Saudi media continued to attack the Soviet occupation of a Muslim land. They emphasized that while Moscow had been continuously promising a withdrawal, "not even a partial withdrawal was carried out." In fact, the Soviets had "strengthened their military presence and [were] trying to build...two new bases [there]." The only way to bring about a Soviet withdrawal, they emphasized, was by "increasing *Mujahidin* pressures and strikes against the Soviet forces." The Soviets "should realize that if they fail to withdraw, the *Mujahidin* are going to move their struggle into Soviet territories."¹⁰⁸

What was new in 1987 was Saudi criticism of the Soviet role in the Arab-Israeli political process and of the growing number of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate. The Saudis feared that the numerous meetings between Israeli and Soviet officials could perhaps mark the beginning of a *rapprochement*, which could lead to the weakening of Soviet support of the Arab camp *vis-à-vis* Israel. It was assumed that in their desire to reenter the political process (after having been excluded for almost 15 years), the Soviets would be ready to reciprocate for Israel's agreeing not to "veto" their participation. One form of reciprocation was to permit a growing number of Soviet Jews to emigrate to Israel.¹⁰⁹ As the attempt to convene an international conference gathered momentum (see essay on the ME peace process), there was increasing Jewish emigration and a Soviet consular delegation extended its stay in Israel (see chapter on Israel). This made the Saudis anxious that the Soviets might reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel, cut since 1967. The pattern suggested that the entire Soviet-Israeli *rapprochement* was "at the expense of the Arabs." "Despite Moscow's attempt to minimize the importance of these steps," said a Saudi commentator, "it was clear that Tel Aviv and Moscow were playing a game of deception."¹¹⁰

Another new field for Saudi anger with the Soviets was their position on the Iraqi-Iranian War, and their relations with Iran. First, the Saudis resented Soviet arms supplies to Tehran, particularly "the sophisticated *Scorpion* surface-to-surface missiles," and condemned such sales as a "hostile act." Second, they stressed that it was only because of the Soviets that Security Council Resolution 598 could not be enforced. For the Soviets "began to show their sympathy for the Iranian side and provide[d] it with weapons, precisely at a time when the Security Council called for an arms embargo against the side rejecting [a] cease-fire." Third, the Saudis charged that the Soviets, for global considerations, "regarded the perpetuation of the Iran-Iraq War as an investment through which they could put pressure on the US."¹¹¹

The net result of Soviet-Saudi differences over such major issues was to check the process of *rapprochement* between the two countries that had been building up since the early 1980s. Indeed, in the second half of 1987, there were hardly any reports of Soviet-Saudi meetings, nor references to diplomatic relations.

RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN

Saudi-British relations seemed to have survived the pitfalls which appeared in 1986 and had the potential of turning into major crises. Thus, the royal family chose to take no action over the remarks of the former British ambassador to the kingdom, James Craig, who described the Saudis as "incompetent, insular, disorganized, and arrogant." Also, the Saudi leadership decided to avoid public criticism of London for cutting diplomatic relations with Syria, and instead pursued the matter through diplomatic channels. (For both episodes, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 569–70). In December 1986, the British gained further Saudi sympathy when they consented to allow the PLO to open an office of its own in London, instead of operating through the Arab League offices there.¹¹² It was expected that Fahd's official visit to England in late March would further boost British-Saudi ties.

But the one issue that continued to threaten relations was British "offset investments" in Saudi industries as part of the \$7 bn. *Tornado* arms deal (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 568–69). Though it had not been stipulated in the agreement, the Saudis made it clear that in the context of "a verbal understanding" they expected Britain to recycle some 35% of the total worth of the deal into high-technology projects in the kingdom.¹¹³ The visits of Defense Minister George Young and Trade and Industry Minister Paul Channon to Riyadh in February did not solve the problem.

They admitted that the two main topics on the agenda were precisely these — "the Yamama project and the economic equilibrium program connected to the project," code words for the arms deal and offset investments.¹¹⁴ But the British continued to insist that joint ventures and industrial cooperation were a matter for the British private sector and not the government. In March, London seemed to have conceded ground in the controversy; it agreed to establish a bilateral joint supervisory offset committee, and appeared to consider itself "committed to offset terms." In preparation for the first meeting of the committee, the Saudis began to apply sustained pressure on the British, including accusations that "Britain was dragging its feet" over the issue. Consequently, the British agreed "to examine ways of profitable joint ventures to diversify the Saudi economy" and to sign a memorandum of understanding which would contractually oblige British firms to invest in Saudi Arabia.¹¹⁵

What made the British finally give up was not anxiety over the *Tornado* deal, which they regarded as "closed," but their desire not to alienate the Saudis at a time when they wished to win another lucrative contract for the supply of 10 submarines to the Saudi Navy (see above). The timing was also crucial — it was the eve of Fahd's visit to London. Indeed, the two topics that figured prominently in Fahd's talks with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher were the thorny issues of the "offset investments" and the projected submarine deal. Fahd raised other controversial issues: the breach in Syrian-British relations; the demand that Britain cut its oil output so as to help defend oil prices; and the Saudi desire to see "a much more activist and positive British policy toward a resolution of the Palestinian problem." In practical terms, the visit achieved very little; the only tangible result was London's choosing of a merchant

bank to judge proposals for offset investments. But it served to confirm publicly that bilateral relations between the two countries were as close as ever. Self-interest evidently outweighed disagreements over controversial issues: Britain was determined not to jeopardize the *Tornado* deal, and Saudi Arabia strove to maintain close ties with London at a time when relations with the US were strained.¹¹⁶

That the *Tornado* deal was paramount in British thinking became obvious toward the end of the year when London finally signed the memorandum of understanding regarding the offset investments. It obliged the government to encourage British investments in joint ventures worth between \$825m. and \$990m. The only concession made by the Saudis was to drop the demand that the investments be only in high-tech projects.¹¹⁷ But since the submarine contract had not yet been awarded, the royal family felt that it still had a decisive card up its sleeve, should the British fail to live up to their commitment.

RELATIONS WITH FRANCE AND GERMANY

The Saudi leadership did not wish to rely solely on the British as far as the purchase of submarines was concerned. In order to generate further competition among bidders, extract the best possible deal, and also obtain political concessions in return, the royal family contacted Germany, France, and Holland for that purpose. Thus, German shipyards submitted in early 1987 a tender for submarines worth DM3 bn., and in the spring a German delegation visited Riyadh to lobby for the deal.¹¹⁸ The visit took place against the backdrop of reports that the royal family, "deeply insulted by the dilatory attitude of Chancellor [Helmut] Kohl," had decided to award the contract to French shipyards. However, no such deal with France was concluded, not even during Fahd's visit to Paris in April. All that the Saudi media reported was that both sides "were negotiating the sale of submarines and arrangements for the instruction of Saudi naval teams."¹¹⁹

Later in the year, there were numerous news stories to the effect that the kingdom was about to conclude a large-scale arms deal with France which included 100 *Mirage*-4000 aircraft and 250 AMX-40 tanks. The deal was presented as a direct result of Reagan's inability to convince Congress not to oppose the arms package to Riyadh (see above). But Saudi Arabia officially denied those parts in the news reports concerning the *Mirage* sale.¹²⁰

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Interview with *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 19 May 1987.
2. SPA, 8 January — DR, 9 January 1987.
3. *FT*, 12 May 1987.
4. *NYT*, 13 October 1987.
5. *Ibid.*
6. *WSJ*, 31 March 1987.
7. *IHT*, 7 September; *Le Monde*, *FT*, 14 October; *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 2nd quarter, 1987, p. 17.
8. SPA, 3 February — DR, 5 February; *FT*, 30 December 1987.

9. *NYT*, 7, 10, 13 December 1987.
10. *MEES*, 11 January 1988.
11. R. Riyadh, 26 October — SWB, 28 October; SPA, 15 December — DR, 17 December 1987; *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 3rd quarter, 1987, p. 15.
12. *MM*, 7 December 1987, p. 11.
13. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 2nd quarter, 1987, p. 12.
14. *Ibid.*, 4th quarter, p. 12; *NYT*, 12 February 1987.
15. *NYT*, 2 March 1987.
16. *Ibid.*, and *FT*, 5 November 1987.
17. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 2nd quarter, 1987, p. 19.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 14.
19. SPA, 9 November — SWB, 17 November 1987.
20. *FT*, 12 November 1987.
21. SPA, 3, 4 January — DR, 4, 6 January 1988.
22. SPA, 30 December — SWB, 31 December 1987; *FT*, 31 December 1987, 4 January 1988.
23. *FT*, 31 December 1987.
24. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 2nd quarter, 1987, p. 11.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
26. R. Riyadh, 28 December — DR, 30 December 1987.
27. *IHT*, 1 June 1987.
28. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 1st quarter, 1987, p. 8.
29. *FT*, 26 November 1987.
30. *Al-Jumhuriyya*, Cairo, 25 April; *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 3rd quarter, 1987, p. 8.
31. For details on these arms deals, see *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 1st quarter, 1987, pp. 9–10, and 3rd quarter, p. 7; *JP*, 8 September; *MM*, 25 May; and R. Riyadh, 19 November — DR, 21 November 1987.
32. *IHT*, 1 June 1987.
33. *WP*, 16 February 1987.
34. R. Riyadh, 6 July — DR, 7 July; SPA, 23 September — SWB, 25 September 1987.
35. R. Riyadh, 29 June — SWB, 1 July; SPA, 3 July — DR, 3 July 1987.
36. *FT*, 15 August 1987.
37. *NYT*, 4, 5, 6 August 1987.
38. 'Ukaz, 4 August; R. Monte Carlo, 4 August — DR, 4 August; SPA, 4 August — DR, 6 August; R. Riyadh, 6, 25 August — DR, 8, 27 August 1987.
39. *Newsweek*, 7 September 1987.
40. R. Riyadh, 25 August — DR, 27 August 1987.
41. Interview with *NYT*, 1 September 1987.
42. R. Riyadh, 15 August — DR, 17 August; IRNA, 26 August — DR, 4 September; *al-Ahram*, 24 August 1987.
43. *The Times*, 19 August 1987.
44. *Al-Nashra*, Athens, 10 September; *al-Thawra al-Islamiyya*, London, 17 February 1987.
45. *The Economist*, 3 October; *MM*, 12 October 1987.
46. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 4th quarter, 1987, p. 8.
47. The analysis of 'Abdallah's visit draws on: *ibid.*; *MM*, 26 October, 9 November 1987.
48. Quoted by *MM*, 12 October 1987, p. 7.
49. *Ibid.*
50. *The Times*, *The Guardian*, 19 August 1987.
51. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 5 January; R. Riyadh, 17 March — SWB, 19 March 1987.
52. 'Ukaz, 13 April 1987.
53. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 5 January 1987.
54. R. Riyadh, 10 March — DR, 11 March 1987.
55. R. Riyadh, 17 March, 29 July — SWB, 19 March, 31 July 1987.
56. Interview with *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 6 October 1987.
57. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 3rd quarter, 1987, p. 6, and 2nd quarter, p. 5.
58. Fahd's own statement, quoted by SPA, 15 May — SWB, 16 May; *al-Jazira*, *al-Riyad*, 12 May; *The Observer*, 18 May 1987.

59. *Al-Bilad*, 12 May; *al-Madina*, 22 May; *al-Riyad*, 14 June 1987.
60. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 25 May; MENA, 26 May — DR, 28 May; *al-Qabas*, 4 June 1987.
61. *Al-Yawm*, 27 August 1987.
62. *Al-Riyad*, *al-Jazira*, 'Ukaz, *al-Bilad*, 12 November 1987.
63. R. Riyadh, 19, 21 December — DR, 21, 23 December 1987.
64. MENA, 21 January, 3 February — DR, 23 January, 5 February 1987.
65. *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 1, 18 February 1987.
66. *Al-Ahram*, 26 April 1987.
67. 'Ukaz, 14 June; *al-Yawm*, 23 June; *al-Bilad*, 20 June 1987.
68. *Akhir Sa'a*, 24 April 1987.
69. See, e.g., *al-Yamama*, 20 May 1987.
70. *Al-Bayan*, Dubai, 30 June 1987.
71. *Al-Akhbar*, Cairo, 10 August; *al-Ahram*, 24 August; *FR*, 27 August 1987.
72. *Al-Ahram*, 17 August; *al-Riyad*, *al-Nadwa*, 5 October; *al-Jazira*, *al-Yawm*, 7 October 1987.
73. R. Riyadh, 16 November — SWB, 18 November 1987.
74. *NYT*, 23 October 1987.
75. *Al-Riyad*, 26 May; *al-Yamama*, 17 June 1987.
76. *Al-Jazira*, 17 February 1987.
77. *Ibid.*, 2 April; *al-Riyad*, 20 April; 'Ukaz, 21 April; *al-Bilad*, 27 April 1987.
78. SPA, 24 January, 10 March — DR, 27 January, 11 March; 'Abdallah's interview with *al-Majalis*, Kuwait, 19 March 1987.
79. R. Riyadh, 25 August — DR, 27 August; *NYT*, 3, 6 August; *IHT*, 19 August; *WP*, 26 August 1987.
80. *NYT*, 25, 26, 29 August; *al-Jazira*, 13 August; *al-Yawm*, 6 October 1987.
81. *Al-Jazira*, 16 September; *al-Madina*, 26 October 1987.
82. *NYT*, 5 August; R. Riyadh, 8 September — DR, 9 September 1987.
83. SPA, 12 September — DR, 15 September; *NYT*, 29 August 1987.
84. *Al-Riyad*, 5 September; *al-Bilad*, 28 September 1987.
85. R. Riyadh, 16 September — DR, 18 September; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 4 September 1987.
86. *WP*, 23 August, 4 October; SPA, 21 September — DR, 22 September; R. Tehran, 7 October — DR, 7 October 1987.
87. *NYT*, 5, 29 August; *WP*, 29 August 1987.
88. R. Riyadh, 29 August — DR, 30 August 1987.
89. *NYT*, 7, 10, 13 December 1987.
90. For an extensive analysis of the Saudi options, see *al-Nashra al-Istratijiyya*, 3 September 1987.
91. SPA, 1 November — DR, 2 November; SPA, 25 October — DR, 26 October; Sa'ud's interview on Turkish TV, 8 September — DR, 9 September 1987.
92. *NYT*, 3 February 1987.
93. *NYT*, 21 March; *WP*, 12 May 1987.
94. *NYT*, 21 June; KUNA, 14 May — DR, 15 May 1987.
95. *NYT*, 22 June 1987.
96. *Ibid.*, 16, 21 May 1987.
97. *Ibid.*, 1, 5, 12 June; *al-Qabas*, 4 June; SPA, 13 June — DR, 14 June 1987.
98. *WP*, 16 June; *NYT*, 20 June 1987.
99. *NYT*, 17 August 1987.
100. *Ibid.*, 29 September, 3 October; *WP*, 30 September 1987.
101. *NYT*, 9, 30 October; *WP*, 10 October 1987.
102. SPA, 23 August — DR, 24 August 1987.
103. *WP*, 23 August 1987.
104. *NYT*, 18 October 1987.
105. *The Guardian*, 2 January 1988.
106. *CR*: Saudi Arabia, 1st quarter, 1987, p. 7; KUNA, 4 January — SWB, 6 January 1987.
107. Tass, 21 January — DR, 22 January; KUNA, 14 January — DR, 16 January; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 22 January, 5 February 1987.
108. *Al-Yawm*, 23 April; *al-Bilad*, 22 June 1987.

109. *Al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 27 May, 12 August 1987.
110. *Al-Yawm*, 21 September; *al-Yamama*, 10 August; *al-Nadwa*, 10 May; R. Riyadh, 24 July — DR, 28 July 1987.
111. R. Riyadh, 29 October, 12 December — SWB, 31 October, 14 December; *al-Riyad*, 5 November 1987.
112. R. Riyadh, 20 December — SWB, 24 December 1986.
113. *MM*, 2 February 1987.
114. SPA, 10 February — SWB, 12 February; *al-Qabas*, 10 February 1987.
115. *MM*, 16 March; *FT*, 9 March 1987.
116. On Fahd's visit, see *FT* and *The Guardian*, 23-26 March; *al-Nahar Arab Report and Memo*, 10 April; *MM*, 13 April 1987.
117. *FT*, 22 October 1987.
118. DPA, 16 February — SWB, 24 February; *JP*, 16 April 1987.
119. DPA, 11 March — DR, 12 March; *al-Yawm*, 20 April 1987.
120. *Le Monde*, 15 June; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 24 June; *Jane's Defence Weekly*, 21 November; SPA, 21 November — DR, 23 November 1987.

The Republic of Sudan

(Jumhuriyyat al-Sudan)

HAIM SHAKED and YEHUDIT RONEN

A severe crisis of expectations dominated Sudan's domestic affairs throughout 1987. It was a period of continuous gloom during which the government of al-Sadiq al-Mahdi — the first democratically elected government in 18 years — showed incompetence in coping with the country's key problems.

The rivalries and suspicions between the two largest political forces and major partners of the coalition government — the *Umma* Party (UP) under Mahdi's leadership, and the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP; *Hizb al-Ittihad al-Dimuqrati*) — largely incapacitated the government during the entire year under review. The situation was further aggravated by the internal disputes that plagued each of them. It was due mainly to the political threat imposed by the third major party, the National Islamic Front (NIF; *al-Jabha al-Islamiyya al-Qawmiyya*), that the coalition partners overcame successive crises and stayed together.

The further decline in the country's financial resources exacerbated the government's difficulties in dealing with mounting economic problems. This in turn led to social and political turmoil. Violence, and in some cases bloody riots, erupted in Khartoum and the periphery of the country throughout the year.

The picture was made even bleaker by the escalation of the civil war of southern Sudan. As political contacts between Khartoum and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army (SPLA) got bogged down, the fighting intensified in scope and essence. The war developed steadily to Khartoum's detriment, reaching a particularly alarming stage at the end of the year when the SPLA extended its areas of activity outside the informal boundaries of the southern region.

Foreign affairs were not a source of encouragement to the government. Khartoum focused on more narrow bilateral issues with its immediate neighbors. Relations with Libya continued in 1987 to be the most divisive of all foreign issues. The process of *rapprochement* with Mu'ammar al-Qadhafi continued, though Sudanese-Libyan relations were not free from tension. The major bone of contention was Tripoli's refusal to meet Khartoum's demand that it pull back its troops from the western part of Sudan, along the border with Chad. The Sudanese Government, aware of its growing reliance on Libya's economic and military aid, as well as its inability to pressure Libya militarily, attempted to play down the affair, though the issue continued to cloud relations with Libya and added tension to Khartoum's ties with Ndjamena.

Libya's relations with Sudan apparently reflected on the latter's relations with Egypt, which had been frozen since the overthrow of Ja'far al-Numayri's regime in April 1985. From the beginning of the year, the Sudanese Government tried, albeit not too strenuously, to break the political stalemate. But the closeness of the links

between Sudan and Libya, which were the antithesis of the anti-Libyan stance that had cemented Sudanese-Egyptian ties until 1985, made the achievement of a greater measure of *rapprochement* between Khartoum and Cairo very complicated.

Sudan made intensive efforts to bolster bilateral ties with two other neighbors — Ethiopia and Uganda. Khartoum took pains to persuade Addis Ababa, both directly and through other countries, to curb its support of the SPLA (which, in late 1987, allegedly turned into direct military involvement). But to no avail. Khartoum did, however, succeed in maintaining close cooperation with Kampala.

On the Arab scene, Sudan adhered to its tradition of maintaining relatively low-key involvement. It attended the Islamic and the Arab summit conferences, the first in Kuwait in January and the second in Amman in November. On the bilateral level, Sudan attributed much importance to its ties with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states — all of which served as important sources of financial aid.

Relations with the superpowers remained basically unchanged. Khartoum wavered, during the year, the flag of non-alignment and of a balanced policy *vis-à-vis* the two blocs. Beyond the declarative level, it tried to unfreeze its ties with Moscow, but did not succeed. It also tried to retain some political distance from Washington, though it was careful not to endanger American economic support.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

THE COALITION GOVERNMENT — SUCCESSIVE CRISES AND CONTINUED FAILURE TO COPE WITH THE COUNTRY'S KEY PROBLEMS

Khartoum's political map — as it crystallized in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 576–81) — remained unchanged during 1987. It continued to be dominated by the UP and the DUP, the two traditionalist right-wing parties, which were also the two largest political forces. They shared power in the coalition government set up in late spring 1986 following the first democratic elections in 18 years. The government's position was constantly threatened by the NIF, the third most effective power in Sudanese politics, which led the opposition. Paradoxically, the NIF's political threat forced the UP and the DUP to continue their partnership and overcome repeated coalition crises, since the only beneficiary of the coalition government's collapse would be the NIF. The government was preoccupied with its own survival, and consequently did not make a serious effort to solve or even bring about an amelioration of the country's major problems — the deteriorating economic situation and the escalating war in the south.

The rivalry and tensions between the UP and the DUP, which began long before the formation of the coalition government, resulted in an open crisis of confidence at the turn of 1986–87. The DUP accused the UP of falsifying the results of the by-election in December 1986 in one of the neighborhoods of Omdurman, following the death, in a car accident, of the prime minister's brother, Salah al-Siddiq al-Mahdi (who won the April 1986 elections in the neighborhood for the UP).¹ In December the UP won the seat with 8,670 votes, compared with the DUP's 6,405. In protest, the embittered DUP staged demonstrations and called for the dismantling of the coalition government.² A series of intensive talks between the leaders of the two parties cooled the crisis atmosphere, but not for long.

A new crisis erupted when Commerce and Supply Minister Muhammad Yusuf Abu

Hurayra (DUP) walked out of a cabinet meeting convened on 3 February 1987 under the chairmanship of Prime Minister Mahdi to discuss economic affairs. Abu Hurayra reportedly protested against the government's import policy and its handling of various issues, such as "the smuggled goods which had already been seized."³ In addition, he accused a number of his own party leaders — a group of major traders — of having illegally imported various goods with forged documents at a time when the country needed a rigorous import policy.⁴ Since Abu Hurayra found himself in a difficult position — being at odds with the prime minister as well as powerful elements in the DUP — he decided to leave the government.⁵ The crisis was defused by the prime minister's prolonged absence abroad, which began with an official visit to the Netherlands (4–8 February), and followed by a private visit to Britain (8–18 February),⁶ and a visit to Egypt (18–23 February; see below). Also DUP elements hostile to Abu Hurayra had a clear interest in defusing the crisis.

Meanwhile, a new controversy emerged between the DUP and the UP in April, when Mahdi announced the cancellation of the Joint Sudanese-Egyptian Defense Agreement signed in 1976.⁷ The DUP rejected Mahdi's move, and this issue exacerbated tensions between the two parties until the end of the year. (For further details on the issue, see below.)

The next crisis came on 7 May, when the deputy premier and foreign minister (and the political leader of the DUP), al-Sharif Zayn al-'Abidin al-Hindi, announced his resignation from his government positions, as well as his party's political bureau.⁸ Though Hindi did not explain the motive for this move, it apparently had more to do with the divisions within his own party leadership than with the DUP's relations with the UP. Nevertheless, his move seemed to be the "last straw" that led Mahdi to announce the dissolution of the government on 13 May — the first anniversary of its formation. The prime minister explained his move by saying there was an urgent need for "a higher level of harmony among the ministers and...the right man in the right job."⁹ Ostensibly, Mahdi read the political map correctly and understood that a tough, though not too drastic, move should be made to "shake" the DUP leadership and thus deal more effectively with the worsening crisis of unfulfilled expectations in the country. The alarming increase in economic-social restiveness throughout Sudan, which in many cases had triggered political turmoil, served as a clear warning. The successive military defeats of the Army in the war in the south (see below) also contributed to the bleak picture, prompting Mahdi to at least attempt to improve the performance of his government.

Exploiting the government's crisis, Mahdi gave a public account of its achievements and failures, trying somehow to contradict the widespread impression of a weak and impotent Cabinet. According to Mahdi, the four most important achievements were: (a) the consolidation of democracy; (b) the leap in production of the agricultural sector and in certain segments of the industrial sector; (c) the formulation of principles for a peaceful solution of the problems of the southern region, and the "highly efficient" performance of the Sudanese military against "the aggression directed against Sudan"; and (d) the annulment of the entire foreign policy of the deposed Numayri regime and its replacement with balanced relations based on good-neighborliness regionally and non-alignment internationally.

The "shortcomings" were: "(a) the extreme delay in the elimination of the vestiges of the May [Numayri] regime and the annulment of the September [*Shari'a*] laws,

[enacted by Numayri in 1983], and the passing of alternative legislation; (b) the failure in the supply and distribution of goods [and] the control of prices...; and (c) the failure in the performance of some ministers...."¹⁰ Mahdi's balance sheet indicated, however, that the major part of the achievements had already occurred during the year of transitional government that followed the overthrow of the Numayri regime (see chapters on Sudan in *MECS* 1984–85, and 1986). On the other hand the failures were deliberately played down and the two major ones were not listed. These were the deterioration of economic conditions and the escalation of the war in the south.

On 3 June, after overcoming a considerable number of difficulties, Mahdi succeeded in establishing a new government, with the UP and the DUP serving again as the major coalition partners, and the participation of Khartoum-based southern parties. There were no dramatic personnel changes in the new government. However, from the structural aspect, it included four new portfolios (see Table 1).

It was not long, however, before new cracks appeared in the coalition government, threatening to throw it into turmoil. In late June, a new confrontation occurred between the UP and the DUP over the composition of the five-member Council of Sovereignty, also known as the State Supreme Council. (For the composition of the council — two UP and two DUP members, and one southern member — which virtually lacked any executive authority, see *MECS* 1986, p. 580.) The crisis began on 22 June, when Muhammad al-Hasan 'Abdallah Yasin, a building contractor who prospered during the Numayri regime and a prominent politician in the DUP, announced his resignation from the council as well as the political bureau of his party.¹¹ His resignation followed the revelation in the Sudanese press that he had been importing, among other things, drinking glasses from Israel, a state with which Sudan was officially at war.¹² Another source attributed his resignation to serious internal rivalries within the DUP leadership.¹³ Wishing to retain its political strength in the council, the DUP nominated Ahmad al-Sayyid Hamad as Yasin's replacement. But the UP objected to him, claiming that he was unfit for office because he had been a close aide of Numayri.¹⁴

Before the rupture over the vacancy in the council was resolved, Mahdi resumed his overseas travels, staying away almost all of July. At the beginning of the month he was in Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia (see below); toward the middle of the month, he was in Yugoslavia for three days, and from 16–27 July he was in Britain on a private visit.¹⁵ Mahdi's absence from Khartoum's political arena delayed the resolution of the dispute. On 8 August, tension again reached a high point when the UP, exploiting the deeply divided leadership of the DUP, masterminded the election of Mirghani al-Nasri — a well-known lawyer who headed the marginal Islamic Socialist Party,¹⁶ and was a member of the Constituent Assembly — as the fifth member of the council.¹⁷ In an act of protest, Health Minister Husayn Sulayman Abu Salih (DUP) resigned.¹⁸ A week later, on 21 August, the furious DUP announced its decision to break up the coalition government.¹⁹

Throughout the fall, Mahdi held intensive negotiations with Khartoum's political parties in an attempt to form a multiparty government or consolidate the coalition government. His mission was complicated by the fact that not one of Sudan's political parties enjoyed, or could hope to enjoy, a truly national base. All parties depended on regional support and, lacking national appeal, could not hope for an electoral majority. The UP, albeit the most effective power in Sudan's politics, did not command

TABLE 1: THE CABINET

<i>Portfolio</i>	<i>15 May 1986</i>	<i>3 June 1987</i>	<i>Party Affiliation</i>
Prime Minister and Defense Minister	Al-Sadiq al-Mahdi	unchanged	UP
Deputy Prime Minister ² and Foreign Affairs	Al-Sharif Zayn al-'Abidin al-Hindi	Muhammad Tawfiq ⁶ Ma'mun Mahjub Sinadah ⁷	DUP DUP
Interior ²	Ahmad al-Husayn	unchanged	DUP
Attorney-General	'Abd al-Mahmud al-Hajj Salih	unchanged	UP
Local Government	Joshua Dewal	Red Shuol Jock ³	SFP ⁴
Finance and Economic Planning	Bashir 'Ummar	unchanged	UP
Housing and Public Works	Muhammad Tahir al-Jaylani	unchanged	DUP
Industry	Mubarak 'Abdallah al-Fadil	unchanged	UP
Agriculture and Natural Resources	'Umar Nur al-Da'im	unchanged	UP
Animal Resources	Isma'il Abaker	vacant	
Commerce and Supply	Muhammad Yusuf Abu Hurayra	Ibrahim Hasan 'Abd al-Jalil ³	DUP
Transport and Communications	Fransino Wani	Aldo Ago Deng	SSPA ⁴
Irrigation	Aldo Ago Deng	Muhammad Bashir ³	UP
Energy and Mining	Adam Madibu	unchanged	UP
Information and Culture	Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad	Ma'mun Mahjub Sinadah ^{3,7}	DUP
Health	Husayn Sulayman Abu Salih	Al-Tum Muhammad al-Tum ⁸	DUP
Education	Bakri Ahmad 'Adil	unchanged ³	DUP
Labor and Social Insurance	Wal Kunijwok	unchanged	UP
Peace and National Constitutional Conference	Muhamamd Ahmad Yaji ¹	Lawrence Mori Tombi ³	PPP ⁴
Cabinet Affairs	Salah al-Din al-Khalifa	vacant	
Youth and Sport ⁹		unchanged Hasan Muhammad Mustafa ³	UP DUP
Public Service and Administrative Reform		vacant	
Social Affairs and the <i>Zakar</i> ⁶		Rashid Ibrahim 'Abd al-Karim ³	UP
Religious Affairs and Endowments (<i>Awqaf</i>) ⁹		vacant	

1 Resigned from his post in November 1986.

2 The deputy prime ministership was awarded to the interior minister by Mahdi's decree of 6 July 1987. See SUNA, 6 July — DR, 8 July 1987. Until the June reshuffle, the post of deputy prime minister was occupied by the DUP leader, al-Sharif Zayn al-'Abidin al-Hindi.

3 New ministers. For biographical details regarding the new ministers, see *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 11 June 1987.

4 A southern party. For details on each of them — Sudan Federal Party, the Southern Sudanese Political Association, and the People's Progressive Party — see *MECS* 1986, pp. 576–79.

5 Resigned from his post in August 1987.

6 Resigned from his post in September 1987.

7 Appointed in October 1987.

8 Appointed in December 1987.

9 New ministries.

enough electoral support to enable it to govern alone. Important circles of the UP rejected the idea of sharing power with the NIF, especially because of the latter's vehement advocacy of the enforcement of the *Shari'a* system (of Islamic Law, which the UP rejected). The NIF, for its part, rejected a partnership in a UP-led coalition

government for the same reason.²⁰ The DUP's political effectiveness was seriously undermined by deep personal rivalries. These represented the schism between the traditionalists who were pro-Egyptian and loyal to party leader and Khatmiyya sect leader, Muhammad 'Uthman al-Mirghani, and the younger generation who wished to see the DUP fill the role of a modern, secular, centrist party.²¹ The complicated map of Sudan's politics was further complicated by the passage of almost 20 years without democracy during Numayri's military dictatorship.

Turmoil in the government, which continued to function despite the DUP's decision in August to leave it, was further reflected in the resignation in early September of the foreign minister, Muhammad Tawfiq Ahmad (DUP), in protest against his party's "unjustified" decision to end the tenure of the coalition government.²²

In mid-October, after a relatively long delay, partly due to Mahdi's stay in Japan (11–17 October)²³ and to widespread riots that swept the country (see below), Mahdi made a new appointment to his coalition government. The previous minister of culture and information, Ma'mun Mahjub Sinadah (DUP), was sworn in as foreign minister. His portfolio was taken over in December by al-Tum Muhammad al-Tum.²⁴ (There were no further changes in the government until the end of the year.) The alarming escalation, in November–December, in the SPLA war against Khartoum, as demonstrated by the capture of two towns outside the southern region and the serious riots in various regions in the last quarter of the year (for more on both, see below), diverted Mahdi's attention from the government's problems to much more urgent issues.

MOUNTING ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL TURMOIL; "STATE OF EMERGENCY" DECLARED

One of the glaring failures of the government was its inability to check the economic deterioration and raise the standard of living of the population. The government's inheritance, from the Numayri era, of a foreign debt of about \$13 bn. and a civil war in the south, which cost an estimated £Sd2m.–£Sd3m. a day,²⁵ served, to some extent, as an excuse. At the same time, however, it was clear that a major part of the economic crisis resulted from the country's consumption, which far exceeded its production and earnings. In 1986, for example, Sudan exported commodities worth \$500m., while its imports cost \$1.2 bn., leaving a huge balance-of-trade deficit. The government's resort to deficit financing greatly fueled inflation. Low revenues from exports made it impossible for the government to supply the hard currency needs of local manufacturers who depended on imports of raw materials, spare parts, and so on. This, in turn, resulted in low production and high prices.²⁶ The weak coalition government, fearing that a daring economic policy might trigger further political instability, refrained from taking the necessary, stringent measures. Thus, economic difficulties were further aggravated and the population's hardships were exacerbated.

The public's resentment was expressed in great turbulence, with a series of strikes and demonstrations in all parts of the country throughout the year. The authorities tried to cope with the unrest by holding negotiations with the strikers, on the one hand, and relying on the police force to suppress the disturbances, on the other.

As if the industrial unrest was not enough, the authorities announced, in early February, the uncovering in Khartoum of "a small group" with "racist tendencies" which planned to "disrupt the march of democracy."²⁷ While no further details were

given, it seemed that the unearthing of subversive activists alarmed the government. In March, the authorities launched a comprehensive crackdown in the capital, arresting about 5,000 people who allegedly constituted a threat to "public order."²⁸

But no one expected these preventive measures to put an end to the strong discontent prevailing among broad circles of Sudanese society, including apparently the military. On 16 April, the authorities announced the thwarting of a "racist, ideological coup attempt" aimed at "overthrowing the democratic regime." The authorities played down the event in the local media, stating only that the plotters belonged to "ideological parties of three [unnamed] different trends" and included "dismissed military elements."²⁹

A new wave of labor unrest, which began with the strike of 55 trade unions in Port Sudan,³⁰ and swept the country in May-June, effectively eclipsed the April coup attempt. In July, another wave of unrest hit Khartoum. Student demonstrations, which rapidly turned into riots, were the most disruptive. They were in protest against what the authorities described as "severe shortages of school equipment."³¹ A short while later, the government accused supporters of the deposed Numayri regime of fomenting the riots, and arrested a number of members of the dissolved Sudanese Socialist Union, the only political party permitted during Numayri's era.³² As an additional measure aimed at reducing the restiveness, the authorities on 25 July declared a state of emergency and closed all schools in Khartoum "until further notice."³³ (They were reopened in the fall.)

This extraordinarily severe measure was prompted by fear of an escalation of the turmoil in Khartoum and its expansion to other regions, especially on the eve of an agreement with the International Monetary Fund (IMF; see below). The year-long state of emergency, which was to affect "all parts" of the country, was declared two days before Mahdi's return to Khartoum from a long visit abroad (see above). It was intended to stop "illegal hoarding of essential foodstuffs, black market dealings, smuggling, armed robberies," and control "anarchy in the market" as well as to ensure "the security of citizens' lives and property."³⁴ The authorities were probably also motivated by their growing inability to contain the unrest, which was assuming an increasingly political character. The government's decision to take such an extraordinary measure was enhanced by the memory of the March-April 1985 strikes and riots in Khartoum, which led eventually to the overthrow of the Numayri regime (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 622-24). The sudden declaration of a state of emergency caught the Sudanese by surprise and provoked rumors of a coup being nipped in the bud. Khartoum denied this, but admitted that "many conspiracies were being concocted behind the scenes."³⁵

Contrary to the government's expectations, the state of emergency provoked waves of protest. On 26-27 July, large demonstrations were staged in the streets of Khartoum. The Minister of Education, Bakri Ahmad 'Adil (a UP member), accused the NIF, which strongly objected to the application of the state of emergency, of instigating the protests, which he referred to as a "political conspiracy."³⁶ Subsequently, 405 students were arrested by the police.³⁷ At the end of the month, the wave of violent protests spread to other parts of the country, including the cities of Shendi, Kassala, and 'Atbara. They resulted in the killing of one student and injuries to others.³⁸ In early September, violent disturbances erupted in the Blue Nile region. Official reports claimed that the protest was over the "acute shortage of school

equipment.” Since many citizens joined in the demonstrations, their protest presumably stemmed from deeper reasons. The turbulence reached such a level of intensity that the police could not handle it and the Army was summoned. A total of five deaths was reported.³⁹ In mid-September students riots broke out in Kordofan, resulting in three deaths. The students reportedly protested against poor conditions in the schools.⁴⁰ Once again, however, it appeared that the protest was due to a broader spectrum of problems, primarily the deterioration of the economy and security conditions. The latter were clearly affected by the SPLA penetration of the region in August (see below).

Meanwhile, after extended talks, the Sudanese Government signed, in late September, an agreement with the IMF. It entailed a 44% devaluation of the Sudanese currency creating a rate of exchange of £Sd4.5 to the dollar, compared with the previous rate of £Sd2.5.⁴¹ The subsequent increase in the price of sugar and of petrol created additional public resentment. The new cycle of riots in Khartoum's streets, from 4–7 October, clearly reflected the population's increasing frustration,⁴² and was fueled by the NIF's strong criticism of the government's agreement with the IMF.⁴³ As the leading opposition party, the NIF was able to criticize the government's performance without the burden of responsibility that participation in government entailed, and it exploited this advantage effectively. On 19 October, the NIF staged a demonstration of 15,000 people in Khartoum to denounce the IMF-inspired economic policy (while demanding, at the same time, the implementation of the *Shari'a* system).⁴⁴ On 24 October, “ten thousand” members of the UP, DUP, and the Khartoum-based southern parties — all members in the coalition government — staged a counterdemonstration in the capital, expressing their support for the government and the military.⁴⁵ (For a somewhat similar situation in Khartoum in April 1985, see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 622–23). On 25 October, a ban on all public demonstrations, announced several days earlier, came into effect.⁴⁶

While order seemed to be restored in Khartoum, at least on the surface, violence erupted in the Darfur region in the west in October. The riots in this backward region were in protest against conditions of extreme poverty, and resulted in the killing of a student and the injury of several others. The authorities accused the NIF of being responsible for the riots.⁴⁷ The western part of the country had long suffered from deprivation, and its population was embittered, as evidenced by the recurrent outbursts of violent disturbances in the area (see, e.g., *MECS* 1980–81, pp. 763–64; and 1986, pp. 581–83). Darfur's proximity to Chad, and the presence of Libyan troops in the region (see below), aggravated the harsh conditions in Darfur, leading to a noticeable deterioration in the security situation there.

Unrest continued until the end of 1987, serving as a reminder that little had changed in Sudan during the two-and-a-half years of democratic rule.

AGGRAVATION OF THE ARMED CONFLICT IN THE SOUTH

The year under survey saw an escalation in the five-year-old armed conflict between Khartoum and the southern Sudanese People's Liberation Movement and its military arm — the SPLA.

Politically, the conflict reached a stalemate, with the antagonists adhering to their positions. The SPLA reiterated its wish for a negotiated peace settlement under the terms of the Koka Dam Declaration,⁴⁸ signed in March 1986 in Ethiopia between the

SPLA and the Alliance of National Forces for the National Salvation of Sudan — a grouping which represented the professional elite and the political parties in Khartoum in the aftermath of Numayri's downfall. The Koka Dam Declaration stipulated, *inter alia*, the repeal of the September 1983 *Shari'a* law, and the abrogation of the two military agreements concluded between Sudan and its two neighbors — Egypt and Libya (see *MECS* 1986, p. 585). The government in Khartoum, for its part, demanded that the SPLA lay down its arms as a precondition for any dialogue.⁴⁹ The unwillingness of both parties to make any compromising gesture brought about an intensification of the fighting between the military ("the enemy" in SPLA terminology) and the SPLA, (the "outlaws," or "rebels," in Khartoum's parlance).

Militarily, the most severely affected region in the first months of 1987 was the Upper Nile region bordering on Ethiopia — the patron and rear base of the SPLA.

On the eve of the new year, Khartoum announced its success in lifting the 23-month-old siege on the town of Bor,⁵⁰ in the Upper Nile region. It signified an important achievement, primarily because Bor's strategic location made it possible to control the movement of steamers or barges sailing along the Nile to and from Juba — the capital of the southern region. In addition, the success in Bor boosted the Army's low morale and enhanced the prestige of its High Command, appointed just a few months earlier (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 582–83).

The SPLA, though temporarily having to contend with adverse conditions resulting from the onset of the dry season, which favored the Army and enabled it to move rapidly and effectively, did not sit idly by. Activating its harassing tactics against the "enemy,"⁵¹ the SPLA's major achievement at that stage was its occupation on 4 March of Pibor — a small garrison town in the Upper Nile region. The SPLA also claimed the shooting down, during the fighting for Pibor, of an F-15 fighter plane west of the town.⁵² Khartoum denied the claim.⁵³ On 4 April, toward the end of the dry season, the SPLA also captured Tonga, about 70 km. west of Malakal, the provincial capital of the Upper Nile region.⁵⁴

On 6 April, the SPLA issued a stern warning to all airlines, requesting that they stop flying over SPLA-controlled areas and "save themselves a lot of trouble."⁵⁵ (Sudan Airways flights had been suspended by Mahdi's government in August 1986, following the shooting down of one of the airline's planes and the death of all its passengers; see *MECS* 1986, p. 588). In late 1986 the government decided to resume flights from Khartoum to Juba and Malakal.⁵⁶ On 5 May, a civilian Cessna 404 was shot down by a SAM-7 antiaircraft missile as it took off from Malakal airport, killing all 13 on board.⁵⁷ In the wake of the incident, which unleashed great rage in Khartoum, the SPLA released a statement to the Sudanese public, accusing the government of chartering commercial and civilian aircraft to carry military supplies and reinforcements to its garrison towns.⁵⁸ The SPLA further warned that a similar fate awaited any aircraft that flew over territory controlled by its forces.⁵⁹ On 12 May, the SPLA claimed that it shot down with antiaircraft guns a *Hercules* C-130 transport plane as it was about to land at Wau, in the Bahr al-Ghazal region. The SPLA said the plane was carrying two platoons of reinforcements.⁶⁰ Khartoum confirmed that the plane had been hit, but claimed that the damage was "only slight,"⁶¹ and added that the plane was carrying supplies for the victims of the famine in the south.⁶²

A serious deterioration in Khartoum's fortunes occurred in late May, after the beginning of the rainy season, which favored the SPLA. On 31 May, the strategic

garrison town of Jokau in the Upper Nile region, on the southeastern border with Ethiopia, was captured by the SPLA. Khartoum admitted the loss of Jokau, accusing "some white mercenaries and Ethiopian forces" of heavily shelling the town, thereby forcing the Army to evacuate it.⁶³ It was the first time since the outbreak of the civil war in 1983 that Khartoum explicitly accused Addis Ababa of direct involvement in the war. This alarming development, together with the humiliating withdrawal of the Army from the town, allegedly triggered a tremor in the Sudanese military top command. Rumors of the sacking — or, according to another version, the resignation or even the placing under house arrest⁶⁴ — of the Armed Forces' commander in chief, Gen. Fawzi Ahmad al-Fadil, were all flatly denied by Khartoum.⁶⁵

An intensive series of SPLA attacks soon followed. On 6 June, the SPLA seized a *Puma* helicopter, after capturing a group of soldiers in the Jokau area and using them as bait to lure the helicopter.⁶⁶ Four days later, the SPLA claimed the shooting down of a MiG-23 fighter aircraft.⁶⁷ Khartoum claimed that the plane was forced to land because it had run out of fuel, and was damaged while landing.⁶⁸ In mid-July, the SPLA captured the town of Ikoto,⁶⁹ near the border with Uganda in the Equatoria region.

The daring of the SPLA, and the military's growing difficulty in coping with the challenge, brought about a new, serious escalation in the course of the war. In August, the SPLA penetrated into southern Kordofan,⁷⁰ extending its activities beyond the southern region. The Sudanese military initiated, in early September, a series of counterattacks against the "rebel forces" in southern Kordofan.⁷¹ However, there were no details available regarding the scope and results of these attacks.

During the fall-winter period, fighting continued intensively, with almost daily incidents. On 14 October, the SPLA ambushed a train on the way from Ariath to Uwayl, in the Bahr al-Ghazal region. The SPLA claimed it killed 153 soldiers and wounded 200 others. It added that the train was carrying soldiers and food supplies for the government's besieged garrisons, rather than relief supplies as claimed by Khartoum.⁷² Khartoum admitted to some 40 military and civilian casualties,⁷³ alleging that the SPLA had had information about the supplies carried by the train, and had concentrated between 4,000 and 9,000 men for the attack.⁷⁴

A new, alarming phase in the war was marked, from Khartoum's viewpoint, in November-December, following the further expansion of SPLA activities outside the southern region. On 12 November, after three days of "heavy and fierce fighting," the SPLA captured the garrison town of Kurmuk, in the southern Blue Nile region near the border with Ethiopia, and outside the informal boundaries of the southern region. Khartoum admitted the loss of the town, noting, however, that Ethiopian soldiers, aided by Cubans and East German experts, had played an active role in its capture.⁷⁵ The fall of Kurmuk dealt a serious blow to the prestige of the military as well as to Mahdi's government. The capture in mid-December by the SPLA, allegedly with the aid of Ethiopians,⁷⁶ of Qaysan, another garrison town in the Blue Nile region near al-Damazine, further emphasized Khartoum's failure to cope adequately with the SPLA. Moreover, the fall of Kurmuk and Qaysan signified the possible extension of the war into northern Sudan. This worried Khartoum, which feared that the SPLA might penetrate further north to al-Damazine, 320 km. south of Khartoum and connected to the capital by one of Sudan's few asphalt roads. In the long term, such a

development, especially if actively backed by Ethiopia, might have serious consequences throughout the country.

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

LIBYA

The presence of Libyan troops in Darfur, in the western part of Sudan, was a major source of friction between Khartoum and Tripoli in the first half of 1987. The problem surfaced in March 1986, when about 1,000 Libyan troops arrived in the famine-stricken region of Darfur, under the guise of a "relief mission." Khartoum's repeated requests that the Libyans leave were ignored, but the Sudanese Government — fully aware of its inability to threaten Libya militarily — did not pressure Tripoli further and the issue remained unresolved.

In early 1987, tension mounted again. Between the end of January⁷⁷ and the first half of February,⁷⁸ a new Libyan contingent, comprising between 700 and 1,000 soldiers, along with a relief convoy, arrived in the region. The convoy included 63 lorries carrying supplies, oil products, medicines, medical equipment, and other items. The military force was equipped with rocket launchers, antiaircraft guns, antitank guns, and 400 vehicles.⁷⁹ A short while later, there were reports that the Libyans there had been reinforced by another 7,000 soldiers equipped with 100 tanks,⁸⁰ among other weapons. Apparently, Qadhafi had decided in early 1987 to use Sudan's western region as a second base for the attack on Hissène Habré's Chadian Army, on the occasion of renewed hostility between Tripoli and Ndjamena. Not surprisingly, the Sudanese Government was seriously concerned that the continuing presence of the Libyan troops might severely damage Khartoum's relations with Chad (see below), and lead to an explosion in the Darfur area. The government was also under internal pressure, especially from the powerful NIF,⁸¹ and foreign pressure from the US and Egypt, to get the Libyan troops to leave as quickly as possible.

Aware, however, of its inability to apply significant pressure on Libya, as well as its growing military and economic reliance on Tripoli, Khartoum attempted to evade the issue by denying the persistent reports of the presence of Libyan troops on Sudanese territory.⁸²

Nevertheless, growing internal and external pressures, as well as increasing fears of becoming unwillingly involved in the war between his two neighbors, forced Mahdi to admit publicly on 8 March that there were Libyan troops on Sudanese territory. In the same breath he also announced that they had been ordered to leave immediately and had virtually begun their withdrawal.⁸³ It soon became clear, however, that the Libyans had not withdrawn northward but had moved west to attack Chadian forces. Consequently, on 23 March, Mahdi expressed his government's indignation over Tripoli's "deceptive behavior." The prime minister also disclosed, on the same day, that he had refused Libya's request to use al-Junaynah airport in the western region for its attacks on Chad.⁸⁴ Libya reacted, as expected, by categorically denying that it had any forces on Sudanese territory.⁸⁵ Following an intensive exchange of diplomatic contacts between the two countries,⁸⁶ Mahdi declared on 29 March that the problem had been resolved "at the political and military levels." But he did not say whether the Libyans had actually withdrawn.⁸⁷ A day later, Mahdi provided additional details,

saying that the two sides had agreed that the Libyan forces would take orders from the Sudanese Armed Forces in the area, and that the Libyan troops would hand their weapons over to the Sudanese military for "safe transportation" home. He said that he had given the Libyan forces a week to depart.⁸⁸ In early April, the Sudanese minister for industry, Mubarak al-Fadil, and the state minister of defense, 'Abdallah Burmah Nasir, paid a joint visit to Tripoli. While the central issue of the talks was reportedly the Sudanese mediation between Libya and Chad (see below), it could be assumed that the acceleration of the withdrawal of Libyan troops from Sudan was prominent on the agenda.

Meanwhile, Libya suffered serious military defeats in Chad and could not afford to evacuate its forces from Sudan, even if it wanted to do so. Against that backdrop, Tripoli released, on 12 April, a strongly-worded message to Mahdi, in which it reiterated its earlier denials that its forces were present in Sudan, and warning the Sudanese Government that it would be better for it not to highlight the issue.⁸⁹ Using the carrot-and-stick approach, Tripoli at the same time presented Khartoum with a gift of four MiG-23s, which were flown to Sudan by Libyan-trained Sudanese pilots. (For details of an earlier Libyan delivery of significant military aid, see *MECS* 1986, p. 590.) The Libyan gesture — a significant contribution to the strength and morale of the Sudanese military — was referred to by Mahdi as "sure evidence" of "common interests," and a sign of the reduction of strain.⁹⁰ It remained unclear whether the MiGs, perhaps accompanied by other promises, were the price for Sudan's undeclared consent to the continued presence of Libyan forces, which, according to various unofficial Sudanese and foreign sources, remained in place until the end of the period reviewed.⁹¹ Khartoum, for its part, consistently denied, until the end of 1987, that there were any Libyan troops on its territory.⁹²

At the beginning of September, Hasan Taj al-Din, the State Supreme Council member in charge of African affairs, attended the celebrations of the 18th anniversary of Qadhdhafi's revolution and returned home with a Libyan pledge to help Sudan "to overcome all its problems [especially]... the southern question."⁹³ On 17 September, Abu Bakr Yunis, Libya's commander in chief, returned the visit. During the week he spent in Khartoum, he announced that Libya would supply Sudan with 600,000 tons of oil for one year, and that the trade exchange was to be increased to \$100m.⁹⁴ Libya's promise of oil constituted significant aid to Sudan, especially in light of Iraq's refusal to supply oil, and Saudi Arabia's decision to halve its offered six-months' supply (for both, see below).

Sudanese appreciation was expressed throughout the summer and fall by the political leadership of the UP and the DUP, who declared their support for Libya's claim of sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip in northern Chad,⁹⁵ thus sharply deviating from Khartoum's hitherto declared neutrality *vis-à-vis* the Chadian-Libyan conflict. This deviation reflected Sudan's increasing reliance — politically, economically, and militarily — on Libya. The SPLA's success, for the first time since the beginning of the civil war in 1983, in taking over (in November-December) two towns outside the region of southern Sudan (see above), further strengthened Sudanese dependence on the Qadhdhafi regime. Following talks between Qadhdhafi and Mahdi, when the latter visited Tripoli on 18–19 December, Mahdi stated that he had discussed with the Libyan leader the issue of "the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa."⁹⁶ It could be assumed that Mahdi asked for Qadhdhafi's help in curbing Ethiopia's aid to the SPLA, and perhaps even requested that Tripoli increase its military assistance to Khartoum.

CHAD

The escalation of fighting between Libya and Chad during the third part of 1987 had a significantly negative impact on Khartoum's relations with Ndjamenā. Ndjamenā repeatedly accused Khartoum of permitting the continued stationing of Libyan troops in the western part of Sudan, thus enabling Qadhafi's forces to use that area as a base for military operations against Chad.⁹⁷

Aware of the potential threat to its essential interests that this situation presented, the Sudanese Government walked a tightrope in its political dealings with Libya and Chad. Khartoum's solution was to maneuver between its two western neighbors by releasing statements declaring its neutrality,⁹⁸ and at the same time embarking on intensive mediatory activities aimed at achieving a settlement of the armed conflict.⁹⁹ Notwithstanding the Sudanese efforts, Chadian-Libyan contacts — via direct talks held in March in Khartoum and through Sudan's mediation¹⁰⁰ — reached a deadlock in spring 1987.

Sudan's inability to remove Libyan troops from its territory, and its repeated statements of support for Libya's sovereignty over the Aouzou Strip, continued to mar relations between Khartoum and Ndjamenā throughout 1987.

EGYPT

Sudan's relations with Egypt were adversely affected by Numayri's overthrow in 1985 (see *MECS* 1984–85, pp. 636–37; and 1986, pp. 591–92.) Since then, ties between the two countries were shaped primarily by Sudan's *rapprochement* with Libya, but also by the rivalries and the contradictory views of Sudan's three major political parties *vis-à-vis* Cairo. Signs of *rapprochement* with Egypt were noticed from time to time in 1987, but nothing significant emerged.

An improvement was indicated early in the year by the comings and goings of top-level officials between Khartoum and Cairo. This trend was highlighted by Mahdi's official visit to Egypt, from 18–23 February, his first since he came to power in spring 1986. The visit was interpreted by various sources in Sudan (as well as outside the country) as a breakthrough in relations between the two countries. The visit was concluded with the signing of a Brotherhood Charter (*Mithaq al-'Ikha*), which was initiated and formulated by Sudan,¹⁰¹ and which was referred to by Mahdi as “an expression of...special relations [and] common interests” and “a step forward on a long road.”¹⁰² The charter centered on the “reformation of cultural and educational cooperation and the development of the basic infrastructure of transport and communications.” It also touched upon “the basic and essential political principles of commitment to democracy, basic freedoms, [and] non-alignment in foreign relations.” In addition, the charter affirmed the “two countries' Arab, African, and Islamic affiliation.” It further stipulated its support of “the Arab cause, the liberation movement in South Africa and the frontline states.”¹⁰³ The charter also provided for the formation of a joint higher committee, headed by the prime ministers of Sudan and Egypt, which would work to implement the charter's articles.¹⁰⁴ Not referred to in the charter, but probably discussed by the Sudanese and Egyptian leaders, were the war in southern Sudan and the possibility of Egyptian mediation in the Sudanese-Ethiopian dispute (see below).

It was not long, however, before it became clear that, instead of bolstering bilateral ties, the charter had introduced new tension into the relationship between the two

countries. A short while after he returned home, Mahdi declared that the charter replaced all the agreements that had been signed between Khartoum and Cairo during the Numayri era. Most important among these was the Joint Defense Agreement signed in July 1976 for a 25-year period (see *MECS* 1976–77, p. 597). The Brotherhood Charter did not mention the Joint Defense Agreement at all, and Mahdi, at a press conference in Cairo, had declined to answer a question on that subject.¹⁰⁵ Mahdi's repeated statements, later in spring and in summer, about the annulment of the Joint Defense Agreement,¹⁰⁶ aroused strong criticism domestically, mainly from the DUP and the NIF. They felt that the new charter was a maneuver by which Mahdi had tricked Egypt into the cancellation of the Joint Defense Agreement. The DUP, traditionally pro-Egyptian, declared its objection to the unilateral cancellation of the agreement by Mahdi.¹⁰⁷ The NIF, which during 1987 made noteworthy efforts to establish looser ties with the Egyptian leadership, expressed its objection to the cancellation of the agreement, saying that it should either have remained in force or been replaced by a similar agreement.¹⁰⁸

Meanwhile, Cairo received senior representatives of Khartoum's three major political parties, who all wished to reduce the newly created strain with Egypt, while at the same time trying to strengthen each party's political ties with Cairo.¹⁰⁹ (For the simultaneous political bickering in Khartoum, see above.)

Improving relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, and the reported Egyptian agreement in the summer to supply Ethiopia with \$250m. worth of Egyptian-made arms,¹¹⁰ at a time when Addis Ababa was strengthening its military support of the SPLA, further aggravated the strained relations. Khartoum appealed to Cairo to take the necessary measures to ensure that these weapons would not reach the SPLA.¹¹¹

In August, sources in both capitals talked about a crisis in bilateral relations,¹¹² which coincided with serious friction in Sudan's Government (see above). It was only in the fall and winter that signs of *rapprochement* were noticed again, mainly due to Sudan's initiative. The alarming escalation in the war against the SPLA, which now enjoyed direct military support from Ethiopia (at least according to Khartoum), urged the Sudanese Government to appeal to every possible source of political and military aid. Cairo had already been involved in mediation efforts between Khartoum and Addis Ababa,¹¹³ and was requested by Sudan to intensify its activities. On 28 November, Egyptian Prime Minister 'Atif Sidqi, whose scheduled visit to Sudan had been delayed several times, arrived in Khartoum and was briefed by his Sudanese counterpart on the "Ethiopian-backed" SPLA attack on Kurmuk (see above). The Egyptians made extensive efforts to contain the Sudanese-Ethiopian crisis (see chapter on Egypt), but to no avail. However, Egypt's mediation opened a new dialogue between Egypt and Sudan, as the exchange of visits of high-level officials at the end of the year clearly indicated.

ETHIOPIA

Notwithstanding Sudan's tireless attempts to defuse the tension with Ethiopia, relations between the countries went from bad to worse, reaching new peaks of mutual hostility toward the end of 1987. While Khartoum spared no efforts to convince Addis Ababa that it was not backing or aiding the Eritrean rebels,¹¹⁴ Ethiopia, for its part, significantly strengthened its assistance to the SPLA. In late spring 1987,

Khartoum claimed that Ethiopia had used its artillery to "heavily" shell the Jokau region, which bordered on Ethiopia (see above).

Nevertheless, not wishing to increase tensions further, especially when relations with Libya were overshadowed by new suspicions (see above) and when a limited *rapprochement* appeared to be shaping up between Khartoum and Addis Ababa under Egyptian sponsorship, Sudan kept its reaction low-key. This response, stemming less from self-restraint than from Khartoum's inability to impose effective political or military pressure on Ethiopia, seemed to be paying dividends in May, when Ethiopia's information minister, Fellke Gedle Giorgis, paid an official visit to Khartoum and officially invited Mahdi to visit Addis Ababa.¹¹⁵

It did not take long, however, before tension increased again. In mid-June, Khartoum reported the massing of Ethiopian forces along the border.¹¹⁶ Clashes, albeit limited in scope, soon followed. According to Sudanese sources, Ethiopian forces opened fire, on 16 July, on Sudanese troops stationed along the border.¹¹⁷ On 20 July, Ethiopian and Sudanese troops exchanged machine-gun and mortar fire for 20 minutes inside Sudanese territory. On the same day, an Ethiopian aircraft overflew the town of Bor and dropped military equipment to the SPLA forces.¹¹⁸ Still maintaining its low-key reaction, Sudan announced on 9 August that two Ethiopian MiGs attacked "an agricultural camp" in al-Qadarif, within Sudan's territory.¹¹⁹ It was not clear, however, whether Ethiopia's military activities were directed against Sudanese targets in order to aid the SPLA, or were aimed at eroding the strength of Eritrean rebels in Sudan. Whatever the case, it was also not clear whether Khartoum was deliberately maximizing Addis Ababa's role in supporting the SPLA in order to help explain the deterioration of its military position in the south, or whether the Ethiopians were indeed directly involved in SPLA fighting against the Sudanese Army.

Whatever the case, and no doubt realizing that the diplomatic route was the only possible way it could influence Ethiopia to curb its support of the SPLA, Khartoum sent a high-level delegation to Addis Ababa in September to attend the 13th anniversary celebrations of Ethiopia's revolution.¹²⁰ About a month later, a high-level Ethiopian delegation headed by Amanuel Amde Michael, a senior political leader, arrived in Khartoum for a three-day official visit. But this did not lead to any tangible results. From early November until the end of the year, the two countries' relations deteriorated further. Khartoum accused the Ethiopian forces (along with Cuban and East German experts) of active involvement in the attacks launched by the SPLA on Kurmuk.¹²¹ This time, Sudan lodged protests with the UN, the Arab League, and the Organization of African Unity over the Ethiopian "aggression" and "violation of Sudan's sovereignty."¹²² Ethiopia denied that it had participated in the Kurmuk attack.¹²³ On 3 December, Mahdi and the Ethiopian head of state, Mengistu Haile Mariam, met in Kampala for talks "on bilateral relations." They decided to set up a joint committee to study the problems between their two countries, which, as Mahdi noted, "if not solved will lead to war."¹²⁴ Within a few days it became clear that the talks had not brought about a substantial improvement. Khartoum accused Addis Ababa of taking part in the SPLA attack that led to the capture of Qaysan (see above).¹²⁵

UGANDA

After settling the serious dispute between them in the fall of 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 594–95), both Khartoum and Kampala tried to maintain good relations. Sudan was aware of Uganda's ability to block the single, vital land route connecting southern Sudan with Kenya's port of Mombasa. Such a move would significantly aggravate the crisis in the famine-stricken areas of the south and, in turn, further weaken Khartoum's foothold in the region. In addition, a renewal of the dispute with Uganda might prompt it to allow the SPLA to use its territory as a second base against Khartoum. Early in the year, Sudan made a series of goodwill gestures toward Kampala, such as expelling a number of Ugandan opposition leaders from Sudan, as well as returning to Kampala the five helicopters¹²⁶ that were used when the deposed Ugandan president, Tito Okello, escaped to Sudan in January 1986.

The improving ties were further strengthened by the visit in mid-June to Khartoum, of Uganda's President Yoweri Museveni. After attending the summit conference of East and Central African states in Khartoum on 5–6 June,¹²⁷ Museveni met with Mahdi and the two decided on an extradition agreement as part of their efforts to bolster security along their mutual border. Museveni, who had personal ties with SPLA leader John Garang, expressed his readiness to mediate between the SPLA and Khartoum.¹²⁸ In the winter, Uganda indeed provided some mediatory services to Khartoum and the SPLA, but without registering any tangible results.¹²⁹ On 4 September, a high-level Sudanese delegation paid a three-day official visit to Uganda, dealing there with issues related to border security, trade, transport, and communications, as well as the implementation of the \$7 bn. barter deal made earlier by the two countries' leaders.¹³⁰

THE ARAB AND ISLAMIC WORLD

Sudan's involvement in the Arab arena continued to be a relatively low-key, relating only to issues relevant to Khartoum's vital interests. At the same time, the Sudanese Government did not miss an opportunity to emphasize that, despite its dual — African and Arab — identity, the country was part and parcel of the Arab and Islamic worlds. Sudan participated in the fifth Islamic summit, which was held in late January in Kuwait. It also participated in the Arab summit in Amman in November. In both forums, the Sudanese delegations, headed by Mirghani, did not take any initiative and maintained a low profile (for further details, see essay on inter-Arab relations).

Special attention was paid by Khartoum to its relations with Saudi Arabia, a major financial backer. Mahdi's visit to Riyadh in July clearly attested to this.¹³¹ It was not surprising, therefore, that Sudan was alarmed by a diplomatic incident that occurred in the summer, following the bloody events in Mecca involving Iranian pilgrims (for details, see chapters on Saudi Arabia and Iran). In early August, during a visit to Khartoum by the Iranian deputy foreign minister, the Iranian media stated that the Sudanese Government was supporting Iran in the Gulf War and on the issue of the riots in Mecca. Seriously concerned about the effects of such statements on its ties with the Saudis, Khartoum was quick to deny any support of the Iranians. Trying to placate Riyadh further, Khartoum also declared that the Saudi Kingdom had "the right [to implement] its laws and regulations on its territory to preserve [the] dignity of Islam and Muslims."¹³² Nevertheless, the damage was done, and Saudi Arabia cut oil supplies to Sudan for several months.¹³³ At the end of the year, tension was defused

and Riyadh gave Khartoum 100,000 tons of oil products.¹³⁴ The Saudis also extended "important military assistance" to the Sudanese Army in its offensive to regain the town of Kurmuk from the SPLA.¹³⁵

Relations with Iraq were also important to Khartoum, as reflected by Mahdi's visit to Baghdad in early July, mainly due to Sudan's wish to be supplied with Iraqi oil. But Baghdad now refused Mahdi's request for oil¹³⁶ — which could be interpreted as retaliation for Khartoum's relative *rapprochement* with Tehran in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, p. 597). A measure of maneuvering between Baghdad and Tehran was how the easy, though not original, "game" of declared neutrality was played, with repetitive calls for both sides to end their war.¹³⁷

Nevertheless, Khartoum denounced "the Iranian aggression" against a Kuwaiti target in October and repeatedly called on Iran to put into effect Security Council Resolution 598 calling for a cease-fire in its war against Iraq.¹³⁸ Kuwait was a very important source of economic aid to Khartoum. Mahdi's visit to Kuwait (and Qatar) in July resulted in the signing of an agreement for oil supplies for the next three months and an increased investment of Kuwaiti funds in Sudan.¹³⁹

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. *Al-Tadamun*, 10–16 January 1987.
2. *Al-Musawwar*, 2 January 1987.
3. SUNA, 5 February — JPRS, 18 March 1987.
4. For Abu Hurayra's criticism and series of accusations, see an interview with *al-Majalla*, 6 May; *al-Maydan*, 19 May; *Africasia*, June 1987.
5. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 7 February 1987.
6. For details of the visits to the Netherlands and Britain, see *Alwan*, 5 February; *al-Dustur*, London, 26 February; *Sawt al-Umma*, 4 February; and R. Omdurman, 13 February — DR, 17 February 1987, respectively.
7. SUNA, 22 April — DR, 23 April 1987. For details on the Joint Defense Agreement, see *MECS* 1976–77, p. 597.
8. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 8 May 1987.
9. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 14 May 1987.
10. *Ibid.*
11. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 22 June 1987.
12. *AC*, 2 September 1987.
13. *Al-Raya*, Khartoum, 18 May 1987.
14. SUNA, 22 July — SWB, 23 July 1987.
15. SUNA, 17, 27 July — DR, 21, 28 July 1987.
16. *AC*, 2 September 1987.
17. R. Omdurman, 8 August — DR, 10 August 1987. For details on the Constituent Assembly, see *MECS* 1986, pp. 579–80.
18. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 15 August 1987.
19. SUNA, 22 August — DR, 24 August 1987.
20. *October*, 6 September 1987: an interview with Hasan 'Abdallah al-Turabi, the NIF leader.
21. *AC*, 2 September 1987.
22. *Al-Majalla*, 23–29 September 1987: an interview with the minister.
23. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 13 October 1987.

24. SUNA, 13 October — SWB, 14 October; *al-Ayyam*, 3 December 1987, respectively.
25. The estimate was given by a specialist on Sudan's economy and a veteran Communist figure, al-Tijani al-Tayyib, in an interview with *al-Majalla*, 9 December 1986. See also a similar Egyptian evaluation in *al-Ahali*, 28 January 1987. In March 1987, according to the commercial rate: £Sd4 per \$, *CR*: Sudan, 1st quarter, 1987.
26. *African Business*, January 1987. For more on Sudan's economy, see *Country Profile*, Sudan, 1987–88.
27. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 14 February 1987.
28. For more details, see *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 20 March 1987.
29. *Al-Ushbu'*, 16 April 1987.
30. See, e.g., *al-Maydan*, 15 May; *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 9 June 1987.
31. SUNA, 21 July — SWB, 23 July 1987.
32. *Al-Sahafa*, 12 July; *al-Maydan*, 21 July 1987.
33. SUNA, 24 July — DR, 27 July 1987.
34. R. Omdurman, 25 July — DR, 27 July 1987.
35. SUNA, 27 July — SWB, 29 July 1987.
36. SUNA, 28 July — DR, 30 July 1987.
37. SUNA, 29 July — DR, 30 July 1987.
38. SUNA, 30 July — DR, 31 July 1987.
39. SUNA, 3 September — DR, 4 September; *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 7 September 1987, respectively.
40. KUNA, 14 September, quoting Sudanese source — DR, 18 September 1987.
41. SUNA, 6 October — DR, 7 October 1987. For the text of the agreement with the IMF, see a statement released by Sudan's Embassy in Abu Dhabi — an important source of financial aid to Khartoum — to *al-Qabas*, 15 October 1987.
42. See, e.g., SUNA, 5 October — DR, 7 October; *al-Ayyam*, 8 October 1987.
43. SUNA, 6 October — DR, 7 October 1987.
44. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 26 October 1987.
45. *Ibid.*
46. *Al-Ayyam*, 29 October 1987.
47. *Al-Ayyam*, 27 October 1987.
48. E.g., R. SPLA, 21 January — JPRS, 24 February; *al-Ahali*, 28 January, and *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 12 March: interviews with John Garang, the SPLA leader; R. Kampala, 7 September — SWB, 10 September 1987: a statement released by Garang.
49. E.g., SUNA, 6 April — DR, 7 April; R. Omdurman, 25 December — DR, 28 December 1987.
50. SUNA, 31 December — DR, 3 January 1987.
51. E.g., R. SPLA, 6, 16 January, 2, 6, 18, 24 February — DR, 9, 19 January, 3, 11, 19, 25 February 1987.
52. R. SPLA, 5 March — DR, 6 March; R. SPLA, 31 March — SWB, 2 April 1987, respectively.
53. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 16 April 1987.
54. R. SPLA, 14 April — SWB, 17 April 1987.
55. R. SPLA, 6 April — DR, 7 April 1987.
56. SUNA, 14 January — SWB, 19 January 1987.
57. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 7 May 1987.
58. *IHT*, 7 May 1987, quoting a "senior source" in the SPLA.
59. R. SPLA, 12 May — SWB, 14 May 1987.
60. R. SPLA, 13 May — DR, 14 May 1987.
61. SUNA, 14 May — SWB, 16 May 1987.
62. *Al-Maydan*, 15 May 1987, quoting al-Mahdi.
63. R. Omdurman, 2 June — DR, 3 June 1987. (See also below, notes 75 and 123.)
64. *CR*: Sudan, 3rd quarter; SUNA, 12 June — DR, 15 June, and R. SPLA, 17 June — SWB, 19 June 1987, respectively.
65. *Al-Maydan*, 15 June 1987: a statement by the state defense minister, 'Abdallah Nasir Burmah.
66. SUNA, 9 June, R. SPLA, 8 June — SWB, 12 June 1987.

67. R. SPLA, 12 June — SWB, 15 June 1987.
68. *Al-Ayyam*, 12 June 1987.
69. R. SPLA, 14 July — DR, 16 July 1987.
70. R. SPLA, 3 August — DR, 5 August 1987.
71. SUNA, 2 September — DR, 3 September 1987.
72. R. SPLA, 22 October — SWB, 22 October 1987.
73. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 17 October 1987.
74. R. Omdurman, 15 October — DR, 16 October; *al-Ayyam*, 19 October 1987.
75. R. Omdurman, 12 November — DR, 16 November 1987.
76. SUNA, 13 December — DR, 14 December 1987.
77. SUNA, 24 January — SWB, 26 January 1987.
78. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 24 March 1987.
79. SUNA, 24 January — SWB, 26 January; *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 24 March 1987.
80. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 13 March 1987, quoting Sudanese and Chadian sources.
81. E.g., see the NIF reference to that issue in SUNA, 15 March — DR, 18 March 1987.
82. For Khartoum's repeated denials, see e.g., *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 28 February, 4 March; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 1 March 1987, interviews with Mahdi.
83. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 9 March, quoting Mahdi in a meeting with the leadership of the Sudanese media in Khartoum a day earlier.
84. An address to the Constituent Assembly, *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 24 March 1987.
85. E.g., JANA, 24, 27 March — DR, 24 March, 2 April 1987.
86. E.g., SUNA, 4 March, 1 April — SWB, 6 March, 3 April; SUNA, 18, 31 March — DR, 19 March, 1 April 1987.
87. SUNA, 30 March — SWB, 31 March 1987.
88. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 31 March 1987.
89. JANA, 12 April — SWB, 14 April 1987.
90. SUNA, 12 April — DR, 13 April 1987.
91. E.g., *al-Ayyam*, 4 May; *al-Musawwar*, 22 May, 21 August; R. Monte Carlo, 9 September 1987, quoting *Sudan Times* of that same day.
92. E.g., SUNA, 13 May — SWB, 15 May, quoting Mahdi; *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 28 June, quoting a Sudanese member of parliament; *al-Musawwar*, 4 September: interview with the foreign minister, Muhammad Tawfiq; *al-Ayyam*, 14 October 1987, interview with "senior military source" and many others.
93. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 4 September 1987.
94. SUNA, 5 October — SWB, 7 October 1987.
95. E.g., Mahdi, Taj al-Din and Mirghani to SUNA, 9 September — DR, 9 September; *al-Majalla*, 30 September — 6 October; and SUNA, 18 August — DR, 19 August 1987, respectively.
96. SUNA, 20 December — DR, 22 December 1987.
97. E.g., R. Ndjamena, 23 March, 8 August — DR, 24 March, 10 August; R. Ndjamena, 9 September — SWB, 10 September 1987.
98. E.g., *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, an interview with Mirghani; SUNA, 7 March — DR, 9 March; *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 9 March 1987, interviews with Mahdi.
99. For details on Sudan's mediation initiative, see *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, a press conference with Mahdi; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 1 March 1987, an interview with Taj al-Din.
100. For details on the mediation activities, see e.g., *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, almost daily in the first third of the year.
101. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 3 February, an interview with Mirghani; *al-Musawwar*, 27 February 1987.
102. SUNA, 24 February — DR, 25 February 1987, addressing the Sudanese Constituent Assembly.
103. For more details regarding the charter, see *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 23 February 1987.
104. MENA, 21 February — SWB, 23 February 1987.
105. MENA, 22 February — SWB, 24 February 1987.
106. E.g., SUNA, 25 May — DR, 26 May; SUNA, 14 June — SWB, 18 June 1987.
107. E.g., statements made by senior DUP leaders; *al-Khalij*, 26 April; MENA, 30 April — DR, 5 May 1987.

108. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 3 April, an interview with Turabi; *Ruz al-Yusuf*, 20 July 1987, quoting the NIF newspaper, *al-Raya*.
109. For the visits of UP, DUP and NIF senior representatives, see *al-Ahram al-Iqtisadi*, 22 June, and SUNA, 26 June — SWB, 29 June; MENA, 14 July — SWB, 17 July, and *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 3 July 1987, respectively.
110. *Middle East Times*, 19 July 1987.
111. *Al-Majalla*, 19 August 1987.
112. E.g., *al-Dustur*, London, 24 August, and *al-Ahram*, 26 August 1987.
113. E.g., *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 18 May; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 28 July; *al-Wafd*, 16 September 1987.
114. Repeated statements of senior political and military figures, e.g., in *al-Ushbu'*, 22 January; *al-Musawwar*, 2 January; *al-Ayyam*, 1 December 1987.
115. For more details on the visit, see *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 4, 5 May, and *al-Ayyam*, 6 May 1987.
116. *Al-Ayyam*, 16 June; *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 19 July 1987.
117. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 19 July 1987.
118. SUNA, 22 July — DR, 23 July 1987.
119. SUNA, 12 August — SWB, 13 August 1987.
120. SUNA, 25 October — DR, 28 October 1987.
121. E.g., *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 16 November; *al-Ushbu'*, 19 November; *al-Quwat al-Musallaha*, 26 November 1987.
122. R. Omdurman, 2 December — DR, 4 December 1987.
123. Ethiopia's chargé d'affaires in Khartoum to SUNA, 22 November — DR, 25 November 1987.
124. SUNA, 5 December — DR, 7 December 1987.
125. *Al-Raya*, Khartoum, 12 December; *Alwan*, 24 December 1987.
126. *CR*: Sudan, 1st quarter; KUNA, 5 January, quoting the Sudanese *al-Ushbu'* — DR, 7 January 1987.
127. For further details on the summit, in which Kenya, Uganda, Burundi, Zambia, Zaire, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Sudan took part, see *al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 8 June 1987.
128. *Al-Siyasa*, Khartoum, 13 January 1987.
129. E.g., *al-Ayyam*, 17 September; *Sawt al-Umma*, 11 October; *al-Anba*, Kuwait, 14 October 1987.
130. *CR*: Sudan, 3rd and 4th quarters; SUNA, 7 September — SWB, 9 September 1987.
131. For details, see R. Omdurman, 11 July — SWB, 15 July 1987.
132. SUNA, 12 August — DR, 12 August 1987.
133. *CR*: Sudan, 4th quarter, 1987.
134. *Al-Ayyam*, 15 December 1987.
135. R. Monte Carlo, 31 December — DR, 31 December 1987.
136. *Al-Raya*, Khartoum, 23 July 1987.
137. E.g., Sudanese top officials in interviews with *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 3 February, 22 March; *Akhir Sa'a*, 25 February, 19 October; *al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 25 October 1987.
138. SUNA, 24 October — SWB, 28 October; Mirghani's interview with *al-Sharq al-Awsat*, 9 December 1987.
139. R. Omdurman, 15 July — DR, 20 July; *al-Khalij*, 22 July 1987.

The Arab Republic of Syria

(Al-Jumhuriyya al-'Arabiyya al-Suriyya)

YOSEF OLMERT

During 1987, the Syrian regime was preoccupied with problems that had originated in earlier years and were greatly exacerbated in 1986. There were six such problems: the deepening economic crisis in the country; the continuing power struggle within the regime; the difficulties of achieving "strategic parity" with Israel; the chaotic situation in Lebanon; the growing isolation in the inter-Arab system; and the uncertainty in Syria's relationship with the USSR and the crisis in its relationships with major Western countries.

In dealing with these problems, the regime's actions were marked by a concerted effort to repair the damage. This was particularly noticeable in the field of foreign policy. After a long period of relative passivity, the Syrian Army moved into West Beirut in February 1987, in a bid to reassert Syria's hegemony in Beirut in particular, and in Lebanon in general. This action fell short of a full-scale military intervention to pacify the whole of Lebanon. However, it gave notice of Syria's commitment to remain the dominant actor in Lebanon, in defiance of the efforts of pro-Iranian and Palestinian factions to become key actors in the fragmented country.

During the year under survey, Syria was also engaged in an effort to improve its regional standing, which had declined in recent years due mainly to its uncomfortable alliance with Iran. In 1987, Syria had a dialogue with Iraq, continued to have an extensive dialogue with Jordan, and participated in Islamic and Arab summit conferences, thus demonstrating its desire to move from a position of isolation back to the center of Arab politics.

In the international arena, Syria's policy was marked by an attempt to remove misunderstandings and uncertainties in its relationship with the USSR. This was amply in evidence during President Hafiz al-Asad's visit to Moscow in April 1987. There was also a concerted and successful effort to mend fences with the US and other Western countries. The anti-Syrian actions taken by these countries following the revelations of Syria's involvement in international terrorism (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 619–21), caused concern to the leadership in Damascus. Asad proved again that he was sensitive to his international standing and reputation. By the end of 1987, Asad could claim an impressive success, when the US and other Western countries restored full diplomatic relations with Syria. The exception was Britain.

Syria's confrontation with Israel, particularly its emphasis on the concept of achieving strategic parity with it, continued to be the main item on Syria's political agenda. During 1987, Damascus upheld this concept in its rhetoric, while also underlining two new elements. First, it was not only Syria's obligation to achieve the long-desired parity with Israel — there was also a pan-Arab need to do so. Second, the

regime referred to strategic parity as a matter of social and cultural confrontation between the Arabs and the "Zionist enemy." It followed, therefore, that the Syrian regime made an effort to reduce the urgency of the need to achieve parity with Israel. This move would be attributed not only to its regional isolation, but also — perhaps primarily — to its deepening economic crisis.

Dealing with the economic crisis was the regime's top priority in 1987. The remedies offered were multifaceted. The official media were encouraged to discuss the problems; some ministers were replaced, and there was subsequently a complete cabinet reshuffle; strong anti-corruption measures were introduced and hesitant attempts were made to liberalize the economy.

All this failed to eradicate the fundamental causes of the crisis; however, it demonstrated the gravity of the situation and the regime's commitment to deal with it seriously. In 1987, as in every year since 1970, the Syrian regime was essentially Asad's regime. Asad's centrality notwithstanding, some senior army commanders, intelligence chiefs, and civilian politicians continued their squabbles and infighting to enhance their status in the hierarchy, much as they had since Asad's illness in November 1983.

DOMESTIC AFFAIRS

CHALLENGES TO INTERNAL STABILITY

There were repeated, unverified reports throughout the year about a deterioration in Asad's health. According to one report, the personal doctors of King Fahd of Saudi Arabia arrived in Damascus on 16 February to monitor Asad's health.¹ In May it was reported that Asad's disease had reappeared and forced him to greatly reduce his workload.² In June there was another report about a sudden deterioration in Asad's condition. He canceled many planned meetings and two Lebanese specialists were urgently summoned to Damascus to treat the president.³ These rumors were not necessarily the prime cause of the widespread and consistent reports about rifts within the leadership, but they illustrated the tense atmosphere that prevailed within the regime.

As was the case in previous years, the president's brother, Rif'at al-Asad, still a nominal vice president and in exile since late 1985, was a focal point of intrigues and counterintrigues. In January, it was reported that Rif'at had returned to Damascus.⁴ In March, April, and May there was a spate of reports about contacts between Hafiz al-Asad and his younger brother, designed to facilitate the latter's return home.⁵ However, Rif'at had still not returned to Damascus by the end of the year. According to some reports, Hafiz al-Asad's son Basil (for his past activities, see *MECS* 1986, p. 606) was the intermediary between the two brothers, and was being groomed by his father to succeed him.⁶ While Rif'at's political future in Syria remained a source of intense speculation, his activities in Europe were well publicized and comprised a constant source of embarrassment for the Syrian regime in general, and Hafiz al-Asad in particular. Some of the reports concerned illegal activities.⁷ Rif'at himself conducted a campaign against such negative reports, suing an American newspaper (*The Wall Street Journal*) and a French magazine (*Minute*) for publicizing details of his allegedly illegal activities.⁸ He also established a monthly women's magazine and a radio station in Paris.⁹ Rif'at's shadow thus continued to haunt the Syrian regime in 1987.

The Syrian Government was beset by other internal problems during the year, such

as restiveness in the Armed Forces. Early in January, it was reported that eight officers had been killed in clashes between rival factions in the Army;¹⁰ soon afterward it was reported that 500 officers had been removed from their posts.¹¹ In April there was reportedly an attempted *coup d'état*, led by Gen. Shafiq Fayyad, the 'Alawi commander of the Third Armored Division, who was related through marriage to Rif'at al-Asad¹² (on their connections, see *MECS* 1986, p. 606). In May, it was reported that 40 pilots had been executed after another attempted *coup d'état* (this report was strongly denied by an official Syrian spokesman).¹³ But, despite the denials, there were continued reports about friction in the Army and challenges to the regime. Syrian officers were removed after being accused of smuggling arms to the Muslim Brotherhood.¹⁴ There were said to have been two attempts on the life of Hafiz al-Asad himself.¹⁵ There were also accounts of changes in the status of some senior intelligence chiefs.

In January it was reported that Gen. Muhammad al-Khuli, the powerful head of Syria's Air Force Intelligence, and the man said to have ordered Nizar Hindawi to plant a bomb on an Israeli airliner at Heathrow Airport in April 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 606–7, 619), had dropped out of sight and may have been sacked or even imprisoned by Asad.¹⁶ This was not confirmed by the Syrian authorities, nor was the rumor that al-Khuli would be Syria's new ambassador in Moscow.¹⁷ The fact was that al-Khuli was hardly mentioned in the Syrian media, in sharp contrast to the wide coverage given to his activities in previous years.

In the absence of al-Khuli, a new strongman emerged. This was Gen. 'Ali Duba, chief of Syria's Military Intelligence. Duba was helped by 'Adnan Badr Hasan, head of the Interior Ministry's Political Security Department, who had a reputation for honesty. Hasan's men arrested smugglers on the Lebanese border and found that some had helped the Muslim Brotherhood. Investigators also discovered links between the smugglers and relatives of senior Syrian officials. Duba was said to have broadened his control of the complicated intelligence network. His former aide, Majid Sa'id, was put in charge of the department handling "general intelligence." Only al-Khuli's own intelligence organization remained outside Duba's control.¹⁸ Toward the end of 1987, it was reported that Asad had decided to cut Duba down to size, and that Badr Hasan was removed from office. Asad's favorite intelligence chief now was apparently Brig. Ghazi Kan'an, chief of Syria's Military Intelligence in Lebanon.¹⁹ Be this as it may, Asad remained above the fray, the only person who could hold together the various rival factions jockeying for power in his regime. This rivalry demonstrated also that if there was any internal threat to the regime's stability it came from within its own ranks, and not from its traditional rivals in the Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups.

During 1987, there was little violent opposition activity, in sharp contrast to the level of antigovernment action in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 608–10). The Islamic opposition occasionally issued anti-Asad communiqués against Syria's support of al-Amal against the Palestinians in Lebanon²⁰ (see below and chapter on Lebanon). A delegation of Syrian opposition leaders participated in the 18th Palestine National Council (PNC; see essay on the PLO), in defiance of Asad's strong anti-'Arafat policies.²¹ On 24 August, five members of the Muslim Brotherhood were hanged in Damascus for blowing up buses on 16 April 1986²² (see *MECS* 1986, p. 608). During the year, there were also reports of a campaign to arrest activists of dissident Communist factions.²³

FORMATION OF A NEW GOVERNMENT

The rapidly deteriorating economic situation (see below) led to changes in the internal composition of the government and then to the formation of a new government. Four ministers, those in charge of building and construction, agriculture, internal trade, and industry, were forced to resign during the year, following a no-confidence vote in the People's Assembly.²⁴ Late in October, the veteran prime minister (since 1980), Dr. 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm, was replaced by another veteran Ba'thi politician, Mahmud al-Zu'bi, the Speaker of the People's Assembly.

The new government consisted of 36 ministers. Key positions were held by Gen. Mustafa Talas (deputy prime minister and defense minister); Mahmud Qaddur (deputy prime minister for services affairs); Dr. Salim Yasin (deputy prime minister for economic affairs); Faruq al-Shar' (minister of foreign affairs); Dr. Muhammad al-'Imadi (minister of economy and foreign trade); Dr. Najah al-'Attar (minister of culture); and Nasir Qaddur (minister of state for foreign affairs). There were 10 ministers with PhDs in the new government.²⁵ The replacement of Kasm with Zu'bi was merely cosmetic, designed to give the financially strapped Syrian public the impression that an effort was being made to tackle the problems of the crippled and corrupt economy. Asad's decision to replace Kasm was not part of a power struggle but the continuation of a propaganda campaign designed to show that the president was doing something about the economic problems. During 1987, however, it became obvious that the worsening economic situation required action, not just words or explanations to the public.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS — THE REGIME'S RESPONSE

The state of the economy assumed the proportions of a major national crisis in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 610–11), and showed no letup in 1987. The crisis affected the everyday life of ordinary Syrians. For hours at a time, regularly, large parts of Syria's main urban centers were without electric power. The authorities tried to limit the power cuts²⁶ but complaints poured in to the official newspapers about longer-than-scheduled and badly planned cuts.²⁷ In an effort to overcome serious electricity shortages, Syria moved to build a series of major power stations, but no significant improvement could be expected for several years. Electricity demands spiraled because of rapid industrialization and an ambitious electrification program that aimed to provide power by 1990 to all 5,400 villages with more than 100 residents. Much of the new demand was to have been supplied by the power plant at the Tabqa Dam, on the Euphrates, which was commissioned in 1978. However, various technical and ecological problems have frequently resulted in the station operating at a mere one third of its capacity. By late 1985, Syria's power shortage had become critical. Hence, the need to establish countrywide electricity rationing.²⁸

Electric power was just one of the basic commodities in short supply. Staple items such as sugar, butter, cheese, and vegetables were sometimes impossible to find. Long queues formed outside butchers' and bakers' shops. Basic medication such as aspirin and cough syrup were not available. Cotton, in a country which had traditionally been an important producer and exporter, was in short supply when available at all. Tissue paper and toilet paper were embarrassingly scarce. Even *samne*, the most popular and common Syrian food, was in short supply. Since the government was unable to allocate funds to import basic items, Syria's industry produced well below its capacity.

The state-owned Suwayda shoe factory, for example, which used to produce 3,000 pairs of shoes a day, could produce only 800 pairs a day in 1987.²⁹ The country's minimum wage was a pitiful £S800 a month. Middle-ranking government officials earned around £S2,000.

Late in July, the Syrian Central Bank devalued the Syrian currency by 50%, from \$1=£S18 to \$1=£S27.³⁰ It is obvious, therefore, that most Syrians could hardly make do with such low wages, while inflation skyrocketed. In January 1987, the estimated inflation rate was 70%.³¹ During the year, inflation continued to soar, many Syrians were impoverished, but Ba'th Party officials and army officers continued to live the good life they had become accustomed to. Although there was a ban on the importation of new cars, many dignitaries drove new Mercedes sedans and BMWs.³²

Faced with harsh economic realities, the Syrian regime devised its response to the mounting difficulties. To begin with, it loosened its grip on the usually tightly controlled media and allowed public criticism of the handling of the economic situation. Critical editorials, research reports, and citizens' letters filled the pages of Syria's newspapers. The newspapers also carried daily stories on ships arriving at Syrian ports with basic commodities and foodstuffs. These reports were designed to reassure the people that the regime was taking action to fulfill their basic needs.

In an unprecedented move, the regime also allowed the country's foremost comedian, Darid Laham, to screen his new film, *The Report*, which took jabs at targets as high as government ministers. It touched upon the widespread corruption in Syrian national life as well as in much of the Arab world. The movie had initially been censored by the Syrian authorities but was subsequently released through the personal intervention of the minister of culture, Dr. Najah al-'Attar. Laham himself said in an interview with an Arab weekly (*al-Mustaqbal*) that if those at the top were aware of corruption, but chose to remain silent, then the situation was grave indeed.³³

During the year, the regime tried hard to convince the people that it was aware of the corruption, the smuggling, and the black market. Special courts of "economic security" imposed severe penalties on offenders; over 600 people were jailed in the first eight months of 1987 for economic crimes, and in many cases the offenders were sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment. Most of the accused were government officials, especially in the agricultural sector. In some cases, the entire management of government-run companies was replaced. The media gave wide coverage to these cases. Some offenders were sentenced to death and publicly executed for economic crimes.³⁴ The government also established a new system to deal with tax evaders.³⁵ But the anti-corruption campaign hit at least two major snags: first, it was used by various elements to settle political accounts with rivals in the regime.³⁶ It was rumored, for example, that Ghazi Kan'an's brother was one of the victims of this campaign.³⁷ Second, army officers were in many cases the chief economic offenders. Therefore, any campaign that focused only on the civilian sector was not effective enough.

Syria's leaders related in public to the anti-corruption campaign. Ra'uf al-Kasm declared that "we managed to curb the smuggling of materials, and currencies in particular, although there are some mean-spirited individuals who are still attempting to do this. However, the measures being taken against them are becoming more formidable. The law will be merciless to them."³⁸ Hafiz al-Asad used softer language to describe the economic situation and his regime's response: "The economic issues have been put up for discussion and handling by the responsible leaderships...all

government sectors must work in a responsible, coordinated, and disciplined manner so their performance will be good...the citizen is the starting point and the objective...he is also the center of concern."³⁹ In line with this "concern" for the ordinary citizen, Asad issued Laws 6 and 7, dated 23 March 1987, authorizing increases in monthly salaries and wages, as of 1 April 1987, for all civilian and military employees in the ministries, public departments institutions, corporations, public-sector companies and establishments, municipalities, local councils, etc. The increases were as follows: 35% on the first £S800 of the monthly salary or wage; 25% on the next £S400 of the monthly salary or wage; 15% on the next £S400 of the monthly salary or wage; and 10% on remaining amounts of the monthly salary or wage. Moreover, there was also an increase in the pensions of military and civilian individuals from families of *mujahidin* or people killed in the struggle against Israel.⁴⁰

The main tool of economic policy in Syria was the new budget, which was introduced late in March. Totalling £S41.7 bn., it was 4.8% lower than that of 1986. While Damascus made strenuous efforts to reduce its expenditures, the defense budget, as in previous years, accounted for one third of public spending. In real terms, however, this represented a small reduction, for the first time in years. The new budget heavily stressed investment. Just prior to the approval of the budget in the People's Assembly, it was revealed that both France and Japan were to fund new industrial and energy projects in Syria worth hundreds of millions of dollars.⁴¹

The new budget reemphasized Syria's intention to increase the role of private enterprise. During 1987, the government set up four semiprivate ventures involving private domestic or foreign Arab capital. Shares in the four companies were sold through banks in Lebanon, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Bahrain. The largest of the companies was Agrosyr, which had capital of \$9m. divided up into 600,000 shares. Two other companies, Baraka and Nama'a, each had a capital of \$27m., while the smallest, Sanabel, was worth about \$18m. The government also announced that it had studied plans for a fifth jointly-owned agrofirma. The companies were empowered to set up farms for crop growing, animal husbandry and fish breeding, to manufacture agricultural or irrigation equipment and fertilizers, and to market their products in Syria and elsewhere. They were given land by the government and exempted from taxation for seven years after the first year in which they made a profit.⁴² The Government also took steps to increase Syria's oil production.⁴³

All these measures clearly indicated the regime's determination to boost the failing economy. However, no signs of improvement were evident by the end of 1987, and three factors contributed to this state of affairs. First, the reduction in the military budget was marginal; without a much larger reduction, which the regime vehemently opposed for political and military reasons, a significant improvement was not possible. Second, the liberalization measures were small-scale and hesitant. The regime could not launch a full-scale liberalization program without taking similar steps regarding the domestic political situation. And in the absence of any meaningful political liberalization, economic liberalization was almost impossible. Third, Syria lacked sufficient sources of foreign capital. The Soviets were not in a position to meet its expectations, Arab aid had steadily decreased, and Iran's aid was erratic (see below). The relative improvement of diplomatic relations with the Western world had not yet generated the volume of foreign aid that Syria was so eager to receive.

REGIONAL AFFAIRS

THE CONFLICT WITH ISRAEL

1987 was the 800th anniversary of the historic battle at Hittin, where Saladin and the Muslim armies originating from Syria defeated the Christian Crusaders. Syria officially marked the great day,⁴⁴ but the present-day "crusaders," the Zionists, were far from being defeated by another invasion of Muslim armies from Syria. Rather, it seemed that Syria was facing increasing difficulties in its relentless pursuit of strategic parity with Israel.

During the year, Syria continued to adhere rhetorically to the concept of strategic parity. However, a careful analysis of its statements indicated that the drive to achieve this parity had lost some of its urgency. Asad himself stated that "strategic parity means a comprehensive balance in all areas...[it] does not mean having the same number of tanks, guns, or other types of weapons." He asked why "we do not begin and triumph at once?" And his reply was:

Our resources need to be exploited, organized, and developed so that they will be equal to the development attained by the enemy...we must correct the mistakes of the past and realize our potential so that we can climb up the mountain, and when we and the Israelis are on the same level of the mountain...we will have the upper hand because we are in the right and we are greater in number.⁴⁵

Asad's deputy, Zuhayr Mashariqa, emphasized that strategic parity with Israel depended on economic, social, cultural, political, and military elements. What was required was a long battle, but it did not matter how long. Time was on the side of the Arabs, and science and knowledge were imperative to the attainment of strategic parity.⁴⁶ Beyond that, the attainment of this much talked-of parity did not depend on Syria alone but was a pan-Arab obligation. The official media emphasized that Syria had participated in the Arab summit in Amman (see below and essay on inter-Arab relations) in November 1987 only because of its desire to mobilize pan-Arab support for the concept of strategic parity.⁴⁷

In reality, however, the drive to achieve parity hit major snags, chiefly the country's economic predicament (see above). Israeli commentators and military experts debated in public whether these economic difficulties had indeed slowed down the growth of Syria's armed forces. The chief of Israel's Military Intelligence argued that the Syrian Army had not made any changes that were meant to reduce its size.⁴⁸

The commander of the Israel Defense Forces armored divisions stated that Syria was preparing for war against Israel.⁴⁹ A civilian expert stated that Syria intended to use chemical weapons in any future confrontation.⁵⁰ A Syrian leader, Gen. Mustafa Talas, stated that Syria had already achieved parity with Israel in terms of weaponry.⁵¹

This claim was refuted by the prestigious International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in London. However, the yearly report of the IISS indicated that the Syrian Army had developed into a huge and impressive military machine. In 1987, the Syrians had 407,000 soldiers, 4,000 tanks, and 478 aircraft.⁵² What they did not have was nuclear capability. Since 1985, Syria's media and political leaders had emphasized Israel's nuclear potential (see *MECS* 1985, pp. 656–57; and 1986, p. 613) and outlined

Syria's responses. These references became much more common during 1987. First, it was Asad himself who said that:

Highly placed sources affirm that Israel has the ability to manufacture and possesses a nuclear bomb. Of course, that prompts us to think in technical terms of confronting such a threat. We must succeed in solving the technical issues in this matter. But, whether or not we succeed in solving the technical issues, our rights will not change...even if Israel possesses the atomic bomb we must not think that it will be easy to use.⁵³

A senior Syrian journalist claimed that Israel itself was behind the spate of rumors regarding its nuclear capability, trying to use these rumors to deter Arab states such as Syria. All these rumors, he claimed, were part of its psychological warfare against the Arabs.⁵⁴ The executive-director of Syria's Nuclear Energy Authority, Dr. Ibrahim Haddad, also referred to the subject, saying that the USSR had pledged to establish a nuclear reactor in Syria which would be used for civilian purposes only. He warned Israel not to use force to try to stop Syria's nuclear projects.⁵⁵

In September, it was reported that Syria had developed the ability to attack Israel's nuclear reactor in the Negev.⁵⁶ The frequent references to the nuclear issue clearly indicated Syria's concern; but the message conveyed by the regime through these references remained unclear. Were they meant to alert the USSR to the need to give greater support to Syria? Were they meant to explain to the Syrian public that despite the constant references to strategic parity, Syria was still inferior militarily to Israel, due to its lack of a nuclear option? Were they a genuine expression of fear of a possible Israeli attack?

Whatever provoked these references, the fact is that such an attack did not materialize in 1987. Rather it was Israel which was frequently attacked during the year from Lebanese territory held by Syria and its allies. Following Syria's invasion of West Beirut in February 1987 (see below and chapter on Lebanon), it was reported that Syria had given a green light to terror organizations in Lebanon to intensify their attacks against Israeli targets, in order to divert attention from its actions in West Beirut.⁵⁷ Late in August, it was reported that the Syrian Army in Lebanon had moved some units to forward positions near the Israeli-held Security Zone in the eastern sector of South Lebanon. It was also reported that Syrian batteries had fired three ground-to-air missiles at Israeli planes flying over the new Syrian positions.⁵⁸ In September, three Israeli soldiers were killed in a battle with infiltrators in the Mt. Hermon area. It was believed in Israel that the attackers had come from Syrian-controlled territory in the Bika' Valley.⁵⁹ Late in November came another successful attack against an Israeli target, as a Palestinian belonging to the pro-Syrian Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (the Ahmad Jibril faction), crossed Lebanese territory in a hang glider and single-handedly attacked an Israeli military camp, killing six Israeli soldiers before being killed himself (for details on both incidents, see essay on armed operations). Syrian commentaries emphasized that this action proved that the concept of a Security Zone was irrelevant, the Israeli Army was not invincible, and Syria was still in the forefront of the armed struggle against Israel. The Palestinian attacker sent a letter to President Asad before embarking upon his fateful mission.⁶⁰ There was also a statement by Mustafa Talas publicly sharing responsibility for the attack. This statement reflected a feeling in Damascus that Israel

was not planning to retaliate against Syrian targets. Claiming responsibility was, from the Syrian standpoint, a way of taking "credit" without incurring a real risk, especially since, soon after the attack, the Palestinians started their uprising against Israel in the West Bank and Gaza Strip (see chapter on Israel, and essay on the West Bank and Gaza Strip). By linking the hang-glider attack and the uprising, the Syrians could claim at least indirect responsibility for the Palestinian struggle against Israel.

Since the attack was against a military target, Syria could stress in its propaganda that it was a legitimate act of armed opposition to Israel, as opposed to terrorism, which Syria was careful to refrain from in 1987, especially outside the ME. This, of course, was in contrast to the situation in 1986 (see above).

During 1987, as in previous years, the Golan Heights were not an arena of hostilities between Syria and Israel. The only problems there emanated from clashes between Israel's security forces and the 15,000 strong Druze community of the region. In early March, these clashes were particularly serious, coinciding with the celebrations of the 24th anniversary of the Ba'th revolution in Syria. Syria's propaganda machine fully exploited the riots, proudly declaring that the Druze population had demonstrated the merits of sustained and steadfast struggle against Israel.⁶¹

While clashes took place on the Israeli-held Golan Heights, the Syrian section of the Heights witnessed hectic development activity. A new city, al-Ba'th, was inaugurated on 26 June. Agricultural villages were established, and some irrigation projects were launched.⁶² Israeli experts monitoring this activity debated Syria's motives. Were they part of a large-scale agricultural rehabilitation program, including also the Yarmuk project (see below), or were they intended to be part of the military buildup on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights?⁶³

SYRIAN POLICY IN LEBANON

From the summer of 1985 until early 1987 Syria was vigorously engaged in efforts to pacify Lebanon and consolidate its hegemony there. These efforts did not lead to a breakthrough, and the failure highlighted the realities of Syria's position in the battered country. Syria was successful in precipitating the Israeli and American withdrawals from Lebanon and could put effective pressure on Yasir 'Arafat's PLO. It was also able to establish a local coalition to fight Syrian enemies in Lebanon. However, all this was not enough when Syria had to find a positive formula to settle things in Lebanon. During most of the period, the Lebanese situation confronted Syria with difficult policy dilemmas and few attractive options. The Syrians were keen to preserve their dominant position in Lebanon but reluctant to employ significant military forces to implement their plans. As a result, the Lebanese domestic configuration shifted against Syria. The PLO infiltrated back to various areas of Lebanon and in the process inflicted severe blows on Syria's ally, the Shi'i militia, al-Amal. Iran increased its activity in Lebanon through its local client, the Hizballah militia, which the Syrians viewed with suspicion. The radical Shi'is were strongly entrenched in the Biqa' Valley, an area seen by Syria as its immediate sphere of interest. Hizballah was also active in South Lebanon, where its operations could unleash an Israeli reaction. Moreover, Damascus lost the support of Amin Jumayyil, and without him it lost its claim to legitimacy in Lebanon. Jumayyil was, of course, a weak and ineffective president, but he represented the legal authority in Lebanon and without him Syria had no other important Christian partner.

Confronted with this set of problems, Syria finally decided in February 1987 to intervene militarily in West Beirut to put an end to the chaotic situation there. The immediate cause of this intervention was the defeat of al-Amal in the West Beirut fighting against a coalition of Palestinian and Lebanese factions. Some of these factions were Syria's allies, such as the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese Communist Party (LCP), and others. The intervention was timed to improve the security situation in West Beirut before the Islamic conference in Kuwait.⁶⁴ According to another report, the intervention was designed to improve Syria's relations with the US and West European countries, because the Syrians had promised to do their utmost to release these countries' nationals who were being held hostage in Beirut.⁶⁵ It was also believed that Syria wanted to improve the security situation in West Beirut in anticipation of Asad's visit to Moscow⁶⁶ (see below). The buildup to the intervention started early in February. On 5 February, Syria's intelligence headquarters in Beirut were hit by a bomb. Responsibility was claimed by a hitherto unknown organization, Revolutionary Vengeance.⁶⁷ On 12 February, there was a clash between Syrian observers and Hizballah.⁶⁸ On 18 February, a Syrian ultimatum to all the armed factions in West Beirut to cease fire expired,⁶⁹ and on 21 February, Lebanese Muslim and Druze leaders met with Asad in Damascus. They issued a joint statement calling on "fraternal Syria to provide military assistance to contribute to the establishment of security and stability" in West Beirut.⁷⁰ On 22 February, this "assistance" materialized in the form of a large Syrian force consisting of a few thousand soldiers with tanks, armored cars, and artillery, which moved into West Beirut.⁷¹ This was a big gamble: could Syria pacify West Beirut despite the defiant Lebanese factions, among them Syria's own allies? Only one day after the initial intervention, the complexities of the Lebanese situation became abundantly clear. On 23 February, the Syrian Army clashed with Hizballah's fighters, killing 23. According to the account given by Hizballah's spiritual leader, Shaykh Fadlallah, "not one shot was fired at the Syrians. It was a cold-blooded massacre." Some 50,000 people attended the funeral of the victims. There was a chorus of denunciations in Iran, which contrasted sharply with the official Syrian account of the incident according to which Syrian soldiers were provoked by Hizballah fighters.⁷² Be that as it may, the February killings left their mark on Iranian-Lebanese Shi'i-Syrian relations, as did the kidnapping of American journalist Charles Glass by pro-Iranian terrorists on 17 June. This particular kidnapping amounted to a serious challenge to Syria's prestige. Immediately afterward, the Syrians warned Fadlallah that Asad felt personally humiliated.⁷³ However, Ghazi Kan'an, chief of Syrian Intelligence in Lebanon, denied that there was any plan to secure Glass's release by force.⁷⁴

Two months later, on 18 August, Glass was again a free man. He claimed that he had managed to escape from his captors.⁷⁵ But a Syrian businessman known for his close ties with the Syrian leadership claimed that Glass's "escape" had been facilitated by Syrian pressure on his captors. Glass himself conceded that "everything was possible."⁷⁶ The Glass incident was an illustration of the fundamentally tense relations between Syria, on the one hand, and Iran and its allies in Lebanon on the other (also see below). The root cause of the tension lay in the conflicting visions of Syrian hegemonic aspirations and Iran's Islamic aspirations. This conflict remained latent until the end of the year and no full-scale clash took place.

Syria's intervention in West Beirut failed also to fundamentally alter its relations

with other power groups in Lebanon. Constant discussions between the Syrian leadership and representatives of the Jumayyil Administration failed to produce a political settlement of the Lebanese crisis. The relationship with the PSP became increasingly sour, particularly after a series of terror attacks against the Syrians in West Beirut by elements of the PSP, and Syrian attempts to limit Druze freedom of action in the Shuf region and in areas around Beirut⁷⁷ (see also chapter on Lebanon). The Syrian troops in West Beirut were also subject to frequent attacks by other factions, as was the case in Tripoli in North Lebanon⁷⁸ (see chapter on Lebanon). Relations with the main Christian militia, the Lebanese Forces, remained tense and constantly on the verge of armed conflict. During the year, relations between Syria and its Christian ally, former president Sulayman Faranjiyya, became tense, due mainly to Syrian interference in his affairs.⁷⁹

Syria suffered a further blow, when its most devoted political ally in Lebanon, the Sunni Prime Minister Rashid Karami, was murdered on 1 June.⁸⁰ But despite these setbacks, Syrian policy in Lebanon during the year was not totally without success. First, Syrian pressure on al-Amal and pro-Syrian Palestinian factions greatly contributed to a termination, at least temporarily, of the "camps war" between Shi'is and Palestinians (see chapter on Lebanon). Second, the Lebanese crisis did not become an Arab or an international issue. This was important to Syria, which never wanted any other state to interfere in Lebanese affairs. Third, Syria's extended military presence in parts of Lebanon did not lead to any large-scale conflict with Israel. Syria stated, publicly and officially, that it did not recognize any "red lines" in Lebanon⁸¹ similar to those that existed there between 1976 and the war of 1982, and were designed to prevent an untimely and unmanageable conflict with Israel.⁸²

On balance, then, Syrian policy in Lebanon in 1987 had mixed results. Syria failed to cement a viable political settlement of the chronic crisis in the country. It failed also to fundamentally curb the power of such elements as the PLO and fundamentalist Shi'is, which posed a challenge to its hegemony there. But it managed to prevent a further erosion of its position, and its intervention in West Beirut served notice to the various factions that it was determined to remain in Lebanon.

SYRIA AND INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS

SYRIA, THE IRAQI-IRANIAN WAR, AND THE GULF STATES

The Gulf War initially presented the Syrian regime with an ideological problem: how to reconcile its long-held pan-Arab ideology with its support of Persians against Arabs? The course of the war further strained Syria's position, for a variety of reasons. First, Syria was part of the inter-Arab system and its regional policy had to be predicated not only on its hostility toward Iraq, but also on wider inter-Arab considerations. Second, the dynamics of the war brought about a realignment of inter-Arab politics, the effects of which were detrimental to Syria's regional interests. Third, Syria was not an active player in the war; therefore, its ability to influence its course was limited. Fourth, Syria's economic dependence on Iran grew significantly during the war, thus weakening its ability to influence Iranian policy. Fifth, the two countries clashed in and over Lebanon (see above).

During 1987, some of these difficulties were considerably exacerbated. The economic relationship with Iran depended on a yearly resumption of the Iranian-

Syrian oil and barter agreement dating from March 1982 (see *MECS* 1981–82, pp. 865–66). This made Syria vulnerable to Iranian pressure. The amount involved was usually in the region of 6m. tons, although in 1984 the figure reportedly rose to 8m. tons. The agreement signed in 1985 allowed for the supply of 1m. tons free of charge to the Syrian Army and 5m. tons at \$2.50 per barrel less than the official price. In October 1985, Iran suspended deliveries. A new agreement was negotiated in July 1986, under which Iran was to supply 2.5m. tons of crude oil between October 1986 and March 1987. In March 1987, it was reported that imports of Iranian crude had reached only 1m. tons in the previous 12 months, although this amount was supplied free of charge.⁸³ In June 1987 it was reported that a new oil agreement had been reached, according to which Syria would get 1m. tons free of charge and another 1m. tons below market price.⁸⁴ However, on the eve of the Arab summit conference in Amman in November, Syria was said to be still waiting for the supply of Iranian oil that had been promised.⁸⁵ In the aftermath of the summit, there was an unconfirmed report that Saudi Arabia and three other Gulf states had promised to give Syria economic assistance amounting to \$2 bn. in return for a Syrian reconciliation with Iraq, and a reopening of the Iraqi pipeline to the Mediterranean through Syria.⁸⁶ The fact that Syria's economy was in a parlous state had undoubtedly encouraged the Gulf states to try to lure Damascus out of its alliance with Iran by promising it increased economic aid. Syria, for its part, made an effort during 1987 to close ranks with the Gulf states regarding the war. It issued calls for an end to hostilities, especially when Iran's military gains seemed to send fear through the Gulf. This was the case when the Iranians launched their offensive against Basra toward the end of 1986 and early 1987⁸⁷ (for details of the offensive, see chapters on Iran and on Iraq, and essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). Following the events in Mecca in July 1987 (for details, see essay on Islamic affairs), Asad personally conveyed his regrets to the "custodian of the two holy mosques, his Majesty King Fahd," and also held a meeting with the visiting Iranian deputy foreign minister, promising to contact Saudi Arabia to arrange for the delivery of the Iranian bodies.⁸⁸

During the year, Syria participated in two important conferences which adopted anti-Iranian resolutions. In January, Syria attended the Islamic conference in Kuwait in defiance of an Iranian plea to boycott the meeting⁸⁹ (on the Islamic conference, see essay on Islamic affairs). Syria also attended the Arab summit in November. This conference adopted a strongly worded anti-Iranian resolution, but Asad did not object.⁹⁰ Following the Amman conference, the Syrians made an effort to allay Iranian fears regarding a change in its position. Official Syrian commentaries emphasized the fact that, thanks to Syria's firm stand, the summit did not call for a complete break of diplomatic relations between Arab states and Iran. It was also emphasized that Syria was in full solidarity with Iran in its struggle against the American naval presence in the Gulf.⁹¹

Syrian-Iraqi contacts designed to bring about a *rapprochement* between the two countries continued in 1987, despite the setbacks that characterized the previous year's contacts (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 416–17). Saudi Arabian, Jordanian, and Soviet pressure (see below) contributed to this state of affairs. The contacts reached a climax in late April, when Asad and Saddam Husayn met in Jordan, for the first time in eight years, under the auspices of King Husayn.⁹² This meeting did not bring about any breakthrough either. For a short period, relations deteriorated even further, when on

28 July a Syrian MiG-21 was shot down by an Iraqi air-defense unit. The incident led to strong verbal exchanges.⁹³ The two presidents saw each other again during the Amman summit,⁹⁴ at a meeting in which eight Arab leaders participated (see also essay on inter-Arab relations).

In summation, the events of 1987 clearly demonstrated that there were cracks in the Syrian-Iranian alliance. Both countries seemed unable to have a joint policy with regard to the situation in Lebanon, and both found it increasingly difficult to maintain their cooperation against Iraq.

Yet when it came to the Gulf War, there seemed to be a clash between Syria's enmity toward Iraq and its desire to close ranks with the rest of the Arab world. It was one thing for Syria to try to bring down Saddam Husayn's regime, in cooperation with Iran, and another thing to do it in the face of a unified Arab world.

SYRIA AND JORDAN

Syria's relations with Jordan continued to be friendly, in line with the trend that began late in 1985 and continued throughout 1986 (see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 655-56; 1986, p. 617). Relations were marked by frequent high-level political consultations between the leaders of the two countries, and also by growing economic cooperation. On 10 and 11 February, King Husayn made his first visit of the year to Damascus.⁹⁵ His second visit was on 3 April,⁹⁶ and his next visit was on 14 May.⁹⁷ In June, Prime Minister 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-Kasm visited Amman,⁹⁸ and Husayn paid another visit to Asad.⁹⁹ In July and August, Jordan's prime minister, Zayd al-Rifa'i, visited Damascus,¹⁰⁰ and Husayn resumed his own visits on 1 September.¹⁰¹ Kasm was in Amman early in September.¹⁰² In preparation for the November summit in Amman, Husayn was in Damascus on 24 September,¹⁰³ and Rifa'i was there on 12 October. During this visit, Rifa'i conveyed Husayn's invitation to Asad to attend the summit. The Syrians accepted the invitation.¹⁰⁴ After the summit, Husayn and Asad met again in Damascus, on 25 November.¹⁰⁵ The extensive dialogue between the two revolved around a series of issues. Jordan tried to mediate between Syria and Iraq (see above). Jordan and Syria seemed also to have achieved considerable coordination in their official positions on an international peace conference. It became clear that Jordan's official, publicly-stated conditions for a peace conference were similar to Syria's. On numerous occasions, the Syrians stated that they were for a unified Arab stand at the conference, against separate agreements between any Arab country and Israel, and for the full and active participation of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council.¹⁰⁶ Jordan also tried to mediate between Syria and West European countries, following the sanctions taken by the European Economic Community (EEC) against Syria because of its involvement in international terrorism.¹⁰⁷

During the year, Syria and Jordan intensified their economic cooperation and signed an important agreement regarding the joint use of the waters of the Yarmuk River. In recent years, Syria had constructed dams and artificial lakes to divert water from tributaries of the Yarmuk and develop agriculture along its southern borders with Jordan and Israel. The Syrian project could reduce the amount of water available to Israel and Jordan. Jordan was especially concerned because of its exclusive dependence on the Yarmuk for irrigation. On various occasions, the Jordanians made lengthy representations to Syria on the issue. The Syrian project was designed to be much larger than Husayn's Jordan Rift Valley irrigation system

and would involve the construction of 20 dams as well as new villages to absorb large numbers of people. It was believed that Syria was seeking to reduce dependence on important Jordanian agricultural products by using the same water to grow such products itself. Jordan's response to the Syrian challenge was to propose a joint development project: the building of a dam on the Yarmuk River at Maqarayn, east of the Israel-Jordan-Syria border. The new dam, the Jordanians believed, would enable the two countries to share the waters of the Yarmuk.¹⁰⁸ This proposal culminated in an agreement to build the Wahdah Dam in the Maqarayn area.¹⁰⁹ According to the agreement, Jordan would receive 75% of the water for irrigation purposes, and Syria would get 25% in order to establish power stations to deal with Syria's acute electricity shortages (see above).¹¹⁰ Most of the investment would be Jordan's.¹¹¹ According to the agreement, construction would be completed in 1991.¹¹² This far-reaching economic agreement highlighted the growing political alliance between Syria and Jordan.

SYRIA AND THE PLO

As in previous years, Syria's relations with the PLO were determined by two factors: first, its objections to Yasir 'Arafat's leadership of the PLO, and the PLO's claim to be the sole representative of the Palestinians, responsible for their diplomatic activity in the Arab world; second, its objections to the PLO's efforts to reestablish itself in Lebanon. During the year, attempts were made to effect a reconciliation between Asad and 'Arafat. In March, Asad rejected King Fahd's appeal to meet 'Arafat,¹¹³ and in April he responded the same way to a request from Algeria's foreign minister.¹¹⁴ It was later reported that Asad had told his Algerian guest that he objected to the establishment of an independent Palestinian state.¹¹⁵

On 20 April, the PNC convened in Algiers, under 'Arafat's leadership (see essay on the PLO). Syria tried hard to prevent as many Palestinian organizations as possible from attending the meetings. But its efforts proved futile, as two of the militant Palestinian organizations that objected to 'Arafat's policies nevertheless opted to participate. These were the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, under George Habash, and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, under Na'if Hawatima.¹¹⁶ Their participation was a significant blow to Asad's prestige, because it proved that even those Palestinians who were close ideologically to Syria's positions rejected its bid to determine Palestinian politics. Syria's response was threefold; first, it launched a campaign of arrests among pro-'Arafat Palestinians in Syria,¹¹⁷ whose total Palestinian population was 250,291 in early 1987;¹¹⁸ second, Asad emphasized Syria's support of "loyalist" Palestinians, congregated in the Palestine National Salvation Front (PNSF);¹¹⁹ (on the PNSF, see *MECS* 1984-85, pp. 216-17); third, Syria tried to mend its fences with Palestinian organizations that had participated in the Algiers meeting.

On 7 September, Khaddam met with Habash.¹²⁰ It was also reported that the Syrians were engaged in secret talks with 'Arafat's envoys, designed to improve relations between the two parties.¹²¹ These contacts yielded no positive results, and at the Arab summit in Amman Syria insisted that the PLO should not be mentioned as the "sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people." Syria's objection was overruled in the end, and it was King Husayn who declared that even Jordan did not object to this reference.¹²² It followed, therefore, that Syria and the PLO failed to

reach any meaningful understanding over their fundamental differences, a state of affairs that was evident in Lebanon, where the Syrians and their Shi'i (al-Amal) and PNSF allies put pressure on the pro-'Arafat PLO (see chapter on Lebanon and essay on the PLO).

SYRIA-LIBYA-ALGERIA

Syria's relations with Algeria were cordial and friendly in 1987; the high point came in January with President Chedli Benjedid's state visit to Damascus.¹²³ Algeria's foreign minister, Ahmad Talib Ibrahim, visited Damascus twice: before the PNC meeting in April (see above) and before the Amman summit.¹²⁴ Syria's vice president, 'Abd al-Halim Khaddam, visited Algeria in June.¹²⁵

Syria's relations with Libya showed signs of strain during the year. It could have been that Syria wanted to play down these ties as it strove hard to improve its international image and extricate itself from its isolation in the Arab world. In January, Khaddam visited Libya.¹²⁶ In March, the number two man in Libya, 'Abd al-Sallam Jallud, criticized the al-Amal siege of the Palestinian camps in Beirut. Embarrassingly for the Syrians, he did this in Damascus.¹²⁷ (On Jallud's long stay in Damascus, see chapter on Libya). In May, it was rumored that Ghazi Kan'an had accused Libya of "buying" a French hostage from his Lebanese captors, in order to put pressure on France over Chad. Kan'an denied that he had made the accusation.¹²⁸ Prior to the Arab summit, it was reported that Libya and Syria had agreed not to attend the meeting unless it discussed all issues of interest to the Arab nation, and not only the Gulf War.¹²⁹ The meeting did indeed discuss other issues but Libya's ruler, Col. Qadhafi, boycotted it, sending Jallud instead, whereas Asad attended. There was also one unconfirmed report about close Syrian-Libyan cooperation, according to which 40 Syrian pilots were sent to help Libya in its war with Chad.¹³⁰

SYRIA AND EGYPT

Officially, the Syrian-Egyptian relationship remained one of total, unqualified enmity. However, there were signs that some improvement was in the making. During the Islamic summit conference in Kuwait, late in January, Asad and President Husni Mubarak had a brief meeting and shook hands (see further in chapter on Egypt, and essay on inter-Arab relations). The Syrians were quick to comment that the handshake had no political significance.¹³¹ The Syrians also took pains to stress that:

No one understands the importance of Egypt's return to Arab ranks more than Syria does...there are no personal differences between Syria and President Mubarak...once Egypt commits itself to the resolutions of Arab and Islamic summits, clarity will also be restored to Syrian-Egyptian relations.¹³²

It was reported that General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, on the one hand, and King Fahd on the other, wished to encourage a Syrian-Egyptian dialogue.¹³³ Any such dialogue that took place in 1987 was in secret; the official and public Syrian dialogue with Egyptians consisted only of meetings with opposition leaders and assistance to the underground terrorist group known as "Egypt Revolution."¹³⁴

On the eve of the Amman summit, Syria made clear its view that Egypt's readmission to the Arab League would not benefit the Arabs.¹³⁵ However, Syria did not object to the summit resolution that enabled Arab countries to resume full diplomatic relations

with Egypt (see essay on inter-Arab relations). While there were public Syrian condemnations of this step,¹³⁶ there were also unconfirmed reports about secret Syrian-Egyptian meetings before, during, and after the summit.¹³⁷

SYRIA AND TURKEY

The most important event in the Syrian-Turkish relationship in 1987 was the visit to Damascus of Turkey's prime minister, Turgut Özal, and the conclusion of a protocol on economic cooperation, which was signed on 17 July. The protocol dealt with exploration for petroleum and gas, the transfer of electric power, trade relations, banking cooperation, and transport and telecommunications. But the most important clauses of the protocol related to water, which had become a source of friction between the two countries in 1986 (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 618–19).

The water agreement read:

6. During the filling up period of the Atatürk Dam reservoir and until the final allocation of the waters of Euphrates among the three riparian countries, the Turkish side undertakes to release a yearly average of more than 500 cu. meters per second at the Turkish-Syrian border, and in cases where the monthly flow falls below the level of 500 cu. meters per second, the Turkish side agrees to make up the difference during the following month.

7. The two sides shall work together with the Iraqi side to allocate the waters of the rivers Euphrates and Tigris in the shortest possible time.

8. The two sides agree in principle to construct and operate jointly projects the lands of both countries on the Euphrates and Tigris rivers for irrigation and power generation.¹³⁸

One problem that was not solved during the visit concerned the help given by Syria to anti-Turkish Kurdish terrorists. There was a report that Syria had transferred training facilities for Kurdish terrorists from its territory to the Biqa' Valley in Lebanon.¹³⁹ According to another report, a notorious Kurdish terrorist lived in an apartment in Damascus that was very near the hotel in which Özal stayed.¹⁴⁰

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

THE DRIVE FOR A BETTER IMAGE

The need to improve Syria's image stemmed directly from the country's involvement in international terrorism, of which there was ample evidence in 1986 (see above, and *MECS* 1986, pp. 619–21). Syria took five specific steps. First it stopped training the Abu Nidal terrorist group on its own territory, extradited some of the terrorists to European countries, and closed down the Abu Nidal offices in Damascus.¹⁴¹ The organization was therefore forced to move its operations to the Biqa' Valley in Lebanon; although this was Syrian-held territory, it was far away from the attention of foreign diplomats and correspondents. Second, Syria initiated a conference to define the term "terrorism" and distinguish between "terrorism" and "liberation war." The Arab League adopted the Syrian initiative,¹⁴² and Asad himself set the tone of the conference with a well-publicized speech in which he said that his country's enemies wanted "to show that there is no difference between a crime that is committed by one or more criminals and the sacred struggle that upholds a mission."¹⁴³ In August, the

Arab committee entrusted with "defining terrorism and differentiating between terrorism and the people's struggle" convened and was chaired by Saudi Arabia's ambassador in Damascus. The conference agreed to formulate a joint Arab concept in implementing the Arab League council's resolution, calling for a UN-sponsored international conference on the meaning of terrorism.¹⁴⁴ The UN did not convene any such conference, but the Syrian initiative paid political dividends because the Damascus definition of terrorism became the accepted Arab definition. Third, Syria sought to improve the situation of its Jews. During former president Jimmy Carter's visit to Damascus in March, Asad released five Jews who were in detention.¹⁴⁵ Later, there were repeated reports of additional measures to make life easier for the Jews.¹⁴⁶ Fourth, Syria used the 10th Mediterranean Games, which opened in Ladhigiyya on 11 September, to demonstrate its goodwill, hospitality and friendship. However, in his opening speech to the athletes, Asad could not resist the temptation to launch a scathing attack on Israel and its "barbaric aggression."¹⁴⁷ The games, which had been scheduled some years in advance, placed a heavy burden on the struggling Syrian economy.¹⁴⁸ But the propaganda opportunities were fully exploited by the regime. Fifth, Syria was extensively involved in attempts to release Western hostages held by Lebanese terror groups (see below, and chapter on Lebanon).

SYRIA AND WESTERN EUROPE

Damascus intended in 1987 to fully restore its diplomatic and economic relations with Western European countries to their pre-1986 level. But it did not succeed with Britain. Late in February, a Syrian diplomat arrived in London to handle his country's affairs there. It was believed that the British Government was ready to resume full diplomatic relations with Syria, but this was thwarted by Syria's demand to reinstate Dr. Lutfallah Haydar, the ambassador who had been expelled from London for complicity in the Hindawi terror case¹⁴⁹ (see *MECS* 1986, p. 619). It was also believed that European partners had put pressure on Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to resume relations with Syria, and that the professional echelons in the Foreign Office were of the opinion that their government should do so.¹⁵⁰ Officially, the British Government indicated only that it would consider restoring relations; it was believed that it did so following the alleged demotion in Syria of Gen. Muhammad al-Khuli (see above), the man behind the Hindawi affair.¹⁵¹ What prevented the restoration of relations was the fact that Britain adhered firmly to its antiterror policy, which meant that it was not ready to trade hostages for diplomatic relations. Consequently, Syrian hints concerning such a deal were not taken well by the British Government. It was none other than Mustafa Talas himself who said to an envoy of the Anglican Church that Syria's good relations with Iran would help Syria to free the British hostages, including the archbishop of Canterbury's special envoy, Terry Waite.¹⁵² In the absence of British willingness to accept any such deal, Syria hardened its own attitude. It was said that Asad had demanded a British apology for its anti-Syrian accusations before he would consider the restoration of ties,¹⁵³ thus proving that he was not ready to resume the ties at all costs.

Syria's efforts to restore relations were more successful in the case of the EEC. This was so because after the takeover of West Beirut in February 1987 (see above), Damascus sent signals that it wished to play what was termed a "constructive role" in the ME.¹⁵⁴ On 13 July, the EEC lifted its ban on high-level contacts with Syria. Britain

reluctantly agreed to this step.¹⁵⁵ Soon afterward, the community's commissioner, Claude Cheysson, declared that the EEC would sign agreements to finance two new major Syrian projects totaling about \$200m.¹⁵⁶ What facilitated the European decision was the West German and French readiness to do what Britain so strongly objected to, i.e., trade hostages for better diplomatic relations. In January, the Germans sent a special envoy to Damascus to discuss the case of two Germans who had been kidnapped a few days earlier in Beirut.¹⁵⁷ Soon afterward, the Germans decided to appoint a new ambassador in Damascus and restore diplomatic relations.¹⁵⁸ Bonn's reward came a few weeks later, when Syria announced that the release of the German hostages was imminent and had been made possible by Syrian endeavors.¹⁵⁹ The release of hostages following Syrian intervention was also the key to improved relations with France, whose foreign minister, Jean-Bernard Raimond, visited Damascus in October. This was the first high-level visit by a French official since the EEC ban on such visits to Syria.¹⁶⁰

RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES

During the past 14 years, since Henry Kissinger's first visit to Damascus after the 1973 war, Asad had tried to persuade various American Administrations that Syria was a key Arab country with a central role in ME politics, one which the US could not ignore. For relatively short periods, Asad managed to have a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with the US. But much of the time the relationship was tense and even acrimonious. This was so because the US and Syria had conflicting views regarding a number of issues, regional as well as global. When the US imposed mild sanctions on Syria on 14 November 1986 and recalled its ambassador, it made it clear that Syria could still play "an important role in a key region of the world but it cannot expect to be accepted as a responsible power or treated as one as long as it continues to use terrorism as an instrument of its foreign policy" (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 621–22). This statement amounted to an open invitation to Syria to reestablish its diplomatic dialogue with the US by changing its policy on terrorism.

What happened in 1987 was exactly that: Syria invaded West Beirut in order to put an end to the rule of terror and anarchy there (see above and chapter on Lebanon); it limited the activities of the Abu Nidal organization (see above), and tried to mend its fences with Western European countries (see above). The US response was to resume full diplomatic relations early in September, when Ambassador William Eagleton returned to Damascus. This move was preceded by Syrian-American contacts. In January, the official in charge of Syrian affairs in the State Department, April Gillespie, visited Damascus.¹⁶¹ In March, Asad hosted former president Carter, who stated in Damascus that Asad had shown keen concern regarding the plight of hostages in Lebanon. Carter also declared that Syria ought to be approached by the US regarding the moribund peace process in the ME.¹⁶² While Damascus maintained its public anti-American rhetoric, as was evidenced when it praised the attackers of US diplomats in Egypt and denounced the American policy in the Gulf,¹⁶³ the US decided to test Syria's intentions. Late in June, the US lifted its ban on high-level visits to Damascus, and shortly afterward the US ambassador to the UN, Gen. Vernon Walters, flew to Damascus. Syria's comment on the visit was that it proved that Syria was an influential force in the ME, and could not be ignored. The visit showed to those "who thought that Syria is vulnerable...that it is lying in wait for them

everywhere."¹⁶⁴ While Walters was in Damascus, the journalist, Charles Glass, was swelling the list of American hostages in Lebanon (see above, and chapter on Lebanon). Referring to his discussions in Damascus, Walters said that they were "very useful, very fruitful, and very cordial." He also expressed "optimism" regarding the fate of American hostages in Beirut.¹⁶⁵ This optimism was partly borne out by events. On 18 August, Glass was released and Walters expressed the US's appreciation.¹⁶⁶ The fact that Ambassador Eagleton was sent back to Damascus soon afterward should therefore be seen against the background of Glass's release and American praise for Syria's role in bringing it about.

A few days later, the US eased its economic sanctions against Syria.¹⁶⁷ Under the circumstances, it was ironic that just over a month later it was revealed that the Central Intelligence Agency had known in 1983 that Syria intended to bomb the Marine headquarters in Beirut in October of that year, an attack in which 241 Americans lost their lives¹⁶⁸ (see *MECS* 1983-84, p. 553). This revelation did not stop the renewed Syrian-American dialogue, but it did put it in a more realistic perspective. Syria and the US normalized their relations, but their policies remained contrary to each other on various issues, among them the political process in the ME, on which there was no change in Damascus in 1987 (see above).

SYRIA AND THE SOVIET UNION

Syrian-Soviet contacts during the year reflected both the fundamental strength of the relationship and difficulties emanating from conflicting interests in specific issues. In February, it was reported that the Soviets were annoyed with Asad, blaming him for the troubles in Beirut; these led finally to Syria's intervention there (see above, and chapter on Lebanon). The Soviets were annoyed because the Syrians and their allies from the Shi'i Amal militia were fighting against the Soviets' allies, the PLO, the PSP and the LCP. Early in February, the LCP held its fifth congress, which was attended by the deputy head of the International Department of the Soviet Communist Party, Karen Brutents. At this congress, the PLO was backed by the Communists, and al-Amal was condemned.¹⁶⁹ According to an unverified report, a Syrian military delegation led by the chief of staff, Gen. Hikmat al-Shihabi, visited Moscow just prior to the Syrian reentry into West Beirut. This visit was also linked to Asad's impending visit to Moscow.¹⁷⁰ Before the visit, it was reported that Asad would raise the issue of an international peace conference and the emigration of Soviet Jews to Israel.¹⁷¹ The issue of Soviet-Israeli relationships was brought up by none other than Gorbachev himself, who said at the state dinner for the Syrian president that the absence of diplomatic relations between the Soviet Union and Israel was abnormal.¹⁷² This statement must have displeased Asad, the self-styled archenemy of Israel. However, Asad must have been pleased with the warm public attention he received. Soviet television interrupted its regular news coverage nine times to report on the Asad-Gorbachev talks. Observers in Moscow commented that this was unusual and indicated a Soviet intention to please Asad.¹⁷³

Asad must have been pleased, too, with the joint communiqué signed by himself and Gorbachev, particularly its reference to an international peace conference and the Palestinian question. Regarding the former, the parties called for an effective conference supervised by the UN, and with the participation of all parties concerned. Regarding the latter, the two called for: (a) the establishment of an independent

Palestinian state; and (b) the right of the Palestinians to return to their country.¹⁷⁴ This was particularly significant because it was not clear whether it meant the right to return to Israel within its pre-1967 boundaries. What was clear, though, was the fact that the PLO was not mentioned at all in the communiqué. The Gulf War was mentioned, and immediately after the Moscow meeting Asad met with Saddam Husayn (see above); that indicated that the Soviets had urged Asad to try to mend his fences with the Iraqis.

The official Syrian comment on the visit was very positive, noting "the importance of the Soviet Union's reiteration of its continued readiness to maintain Syria's defense capabilities at an appropriate level and of its support for Syria's courageous confrontation of imperialist-Israeli threats and challenges."¹⁷⁵ This was a clear reference to Asad's request for advanced Soviet arms. Indeed, soon after Asad's return home it was reported that shipments of advanced Soviet weapons, including T-72 tanks and surface-to-air and surface-to-surface missiles, had arrived in Damascus.¹⁷⁶ It was also reported that the number of Soviet military personnel in Syria had increased,¹⁷⁷ and MiG-29s were on their way to Syria,¹⁷⁸ a fact which was confirmed by informed Israeli sources.¹⁷⁹ There was also a report about extensive Soviet help for the relatively small and weak Syrian Navy, including the shipment of surface-to-surface *Sepal* missiles with an effective range of 315 km.¹⁸⁰ A further report indicated that the Soviets had agreed to reschedule the payments of Syria's estimated \$15 bn. debt.¹⁸¹ Contrary to the above, there were other, unconfirmed reports to the effect that the Soviets were not so forthcoming in their arms supplies.¹⁸² This received some credence with Talas, who stated that Syria had had to "bargain with the Soviets for every bullet."¹⁸³ Indeed, there were problems overshadowing the bright picture of Syrian-Soviet relations suggested by Asad's visit, and the participation of two Syrian cosmonauts in a joint space flight with Soviet colleagues.¹⁸⁴ The fact was that the Soviets were engaged in a dialogue with Israel (see essay on the USSR and the ME, and chapter on Israel), and wanted Syria to effect a reconciliation with the PLO and start a *rapprochement* with Iraq.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here. In the present chapter, however, all references to *al-Thawra*, are to the Damascus newspaper of that name, unless stated otherwise.

1. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 23 February 1987.
2. *FR*, 12 May 1987.
3. *Ma'ariv*, 24 June 1987 (citing Voice of Free Lebanon).
4. *Al-Musawwar*, 23 January 1987.
5. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 2, 30 March; *al-Dustur*, London, 23 March, 4 May; *Akhbar al-'Usbu'*, 21 May 1987.
6. For biographical notes on Basil al-Asad, see *al-Thawra*, 20 September; on Basil's activities and his father's plans regarding his future, see *al-Dustur*, London, 13 April; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 1 October 1987 (citing *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*).
7. *Al-Nashra*, Athens, 25 May; *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 9 September 1987 (citing an Italian newspaper).
8. *Davar*, 17 April; *al-Fursan*, 30 March 1987 (respectively).

9. *Le Point*, 7 September; *Filastin al-Thawra*, 17 January 1987.
10. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 12 January 1987.
11. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 9 February 1987.
12. *Al-Nashra*, Athens, 6 April 1987.
13. MENA, 13 May; R. Monte Carlo, 15 May 1987 (respectively).
14. *Al-Masira*, 16 May 1987.
15. *Al-Dustur*, London, 1 June 1987.
16. *The Guardian*, 22 January 1987.
17. MENA, 8 March 1987.
18. *FR*, 21 May 1987.
19. *FR*, 12 November 1987.
20. *Al-Bayadir al-Siyasi*, 21 February; *al-Dustur*, London, 2 March 1987.
21. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 27 April 1987.
22. R. Damascus, 24 August — DR, 26 August 1987.
23. *Al-Dustur*, Beirut, 11 May; *al-Dustur*, London, 18 May; *al-Bayadir al-Siyasi*, 21 November 1987.
24. R. Damascus, 17 June; SANA, 25 June — DR, 26 June; Syrian TV, 26 October — DR, 27 October; R. Damascus, 26 October 1987 (respectively).
25. R. Damascus, 1 November — SWB, 3 November 1987.
26. *Al-Ba'th*, 27 April, 4 October 1987.
27. *Tishrin*, 9 May; *al-Ba'th*, 17 May, 1 June, 2 August, 4 August; *al-Thawra*, 29 May 1987.
28. *MM*, 2 March 1987.
29. Nora Boustany in *FT*, 20 October 1987.
30. *Al-'Alam*, 25 July 1987.
31. *MM*, 19 January 1987.
32. Nora Boustany, *ibid*.
33. *JP*, 11 February 1987.
34. *Al-Ba'th*, 25 December 1986; SANA, 27 February; *al-Dustur*, London, 23 March; *Tishrin*, 2 April, 10 June; SANA, 9 June, 7 October; *Ha'aretz*, 31 July; KUNA, 13 August, 7 October; R. Monte Carlo, 5 September — DR, 9 September 1987.
35. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 12 January 1987.
36. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 11 May 1987.
37. Voice of Free Lebanon, 27 June 1987.
38. Syrian TV, 10 February — DR, 13 February 1987.
39. R. Damascus, 8 March — DR, 9 March 1987.
40. R. Damascus, 23 March — DR, 25 March 1987.
41. *Mideast Mirror*, 2 April; the full text of the budget speech of Syria's finance minister, *al-Iqtisad*, May 1987.
42. *JP*, 21 June 1987 (quoting a report from AFP).
43. *Al-'Alam*, 25 April; *Sawt al-Sha'b*, 9 May; *MM*, 31 August; KUNA, 4 September 1987.
44. *Tishrin*, 11 July 1987.
45. Asad's interview with *al-Qabas*, 24 January 1987.
46. *Tishrin*, 12 April 1987.
47. *Al-Thawra*, *al-Ba'th*, 13 November 1987.
48. *Ha'aretz*, 19 June 1987.
49. *Ha'aretz*, 1 October 1987.
50. Brig.-Gen. (res.) Lev-Ran in an interview with *Jane's Defence Weekly*, cited in *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 5 November 1987.
51. *Ha'aretz*, 29 October 1987.
52. *Ha'aretz*, 11 November 1987.
53. Asad's interview, *al-Qabas*, 24 January 1987.
54. Samir 'Arbash, *al-Ba'th*, 7 January 1987.
55. *Afaq 'Alamiyya*, January-February 1987, p. 14.
56. *Ha'aretz*, 16 September 1987 (citing *al-Qabas*).
57. *Ma'ariv*, 24 March 1987.
58. *Ma'ariv*, 26 August 1987.
59. *Ma'ariv*, 17 September 1987.

60. For text of the letter, see R. Damascus, 29 November — SWB, 1 December 1987.
61. Syrian TV, 10 March — DR, 11 March; R. Damascus, 11 March; *JP*, 13 March 1987.
62. *Al-Ba'ith*, 9 March, 7 April, 25 May; *al-Thawra*, 26 May; *Tishrin*, 27 June 1987.
63. *Ha'aretz*, 18 August 1987.
64. Voice of Free Lebanon, 24 January 1987.
65. *Al-Usbu' al-'Arabi*, 2 March 1987.
66. *Al-Qabas*, 26 February 1987.
67. Voice of Free Lebanon, 5 February 1987.
68. R. Beirut, 13 February 1987.
69. R. Beirut, 18 February 1987.
70. R. Beirut, 21 February — SWB, 23 February 1987.
71. Tanjug, VoL, 22 February 1987.
72. On the funeral, see *al-Nahar*, 26 February; the Syrian version of the incident, Voice of Free Lebanon, 24 February — SWB, 26 February 1987.
73. *Ma'ariv*, 22 June 1987.
74. *IHT*, 24 June 1987.
75. R. Monte Carlo, 18 August — DR, 18 August 1987.
76. *Ha'aretz*, 20 August 1987.
77. On clashes between Syria and the PSP, see METV, 6 April; *al-Nahar*, 15 April; Voice of Free Lebanon, 20 May — DR, 21 May; *al-Watan al-'Arabi*, 29 May; AFP, 11 June; VoL, 12, 22 June; *al-Dustur*, London, 23 June 1987.
78. *Al-Dustur*, London, 13 April, 22 June 1987.
79. R. Damascus, 1 June — SWB, 3 June 1987.
80. *Tishrin*, 17 April 1987; the article was published when some Syrian "observers" moved to Sidon in South Lebanon.
81. On the "red-line" agreement between Syria and Israel in 1976, see Y. Olmert "The Lebanese Crisis; The Dangers to Security in the Mediterranean," *Adelphi Papers*, No. 230, Part II, Spring 1988.
82. *Country Profile: Syria, 1986-1987*, p. 28.
83. *NAD*, 1 June 1987.
84. *Al-Watan*, 28 October 1987.
85. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 15 November 1987.
86. *Al-Qabas*, 29 January 1987.
87. R. Monte Carlo, 2 August — DR, 3 August 1987.
88. About the Iranian plea, IRNA, 6 January — DR, 7 January 1987.
89. For the full text of the resolution, see R. Amman, 11 November 1987.
90. *Al-Thawra*, 14 November 1987.
91. VoI, 4 May 1987 (citing *WP*).
92. R. Damascus, INA, 28 July — SWB, 30 July 1987.
93. *Al-Ra'y*, 10 November 1987.
94. JNA, Jordanian TV, 10 February; R. Damascus, 1 February — DR, 11 February 1987.
95. R. Damascus, 3 April — DR, 6 April 1987.
96. Syrian TV, 14 May — DR, 15 May 1987.
97. R. Damascus, 15 June — DR, 16 June 1987.
98. R. Damascus, 24, 25 June — DR, 25 June 1987.
99. R. Damascus, 5 July — DR, 7 July; KUNA, 18 August; R. Damascus, Syrian TV, 22 August — DR, 24 August 1987.
100. R. Damascus, Jordanian TV, 1 September — DR, 2 September 1987.
101. R. Damascus, 5 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
102. R. Monte Carlo, R. Damascus, SANA, R. Amman, 24 September — DR, 25 September 1987.
103. R. Damascus, 14 October — SWB, 16 October 1987.
104. R. Damascus, 25 November 1987.
105. For Syria's position regarding a conference, see *al-Ba'ith*, 22 March; R. Damascus, 25 March; *al-Qabas*, 6 April; *Tishrin*, 15 April; *al-Shira'*, 2 November 1987.
106. *Al-Itihad*, Abu Dhabi, 6 April; *al-Qabas*, 10 April 1987.
107. *JP*, 19 August 1987.

108. R. Damascus, 7 September — DR, 9 September 1987.
109. *Al-Qabas*, 7 September 1987.
110. *Al-Ra'y*, 18 September 1987.
111. *Al-Ra'y*, 17 October 1987.
112. *Al-Sharq al-Jadid*, 6 March 1987.
113. R. Damascus, 14 April — DR, 16 April 1987.
114. *Al-Ahram*, 22 April 1987.
115. *Al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 13 April 1987.
116. *Ma'ariv*, 8 May; *The Guardian*, 28 October 1987.
117. *Sawt al-Bilad*, 4 February 1987.
118. R. Damascus, 3 May — SWB, 5 May 1987.
119. R. Monte Carlo, 7 September — DR, 8 September 1987.
120. *Al-Nashra al-Istraijiyya*, 15 October; MENA, 15 October; VoL, 17 October — DR, 19 October; *al-Shira'*, 23 November 1987.
121. *Al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 12 November; *al-Yawm al-Sabi'*, 16 November 1987.
122. R. Damascus, 23 January — DR, 23 January 1987.
123. SANA, 24 October — DR, 26 October 1987.
124. R. Damascus, 24 June — DR, 24 June 1987.
125. R. Damascus, 24 January — DR, 27 January 1987.
126. *Al-Sharq al-Jadid*, 6 March 1987.
127. *Al-Sharq*, 25 May 1987.
128. JANA, 26 September — SWB, 29 September 1987.
129. MENA, 29 September — DR, 1 October 1987.
130. R. Damascus, 28 January — DR, 28 January 1987.
131. R. Damascus, 31 January — SWB, 3 February 1987.
132. *FR*, 14 May 1987.
133. R. Damascus, 26 June, 8 October; *Ma'ariv*, 16 October 1987.
134. R. Damascus, 28 October — DR, 30 October 1987.
135. R. Monte Carlo, 10, 17 November; *Tishrin*, 11 November 1987.
136. *Al-Qabas*, 14 November; *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 25 November 1987.
137. *Resmi Gazete*, 10 December; on the visit, see also, Anatolia, R. Ankara, 16 July; R. Damascus, 17 July — DR, 17 July 1987.
138. *Al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*, 17 August 1987.
139. *Al-Ra'id al-'Arabi*, 10 August 1987.
140. R. Monte Carlo, 17 April; *Ma'ariv*, 19 April (citing the British daily, *The Independent*); *JT*, 4 June 1987 (respectively).
141. R. Damascus, 7 April 1987.
142. R. Damascus, 26 May — SWB, 28 May 1987.
143. R. Damascus, 18 August — SWB, 20 August 1987.
144. *Ma'ariv*, 5 April 1987.
145. *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, 7 June; *JP*, 5 August (citing *The Observer*); *Ma'ariv*, 6 October (citing *al-Tali'a al-'Arabiyya*); *Ha'aretz*, 13 October 1987 (reporting the content of a conversation between France's foreign minister and Israel's ambassador in Paris).
146. R. Damascus, 11 September — DR, 16 September 1987.
147. For a detailed account of the new "Asad sports complex" in Ladhqiyya, see *Tishrin*, 29 July 1987.
148. *Al-Sharq al-Jadid*, 6 March 1987.
149. *FT*, 10 June 1987.
150. *Al-Qabas*, 9 November 1987 (citing a spokesman of the British Foreign Office).
151. *JT*, 15 September 1987 (citing a British church envoy who reported on his discussion with Talas).
152. *Al-Qabas*, 24 September 1987.
153. *NYT*, 31 March 1987.
154. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 14 July 1987.
155. *JP*, 8 September 1987.
156. R. Monte Carlo, 27 January 1987.
157. *Al-Siyasa*, Kuwait, 25 February 1987.

158. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 3 September 1987.
159. R. Damascus, 10, 11 October — DR, 13 October 1987.
160. *Al-Bayan*, Dubai, 4 February 1987.
161. R. Damascus, 22 March; SANA, 24 March 1987 (respectively).
162. R. Damascus, 27 May — DR, 27 May; R. Damascus, 31 May — DR, 1 June 1987 (respectively).
163. R. Damascus, 8 July — DR, 9 July 1987.
164. *IHT*, 8 July 1987.
165. R. Damascus, 19 August — DR, 19 August 1987.
166. *IHT*, 13 September 1987.
167. *Yedi'ot Aharonot*, 25 October 1987 (reporting about an ABC report regarding Syria's responsibility).
168. *FR*, 26 February 1987.
169. *Al-Mustaqbal*, 7 March 1987.
170. *Al-Bayan*, Dubai, 16 March; *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 22 March 1987 (respectively).
171. *Tass*, 24 April 1987.
172. *NAD*, 4 May 1987.
173. R. Damascus, 27 April 1987.
174. *Al-Thawra*, 26 April 1987.
175. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 3 May 1987.
176. *Ma'ariv*, 25 May 1987 (citing *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi).
177. *VoL*, 29 May — DR, 1 June 1987.
178. *Ma'ariv*, 23 July 1987 (citing "knowledgeable Israeli sources").
179. *Ha'aretz*, 11 September 1987.
180. *NYT*, 30 April 1987.
181. *The Guardian*, 24 July; *FR*, 13 August; *Ma'ariv*, *JP*, 14 August 1987.
182. *Ha'aretz*, 21 April 1987 (citing *Newsweek*).
183. R. Damascus, 22 July — SWB, 24 July.
184. On the tumultuous welcome given to the cosmonaut on his return to Damascus, see R. Damascus, 11 August 1987.

Turkey

(Türkiye Cumhuriyeti)

WILLIAM HALE

The year under review saw important developments in Turkey, but also left vexatious problems unresolved. There were signs that the restrictive political system inherited from the military regime of 1980-83 was gradually becoming both more liberal and more stable. A referendum held on 6 September returned full political rights to the former party leaders who had been kept out of parliament since the *coup d'état* of 12 September 1980. Fears that this would lead to a return to the chaotic political conditions of the late 1970s proved unfounded. When early general elections were held on 29 November, all parties but those of the ultraleft were allowed to compete. Nevertheless, Turgut Özal's ruling Motherland Party (MP; *Anavatan Partisi*) was returned to power with an increased majority. Turkey thus seemed to be assured of reasonably stable and effective government for the next five years.

Özal's electoral success was partly based on that of his economic program, which had brought steady growth at the cost of high inflation. For the longer term, his most important initiative was the government's application for admission to the European Economic Community (EEC), which was formally delivered on 14 April.

The application to the EEC was not the only significant event in Turkey's foreign relations. In March, yet another in the series of risk-fraught confrontations with Greece erupted in the Aegean. There was also an apparently endless wrangle between Ankara and Washington over the level of US military and economic aid, and continuing worries over the impact of the Gulf War, both domestically and internationally. In spite of this, however, the general trend of events tended to reinforce those factors that give Turkey a unique position in the Middle East — i.e., the joint commitments to liberal democracy, constitutional secularism, and formal attachment to the Western alliance.

DOMESTIC POLITICS

PARLIAMENT AND THE PARTIES

The political situation at the beginning of 1987 was full of paradoxes. Constitutionally, parliament was still operating under the rules laid down by the military regime of 1980-83. On the other hand, the military had slipped steadily into the political background over the previous three years. In November 1986, martial law had been withdrawn from all but five of the country's 67 provinces. The press was a good deal more outspoken than it had been at the end of 1983, and the general political atmosphere seemed far more free and relaxed.

In the 400-member Grand National Assembly, the MP had a majority of around

100 seats over the combined opposition. Within the party, there was no serious challenge to Özal's leadership. Although the government's standing had been somewhat undermined in the by-elections held on 28 September 1986, in which its share of the vote had sunk to 32%, it seemed likely that Özal could stay in office until November 1988 (when general elections would be obligatory) if he chose to do so.

On the other side of the party divide, the opposition parties were beset by uncertainties and confusion. Erdal İnönü's Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP; *Sösyal Demokratik Halk Partisi*) was emerging as the standard-bearer of the moderate left, with some 65 seats in the assembly. The two other parties represented in parliament were the True Path Party (TPP; *Doğru Yol Partisi*) and the Democratic Left Party (DLP; *Demokratik Sol Partisi*) which had around 48 and 20 seats respectively. Officially, the TPP was led by Hüsamettin Çindoruk. In fact, the party's real leader was Süleyman Demirel, the pre-1980 premier and former Justice Party (*Adalet Partisi*) chairman. Like the other previous party leaders, Demirel had been officially barred from running for public office or joining any political party by Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution. He had therefore established the TPP as a front party, which he controlled from behind the scenes. Similarly, the DLP was the front organization for another ex-premier, Bülent Ecevit, whose wife Rahsan served as the official party leader.

Ideologically, there was little difference between the MP and the TPP, since both tried to continue the center-right tradition inherited from Adnan Menderes's Democrat Party of the 1950s. On the center-left, both the SDPP and the DLP were rivals for the electoral mantle of the former Republican People's Party (*Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi*), which Ecevit had once headed. In this contest, İnönü had the advantage of an honored surname — his father, İsmet İnönü, had been Atatürk's right-hand man and president of the republic after Atatürk's death. The differences between the main parties were thus determined largely by historical circumstances and personal rivalries. On the one side were the "new men" like Turgut Özal and Erdal İnönü, who had come to the fore in the post-1980 political reconstruction; and, on the other, the old leaders of the pre-1980 era, who were now reemerging from the political shadows. These personality factors cut into the broader ideological contest between the MP and the TPP on the right, and the SDPP and the DLP on the left.

To add to the confusion, Necmettin Erbakan, the former chairman of the Muslim fundamentalist National Salvation Party (NSP; *Milli Selamet Partisi*), and Alparslan Türkeş, one-time chief of the neo-fascist National Action Party (*Milli Hareket Partisi*), had also established their own front parties. These were known as the Welfare Party (WP; *Refah Partisi*) and the Nationalist Endeavor Party (NEP; *Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi*), respectively. However, neither of them had any representation in parliament.

ISLAM AND POLITICS

Constitutionally, Turkey is a secular state — a unique distinction in the ME. Since Atatürk's day, the Penal Code has made it a criminal offense publicly that the "political order of the state [should be based], even if partially, on religious principles or beliefs." To reinforce the point, the 1982 Constitution bans the exploitation of religious beliefs "for the purpose of personal or political influence."¹ Nevertheless, it can be argued that these laws fail to achieve their full objective, since Islamicist

politicians like Necmettin Erbakan have been able to sail very close to the wind, by appealing to conservative Muslim sentiment without breaking the letter of the law.²

It was from this quarter that the first serious political crisis of 1987 arose. Its starting point was in the universities, where conservative Muslim women students demanded the right to wear enveloping headscarves in class. This provoked loud protests from the secularists, who expected the universities to act as the bastions of Atatürkism. By 16–17 January, Erbakan and his colleagues had succeeded in spreading the conflict to the streets, by organizing large demonstrations of his supporters in Istanbul and Konya.³ These incidents heightened fears that Turkey was about to be engulfed in the wave of Islamic fundamentalism that had swept across the rest of the ME.

In the event, the storm seemed to have blown itself out by the spring of 1987. There was some evidence that it had been encouraged by the Islamic Republic of Iran. As an indication of this, two of the seven people arrested after the Istanbul demonstrations of 16 January were Iranian nationals. Radio Tehran also carried on a bitter campaign of abuse against Turkey's supposedly godless government. The connection with Iran was probably more of a liability than an asset to Turkish fundamentalists, granted that the Iranians were regarded with some suspicion by religious Turks, both as Shi'ites and as hereditary foes of the Ottoman Empire.

The "Islamic" protests provoked mixed reactions from the political parties and other institutions. The Higher Education Council, which had been set up by the previous military regime, banned the headscarf wearers from class. This could be taken as a predictable sign of strong opposition from the Army. To underline the point, the president, ex-Gen. Kenan Evren, declared that Muslim fundamentalism was as serious a threat to Turkey as communism. On the other hand, some secularist intellectuals had ambivalent feelings about the ban on headscarves, since they also favored greater freedom of political expression as a general principle. Özal and several of his colleagues in the MP were former members of Erbakan's NSP. Although officially committed to upholding the secular state, they were not always averse to making a bid for conservative Muslim votes. Both Özal and Mehmet Keçeciler, then deputy chairman of the party, initially issued statements expressing guarded support for the fundamentalist students. At about the same time, Evren was embarrassed by revelations that the former military regime had itself accepted indirect aid from a pan-Islamic organization, the *Rabitat al-'Alam al-Islami* ("World Muslim League"), based in Saudi Arabia.⁴ Before long, the waters of debate had become hopelessly muddled by accusations and counteraccusations.

Thanks to a firm stand by the authorities, the universities calmed down. The politicians decided that it might be more profitable to turn their attention to other issues, since prolongation of the argument was only likely to play into Erbakan's hands. The following June, Özal took steps to reduce the salience of the fundamentalist wing of his party. In a wide-ranging reshuffle of the party hierarchy, Keçeciler was moved sideways to become "chief assistant to the party chairman." Both he and Mustafa Taşar, the secretary-general of the party, were replaced by other nominees who were more identified with liberal secularism. This suggested that Özal was anxious to put his house in order, even at the risk of alienating fundamentalist sections of the party's rank and file.

THE KURDISH PROBLEM AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

During February-March, the government's ability to deal with the threat from the fundamentalists was seriously affected by the prime minister's ill health. Özal had long suffered from heart trouble and high blood pressure, both of which were aggravated by his "workaholic" lifestyle. At the end of the first week in February he was forced to fly off for hospital treatment in Texas, where he underwent a triple bypass operation. The surgery was successful, but he only returned on 29 March, to exuberant demonstrations of loyalty by his supporters.

In the meantime, the challenge from the fundamentalists had been replaced by another. The Kurdish minority probably accounts for around 15% of Turkey's total population. It is concentrated in the southeastern corner of the country, close to the Kurdish inhabited regions of Iraq and Iran. The 1982 Constitution strictly banned any kind of separatist activity, and even forbade the use of "any language prohibited by law [i.e., Kurdish]...in the expression and dissemination of thought."⁵ For the most part, Turkey's Kurds are proud of their distinctive language and folk culture, and frequently complain of the government's economic neglect of their region. Nevertheless, they are far from unanimous in supporting ultranationalist demands for an independent Kurdistan. They are also deeply split by tribal divisions. Hence, Kurdish guerrilla activity in Turkey is often directed against fellow Kurds, rather than against the Turkish security forces directly.

The present round of violence in southeastern Anatolia began in 1983, partly as a by-product of the Iraqi-Iranian War. The Iranian support for Kurdish guerrillas operating in Iraq provided Kurdish groups active in Turkey with safe hideouts in Iraqi territory. The main such group was the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK; *Parti-ye Karkaran-i Kurdistan*) which apparently received logistic support from Syria. To add to these international entanglements, the PKK appeared to have an informal on-off alliance with the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP), which was mainly active in Iraq and was principally supported by Iran.

During 1987, the PKK seemed to be concentrating its attacks on Kurdish families whose heads had been armed by the Turkish authorities as "village guards." Eighteen people, including seven children, were killed in these attacks in January, to be followed by a further 73 during the course of the following five months. These raids did the PKK no good politically, since they alienated many Kurdish villagers to whom the insurgents needed to look for support. They also attracted fierce criticism from Kurdish resistance groups outside Turkey. Mas'ud Barazani, the leader of the KDP, and Jalal Talabani, head of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, even appeared on Turkish television to dissociate themselves from the PKK's tactics. In this way, the Turkish authorities scored a significant propaganda victory. Nevertheless, they had to take the PKK's activities seriously, since they would otherwise have laid themselves open to the charge that they were failing to preserve law and order, or to protect the lives of innocent citizens. On 19 July, the government lifted martial law from the four Kurdish-inhabited provinces where it had remained in force. These were then joined to four neighboring provinces to form a "Regional State of Emergency Governorate." This was headed by a "coordinator-governor," Hayri Kozakçıoğlu, who was to oversee security throughout the region. The Army and the Gendarmerie carried out large-scale search-and-destroy operations against the PKK, for which they received extra arms and equipment.⁶

As a sign of the general liberalization of Turkish politics, the renewed upsurge of Kurdish violence prompted a far more realistic and self-critical analysis of the problem by the Kurdish press than had previously been considered acceptable.⁷ Nevertheless, it was far from clear what the government could do to solve the Kurdish problem, at least in the short term. Even the most limited autonomy scheme for the Kurds seemed to be very far from the Turkish political agenda. Even if such a plan were to be attempted, it seemed most unlikely to be sufficient to persuade the militants in the PKK to lay down their arms. The government appeared to be pinning its hopes on the economic regeneration of southeastern Anatolia, through such schemes as the gigantic South Anatolia project for irrigation and power generation in the Tigris and Euphrates basins. These projects could help to allay some of the economic causes of Kurdish discontent, but they would take many years to come to fruition. Barring some dramatic change in the external situation, it seemed likely that the government would be faced with a long-term problem, similar to that posed by the IRA in Ireland or the ETA in Spain.

The fight against the PKK also raised the tricky question of the government's relations with the military, on whom it obviously depended for the restoration of law and order. The formal lifting of martial law was a clear sign of the gradual reassertion of civilian authority. A parallel incident occurred at the end of June with the retirement of Gen. Necdet Uruğ, the chief of the General Staff. His expected successor, who was apparently supported by the top army brass, was the commander of the land forces, Gen. Necdet Özturun. Unfortunately for the Army, Özturun had angered Özal by failing to inform the prime minister of a particularly vicious Kurdish attack on the village of Pınarcık on 20 June, and by his allegedly faulty handling of the southeastern security problem. It was also reported that there was tension between Özal and some of his generals, who were suspicious of the role played by fundamentalists within the MP. This seemed to have reached flashpoint on 29 June, when the prime minister sacked Özturun and appointed Gen. Necip Torumtay to succeed Uruğ as chief of the General Staff. Torumtay took over his new job on 1 July.⁸

In most democratic countries, the fact that the prime minister had exercised his constitutional right to nominate the chief of the General Staff would hardly have caused a major political storm. In the Turkish context, however, it signaled an important change. The armed forces chiefs have traditionally resisted any interference by civilian politicians in military affairs, regarding this as a grave form of *lèse majesté*. On this occasion, it was rumored that Evren (who, as president, constitutionally makes the appointment on the proposal of the Cabinet) was not an unreserved supporter of Özturun. Whatever the reason, the Army appeared to have accepted the *fait accompli* with good grace. Turkey thus seemed to have taken an important step towards normal democratic order, in which the generals were the servants, not the masters, of the elected government.

CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGES

With Özal's return from the US at the end of March, attention was refocused on the parliamentary battle. By this stage, it was quite clear that the formal exclusion of the old politicians from political activity was not only of questionable democratic legitimacy, but also ineffective. Demirel, Ecevit and the other political survivors from the 1970s had made a mockery of the bans, by behaving as though they did not exist.

Özal's position was ambivalent. If Demirel returned to parliament, then he could threaten the premier's authority, since the MP and the TPP were competing in the same sector of the electoral market. On the other hand, if the bans were continued, Özal faced the charge that he was hiding behind undemocratic restrictions originally imposed by the military regime. Withdrawal of the bans would also help to disarm Turkey's critics in Western Europe, who complained that the constitution did not meet democratic norms, and would thus strengthen the government's application for full membership in the EEC.

With these considerations in mind, Özal decided to take steps to withdraw Provisional Article 4 of the constitution. This was included in a package of constitutional amendments submitted to parliament on 13 May. As part of the package, the government also proposed to reduce the minimum voting age from 21 to 20, to raise the number of seats in the assembly from 400 to 450, and to make the passage of future constitutional amendments easier.⁹ Since the opposition parties had long supported the extension of political rights, the government had no difficulty in winning the two-thirds majority required for the amendments. These were passed on 14 May, by a majority of 315 to 56.

Under Article 175 of the constitution, the president had the right to submit the amendments to a referendum, if he wished. On this occasion, however, parliament decided to anticipate this possibility by itself calling for a referendum on the proposal to withdraw Provisional Article 4. It seemed likely that Özal's main reason for adding this rider was the expectation that the proposal might be turned down by the electorate, or passed by no more than a narrow majority. In the former case, the bans would acquire democratic legitimacy. Even in the latter case, Demirel's prestige would be badly dented. It was possible, of course, that the amendments would be accepted by a landslide majority, but the prime minister evidently decided that he could afford to take this risk.

The referendum was to be held on 6 September. Accordingly, during August, the parties mounted a sort of shadow election campaign to put their views across to the electorate. The question was to be put to the public as simply as possible — that is, a "yes" vote would mean approval of the return of political rights to the old leaders, a "no" vote, disapproval. Nevertheless, many voters were quite befuddled, not at all sure what it was they were supposed to be voting for. According to the newspaper pollsters, a large number of people admitted that they were far more worried by the rising cost of living than by the relatively esoteric question of the return of political rights to Demirel and Ecevit.¹⁰

The public's mystification was probably increased by Özal's posture in the referendum campaign. Since he had instructed his party to vote in favor of the amendments in the assembly, he could hardly turn around and explicitly urge the people to vote against them. On the other hand, he obviously stood to lose morally if the "yes" camp won a massive majority. Accordingly, he constantly reminded his listeners at public meetings of the disastrous state of the country under the leadership of Demirel and Ecevit in the 1970s. His rallies were bedecked with orange banners (orange being the color used for the "no" ballots, blue for the "yes"), and there was a brisk sale of orange T-shirts to MP supporters.

For Demirel and Ecevit the issue was straightforward, since neither of them had any hesitation in urging people to vote "yes." İnönü's position was more complicated,

since his party was likely to suffer electorally if Ecevit were allowed to run for parliament in his own right. On the other hand, the SDPP supported the principle of democratizing the constitution. İnönü therefore joined the other opposition leaders in support of the "yes" campaign. Needless to say, blue banners and T-shirts predominated at opposition rallies. With all the opposition parties lined up in the "blue" corner, the referendum effectively became a vote of confidence in the government.

The result was a hair's breadth victory for the "yes" camp, by 50.3 to 49.7%. Turnout was high, at almost 94%—probably because registered electors who failed to vote could be fined TL12,500 (\$14).¹¹ This was an ideal result for Özal. As he later admitted, "Many people thought I won the 1983 election only because the old leaders were not allowed to stand."¹² Since Demirel and Ecevit had now regained their political rights, the force of this complaint had been removed. On the other hand, the two former premiers had fallen well short of the sweeping majority they had hoped for. Making the reasonable assumption that the great majority of "no" voters were MP supporters, and allowing for the fact that the electoral system would tilt the results in favor of the leading party, Özal could confidently expect to win if he called a snap election. Accordingly, while the final referendum results were still coming in, the prime minister announced that he would go to the country in November.

CONSTITUTIONAL UPSETS, AND THE ELECTION CAMPAIGN

Under the constitution, parliament had to pass an early elections bill before campaigning could begin. This was passed four days after the referendum, on 10 September. To give Demirel and Ecevit the minimum of time to take over their parties officially, the election was scheduled for 1 November. The government also took steps to increase its chances of victory, by altering the election law so as to enhance the advantage given to the leading party. As in the 1983 elections, parties needed to win at least 10% of the national poll to qualify for any seats in the assembly. As an additional hurdle, they also needed to capture at least 20% of the votes locally to win seats in any given constituency. The maximum size of constituencies was reduced. In certain constituencies, the winning party was to be entitled to a bonus of one extra seat before the remaining seats were distributed by proportional representation. All these changes would clearly be to the MP's advantage, granted that the opposition vote would be divided among a number of parties.¹³ Finally, to speed up the election campaign, the early elections bill withdrew arrangements for party primaries which had been included in earlier legislation. Instead, it was decided that the central management committees of each party (in effect, the parties' national leaders) would draw up the slate of candidates for each constituency. (This change had the additional effect of reducing the power of local party groups, which were expected to support some candidates hostile to the national leadership.)

The prospect of early elections placed the opposition leaders in a dilemma. They strongly opposed the changes to the electoral system, but on the other hand they did not want to make it look as if they were trying to run away from the voters. For some days, rumors were rife that they might decide to boycott the elections. Özal claimed that Ecevit and Demirel had asked İnönü to join them in a boycott. "So I said [to İnönü], 'All right, boycott it! But in that case you'll have Mr. Erbakan and the fundamentalists in parliament.' So İnönü refused and there was no boycott."¹⁴ Nevertheless, İnönü decided to refer the early elections bill to the Constitutional

Court,¹⁵ on the grounds that the alterations to the electoral system were undemocratic. The court delivered its verdict on 9 October, upholding the changes to the proportional representation system, but canceling the ban on primaries.

The Constitutional Court's decision left the parties in disarray, since they had already begun their campaigns on the assumption that polling would take place on 1 November. The government was now obliged to allow the parties to hold primaries, if they wished to do so, but these could not be organized in time for the original deadline. Parliament was recalled in special session. After a stormy debate, another early elections bill was passed on 18 October. This reinstated the arrangements for voluntary primaries and fixed the new election date as 29 November — probably the latest date in 1987 which could have been chosen, since the harsh weather in eastern Anatolia would then make campaigning impossible until the following spring.

The government's handling of the economy proved to be the most important issue in the election campaign. At public meetings and in special election programs on television, all the opposition leaders attacked Özal for the inflation rate of 50% p.a., and the fact that wage rises lagged well behind this. Under Özal, they argued, the rich were becoming richer and the poor poorer. The high rate of unemployment, especially among young people, was another point on which the government was vulnerable, and which the opposition leaders naturally made the most of.¹⁶

Among other issues raised by the opposition, the question of civil liberties was also of some importance, especially to the more educated voters. The SDPP, in particular, stressed the need to reform the Criminal Code and industrial relations legislation, so as to extend the freedom of speech and the right to strike.¹⁷ The broader issue of political rights achieved prominence on 16 November when the two founders of the newly formed United Communist Party of Turkey (*Türkiye Birleşik Komünist Partisi*), Haydar Kutlu and Nihat Sargın, returned to Ankara from exile in Europe and were promptly arrested. Their incarceration did not seem to make much impact on the majority of Turkish voters. However, the incident clearly demonstrated the fact that civil rights in Turkey still fell short of what would be expected in Western Europe. This was likely to remain a crucial issue if Turkey pressed her case for eventual membership in the EEC. On a related issue, none of the parties supported Kurdish separatism (which would have been both illegal and a serious vote loser among the Turkish majority), but they naturally attacked the government for its failure to maintain security in the eastern provinces.

Erbakan's new creation, the WP, probably had the most distinctive program. It was the only party that argued strongly against the application for membership in the EEC, which was viewed as a sinister plot against Islam. The party strongly criticized the alleged decline in morals under Özal's Administration.¹⁸ Erbakan attacked the other opposition parties, as well as the government, since they were all regarded as equally misguided. There was also fierce infighting between the DLP and the SDPP, in which Ecevit alleged that İnönü had sold out to the right-wing forces, and that the DLP was therefore the only true champion of the left.

Özal's reply to these attacks was straightforward — that under his government Turkey had been restored to economic health and stable democratic government, and that none of the opposition parties would be able to offer more effective solutions to the country's problems. The MP stressed the renewed growth in the economy its policies had achieved, combined with the rise in exports and the liberalization of

foreign trade. On inflation, the prime minister fought shy of committing himself to a definite target, saying merely that price rises would be held down to "reasonable levels." Özal evidently felt he was on stronger ground on the law and order issue, since he could point out that, whatever the present attacks of the opposition, public insecurity had been infinitely worse in the 1970s, when Demirel and Ecevit were in power.¹⁹

A notable and reassuring feature of the campaign was the minimal amount of public violence, despite the fierce arguments provoked by the issues. Turks appeared to approach their politics in a sober and responsible spirit. The alteration of the electoral system was strongly attacked by the smaller parties, especially the DLP and the WP, but there was no suggestion that the election results would be falsified or the polls rigged in some flagrant manner. In this way, the 1987 elections encouraged those who hoped that Turkey was moving toward a stable democratic order.

ELECTION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Throughout the campaign, public opinion polls had indicated a steady lead for the MP. The results, shown in Table 1, confirmed the poll predictions, and amply justified Özal's decision to call an early election. With just over 36% of the vote, the MP won an overall majority of 134 seats in the assembly, or 28 more than it had enjoyed at the end of the outgoing parliament.²⁰ Of the opposition parties, the Reformist Democracy Party (*Islahatçı Demokrasi Partisi*), a very minor group of independent and virtually unknown politicians, failed to garner even 1% of the votes. More significantly, the DLP, WP, and NEP all fell short of the 10% requirement. Türkeş's meager performance must have come as a relief to most Turks, since his fiery brand of ultraright-wing nationalism stirred up bitter memories of the chaotic and bloody days of the late 1970s. Similarly, Erbakan's failure to break through the 10% barrier indicated that Islamic fundamentalism was a much weaker force in Turkey than in most other ME countries. For Ecevit, the results came as a bitter blow. Immediately after the elections, he announced that he would retire from active politics (in the event, he did not carry out this promise until the following March). The man who had once been pictured as the great young hope of Turkish politics had apparently come to a humiliating political end.

Reactions among the other parties were more mixed. İnönü admitted that he was disappointed with his party's performance. Nevertheless, the SDPP could take comfort from the fact that it was now the most powerful opposition party. With Ecevit out of the way, it stood a good chance of running a far closer race against the MP in future elections. For his part, Demirel had handsomely secured his return to parliament. But the fate of his party in the longer term seemed more doubtful. Since the policies he advocated did not differ greatly from those of the government, his hopes of regaining power rested on the chance that Özal might make some major blunder. Only then, it seemed, could Demirel hope to recapture the leadership of the center-right. However, there was no sign that the skillful Özal would allow this to happen.

Faced with these results, many opposition supporters were naturally inclined to shout "foul" and to argue that Özal could not have won his crushing majority if he had not altered the electoral system. Computer projections of the likely results under the old rules suggested that these claims were exaggerated. If the elections had been run under the arrangements that applied in 1983, the MP would still have won 252 seats,

giving Özal a comfortable majority of 54 over all other parties. What really cost İnönü his chance of gaining power was the intervention of third parties, particularly Ecevit's DLP. Assuming that the DLP had not run, and that 80% of its supporters had voted SDPP (a not unreasonable assumption), İnönü's party would have won 169 seats and Özal's overall majority would have been cut to 22 seats. In other words, it seemed that it was the rivalry of the DLP, rather than the electoral law, which most hurt the SDPP.²¹

The underlying reasons for Özal's success also required explanation, granted that his record in office had been far from faultless, particularly in its failure to control inflation. The overall growth of the economy perhaps provided part of the answer. Wage and salary earners still accounted for a relatively small proportion of the working population. The remainder, who were self-employed or worked in small family partnerships — i.e., the peasants, artisans, shopkeepers, and other businessmen — were better protected against the ravages of inflation. In other words, it seemed that those who had suffered from Özal's economic policies were statistically balanced by those who had gained from the general business recovery. Many voters may have come to accept inflation as an inevitable part of life, doubting that the opposition leaders would control it more effectively than Özal. The premier's main asset was the fact that an MP administration would at least be a known quantity, and that the opposition parties had failed to project themselves as a credible alternative. Barring the unlikely prospect of an outright win by the SDPP, the most probable result of a defeat for the government would have been a coalition between İnönü and Demirel (or, more remotely, between Demirel and Özal). Coalitions had never proved effective in Turkey, and many voters may well have plumped for Özal simply because they wished to avoid one. To be more specific, neither of the two possible coalitions seemed an enticing prospect, in view of the bitter personal rivalry between Özal and Demirel, and the wide policy differences between the SDPP and the other parties. A vote for the opposition thus looked like a leap into the dark, and a large proportion of the electorate decided not to take it.

With this convincing win behind him, Özal made a brief return trip to Texas for a medical checkup. The grueling election campaign had sapped his health, but the doctors' verdict was favorable. He returned to Ankara on 13 December, when he had just over a week to form his new Cabinet, which was announced on 21 December. The number of members had been increased from 23 to 25; there were now nine ministers of state, including the premier's younger brother, Yusuf Özal, and Adnan Kahveci, previously his chief adviser and general troubleshooter. A predictable departure from the Cabinet was that of the veteran foreign minister, Vahid Halefoğlu. He was succeeded by Mesut Yılmaz — a far younger man who was also known for his liberal, Western-oriented views. Equally significant was the exclusion of two former ministers associated with the fundamentalist wing of the MP — Vehdi Dinçerler and Mehmet Keçeciler — both of whom had been tipped for cabinet office.

All these moves suggested that Özal was trying to put his fundamentalist past well behind him. With the prospect of another five years of power, the need to press ahead with economic modernization and further integration into Western Europe was evidently a far more important consideration for the premier than the doubtful benefit of appeals to conservative Muslim opinion. The composition of the new Cabinet thus seemed to confirm the generally modernizing and liberalizing trend of Turkish politics.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

The main trends in the Turkish economy during 1987 have been referred to above: a strong rate of economic growth; an impressive rise in foreign trade; and a high and generally rising rate of inflation. Preliminary estimates suggested that real gross national product (GNP) growth ran at 6.8% for the year—a good deal higher than that experienced in most other countries. Exports rose to just under \$10.2 bn., from \$7.5 bn. in 1986. Imports also rose, but at a lower rate in percentage terms, from \$11.1 bn. to \$14.2 bn. Allowing for invisibles, such as tourism, emigrants' remittances, and interest payments on the foreign debt, Turkey's current account deficit for the first 11 months of 1987 fell to \$645m., from \$1.5 bn. in the same period of 1986. Turkey had thus scored a rare success, by combining domestic growth with a strengthening balance of payments position. The Achilles' heel of Özal's economic record was obviously inflation, which rose to 53.6% on a year-on-year basis.²² The steadily eroding purchasing power of the currency was marked by the steady fall in the exchange rate of the lira, by some 46% against the dollar, and 66% against the Deutsche Mark, between January and December 1987.²³

According to preliminary national income estimates, value added in the agricultural sector rose by 2.9%. Provisional statistics suggested that there was a slight fall in the production of wheat and barley (the staple crops) but gains for industrial crops such as maize, sugar beet, and cotton. The value of industrial production rose by 9.3%. This rise was spread across all industries, but was especially notable in the cases of cement, cars, and tractors. There were some signs, in fact, that the economy might be overheating. An example was that of the car industry, in which waiting lists for new vehicles steadily lengthened. In the services sector, the construction industry enjoyed boom conditions. Part of this was accounted for by large-scale public projects — such as the Karakaya and Atatürk dams on the Euphrates, the second Bosphorus Bridge and the Istanbul-Ankara motorway — and part by private investment in new houses and apartments.

In foreign trade, the decline in world oil prices and the continuation of the Gulf War brought both costs and benefits. The availability of cheaper fuel was obviously of benefit to an oil-importing country like Turkey. On the debit side, exports to the oil-producing countries of the ME (which had come to account for around one quarter of the total) were held back by the decline in the purchasing power of the Opec states. Exports to Iran and Iraq were also affected by the Gulf War but, at just under \$1.4 bn., still accounted for about 14% of the total. Exports to all ME countries rose in absolute terms over 1986 levels (from \$2.0 bn. to \$2.6 bn.) but fell as a proportion of total exports (from 28% to 25%). On the other hand, exports to the EEC states rose by 49%, to reach just under \$4.9 bn., or almost 48% of the total. As a mark of the increasing sophistication of the Turkish economy, and of Özal's success in weaning industrialists away from sole dependence on the protected home market, industrial products (mainly textiles, clothing, leather goods, and light machinery) now accounted for nearly 80% of Turkey's exports. Traditional agricultural exports — such as dried fruits, nuts, tobacco, and cotton — now played a far smaller proportionate role in Turkey's foreign trade than they had once done.²⁴

Emigrants' remittances, which had proved a lifesaver for the Turkish economy during the early 1970s, rose to \$1.9 bn. in the first 11 months of 1987, from \$1.5 bn. in

the same period of the previous year. Economically, their importance was now being rivaled by that of tourism earnings, which rose by 32% in 1987. For years, economists had been urging the Turks to develop the tourism potential of their country. Now that the tourism boom seemed to be taking place, the main worry was that it would get out of hand, and that the most attractive beauty spots might be ruined by a rash of ill-planned speculative developments.

In Turkey's external economic relations, the most disturbing trend was the rise in the total foreign debt, from \$31 bn. at the end of 1986, to around \$35 bn. a year later. Part of this increase was accounted for by the decline in the value of the dollar against other currencies in which Turkey's debt was denominated. Hence, the real rise was somewhat less than this. (The same factor also accounted for some of the recorded rise in both foreign trade and invisible earnings.) Nevertheless, there were worries that Turkey might be borrowing beyond its means. Debt servicing, for both interest and repayment of principal, swallowed up around \$4.5 bn. in 1987, equivalent to around 29% of all foreign currency earnings from both exports and invisibles. In 1988, this figure was expected to rise to \$6.5 bn. There were fears that Turkey might have to seek a major debt rescheduling in 1988. At the very least, Özal would probably have to take the politically unpopular step of throttling back domestic growth, to maintain the confidence of foreign creditors.

For businessmen, the boom in demand was obviously a blessing. On the other hand, the surge in inflation was a major bugbear, since it made forward planning so hazardous. To induce the public to deposit money in savings accounts, banks had to offer sky-high interest rates, which they naturally passed on to borrowers, mainly in the business sector. At the end of June, the government decided to allow the banks to fix their own rates, which were raised to 48% for one-year deposits. By the year's end, however, the inflation rate was well above this, and interest rates paid to depositors reached 65%.²⁵ The effect was that inflation became almost built-in to the economy, as businesses had constantly to raise their prices to cover the soaring cost of borrowing.

There was not much doubt that the main reason for rising inflation was the government's failure to control its own expenditure and that of the local authorities. The sign of a possible change in policy occurred in July, when Özal appointed 39-year-old Rüşdü Saracoğlu as governor of the Central Bank in place of Zekeriya Yıldırım, who had been serving as acting governor for the previous ten months. Saracoğlu, who was one of a group of young, American-trained technocrats close to Özal, also believed in the doctrine of tight monetary discipline. He was expected to resist political and business pressure on the Central Bank to ease monetary restraints.

These expectations proved too optimistic, however. Between the end of December 1986 and the end of November 1987, the crudely measured money supply (M1)²⁶ rose by almost 35%. More money was pumped into the system in the last quarter of 1987 than at any time in recent history, as the government went on a preelection spending spree. The official budget figures were a poor guide to actual government expenditure, since they excluded many items which were really part of the government's spending. Nevertheless, the budget deficit for the first ten months of 1987 reached TL1,118 bn., compared with the target of TL931 bn. for the whole year.²⁷

Immediately after the elections, there was a predictable cutback — in fact the Central Bank actually succeeded in reducing the money supply. At the end of December, the government raised the value added tax (VAT) rate on consumer

durables from 12% to 15%. It was also announced that, for the first time, VAT would be levied on basic food items, at 3%. Meanwhile, the prices of state-sector products, such as petrol, tobacco, liquor, sugar, and cereals had also been subjected to price increases of 30% or more. On the other hand, the government was also forced to raise civil servants' wages, which had fallen well behind the inflation rate. The result was a projected public expenditure budget of TL5,875 bn. for the first quarter of 1988, a 57% rise over the 1987 average. All these statistics suggested that Özal was still some way from achieving the degree of monetary rectitude that he had set himself. His main advantage was that the massive parliamentary majority he had won in November gave him the political freedom of maneuver that had been denied to most previous Turkish premiers. He was thus in a strong position to take some of the unpopular economic measures that seemed unavoidable.

FOREIGN RELATIONS

The year saw some important initiatives in Turkey's foreign policy, but also serious frictions with both its neighbors and global allies. Although some hopeful signs were emerging by the end of 1987, the substance of Turkey's main foreign policy problems remained unresolved at the year's end.

For the Turks, the main event of the year was the government's application in April for full membership of the EEC. Turkey's official links with the community had begun in 1963, when an Association Agreement was signed. This was followed in 1970 by an Additional Protocol. This outlined the economic adjustments the two sides were expected to make to allow for Turkey's eventual accession. However, Turkey's economic collapse in the late 1970s, and the military takeover in 1980, effectively put these arrangements in abeyance. The Turkish application thus marked a determined effort by Özal to regenerate the relationship. It also served as an important sign of Turkey's growing confidence in its own ability to meet the political and economic demands that would be imposed by accession.

From the start, it was realized that the application faced some huge obstacles. Politically, there were serious doubts in Western Europe as to whether Turkey's political system was sufficiently democratic to qualify it for membership. The important constitutional restrictions on freedom of speech, political organization, and trade union rights were naturally of concern to liberal opinion abroad. Armenian *émigré* groups, which were especially influential in France, were strongly opposed to any strengthening of Turkey's links with Europe. Similarly, Greece was expected to oppose the process so long as her disputes with Turkey continued, and could exercise a veto against Turkish accession.

Economically, the problems seemed equally daunting. As a major agricultural producer, with a far lower per capita GNP than the existing member states, Turkey could be expected to put further strain on community resources for aid to agriculture and to backward regions. Turkey would also need to make radical adaptations in its hitherto protected industries, before they could meet the challenge of EEC competition. On their side, the community members were also worried by the prospect of unhindered access for Turkey's industrial exports (especially textiles and ready-made clothing), and a possible flood of immigrant Turkish workers.

Despite the problems, majority opinion in the community did not favor the idea of

giving the Turks an immediate and outright rejection. As the British newspaper, *The Independent*, put it, "it would be wrong for the Council of Ministers to give an outright rejection [since] to do so would put Turkey's still fragile democracy at risk."²⁸ Turkey's vital strategic situation on Nato's southeastern flank, and the possibility that it might drag its heels in carrying out its alliance commitments if it were snubbed by the community, were also important considerations for both the US and the Western European allies. Accordingly, Brussels decided to put the lengthy process in motion. Several years were likely to pass before formal negotiations could even begin. The first step was for the Council of Ministers to ask a commission to prepare a formal opinion on the Turkish application. However, it was not until 8 December that a three-man team arrived in Ankara to start investigations.

In the meantime, relations with Western Europe had been jolted by a pro-Armenian (and vaguely pro-Kurdish) resolution, which was passed by the European Parliament in June. In November, there were further protests from Strasbourg over the arrests of Kutlu and Sargin (see above). The June resolution provoked an angry outburst from Evren, who even hinted that Turkey could "reevaluate" its membership in Nato. His reaction seemed somewhat exaggerated, but underlined the Turks' sensitivity on questions that were thought to affect their national integrity. It was also likely that Turkish public opinion would have to learn to take resolutions of the European Parliament with a large pinch of salt, remembering that it actually had very little policy-making power within the community.²⁹

A major factor affecting Turkey's relations with Brussels was its bilateral relationship with Greece. On this score, three long-standing arguments continued to sour the atmosphere in 1987. For many years, Greece had claimed that the chain of Greek islands across the Aegean gave it rights over the whole of the Aegean continental shelf, except for a narrow strip along the Turkish coast. Turkey claimed that the shelf belonged to both countries and should be divided by a median line or shared, thus being subject to joint exploitation. In 1976, the two countries agreed to avoid provocative actions on this issue, but the substance of the dispute remained unsettled. In a related quarrel, Greece claimed the right to extend the territorial waters of the Aegean islands from six to 12 nautical miles, affecting other maritime rights besides oil. Turkey rejected this, since it would place over 70% of the Aegean under potential Greek control. Finally, the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the subsequent division of the island, naturally envenomed relations between the mainland governments of Greece and Turkey.

The first of these disputes provoked a serious crisis in Greek-Turkish relations in March 1987. For some years, the Canadian-controlled North Aegean Petroleum Company (NAPC) had exploited an undersea field off Thásos in the northern Aegean, in indisputably Greek waters. The crisis broke when NAPC, which was also involved in a separate dispute with the Greek Government, announced its intention to drill in a contested zone, ten miles off the coast of Thásos. This prompted Turkey to send her own survey ship, *Sismik I*, into the Aegean. In response, Greek warships were reportedly prepared for action. After a few days of saber rattling, the crisis was defused when Özal, newly returned from his operation in Texas, announced that *Sismik I* would not sail into disputed waters unless Greece moved in to drill new wells.³⁰ This was apparently followed by a series of secret contacts between the two sides, the exact nature of which remained unclear. It was not until 1988, however, that these discussions began to bear fruit.

On the Cyprus question, the year saw no important movements on either side. Negotiations for a possible settlement of the problem had remained deadlocked since the failure of the initiative by UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar in 1984–85 (see *MECS* 1984–85, p. 695). This plan, which envisaged the establishment of a bizonal federal republic in Cyprus, had been accepted by Rauf Denktaş, the Turkish Cypriot leader, but rejected by the Greeks. Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou and President Spyros Kyprianou of Cyprus demanded the withdrawal of all Turkish forces as a prior condition for the start of talks — a demand which they must have known would be quite unacceptable to the Turks. In May 1987, the Soviet Union repeated proposals for convening a multilateral international conference on the Cyprus problem. This was accepted by the Greek side but, equally predictably, rejected by the Turks and the British. The problem was thus allowed to fester on for another year.

Turkey's relations with the US had for many years been interlocked with Greek-Turkish disputes, since the powerful Greek lobby in Washington sought to use the level of American aid as a means of putting pressure on Ankara. In 1987, the major topic of discussion between Turkey and the US was the Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement (DECA), which was formally signed on 16 March. This established American use of the joint defense installations on Turkish soil until 1990. In return, Turkey had hoped to induce the Reagan Administration to enter into a definite commitment to maintain an increased level of military and economic aid for the duration of the agreement. This, Ankara argued, was essential if Turkey were to modernize her badly outdated military and air force hardware. The problem for Reagan was that aid appropriations could only be approved by Congress on an annual basis, and any such promise would contravene America's constitutional rules. Accordingly, the new agreement was merely accompanied by a letter signed by Secretary of State George Shultz, declaring that the "Administration will...consistent with US constitutional procedures, propose annually to the US Congress a high level of support for Turkey...commensurate with Turkey's important contribution to the common defense."³¹ This was a far vaguer undertaking than Turkey had been hoping for.

To emphasize this point, Congress cut the 1988 aid package from the proposed \$914m. to around \$570m. The Administration then tried to sugar the pill by providing \$312m. of its military aid as a grant, rather than a loan, and by undertaking to supply surplus US equipment (mainly updated F4-E fighters) valued at \$300m. However, Turkish disappointment remained acute. Foreign Minister Vahit Halefoğlu warned that Turkey could exercise her right, under Article 7 of the new agreement, to demand the cancellation or renegotiation of the agreement if the Administration failed to fulfill its share of the bargain. The atmosphere was further embittered by the activities of a group of pro-Armenian congressmen who prepared a resolution declaring 24 April an official day of commemoration for the 1.5m. Armenians whom they claimed had been killed by the Turks in World War I. This particularly infuriated Evren, who called off a long-planned visit to Washington, scheduled for late May.

By the end of the year, Turkish-American tension seemed to have relaxed. The new DECA remained unratified by the Turkish parliament, but the two governments had quietly agreed to put it into operation for the time being. It was nevertheless clear that the annual wrangles over aid appropriations and related political issues were likely to continue for several years to come.

In other theaters, Ankara's external relations continued to be affected by the political turbulence in the ME, especially by the Gulf War. Turkey's concern derived mainly from the importance of her commercial links with the two belligerent countries, which have been referred to above, and the interconnection between the Iraqi-Iranian War and the Kurdish rebellion in Iran—which, in turn, affected security in its own southeastern provinces. Early in 1987, there were fears that the Iranian "Karbala Five" offensive might succeed, and that there might even be a general collapse on the Iraqi side (see essay on the Iraqi-Iranian War). This prompted press speculation that Turkey might then occupy Mosul and the northern oil fields area of Iraq. This, it was argued, would prevent both Iranian domination of the region and any extension of the Kurdish rebellion. There seemed to be little support for this idea in official circles in Ankara, since the government repeatedly and explicitly denied that it had any plans with regard to northern Iraq. It was pointed out that such an operation would present the Turkish military with a very difficult task, since the Iraqi Kurds were far better armed and organized than the PKK.³² It would also create serious complications in Turkey's delicate relations with Iran and the Soviet Union, who would almost certainly suspect an American hand in any such operation.

As it was, the "Karbala Five" offensive failed, and the Mosul question dropped out of the headlines by the spring of 1987. Turkey's direct involvement in the affairs of northern Iraq was limited to occasional forays against alleged PKK bases in Iraqi territory, which were carried out with the consent (if not active support) of the Iraqi Government. One such "hot pursuit" attack was launched in March 1987, when the Turkish Air Force bombed what were said to be PKK hideouts in northeastern Iraq. However, these operations were limited in both scope and duration, and did not really support the view that Turkey was likely to abandon its policy of strict noninvolvement in the Iraqi-Iranian War.

Normally, Turkish and Iraqi interests tended to coincide, to the extent that both governments opposed Kurdish separatism. The same was not true of Turkey's relations with Iran, since the latter was the foremost supporter of the Kurdish rebellion in Iraq. The apparent encouragement given by Iran to Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey (see above) was another source of tension. On the other hand, Turkey had an important export and transit trade with Iran, and could face serious security problems in her eastern provinces if her relations with Tehran broke down. Accordingly, she had to walk a delicate tightrope, turning an occasional blind eye to provocative acts by the Iranians. One such act occurred in June 1987, when Husayn Musavi, the Iranian premier, paid an official visit to Ankara. Musavi publicly criticized Atatürk's secularist philosophy and refused to make the pilgrimage to Atatürk's mausoleum in an Ankara suburb which is normally considered *de rigueur* for all visiting dignitaries. It was a mark of the sensitivity and importance of Turkey's relations with Iran that the government did not openly protest — though the opposition parties and the press were naturally less reticent.

It was in relations with Turkey's third ME neighbor, Syria, that the most signal diplomatic success of 1987 was scored. The two states had long been on suspicious terms, thanks originally to the Turkish annexation of Alexandretta in 1939. In recent years, two further disputes had added to the tension. On the one side, Turkey complained that Syria had consistently given support to the PKK and other terrorist groups active in Turkey — either on its own territory, or in areas of the Lebanon

which it controlled. On the other side, Syria feared that the huge irrigation works which Turkey was constructing on the upper Euphrates (notably the Karakaya and Atatürk dams) could give it the power to cut off the flow of the river into Syria, with disastrous effects on Syria's economy³³ (see also chapter on Syria).

As it was, the issues of terrorism and water rights gave each side something to bargain with, and thus provided the conditions for a mutually beneficial deal. In a visit to Damascus in July (the first by any Turkish premier), Özal agreed with President Asad that even after the Atatürk and Karakaya dams were completed, Turkey would maintain a flow of 500 cu. meters per second into the lower Euphrates. This was less than the Syrians had originally asked for, but was still acceptable. On their side, the Syrians tried to deny that they had ever assisted the PKK or any other anti-Turkish terrorist groups. Nevertheless, they agreed to a joint declaration in which they stated that they would "obstruct groups engaged in destructive activities directed against one another on their own territory and would not turn a blind eye to them in any way."³⁴ On the Turkish side, there were lingering suspicions that Asad might not keep his side of the bargain. Nevertheless, it appeared that a genuine step forward had been taken, and that the visit might have opened a new chapter in Turkish-Syrian relations. One particular problem in the complex web of Turkey's external relationships seemed to have been cleared up, even if most of the others still remained unsettled.

TABLE 1: RESULTS OF THE 1987 GENERAL ELECTIONS

<i>Party</i>	<i>Leader</i>	<i>Platform</i>	<i>Percentage of Votes</i>	<i>Seats Won</i>
Democratic Left Party (DLP) (<i>Demokratik Sol Partisi</i>)	Bülent Ecevit	Social democrat	8.5	—
Social Democratic Populist Party (SDPP) (<i>Sosyal Demokratik Halk Partisi</i>)	Erdal İnönü	Social democrat	24.7	99
True Path Party (TPP) (<i>Doğru Yol Partisi</i>)	Süleyman Demirel	Center-right	19.1	59
Motherland Party (MP) (<i>Anavatan Partisi</i>)	Turgut Özal	Center-right	36.2	292
Reformist Democracy Party (<i>İslahatçı Demokrasi Partisi</i>)	Aykut Edibali	Center-right	0.8	—
Welfare Party (WP) (<i>Refah Partisi</i>)	Necmettin Erbakan	Islamic fundamentalist	7.1	—
Nationalist Endeavor Party (NEP) (<i>Milliyetçi Çalışma Partisi</i>)	Alparslan Türkeş	Ultrnationalist	2.8	—
Independent candidates			0.8	—
Totals			100.0	450

Results as printed in *Hürriyet*, 1 December 1987.

Parties needed at least 10% of total vote to qualify for any seats.

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Turkish Penal Code, Article 163; 1982 Constitution, Article 24.
2. On a few occasions, Erbakan overstepped the mark. In February 1983, he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment for infractions of Penal Code Article 163. However, he only served part of his sentence, and was back on the political stump by 1986 (although he was still legally barred from running for office by Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution).
3. The following narrative is based on contemporary Turkish press reports. Specific references are given only for quotations, feature articles, and other sources.
4. This took the form of payment of salaries of Turkish imams ministering to *Gastarbeiter* in Western Europe. The "Rabbitgate scandal" was revealed by the journalist Uğur Mumcu in a series of articles in *Cumhuriyet* in January 1987. See also Christian Rumpf, *Laizismus und Religionsfreiheit in der Türkei* (Ebenhausen: Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, 1987), pp. 150–52.
5. 1982 Constitution, Article 26.
6. Under the State of Emergency Law, No. 2935, extraordinary powers are given to the civilian authorities to maintain order and control political activities. A "State of Emergency" thus lies somewhere between full martial law and the normal civilian administrative regime. The State of Emergency must be renewed by parliament every four months.
7. See, for instance, Mehmet Ali Biran, "Köşe," *Milliyet*, 21 July 1987.
8. Turkish press; Ken Mackenzie, "Turkey: Özal vs. the Generals," *MEI*, 11 July 1987, pp. 13–14.
9. The parliamentary majority required for the passage of a constitutional amendment was reduced from two thirds to three fifths. However, amendments passed by a majority of between three fifths and two thirds could only take effect if they were also accepted in a national referendum. Amendments receiving a majority of more than two thirds could still be submitted to a referendum by the president of the republic, if he wished. (1982 Constitution, Article 175).
10. *Milliyet*, 30 August, 4 September 1987.
11. Results as printed in *Milliyet*, 8 September 1987.
12. Quoted, Alison Macleod, "Özal Bounces Back," *Euromoney*, January 1988, p. 103.
13. This must be regarded as no more than a very summary sketch of the baffling complexities of the present Turkish electoral system, which is based on multimember constituencies and the *d'Hont*, or "highest average" distribution system. For fuller details and analysis, see Hikmet Sami Türk, "Seçim hukukumuz ve sorunları," *Cumhuriyet*, 16–21 September 1987.
14. Quoted, Alison Macleod, op. cit., p. 103.
15. The Constitutional Court has the power to annul legislation which it deems to be contrary to the constitution. Its role is thus comparable to that of the Supreme Court in the US.
16. Press reports: *SDPP Üçüncü Olağanüstü Kurultay'da Kabul Edilen Uygulama Politikaları* (SDPP policy document), pp. 6–7, 25–26, 30; *Doğru Yol Partisi 1987 Seçim Beyannamesi* (TPP election manifesto), pp. 18, 23–27; *Tek Çözüm: Refah Partisi* (WP election manifesto), pp. 14–29.
17. SDPP policy document, op. cit., pp. 40, 78.
18. WP election manifesto, op. cit. pp. 9–13.
19. *Anavatan Partisi 29 Kasım 1987 Seçim Beyannamesi* (MP election manifesto), p. 11–12, 38–39, 41, 88–89.
20. Comparison is obviously complicated by the fact that the new assembly contained 50 more seats than the old one.
21. Computer analysis of the election results carried out by Andrew Finkel and the author.
22. State Institute of Statistics, Wholesale Price Index.

23. Data from *Briefing*, 15 February 1988, pp. 20–29.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 4 January 1988, p. 24, 15 February 1988, p. 29.
26. Currency in circulation, plus commercial and savings sight deposits.
27. *Briefing*, 3 August 1987, pp. 3–8, 4 January 1988, pp. 18–27, 15 February 1988, p. 28.
28. *The Independent*, 2 April 1987.
29. *Briefing*, 29 June 1987, pp. 3–6.
30. Turkish press reports; *ST*, 25 March 1987.
31. English text, quoted in *Briefing*, 23 March 1987, p. 3.
32. Mehmet Ali Birand in *Milliyet*, 3 February 1987.
33. See David Kushner, "Conflict and Accommodation in Turkish-Syrian Relations," in Moshe Ma'oz and Avner Yaniv (eds.), *Syria under Assad* (London: Croom Helm, 1987), pp. 85–104.
34. Turkish text, from *Milliyet*, 18 July 1987.

The Yemeni Arab Republic

(Al-Jumhuriyya al-‘Arabiyya al-Yamaniyya)

JOSEPH KOSTINER

In 1987, the leaders of the Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR) continued focusing on the development of their country's institutions and economy, with vigor and growing optimism. Three main developments accounted for this positive outlook:

(1) After a long period of civil war, which had plagued the YAR since 1962, a substantial decline in internal violence was marked in the last few years. The government's crackdown on opposition bodies and appeasement of tribal groups induced relative political tranquillity, which made development projects possible.

(2) San'a's improved relations with both its neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), encouraged an atmosphere of regional relaxation and, more significantly, stopped these states from interfering in the YAR's internal affairs. Internal opposition movements were thereby cut off from their external sources of support.

(3) The discovery of oil in the YAR provided its leaders with an asset that could facilitate internal development on a large scale.

The YAR in 1987 sought both to maintain these favorable conditions and to exploit them to advance essential, and long delayed, projects. In internal affairs, the government attempted mainly to achieve two goals. One was to institutionalize sound sociopolitical patterns of relations in society that would secure the newly acquired internal stability for the future. The government also sought to encourage tribal groups in society to take an increasing part in state institutions, notably in representative bodies.

The second goal was economic development. The government focused on making the best immediate use of the recently found oil. However, more long-range projects in education, agriculture, and developing industrial infrastructure, which would be paid for with oil revenues, were also contemplated.

Perhaps the most significant domestic achievement during the year was the relative quiet that prevailed, which made it possible for the government to carry out its policies unimpeded. Although there was no rapid solution for the YAR's residual economic and political problems, progress was possible in the prevailing atmosphere.

In foreign affairs, the YAR continued to seek regional stability. San'a continued with its overall pan-Arab policy, which avoided entanglement among the different regional camps and between the two superpowers who supported these camps. Moreover, the YAR sought to adhere to goals and policies that were accepted by the majority of Arab states. Thanks to this policy, San'a was able to avoid the effects of various crises which sent ripples throughout the region, such as the Iraqi-Iranian War and the disputes generated by the civil war in the PDRY.

INTERNAL AFFAIRS

SOCIOPOLITICAL CALM

The new stability in the YAR was reflected in the relative calm in society and in the way the government went about its business. This was in marked contrast to the situation during the civil war. There was less conflict and more cooperation among different societal segments and between them and the government. The tribal confederacies based in the northern parts of the country, Shi'i-Zaydi by denomination, and the urban population of the coastal region, who subscribed to the Sunni-Shafi'i denomination, had previously been at loggerheads and obstructed the government's ability to rule their regions. This conflict had led to the emergence of active opposition groups, such as the leftist National Democratic Front (NDF) and the tribal Islamic-oriented People's Army, which systematically fought each other and subverted the government. The assistance rendered to these groups by the PDRY and Saudi Arabia, respectively, had encouraged their activities. However, since 1982, President 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih's regime had succeeded in curbing the NDF militarily and in weakening the power of the People's Army. An improved and balanced YAR foreign policy towards the PDRY and Saudi Arabia helped to reduce the level of their involvement with the opposition groups, and consequently undermined their effectiveness (see chapters on the YAR in previous volumes of *MECS*).

YAR spokesmen made mention of additional means whereby the government capitalized on the weakening of these bodies in order to establish sociopolitical calm. These included the collective representation of different groups in state institutions and the accommodation of their contradictory influences. According to Interior Minister 'Abdallah Barakat, the assumption underlying this process was the recognition of North Yemen's tribal plurality and way of life — the "special makeup" of Yemeni society which became the legitimate basis of the regime and its representative bodies.¹ The regime was therefore bound to accept the mass representation of different groups, and many delegates for each group (President Salih noted that 27,000 people were taking part in the process of decision making but did not specify their rank or institutions). This was in line with the tribal tradition of mass and open political consultation. Moreover, Salih stressed that this principle also enabled a number of opposition groups to play a part in politics, to encounter each other's representatives, and learn conciliation and cooperation. In his words: "We have an experiment which perhaps differs a great deal from other people's experiences. It is not the single party theory, but a comprehensive theory that represents the ambitions of all the political forces regardless of their different inclinations."² Salih did not say so specifically, but his statement probably related to the government's consent to permit former NDF members to function in government institutions, thereby facilitating national reconciliation.

YAR spokesmen pointed to the "National Charter" and especially to the General People's Congress (GPC), which comprised a 1,000-member Standing Committee representing different groups, as the embodiment of the regime's policies of mass participation and national reconciliation. (For more on the inception and development of these institutions, see chapters on the YAR in previous volumes of *MECS*.) Two reports attested to the GPC's performance. There was a Standing Committee meeting in early January 1987 which approved the government's policies and praised the

"democratic discussion symbolizing dynamic popular participation."³ There were also elections to staff the GPC's district committees in June (at Ta'izz, al-Bayda', Ibb, and Saba'), which were reported to have been successfully accomplished, promoting national unity and effective leadership.⁴ Following the elections for the GPC assembly in 1985 and the convention of its biennial meeting in 1986,⁵ the GPC had surely become a successful institution in the YAR.

The long period of conflict and residual differences in society cast doubt over the persistence of calm and the effectiveness of the GPC in the long run. For the moment, however, the GPC was fulfilling the functions of representation and reconciliation, thereby instilling hope for the future.

Opposition activity was definitely on the decline. After years of internal conflict no internal political opposition groups were reported to be active or to be causing damage. There were two potential threats which did not materialize during the period under review. First, there were growing difficulties with South Yemeni refugees. Their numbers had been swelling after every political crisis in the PDRY, and in 1987 reached c. 400,000. The last group of these refugees, comprising about 50,000 followers of the former president of the PDRY, 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, had fled from the PDRY after the civil war of January 1986 (see chapter on the PDRY). In Salih's words, they constituted "a big burden"⁶ — first, because they competed with YAR citizens for the country's sparse economic resources; and second, and more significantly, because they were dissidents who challenged the legitimacy of the new leadership in Aden, who in their turn regarded the dissidents as war criminals. Salih particularly resented the possibility of having to choose between two leading PDRY groups,⁷ both of which were perceived as legitimate by San'a. The recent PDRY refugees occasionally carried out incursions into the PDRY, which Salih was reluctant to confirm, but did not flatly deny,⁸ and which threatened to expand in scope; there was also a state of continuous debate with Aden (see below). However, there was no report of a political crisis caused by these refugees in 1987.

The second development that threatened to shatter the calm was a case of externally instigated terrorism. In June, the local media reported that a group of 140 "saboteurs" who had aimed at "disrupting security and compromis[ing] national interests," had been intercepted. They were to be interrogated and tried. YAR sources commented on the event briefly, stressing that the group had "close contacts with a non-Arab Asian state,"⁹ a possible allusion to Iran, which may have decided to act against the YAR because of the latter's support for Iraq. No further details were given.

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

During 1987, the YAR concentrated on developing its small but growing oil industry (see *MECS* 1986, pp. 667–68). According to Ahmad al-Muhanni, the minister of oil, the 'Afif field near Marib, discovered in 1984 by the Hunt Company, was currently producing 100,000 barrels per day (b/d) and in 1990 would produce as many as 400,000 b/d.¹⁰ Western sources reported that San'a expected to earn \$600m.–\$700m. a year;¹¹ but YAR spokesmen attempted to play down the potential benefits their country would have from oil, in order to prevent Saudi and South Yemeni competition. They therefore limited the role of oil profits to stimulating agricultural and industrial development.¹² The YAR's prime minister, 'Abd al-'Aziz 'Abd al-Ghani, stated that the contemplated profits would not suffice "to expand our reserves" or to

"copy the mode of consumption prevailing in other Third World states."¹³ The government, however, concentrated on developing the oil industry by reinforcing drilling and constructing a pipe designed to transport oil to the port of Salif, at the Red Sea.¹⁴ The pipe was inaugurated by Salih on 10 December 1987, which also marked the beginning of oil shipments via this line.¹⁵ In addition, the YAR also focused on the development of its gas and mineral resources in April, when Muhanni visited France to negotiate with his French counterpart a "complete geological survey in Yemen and possible cooperation in future production."¹⁶

YAR spokesmen were rather optimistic about the overall economic situation. The minister of development and planning, Muhammad Sa'id al-'Attar, stated that the YAR's debts amounted to \$1.3 bn., but the country could spread payments over 40 years. He stressed that the YAR's national income — notably \$800m. of the remittances from Yemeni workers stationed in the Gulf, \$700m. in assistance, and the actual and potential oil profits — provided for the current and pending expenses of the YAR.¹⁷ Consequently, new projects were contemplated, which included the improvement of educational facilities in al-Hajariyya district; agricultural development in al-Bayda district; the use of the new Marib Dam for irrigation and electricity; and the improvement of welfare services.¹⁸ The emerging role of the YAR's private sector in developing the industrial infrastructure of the state was also discussed by the YAR's spokesmen.¹⁹

However, this optimistic outlook notwithstanding, the YAR's economy was beset by several immediate problems. A high rate of inflation caused the government to impose stringent import restrictions and to curb the freedom to purchase foreign currency, measures likely to remain in force for some time to come.²⁰

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

SEEKING REGIONAL STABILITY

The YAR perceived regional stability as an essential condition for the much sought-after internal development and for obtaining legitimacy in the Arab world, which would ensure the country's regional stature. To achieve regional stability, San'a carried out a policy of non-alignment among both international and inter-Arab blocs, at the same time promoting broadly agreed-upon inter-Arab interests and sentiments. This policy had several advantages. First, by staying aloof from regional disputes, the YAR could avoid a partisan image and possible military costs. While San'a applied this policy throughout the region, it was particularly useful *vis-à-vis* its immediate neighbors, Saudi Arabia and the PDRY, who belonged to opposite camps in the Arab world (the pro-Western "moderate," and pro-Soviet "radical," respectively). Saudi Arabia and the PDRY tended to interfere in YAR internal affairs according to their interests. By pursuing a policy of non-alignment, San'a sought to avoid provoking its neighboring states into a response that would damage the YAR. Second, this policy also made it possible for the YAR to obtain assistance from both pro-Soviet and pro-Western states, and to diversify the sources of its arms without having to compromise its sovereignty.²¹ Third, the policy of non-partisan pan-Arabism also allowed the YAR to improve its prestige in the Arab world and thereby secure its position in the Arab system. San'a tried to act as an intermediary or consensus builder among different parties. In the light of the decline of traditional Arab intermediaries

such as Saudi Arabia, the YAR's role in this respect brought it some dividends. In several interviews with various Arab papers, Salih came across as a responsible intermediary in Arab politics whose previous initiatives had helped to clear the Arab atmosphere.²²

YAR leaders were therefore determined to carry on with this policy. In Salih's view, the first priority was the resolution of inter-Arab disputes or "peripheral differences," and the clearing of the "Arab atmosphere" in order to achieve "the maximum level of Arab solidarity." Salih further explained the means that would facilitate this goal: an inter-Arab dialogue that would establish "mature awareness" on all sides; the convocation of Arab and Islamic summits, being forums to iron out regional problems; and support for "just Arab causes," which in Salih's terminology referred to non-controversial, broadly agreed-upon issues such as Lebanese unity, the attainment of Palestinian rights, and the termination of the Iraqi-Iranian War.²³ These guidelines, together with strict adherence to a position of neutrality between the superpowers, characterized the YAR's foreign policy in 1987.

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

San'a exercised an ambivalent policy toward the PDRY during 1987. On the one hand, the YAR sought to ease tensions with the PDRY which might precipitate unwanted clashes; in fact, San'a even strove to continue the process of unity between the two states. On the other hand, there were obvious difficulties between the two Yemens, generated by the 1986 civil war in the PDRY which compelled San'a to oppose Aden and risk the eruption of hostilities.

San'a had an obvious problem with the South Yemeni refugees, who constituted an economic and social burden. Salih took a strong stand in supporting their right to find shelter in his country, as the YAR was "part of the Yemeni homeland" and the Yemenis of both states were "one people."²⁴ Salih's perception of a broad national reconciliation in the YAR probably induced him to regard the South Yemeni refugees as part of the population to be reconciled. He claimed that the solution of the refugee problem should be part of a comprehensive settlement between the factions of the South Yemeni elite, a stand that contradicted Aden's position and caused further friction between the parties. YAR spokesmen were overtly critical of the PDRY's new elite, which took power in January 1986, because of their attitude to 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, now in exile in the YAR, and their refusal to come to terms with him. In San'a's view, 'Ali Nasir's rule in Aden (1980-86) brought about improved relations between the two Yemens and helped to deradicalize the Marxist South Yemeni regime. The YAR consequently favored 'Ali Nasir's return to a leading position in Aden.²⁵ To the new PDRY elite's obvious dismay, YAR leaders therefore demanded once and again that Aden come to terms with 'Ali Nasir, develop a "national dialogue," and permit him and his group to return to the PDRY. San'a's pressure led Aden to declare an amnesty for the majority of the refugees (except for 'Ali Nasir and his top 47 aides), of whom a very few started returning to the PDRY in 1987 (see chapter on the PDRY).

San'a, however, was careful to avoid a real crisis with the PDRY. On one occasion, a visit by the South Yemeni chief of staff helped to resolve a tense situation along the border between the two states.²⁶ To avoid further tension, San'a refrained from extending any tangible assistance to 'Ali Nasir's group, and rejected PDRY charges

that it was doing so. San'a claimed to be extending only humanitarian aid to PDRY refugees.²⁷ The YAR also resumed unity talks with the PDRY and made positive statements to the press to that effect. Salih nevertheless admitted that the 1986 PDRY civil war had had a "negative effect" on prospects for unity. Consequently, negotiations with PDRY leaders, such as the secretary-general of the Yemeni Socialist Party, 'Ali Salim al-Bayd in July, and with PDRY President Haydar al-Attas in October, did not lead to an immediate breakthrough on the question of unity. Salih's comment on these meetings concerned the "frankness" of the discussion and the need to develop gradual, well-prepared projects together that would pave the way for the actual act of unity.²⁸ His language attested to the difficulties the two sides had over unity at that stage.

The death sentences passed by a PDRY court on 'Ali Nasir and some of his aides *in absentia* in December 1987 were perceived in San'a as an additional complication which would increase tension between the rival factions of the South Yemeni elite, and therefore risk entangling the YAR in unwanted trouble with the PDRY. The YAR Government therefore sought to dissuade PDRY leaders from carrying out the harsh sentences. Salih even phoned Bayd on 12 December to plead for reconsideration and affirm that "postponing these sentences serves national interests and nurses the wounds."²⁹ These events cast a shadow over relations between the Yemeni states as 1988 approached.

ATTITUDES TOWARD OTHER REGIONAL ISSUES

San'a continued to call for an end to the Iraqi-Iranian War, in conformity with its policy of regional stability and Arab (and Muslim) solidarity. Salih explained that the war benefited only Israel and international arms dealers, and its termination would enhance Muslim unity.³⁰ In practice, the YAR supported the January 1988 initiative of UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar to send a Security Council mission to mediate between the parties.³¹ In April, the YAR's foreign minister, 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, led an Arab League mission to Washington to discuss the implementation of this UN resolution and the possibility of imposing sanctions on Iran.³² YAR leaders usually presented their policy in positive terms, so as to avoid a collision with Iran; they reiterated that their "Iranian brethren" would see the logic in ending the war. In Iryani's words, "we are looking for ways to convince Iran for peace and not to isolate Iran."³³ It was however evident that, for the moment, as the Gulf War was still raging, San'a was fulfilling its aspirations for Arab solidarity by siding with Iraq. As Baghdad supported an end to the war, it earned praise from San'a.³⁴ Telephone contacts between the YAR and Iraqi leaders were often reported, and visits of officials from both states were exchanged. The Iraqi foreign minister, Tariq 'Aziz, and the deputy prime minister, Taha Yasin Ramadan, visited San'a in August and October, respectively.³⁵ Iraq and the YAR also signed an agreement in January 1987 for a mutual "exchange of expertise and manpower training,"³⁶ a phrase which presumably signified Iraqi consent to give technical advice to the YAR.

San'a's relations with Kuwait were depicted by Salih as "sincere, developed, and special."³⁷ Kuwait's role in convening the Islamic conference in January was praised for its peaceful thrust among Muslim states.³⁸ Salih even pledged that if the Gulf states were attacked, the YAR would put its potential and resources at their disposal.³⁹ But San'a did not fulfill this promise when Kuwaiti facilities were attacked by Iran.

'Abd al-Ghani also praised the role the Saudi king played in improving the atmosphere in the Arab world.⁴⁰ Yemeni-Saudi cooperation over Gulf issues were discussed during a visit to San'a by Saudi Defense Minister Sultan in April.⁴¹ Tribal frontier problems were discussed during a visit of Saudi Interior Minister Na'if in September.⁴²

The YAR improved its relations with Libya when Salih visited Tripoli in March.⁴³ Iryani conceded that San'a had tried to mediate between Libya and Egypt, to no avail,⁴⁴ and had maintained a continuous political dialogue with Syria, vainly seeking to encourage Damascus to effect a reconciliation with Iraq.⁴⁵ San'a also continued to support renewed unity among the ranks of the PLO under Yasir 'Arafat (Syria's and Libya's rival); and Salih even depicted PLO unity as tantamount to Arab unity, and just as essential.⁴⁶ As there were PLO training camps in the YAR, Salih often hosted 'Arafat in San'a and discussed regional affairs with him. San'a was reportedly preparing for an Israeli attack against PLO targets in the YAR in December 1987, in retaliation for the PLO's attack on an Israel Defense Forces's base in November.⁴⁷

As a non-partisan intermediary, the YAR sought to improve relations with Egypt and justified its position by praising Egypt's "historical role" in the Arab world, and particularly "the favors" it did for the YAR (i.e., by providing assistance during the revolution in the 1960s). In Salih's words, the YAR's relations with Egypt "were baptized by the blood which flowed on Yemeni territory in defense of the glorious 26 September Revolution."⁴⁸ Following the Amman summit in November, San'a renewed diplomatic ties with Egypt. There were soon rumors of military cooperation between the two states. Iryani denied these rumors, but insisted that in the event of external aggression, Egypt's role in defending the Red Sea region should be evident.⁴⁹

ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SUPERPOWERS

In an interview given in December 1987, Salih explained the YAR's policy of cooperation with both superpowers:

We in the Yemen do not feel any embarrassment in the establishment of distinguished relations with the USSR and the US. Both are superpowers and it is our duty to establish good relations with these countries. If there are also advantages in our relations with the USSR, there are also advantages in our relations with the US.⁵⁰

San'a thus sought to benefit from relations with both superpowers. YAR leaders made only a few references to US policies in the ME, most of which were critical of American support for Israel. However, the YAR was more positive about US strategy concerning the Gulf War. Iryani expressed satisfaction with Washington's support of moves to end the Gulf War and impose a cease-fire on Iran.⁵¹ The American decision to reflag Kuwaiti ships in the Gulf was perceived by San'a as a means of protecting the Arab side and limiting Iran's aggression; and San'a voiced the hope that Tehran would "respond to the efforts to stop the war."⁵² Western reports also indicated the YAR Army's satisfaction with American weapons and disappointment with Soviet arms.⁵³

On the other hand, several Soviet and YAR delegations exchanged visits. There were no reports of new strategic coordination between the two states in 1987. However, in April, San'a bought Soviet SAM missiles which it planned to deploy all over the

country.⁵⁴ San'a also continued to sing Moscow's praises as a superpower that had continuously supported the YAR since the beginning of the 1962 revolution.⁵⁵

NOTES

For the place and frequency of publications cited here, and for the full name of the publication, news agency, radio station, or monitoring service where an abbreviation is used, please see "List of Sources." Only in the case of more than one publication bearing the same name is the place of publication noted here.

1. Barakat's interview with *al-Tadamun*, 20–26 December 1986.
2. Salih was quoted by R. San'a, 11 December — DR, 18 December 1983.
3. Ibid.
4. *Al-Thawra*, San'a, 22 June 1987.
5. R. Burrowes, *The Yemen Arab Republic: the Politics of Development, 1962–1986* (London and Boulder: Westview Press and Croom Helm, 1987), p. 143.
6. Salih's interview with *al-Tadamun*, 27 December 1986 — 1 January 1987.
7. *Al-Musawwar*, 23 January 1987.
8. R. San'a, 4 January — DR, 5 January 1987.
9. R. San'a, 9 June — SWB, 11 June; *al-Majalla*, 27 July 1987.
10. *FT*, 19 March 1987.
11. *WSJ*, 15 December 1987.
12. Salih's interview with *al-Yaqza*, 3 December 1987.
13. 'Abd al-Ghani's interview with *al-Tadamun*, 9 May 1987.
14. *Al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 15 August 1987.
15. R. San'a, 10 December — DR, 10 December 1987.
16. R. San'a, 14 April — DR, 15 April 1987.
17. Al-'Attar's interview with *al-Musawwar*, 20 March — DR, 23 March 1987.
18. See *al-Thawra*, San'a, 23 December 1986, 19 January, 9 February 1987.
19. Al-'Attar's interview with *al-Musawwar*, 20 March — DR, 23 March 1987.
20. *CR*: North Yemen, 2nd quarter, 29 May 1987.
21. Salih's interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 6 April 1988.
22. Cf. *ibid.*, and Salih's interview with *al-Sayyad*, quoted by R. San'a, 14 October — DR, 16 October 1987.
23. Ibid., and R. San'a, 3 January — DR, 5 January 1987.
24. E.g., Salih's interview with *al-Shira'*, 5 January — DR, 5 January 1987.
25. Ibid.; *al-Qabas*, 22 February; Salih's interview with *al-Musawwar*, 6 March 1987.
26. Interview with the YAR foreign minister, 'Abd al-Karim al-Iryani, *al-Tadamun*, 19 December 1987.
27. Salih's interview with *al-Shira'*, 5 January; and quoted by R. San'a, 28 February — SWB, 5 March 1987.
28. R. Aden, 24 July — DR, 27 July; R. San'a, 14 October — DR, 16 October 1987.
29. R. San'a, 12 December — DR, 15 December 1987.
30. R. San'a, 1 January — DR, 2 January 1987.
31. R. San'a, 18 January — DR, 20 January 1987.
32. Iryani's interview with *al-Hawadith*, 26 May 1987.
33. Ibid.; R. San'a, 14 October — DR, 16 October 1987.
34. R. San'a, 13 January — DR, 16 January 1987.
35. R. San'a, 27 October — DR, 30 October 1987.
36. R. San'a, 22 January — DR, 23 January 1987.
37. Salih's interview with *al-Yaqza*, 29 December 1986.
38. R. San'a, 28 January — DR, 3 February 1987.
39. Salih's interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 6 April — DR, 8 April 1987.
40. Al-Ghani's interview with *al-Bilad*, 25 March 1987.

41. R. San'a, 9 July — DR, 10 July 1987.
42. R. San'a, 24 September — DR, 25 September 1987.
43. *Al-Usbu' al-'Arabi*, 30 March 1987.
44. Iryani's interview with *al-Tadamun*, 19 December 1987.
45. Salih quoted by R. San'a, 11 December — DR, 18 December 1987.
46. Salih's interview with *al-Ittihad*, Abu Dhabi, 4 January 1987.
47. *Al-Qabas*, 4 January 1988.
48. Salih's interview with *al-Ra'y al-'Amm*, 6 April — DR, 8 April 1987.
49. Iryani's interview with *al-Tadamun*, 19 December 1987.
50. Salih quoted by R. San'a, 11 December — DR, 18 December 1987.
51. Iryani's interview with *al-Hawadith*, 26 May 1987.
52. R. San'a, 14 October — SWB, 17 October 1987.
53. *The Washington Times*, 3 April 1987.
54. SWB announcement, 8 April 1987.
55. Salih quoted by R. San'a, 11 December — DR, 18 December 1987.

INDEX

NOTE

Most political parties, organizations, public bodies, and institutions have been indexed by name rather than by country, and where it is not otherwise obvious the name of the country is shown in parentheses at the end of the entry. Page numbers in **bold** type indicate principal references. Alphabetical order is word-by-word.

- 'Abbas, Mahmud, 211, 219, 221, 222, 229
 'Abbas, Muhammad Zaidan (Abu al-'Abbas), 108, 109, 201, 204, 208, 211
 'Abd al-'Aziz, 'Abd al-Nasir, 247
 'Abd al-'Aziz, Muhammad, 209
 'Abd al-'Aziz, Shaykh (Sharja), 386
 'Abd al-'Aziz Ibn Baz, Shaykh, 170
 'Abd al-Ghani, 'Abd al-'Aziz, 680, 684
 'Abd al-Hadi, Dr. Ibrahim, 256
 'Abd al-Majid, 'Ismat, 53, 82–83, 84, 224, 349, 352
 'Abd al-Nasir, Jamal, 230, 332, 336
 'Abd al-Nasir, Khalid Jamal, 336–337, 532
 'Abd al-Rahman, Ahmad 219
 'Abd al-Rashid, Hatim, 430, 454
 'Abd al-Rashid, Mahir, 430, 435, 455
 'Abd Rabbuh, Yasir, 203, 205, 211
 'Abdallah, Crown Prince, 121, 122, 129, 130, 134, 580, 591, 592, 593, 595, 596, 597, 600, 601
 'Abdallah, 'Ali al-, 519
 'Abdallah, Rashid, 389
 Abram, Morris, 50, 51
 Abu al-'Abbas, *see* 'Abbas, Muhammad Zaidan
 Abu 'Ali, Sultan, 335
 Abu al-Za'im, *see* 'Atallah, 'Atallah
 Abu 'Awda, 'Adnan, 508
 Abu Ayyash, Radwan, 261
 Abu Bakr, 'Atif, 208, 214
 Abu Basha, Hasan, 335
 Abu Dabbus, Rajab Muftah, 548, 565
 Abu Dhabi, 309, 386, 387
 Abu Ghazala, Field Marshal Muhammad
 'Abd al-Halim, 345, 348, 352, 374
 Abu Haytham (Jamal Karrara), 632
 Abu Hisham (Sa'id al-Mazin), 217
 Abu Hurayra, Muhammad Yusuf, 616–17, 619
 Abu Isma'il, Salah, 326
 Abu Iyad, *see* Khalaf, Salah
 Abu Jaziyya, 'Ali, 548
 Abu Jihad, *see* Wazir Khalil al-
 Abu Khalil, Joseph, 535
 Abu Musa (Sa'id Musa Muragha), 53, 205
 Abu Nadir, Fu'ad, 533, 534–35
 Abu Nidal (Sabri al-Banna), 108–9, 205, 207, 208, 214–15, 650, 652
 Abu Rahma, Fa'iz, 254, 258
 Abu Salih, Husayn Sulayman, 618, 619
 Abu Sharif, Bassam, 217
 Abu Shiraf, Lt. Gen. Sayf al-Din, 332
 Abu Usama, *see* Waliba, Zayd
 Adham, 'Umrān, 123, 419
 'Adil, Bakri Ahmad, 619, 621
 Afghani, Jamal al-Din al-, 161
 Afghanistan,
 insurgents in helped by Iran, 47, 48, 58
 National Reconciliation Commission, 45
 Soviet presence in, 44, 48, 120, 375, 414, 415, 609
 Soviet withdrawal from 6, 12, 44–45, 156
 'Aflag, Michel, 427
 Agazadeh, Gholam-Reza, 281, 415, 601
 Ahimeir, Yossi, 52
 Ahmad, 'Abd al-Rahim, 211
 Ahmad, Khurshid, 160
 Ahmad, Makram Muhammad, 336
 Ahmad, Muhammad Tawfiq, 138, 619, 620
 Ahmad, Salih 'Ubayd, 572

- 'Alawi, Yusuf al-, [359](#), [379](#)
- Algeria,
 foreign policy, [141–42](#)
 influence with Syria, [141](#)
 in Iraq-Iran mediation, [141](#)
 on Palestinians, [141](#)
 stance on Iran, [450](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [340](#)
 Libya, [14](#), [141–42](#), [545](#), [557–58](#)
 Mauritania, [142](#)
 Morocco, [140–41](#)
 Syria, [649](#)
 Tunisia, [142](#)
- Algerian-Moroccan summit, [14](#), [140](#)
- 'Ali, Sulayman al-, [532](#)
- 'Ali Nasir Muhammad, *see* Muhammad, 'Ali Nasir
- 'Alwan, Ahmad Muhsin, [432](#)
- Amal, Shi'i militia (Lebanon), [9](#), [54](#), [120](#), [125](#), [156](#), [165](#), [168](#), [169](#), [201](#), [214](#), [230](#), [231](#), [514](#), [515](#), [521–30](#) *passim*, [532](#), [637](#), [643](#), [644](#), [645](#), [649](#), [653](#)
- 'Amal al-Islami, *Munazzamat al-*, Shi'i group (Iraq), [439](#), [440](#)
- Amami, Sa'id, [403](#)
- Amin, Sayyid Ibrahim al-, [167](#), [168](#)
- Amin al-Yasin, Muhammad 'Abd al-Fattah, [429](#)
- Amirav, Moshe, [221](#), [222](#), [261](#)
- 'Amiri, Hasan 'Ali al-, [428](#), [429](#)
- 'Amla, Jamil al-, [256](#)
- Anani, Isam al-, [255](#)
- Anbari, 'Abd al-Amin al-, [446](#)
- Anderson, Terry, [29](#)
- Antipov, Yevgeny, [57](#)
- Aqazadeh, *see* Agazadeh, Gholam-Reza
- Arab Democratic Party (Lebanon), [528](#)
- Arab League, [39](#), [61](#), [118](#), [134](#), [142–43](#), [189](#), [650](#)
 Emergency Foreign Ministers' meeting, [126–28](#), [596](#)
 Supreme Defense Council, [604](#)
- Arab League summit (Amman), [9](#), [14](#), [15](#), [33](#), [79](#), [85](#), [103](#), [108](#), [128–34](#), [227](#), [502](#), [506](#), [596](#), [597](#)
 and Arab-Israeli conflict, [132](#), [596](#)
 on Egyptian question, [131](#), [189](#), [341](#), [358](#), [506](#), [596](#), [597](#)
 final statement, resolutions, [143–47](#)
 and Iranian threat, [7](#), [596](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [7](#), [63](#), [117](#), [131](#), [143](#), [189](#), [450](#), [506](#), [579](#)
 and Lebanon, [132](#), [133](#)
 and Occupied Territories, [85](#), [133](#)
 on Palestinian question, [7](#), [143](#), [201](#), [262](#), [506](#)
 planning for, [120](#), [121](#), [595–96](#), [600](#)
- Arab Liberation Front (Palestinian), [201](#), [204](#), [207](#), [211](#)
- Arab-Israeli peace process, [7–8](#), [15](#), [75–98](#)
 Egypt and, [41](#), [49](#), [82–84](#), [136](#), [155](#), [338](#), [339](#), [340](#), [349](#)
 Israel and, [8](#), [35](#), [37](#), [52](#), [75](#), [85–92](#), [461](#)
 Jordan and, [8](#), [35](#), [41](#), [49](#), [75–79](#), [93](#), [496–506](#)
 London Document, [76](#), [78–79](#), [92](#), [94](#), [97–98](#)
 Palestinians and, [8](#), [35](#), [37](#), [38](#), [39](#), [41](#), [75–78](#) *passim*, [79–82](#), [217–20](#)
 plans for international conference, [8](#), [36](#), [37–38](#), [40](#), [49](#), [81](#), [155](#); *see also under individual country for reactions to*
 Soviet Union and, [44](#), [45](#), [49](#), [55](#), [81](#), [95–97](#), [609](#)
 Syria and, [35](#), [36](#), [38](#), [41](#), [75](#), [84–85](#), [647](#)
 US and, [8](#), [11](#), [12](#), [25](#), [35–41](#), [42](#), [75](#), [89](#), [92–95](#), [507](#)
- 'Arafat, Yasir,
 abrogation of agreement with Husayn, [8](#), [53](#), [79](#), [136–37](#), [202](#)
 and Abu Nidal, [214](#)
 at Amman summit, [502–3](#)
 at ICO summit, [118](#), [120](#), [155–56](#)
 and internal tension in Fath, [215–17](#)
 Israeli contacts, [221](#), [222](#)
 and Lebanon/Palestinian situation, [204](#), [230–31](#)
 meetings with Husayn, [120](#), [132](#), [156](#), [201](#), [227](#), [502](#), [596](#)
 meetings with Mubarak, [137](#), [213](#), [217](#), [224](#), [347](#)
 Moscow visit, [57](#), [229–30](#)
 and peace process, [36](#), [37](#), [38](#), [41](#), [80](#), [218–19](#), [220](#)
 on international conference, [209](#), [211–12](#), [218](#), [220](#)
 PLO reconciliation moves, [53](#), [54](#), [201](#), [202](#), [204](#), [206–9](#) *passim*, [257](#)
 at PNC meeting, [53](#), [56](#), [201](#), [204](#), [209–14](#) *passim*, [257](#)
 and possible Jordan-West Bank federation,

- 35, 36
 regional visits, [366](#), [384](#), [684](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [224–25](#)
 Syria, [53](#), [225](#), [226](#), [648](#)
 Tunisia, [229](#)
 and uprising, [233](#), [264](#)
 other references, [347](#), [534](#), [572](#), [643](#)
 Ardebili, Husayn Kazem-pur, [281](#), [282](#)
 Arbeli-Almoslino, Shoshana, [466](#), [467](#), [477](#)
 Arens, Moshe, [88](#), [466](#), [469](#), [471](#), [472](#)
 Asad, Basil al-, [636](#)
 Asad, President Hafiz al-,
 at Amman summit, [128](#), [130–31](#), [132](#), [518](#),
 [646](#)
 and 'Arafat, [54](#), [216](#), [225](#), [226](#), [637](#)
 and Arab-Israeli conflict, [9](#), [78](#), [84](#), [85](#), [97](#),
 [642](#)
 attitude to Egypt, [340](#), [346](#)
 meets Mubarak, [119](#), [120](#), [155](#), [346](#), [649](#)
 domestic affairs, [19](#), [636](#), [637](#), [638](#)
 on the economy, [84](#), [639–40](#)
 in foreign affairs, [635](#), [650–51](#), [652](#)
 health of, [636](#)
 at ICO summit, [119–20](#), [155](#), [340](#), [346](#)
 and Lebanese involvement, [169](#), [523](#), [644](#)
 relations with Jumayyil, [120](#), [518](#), [596](#)
 on Mecca incident, [126](#), [600](#), [646](#)
 Moscow visit, [11](#), [54](#), [55](#), [56](#), [225](#), [635](#), [644](#),
 [653](#), [654](#)
 relations with Husayn, [85](#)
 relations with Jallud, [549](#)
 relations with Saddam Husayn, [15](#), [121](#)
 [130–31](#), [134](#), [388](#), [418](#), [419](#), [451](#), [595](#),
 [596](#), [600](#), [646–47](#), [654](#)
 on strategic parity [641](#)
 other references, [345](#), [419](#), [596](#), [636](#)
 As'ad, Kamil al-, [516](#)
 Asad, Rif'at al-, [120](#), [636](#), [637](#)
 Ashur, Khalil, [247](#), [255](#)
 'Atallah, 'Atallah (Abu al-Za'im), [228](#)
 Atatürk, Kemal, [660](#), [674](#)
 Atrash, Hana al-, [261](#)
 'Attar, Muhammad Sa'id al-, [681](#)
 'Attar, Dr. Najah al-, [638](#), [639](#)
 'Attas, President Haydar al-, [571](#), [572](#), [573](#),
 [575](#), [577](#), [683](#)
 Augue, Roger, [520](#)
 Awad, Mubarak, [247](#)
 'Awda, 'Abd al-'Aziz, [247](#)
 'Awn, al-Hajj 'Atif, [529](#)
 'Awn, Gen. Michel, [517](#), [519](#), [534](#)
 Ayalon, Ami, [17](#), [19](#)
 'Ayish, Muhammad (the late), [434](#)
 Azhar, al-, university of, [159](#), [331](#), [335](#)
 Shaykh al-Azhar, [159](#)
 'Aziz, Tariq, [61](#), [62](#), [122](#), [127](#), [418](#), [427](#), [436](#),
 [446](#), [448](#), [449](#), [683](#)
 'Azzam, Salim, [160](#)
 Baccouche, Hedi, [558](#)
 Badr, Zaki Mustafa, [328](#), [329](#), [352](#)
 Badri, Yusuf al-, [164](#)
 Baghdad,
 Iranian missile attacks on, [62](#), [63](#), [436](#)
 terrorist activity in, [437](#), [440](#)
 Baha al-Din, Ahmad, [224](#)
 Bahrain, [364–67](#)
 armed services, [365](#)
 dispute with Qatar, [21](#), [364](#), [366](#), [383](#), [384](#)
 economic development, [365](#)
 financial reserves, [310](#)
 and Gulf War, [366](#)
 immigration, [299](#), [309](#), [310](#)
 regional politics, [366](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [63](#), [132](#), [366](#)
 Iran, [364](#)
 Jordan, [366](#)
 Kuwait, [366](#)
 Saudi Arabia, [366](#)
 UK, [367](#)
 US, [367](#)
 Saudi-Bahraini causeway, [364](#), [365](#)
 Shi'i subversive activities, [364](#), [366](#)
 US aircraft for, [30](#), [365](#), [366](#), [367](#)
 Bakraduni, Karim, [231](#), [517](#), [534](#), [535](#)
 Bandar Ibn Sultan, Prince, [592](#), [593](#), [603](#), [605](#),
 [606](#)
 Banna, Sabri al-, *see* Abu Nidal
 Banura, Hanna, (the late), [491](#)
 Barakat, 'Abdallah, [679](#)
 Baramki, Gabi, [249](#)
 Barazani, Idris, [443](#)
 Barazani, Mas'ud, [183](#), [441](#), [443](#), [662](#)
 Barazani, Mulla Mustafa (the late), [441](#)
 Barazani, Nejir, [443](#)
 Barbar, Mustafa al-, [250](#)
 Barghuthi, Bashir, [256](#)
 Barghuthi, Marwan al-, [247](#), [254–55](#)
 Barrak, Fadil, [429](#)
 Barri, Nabih, [54](#), [515](#), [517](#), [519](#), [522](#), [525](#), [528](#),

- [529](#), [530](#)
 Basra, [6](#), [14](#), [118](#), [123](#), [404](#), map [424](#), [434](#), [435](#), [436](#)
 Ba'th Party,
 in Iraq, [19](#), [423](#), [426–27](#), [428](#), [429](#), [432](#), [433](#), [435](#), [437](#), [441](#), [442](#)
 in Jordan, [492](#), [493](#)
 in Lebanon, [519](#), [528](#)
 Bayd, 'Ali Salim al-, [45](#), [570](#), [571](#), [573](#), [575](#), [577](#), [683](#)
 Baz, Dawud, [528](#)
 Bazargan, Mehdi, [407](#)
 Begin, Menahem, [36](#), [466](#)
 Behouchet, 'Abdallah, [557](#)
 Beillin, Dr. Yossi, [264](#)
 Beirut,
 Iran-inspired terrorism in, [154](#), [176](#), [519–20](#)
 Shi'ite rivalries in, [165](#), [168](#), [169](#), [521–22](#)
 Syrian operations in [168–69](#), [514](#), [515](#), [523](#), [530](#), [635](#), [644](#), [652](#), [653](#)
 West Beirut, battle for [523](#)
 Belogonov, Alexander, [47](#)
 Ben 'Ali, Zayn al-'Abidin, [229](#), [558](#)
 Ben Suda, Ahmad, [140](#)
 Bengio, Ofra, [20](#)
 Ben-Gurion, David, [221](#), [451](#)
 Benjedid, President Chedli, [120](#), [130](#), [140](#), [204](#), [206](#), [207](#), [595](#), [649](#)
 Benvenisti, Dr. Meron, [266](#)
 Besharati, 'Ali Muhammad, [405](#), [562](#)
 Birks, J.S., Seccombe, L.I. and Sinclair, C.A., [306](#), [311](#)
 Bishara, Antoine, [527](#)
 Biton, Charlie, [219](#)
 Bizri, Dr. Nazih al-, [519](#)
 Bourguiba, President Habib, [492](#)
 deposition of, [20](#), [139](#), [229](#), [558](#)
 Britain, *see* United Kingdom
 Bronfman, Edgar, [50](#), [51](#), [57](#)
 Bruno, Michael, [483](#)
 Brutents, Karen, [52](#), [65](#), [97](#), [653](#)
 Buchanan-Smith, Alick, [278](#)
 Bumpers, Senator Dale, [30](#)
 Busa'id, Sayyid al-Mu'tasim Ibn Hamad al-, [378](#)
 Bush, George, [508](#), [593](#)
 Bustani, Dr. Salah, [254](#)
 Butrus, Fu'ad, [517](#)
 Butrus-Ghali, Dr. Butrus, [48](#), [84](#), [339](#), [351](#), [352](#)
 Cairo-Amman Bank, Nablus, [251](#), [253](#)
 Carlucci, Frank, [30](#), [92](#), [188](#), [607](#)
 Carter, ex-President Jimmy, [36](#), [75](#), [81](#), [84](#), [85](#), [651](#), [652](#)
 Casey, William, [26](#), [28](#), [593](#)
 Chad,
 French connection, [545](#), [553](#)
 Libyan involvement in, [12](#), [16](#), [21](#), [46](#), map [544](#), [545](#), [549](#), [625](#), [627](#)
 relations with Sudan, [615](#), [627](#)
 US involvement, [545](#), [553](#), [563–64](#)
 Chamoun, Camille, [18](#), [514](#), [515](#), [519](#), [533](#), [535](#), [536](#)
 Chamoun, Danny, [516–17](#), [519](#), [524](#), [533](#), [536](#)
 Chamoun family, [524](#)
 Channon, Paul, [610](#)
 Chaplin, Edward, [413](#)
 Cheysson, Claude, [251](#), [652](#)
 China, People's Republic of, [6](#), [51](#), [91](#), [389](#), [476](#)
 Chirac, Jacques, [262](#)
 Cicippio, Joseph, [29](#)
 Cindoruk, Husamettin, [660](#)
 Cohen, Geula, [474](#)
 Communist Labor Organization (Lebanon), [528](#)
 Conference of Presidents of Major Jewish Organizations (US), [50](#), [477](#)
 Conference on Islamic Thought (Tehran), [164](#)
 Craig, James, [610](#)
 currencies, [322](#)
 Cyprus question, [672](#), [673](#)
 Dahdah, Charles, [535](#)
 Dakhlan, Muhammad Yusuf, [247](#)
 Dali, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-, [380](#), [576](#)
 Darwish, Mahmud, [211](#)
 Dastmalchiyan, Ahmad, [166](#), [167](#)
 Da'wa, al-, group (Iran, Iraq), [27](#), [169](#), [170](#), [371](#), [437](#), [439–40](#)
 Dawud, Dawud, [528](#), [529](#)
 Dayan, Moshe, [78](#)
 Demchenko, Pavel, [47](#), [54](#), [63](#)
 Demirel, Suleyman, [660](#), [663–64](#), [665–68](#)
passim
 Democratic Alliance (Palestinian), [210](#)
 Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), [53](#), [54](#), [105](#), [113](#), [201–7](#)
passim, [210](#), [211](#), [213](#), [214](#), [224](#), [225](#), [233](#), [492](#), [493](#), [648](#)

- Denktas, Rauf, [673](#)
- Dhanun, Gen. 'Abd al-Jawad, [435](#), [455](#)
- Di'bis, al-Hamza, [326](#)
- Di'bis, Carlos, [491](#)
- Din, Ahmad Baha al-, [350](#)
- Din, Fu'ad Siraj al-, [325](#), [329](#)
- Din, Hasan Taj al-, [626](#)
- Din, Khalid Muhyi al-, [325](#), [326](#), [329](#)
- Diñçerler, Vehdi, [668](#)
- Dirani, Mustafa, [528](#)
- Djibouti, [132](#)
- Dobrynin, Anatoly, [50](#)
- Duba, Gen. 'Ali, [637](#)
- Dubai, [309](#), [386](#), [387](#), [388](#)
- Dubinin, Yuri, [49](#), [51](#), [57](#)
- Dudin, Marwan, [253](#), [254](#), [499](#), [503](#)
- Duri, 'Izzat Ibrahim al-, [427](#)
- Duri, Maj.Gen. Tali' Khalil Arhim al-, [435](#), [443](#), [455](#)
- Eagleton, William, [652](#), [653](#)
- Eban, Abba, [221](#), [469](#), [473](#)
- Ecevit, Bülent, [660](#), [663-68](#) *passim*
- Ecevit, Rahsan, [660](#)
- Eddé, Raymond, [516](#), [517](#)
- Egypt, [323-52](#)
- and Arab-Israeli peace process, [41](#), [49](#), [82-84](#), [136](#), [338](#), [339](#), [340](#), [349](#)
- domestic affairs, [323-37](#)
- attempted assassinations, [19](#), [20](#), [323](#), [336](#), [346](#)
- electoral law revised, [324-25](#), [327](#)
- emigration, [299](#), [300](#), [301](#), [303](#), [304-5](#), [306](#), [311](#), [450](#)
- immigration, [301](#), [303](#)
- militant religious in, [19](#), [170-71](#), [334](#)
- Muslim/Coptic clashes, [13](#), [323](#), [334-35](#)
- parliamentary elections, [323-30](#)
- PLO offices closed, [53](#), [83](#), [137](#), [224](#), [347](#)
- population, [17](#), [332](#)
- presidential elections, [19](#), [323](#), [330-32](#)
- social unrest, [334-37](#)
- terrorist activity in, [334](#), [335-36](#), [346](#)
- "Tripartite Coalition", [326](#), [328](#), [329](#), [330](#)
- economy, [17](#), [159](#), [323](#), [332-34](#)
- debt scheduling, [11](#), [48](#), [135](#), [333](#), [337-38](#), [339](#)
- IMF agreement, [333](#)
- foreign affairs, [337-51](#)
- PLO relationship, [53](#), [137](#), [206](#), [208](#), [223-25](#), [340](#), [341-42](#), [346-47](#)
- relations with
- Bahrain, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#), [366](#)
- Djibouti, [132](#)
- Ethiopia, [628](#)
- GCC states, [135](#), [341](#)
- Iran, [343](#), [409](#), [451](#)
- Iraq, [63](#), [132](#), [303](#), [341](#), [343](#), [450](#)
- Israel, [8-9](#), [21](#), [82](#), [323](#), [340](#), [347-51](#)
- Jordan, [14](#), [15](#), [132](#), [136-37](#), [340](#), [342-43](#)
- Kuwait, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#), [374-75](#)
- Libya, [139](#), [345-46](#)
- Mauritania, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#)
- Morocco, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#)
- Oman, [132](#), [358](#), [380-81](#)
- Qatar, [132](#), [341](#)
- Saudi Arabia, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#), [580](#), [597-99](#)
- Somalia, [132](#)
- Soviet Union, [11](#), [48-49](#), [65](#), [323](#), [337](#), [338-39](#)
- Sudan, [14](#), [132](#), [137-39](#), [340](#), [343-44](#), [615-16](#), [627-28](#)
- Syria, [119](#), [345](#), [346](#)
- UAE, [63](#), [341](#), [345](#)
- US, [11](#), [42](#), [49](#), [323](#), [337-38](#), [339](#)
- YAR, [63](#)
- inter-Arab relations and, [14](#), [63](#), [82](#), [117](#), [121](#), [131](#), [134-39](#), [155](#), [156](#), [189](#), [323](#), [340-42](#)
- Iranian influence in, [336](#), [343](#)
- involvement in Gulf security, [360](#), [374](#)
- Iraqi-Iranian War, [117](#), [135-36](#)
- Ra's Burqa' incident, [350](#)
- reaction to uprising, [350-51](#)
- support and military aid for Iraq, [135](#), [340](#), [343](#)
- Taba dispute, [21](#)
- Egyptian Revolution Organization, [336-37](#)
- Egyptian-Jordanian Joint Higher Committee, [137](#), [343](#)
- Egyptian-Soviet Friendship Society, [48](#), [339](#)
- Egyptian-Sudan-Libya triangle, [137-39](#)
- Eitan, Raphael, [469](#), [473](#), [474](#)
- Elbert, Lev, [51](#)
- Erbakan, Necmettin, [160](#), [660](#), [661](#), [665](#), [666](#), [667](#)
- Erez, Brig. Gen. Yesha'ayahu (Shailee), [252](#)
- Ethiopia,
- involvement in Sudan civil war, [624](#), [625](#), [626](#)

- relations with Sudan, [616](#), [628–29](#)
 European Economic Community, [647](#), [671–72](#)
 relations with Syria, [651–52](#)
 support for international conference, [49](#),
[77](#), [81](#), [91](#)
 trade with Occupied Territories, [251](#)
- Fadil, Badan (the late), [434](#)
 Fadil, Gen. Fawzi Ahmad al-, [344](#), [624](#)
 Fadil, Mubarak 'Abdallah, [619](#), [626](#)
 Fadlallah, Ayatollah Sayyid (Shaykh)
 Muhammad Husayn, [166–67](#), [169](#), [175](#),
[517](#), [530](#), [531](#), [593](#), [644](#)
- Fahd, King,
 and economy, [586](#)
 family affairs, [591](#), [592](#), [593](#)
 and foreign affairs, [14](#), [120](#), [140](#), [595](#)–[596](#),
[597](#), [599](#), [600](#), [607](#), [610](#), [611](#), [649](#)
 and Mecca incident, [126](#), [175](#)
 and oil affairs, [277](#), [278](#), [580](#), [581](#), [582–83](#)
 security measures, [588–89](#), [599](#)
 stance on Iran, [129](#), [175](#), [189](#), [589](#), [591](#), [601](#)
 other references, [576](#), [585](#), [605](#), [606](#), [636](#),
[648](#)
- Fahum, Khalid al-, [205](#), [207](#), [213](#)
 Fakhri, Lt. Gen. Hisham Sabah al-, [435](#),
[455](#)
- Faqi, Mahmud, [528](#), [529](#)
 Faraj, Ibrahim, [329](#)
 Faranjiyya, Sulayman, [519](#), [533](#), [534](#), [645](#)
 Farhat, Muhammad Lutfi, [548](#), [565](#)
 Faris, Marwan, [528](#)
 Faris, Tahsin al-, [255](#), [256](#)
 Fasht al-Dibal island dispute, [21](#), [364](#), [366](#),
[383](#), [384](#)
- Fath, al-, [53](#), [106](#), [107](#), [110](#), [111](#), [112](#), [201–18](#)
passim, [220](#), [221](#), [223](#), [225](#), [226](#), [231](#), [232](#),
[247](#), [249](#), [522](#), [525](#)
- Fath-Revolutionary Council, [205](#), [207](#), [208](#),
[209](#), [214–15](#)
- Fath Uprising (Fath rebels), [205](#)
- Fatayri, Anwar, [533](#)
- Faysal, King (the late), [592](#)
 Faysal, Prince (son of Fahd), [594](#)
 Faysal, Sa'ud al-, [127](#)
- Fayturi, Muhammad al-, [548](#), [565](#)
 Fayyad, Gen. Shafiq, [637](#)
- fida'i* activity, [103](#), map [104](#), [105](#), [106](#), [109](#), [110](#)
- Filali, 'Abd al-Latif al-, [140](#)
- France,
 activity in Chad, [545](#), [553](#)
 Gulf naval involvement, [32](#), [187](#), [188](#), [412](#)
 and international conference, [77](#), [91](#)
 other references, [385](#), [389](#), [446](#), [504](#), [520](#)
- Fraternity and Concord Treaty (Algeria-Tunisia-Mauritania), [142](#)
- Freedman, Robert, [11](#)
- Freedom Movement (Iran), [407](#)
- Freij, Elias, [253](#), [257](#), [262](#)
- Friedman, Thomas, [265](#), [266](#)
- Garang, John, [630](#)
- Gaza Strip, [81](#), [82](#), [86](#), [252](#), [257](#), [501](#)
 armed operations in, [103](#), [105–6](#), [109–11](#)
 increasing violence in, [244](#), [246](#)
 Jordan involvement in, [253](#), [254–55](#),
[503–6](#)
 labor unions in, [250](#)
 uprising in, [7](#), [40](#), [66](#), [79](#), [80](#), [201](#), [231–33](#),
[244](#), [263–68](#)
- Gazit, Mordechai, [8](#)
- Geivandov, Konstantin, [49](#)
- General Confederation of Lebanese Trade Unions, [527](#)
- General Union of Palestinian Writers and Journalists, [203](#)
- Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, [447](#)
- Gera, Gideon, [6](#), [7](#)
- Gerasimov, Gennady, [46](#), [62](#), [64](#), [375](#)
- Ghadamsi, 'Izz al-Din al-, [552](#)
- Ghadimi, 'Ali, [308](#)
- Ghani, 'Abd al-'Aziz al-, [572](#)
- Ghanim, 'Adil, [250](#)
- Ghanushi, Rashid al-, [171](#)
- Ghawsha, Samir, [205](#)
- Ghazzala, Dr. Zuhdi, [255](#), [261](#)
- Ghorbanifar, Manouchir, [26](#)
- Ghul, Jihad al-, [522](#)
- Ghul, Rahim al-, [216](#), [522](#)
- Ghusayn, Jawid al-, [211](#)
- Gillespie, April, [446](#), [652](#)
- Giorgis, Felke Gedle, [629](#)
- Glass, Charles, [521](#), [644](#), [653](#)
- Glukhov, Yuri, [63](#)
- Golan Heights, [78](#), [85](#), [119](#), [643](#)
- Goldberg, Jacob, [16](#)
- Golpaygani, Ayatollah Reza Musavi, [394](#)
- Goodman, Hirsh, [267](#)
- Gorgachev, Mikhail,
 'Arafat meets, [230](#)
 Asad visits, [54–56](#), [96](#), [653](#)
 cultivation of Israel, [50](#), [96–97](#)

- Husayn visits, [65](#), [509](#)
 and Middle East, [44](#), [45](#), [46](#), [50](#), [649](#)
 Moscow meeting with Reagan, [6](#), [40](#), [64](#), [65](#)
 at Reykjavik, [50](#)
 Washington meeting with Reagan, [7-8](#), [32](#), [95](#)
- Goren, Shmuel, [252](#), [264](#), [266](#)
- Gorji, Wahid, [412](#), [413](#)
- Greenberg, Joel, [251](#)
- Gromyko, Anatoly, [48](#)
- Gromyko, President Andrei, [47](#), [58](#), [64](#), [509-10](#)
- Gulf Cooperation Council, [10](#), [14](#), [30](#), [282](#), [313](#)
 and Egyptian involvement in Gulf, [360](#)
 and Gulf War, [33](#), [35](#), [118](#), [126](#), [189](#), [358](#), [359](#), [360](#), [423](#)
 Ministerial Council meetings [189](#), [341](#), [359-60](#)
 and Palestinian issue, [360](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [135](#), [341](#), [358](#)
 Iran, [14](#), [15](#)
 Jordan, [358](#)
 Saudi Arabia, [360](#)
 security strategy, [358](#), [359](#), [360](#)
 rapid deployment force, [358](#)
 Supreme Council meeting, [360](#), [361-62](#)
- Gush Emunim (Israel), [245](#), [463](#), [474](#)
- Habash, George, [53](#), [63](#), [201](#), [203](#), [205-12](#) *passim*, [214](#), [217](#), [220](#), [222](#), [224](#), [225](#), [226](#), [257](#), [648](#)
- Habré, Hissène, 552-56 *passim*, [625](#)
- Haddad, Dr. Ibrahim, [642](#)
- Haddad, Na'im, [429](#)
- Hajirin, Muhammad Ibn Salim al-, [380](#)
- Hajj, Munir al-, [525](#)
- Hakim, 'Abd al-'Aziz, [440-41](#)
- Hakim, (Ayatollah) Sayyid Muhammad Baqir al-, [170](#), [176](#), [440](#)
- Halefoglu, Vahid, [668](#), [673](#)
- Hamad, Ahmad al-Sayyid, [618](#)
- Hamada, Muhammad 'Ali, [29](#)
- Hamdam, Dr. Hasan, [519](#)
- Hamdun, Nizar, [446](#), [452](#)
- Hamilton, Representative Lee, [31](#)
- Hamiyya, 'Aql, [528](#), [529](#)
- Hammud, Joe, [515](#)
- Hanafi, Musa, [245](#)
- Haniyya, Akram, [247](#)
- Haqq, Jadd al-Haqq 'Ali Jadd al-, Shaykh al-Azhar, [159](#)
- Hasan, Crown Prince (of Jordan), [491](#), [496](#), [497](#), [500](#), [502](#), [509](#)
- Hasan, King, [120](#), [129-30](#), [140](#), [522](#), [595](#)
 attitude to Shi'i Islam, [159-60](#)
 meeting with Peres, [119](#), [120](#)
 and Palestinians, [229](#)
- Hasan, 'Adnan Badr, [637](#)
- Hasan, Bilal al-, [213](#)
- Hasan, Hani al-, [206](#), [213](#), [215](#), [221](#), [224](#), [227](#), [233](#), [502](#)
- Hasan, Khalid al-, [208](#), [213](#), [215](#), [219](#), [221](#), [229](#), [232](#), [233](#)
- Hasan, Khalid al-Hajj, [306](#), [494](#)
- Hasan Ali (Nassar), [445-46](#), [454](#)
- Hashemi, Hadi, [400](#)
- Hashemi, Mehdi, [163](#), [394](#), [398](#), [400](#), [410](#)
- Hashim, Hasan, [528](#), [529](#)
- Hashim, Joseph al-, [515](#), [517](#), [527](#), [535](#)
- Hasuna, Kamal, [261](#)
- Hawatima, Na'if, [53](#), [203](#), [206](#), [207](#), [209](#), [210](#), [212](#), [213](#), [220](#), [222](#), [225](#), [257](#), [648](#)
- Haybi, Hasan al-, [216](#)
- Haydar, Dr. Lutfallah, [651](#)
- Hayrani-Nobayr, Naser [62](#)
- Hazbun, George, [248](#)
- Hazmo, Jacques, [254](#)
- Herrington, John, [278](#), [285](#), [286](#), [289](#)
- Heth, Dr. Meir, [484](#)
- Hijazi, Fakhr al-Din, [394](#)
- Hindawi, Nizar, [637](#), [651](#)
- Hindi, Inayat, [246](#)
- Hindi, Jamal, [247](#)
- Hindi, al-Sharif Zayn al-'Abidin al-, [617](#), [619](#)
- Hittin battle celebrations, [9](#), [641](#)
- Hizballah (Lebanon), [27](#), [107](#), [109](#), [111](#), [112](#), [113](#), [165-69](#), [231](#), [418](#), [514](#), [515](#), [516](#), [521](#), [524](#), [525](#), [526](#), [528](#), [530-31](#), [593](#), [643](#), [644](#)
 kidnapping, assassinations by [167](#), [519](#), [520](#), [521](#), [531](#)
- Hizballah, internationally, [165](#), [336](#), [371](#)
- "Hizballah of the Hijaz," [590](#)
- Hizbollah (Iran), [399](#)
- Hodel, Donald, [286](#)
- Holmes, Peter, [292](#)
- Hormuz, Strait of, [34](#), [289](#)
- Howe, Sir Geoffrey, [414](#)
- Hubayka, Elie, [519](#), [521](#), [533](#), [534](#)
- Humaydi, Khuwaylidi al-, [558](#)
- Hurani, 'Abdallah, [211](#)

- Husayn, King
 abrogation of 'Arafat agreement, [8](#), [53](#), [79](#),
[136-37](#), [201](#), [202](#), [257](#), [503](#)
 and Amman summit, [117](#), [120](#), [129](#), [130](#),
[132](#), [133](#), [201](#), [343](#), [489](#), [502](#), [506](#)
 and domestic affairs, [490-91](#), [492](#), [493](#),
[495](#)
 Gulf visits, [366](#), [375](#), [381](#), [384](#), [388-89](#)
 at ICO summit, [120](#), [154](#), [157](#), [375](#)
 and inter-Arab relationships, [506](#), [507](#), [600](#)
 and international conference, [36](#), [37](#), [38](#),
[75-78](#) *passim*, [94](#), [133](#), [496-97](#), [498](#), [500](#),
[509](#)
 London meeting with Peres, [56](#), [78](#), [79](#), [87](#),
[89](#), [94](#), [496-97](#)
 meeting with 'Arafat, [120](#), [132](#), [156](#), [201](#),
[227](#), [502](#), [596](#)
 meetings with Mubarak, [137](#), [342-43](#)
 Moscow visit, [65-66](#), [509](#)
 and Occupied Territories, [75](#), [254](#), [503](#),
[505](#)
 and peace process, [25](#), [40](#), [75](#), [76-77](#), [89](#),
[94-95](#), [133](#), [499](#)
 and PLO and Palestinians, [489](#), [500-501](#),
[502](#)
 possible Jordan-West Bank federation, [35](#),
[36](#)
 reactions to US-Iran arms deal, [508](#)
 relations with Asad, [85](#), [647](#)
 and Syrian-Iraqi relations [121](#), [122](#), [133](#),
[134](#), [388](#), [451](#), [489](#), [507](#), [600](#), [646](#), [647](#),
 other references, [6](#), [15](#), [128](#), [212](#), [508](#)
- Husayn, President Saddam,
 assassination attempt on, [437](#), [438](#)
 internal affairs, [19-20](#)
 revolutionary reforms by, [423](#), [425-32](#),
[437](#)
 Iran and, [32](#), [47](#), [407](#), [408](#), [415](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [180](#), [181](#), [183](#), [190](#),
[193](#), [434](#), [435](#), [447](#)
 and Mecca incident, [126](#)
 meeting with Asad, [15](#), [121](#), [130-31](#), [134](#),
[388](#), [418](#), [419](#), [451](#), [595](#), [596](#), [600](#), [646-47](#)
 opposition to, [437](#), [438](#)
 son Qusay, [430](#)
 son 'Uday, [429](#)
 Soviet relationship, [449](#)
 US relations, [446](#)
 other references, [120](#), [124](#), [132](#), [168](#), [169](#),
[366](#), [388](#), [440](#), [442](#), [452](#), [455](#)
- Husayni, 'Arif al-, [176](#)
- Husayni, Faysal al-, [247-48](#), [261](#)
- Husayni, Hashim, [519](#)
- Husayni, Hajj Amin al— (the late), [219](#)
- Husayni, Husayn al-, [515](#), [517](#), [529](#)
- Huss, Salim al-, [515](#), [527](#), [528](#)
- Ibn Salman, Shaykh 'Isa, [366](#)
- Ibn Shakir, Zayd, [498](#)
- Ibn 'Umar, Shaykh, [552](#), [554](#)
- Ibrahim, 'Izzat, [443](#)
- Ibrahim, Muhsin, [528](#)
- Ibrahim, Sa'd al-Din, [304](#)
- Ibrahim, Sulayman, [216](#)
- Ibrahimi, Ahmad Talib, [140](#), [649](#)
- 'Imadi, Dr. Muhammad, [638](#)
- Independent Nasserites (Lebanon), [528](#), [532](#)
- Inönü, Erdal, [660](#), [664-68](#) *passim*
- Inönü, Ismet, [660](#)
- International Conference on Safeguarding the
 Sanctity and Security of the Holy *Haram*
 (Iran), [175](#)
- International Institute for Strategic Studies
 (London), [641](#)
- International Islamic News Agency, [157](#)
- intifada*, [6](#), [7](#), [9](#), [14](#), [18](#), [40](#), [41](#), [244](#), [263-68](#),
[505](#)
see also under West Bank and Gaza Strip,
 uprising in
- Iran, [391-419](#)
 attitude to Saudi Arabia, [416-18](#)
 Black Sea pipeline, [61](#), [375](#)
 and calls for cease-fire in Gulf War, [6](#), [7](#),
[32](#), [34](#), [61](#), [190](#), [192](#)
 Council of Experts, [393](#), [395](#)
 domestic affairs,
 Islamization, [391](#), [398](#)
 Labor Law, [395-96](#)
 opposition in, [406-9](#)
 power struggle among clerics, [20](#), [391](#),
[392-401](#)
 economic affairs, [16](#), [391](#), [401-4](#)
 foreign affairs, [20](#), [392](#), [409-19](#)
 and ICO summit, [118](#), [369](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [409](#)
 France, [392](#), [409](#), [411-13](#)
 Gulf states, [14](#), [15](#), [398](#), [404](#)
 Iraq, [409-10](#)
 Kuwait, [392](#), [416](#)
 Libya, [559-62](#)
 Oman, [127](#), [169](#), [359](#), [379](#)

- Saudi Arabia, [126](#), [409](#), [410](#), [416](#)
 Soviet Union, [11](#), [47–48](#), [57–58](#),
[59–60](#), [191](#), [375](#), [410](#), [414–15](#)
 Syria, [55](#), [122–25](#), [409](#), [418–19](#)
 Tunisia, [409](#)
 Turkey, [409](#)
 UK, [392](#), [409](#), [413–14](#)
 US, [11](#), [13](#), [25](#), [409](#), [410–11](#)
 tension with, [125](#), [392](#), [404](#), [406](#)
 and Irangate affair, [25–29](#), [44](#), [410](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War [391](#), [401](#), [404–6](#),
[408](#), [409](#), [416–18](#)
 see also main heading
 Islamic militancy, [13](#), [58](#), [158](#)
 export of, [162–72](#), [419](#)
 Israeli arms deal, [26](#), [425](#), [451](#), [602](#), [605](#)
 Lebanese Shi'i connection, [400](#), [418](#), [643](#)
 Libyan support for, [55](#), [120](#)
 Martyrs' Foundation, [163](#), [167–68](#), [170](#)
 and Mecca pilgrimage incident, [126](#),
[172–74](#), [175–76](#), [416–17](#)
 oil affairs, [290](#), [401](#), [416](#)
 and Opec, [15](#), [275](#), [276](#), [277](#), [279–84](#)
 passim, [288](#)
 Revolutionary Guards, [33](#), [163](#), [168](#), [180](#),
[181](#), [183](#), [398](#), [399](#), [410](#), [442](#)
 Syria-Libya connection, [122–25](#), [418](#)
 other references, [6](#), [58](#), [61](#), [117](#)
 Iran-Contra affair, [10](#), [11](#), [12](#), [25–29](#), [38](#), [444](#),
[446](#), [602](#), [605–6](#)
 exploited by USSR, [48](#), [57](#), [66](#), [191](#)
 repercussions in Middle East, [44](#), [48](#), [375](#),
[449](#), [451](#), [508](#)
 Tower Commission, [27](#), [28](#), [163](#), [605](#), [606](#)
 Iranian National Liberation Army (Iraq), [183](#)
 Iraq, [423–55](#)
 air force, [183](#), [184](#), [434](#), [435](#)
 and Arab League Summit, [450](#)
 Arab support for, [449–51](#)
 attack on US frigate, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [30](#), [58](#), [444](#),
[446](#), [606](#), [607](#)
 domestic affairs, [19–20](#)
 administrative revolution, [19–20](#), [423](#),
[425–34](#)
 bureaucracy reforms, [431–2](#)
 cabinet reshuffle, [427–30](#)
 employees, workers, [431–32](#)
 infithar, open-door policy, [426](#), [430](#)
 Trade Unions, [425](#), [426](#), [432](#), [433–34](#)
 economic affairs, [16](#), [192](#), [423](#), [425](#), [428](#),
[436](#)
 arms industry, [431](#), [435](#)
 effects of Gulf War, [20](#), [192–93](#)
 Egyptian military aid for, [343](#), [450–51](#)
 French military aid for, [412](#), [413](#), [435](#), [446](#)
 immigration, immigrants, [300](#), [303](#), [311](#),
[450](#)
 Islamic fundamentalism in, [423](#)
 Kurdish opposition, [21](#), [437](#), [438](#), [439](#),
 operations against, [6](#), [10](#), [404](#), [423](#),
[441–44](#)
 military changes, [435](#)
 oil pipelines, [16](#), [279](#), [289](#), [290](#), [436](#)
 Opec dealings, [275](#), [276](#), [277](#), [279–80](#), [282](#)
 opposition in, [437–44](#)
 Shi'i community, [169–70](#), [423](#), [437](#),
[438–41](#)
 Revolutionary Command Council, [427](#),
[429](#), [431](#), [433](#), [436](#), [437](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#), [343](#), [450](#), [453](#)
 Jordan, [15](#), [450](#)
 Kuwait, [450](#)
 Libya, [15](#), [545](#), [562–63](#)
 Saudi Arabia, [450](#)
 Soviet Union, [447–49](#)
 aid from, [56](#), [448](#)
 Syria, [15](#), [121–22](#), [133](#), [418](#), [450](#), [451](#),
[595](#), [597](#)
 West Germany
 stance toward Israel, [452–53](#)
 US attitude to, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [423](#), [444–46](#)
 use of chemical weapons, [10](#), [122](#), [183](#),
[442](#), [447](#)
 Iraqi Communist Party, [437–38](#)
 Iraqi-Iranian War, [5](#), [6](#), [12](#), [13](#), [41](#), [47](#), [117](#),
[121](#), [180–95](#), map [182](#), [434–36](#)
 arms supplied for, [6](#), [26](#), [180](#), [412](#), [413](#),
[414–15](#), [425](#), [435](#), [446](#), [451](#), [602](#), [605](#)
 Basra offensive, [6](#), [14](#), [118](#), [123](#), [163](#), [181](#),
[183](#), [404](#), [423](#), map [424](#), [425](#), [434](#), [435](#),
[436](#), [440](#), [450](#)
 calls for cease-fire, [7](#), [32](#), [34](#), [60](#), [63](#), [120](#),
[125](#), [128](#), [129](#)
 Security Council Resolution, [598](#), [190–](#)
[91](#), [193–95](#) *see also under* United
 Nations Security Council, Resolution
[598](#)
 casualties, [192](#)
 and inter-Arab relationships, [125–26](#), [128](#)
 internationalization of, [423](#), [425](#)
 Kurdish operations, [6](#), [10](#), [404](#), [423](#),

- [441-44](#)
 military developments, [6](#), [7](#), [180-81](#),
[183-84](#), [192](#)
 outlook for, [193](#)
 Soviet Union and, [47-48](#), [55](#), [58](#), [59-60](#),
[190-91](#)
 tanker reflagging, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [29-35](#), [44](#), [48](#),
[58](#), [125](#), [186](#), [278](#), [358](#), [359](#), [371](#), [372-74](#),
[381](#), [445](#)
 tanker war [6](#), [10](#), [14](#), [32](#), [33-34](#), [58](#), [125](#),
[184-89](#), [372](#), [445](#), [450](#)
 US frigate attacked, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [30](#), [58](#), [184](#),
[188](#), [444](#), [606](#), [607](#)
 war of the cities, [48](#), [62](#), [63](#), [183](#), [184](#), [436](#)
 Iryani, 'Abd al-Karim al-, [683](#), [684](#)
 Islam,
 Iranian export of, [162-72](#)
 Libyan version, [161-62](#)
 Sunni Muslim activities, [158-60](#)
 Iran ties with, [170-71](#)
 Sunni/Shi'i differences, [153](#), [158-60](#)
 see also Islamic fundamentalism
 Islam, Husayn Shaykh ul-, [411](#), [413](#)
 Islamic Action Organization (Iran), [170](#)
 Islamic Conference for Friday Prayer Leaders,
[160](#)
 Islamic Conference Organization, [81](#), [153](#), [158](#)
 budget problems, [157](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [153](#), [154](#)
 Kuwait Summit, [12-13](#), [14](#), [15](#), [44-45](#),
[118-20](#), [153-58](#), [227](#), [369](#), [374](#)
 and Egypt, [12](#), [118](#), [120](#), [155](#), [156](#), [340](#)
 Iran and, [154](#), [164](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War [120](#), [156](#)
 Islamic Council of Europe, [160](#)
 Islamic Front for the Liberation of Bahrain,
[364](#)
 Islamic fundamentalism, [41](#)
 in Egypt, [334](#), [335](#), [336](#)
 export by Iran, [58](#), [162-72](#), [419](#)
 in Jordan, [489](#), [491-92](#)
 Muslim Brotherhood and, [160-61](#)
 In Occupied Territories, [265](#)
 in Tunisia, [139](#)
 in Turkey, [661](#), [663](#), [667](#)
 Islamic Jihad,
 in Lebanon, [106](#), [110](#), [111](#), [171](#), [210](#) [217](#),
[369](#)
 in Libya, [550](#)
 in Occupied Territories, [246](#), [265](#)
 Islamic Liberation Party (Jordan), [491](#), [492](#)
 Islamic Movement (Lebanon), [517](#)
 Islamic Popular Conference Organization, [438](#)
 Islamic Republican Party (Iran), [398](#), [399-400](#)
 Islamic Revolutionary Organization (Lebanon),
[369](#)
 Islamic Solidarity Fund, [157](#)
 Islamic *Tawahid* Movement, [531](#)
 Islamic Tendency Movement (Tunisia), [171](#)
 Islamic Unification Movement (Lebanon), [170](#)
 Isma'il, Muhammad Nabawi, [336](#)
 Israel, [460-85](#)
 and Arab-Israeli peace process, [7-8](#), [35](#),
[37](#), [52](#), [75](#), [85-92](#), [461](#)
 armed operations in, [9](#), [103](#), [105-6](#), [109-11](#)
 economic affairs, [17](#), [460](#), [481-84](#), [485](#)
 Bank Leumi affair, [483-84](#)
 economic program, [481-82](#)
 inflation, [481](#), [484](#)
 foreign affairs, [476-77](#)
 relations with
 China, [476](#)
 Egypt, [8-9](#), [21](#), [82](#), [323](#), [347-51](#)
 Iraq, [451-52](#)
 South Africa, [476](#)
 Soviet Union, [11](#), [49-50](#), [52](#), [55](#), [57](#),
[96](#), [476](#)
 US, [39-40](#), [41](#), [42](#)
 General Security Services inquiry, [475](#)
 Government, [8](#), [17](#), [18](#), [460-65](#)
 Knesset weaknesses, [468-70](#)
 National Unity Government, [8](#), [18](#), [38](#),
[49](#), [56](#), [86](#), [349](#), [460](#), [463](#), [464](#), [465](#), [470](#)
 hang-glider attack, [8](#), [9](#), [107-8](#), [113](#), [264](#),
[525](#), [642-43](#)
 Histadrut, [470](#), [477](#), [478](#), [479](#), [481](#), [482](#),
[483](#)
 intifada, [7](#), [17](#), [18](#), [21](#)
 see also West Bank, uprising in
 and Iran arms deal, [26](#), [425](#), [451](#), [602](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [425](#), [451-52](#)
 Lavi fighter aircraft, [40](#), [465-68](#)
 minimum wage law, [469-70](#)
 politics, [16](#), [18](#), [85](#)
 Agudat Israel, [464](#), [468](#), [474](#)
 Center Party, [474](#)
 Citizens' Rights Movement, [462](#)
 Herut, [82](#), [221](#), [222](#), [466](#), [471](#), [473](#), [474](#)
 Independent Liberal Party, [474](#)
 Labor Party, [17](#), [18](#), [52](#), [85](#), [258](#), [349](#),
[460-70](#) *passim*, [473](#), [498](#)
 Liberal Center, [474](#)

- Liberal Party, [472–73](#)
 Likud, [17](#), [18](#), [52](#), [75](#), [85](#), [88](#), [349](#), [460](#),
[462–70](#) *passim*, [472](#), [483](#)
 National Religious Party, [464](#), [468](#), [474](#)
 Shas, [464](#), [465](#), [468](#), [474](#)
 Shinui, [464](#), [474](#)
 Tehiya, [464](#), [468](#), [473–74](#)
 presence in South Lebanon, [18](#), [515](#), [524](#),
[525](#)
 Ra's Burqa' incident, [350](#)
 reactions to proposed international con-
 ference, [56–57](#), [349](#), [461–62](#), [497](#), [498](#)
 rumor of nuclear capability, [646](#)
 social affairs, [477–80](#), [484](#)
 Jewish/Arab relations, [480](#)
 labor relations, [477–79](#)
 religious/secular relations, [13](#), [479–80](#)
 and Soviet Jewish emigration, [52](#)
 and Taba dispute, [21](#)
 United Kibbutz movement, [461](#)
 Ivanko, Sergei, [50](#)
 Ivanovskiy, Gen. Yevgeniy Filippovich, [577](#)
- J'Abani, Ahmad, [255](#)
 Jabir, Abu Bahr Yunis, [564](#)
 Jacobsen, David, [27](#)
 Jad'un, Suhayl, [261](#)
 Jaffet, Ernest, [483](#)
 Ja'ja', Samir, [514](#), [517](#), [519](#), [524](#), [533–34](#), [535](#)
 Jallud, 'Abd al-Salam, [19](#), [46](#), [132](#), [228](#), [543](#),
[549–50](#), [557](#), [562](#), [649](#)
 Jamal, Maj. Gen. Diya al-Din, [435](#), [455](#)
 Jasim, Latif Nusayyif al-, [184](#), [425](#)
 Jawara, President Dawda, [154](#)
 Jenco, Fr. Lawrence, [26](#)
 Jerusalem, [78](#), [90](#), [232](#), [259–61](#), [461](#), [479](#), [480](#)
 violence in, [103](#), [106](#), [109](#), [110](#), [111](#), [246](#),
[261](#), [263](#)
 Jibril, Ahmad, [108](#), [205](#), [642](#)
 Jirghum, Muhammad Ahmad, [576](#)
 Jiryis, Sabri, [221](#), [223](#)
 Jordan, [489–510](#)
 and Arab-Israeli peace process, [8](#), [35](#), [41](#),
[49](#), [75–79](#), [93](#), [496–506](#)
 Communist Party, [492](#), [493](#)
 discovery of oil in, [290](#)
 domestic affairs, [20](#)
 emigration, emigrants, [300](#), [303](#), [305–6](#),
[493–94](#)
 immigration, [300](#), [305](#), [495](#)
 opposition, [492–93](#)
 parliamentary elections, [489–92](#), [493](#)
 economic affairs, [304](#), [489](#)
 budget, [490](#), [493](#)
 impact of recession, [493–95](#)
 unemployment, [494](#), [495](#)
 foreign affairs, [506–10](#)
 relations with
 Bahrain, [366](#)
 Egypt, [14](#), [15](#), [132](#), [136–37](#), [340](#),
[342–43](#), [489](#), [506](#), [507](#)
 Iraq, [15](#), [450](#), [489](#), [506](#)
 Kuwait, [375](#)
 Libya, [127](#), [507](#)
 Oman, [381](#)
 Saudi Arabia, [48](#), [506](#)
 Soviet Union, [509–10](#)
 Syria, [489](#), [506](#), [635](#), [647–48](#)
 US, [42](#), [507–9](#)
 Gaza Strip involvement, [80](#), [253](#), [254](#), [489](#)
 and international conference proposal,
[76–77](#), [79](#), [89](#), [496–99](#), [508](#), [647](#)
 Islamic fundamentalism in, [489](#), [491–92](#)
 Jordanian-Israeli memorandum (London
 Document), [76](#), [78–79](#), [87](#), [88](#), [89](#), [497](#),
[498](#)
 military detachment at Mecca, [589](#)
 and Palestinians, [496–506](#)
 Jordanian/PLO rivalry, [504–5](#)
 PLO relations, [36](#), [83](#), [136–37](#), [201](#), [212](#),
[223](#), [226–28](#), [489](#), [499–500](#), [502–6](#),
[507](#)
 proposed confederation, [83](#), [88](#), [500](#), [503](#)
 rights and representation, [499–501](#)
 reaction to uprising, [505](#)
 US military aid to, [507](#), [508](#)
 West Bank involvement, [8](#), [76](#), [80](#), [227](#),
[253](#), [489](#), [501](#), [503–6](#)
 anti-Jordan elements, [254–55](#)
 Five-Year Development Plan, [253–54](#),
[502](#), [503](#), [504](#)
 pro-Jordanians, [255–57](#)
 Jordanian-PLO Joint Committee, [502](#), [503](#),
[504](#)
 Jordanian Writers' Association, [492](#)
 Jumayyil, President Amin, [166](#), [231](#), [514–19](#)
 passim [524](#), [533](#), [534](#), [535](#), [643](#), [645](#)
 meeting with Asad, [120](#), [596](#)
 Jumayyil, Bashir, [536](#)
 Junblat, Walid, [46](#), [515](#), [517](#), [519](#), [520](#), [526](#),
[532–33](#)

- Jurasi, Jalil, [246](#)
 Juraysh, Jubran, [528](#)
- Kabalan, 'Abd al-Amir, [529](#)
 Kafrawi, Hasballah Muhammad, [326](#), [352](#)
 Kahveci, Adnan, [668](#)
 Kamal, Muhammad, [498](#)
 Kan'an, Brig. Ghazi, [637](#), [639](#), [644](#), [649](#)
 Kan'an, Sa'id, [254](#), [261](#)
 Kanovsky, Eliyahu, [302](#)
 Karami, 'Abd al-Hamid, [519](#)
 Karami, Ahmad, [531](#)
 Karami, Rashid, [18](#), [514](#), [515](#), [519–20](#), [528](#), [531](#), [645](#)
 Karami, 'Umar, [528](#), [531](#)
 Karra, Jamal, *see* Abu Haytham
 Karrubi, Mehdi, [173](#), [417](#)
 Kasm, Dr. 'Abd al-Ra'uf al-, [638](#), [639](#), [647](#)
 Katsav, Moshe, [471](#)
 Kaunda, President Kenneth, [556](#)
 Kazakhstan, [12](#), [45](#)
 Keçeciler, Mehmet, [661](#), [668](#)
 Kessar, Yisrael, [482](#)
 Khaddam, 'Abd al-Halim, [122](#), [226](#), [418](#), [648](#), [649](#)
 Khalaf, Salah (Abu Iyad), [81](#), [203](#), [208](#), [214](#), [215–16](#), [219–20](#), [224](#), [229](#), [232](#), [233](#)
 Khalaf, Yazid, [223](#)
 Khaled, Prince, son of 'Abdallah, [592](#)
 Khaled, Prince, son of Faysal, [585](#)
 Khalid, Shaykh Hasan, [528](#)
 Khalidi, Walid al-, [226](#)
 Khalifa, 'Abd al-Rahman, [160](#)
 Khalifa, 'Ali al-, [62](#)
 Khalifa, Shaykh Hamad Ibn 'Isa al-, [367](#)
 Khalifa, Shaykh Muhammad Ibn Mubarak al-, [366](#)
 Khalil, Dr. Mustafa [350](#)
 Khalil, Sami Shaykh, [246](#)
 Khallaq, 'Uthman al-, [255](#), [256](#)
 Khameneh'i, President Muhammad Ali, [34](#), [44](#), [59](#), [61](#), [123](#), [154](#), [175](#), [181](#), [395–401](#) *passim*, [405](#), [406](#), [410](#), [413](#), [415](#), [418](#), [419](#), [601](#)
 Khamis, Edward, [256](#)
 Kharazi, Kamal, [406](#)
 Kharg Island, [184](#)
 Khashoggi, Adnan, [605](#)
 Khatib, Anwar al-, [260](#)
 Khazraji, Lt. Gen. Nizar 'Abd al-Karim al-, [435](#), [455](#)
 Kho'i, Ayatollah Seyyed Abul-Qasem, [394](#), [439](#)
 Kho'iniha, Hujjat ul-Islam, [417](#)
 Khomeyni, Ayatollah Ruhollah, ideology and regime, [165](#), [391–92](#), [393](#), [394](#), [396–97](#), [399–400](#), [402](#), [409](#), [410](#), [417](#)
 and the pilgrimage, [172](#), [173](#), [589](#), [590](#), [601](#)
 Saudi antipathy, [174](#), [579](#), [596](#), [598](#), [602](#)
 succession struggle, [20](#), [162](#), [391–95](#) *passim*
 and war [32](#), [172](#), [405–8](#) *passim*, [595](#)
 Khomeyni, Ahmad, [398](#), [400](#)
 Khuli, Gen. Muhammad al-, [637](#), [651](#)
 Khuri, Bishara al-, [516](#), [536](#)
 Khuri, Bishop Iliya, [211](#)
 Khuri, Joseph, [520](#)
 Khuri, Saman, [247](#)
 Kiftaru, Shaykh Ahmad, [161](#)
 Kissinger, Henry, [31](#), [89](#), [92](#), [652](#)
 Klibi, Chedli, [127](#), [128](#), [130](#), [134](#)
 Kohl, Chancellor Helmut, [611](#)
 Kolbin, Gennady, [45](#)
 Kollek, Teddy, [259](#)
 Kozakcioglu, Hayri, [662](#)
 Kramer, Martin, [12](#)
 Kunaev, Dinmukhamed, [45](#)
 Kurdish Democratic Party (Iran), [183](#)
 Kurdish Democratic Party (Iraq), [183](#), [441](#), [442](#), [443](#), [662](#)
 Kurdish Workers' Party, [662](#), [663](#), [647](#), [675](#)
 Kurds, [21](#), [423](#), [437](#), [438](#), [439](#), [662](#) *intifada* [21](#), [441](#)
 Iranian influence with [441–44](#), [662](#)
 Iraqi operations against, [6](#), [10](#), [404](#), [423](#), [441–44](#)
 in Iraqi-Iranian War, [6](#), [183](#), [674](#)
 Kutlu, Haydar, [666](#), [672](#)
 Kuttab, Da'ud, [260](#)
 Kuwait, [369–76](#)
 financial reserves, [310](#)
 ICO summit in, [118–20](#), [153–58](#), [450](#)
 expenditure on, [157](#)
see also main entry Islamic Conference Organization
 immigration, [299](#), [300](#), [303–7](#) *passim*
 imprisoned Shi'i terrorists, [27](#), [371](#)
 and inter-Arab relationships, [121](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [6](#), [185–86](#), [187–88](#), [369](#)
 oil targets attacked, [7](#), [33](#), [34](#), [62](#), [118](#), [125](#), [135](#), [187](#), [345](#), [358](#), [359](#), [369](#), [370](#),

- [374, 416, 450](#)
- tanker reflagging, [6, 10, 29–35, 44, 121, 125, 186, 278, 358, 359, 369, 371, 372–74, 381, 445](#)
- oil affairs, [289, 290–91, 306](#)
- dealings with Opec, [275, 276, 277, 280, 282, 284, 285](#)
- overseas investment, [291, 310](#)
- regional politics, [374–75](#)
- relations with
 - Bahrain, [366](#)
 - Egypt, [63, 132, 341, 345, 374–75](#)
 - Iran, [392, 416](#)
 - Iraq, [450](#)
 - Jordan, [375](#)
 - Soviet Union, [62, 375–76](#)
 - request for tanker leases, [11, 29, 48, 57–58, 186, 278, 372, 375](#)
 - Syria, [375](#)
- Shi'i opposition and terrorism in, [19, 20, 154, 307, 369–71](#)
- Kyprianou, President Spyros, [673](#)
- Labor mobility, [298–313](#)
 - causes of, [298, 301, 306, 309](#)
 - effects of Iraqi-Iranian War, [300, 302–3, 311](#)
 - impact of recession, [301–9](#)
 - remigration, [302, 304, 305, 310](#)
 - remittances, [298, 303–4, 306, 312, 573, 669, 681](#)
- Lafi, Tal'at, [250](#)
- Lahad, Gen. Antoine, [166, 519, 524](#)
- Laham, David, [639](#)
- Landau, Moshe, [475](#)
- Landau, Uzi, [52](#)
- Larak Island, [34, 184](#)
- Larijani, Muhammad Javad, [60, 61, 415](#)
- Lebanese Communist Party, [519, 523, 528, 532, 533, 644, 653](#)
- Lebanese National Resistance Front, [107, 113](#)
- Lebanon, [514–36](#)
 - armed operations in, [103, 109, 111–13, 521–25](#)
 - Amal/PLO strife, [9, 521–23](#)
 - in South Lebanon, [9, 106–7, 515, 516, 521, 524–25](#)
 - West Beirut battle, [521–22, 523, 530, 532](#)
- Christian community, [533–36](#)
- death of Chamoun, [536](#)
- Maronite Church, [533](#)
- Maronite differences, [514, 517](#)
- power struggle in, [533–36](#)
- Druze community, [514, 523, 526, 532–33, 644](#)
- economy, [16, 133, 514, 515, 525–27](#)
- emigration, [301](#)
- Government, [18, 515–16, 527–36](#)
 - Chamber of Deputies, [515–16](#)
 - presidential elections, [18, 514, 516–18](#)
- hostages held in, [11, 25–29 passim, 44, 520–21, 644, 651, 652, 653](#)
- interreligious, internecine violence, [5, 13, 20, 41](#)
- Iranian involvement in [165–69, 526, 530, 531](#)
- Israeli involvement in South, [18, 515, 524, 525](#)
- Lebanese Army, [516, 522, 523, 534, 535](#)
- Lebanese Forces, [514, 517, 519, 524, 526, 532, 533–35, 536, 645](#)
- "Lebanese Forces-Free Bashirites-Forces of Vengeance," [519](#)
- Lebanese Front, [536](#)
- Phalangist Party, [517, 533, 535–36](#)
- PLO/Palestinian presence in, [230–31, 514, 516, 521–23](#)
- political coalitions and communities, [527–36](#)
 - Lebanese National Movement, [527, 528](#)
 - Unification and Liberation Front, [527, 528](#)
- Shi'i community, [514, 522, 524, 525, 528–31, 643](#)
- South Lebanese Army, [9, 106–7, 515, 524](#)
- Sunni community, [514, 519, 528, 531–32](#)
- Syrian-Iranian differences in, [123](#)
- Syrian involvement, [21, 41, 514–18, 520, 523, 528, 642, 643–45](#)
- in West Beirut, [18, 21, 514, 515, 521, 530, 532, 635, 642, 644](#)
- terrorism, hostages, assassinations in, [518–21, 522, 531, 644](#)
- see also* hostages held in *above*
- US presence in, [521](#)
- war of the camps, [9, 54, 107, 118, 120, 125, 156, 201, 214, 230, 231, 521, 529, 645](#)
- Ledeen, Michael, [26](#)
- Levy, David, [461, 467, 471, 472](#)
- Liberal Party (Egypt), [325, 326, 331](#)
- Libya, [543–65](#)

- animosity against US, [546](#), [563–64](#)
- Chad situation, [12](#), [16](#), [21](#), [46](#), [118](#), [120](#), [124](#), [125](#), [137](#), [543](#), map [544](#), [545](#), [546](#), [551](#), [552–57](#), [559](#), [625](#), [626](#), [627](#)
- economic affairs, [16](#), [309](#), [310](#), [543](#), [546](#), [547](#)
- Government, [19](#)
- General People's Committee, [543](#), [548](#)
- General People's Congress, [543](#), [547–49](#)
- Revolutionary Committees, [549](#), [550](#), [551](#)
- immigration, [300](#), [303](#), [309](#), [310–11](#)
- Iran-Syria-Libya connection, [122](#), [124–25](#), [344](#), [418](#)
- and Iraqi-Iranian War, [451](#), [545](#), [559–63](#)
- Islamic militancy in, [13](#), [161–62](#), [550–51](#)
- Lebanese connection, [526](#), [528](#)
- Moroccan-Libyan Federation Agreement, [545](#), [559](#)
- oil revenues, [543](#), [546](#)
- Opec relations, [279](#)
- opposition,
- in Army, [543](#), [545](#), [550](#), [551](#)
- expatriate, [545](#), [552](#)
- fundamentalist, [543](#), [545](#), [550–51](#)
- reaction to Iran-Contra affair, [449](#), [559](#)
- relations with
- Algeria, [14](#), [124](#), [545](#), [557–58](#)
- Egypt, [139](#), [340](#), [345–46](#)
- Iran, [545](#), [559–62](#)
- Iraq, [15](#), [545](#), [562–63](#)
- Jordan, [127](#)
- Morocco, [14](#), [141](#), [545](#), [559](#)
- PLO, [228](#)
- Soviet Union, [11](#), [12](#), [546](#), [564](#)
- Sudan, [625–26](#)
- Tunisia, [142](#), [545](#), [558–59](#)
- status of Tripoli, [19](#), [543](#), [546–47](#)
- Sudanese involvement, [137–39](#), [545](#), [557](#), [622](#), [625–26](#)
- support for Iran, [120](#), [451](#)
- terrorist involvement, [108](#)
- Litani, Yehuda, [259](#)
- Lukman, Rilvanu, [281](#), [282](#), [283](#), [291](#)
- Mabhuh, Tawfiq al-, [250](#)
- McFarlane, Robert, [26](#), [605–6](#)
- Maddy-Weitzman, Bruce, [13](#)
- Maghrib affairs, [118](#), [139–43](#)
- see under the name of individual countries*
- Mahayri, Isam, [528](#)
- Mahdi, al-Sadiq al-, [138](#), [160](#), [343–44](#), [615](#), [617–21](#) *passim*, [625–31](#) *passim*
- Mahdi, Salah al-Siddiq al-, [616](#)
- Mahjub, Muhammad 'Ali, [159](#)
- Mahjub, Dr. Rif'at al-, [329](#)
- Majid, 'Ali Hasan al-, [429](#), [442](#)
- Majid, Col. Husayn Kamil al-, [455](#)
- Malekzadegan, Muhammad Husayn, [406](#)
- Maltz, Ya'acov, [467](#)
- Mansur (known as Maqhur), Kamal Hasan al-, [548](#), [565](#)
- Mariam, President Mengistu Haile, [572](#), [629](#)
- Mashariqa, Zuhayr, [641](#)
- Masri, Hikmat al-, [262](#)
- Masri, Tahir al-, [128](#), [496](#), [498](#), [500](#), [501](#), [502](#), [508](#)
- Masri, Umat al-, [255](#)
- Masri, Zafir al-, murder of, [261](#)
- Mauritania,
- relations with
- Algeria, Tunisia, [142](#)
- Egypt, [63](#), [132](#)
- Morocco, [141](#)
- Mawdudi, Mawlana, (the late), [160](#)
- Mazin, Sa'id al— (Abu Hisham), [217](#)
- Mecca pilgrimage disturbances, [13](#), [20](#), [61](#), [125](#), [126](#), [153](#), [158](#), [172–74](#), [308](#), [388](#), [392](#), [416](#), [450](#)
- Iranian/Saudi Arabian reactions to [174–76](#), [189](#), [280](#), [410](#), [416–17](#), [589–91](#), [598–99](#), [600](#), [601–2](#)
- Menashri, David, [20](#)
- Menderes, Adnan, [660](#)
- Meshkini, Ayatollah 'Ali, [395](#)
- Mestiri, Muhammad, [142](#)
- Michael, Amanuel Amde, [629](#)
- Milhim, Muhammad, [211](#), [218](#), [220](#), [221](#)
- Mirghani, Muhammad 'Uthman, [620](#), [630](#)
- Mitterrand, President François, [91](#), [412](#)
- Mitzna, Maj. Gen. Amran, [245](#), [267](#)
- Moda'i, Yitzhak, [17](#), [472](#), [473](#)
- Mohtadi, Mahmud, [171](#)
- Mohtashemi, Hujjat al-Islam 'Ali Akbar, [400–401](#), [417](#), [418](#)
- Montazeri, Ayatollah Husayn 'Ali, [162–63](#), [164](#), [167](#), [175](#), [393](#), [394](#), [395](#), [398](#), [400](#), [401](#), [402](#), [403](#), [418](#), [440](#)
- Moroccan-Libyan Federation, [545](#), [559](#)
- Morocco, [140–41](#)
- Algerian-Moroccan summit, [14](#), [140](#)
- relations with

- Algeria, [140–41](#)
 Egypt, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#)
 Libya, [14](#), [141](#), [545](#), [559](#)
 Western Sahara question, [14](#), [21](#), [140–41](#)
- Moseli-Lesch, Ann, [305](#)
- Moses, Ofra, [244](#), [247](#)
- Mubarak, President Husni,
 and Arab-Israeli peace process, [39](#), [49](#), [78](#),
[82](#), [84](#), [338](#), [339](#)
 attitude to Libya/Qadhdhafi, [139](#), [346](#)
 domestic affairs, [325](#), [327](#), [329](#), [333](#), [335](#)
 Gulf visits, [189](#), [345](#), [366](#), [381](#), [389](#)
 and Kuwait summit, [14](#), [118](#), [119](#), [120](#),
[155](#), [156](#), [340](#), [345](#), [346](#)
 and Mecca pilgrimage incident, [126](#)
 meeting with Husayn, [137](#), [343](#)
 meeting with Peres, [49](#), [82](#), [349](#), [484](#)
 meets with 'Arafat, [137](#), [213](#), [224](#), [347](#)
 meets with Asad, [119](#), [120](#), [155](#), [346](#), [649](#)
 postponed Washington trip, [11](#), [337](#), [338](#)
 reelection of, [19](#), [323](#), [324](#), [329](#), [330–32](#)
 relations with PLO, [53](#), [137](#), [224](#), [347](#)
 Saudi Arabian relationship, [597](#), [598](#), [599](#)
 and Soviet relationship, [11](#), [48](#)
 other references, [134](#), [136](#), [139](#), [304](#), [343](#),
[347](#), [374](#)
 Mubarak, Sami, [326](#)
- Mudarrisi, Muhammad Taqi al-, [440](#)
- Mufti, 'Abd al-Wahhab Muhammad Latif al-,
[431](#)
- Muhammad, 'Abd al-Karim, [365](#)
- Muhammad, Prince, son of King Fahd, [590](#)
- Muhammad, Prince, son of King Sa'ud, [593](#)
- Muhammad, 'Ali Nasir, [45](#), [570–75](#) *passim*,
[577](#), [680](#), [682](#), [683](#)
- Muhammadi-Reyshahri, Hujjat al-Islam
 Muhammad, [163](#), [171](#)
- Muhanni, Ahmad al-, [680](#), [681](#)
- Muhyayir, Albert, [515](#)
- Muhsin, Muhammad Sa'id 'Abdallah, [577](#)
- Mujahidine Khalq (Iran), [183](#), [407](#), [408](#), [413](#)
- Muntasir, 'Umar Mustafa al-, [548](#), [565](#)
- Murad, Mustafa Kamil, [304](#), [325](#), [331](#)
- Muragha, Sa'id Musa, *see* Abu Musa
- Murphy, Richard, [32–33](#), [37](#), [38](#), [39](#), [84](#), [92](#),
[97](#), [385](#), [389](#), [606](#)
- Musavi, Shaykh 'Abbas, [517](#)
- Musavi, Mir-Husayn, [27](#), [59](#), [62–63](#), [123](#), [154](#),
[290](#), [397](#), [400](#), [401](#), [403](#), [405](#), [411](#), [412](#), [674](#)
- Musavi-Kho'iniha, Hujjat al-Islam, [172–73](#)
- Musawi, Husayn al-, [168](#)
- Museveni, President Yoweri, [630](#)
- Muslim Brotherhood, [160–61](#), [325](#), [326](#), [328](#),
[329](#), [330](#), [637](#)
 in Jordan, [491](#), [492](#)
- Muslim World League (Mecca), [158–59](#), [161](#),
[170](#), [174–75](#), [176](#)
 Third General Islamic Conference, [174–75](#)
- Mustafa, Lt. Gen. Sa'd al-Din 'Aziz, [435](#), [455](#)
- Mustafa, Dr. Yusri 'Ali, [339](#), [352](#)
- Mustafa al-Zibri, Abu 'Ali, [207](#), [208](#), [211](#), [217](#)
- Mutanalli, Gen. Farid, [577](#)
- Mutawalli, Sulayman, [326](#)
- Nabavi, 'Ali Tavakoh, [408](#)
- Nabi, Belkacem, [289](#)
- Nafi', Ibrahim, [337](#)
- Nafsu, Izak, [475](#)
- Nahhas Pasha, [136](#)
- Na'if Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Prince, [170](#), [174](#), [590](#),
[591](#), [593](#), [594](#), [684](#)
- Najab, Sulayman, [53](#), [211](#)
- Naji, Kan'an, [532](#)
- Najibullah, President, [375](#)
- Nakash, William, [479](#)
- Naor, Arye, [472](#)
- Nasif, 'Abdallah 'Umar, [170](#)
- Nasir, 'Abdallah Burmah, [626](#)
- Nasir, Ahmad, [247](#), [255](#)
- Nasrallah, Sayyid Hasan, [165](#)
- Nasri, Mirghani al-, [618](#)
- Nassar, Muntaz, [329](#)
- Nasserite Party (*al-hizb al-Nasiri*; Egypt), [326](#)
- National Conference on Soviet Jewry, [50](#)
- National Democratic Party (Egypt), [325–29](#)
passim
- National Front for the Salvation of Libya, [552](#)
- National Liberal Party (Lebanon), [524](#), [536](#)
- National Progressive Unionist Grouping
 (Egypt), [325](#), [326](#), [328](#), [329](#), [331](#)
- Natsha, 'Abd al-Nabi al-, [260](#), [261](#)
- Navab, Mehdi, [413](#)
- Nayruz, Faysal Ahmad Karam, [370](#)
- Nazir, Hisham, [46–47](#), [275](#), [276](#), [277–78](#), [282](#),
[580](#), [581](#), [582](#), [608](#)
- Nehamkin, Arye, [466](#)
- Nimr, 'Abd al-Munt'im, [329](#)
- Nir, Ori, [258](#)
- Nissim, Moshe, [461](#), [466](#), [467](#), [472](#), [477](#), [478](#),
[481–82](#)
- Normandin, Jean-Louis, [520](#)
- North, Lt. Col. Oliver, [26](#), [27](#), [28](#)

- Novik, Nimrod, [57](#)
- Nuhayan, President Shaykh Zayid Ibn Sultan al-, [127](#), [387](#), [388](#)
- Nu'am, Yasin Sa'id, [573](#)
- Numayri, Ja'far al-, [18](#), [137](#), [138](#), [161](#), [344](#), [615](#), [617](#), [618](#), [620](#), [621](#), [623](#), [627](#)
- Nunn, Senator, Sam, [30](#)
- Nurbakhsh, Mohsen, [403](#)
- Nusayba, Prof. Sari, [259](#), [261](#)
- Nusayr, Dr. 'Abd al-Majid, [491](#)
- Nushirwan, Amin, [442](#)
- Nuwayisa, Riyad al-, [490](#)
- Occupied Territories, [9](#), [85](#), [244](#), [350](#), [505](#)
 see Gaza Strip; West Bank
- oil developments,
 effects of war, [279](#), [280–81](#), [288–89](#)
 free flow of oil, [10](#), [29](#), [32](#), [41](#), [42](#), [278](#)
 non-Opec producers, [277–78](#), [283](#), [287](#)
 petro-dollar investments in US, [291](#)
 prices and production, [12](#), [15](#), [32](#), [46](#), [275–85](#) *passim*, [286–87](#), [310](#), [365](#)
 see also Organization of Petroleum Ex-
 porting Countries
- Okello, Tito, [630](#)
- Oman, [378–82](#)
 border dispute with PDRY, [21](#), [378](#), [380](#)
 domestic issue, [378–79](#)
 immigration, immigrants, [300](#), [379](#)
 financial reserves, [310](#)
 and Gulf War, [378](#), [379](#)
 regional politics, [379–81](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [132](#), [358](#), [380–381](#), [389](#)
 Gulf states, [358](#), [378](#), [380](#)
 Iran, [127](#), [189](#), [359](#), [379](#)
 Jordan, [381](#)
 Soviet Union, [11](#), [381–82](#), [389](#)
 Syria, [378](#), [381](#)
 UK, [379](#), [381](#),
 US, [381](#)
 stance on Iran, [378](#), [379–80](#)
- "Oppressed of the Earth" (Lebanon), [519](#), [520](#)
- Organization of African Unity, [46](#), [81](#), [140](#), [141](#), [346](#), [555](#), [556](#)
 Addis Ababa summit, [137](#)
- Organization of Petroleum Exporting
 Countries (Opec), [604](#)
 finances, [291–92](#)
 oil prices, [15–16](#), [46](#), [287](#), [288](#), [293–94](#),
 [580](#), [582](#), [604](#)
 oil revenue figures, [301](#), [312](#)
 overseas investments, [291](#), [310](#)
 production levels, [15–16](#), [275–82](#) *passim*,
 [284](#), [287](#), [288](#), [292–93](#), [581](#), [582](#)
 Vienna conferences,
 December 1986, [15](#), [275–76](#)
 June 1987, [279–80](#)
 December 1987, [15](#), [283–85](#), [582](#)
- Özal, Turgut, [650](#), [659](#), [660](#), [661](#), [663–72](#)
 passim, [675](#)
 health of, [662](#), [668](#)
- Özal, Yusuf, [668](#)
- Özturun, Gen. Necdet, [663](#)
- Palestine Communist Party, [53](#), [201](#), [204](#), [207](#),
 [210](#), [225](#), [258](#), [492](#)
- Palestine Liberation Front, [108](#), [201](#), [204](#), [205](#),
 [207](#), [208](#), [211](#)
- Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO),
 [201–33](#)
 abrogation of Husayn-'Arafat agreement,
 [12](#), [201–2](#), [203](#), [257](#), [499](#), [501](#), [506](#)
 and Amman summit, [132](#)
 armed struggle, [217](#), [218](#), [222–23](#)
 Central Council, [204](#), [206](#), [210](#), [229](#)
 Egyptian offices closed, [53](#), [83](#), [137](#), [234](#),
 [258](#), [347](#)
 Executive Committee, [202–8](#) *passim*, [210](#),
 [211](#), [213](#), [221](#), [229](#)
 government-in-exile proposal, [232–33](#)
 influence in Occupied Territories, [247](#), [254](#),
 [255](#), [256](#), [262](#), [264](#)
 internal conflicts and reconciliation, [12](#),
 [38](#), [53](#), [97](#), [201](#), [257–58](#), [600](#)
 internal relationships post-PNC, [213–17](#)
 and Israeli-Arab peace process, [8](#), [35](#), [38](#),
 [39](#), [41](#), [76](#), [77](#), [79–82](#), [217–20](#)
 and international conference, [8](#), [37](#), [76](#), [77](#),
 [78](#), [212](#), [218–20](#), [500–501](#)
 meetings with Israelis, [217](#), [220–22](#)
 Jordan relationship, [36](#), [83](#), [136–37](#), [201](#),
 [212](#), [223](#), [226–28](#), [600](#)
 presence in Lebanon, [230–31](#), [514](#), [515](#)
 [525](#), [643](#), [648](#), [653](#)
 refugee camps, [9](#), [521–23](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [53](#), [206](#), [208](#), [223–25](#), [346–47](#)
 Libya, [223](#), [228](#)
 the Maghrib, [223](#), [229](#)
 Soviet Union, [12](#), [80–81](#), [97](#), [202](#), [207](#),
 [229–30](#)

- Syria, [54](#), [207–8](#), [213](#), [216](#), [225–26](#), [648–49](#)
 right of representation, [8](#), [39](#), [76](#), [83](#), [205](#), [211–12](#), [217–18](#), [220](#)
 terrorist activity, [38](#), [39](#), [109](#)
 “Tripoli document,” [205–6](#), [207](#), [208](#), [214](#)
 and UN Resolution [242](#), [212](#), [218](#)
 US and, [37](#), [41](#), [230](#)
 and uprising, [231–33](#), [264–5](#)
- Palestine National Charter, [210](#)
- Palestine National Council Algiers meeting, [8](#), [9](#), [12](#), [53–54](#), [56](#), [79](#), [97](#), [103](#), [137](#), [201–13](#), [222](#), [499](#), [648](#)
 and Egypt, [211](#), [212](#)
 on international conference, [53](#), [75](#), [211–12](#), [220](#)
 on Jordan relationship, [212](#)
 preparations for, [201–9](#)
 proceedings, [209–13](#), [233–36](#)
 reaction to, in Territories, [257–58](#)
 Soviet Union and, [53–54](#), [93](#), [202](#)
 on Syria, [212](#)
- Palestine National Salvation Front, [53](#), [203](#), [205](#), [207](#), [209](#), [213](#), [217](#), [225](#), [648](#), [649](#)
- Palestine Popular Struggle Front (PPSF), [205](#), [207](#), [209](#)
- Palestinians,
 armed operations by, [103](#), [106](#)
 comprehensive national dialogue, [206–9](#)
 hang-glider attack by, [8](#), [9](#), [107–8](#), [113](#), [264](#), [525](#), [642–3](#)
 independence for, [6](#), [79](#)
 migrant workers, [303](#), [311](#)
 and peace process, [75](#), [78](#), [79–82](#), [92](#), [261](#)
 presence in Lebanon, [230–31](#), [244](#)
 representation of, [36](#), [39](#), [40–41](#), [51](#), [75](#), [76](#), [81](#), [83](#)
 self-determination issue, [8](#), [79](#), [81](#), [83](#), [261](#)
 uprising, [6](#), [7](#), [9](#), [40](#), [66](#), [79](#), [80](#), [201](#), [489](#)
- Papandreou, Andreas, [673](#)
- Parviz, Amir Khosrow Amir, [408](#)
- Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, [183](#), [441](#), [442](#), [443](#), [662](#)
- Patt, Gideon, [472](#)
- Peace Now movement (Israel), [50](#), [221](#), [222](#)
- People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY), [570–77](#)
 border disputes, [21](#)
 civil war in, [45](#), [570](#), [573](#)
 foreign relations, [570](#), [574–77](#)
 relations with
- Ethiopia, [577](#)
 Gulf states, [570](#), [575–76](#)
 Iran, [576](#)
 Soviet Union, [574](#), [576](#), [577](#)
 Syria, [577](#)
 YAR, [45](#), [570](#), [574–75](#)
 and Gulf War, [575–76](#)
 inter-Arab relations, [118](#), [127](#)
 internal affairs,
 consolidation of regime, [571](#)
 economy, [16](#), [570](#), [571](#), [573–74](#)
 oil prospecting, [574](#)
 opposition, [571](#), [572–73](#)
 Yemeni Socialist Party, [570](#), [571–72](#)
 South Yemeni Communist Party, [45](#)
- People’s (*Umma*) Party (Egypt), [325](#), [326](#), [331](#)
- Peres, Shimon,
 and Arab-Israeli peace process, [37](#), [38](#), [39](#), [41](#), [57](#), [82](#), [93](#), [463](#)
 domestic politics, [87–88](#), [465](#), [473](#)
 and international conference, [49–52](#) *passim* [56](#), [57](#), [75](#), [85–86](#), [87](#), [89–91](#), [93](#), [94](#), [349](#), [461–64](#) *passim*, [473](#), [476](#), [508](#)
 and Lavi aircraft, [466](#), [467](#)
 London meeting with Husayn, [8](#), [56](#), [78](#), [79](#), [85](#), [87](#), [496](#)
 London Document, [78](#), [79](#), [87](#), [88](#), [89](#), [94](#), [497](#), [498](#)
 meeting with Hasan, [119](#), [120](#)
 meets Mubarak, [49](#), [82](#), [349](#), [484](#)
 and Occupied Territories, [252](#), [255](#), [256](#)
 premiership, [17](#), [37](#), [85](#), [469](#)
 Shamir-Peres differences, [86–90](#) *passim* [94](#), [463](#), [465](#)
 Soviet contacts, [51](#), [52](#), [57](#), [97](#), [476](#)
 other references, [51](#), [90](#), [452](#), [469](#), [477](#)
- Peretz, Rabbi Yitzhak, [465](#), [479](#)
- Péres de Cuellar, Javier, [60](#), [405](#), [673](#), [683](#)
- Petrovsky, Vladimir, [58](#), [60](#), [382](#), [389](#), [518](#)
- Pirzada, Sharifuddin, [154](#), [156](#), [157](#)
- Poindexter, Adm. John, [26](#), [28](#)
- Polhill, Prof. Robert, [29](#)
- Polisario movement, [14](#), [21](#), [140](#), [141](#), [209](#), [559](#)
- Pollard, Jonathan, and Anne Henderson, [39–40](#)
- Pollard affair, [465](#), [469](#), [473](#), [474](#)
- Polyakov, Vladimir, [97](#)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman, [378](#), [576](#)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), [53](#), [54](#), [103](#), [109](#), [201–11](#) *passim*,

- [213](#), [214](#), [217](#), [222](#), [224](#), [225–26](#), [228](#), [229](#), [232](#), [247](#), [261](#), [492](#), [648](#)
- Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
— General Command (PFLP-GC), [53](#), [108](#),
[110](#), [112](#), [205](#), [213](#), [642](#)
- population figures, [312](#), [321](#)
- Porat, Prof. Yehoshua, [266](#)
- Progressive Socialist Party (Lebanon), [527](#),
[528](#), [533](#), [644](#), [645](#), [653](#)
- Qabus, Sultan, [379](#), [381](#)
- Qaddumi, Faruq al-, [210](#), [218](#), [220](#), [229](#), [518](#)
- Qaddur, Mahmud, [638](#)
- Qaddur, Nasir, [638](#)
- Qadhdhafi, Mu'ammarr,
 antipathy, fear of US, [41](#), [547](#), [559](#), [561](#),
 [563](#)
 on Arab League, [142–43](#)
 domestic affairs, [19](#), [543](#), [548–49](#), [552](#)
 Egyptian attitude to, [345](#), [346](#)
 friction with Jallud, [543](#), [549–50](#)
 and Gulf War, [124](#), [560–61](#)
 Iran relationship, [124](#), [419](#)
 and Mecca incident, [126](#), [562](#)
 and Muslim fundamentalists, [161–62](#), [543](#),
 [545](#), [550–51](#)
 and Palestinians, [125](#), [204](#), [206](#), [209](#), [228](#)
 proposed Libyan–Algerian union, [14](#), [46](#),
 [141–42](#), [557–58](#)
 reaction to US arms for Iran, [559](#), [561](#)
 Soviet relationship, [46](#), [564](#)
 and status of Tripoli, [546–47](#), [549](#)
 Sudan involvement, [615](#), [625](#), [626](#)
 Syrian relationship, [125](#), [649](#)
 and war in Chad, [21](#), [543](#), [552–56](#) *passim*,
 [558](#), [625](#)
 and Western Sahara, [141](#), [559](#)
 other references, [120](#), [129](#), [139](#), [142](#), [309](#),
 [526](#), [558](#)
- Qadi, Nawwaf Sa'ud al-, [491](#)
- Qadi, Shaykh Sa'ud al-, [491](#)
- Qalqiliya, disturbances at [103](#), [105–6](#), [110](#),
[244–45](#)
- Qansur, 'Asim, [519](#), [528](#)
- Qatar, [383–85](#)
 dispute with Bahrain, [21](#), [364](#), [366](#), [383](#),
 [384](#)
 domestic affairs, [383](#)
 financial reserves, [310](#)
 foreign relations, [384–85](#)
 and Gulf War, [383–84](#)
 immigration, [300](#)
 natural gas project, [383](#)
 relations with GCC, [360](#), [383](#)
- Qawasima, Fa'iz, [261](#)
- Qomi, Ayatollah Ahmad Azari, [394–95](#)
- Qulayat, Ibrahim, [528](#), [532](#)
- Rabbani, Burhan al-Din, [160](#)
- Rabin, Yitzhak, [78](#), [466](#), [467](#), [469](#), [473](#)
 and Occupied Territories, [245](#), [249](#), [256](#),
 [264](#), [267](#), [505](#)
- Rabinovich, Itamar, [5](#)
- R'ad, 'In'am, [528](#)
- Radwan, Muhammad 'Abd al-Hamid, [326](#),
[352](#)
- Rafiqdust, Mohsen, [399](#)
- Rafsanjani, Hujjat ul-Islam Ali Akbar
 Hashemi, [26](#), [59](#), [154](#), [167](#), [181](#), [403](#), [405](#),
 [407](#), [415](#), [419](#), [519](#)
 attitude to Saudi Arabia, [174](#), [175](#), [417](#),
 [418](#)
 attitude to US, [34](#), [187](#), [188](#), [398](#), [406](#), [410](#),
 [411](#)
 internal power struggle, [162](#), [163](#), [393](#), [397](#),
 [398–401](#)
- Rahimi, 'Azizollah Amir, [408](#)
- Rahmah, Emille, [534](#)
- Raimond, Jean-Bernard, [389](#), [446](#), [652](#)
- Rajavi, Mas'ud, [183](#), [407](#)
- Ramadan, Taha Yasin (al-Jazrawi), [47](#), [134](#),
[366](#), [427](#), [444](#), [445](#), [446](#), [448](#), [451](#), [683](#)
- Reagan, President Ronald,
 and Arab–Israeli peace process, [39](#), [41](#),
 [87](#), [88](#), [92](#), [93](#), [95](#)
 Crown Prince 'Abdallah meets, [593](#)
 and Iran arms/hostages deal, [25](#), [26](#), [28](#),
 [29](#)
 and Iraqi–Iranian War, [34](#), [58](#), [411](#),
 [444–45](#)
 meets Shamir, [87](#), [93](#)
 Moscow meeting with Gorbachev, [6](#), [40](#),
 [64](#), [65](#)
 Persian Gulf objectives, [30](#), [58](#), [191](#), [278](#)
 at Reykjavik with Gorbachev, [50](#)
 and Saudi Arabian relationship, [606](#), [607](#),
 [611](#)
 on US oil sources, [285](#)
 Washington meeting with Gorbachev,
 [7–8](#), [32](#), [95](#)
- Reagan Administration,
 and Arab–Israeli peace process, [38](#), [92](#)

- and Irangate affair, [10](#), [11](#), [25](#)
- and international conference, [90](#)
- and Israeli Government, [476](#)
- Middle East policy of, [36](#)
- proposed oil import tax, [285](#)
- Reed, Frank, [29](#)
- Regan, Donald, [28](#)
- Renton, Timothy, [381](#)
- Republican Party (Egypt), [326](#)
- "Revolutionary Organization — Forces of the Prophet Muhammad in Kuwait," [370](#)
- "Revolutionary Vengeance" (Lebanon), [644](#)
- Reza (Shah) II, [408](#)
- Reza'i, Mohsen, [399](#)
- Ri'ad Mahmud, [119](#)
- Rifa'i, Zayd al-, [38](#), [78](#), [93–94](#), [122](#), [227](#), [343](#), [490](#), [495](#), [497](#), [502](#), [504](#), [508](#), [647](#)
- "Right Against Falsehood" (Lebanon), [520](#)
- Rosenne, Meir, [49](#), [51](#)
- Roth, Representative Toby, [30](#)
- Rubin, Barry, [10](#)
- Rubinstein, Amnon, [464](#)
- Ryzhkov, Nikolai, [46–47](#), [608](#)
- Sa'ada, George, [535](#), [536](#)
- Sabah, 'Ali Khalifa al-, [282](#), [373](#)
- Sabah, Jabir al-Ahmad al-, Emir of Kuwait, [576](#)
- Sabah, Shaykh Sa'd al-'Abdallah al-, [370](#), [372](#), [373](#), [374](#)
- Sabah, Shaykh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir al-, [118](#), [120](#), [154](#), [372](#), [376](#)
- Sabbagh, Hasib al-, [226](#)
- Sabra, Hasan, [519](#)
- Sabri, Shaykh Akrama al-, [255](#)
- Sa'd, Mustafa, [519](#)
- Sadat, Anwar al-, [9](#), [14](#), [119](#), [233](#), [303](#), [332](#), [347](#), [348](#), [350](#)
- Saddam Husayn, Qusay, [430](#)
- Saddam Husayn, 'Uday, [429](#)
- Sadiqi, Hamid, [519](#)
- Sadr, Imam Musa al-, [530](#)
- Safi, Ayatollah Lotfollah, [395](#)
- Saharan Arab Democratic Republic, [140](#)
- Sa'id, Majid, [637](#)
- Sa'ih, Shaykh 'Abd al-Hamid al-, [209](#), [225](#), [341](#)
- Sa'iqa, al— (Lebanon), [53](#), [205](#), [213](#), [524](#)
- Salam, Malik, [519](#)
- Salam, Sa'ib, [516](#), [532](#)
- Salibi, Private Elie Louis, [520](#)
- Salih, President 'Ali 'Abdallah, [45](#), [572](#), [573](#), [575](#), [679–84](#) *passim*
- Salih, Muhammad Mahdi, [445](#), [454](#)
- Salim, Salih, [571](#), [572](#)
- Salman Ibn 'Abd al-'Aziz, Prince, [591](#), [592](#), [598](#)
- Sansur, Antun, [249–50](#)
- Saqal, Shlomo, [264](#)
- Saracoğlu, Rüştü, [670](#)
- Sargin, Nihat, [666](#)
- Sarid, Yossi, [221](#)
- Sassin, Michael, [515](#), [519](#)
- Sasson, Moshe, [351](#)
- Sasson, Yitzhak, [519](#)
- Sa'ud al-Faysal, Prince, [605](#)
- Saudi Arabia, [579–611](#)
 - aid to Jordanian-Palestinian Committee, [227](#), [502](#), [503](#), [504](#)
 - at Arab League meeting and summit, [127](#), [128](#), [129](#), [596](#)
 - attitude to Jordan and PLO, [600–601](#)
 - collaboration with US, [10](#), [580](#), [605–8](#)
 - domestic affairs, [20](#), [580–95](#)
 - development plans, [308](#)
 - drug trafficking, [594–95](#)
 - economy, [16](#), [303–4](#), [308](#), [310](#), [579](#), [583–86](#), [579](#)
 - immigration, [300](#), [303](#), [304](#), [307–8](#)
 - military expenditure, [579](#), [587–88](#)
 - recession, [583–87](#), [591](#)
 - financial aid to Syria, [84](#), [596](#), [600](#), [646](#)
 - foreign affairs, [595–611](#)
 - inter-Arab relationships, [121](#), [227](#), [595–97](#)
 - relations with
 - Egypt, [63](#), [132](#), [341](#), [580](#), [597–99](#)
 - France, Germany, [611](#)
 - Iran, [126](#), [128](#), [416](#)
 - Iraq, [450](#)
 - Soviet Union, [47](#), [61](#), [608–10](#)
 - Syria, [599–600](#)
 - UK, [610–11](#)
 - and Iraqi-Iranian War, [6](#), [35](#), [185–86](#), [187](#), [595](#), [600](#), [601](#)
 - mediation efforts in
 - Bahrain/Qatar dispute, [21](#)
 - Syrian/Iraqi reconciliation, [451](#), [595](#), [600](#)
 - Western Sahara, [140](#), [595](#)
 - oil affairs, [289](#), [302](#), [579](#), [580–83](#), [604](#)
 - and Opec, [15](#), [275](#), [276](#), [277](#), [279–82](#)

- passim*, [284](#), [285](#), [287–88](#), [580–82](#), [604](#)
pilgrimage disturbances, [13](#), [20](#), [61](#), [125](#),
[126](#), [153](#), [158](#), [172–75](#), [176](#), [280](#), [308](#),
[416](#), [579](#), [580](#), [589–91](#), [598–99](#)
reaction to Irangate affair, [605](#)
role in Sunni Islam, [158](#), [159](#)
royal family politics, [591–93](#)
Shi'i population in, [307](#)
stance on Iran, [579–80](#), [595](#), [596](#), [601–5](#),
[608](#)
submarine procurement, [587–88](#), [610](#), [611](#)
Tornado aircraft deal, [581](#), [587](#), [610–11](#)
US military aid, [30](#), [587](#), [588](#), [593](#), [606](#), [607](#)
US military presence, [35](#), [579](#), [580](#)
- Sawrani, Jamal al-, [210](#)
Sayfyan, William Najib, [329](#)
Sayyid, Jamal al-, [326](#), [329](#)
Sayyid, Ma'mun al-, [247](#)
Schmidt, Alfred, [520](#)
Secord, Gen. Richard, [27](#)
Sella, Col. Aviem, [40](#), [469](#)
Serageldin, Ismail, *et al.*, [311](#)
Sfeir, Patriarch Nasrallah, [514](#), [517](#), [524](#), [535](#)
Sha'ban, Shaykh Najib, [170](#), [175](#), [517](#), [531–32](#)
Shahal, Moshe, [484](#)
Shahin, Abu 'Ali, [216](#), [522](#)
Shahin, Sulayman Majid al-, [31](#)
Shahir, Nuri Faysal, [429](#)
Shak'a, Bassam, [258](#), [265](#)
Shakir, Sa'dun, [428–9](#), [454](#)
Shalom Achshav (Peace Now; Israel), [50](#)
Shamir, Yitzhak,
 and international conference, [49](#), [52](#), [75](#),
 [77](#), [86](#), [87](#), [89–90](#), [91](#), [92](#), [349](#), [462](#), [463](#),
 [464](#)
 and peace process, [8](#), [39](#), [41](#), [84](#)
 premiership, [82](#), [85](#), [348](#), [467](#), [469](#)
 Shamir-Peres differences, [87–90](#) *passim*
 [94](#), [463](#), [465](#), [476](#), [477](#)
 Washington visit, [39](#), [49](#), [86](#), [93](#), [461](#),
 [462–63](#)
 other references, [51](#), [84](#), [266](#), [465](#), [467](#), [469](#),
 [471](#), [472](#), [476](#)
Shams al-Din, Muhammad Mahdi, [515](#), [517](#),
[519](#), [529](#)
Shanshal, Gen. 'Abd al-Jabbar, [446](#), [455](#)
Shar', Faruq al-, [122](#), [126](#), [127](#), [134](#), [381](#), [418](#),
[638](#)
Sharansky, Anatoly, [51](#)
Sharir, Avraham, [467](#), [472](#)
Sharja, abortive *coup d'état* in, [17](#), [386–87](#)
- Sharon, Ariel, [120](#), [465](#), [467](#), [471](#), [472](#), [480](#)
Shawa, Rashad al-, [254](#), [257](#), [258](#), [262](#), [504](#)
Shaykh, Nizar Ibn Muhammad Ibn 'Ali al-,
[381](#)
Shaykhli, Samir Muhammad 'Abd al-Wahhab
al-, [429](#), [454](#)
Sherbiny, Naiem A., [311](#)
Shevardnadze, Eduard, [39](#), [47](#), [57](#), [62](#), [97](#), [609](#)
Shihabi, Gen. Hikmat al-, [653](#)
Shomron, Gen. Dan, [246](#), [268](#)
Shtern, Yuri, [51](#)
Shubaylat, Layth, [490](#), [491](#)
Shukri, Ibrahim, [325](#), [329](#)
Shultz, George, [26](#), [28](#), [30](#), [37](#), [39](#), [40](#), [41](#), [44](#),
[50](#), [75](#), [77](#), [87](#), [88](#), [90–91](#), [92–93](#), [94](#), [261](#), [445](#),
[498](#), [501](#), [518](#), [607](#), [608](#), [673](#)
Shunar, Dr. 'Abd al-Rahman, [256](#)
Shuqayr, Muhammad, [519](#)
Shuqayri, Ahmad al-, (the late), [203](#)
Siddiqui, Kalim, [176](#)
Sidi Muhammad, Crown Prince, [130](#)
Sidqi, Dr. 'Atif Muhammad Najib, [332](#), [334](#),
[343](#), [352](#), [628](#)
Sinadah, Ma'mun Mahjub, [619](#), [620](#)
Siniora, Hana, [232](#), [258–61](#), [265](#)
Sirtawi, 'Abd al-Rahim, [256](#)
Skaf, Joseph, [515](#)
Sneh, Brig. Gen. Ephraim, [252](#)
Socialist Labor Party (Egypt), [325](#), [326](#), [329](#),
[331](#)
Somalia, relations with Egypt, [132](#)
Soviet Union,
 and Afghanistan situation, [6](#), [12](#), [44](#), [47](#),
 [48](#), [58](#), [120](#), [156](#), [375](#), [414](#), [609](#)
 and Arab-Israeli peace process, [44](#), [55](#),
 [95–97](#), [609](#)
 Gulf rivalry with US, [10](#), [11](#), [12](#), [25](#), [30](#), [33](#),
 [42](#), [48](#), [58](#), [191](#), [444](#)
 and international conference, [45](#), [49](#), [55](#),
 [66](#), [75](#), [91](#), [93](#), [97](#), [339](#), [476](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [44](#), [47–48](#), [55](#), [58](#),
 [59–61](#), [64–65](#), [190–91](#), [278](#), [414–15](#), [425](#),
 [447](#), [510](#), [609](#)
 Islam in, [12](#), [45](#)
 Jewish emigration, [49](#), [50–51](#), [52](#), [85](#), [93](#),
 [609](#)
 and Middle East affairs, [44–66](#)
 oil affairs, [46](#), [276–77](#), [290](#)
 and PNC meeting, [53–54](#), [92](#), [202](#)
 relations with
 Egypt, [11](#), [48–49](#), [65](#), [323](#), [337](#), [338–39](#)

- Iran, [11](#), [47–48](#), [57–58](#), [59–60](#), [61](#), [191](#), [375](#), [410](#), [414–15](#), [609](#)
- Iraq, [447–49](#)
- Israel, [11](#), [44](#), [49–50](#), [51](#), [52](#), [55](#), [57](#), [476](#), [609](#)
- Jordan, [509–10](#)
- Kuwait, [62](#), [375–76](#)
tanker leasing, [11](#), [29](#), [48](#), [57–58](#), [278](#), [447](#)
- Libya, [11](#), [12](#), [46](#), [546](#), [564](#)
- Oman, [11](#), [381–82](#)
- PLO, [12](#), [80–81](#), [202](#), [207](#), [229–30](#)
- Saudi Arabia, [11](#), [47](#), [61](#), [608–10](#)
- Syria, [11](#), [652–53](#)
- UAE, [11](#), [389](#)
- other references, [6](#), [66](#), [290](#), [532](#)
- Steadfastness Front, [127](#), [340](#)
- Steen, Prof. Allen, [29](#)
- Sudan, [615–31](#)
Alliance of National Forces for the National Salvation of Sudan, [623](#)
civil war in, [5](#), [16](#), [18](#), [21](#), [118](#), [615](#), [616](#), [617](#), [618](#), [620](#), [622–25](#), [628](#)
economic affairs, [15](#), [16](#), [18](#), [615](#), [616](#), [618](#), [620](#), [622](#)
finance, [615](#), [620](#), [622](#)
IMF agreement, [621](#), [622](#)
emigration, [300](#), [303](#)
Ethiopian border tension, [138](#), [624–25](#)
foreign affairs, [615](#), [625–31](#)
relations with
Chad, [615](#), [627](#)
Egypt, [14](#), [132](#), [137–39](#), [340](#), [343–44](#), [615–16](#), [627–28](#)
Ethiopia, [616](#), [628–29](#)
Gulf states, [616](#)
Iraq, [631](#)
Kuwait, [631](#)
Libya, [615](#), [616](#), [625–26](#)
Saudi Arabia, [616](#), [630–31](#)
Soviet Union, [616](#)
Uganda, [616](#), [630](#)
US, [616](#)
Islamic Law in, [161](#)
Koka Dam Declaration, [622](#), [623](#)
Libyan involvement, [137](#), [615](#), [622](#), [625–26](#)
politics, [18](#), [615](#), [620–22](#)
Democratic Unionist Party, [615–18](#)
passim [620](#), [622](#), [626](#), [628](#)
Government, [18](#), [616–20](#)
Islamic Socialist Party, [618](#)
National Islamic Front, [615](#), [616](#), [619](#), [621](#), [622](#), [625](#), [628](#)
State Supreme Council, [615](#), [620–22](#)
Sudanese Socialist Union, [621](#)
Umma Party, [615–19](#) *passim*, [622](#), [626](#)
Sudanese People's Liberation Army, [615](#), [616](#), [620](#), [622–26](#) *passim*, [628](#), [629](#), [630](#)
Sudanese–Egyptian Defense Agreement, [617](#)
Sulayman, Jamal, [216](#)
Sultan, Prince, of Saudi Arabia, [580](#), [588](#), [591](#), [592](#), [593](#), [605](#), [606](#), [684](#)
Sultan, Shaykh, of Sharja, [386](#)
Supreme Assembly of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SAIRI), [170](#), [175](#), [183](#), [437](#), [439](#), [440](#)
Supreme Islamic Shi'i Council (Lebanon) [515](#), [528](#)
Sutherland, Thomas, [29](#)
Syria, [635–54](#)
and Amman summit, [128–29](#), [133](#), [134](#), [450](#), [641](#), [646](#)
and Arab-Israeli conflict, [8](#), [635](#), [641–43](#)
and Arab-Israeli peace process, [35](#), [36](#), [38](#), [41](#), [75](#), [84–85](#), [647](#)
domestic power struggle, [19](#), [20](#), [635–37](#)
army factions, [636](#), [637](#)
new Government, [638](#)
economic affairs, [15](#), [16](#), [84](#), [117](#), [121](#), [635](#), [636](#), [338–40](#), [641](#)
Arab aid to, [133](#), [640](#), [646](#)
Iranian oil supplies, [123](#), [646](#)
Saudi financial aid, [84](#), [596](#), [600](#)
emigration, [301](#), [303](#)
foreign affairs, [635](#), [650–51](#)
relations with
Algeria, [649](#)
EEC, [651–52](#)
inter-Arab relations, [14](#), [15](#), [117](#)
Iran, [15](#), [122–25](#), [134](#), [418–19](#), [645](#), [646–47](#)
Iraq, [15](#), [121–22](#), [133](#), [418](#), [450](#), [451](#), [595](#), [597](#), [635](#)
Jordan, [489](#), [506](#), [635](#), [647–48](#)
Kuwait, [375](#)
Libya, [15](#), [122–25](#), [649](#)
Oman, [381](#)
PLO, [54](#), [207–8](#), [213](#), [225–26](#), [643](#), [648–49](#)
Saudi Arabia, [599–600](#)
Soviet Union, [11](#), [54–56](#), [207](#), [635](#), [653–54](#)
Turkey, [650](#), [674–75](#)

- UK, [651](#)
 US, [652–53](#)
 and hang-glider attack on Israel, [642–43](#)
 Iraqi oil pipeline, [134](#), [290](#), [646](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [123](#), [143](#), [450](#), [645–47](#)
 and Kuwait summit, [118–19](#), [120](#), [646](#)
 and Lebanese hostages, [521](#), [651](#), [652](#), [653](#)
 Lebanese involvement, [15](#), [16](#), [21](#), [41](#), [125](#), [168–69](#), [418–19](#), [514–18](#) *passim*, [520](#), [521](#), [523](#), [528](#), [635](#), [642](#), [643–45](#)
 in West Beirut, [18](#), [21](#), [514](#), [515](#), [521](#), [523](#), [530](#), [532](#), [635](#), [642](#), [644](#), [652](#), [653](#)
 nuclear developments, [642](#)
 stance *re* Egypt, [118–19](#), [340](#), [341](#), [345](#), [346](#), [649–50](#)
 strategic parity policy, [55](#), [85](#), [132](#), [635–36](#), [641](#)
 terrorist connection, [84](#), [108](#), [635](#), [647](#), [650](#), [652](#)
 water supplies, [643](#), [647–48](#), [650](#)
 Syrian Social Nationalist Party (Lebanon), [523](#), [525](#), [528](#), [532](#)
 Syrian-Libyan-Iranian triangle, [15](#), [418](#)
 Sytenko, Mikhail, [191](#), [449](#), [509](#)
- Tahir, Haytham Ahmad, [572](#)
 Tahir, Jadallah Aziz a-, [46](#)
 Ta'if, 'Ummar al-Mabruk al-, [550](#)
 Tal, Capt. Ron, [246](#)
 Talabani, Jalal, [183](#), [441](#), [443](#), [662](#)
 Talas, Gen. Mustafa, [56](#), [638](#), [641](#), [642](#), [651](#), [654](#)
 Talfah, Gen. 'Adnan Khayrallah, [434–35](#), [436](#), [446](#), [455](#)
 Talhi, Zaydallah 'Azuz al-, [124](#), [548](#), [563](#), [565](#)
 Talyzin, Nikolai, [577](#)
 Tamini, Shaykh As'ad Bayud al-, [212](#)
 Tarasov, Vladimir, [57](#)
 Taratura, Vasily, [53](#), [211](#)
 Tasar, Mustafa, [661](#)
 Taziz, Isma'il, [249](#)
 terrorism, [27](#), [28](#), [29](#), [38](#), [39](#), [41](#), [91](#), [108](#)
 Arab League on, [650–51](#)
 Syrian connection, [84](#), [108](#), [635](#), [647](#), [650](#)
 Thabit, Rashid Muhammad, [525](#)
 Thani, Shaykh Ahmad Ibn Sayf al-, [384](#)
 Thani, Shaykh Hamad Ibn Khalifa al-, [385](#)
 Thatcher, Margaret, [91](#), [367](#), [610](#), [651](#)
 To Chae-Song, [520](#)
 Torumtay, Gen. Necip, [663](#)
- Tracey, Edward, [29](#)
 Trefgarne, Lord, [367](#)
 Tudeh Party (Iran), [407](#)
 Tufayli, Shaykh Subhi, [530](#), [531](#)
 Tum, al-Tum Muhammad al-, [619](#), [620](#)
 Tunisia, [141–42](#)
 call for Arab League meeting, [126](#)
 deposition of Bourguiba, [20](#), [139](#), [229](#)
 economy, [140](#)
 inter-Arab relations, [139](#), [143](#)
 Islamic fundamentalism in, [139](#), [140](#), [171](#)
 relations with
 Iran, [419](#), [450](#)
 Iraq, [450](#)
 Libya, [142](#), [545](#), [558–59](#)
 PLO, [229](#)
- Tuqan, Hafiz, [253](#)
 Turabi, Hasan al-, [160](#)
 Türkeş, Alparslan, [660](#), [667](#)
 Turkey, [659–75](#)
 application to EEC, [17](#), [659](#), [664](#), [666](#), [671–72](#)
 economy, [17](#), [659](#), [668](#), [669–71](#)
 foreign affairs, [671–75](#)
 relations with Iran, [674](#)
 relations with Syria, [650](#), [674–75](#)
 relations with US, [11](#), [673](#)
 impact of Gulf War, [659](#), [662](#), [669](#), [674](#)
 Iraqi pipelines, [16](#), [279](#), [290](#), [436](#), [442](#)
 irrigation and power project, [663](#), [669](#), [675](#)
 Kurdish problems, [442](#), [662–63](#), [674](#)
 politics, [17–18](#)
 constitutional changes, [663–65](#), [666](#)
 Democratic Left Party, [660](#), [666](#), [667](#), [668](#)
 elections, [659](#), [665–68](#)
 Justice Party, [660](#)
 Motherland Party, [18](#), [659](#), [660](#), [661](#), [665](#), [664](#), [667](#)
 National Action Party, [660](#)
 National Salvation Party, [160](#), [660](#), [661](#)
 Nationalist Endeavor Party, [660](#), [667](#)
 Reformist Democracy party, [667](#)
 Republican People's Party, [660](#)
 Social Democratic Populist Party, [660](#), [665–68](#) *passim*
 True Path Party, [660](#), [664](#)
 United Communist Party of Turkey, [666](#)
 Welfare Party, [660](#), [666](#), [667](#)
 religious observances, fundamentalism in,

- 13, [661](#), [663](#), [667](#)
 Turkish-Greek dispute, [21](#), [659](#), [671](#), [672](#)
 US military and economic aid, [659](#)
 Turki, Prince, of Saudi Arabia, [598](#)
 Turner, Prof. Jesse, [29](#)
- 'Ubayd, 'Aish, [250](#)
 'Ubayd, Dr. Yasir, [257](#)
 Uganda, Sudanese relations with, [616](#), [630](#)
 'Umayrah, George, [535](#)
- United Arab Emirates (UAE), [386–89](#)
 economy, [310](#), [387](#)
 and Gulf War, [33](#), [386](#), [388–89](#)
 immigration, [300](#), [304](#), [305](#), [308–9](#)
 oil affairs, and Opec, [275](#), [276](#), [282](#), [289](#)
 regional politics, [387–89](#)
 relations with
 China, [389](#)
 Egypt, [63](#), [341](#), [345](#), [386](#)
 France, [389](#)
 Gulf states, [359](#), [360](#), [388](#)
 inter-Arab relationships, [121](#), [388–89](#)
 Iran, [127](#), [189](#), [359](#), [386](#), [388](#)
 Soviet Union, [11](#)
 and Sharja attempted coup, [17](#), [386–87](#)
- United Kingdom, [278](#), [291](#), [504](#), [651](#)
 and Gulf tanker escorts, [32](#), [187](#), [188](#), [414](#)
 and proposed international conference, [77](#), [91](#)
 relations with
 Bahrain, [367](#)
 Iran, [392](#), [413–14](#)
 Iraq, [446–47](#)
 Oman, [379](#), [381](#)
 Saudi Arabia, [609–10](#)
- United Kurdish Front (Iraq), [21](#)
- United Nations, [81](#)
 Unicef, [526](#)
 Unifil, [62](#), [515](#), [524](#)
- United Nations Security Council, [75](#), [76](#), [555](#)
 Resolution [242](#), [37](#), [38](#), [40](#), [56](#), [77](#), [79](#), [83](#), [91](#), [130](#), [202](#), [218](#), [497](#), [498](#), [499](#), [501](#)
 Resolution [338](#), [37](#), [38](#), [40](#), [77](#), [83](#), [91](#), [130](#), [218](#), [497](#), [498](#), [501](#)
 Resolution [598](#), [7](#), [32](#), [34](#), [60](#), [61](#), [62](#), [64](#), [125](#), [131](#), [184](#), [185](#), [189](#), [190–91](#), [193–95](#), [375](#), [376](#), [379](#), [423](#), [445](#), [604](#), [609](#)
- United States,
 and Arab-Israeli peace process, [8](#), [11](#), [12](#), [25](#), [35–41](#), [42](#), [75](#), [89](#), [92–95](#), [507](#)
 Chad involvement, [545](#), [553](#), [563–4](#)
 and international terrorism, [27](#), [28](#), [44](#), [652](#)
 Irangate affair, [25–29](#)
 impact of, [10](#), [12](#), [25](#), [28](#), [29](#), [38](#)
 and Iraqi-Iranian War, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [27](#), [29–35](#), [58](#), [60](#), [190](#), [191–92](#), [507](#)
 attack on frigate *Stark*, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [30](#), [58](#), [444](#), [446](#)
 attitude to Iran, [7](#), [10](#), [25](#), [27](#), [44](#), [58](#), [62](#)
 attitude to Iraq, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [423](#), [444–46](#)
 tanker convoying, [58](#), [60](#), [61](#), [186](#), [280](#)
 tanker reflagging, [6](#), [10](#), [25](#), [29–35](#), [44](#), [48](#), [58](#), [121](#), [186](#), [358](#), [359](#), [371](#), [372–74](#), [409](#), [445](#), [508](#)
 Middle East Force, [11](#), [187](#), [367](#), [373](#)
 military confrontations with Iran, [125](#), [187](#)
 oil affairs, [278](#), [285–86](#), [291](#)
 Persian Gulf commitments, [10–11](#), [25](#), [29–35](#), [41](#), [42](#), [58](#), [444](#)
 military/naval presence in, [61](#), [62](#), [125](#), [126](#), [187](#), [373–74](#), [379](#), [381](#), [385](#), [406](#), [409](#), [410](#), [416](#), [445](#), [508–9](#), [608](#)
 recognition of PLO, [37](#), [41](#), [230](#)
 regional objectives, [10](#), [29](#), [30](#), [42](#), [58](#), [191](#), [279](#)
 relations with
 Bahrain, [367](#)
 Egypt, [11](#), [42](#), [49](#), [323](#), [337–38](#)
 Iran, [11](#), [410–11](#)
 Iraq, [42](#)
 Israel, [39–40](#), [41](#), [42](#)
 Jordan, [42](#), [507–9](#)
 Libya, [41](#)
 Saudi Arabia, [10](#), [42](#), [580](#), [605–8](#)
 Syria, [11](#), [41](#), [652–53](#)
 Turkey, [11](#), [673](#)
- 'Urabi, Lt. Gen. Ibrahim al-, [135](#), [332](#)
 'Uraybi, Qasim Ahmad Taqi al-, [433](#), [454](#)
 Uruğ, Gen. Necdet, [663](#)
 'Usayli, Khalid, [254](#)
 'Usaymi, Muhammad al-, [572](#)
- Veil: The Secret Years of the CIA* (Woodward), [593](#)
velayate faqih, rule of jurisconsult, [393](#), [395](#), [397](#)
 Velayati, 'Ali Akbar, [47–48](#), [123](#), [154](#), [175](#), [384](#), [387](#), [411](#), [415](#), [561](#), [562](#)
 Virshubski, Mordechai, [474](#)

- Vorontsov, Yuri, [59](#), [61](#), [62](#), [65](#), [376](#), [415](#), [449](#), [509](#)
- Wafd Party (Egypt), [325](#), [326](#), [328](#), [329](#), [330](#)
- Wahba, Zayd (Abu Usama), [216](#), [522](#)
- Waite, Terry, [520](#), [651](#)
- Wakin, Najah, [519](#)
- Wali, Dr. Yusef Amin, [327](#), [352](#)
- Walters, Gen. Vernon, [60](#), [652–53](#)
- Wazir, Khalil al— (Abu Jihad), [201](#), [205](#), [206](#), [208](#), [214–17](#) *passim*, [219](#), [220](#), [226](#), [227](#), [228](#), [233](#)
- Webb, James, [31](#)
- Weinberger, Caspar, [26](#), [33](#), [34](#), [40](#), [367](#), [593](#), [606](#), [607](#)
- Weir, Revd. Benjamin, [26](#)
- Weiss, Daniella, [245](#)
- Weizman, Ezer, [221](#), [222](#), [473](#), [484](#)
- West Bank, [81](#), [82](#), [86](#)
 - Administration, [250](#), [252](#)
 - armed operations in, [103](#), [105–6](#), [109–11](#)
 - detention and deportation, [246–48](#), [267](#), [268](#)
 - economic developments, [250–52](#)
 - increasing violence in, [244–46](#)
 - Jordanian involvement in, [90](#), [253–56](#)
 - labor unions and press, [250](#)
 - Palestinian politics, [255–56](#), [261–63](#)
 - Siniora initiative, [258–61](#)
 - universities, [245](#), [248–50](#), [267](#)
 - uprising in, [7](#), [40](#), [66](#), [79](#), [80](#), [201](#), [231–33](#), [244](#), [263–68](#)
 - immediate causes, [264–65](#)
 - Israeli response, [266–68](#)
 - nature of, [263](#), [265–66](#)
 - water-drilling project, [251–52](#)
- Western Sahara conflict, [14](#), [21](#), [140–41](#)
- Whitehead, John, [29](#)
- Woodward, Bob, [593](#)
- World Islamic Call Society (Libya), [161–62](#)
- World Islamic Council, [160](#)
- World Jewish Congress, [50](#)
- World Muslim League (Saudi Arabia), [661](#)
- Wuedeï, Goukkouni, [552](#)
- Ya'acobi, Gad, [470](#)
- Yahya, 'Abd al-Razzak al-, [211](#)
- Yamani, Abu Mahir al-, [217](#)
- Yamani, Ahmad Zaki, [583](#)
- Ya'qub, Tal'at, [205](#), [207](#), [208](#)
- Yasin, Shaykh 'Ali, [519](#)
- Yasin, Muhammad 'Abd al-Fattah Amin al-, [429](#)
- Yasin, Muhammad al-Hasan 'Abdallah, [618](#)
- Yasin, Dr. Salim, [638](#)
- Yemeni Arab Republic (YAR), [678–85](#)
 - economic development, [678](#), [680–81](#)
 - oil production, [291](#), [678](#), [680–81](#)
 - emigration, [300](#), [305](#)
 - externally instigated terrorism, [680](#)
 - foreign affairs, [678](#), [681–85](#)
 - attitude to superpowers, [682](#), [684–85](#)
 - relations with
 - Egypt, [341](#)
 - Iraq, [683](#)
 - Kuwait, [683](#)
 - Libya, [684](#)
 - PDRY, [21](#), [45](#), [570](#), [574–75](#), [678](#), [679](#), [682–83](#)
 - Saudi Arabia, [678](#), [679](#), [681](#), [684](#)
 - General People's Congress, [679–80](#)
 - National Democratic Front, [679](#)
 - PDRY involvement in, [45](#), [679](#), [681](#)
 - PDRY refugee problem, [680](#), [682–83](#)
 - People's Army, [679](#)
 - support for PLO, [684](#)
- Yemeni Socialist Party (PDRY), [570](#), [571](#), [683](#)
- Yıldırım, Zekeriya, [670](#)
- Yılmaz, Mesut, [668](#)
- Yishai, Yael, [18](#)
- Young, George, [610](#)
- Yunis, Abu Bakr, [626](#)
- Zackheim, Dov, [467](#)
- Zadik, Bino, [484](#)
- Zak, Moshe, [260](#)
- Zawi, Grand Mufti Muhammad, [550](#)
- Zaydi, Mustafa Muhammad al-, [548](#), [565](#)
- Zeevi, Gen. (res.), Rehavam, [480](#)
- Zhuravlev, Gennady, [339](#)
- Zibri, Abu 'Ali Mustafa al-, [207](#), [208](#), [211](#), [217](#)
- Zotov, Alexander, [50](#)
- Zu'bi, Mahmud al-, [638](#)
- Zuhaika, Salah, [247](#), [261](#)
- Zuriel, Yosel, [265](#)

